

I AND THOU: A STUDY OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

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ABSTRACT

In order to provide formal and systematic access to facts and possible facts about personal relationships, logical interconnections among the concepts of person, world creator, status assigner, and I and Thou are clarified, and a paradigm case formulation (PCF) of personal relationships is presented. In the PCF, the Paradigm Case is a relationship between mutual status assigners (an I-Thou relation), and the transformations of the Paradigm Case include relationships between unilateral status assigners (I-Them relations) and relationships between rote status assigners (I-It relations). The concepts of insider and outsider are introduced and related to the formulation, which is then applied successfully in predicting differences among persons in their judgments of similarity between I-Thou relationships. In the second half of the paper, the concept of authenticity is explicated as a Critic's concept, and access to additional facts about relationships is provided by a PCF of authentic personal relationships. This formulation is used in understanding differences among persons in their degree of disappointment with romantic love relationships.

Existentialists draw attention to the phenomena of personal relationships by talking about I-Thou relationships and about authentic relationships,

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but traditional behavioral scientists tend to reject such ways of talking as too “murky and ineffable” to be of use in scientific work (cf. Ossorio, 1978, p. 152). My aims in this paper are to provide a systematic representation of the phenomena of personal relationships to which the existentialists have drawn attention, and to demonstrate that behavioral scientists need not eschew facts formulated in terms of concepts such as I and Thou and authenticity. To achieve these aims, I will articulate the concepts of I and Thou and authenticity within the conceptual structure of the Person Concept (Ossorio, 1966, 1978), present paradigm case formulations of I-Thou relationships and authentic personal relationships, and illustrate the use of this conceptualization by reference to two empirical studies. In presenting the conceptualization and illustrating its use, I will be demonstrating how it is possible to take scientific account of the phenomena of personal relationships which the existentialists have made salient without preempting or endorsing existential theory as such.

I AND THOU

In order to articulate the concepts of I and Thou within the conceptual structure of the Person Concept, I will clarify the logical interconnections among the concepts of person, world creator, status assigner, and I and Thou.

World Creators and Status Assigners

For a person to behave, there has to be a set of relationships and a context within which he behaves. A person naturally formulates all the states of affairs he distinguishes empirically as elements of a conceptually single totality, i.e., as elements of the world. The formulation of such a world gives a person an overall context within which behavior is possible.

The world a person creates may be understood as a structure of related statuses (cf. Ossorio, 1982a, pp. 151–152). This structure has places for the person himself as well as for others. Each place within the structure carries with it certain behavior potential, as well as certain limitations on behavior potential, for an individual who embodies that status. Each place that is distinguished is in part distinguished by the standards in terms of which an individual occupying, or embodying, the status is properly to be judged.

Persons assign particular individuals to embody the statuses in their worlds and treat them accordingly. Correspondingly, they judge these individuals by how well they play the parts to which they have been assigned. If an individual plays a given part too poorly, a person may decide that that individual is miscast and reassign the individual to a different part in his world.

“Person” is itself a status, a general place within the structure of statuses persons create. This status logically carries with it the potential to create worlds and assign statuses. An individual is not a person if he is not eligible to actualize these possibilities, and he is miscast as a person if he does not have the ability to do so. Thus, to assign an individual to the status of person is automatically to assign him to the statuses of “world creator” and “status assigner” as well. The status of person also carries with it the eligibility to make self-status-assignments. If an individual assigns himself the status of person, that automatically makes him a person, since only persons can self-assign statuses.

“I” and “Thou” are a pair of statuses for persons which signify the making of mutual status assignments. These statuses are characterized by symmetry, mutual dependency, and what the persons in the statuses share. The statuses are symmetrical in that persons in the statuses are equally eligible to assign statuses. The statuses are interdependent in that each person’s status depends on the other person’s having assigned him a status, and not merely on a self-status-assignment. And what persons in these statuses share is human relationships and interactions.¹

The statuses of I and Thou also signify the mutual construction of a world. Again, the statuses are symmetrical: Both persons in the statuses are world creators. The statuses are interdependent: The construction of a world together is dependent on each person’s contribution. And what persons in these statuses share is a world, i.e., their world. It is within the context of this shared world that persons stand in I-Thou relationships to each other.

I-Thou Relationships

Being in an I-Thou relationship with another person does not involve any special capacities or mysterious processes, just normative human competence to create worlds and assign statuses. Not everyone has normative human competence, however. Persons may have deficiencies in their abilities as status assigners and world creators, and a range of relationships is possible between persons with such deficiencies. In this section, I will use a unique conceptual-notational device from Descriptive Psychology, the Paradigm Case Formulation (Ossorio, 1981a), to provide access to a range of relationships possible between persons. The Paradigm Case is a relationship between persons with normative competence, and the transformations of the Paradigm Case are relationships in which persons have restrictions on their abilities to assign statuses and create worlds.

In a relationship between people who have normative competence at status assigning, the places the people have with each other, and the corresponding standards by which each is to be judged, are mutually agreed upon. Moreover, the places are subject to negotiation between the two

people. For example, Person X may assign Person Y a status, but Y may refuse to play that part in X's world. Y may also refuse to be counted as a failure at it. In this case, X and Y may negotiate what status Y can have in X's world. Symmetrically, Y may assign X a status, and X may refuse to play that part. The two may then negotiate what status X can have in Y's world. Such negotiation will continue until the two people reach a point where mutual statuses, acceptable to both, have been assigned.

In mutually assigning statuses and treating each other in accordance with these statuses, the two people create a shared world. The relationship between the shared world and the individuals' personal worlds is one of mutual inclusion: The shared world has a place in each person's individual world, and the shared world has a place for each individual to have his or her own world. In personal relationships, the places the two people have in the shared world are, normatively, ones that allow them to be themselves: Neither person has to restrict the reasons he acts on in order to fit his position in the shared world. Instead, each person's world is enriched by the new possibilities offered by sharing with another.

In the shared world, each person recognizes the other as a fellow person, with his own interests, values, potentials, etc., and treats him accordingly. Each appreciates how the other counts things, what he or she gives value to, what reasons carry weight with him or her, and so forth. Each takes the other's interests into account and acts with them in mind.

Because each person appreciates the kinds of reasons and the force those reasons have for the other person in a given situation, each is able to recognize *what* the other person is doing in a given context. Each is able to understand behaviors that are unique (because context dependent) expressions of the relationship they have to each other, as well as behaviors that are conventional expressions of just such relationships. Each responds in ways called for by the particulars of who each is, the relationships between them, and the situation they are in.

Finally, each person appreciates both his own freedom and that of the other person. Each chooses *which* place the other is to have in his life, and accepts having the place he has in the other's life. Of course, each is free to renegotiate the place he has with the other if he changes in such a way that the place is no longer one in which he can be himself.

I-Them: Imperialistic Status Assignments

In contrast to the Paradigm Case, in which statuses are mutually assigned, consider a relationship in which one person unilaterally, or imperialistically, assigns another person to play particular parts in his life. An imperialistic status assigner selects people to fill certain positions in his or her life, insists that these people play their parts, and insofar as possible, ignores the ways in which and extent to which they do not play

their parts. If a given person refuses to play his part to such an extent that it cannot be ignored, the imperialist counts that person as a failure, degrades him, and casts someone else for the part. At no point is the assigned person eligible to negotiate his place, or the standards by which he is to be judged, in the imperialist's world.

The imperialist does not appreciate other persons as fellow world creators with whom the imperialist might negotiate shared worlds. Rather, other people exist primarily to embody statuses in the imperialist's world, thereby enabling the imperialist to enact the scenario he or she has created. (Compare to the classic line: "I couldn't have done it without each and every one of you—or people very much like you.")

The imperialist tends not to think of people in terms of their own interests, values, abilities, etc., and so is insensitive as to whether or not a given place in his or her world fits for a particular person. Having assigned someone to a place in his or her world, the imperialist treats him in the way that one would treat a person who is employed in a particular job. His behavior is guided by the place he has given the other person in his life, and not by an appreciation of how to treat this particular person filling that place.

The imperialist relates to the other person insofar as he or she *acts as* husband, wife, mother, father, or whatever in the imperialist's world. The person who has been cast, e.g., as wife and mother-to-the-children by an imperialist may complain "I wish you loved me for myself, and not just as your wife."² If she complains, it is because she senses that the status the imperialist puts her in does not allow for the possibility of being fully herself, and she resents the way in which the range of what is possible for her is narrowed by the place the imperialist gives her.

The imperialist will probably not understand her resentment and will not be able to respond appropriately. The imperialist expects the other person to fit in his world wherever the imperialist puts him or her, and does not recognize the person's freedom to reject that place, to negotiate a different place, or to create his or her own world in which the imperialist has a place.

The imperialist does not recognize his own freedom or appreciate himself as a world creator, either. When it comes to his world creation, it appears to him that "That's just how things *are*." It is primarily as the upholder of Truth that he tyrannizes over others and over himself.

Don Juan is an example of an imperialistic status assigner. He repeatedly casts women for the part of "Great and True Love" and tries to carry off the corresponding scenario. At no point, however, does he find out what the women he is involved with are really like. Instead Don Juan treats them in the way that a man would treat a woman he loves. When he can no longer sustain the illusion that he has a love relation with a

given woman, Don Juan degrades her and moves on. As an imperialist, he is not in a position to appreciate a woman who would be the right person for him.

In some senses, the perfect match for a person who imperialistically assigns statuses is a person who is willing to accept whatever place another gives him or her without question, protest, or resentment. Such a person is colloquially known as a “wimp” or a “doormat”. The world formulation of a doormat includes only a sketchy place for the doormat himself, and has a place for another person who will tell the doormat how the world is, and what the doormat’s place in the world is.

Because the doormat’s own place is too tenuously defined to be of much help in guiding behavior, the doormat needs the other person to tell him what his behavior potential is. As soon as the other person tells him what’s allowable, what makes sense, what’s okay for him to do, and so forth, the doormat then can engage in that range of behaviors.

Even though the other person may give the doormat a bad place (with limited or degrading possibilities), the doormat tends to accept that place because he or she needs it in order to have any behavior potential at all. The doormat assigns himself no behavior potential except that which corresponds to the place that other people give him in their worlds. Without a place in another’s world, the doormat is very nearly “nowhere”, i.e., he has no status and no behavior potential.

Doormats also tend to accept whatever places others give them because they do not realize their freedom to give themselves a status in a world of their own creation, or to negotiate their status in another’s world. They also do not realize that other persons are doing these things. Doormats accept whatever places others give them because it appears to them that “That’s just how it is.”

Just as doormats do not realize they can assign themselves statuses, they also do not realize that they can set their own standards. Instead, doormats want their accreditors to supervise, criticize, and in general provide feedback as to how they are doing. Even though the doormat may try hard to meet the accreditor’s standards and to please him or her, the doormat may end up annoying his accreditor by persistent checking to see if what he is doing is pleasing, acceptable, etc.³

Shirley, in “The Case of Shirley” discussed by Ossorio (1976, pp. 88–98), is an example of a doormat. Shirley lives with a man named James who has a stated principle of “no commitments.” Shirley supports both of them while he has affairs with other women. She tries several times to leave James but finds she is unable to do so. In explaining why she cannot leave, Ossorio points to her inability to self-assign statuses. Shirley cannot leave James because her behavior potential is contingent upon his accreditation, and she would be nowhere without him.

Although the inability to self-assign statuses represents a deficiency in

an adult, it is relatively normal for children at a young age. Initially, a child's statuses are assigned by other people and the child fits in. At some point in normal development, however, the child begins to assign his own statuses and to negotiate with his parents about what he can do and about the standards by which he is judged. Through practice and experience the child becomes a competent status assigner who can function autonomously, and not be dependent on others for a ground for his existence in the way the doormat is.

I-It: Rote Status Assignments

Both competent status assigners and imperialistic status assigners draw upon the patterns of their cultures in creating the status frameworks that they do. From the range of cultural patterns available, these people choose those patterns and social practices which fit who they are, and put these together into a framework within which they can be themselves. Sometimes they invent new social practices, but their creativity comes mainly in which practices they choose and how they put these together to form a world (cf. Ossorio, 1976, pp. 178–180). Some people, however, do not exercise their freedom or creativity when it comes to choosing cultural patterns that fit them. Instead such people assume that everybody fits into conventional social templates. They lay these templates on themselves and others regardless of how well they do or do not fit.

When two people who operate with social templates in this way are involved with each other, they may be said to “share a world” only in the sense that both use the same template (“a prefab world”). This world is unlike the world shared by mutual status assigners in that it is not co-created by the two people, and it does not have a place for each person to have his or her own world. At the extreme, people in a template world have no possibilities apart from their statuses in the conventional framework they have accepted. They do not distinguish themselves from their place in this framework.

The description of schizogenic families presented by Kantor (1977) provides an example of such people. In a schizogenic family the accepted template requires that the family be “the successful, the happy, the normal family”. Each person must enact his status as a member of “the normal family”. Unfortunately for the child growing up in a schizogenic family, parental discipline is such that the child's behavior potential is restricted to that of acting as “the child”. Because the parents need the child to continue to be “the child” so that they in turn can enact their statuses as “the parents”, and because the child's possibilities are severely restricted by their discipline, the child's transition to adulthood is difficult for everyone.

What is the difference between a doormat who accepts the place given

to him by an imperialist, and a person who accepts the place available to him in a social template? One difference is in behavior potential: The doormat usually has a range of behaviors available to him, as long as someone else says it's okay to engage in these behaviors. (If the doormat is involved with an imperialist who okays the full range of the doormat's possibilities, the doormat might not be dissatisfied.) The person identified with a social position, however, is barred from acting on any concepts, skills, or reasons other than those conventionally called for by his position.

Because the person identified with a particular social position essentially behaves by rote, enacting his position without needing much understanding of how his position fits in a larger social pattern, or how this pattern could be meaningfully incorporated in a human life, I will call such a person a "rote status assigner". Compared to mutual status assigners, imperialists, and doormats, the rote status assigner is the most deficient at negotiating, at understanding individual difference, and at recognizing human freedom.

In the world of the rote status assigner there is very little to negotiate. People already have their designated parts to play ("the mother", "the child", "the banker", etc.), and the general fund of social knowledge provides enough guidelines so that people know how to treat each other. Decisions as to who does what or what people will do together are not a matter of negotiation, but rather are made on the basis of convention and conformity to their positions. The rote status assigner therefore does not develop competence at negotiation. His situation is comparable to that of a 'chessplayer' who merely replays games recorded in a book.

The rote status assigner also does not develop competence at understanding individual differences. To the extent that people in his world behave on the basis of what is conventionally called for by their positions and do not distinguish themselves from those positions, there is little place for the rote status assigner to learn to use individual difference concepts. Questions of how to treat this particular person or what allowances to make for that person do not arise for the rote status assigner, or are answered by knowing the person's status. It is as if the rote status assigner lives in a world of "standard normal persons" who have no personal characteristics and only do what is called for by the situation (Ossorio, 1983).

Finally, there is little question of freedom in the rote status assigner's world. Issues of giving places in one's life to other people or of creating one's own world simply do not arise. In fact, there may be some tendency toward engaging in performances that will predictably have the effect of getting the other person to engage in corresponding performances.

Access to a range of relationships among persons has now been provided via a paradigm case formulation. The Paradigm Case is a relationship between mutual status assigners and world creators, and the transformations of the Paradigm Case include relationships between unilateral status as-

Table 1
Paradigm Case Formulation

	<i>Paradigm Case: Mutual Status Assigners</i>	<i>Transformation: Unilateral Status Assigners</i>	<i>Transformation: Rote Status Assigners</i>
Worlds	Shared world is co-created by both people, and has a place for each person to have his or her own world	Only one world, that created by the imperialist, and accepted by the doormat	Only one world, which is a conventional social template (“a prefab world”)
Behavior potential	Full range of behaviors available; neither person has to restrict reasons he acts on to fit position in shared world	Significant restriction on behavior potential; range of what is possible tends to be narrowed by statuses	Extreme restrictions on behavior potential, since a person is barred from acting on any reasons other than those called for by the person’s position
Negotiation	Places, standards for each person are mutually agreed upon and are subject to negotiation	Places, standards tend to be non-negotiable; imperialist lays down the law about “how it is”	Places, standards are based on convention, not a matter of negotiation at all
Personal Characteristics	Each recognized and treated as a fellow person, with his or her own interests, values, potentials, etc.	Each expected to fit his position, and to suppress any characteristics which make a position a bad fit	Each identified with his position; no personal characteristics (i.e., depersonalized)
Freedom	Human freedom appreciated; each recognized as creating a world, assigning statuses	Freedom not recognized; couple primarily upholding ‘Truth’ about how the world is	Performances engaged in for the sake of getting the other person to engage in corresponding performances
Relationships	I-Thou	I-Them	I-It

signers (imperialists and doormats) and relationships between rote status assigners. Table 1 highlights some of the differences among these cases.

This formulation could be further elaborated, with attention paid to intermediate cases. For example, I might introduce a case in which a person is aware of the freedom of other people, but deliberately selects people who do not value their own freedom to fill the parts in his or her life. Or I might introduce a case in which people choose cultural patterns that do not fit them, and wind up creating frameworks in which they cannot be themselves. But because the Paradigm Case and the deficit cases discussed above are sufficient for my purposes, further transformations will not be introduced.

The introduction of two status pairs is apropos, however. *P*ace Buber (1958), these pairs are the statuses of I and Them (or more formally, I and One-of-Them) and the statuses of I and It. Just as mutual status assigners may be described as having I-Thou relations, unilateral status assigners may be described as having I-Them relations and rote status assigners as having I-It relations.

Insiders and Outsiders

A final set of concepts will be introduced to complete the formulation. These are the concepts of social practice, person, insider, and outsider.

Social practices are teachable, learnable, and repeatable patterns of behavior, and they vary in extensiveness from short, simple patterns to larger, more extensive ones. Many of the shorter practices are components of more extensive ones, e.g., doing arithmetic as part of the social practices of making change, filing tax returns, determining areas, etc. (cf. Ossorio, 1978a, p. 72).

Social practices which need not be part of any other social practice but are intelligible as being engaged in for themselves are known as intrinsic social practices. Games are clearcut examples of intrinsic social practices, since playing a game is intelligible in itself. We can understand someone playing a given game for its own sake, without ulterior motives and without any further end in view.

The concept of a social practice is pivotal for the connections among the concepts of persons, world creation, and status assignment. To be a person is, categorically, to be eligible to create worlds and assign statuses. In creating a world, a person draws upon the resources of his culture, including social practices, and puts these together into a framework which gives him behavior potential. In assigning statuses, a person gives other people places that are available within the structure of the social practices which he has chosen for inclusion in his world. And in behaving, a person selects among the options provided by one or more social practices included in his world and enacts versions of these social practices with other

persons. (Of course, persons can also invent new practices, but these practices must be accepted by others as social practices before they give a person behavior potential.) Given these conceptual connections, to be a person is, categorically, to be eligible to participate in human social practices.

“Insider” and “outsider” are ability-type personal characteristics, i.e., sensitivities, appreciations, judgment, which determine whether a person participates normatively or non-normatively in particular social practices. An insider with respect to a given social practice is someone who can participate in that particular social practice in normative ways, while an outsider is someone who has a certain kind of limitation on his ability to participate in normative ways.

For example, an insider with respect to golf is someone who obtains the intrinsic satisfactions that go with playing golf and who can play golf for its own sake. An outsider with respect to golf is someone who can at most go through the motions of playing (“walking around on grass and knocking little white balls into holes in the ground”), without getting or appreciating the kinds of satisfactions intrinsic to the game (cf. Ossorio, 1976, pp. 116–117). If a person merely goes through the motions, his behavior will be relatively meaningless. If a person goes through the motions of playing for some ulterior motive (e.g., in order to sell insurance, in order to be a member of the club, etc.), his behavior will not be meaningless, but he will not realize the non-ulterior satisfactions that are possible from golf itself.

Paradigmatically a person is an insider with respect to social practices which express personal relationships.⁴ This is because persons do not simply treat each other as fellow persons in the abstract. Rather, they give each other places in particular relationships, e.g., in friendships, in romantic love relationships, in parent-child relationships, and so forth. Normatively, persons find such relationships intrinsically satisfying, and engage in them without a further end in view.

This is not to say that it is normative for persons to be insiders with respect to all the social practices and relationships they include in their worlds. A person may not appreciate a given social practice, but will include it in his world because he knows that other persons find it meaningful and satisfying. While he cannot participate in normative ways in that particular practice, he can still relate in a personal way to others who appreciate the practice (e.g., “I really don’t like football, but I’d like to be with you.”).

When persons have deficiencies in their ability to treat others as fellow persons, they tautologously lack appreciation of the non-ulterior satisfactions possible in particular kinds of personal relationships. For example, imperialists, doormats and rote status assigners are all outsiders who miss out on many of the intrinsic satisfactions of personal relationships.

SIMILARITY STUDY

There is a tradition in psychology of talking about things which are hidden from view as inner things (e.g., inner thoughts, inner feelings, inner desires, etc.), and those things which are readily visible as outer things. Skinner, for example, rejects the notion of inner causes of behavior and prefers to deal exclusively with that which is 'observable'. For the reader trained in accordance with this tradition, confusion could arise regarding the use of the Descriptive concepts of insider and outsider. The traditionalist might assume that insiders with respect to particular kinds of relationships are persons who have access to something hidden or mysterious about these relationships rather than something public and obvious.

In fact both insiders and outsiders are seeing something public and obvious about social practices. The outsider, however, recognizes and responds to only the conventional, performative aspects of social practices. He is like the tone-deaf person who goes to a symphony concert, observes all the motions that the musicians go through, follows the conventions of concert-going, shows good taste in music, etc., without appreciating the music itself.

In contrast, the insider recognizes not only the performative aspects of social practices, but also appreciates the intrinsic satisfactions that go with these performances. Thus, if a person with normal sensitivity to pitch, who is also an insider with respect to music, goes to a concert, he may appreciate the music itself, as well as participating in other relevant social practices in normative ways. In appreciating the music, the insider is not responding to something inner, private, inaudible, mysterious, etc., although it may seem that way to the outsider. Rather, what the insider hears and appreciates is readily accessible to and may be shared by other members of the community who have the relevant sensitivity.

The insider with respect to a particular relationship who recognizes when a relationship of that kind is an I-Thou relationship also is responding to a public, observable state of affairs. Other insiders may see that the relationship is an I-Thou relationship. Outsiders, however, cannot recognize this state of affairs, just as the tone-deaf person cannot hear a melodic line. The fact that outsiders with respect to particular relationships miss the realities that are obvious to insiders is demonstrated empirically in the Similarity Study presented below.

The basic approach used in the Similarity Study was to ask participants to make judgments regarding the similarity of a range of personal relationships among men and women. Two specific predictions were made concerning the differential judgments of similarity expected by participants, depending on whether they were insiders or outsiders with respect to personal relationships.

PREDICTION 1. Participants who are insiders, when compared to participants who are outsiders, will see less similarity between I-Them and I-Thou relationships.

PREDICTION 2. Participants who are insiders, when compared to participants who are outsiders, will see more similarity between I-Thou relationships.

The indicators used in testing these predictions are described below, followed by a description of the study's participants and a summary of results.

Indicators

Memories Form

This form was used to determine if individuals were insiders or outsiders with respect to particular personal relationships. It was not possible to rely upon self-report for this information, since persons who have deficits in understanding generally do not know this about themselves. The imperialist, for example, tends not to know he is missing out on anything in terms of his relationships to other people, because it appears to him that his way of relating fits the way things are in the world. Rather than relying on self-report to determine individuals' degrees of mastery of particular personal relationships, memories were used to give persons a standard situation and task in which they could demonstrate the understanding they had.

Participants recorded five memories: (a) earliest memory of a friendship, (b) earliest memory of a competitive relationship, (c) earliest memory of a romantic attachment, (d) earliest memory of when someone broke his or her word, and (e) earliest memory of a supportive relationship. During the study it was found that participants had difficulty with the memory of someone breaking his word, and this was then changed so that participants were asked instead to record their earliest memory of a relationship in which each person had an obligation to the other. Three of these memories were used for the Similarity Study—the earliest memories of a friendship, of a romantic attachment, and of a relationship in which an obligation was involved. The other two memories were included for reasons not connected to the Similarity Study (cf. Roberts, 1980, p. 83).

On the basis of pilot work, a five-point coding system had been developed, with codes ranging from "1" (Insider) to "5" (Extreme Outsider). When the memories for the Similarity Study were actually coded, however, there were very few "4" or "5" codes given on any of the memories. Essentially a three-point coding system was used, with a code of "1"

indicating that the person was an insider with respect to a particular relationship, a code of “3” indicating that the person was an outsider, and a code of “2” indicating that the person could not be unambiguously classified either as an insider or an outsider on the basis of a particular memory. (Guidelines used in coding the memories are presented in Roberts [1980, p. 231].)

The coding of the memories was done by two doctoral candidates in clinical psychology at the University of Colorado, both of whom had previous experience in categorizing memories. They first coded the memories independently. In 57 percent of the cases the two judgments were identical. Of the remaining cases, 94 percent showed the least possible difference, i.e., one point on the original five-point scale. In the case of disagreement, the final coding was arrived at as a result of negotiation between the two judges.

Sample memories of romantic attachment are presented below. The first memory was coded “1” (Insider) and the second memory was coded “3” (Outsider).

In first grade, I seemed to have had a crush on a girl named Lisa. Every time someone yelled “Ooh, Jim loves Lisa!” both Lisa and I would take fits. Still, we always considered ourselves boyfriend, girlfriend. Each afternoon, we sang a song to the Virgin Mary (I went to a Catholic school) which included the words “I love you.” Every time we came to that part, Lisa and I looked at each other and giggled. (Any other details?) The only recollections I have are running around the playground denying my “girlfriend”, as Lisa denied her “boyfriend”. But every afternoon, we sang “I love you” to each other!

This is, if you could call it an attachment, my earliest memory. It was more of a fling. In kindergarten, there was this girl, I forget her name, I wanted to kiss, I think just because it was taboo. Anyway, one day after school I did. That was it. It made me feel proud and brave, like Hillary on Everest’s summit. I felt I had conquered.

Similarity Form

On this indicator, participants read a set of six descriptions of relationships between men and women written especially for the study. Three of the relations were I-Thou relationships, and three were I-Them relationships. An I-Them relationship included on the form is presented below.

Marianne was a dynamic woman, and was the leader of a group devoted to protecting the environment. She spent a lot of time organizing the group. She liked to bring people together to talk about the environment, and she could find a place in the group for anyone interested in helping promote environmental legislation. Sometimes however, so many different ideas were expressed at the group’s meetings that Marianne was at a loss about how to proceed.

At such times, she was glad her boyfriend Mark was there. Mark was in pre-law, and he had a gift for bringing order to such situations. He could see what the major

issue was, and once he spoke, it was clear how to proceed. Marianne felt that they made a good team: She could get everyone warmed up and involved, and he could bring out the basic issues and arrange a solution.

Mark agreed that they were a good team "in more ways than one." But he had a vague feeling of something missing, although he didn't know what it could be. Marianne met all his expectations in terms of age, political party, family background, etc., and he enjoyed their activities. When he told Marianne how he felt, she seemed puzzled, but said she was glad he had been open and honest about his feelings.

After reading the relationships, participants were instructed to consider each of the relationships as personal relationships and to rate the degree of similarity between specified pairs. In six of the comparisons an I-Them relationship was paired with an I-Thou relationship, and in three of the comparisons an I-Thou relationship was paired with another I-Thou relationship. Ratings were done on ten-point scales with scale points ranging from "0" (Not at all similar) to "9" (Very similar). The mean of a participant's ratings of the six I-Them/I-Thou pairs was used as an index of the similarity the participant saw between I-Them and I-Thou relationships, and the mean of a participant's ratings of the three I-Thou/I-Thou pairs was used as an index of the similarity he or she saw between I-Thou relationships.

Participants

Participants in the study included 166 students who were enrolled at the University of Colorado during the summer and fall of 1979. They ranged in age from 17 to 46, with the median age being 18.9. One hundred fifty-four of the participants, approximately 93%, were single. There were 71 men and 95 women.

When the participants' responses on the Memory Form were coded, 24 people were designated as insiders (received codes of "1") on at least two of the memories. These people were taken to have in general mastered the concept of a personal relationship. Fifty-two people were designated as outsiders (received codes of "3") on at least two of the memories and were taken to have general deficits in their mastery of the concept of a personal relationship. For informational purposes, the proportion of participants classified as insiders or outsiders with respect to particular kinds of relationships is presented in Table 2.

Results

Ratings made on the Similarity Form by the insiders and outsiders described above were analyzed using *t*-tests. Because the direction of the differences between the means was predicted, one-tailed tests were used. A probability level of .05 or less was considered significant. As the results

Table 2
Proportion of Participants Classified as Insiders or Outsiders
With Respect to Particular Kinds of Relationships

<i>Relationship</i>	<i>Insider "1"</i>	<i>"2"</i>	<i>Outsider "3"</i>
Friendship	33%	34%	33%
Contractual	22%	24%	54%
Romantic love	13%	33%	54%

in Table 3 show, Prediction 1 was not verified, although the difference between the means almost reached significance. Prediction 2, however, was verified.

Discussion

The overall pattern of results in the Similarity Study serves to establish the predictive applicability of the conceptualization presented above. The success of Prediction 2 indicates that the conceptualization can be used effectively in predicting differences among persons in their judgments about I-Thou relationships.

But what of the failure to achieve statistical significance for Prediction 1? Since both predictions are tautologies (cf. "Individuals who have normal hearing, as compared to individuals who are tone-deaf, will be better able to judge similarities between melodies."), the most plausible explanation for the failure with respect to Prediction 1 is that the I-Them relationships on the Similarity Form were not clear-cut enough to bring out statistically significant differences in judgments between insiders and outsiders. These descriptions could be rewritten with greater clarity and this hypothesis tested out.

Table 3
Comparison of Insiders and Outsiders on Ratings of Similarity

<i>Groups</i>	<i>n^a</i>	<i>\bar{X}</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p^b</i>
Similarity between I-Them and I-Thou Relationships					
Insiders	24	3.10	1.15		
Outsiders	49	3.58	1.42	1.44	.077
Similarity between I-Thou Relationships					
Insiders	24	6.04	1.38		
Outsiders	49	5.08	1.55	2.55	.007

^a Three outsiders had missing data.

^b All probability levels cited are for one-tailed tests.

Although the Similarity Study serves to establish the applicability of the conceptualization, application in understanding persons in a wider range of circumstances and contexts is what is of scientific significance, rather than merely predictive applicability as was established here. I will therefore continue to map out the range of applicability of the conceptualization in the discussion of authenticity below.

AUTHENTICITY

The second concept to be articulated within the conceptual structure of the Person Concept is the concept of authenticity. My starting point in articulating this concept is to ask what a person is doing when he or she says of something "It's authentic." To say that something is authentic is to say that it is real or genuine. Ordinarily a person does not bring into question the genuineness of things. He simply takes it that things are as they seem (Maxim 1) and acts accordingly. However, when a person has some reason to question whether or not something is genuine, on that occasion he may comment on its authenticity. If the person says "It's *inauthentic*", he is saying that it isn't really what it seems; the thing is a counterfeit or a pretense. If the person says "It's authentic", he is using a double negative ("not inauthentic") in order to deny that the thing is counterfeit and to say that no criticism of that sort is applicable.

Saying that something is authentic is not a way of talking about something called "authenticity" that is in addition to the thing being judged. To illustrate this point, Ossorio has students "Consider the difference between a cup of tea and a real cup of tea." There is no difference: A real cup of tea is not a cup of tea with something called "real" added; it is simply a cup of tea without a certain kind of defect. Likewise, an authentic personal relationship is not a personal relationship with something special added; it is simply a relationship that has not failed in one of the ways it might have failed.

In making judgments of authenticity, a person is functioning as a Critic-appraiser (cf. the Actor-Observer-Critic Schema created by Peter G. Ossorio [1981b, pp. 109–110]). As clarified in the Schema, a person functions as a Critic by deciding whether things are going right or going wrong. When things are going wrong, a person formulates "(a) a diagnosis, i.e., an account of what it is that has gone wrong, and/or (b) a prescription, i.e., a practical guide in regard to what to do differently so as to improve matters" (Ossorio, 1981b, p. 109). In appraising something to be inauthentic, a person is diagnosing what is wrong.

A person may also use the concept of authenticity in classifying things. Those things which are genuine may be assigned to the category or class of authentic, and those that are counterfeit to the category of inauthentic.

The concept is not useful, however, to a person functioning as Actor. Although the concept of inauthentic is diagnostic of what is wrong, it is not prescriptive. Knowing that something is inauthentic does not tell a person what to do differently so as to improve matters. "Authentic" is used to criticize and classify something after-the-fact but not to guide behavior before-the-fact.

In functioning as a Critic-appraiser, a person may judge varying degrees of authenticity in a variety of contexts relative to various standards. For example, over the life history of a personal relationship there may be a great deal of heterogeneity in regards to the authenticity of behaviors. For such a relationship to be judged authentic, a certain balance of the behaviors over the history of the relation need to be expressive of an I-Thou relationship. Given that the balance of such behaviors is positive, varying degrees of authenticity may be judged based on the relative frequency and significance of authentic or inauthentic behaviors.

If the number of authentic behaviors is below a certain threshold, the relationship may be judged inauthentic as a personal relationship. But there is always another context in which a person in such a relationship is doing something authentically. For example, an imperialist involved in a romantic love relationship may be authentically enacting the part of a romantic man or woman and will be being himself or herself in such a relationship. In this case the relationship may be judged authentic as an I-Them relationship.

In each context, the person as Critic sets a standard against which to judge relationships. The person is free to set the behavioral threshold for authenticity so high that every relationship is judged to be a failure in regards to genuineness, or so low that every relationship is judged a success. Of course, a person as Critic is in turn subject to criticism for using standards which are too severe or too lax. Where there is disagreement, standards may be negotiated so that they are appropriate for a given phenomenon.

Historically, the concept of authenticity has been used primarily in two domains. The existentialists focused principally on authenticity in the domain of individuals' lives, while sociologists have focused on authenticity in the context of the majority of people's lives in a particular milieu. Social psychologists have also looked at authenticity in the domain of personal relationships (e.g., La Gaipa, 1977; Davis & Todd, 1982), and this will be my focus here.

Authentic Personal Relationships

When is a personal relationship authentic? As a Paradigm Case of an authentic relationship, we take it that a person has it in him or her to be

in a particular kind of relationship, and that the person is an insider with respect to that relationship. When that person enacts that relationship in good faith with an appropriate person, he or she gets the intrinsic satisfactions possible with that relation. When this is the case, there are no questions to be asked. Questions of authenticity may be raised, however, when one or more of these requirements are missing.

The first requirement has to do with whether a person “has it in ’em” to love, be friends, etc. Just as not everybody who knows how to play golf has it in him to appreciate it and enjoy it, not everybody has it in him to be, for example, in a romantic love relationship and be satisfied. If a person does not, he or she will be trying to be somebody else in doing these things. While a person is free to try to be somebody who enjoys golf or who appreciates romantic love, if in fact he does not, when he does these things it will be inauthentic.

Certain personality characteristics create difficulties when it comes to actualizing personal relationships. For example, people who are selfish, or super-critical, or suspicious, and so forth have strong constraints on their behavior in a relationship (cf. Davis & Todd, 1982, p. 84). If a person is too selfish, when it comes to having a love relation we may say that “He doesn’t have it in him. Nobody could count that much with him.” What counts with such a person is primarily getting what he wants and needs, not another person’s interests and wants. Likewise, a person may be too particular about whom he loves, and feeling that no one is good enough end up like “the gourmet who starved to death”. Or the person may not believe another person enjoys being with him or could have a good life with him, and hence be unable to accept a love relation for what it is.

In addition to having it in him, a person’s behavioral history must be such that the person has in fact acquired appreciation of the relevant relationship. In acquiring such appreciation, the person may initially go through the motions of participation. Romeo, for example, before he met Juliet, would pace under the sycamores by night, pen sonnets in a dark room by day, and do all the things which a young man in love in sixteenth century Verona would do. While he performed the rituals of love, he did not seem to appreciate what a real love relationship was like. By the time he met Juliet, however, he had acquired sufficient appreciation of romantic love so that he was an insider and could share a genuine love relationship with her.

If a person is an insider with respect to a particular relationship, the next requirement is that a person enact the relationship in good faith. Relationships enacted in bad faith are perhaps the most familiar cases of inauthenticity (e.g., “All the things he said that night. . . . to think it was just a line.” or “I wonder if she loves me or my million dollars?”). Even

though a person appreciates the intrinsic satisfactions of a relationship, he or she may nonetheless participate in a given relationship out of some ulterior motivation.

For behaviors to be authentic expressions of a personal relationship, they must be engaged in under Deliberate Action Descriptions, in which a partial specification of the value of the cognitive parameter of the behaviors includes an appraisal of the personal, I-Thou relationship between the particular people. Since an appraisal is defined as “a discrimination which carries tautologous motivational significance” (Ossorio, 1978, p. 128), the appraisal in the cognitive parameter logically guarantees a correspondingly appropriate value of the motivational parameter, so that the behaviors are engaged in for non-ulterior reasons. In contrast, if behaviors are expressive of a personal relationship *only* under Activity Descriptions (which are noncommittal in regard to motivation; cf. Ossorio, 1978, p. 32), the relationship will be inauthentic as a personal relationship. In accordance with the origin of the word “authentic” in the Greek αὐθεντης, which means a perpetrator, a murderer, a self murderer, “a doer of the deed”, the motivational aspect of the behavior is crucial for authentic enactment.

The partner in the relation must also be appropriate. For example, a man may appreciate the kind of relationship possible between colleagues and have it in him to be a colleague. But if he tries to enact such a relation with his young son, most of the possibilities of a collegial relation could never be realized. Given the capabilities of a child, the limitations on the relationship would be serious enough and central enough so one could just as well say it’s not a collegial relationship. Since the father and young son are not in fact colleagues, the most they could have in this case is the pretense of a collegial relationship. By contrast, if a man appreciates his boy in the way a father appreciates a son, they may have an authentic father-son relationship. Instead of being disappointed when his son doesn’t act like a colleague, he will enjoy his son for who he is.

The final requirement for an authentic relationship is the enjoyment of the intrinsic satisfactions that go with having or enacting that relationship. In each case where a relationship is inauthentic, either because an individual does not have it in him to be in such a relation, does not appreciate the value intrinsic to the relation, is acting on ulterior motives, or is using a relationship paradigm that is wrong for the particular people involved, the individual misses out on the intrinsic satisfactions that are possible.

AUTHENTICITY STUDY

In conjunction with the research reported above, there was an unanticipated opportunity to demonstrate the relationship between authenticity

for romantic love relationships and personal satisfaction with such relationships. The 166 participants in the Similarity Study, in addition to reporting memories and completing the ratings on the Similarity Form, also completed two additional indicators, the Disappointment Rating Form and the Paradigm Form. These indicators, reported on earlier in *Advances* (Roberts, 1982, pp. 70–72), will be presented in light of their use here. Following this presentation, the rationale and groups of participants used in the Authenticity Study will be explained, and the results reported and discussed.

Indicators

Disappointment Rating Form

In this form, participants were presented with descriptions of twelve masculine-feminine relationships, with four relationships exemplifying the romantic love paradigm, four relationships exemplifying the friendship paradigm, and four exemplifying the contract-partnership paradigm. A sample description of a romantic love relationship included on the Disappointment Rating Form is presented below.

The Shulamite, a simple country girl living in Israel during the reign of King Solomon, was seen one day by the King, who desired her for one of his wives. The King had her brought to his palace, and ordered her to live there for a while, hoping she would consent to be his wife. The Shulamite enjoyed her new life at the palace: She was freed from the endless hours of work she had to do in the family vineyard; she slept in a soft spacious bed rather than in a tent; and she delighted in unlimited possessions, fine clothing and jewelry.

Before the King saw her, however, the Shulamite had been betrothed to a shepherd who loved her. Her shepherd, knowing she was inexperienced and might easily be overwhelmed by Solomon, took his flocks and walked a great distance to Jerusalem to protect her. When he arrived, however, the Shulamite treated him as a threat to her new life, and did not want to see him. He withdrew, promising to stay near Jerusalem in case she changed her mind.

After she sent him away, the Shulamite realized she valued him more than anything the King could offer her. That night she dreamt of him: “By night on my bed I sought him whom my soul loveth: I sought him, but I found him not. . . .” Waking up afraid, she went into the streets alone to find him. Despite being beaten by watchmen, she kept going until she came to him on the outskirts of the city as he had promised. They renewed their betrothal, and made the journey home together.

Participants were instructed to rate “How disappointed would you be if this was the best relationship you ever had?” for each of the relationships on the form. The ratings were done on ten-point scales. The mean of a person’s ratings of the four relationships exemplifying romantic love was used as an index of the person’s tendency to be disappointed with a romantic love relationship.

Paradigm Form

This indicator, which involved the use of the same twelve relationships included on the Disappointment Rating Form, was administered after the Disappointment Rating Form. Participants were asked to rate “How well does this relationship get at the essentials of a masculine-feminine relationship?” for each relationship on the form. In addition, participants were asked to indicate which relationship “best gets at the essentials”.

On the basis of responses on the Paradigm Form, a person was designated as having romantic love as his paradigm if he met two criteria: (a) on the average, the person rated romantic love relationships above the other relationships, and (b) the person indicated a romantic love relationship as best getting at the essentials.

Opportunity and Rationale

When participants’ responses on the Paradigm Form were analyzed, 109 people were found who rated romantic love relationships higher than friendship or contractual relationships. But a surprising number of these people did not meet the second criterion for having romantic love as their paradigm, i.e., they did not choose a romantic relationship as best getting at the essentials of a masculine-feminine relationship. Out of 109 people, only 57 met both criteria, while 52 people did not meet Criterion (b). Two people who did not meet Criterion (b) had missing data and were excluded from further analysis.

When a check was made to see if there were any significant trends in which relationships were top-ranked by the maintaining 50 participants who did not meet Criterion (b), it was discovered that 70 percent chose one of two friendship relationships as best getting at the essentials. Twenty-two of the participants chose a relationship between VISTA volunteers, and thirteen chose a relationship between Pierre and Marie Curie.

In explaining this unexpected finding, it was suggested that participants may have been influenced by the humanitarian ideal exemplified in the Peace Corps when it came to top-ranking a relationship.

In conjunction with a historical trend toward denying the validity of romantic love (e.g., Rougemont, 1940), there came a trend in the 60’s toward elevating the Peace Corps ideal—the young couple serving humanity together under difficult conditions—as a model for man-woman relationships. The Peace Corps was founded in 1961, the same year that many of the subjects in the study were born, and was at its height during their years of socialization. The young couple serving in VISTA, the domestic peace corps, is a prime exemplar of the ideal, and the Curies’ relationship is a close second. (Imagine the Curies’ laboratory, an abandoned hangar, in Africa.) It would not be surprising if subjects were influenced by the Peace Corps ideology when they top-ranked these two relationships. (Roberts, 1980, p. 134)

The Peace Corps ideology involves more than a personal relationship; it involves do-gooding in one form or another. For anyone accepting this ideology as true, a merely romantic relation would be seriously deficient, because romantic love relationships do not paradigmatically involve social consciousness or a commitment to doing good. For example, in light of the Peace Corps ideal, the relationship of Romeo and Juliet seems both selfish and wasteful, since it did not contribute to society except accidentally.

Unfortunately, the acceptance of the Peace Corps ideology makes a romantic love relationship inauthentic. No matter how much a person appreciates romantic love, if he or she has accepted this ideology, a romantic love relationship by itself is not enough. A merely romantic relationship falls short of the ideal relationship for men and women, i.e., a combination of friendship and do-gooding. Romantic love therefore differs in its authenticity for participants depending on whether or not they have accepted the Peace Corps ideology.

Romantic love also differs in its authenticity based on whether participants are insiders or outsiders with respect to romantic love to begin with. Romantic love is more authentic for an insider who appreciates the intrinsic satisfaction of a love relationship than for an outsider who does not fully realize what there is to be appreciated in a love relationship. Thus, among those participants who have not been influenced by an ideology, romantic love will be more authentic for insiders than for outsiders.

But what of those participants for whom romantic love has been ruined by the acceptance of an ideology? In this case, will romantic love be less authentic for insiders or for outsiders? If a general insiders appreciate human relationships and social practices more, it seems likely that insiders with respect to romantic love will also be insiders with respect to friendship and humanitarianism. (There was some empirical support for this hypothesis in the coding of the memories. Sixteen of the 22 people who received a code of "1" on the romantic love memory also received a code of "1" on the friendship memory, and 4 more people received at least a "2" on the friendship memory.) If insiders are more appreciative of the combination of friendship and humanitarianism, then romantic love will be more inauthentic for insiders who have adopted this ideology than for outsiders who have adopted the ideology, because insiders will be more sensitive to what is missing from love relationships in light of the ideology.

On account of these differences in this authenticity of romantic love for participants, I have an opportunity to demonstrate empirically the relationship between authenticity and satisfaction by comparing participants on their ratings on the Disappointment Rating Form.

Table 4
Degree of Disappointment with Romantic Love Relations

<i>Groups</i>	\bar{X}	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>
Insiders/Meet both criteria	2.5000	1.6298	9
Outsiders/Meet both criteria	3.0093	1.1529	27
Outsiders/Fail to meet Criterion(b)	3.7596	1.2990	26
Insiders/Fail to meet Criterion(b)	4.5556	1.6478	9

ANOVA Summary				
<i>Source</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>
Between Groups	3	26.7755	8.9252	4.995*
Within Groups	67	119.7175	1.7868	
Total	70	146.4930		

* $p < .0035$

Participants

Of the 107 participants who had complete data on the Paradigm Form, 71 were included in the data analysis for the Authenticity Study. Table 4 shows the distribution of these participants into four groups, based on whether or not they had acquired appreciation of the intrinsic satisfactions of a love relation (as reflected in their romantic love memory), and whether or not their appreciation of romantic love had been affected by ideological influences (as reflected in their choice of a "best" relationship on the Paradigm Form). Thirty-six participants were excluded from the data analysis because they received codes of "2" on the romantic love memory and could not be unambiguously classified as insiders or outsiders.

Of those participants who did not choose a romantic love relation as best getting at the essentials of a masculine-feminine relation (i.e., who did not meet Criterion (b) on the Paradigm Form), seven out of nine insiders (78 percent) chose either a relationship between VISTA volunteers or a relationship between the Curies as best getting at the essentials, and 20 out of 26 outsiders (77 percent) top-ranked one of these humanitarian relationships.

Results

On the grounds that romantic love has different degrees of authenticity for each of the groups discussed above, a one-way analysis of variance was performed using ratings on the Disappointment Rating Form as the dependent variable. A summary of the analysis of variance is presented

in Table 4. As expected, participants for whom romantic love was less inauthentic were significantly less disappointed with love relationships than participants for whom romantic love was more inauthentic [$F(3,67) = 4.995, p < .0035$]. A Student-Newman-Keuls test for subsets of different sizes indicated that this significant F was attributable to differences between the means of those participants who met both criteria for having romantic love as a paradigm and those who did not.

Since the multiple range test indicated that only those differences attributable to acceptance or non-acceptance of an ideology were statistically significant, I am required by convention to treat differences in the means of insiders and outsiders as simply caused by chance. With due respect to this convention, I will nonetheless note that the pattern of results in Table 4 corresponds to the pattern of results to be expected based on the differences in the authenticity of romantic love for insiders and outsiders discussed above (cf. Ossorio, 1981b, p. 107).

Discussion

The overall pattern of results in the Authenticity Study serves to establish that the conceptualization of authenticity presented above can be used effectively in understanding differences in personal satisfaction with human relationships. The study also illustrates the use of an "unless" clause, which may be added to the formulation of authenticity in personal relationships.

The unless clause may be stated as follows: A person who is an insider with respect to a particular kind of relationship may enjoy the intrinsic satisfactions possible with that relation, *unless* the relationship has been ruined for him or her by the acceptance of an ideology that makes the relationship inauthentic. The addition of this clause to the formulation serves as a reminder to watch for ideological influences not only in the context of romantic love relationships, but also in the context of other personal relationships as well.

The unless clause represents only one of many possible extensions of the formulation of authenticity. By making additional connections between the concept of authenticity and other concepts, I could continue to extend the formulation. For example, one possible extension would be the clarification of the relationship between inauthenticity in personal relationships and the inauthenticity of a person's life as a whole. Given the salience of personal relationships for a satisfying human life, it seems likely that a person's life as a whole would be inauthentic if the person were inauthentic with respect to all his personal relationships.

A second area that could be developed is the effect of inauthenticity on others. I have focused primarily on the price of inauthenticity for the

individual, but both people in a relationship are affected by inauthenticity. As an example, consider a relationship in which one person is an insider but the other person is not. Unless the insider has ulterior motives for being in the relationship, the insider may end up disappointed and disillusioned, while the outsider may end up frustrated because he cannot understand why his partner is so dissatisfied.

The clarification of connections such as these would not be an idle exercise. Given the low proportion of insiders represented in the studies presented here (cf. Table 2), and the effect of ideological influences on those who are insiders (cf. Table 4), the problem of inauthenticity is pervasive and important to understand. Each conceptual connection that is clarified may further our understanding of inauthenticity and open up new possibilities for empirical application.

SUMMARY

In the conceptual parts of the paper, the concepts of I and Thou are explicated as status concepts, and the concept of authenticity is explicated as a Critic's concept. Two paradigm case formulations are presented. In one formulation, the Paradigm Case is a relationship in which persons mutually assign statuses (an I-Thou relation). In the other formulation, the Paradigm Case is the case of an authentic personal relationship. In the empirical parts of the paper, studies are presented which demonstrate that the conceptualization can be used in predicting differences among persons in their judgments of similarity between personal relationships, and in understanding differences among persons in their degree of disappointment with romantic love relationships. In presenting the conceptualization and illustrating its use, I have provided conceptual access to facts and possible facts about personal relationships, and demonstrated that behavioral scientists need not eschew facts formulated in terms of concepts such as I and Thou and authenticity.

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NOTES

1. Although the discussion here focuses on I-Thou relations between human beings, the concept of an I-Thou relationship with God may also be developed within this framework. In this case, God is conceived of as an ultimate status assigner (cf. Shideler, 1975).
2. The complaint of "I wish you loved me for myself, and not just as. . . ." is not legitimate if used concerning all the areas of a person's life. One of the marks of a personal relationship between status assigners is that each person's interests carry weight with the other. If one person rejects the caring expressed by the other for him as, e.g., a skier, a lover, a cook, a lawyer, and so on in all the areas of his life, what interests remain to carry weight with the other? (Ossorio, 1982b)
3. In psychotherapy with doormats, a Descriptive therapist may use the image of "Scorekeeping". A person who is a scorekeeper is someone who uses other people's reactions to keep score on himself ("If he likes me, I'm okay."). Unfortunately, such a person usually feels that he has to keep scoring to continue to be okay.
4. Regarding the connection between social practices and relationships, we may note that a social practice is a process. Processes generally involve object constituents, and these objects (e.g., persons) have certain relationships which change over time. The changing of these relationships over time *is* the occurring of the process, or in this case, the occurring of the social practice (cf. Ossorio, 1981b, p. 117).

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