

A CONCEPTUALIZATION  
OF HYPNOSIS. II:  
HYPNOTIC INDUCTION PROCEDURES  
AND MANIFESTATIONS OF  
THE HYPNOTIC STATE

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**ABSTRACT**

This article, the second of three introducing a new approach to the explication of hypnotic phenomena, centers on hypnotic induction procedures and various manifestations of the hypnotic state. The discussion of hypnotic induction presents a logic of inductions, with application to preliminary procedures such as Redescription Techniques, and to three formal methods of induction: Absorption, Relaxation, and Confusion. The discussion of manifestations of the hypnotic state include "focused attention," suggested effects, nonsuggested effects, and the consequences of specific induction procedures or demand characteristics.

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Advances in Descriptive Psychology, Volume 4, pages 75–101.

Editors: Keith E. Davis and Thomas O. Mitchell.

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ISBN: 0-89232-358-2.

In our first article (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982), we introduced a conceptual map of hypnosis which included formal conceptualizations of "psychological state," "Trance state," "Hypnotic state," "Hypnoid behavior," "Hypnotizability," and "Suggestibility."<sup>1</sup> Central to this conceptual map is the notion of final-order appraisal (FOA). By this term we designate an individual's appraisal of the place of an Element in the ultimate context of his real world: "To make an FOA of any element is to decide under what description that Element is real or nonreal" (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982, p. 151).

In the present article, we focus on the concept of "Hypnotic state" and demonstrate how it can order various possible facts concerning the induction of Hypnotic states and several selected manifestations of this state. Some of these possible facts correspond to historically-representative or empirically-ascertained facts. Others involve possibilities that are shown to be within the domain that is formally articulated by our conceptual map, but which have not as yet received any systematic empirical attention.

The reader is reminded that in these articles we are not primarily interested in presenting a review of empirical findings concerning hypnosis; moreover, we are not asserting anything about hypnosis, nor proposing any hypotheses or theories about hypnosis (see Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982, pp. 143–146). Rather, we are (a) demonstrating *how* various historically-representative induction procedures *could* lead to the type of psychological state we formally defined in our previous paper and labeled an Hypnotic state (whether or not a given procedure employed on a particular occasion succeeds in the induction of an Hypnotic state is, of course, an empirical question; see Plotkin & Schwartz [1982]), and (b) demonstrating how various behavioral phenomena—some, but not all, historically identified as hypnotic—would or would not *logically* be manifestations of the Hypnotic state, and if so, why.

## HYPNOTIC INDUCTION PROCEDURES

An Hypnotic state, like all personal characteristics, has to be acquired or induced in some manner. The acquisition of *any* personal characteristic (PC) can be conceptualized as follows: If a person has a given PC, he acquired it by having the relevant prior capacity and an appropriate intervening history (see also Ossorio, 1981a, pp. 33–34, 1981b, pp. 63–65). Some of the prior capacities that may be relevant to the induction of the Hypnotic state are the capacities to cease generating final-order appraisals (FOAs), to understand the hypnotist's language, to pay close attention, to become absorbed in one's imagery or fantasy, to relax, and to become involved in various role-enactments.

The appropriate intervening history that produces a change in psycho-

logical state may take the form of a formal hypnotic induction procedure, although this is not logically necessary. An hypnotic induction procedure is here identified as any social episode between a hypnotist and a subject that has the likelihood of leading to a significant reduction in the subject's power and/or disposition to generate FOAs, while maintaining a relationship that both parties can act upon. An hypnotic induction procedure may or may not be successful in inducing an Hypnotic state; it may, instead, result in Hypnoid behaviors, the simulation of hypnosis, or nonresponsiveness. Although the outcome of using the standard induction procedures is never guaranteed, they are understandable as the sorts of procedures that one would, in fact, want to employ in an attempted induction of the Hypnotic state.

In the past, theorists of hypnosis have offered detailed explanations of how one or two particular types of induction procedures may lead to hypnotic phenomena, but they have said little or nothing about how other procedures (such as the Confusion Technique) lead to the same result. As Shor (1970) has pointed out, some types of known induction techniques appear to include procedures that are exactly opposite to those of other known techniques.

All induction procedures will fall into one or both of the following categories: (a) those that attempt to lower the subject's *disposition* to generate FOAs, and (b) those that attempt to reduce the subject's *power* to do so. The known induction procedures fall into three general types; we shall call these the Absorption, Relaxation, and Confusion Techniques. The Absorption Technique is employed to lower the subject's disposition to generate FOAs, while the Relaxation and the Confusion Techniques are more oriented toward reducing his power to do so.

The specific manifestations of the Hypnotic state on any particular occasion will reflect the type of induction procedure employed as well as the personal characteristics of the hypnotic subject and the circumstances of the hypnotic interaction. A formal induction procedure is not logically required for the induction of an Hypnotic state, however; it is possible that a person who already *knows how* to enter an Hypnotic state will simply do so at will, upon request, or following an appropriate cue. The talented hypnotic subject may only require the appropriate context or surrounding and be free of other pressing needs to self-induce a Trance state (although if a hypnotist has no role in the facilitation or maintenance of the state it would not be a paradigmatic Hypnotic state). It may be discovered, then, that formal Hypnotic inductions of the sort discussed here are only required for the induction of Hypnotic states in persons who are new to hypnosis, who have little hypnotic talent, or who are in a circumstance or psychological state that is not conducive to unaided self-induction.

After discussing some general preliminaries to—and characteristics of—

inductions, we consider each of the above three Techniques separately, then illustrate briefly how they can be combined.

### Characteristics of Induction

First, it is an essential feature of all hypnotic induction procedures that the subject pay attention to the hypnotist's communications, simply because the hypnotist cannot be effective if he is ignored. Thus, one of the first tasks of the hypnotist is to ensure that his subject has sufficient reasons for paying close attention to the hypnotist's words and/or gestures. It does not at first matter what these reasons are. For example, a person who passionately believes that hypnosis is a lot of nonsense and that he could never be hypnotized might have as much reason to pay close attention to a hypnotist as does a person who is fascinated by hypnosis (Erickson, 1959). A person who is simply bored by it all or a person who is too busy with something else is a poor prospect since he does not have sufficient reason to pay attention to the hypnotist *as* a hypnotist.

Second, redundancy and clarity are features of the hypnotist's communications during almost all induction procedures (the Confusion Technique is a partial exception here; see below). The hypnotist wants to ensure no questions arise about meaning; such questions often entail the generation of FOAs. Constant repetition may be employed to make sure that the communications are clear and understandable.

Third, a typical feature of most induction procedures (again, with the Confusion Technique sometimes being an exception) is for the hypnotist to expend some effort, before and during the induction, to establish rapport with the subject—that is, to establish a trusting relationship. By establishing a trusting relationship with the subject, the hypnotist can create a situation in which the subject may be comfortable in reducing his disposition to generate FOAs. Since it can be a delight to reduce this disposition temporarily, a person needs no further reason to do so other than the fact of being in a relationship (with the hypnotist) in which such a state of affairs is nonthreatening.

### A Preliminary to Induction: Redescription

One of the most popular means of establishing and maintaining rapport, reducing resistance to hypnosis, and enhancing the credibility of the proceedings is what we call the "Redescription Technique." This is not an Hypnotic induction per se, but a useful preliminary or adjunct to most inductions. When using this technique, the hypnotist begins by accepting and describing whatever the subject is doing or experiencing; then the hypnotist simply redescribes that behavior or experience to the subject in such a way that the subject understands the hypnotist is aware of and sensitive to the subject's feelings, desires, concerns, and capacities.

In addition, the hypnotist may gradually turn to descriptions that *anticipate* the experiences that will occur naturally in the course of the induction, especially those that the subject may be unaware will occur, such as blurred vision, slowed breathing, or changes in perceived body size or orientation. No matter what the subject actually does or experiences, he is led to believe, through the hypnotist's careful redescrptions, that he is responding successfully and may expect that he will continue to respond well. Thus, with the Redescription Technique, the hypnotist (a) effects a smooth transition into the induction procedure proper while (b) establishing his trustworthiness and expertise, as well as (c) the credibility, harmlessness, and ease of the hypnotic procedures.

Milton Erickson (1959) has made extensive use of Redescription Techniques, which he named "Utilization Techniques". Erickson's writings (Haley, 1967) furnish descriptions of some very sophisticated usages of the Redescription Technique, particularly with subjects who previously were highly resistant to hypnosis. We will quote an instance of this technique below.

The Redescription Technique is also frequently used as a *Hypnoid* induction, in which the hypnotist attempts to evoke a specific (usually anomalous) appraisal. Two common examples (Weitzenhoffer, 1969) are the Postural Sway—in which the subject, who is standing with his feet together and eyes closed, is asked to think of swaying back and forth—and the Chevreux Pendulum—in which a small object, such as a key, suspended from the subject's index finger begins to pendulum back and forth as the subject thinks of the movement. Indeed, the evocation of these sorts of Hypnoid behaviors through the Redescription Technique can be an important initial step of an *Hypnotic* induction: if the Hypnoid induction is successful, the hypnotist will have demonstrated his effectiveness at evoking unusual experiences and at predicting—and perhaps controlling—the subject's behavior. Moreover, Hypnoid inductions can be effective means of generating experiential phenomena which can be employed as a focus for the Absorption Technique.

### The Absorption Technique

The central feature of the Absorption Technique is the communication, identification, or evocation of something interesting, absorbing, and greatly worthy of the subject's attention. When employing this technique, the hypnotist attempts to produce in the subject "absorption"—a rapt interest or sense of immediacy. The very notion of being absorbed in something, whether it be theater, film, dance, music, poetry, storytelling, or fantasy, entails a reduced disposition to generate or to act upon FOAs. All esthetic modalities have been used in hypnosis induction (see, for example, Snyder & Shor, 1983). Two forms of absorption need to be contrasted here. The

first, involves an absorption in an imaginary context (a fantasy) such that, although the individual still *generates* FOAs, he does not *act* upon them. This form of absorption is Hypnoid, not Hypnotic, since there is a reduced disposition to act upon FOAs but not a reduced disposition to generate them. The second involves absorption in a fantasy that temporarily constitutes the whole of one's consciously apprehended world. This form is Hypnotic, since its central feature is the loss of one's final-order perspective.

As one becomes more and more Hypnotically absorbed in a given activity, one becomes less disposed to generate FOAs as to what place that activity has in our world. If and when a person reaches the point at which it is only the attended Element that matters and not the relationship of that Element to other Elements, nor its place in the real world, then the person is highly absorbed and not disposed to generate FOAs. At this point, the hypnotist can make certain suggestions with the likelihood that the subject will continue to forgo FOAs, especially if the hypnotist works these suggestions into the ongoing fantasy. To the extent that the subject does not generate FOAs, he will carry out the hypnotist's suggestions, and experience their effects as real (or, more correctly, as neither real nor unreal).

Indirect suggestion, or intimation, is related to the Absorption Technique. By presenting ideas indirectly, for example, by weaving them into the fantasy, the subject's attention is circumvented, and there is less likelihood that FOAs will be generated concerning the suggestions. Imagery and symbolism include this aspect of indirection, which aids the hypnotist in directing the subject's attention away from the current situation and in reducing his vigilance.

One of the major instances of Absorption Techniques is the guided fantasy in which the hypnotist enjoins the subject to imagine in one or more sensory modalities in an attempt to get the subject caught up in a fantasy or feeling. The object of absorption, however, need not be a fantasy. It may be any behavior or experience that the subject finds compelling. For example, some persons may become highly absorbed in the changes in body feelings or perceived body orientation generated by Redescription, drowsiness, or in the ideomotor movements produced by other Hypnoid procedures. In addition, the Absorption Technique can be employed with feelings of alertness or exertion, as in Banyai and Hilgard's (1976) "active-alert" hypnotic induction. (Whether or not actual use of the latter technique produces Hypnotic, and not "merely" Hypnoid, phenomena, is an empirical question that has not yet been investigated; see Plotkin & Schwartz [1982]).

An interesting instance of the Absorption Technique is that which Sarbin and Coe (1972) have referred to as "hypnotic role enactment," discussed

in Plotkin & Schwartz (1982). The subject is either implicitly or explicitly invited to play the role of a hypnotized person—some combination of what he imagines that role to be and what he is led to believe it is by the hypnotist. Often this process will result in simulation or Hypnoid phenomena, but *if* the subject becomes highly absorbed in this role which, in effect, creates a fantasy context, he may in fact become Hypnotized. This is a particularly interesting means of inducing an Hypnotic state, since one becomes Hypnotized by *pretending* to be hypnotized. Like any Absorption Technique, whether or not it succeeds depends upon how absorbing the subject finds this fantasy context.

Another interesting instance of the Absorption Technique is that which Erickson (1964) calls the “surprise technique.” This technique involves the sudden evocation in the subject of an extraordinary experience of surprise, or even astonishment. Such a surprise, of course, has a tremendously *absorbing* quality. Another is its kinship to a state of confusion; thus, surprise can be an instance of both the Absorption and the Confusion Techniques; see below.

In a Hypnotic state induced by an Absorption induction the subject may be mostly oblivious to real world Elements because Absorption Techniques often employ fantasy as the domain of absorption, with a result being loss of real world contact—a special case of a reduced power and/or disposition to generate FOAs. This type of Hypnotic state may also be the sort in which the hypnotist acts only as a “doorman”: he aids in the induction of the state but does not become eligible to evoke appraisals *within* the fantasy context.

Absorption Techniques differ depending upon whether they are designed to generate Hypnoid or Hypnotic phenomena. Since the aim of a Hypnoid induction is usually the evocation of a very specific appraisal, the suggested imagery is tailored to the specific effect that is desired, such as images of the insensitivity and rubbery nature of one’s arm if the goal is to induce an anaesthesia. In contrast, when used as an *Hypnotic* induction procedure, the fantasy-based Absorption Technique usually involves the creation of a complete fantasy context—an imaginary world—that the subject can find himself in. When a person makes such a super-ordinate appraisal, he will be in a Trance.

### The Relaxation Technique

The Relaxation Technique is perhaps the most popular method of inducing the Hypnotic state. Its goal is the reduction of the subject’s *power* to generate FOAs. As with the Absorption Technique, the Relaxation Technique depends, at least initially, on getting the subject to overcome his hypervigilance, perhaps by means of the Redescription Technique.

Then the Relaxation Technique consists of any procedure that has the result of getting the subject to enter a state which is between waking and sleeping (the “twilight” state [see Budzynski, 1972]), a type of state that frequently has the physiological characteristics associated with the “relaxation response” (Benson, Arns, & Hoffman, 1981).

The empirically-ascertained characteristics of the twilight state include a heightened awareness of the body, unusual body sensations such as the Isokower phenomena (Isokower, 1938), dreamlike experiences, a loss of volitional control over mentation, an increased production of “primary process material” (Bertini, Lewis, & Witkin, 1969), a loss of “reality-testing” (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965), and a “loosening of the reality-oriented frame of reference” (Budzynski, 1972). In our present terms, what these and other studies have noted is that the drowsy individual typically loses much of his power to generate FOAs; he loses his sense of contact with the real world.

This loss of the power to generate FOAs is what Barber (1957), for example, discovered when he found that subjects were just as suggestible when in a drowsy state as following an hypnotic induction. One of his research participants who had followed suggestions when drowsy said, “I was just asleep enough to believe what you were saying was true. I *couldn't* oppose what you wanted with anything else” (Barber, 1957, p. 59, emphasis added). Here we see that the research participant reported a loss of *power* to generate FOAs.

It is important not to *equate* sleep or the twilight state with the Hypnotic state, however, as did earlier investigators who equated hypnosis with somnambulism (e.g., Puységur, 1811). Drowsy states are not necessary for, nor equal to, the Hypnotic state; rather, since being drowsy is a natural state in which there is a reduced power to generate FOAs, inducing drowsiness is one way to induce hypnosis. As Ronald Shor (1970) has noted, “the altered state [hypnosis] can exist without any drowsiness whatsoever. Drowsiness has a certain indirect instrumental value in teaching an individual how to achieve the altered state, but it is not intrinsic to it nor is it essential to go through drowsiness to achieve it” (p. 234).

A variation on the Relaxation technique is sensory deprivation, which can be used as an Hypnotic induction since it often produces a drowsy state in which the person loses much of his power to generate FOAs (as manifested, for example, in the inability to distinguish hallucination from perception). In addition, sensory deprivation often involves constraints on the subject’s motility, reducing the power to generate FOAs since, as Freud (1975) noticed, being able to move about is fundamental to the establishment of reality testing.

Although the Relaxation technique, when successful, induces a Hypnotic state through the reduction of *power* to generate FOAs, it is possible that



the state is *maintained* via a reduced *disposition* to generate FOAs: It is possible that the Relaxation induction shows the subject what it is *like* to be Hypnotized so that he is then capable of maintaining that state by voluntarily relinquishing his disposition to generate FOAs.

Recent studies of arctic isolation and absorption (Barabasz, Barabasz, & Mullin, 1983) have suggested that the long term effects of isolation include an increased skill or liability for absorption. Long term environmental isolation and sensory deprivation enhance conditions for absorption in fantasy and body states. Sensory deprivation and suggestions of relaxation, drowsiness, and sleep can serve as a vehicle for the Absorption technique as well as the relaxation technique. Both the drowsy individual and the one who has been sensorily deprived often become highly aware of unusual body sensations of heaviness, slowed respiration and pulse, drowsiness, altered experiences of limb position, etc. (Isokower, 1938; Zubeck, 1969). The hypnotist can induce the subject to become highly absorbed in these sensations.

The following brief induction of Milton Erickson's illustrates the employment and integration of the Redescription, Absorption, and Relaxation Techniques.

The suggestion was offered that she select the chair and position she felt would be most comfortable. When she had settled herself to her satisfaction, she remarked that she would like to smoke a cigarette. She was immediately given one, and she proceeded to smoke lazily, meditatively watching the smoke drifting upward. Casual conversational remarks were offered about the pleasure of smoking, of watching the curling smoke, the feeling of ease in lifting the cigarette to her mouth, the inner sense of satisfaction of becoming entirely absorbed just in smoking comfortably and without the need to attend to any external things. Shortly, casual remarks were made about inhaling and exhaling, the words timed to fit in with her actual breathing. Others were made about the ease with which she could almost automatically lift her cigarette to her mouth and then lower her hand to the arm of the chair. These remarks were also made to coincide with her actual behavior. Soon, the words, "inhale", "exhale", "lift", and "lower" acquired a conditioning value of which she was unaware because of the seemingly conversational character of the suggestions. Similarly, casual suggestions were offered in which the words "sleep", "sleepy", and "sleeping" were timed to her eyelid behavior.

Before she had finished her cigarette, she had developed a light trance. (Haley, 1967, p. 18.)

### The Confusion Technique

The Confusion Technique aims to reduce the hypnotic subject's *power* to generate FOAs without necessarily producing a drowsy state; it aims to "push" him into the Hypnotic state. The originator of the Confusion Technique, Milton Erickson, describes it as follows:

. . . a play on words or communications of some sort that introduces progressively an element of confusion into the question of what is meant, thereby leading to an inhibition of responses called for but not allowed to be manifested and hence to an accumulating need to respond . . . the author has added to the play on words the modification of seemingly contradictory, or irrelevant unrelated concepts, non sequiturs and ideas, variously communicated, and each of which *out of context* is a simple reasonable assertion, meaningful and complete in itself. *In context*, such communications given in a meaningful emphatic manner become a medley of seemingly valid and somehow related ideas that leads the subject to try to combine them into a single totality of significance conducive to a response, literally compelling a response. But the rapidity of the communications inhibits any true understanding, thereby precluding responses and resulting in a state of confusion and frustration. This compels a need for some clear and understandable idea. As this state develops, one offers a clearly definite easily comprehensible idea which is seized upon immediately and serves to arouse certain associations in the subject's mind. The medley is then continued and another comprehensible idea is offered, enhancing the associations of the previous clear understanding. And in the process, one throws in irrelevancies and non sequiturs as if of pertinent value, thereby enhancing the confusion. (Haley, 1967, p. 156.)

The net effect, Erickson claims, is that the subject "welcomes any positive suggestions that will permit a retreat from so unsatisfactory and confusing a situation" (Haley, 1967, p.24). When such a hypnotic suggestion is made, the subject is literally more than willing to respond to it (for further illustrations see Bandler & Grinder, 1975; Erickson, Rossi, & Rossi, 1976; Haley, 1967).

Being in a state of confusion is the same state of affairs as being unable to generate certain final-order appraisals. We are in a state of confusion when (a) having observed some anomalous state of affairs, (b) we initiate a FOA of this state of affairs, but (c) we fail to complete this appraisal due to a lack of information or to an inability to make the available information "fit together." We cannot be confused about a state of affairs of which we are not aware. Thus, in order to employ successfully the Confusion Technique, it is important, as in all Induction Techniques, that the hypnotist ensure that the subject has reason to pay close attention to his communication, and that he communicates in such a way that the subject can easily perceive, but not completely understand, the communication. Also, if the subject does not *attempt* to generate FOAs of the communication, then he will not be confused about it. Thus, in order to keep the subject in a state of confusion, the hypnotist must ensure (a) that it is very important to the subject that he makes some kind of sense out of the hypnotist's communication, and (b) that the subject cannot do so.

There are four states of affairs that can occur once the subject is confused: (a) the subject acquires new information about the confusing state of affairs which renders it no longer confusing, (b) the subject "leaves

the field,” so that generating FOAs about the confusing state of affairs is no longer important, (c) the subject quits trying (i.e., loses his disposition) to generate FOAs, or (d) he keeps trying to generate FOAs, but is unable to. If the Confusion Technique is to be successful, the hypnotist must minimize the likelihood of the first two alternatives, so that the result is one of the latter two: a reduction in the subject’s power or disposition to generate FOAs. This may take great skill on the part of the hypnotist, but the successful result may be a deeply Hypnotized individual.

In the employment of the Confusion Technique, one of its results may be that the person remains confused while he is otherwise free to act. He might not even know that he is confused. This is to say that the critical activity of generating or attempting generation of FOAs can go on independent of the individual’s other activities. Hence, it is possible that a person’s power to generate FOAs might be fully engaged (and he remains confused) in spite of his intact eligibility to perform other acts. The two issues involved here are: 1) people have a limited capacity to problem solve over a given time and 2) people can be unaware that they are trying and failing to solve a particular problem. To the extent and during the period in which a person is fully and unsuccessfully engaged in generating a FOA while at the same time unaware of that fact, he can be said to be unconsciously confused and deficient in his eligibility to tackle other anomalous matters.

#### Hypnosis and Status-Assignments: Hypnotism Without an Induction

A person will be more disposed to give up his generation of FOAs if he appraises the hypnotist to be effective or compelling, if he sees the hypnotist as, e.g., having the power to make people experience whatever he suggests. To this end, the hypnotist may, at certain times and with certain persons, use such potential status-accurring gimmicks as crystal balls, magic tricks, or mysterious names and appearances. (See Hull’s [1933] discussion of “prestige suggestion.”)

Moreover, a person will be more easily hypnotized if the assigns *himself* the status of hypnotizable. The hypnotist can take advantage of this state of affairs by beginning with Hypnoid suggestions that are very easy to carry out such as the Postural Sway.

In general, the more a person sees the hypnotist as a person having hypnotic powers, and the more he assigns himself the status of being a person who is susceptible to hypnotic powers, the more likely he will be to enter an Hypnotic state, given an appropriate intervening history. An appropriate intervening history need not resemble what we normally consider to be an hypnotic induction procedure, however. Moreover, the hypnotist’s status-claims of being a competent, compelling, or even ineludible hypnotist need not involve, on his part, assertions to this effect.

It is the significance of his behavior, not the details of his performance, that matters. Thus, a person may very well enhance his status as a compelling hypnotist by emphatically *denying* such a status or by denying the very existence of hypnosis or hypnotic states. If there is no such state to achieve, the subject need not worry about his competence to achieve it. By emphasizing the naturalness and universal ease of “simply responding to suggestions,” the hypnotist aids his subjects to relinquish their self appraisals of whether or not they are eligible for or capable of such experiences, in the first place.

## MANIFESTATIONS OF THE HYPNOTIC STATE

We will divide our discussion of hypnotic phenomena into four sections: (a) focused attention, (b) suggested effects, (c) nonsuggested effects, and (d) consequences of specific induction procedures or demand characteristics. We will find that, for the most part, it is only the nonsuggested effects that are distinctive to the Hypnotic State and that are not in principle producible as Hypnotic phenomena. However, we will also outline our reasons for supposing that at least some of the suggested effects would appear to require the Hypnotic State in order to be genuinely elicited and experienced, although whether or not they actually do require the Hypnotic State is an empirical question.

The explications of the representative hypnotic phenomena offered below are *not* based on the empirical finding that these phenomena occur during the Hypnotic state; there are no well-known procedures for assessing the presence of the Hypnotic state as distinct from suggestibility. Rather, what we hope to demonstrate here is that there is a wide range of phenomena traditionally associated with the subject matter of hypnosis which are *understandable* manifestations of the psychological state we have articulated here as Hypnotic. Since many of these phenomena are, in addition, those that are historically associated with the topic of “hypnotism,” then our identification of the Hypnotic state with the “hypnotic state” appears to be a useful one. We will also discover that, logically, some of the phenomena traditionally labelled “hypnotic” are not necessarily or ever Hypnotic.

### Focused Attention

Hypnosis has often been described as involving “focused attention”. It may be more appropriate to talk about “*restricted* attention”. To speak of restricted attention is to call attention to the fact that someone is attending to one or more Elements to the exclusion of some other Elements, especially when, as observers, we have some reason to expect that these

other Elements would normally be attended to. When someone is in an Hypnotic state, we have special reasons for speaking of restricted attention.

First, as we saw in our first paper (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982), a significant reduction in power and/or disposition to generate FOAs corresponds to a loss of sense of real-world context. Hence, the Elements attended to, and behavioral choices made, by a person who has been Hypnotized are significantly different from what they would be at other times.

Second, we saw that in the paradigm case of an Hypnotic state, the hypnotist becomes eligible to evoke anomalous appraisals for the subject. Since it is appraisals that give a person reasons to act, the Hypnotized person may be acting on some normally less salient reasons, and thus paying attention to some unusual Elements. To an observer, this may look like selective, focused, or restricted attention, but to the subject, it is simply attention to what is then of interest.

Third, in evoking appraisals for the subject, the hypnotist is directing the subject's attention to certain Elements and directing it away from certain others. Since a Hypnotized person, who is not disposed to generate FOAs, is a person who is not disposed to question the place of Elements that he encounters, nor to relate encountered Elements to other Elements in the world or to his self concept, the Hypnotized person will not be easily distracted: there *are* few problematic or distracting Elements. Thus, the Hypnotized person seems to be able to hold or restrict his attention to a single Element for long periods of time.

Restricted attention is both (a) an expression of the Hypnotic state and (b) a state of affairs that the hypnotist tries to cultivate during, and for the purposes of, the Hypnotic induction. During the induction, the hypnotist wants the subject to pay special attention to what he is saying—that is, to hold his attention on the hypnotist's communication. The hypnotic induction cannot be effective unless the subject selectively attends to the hypnotist. In particular, selective or restricted attention would be a natural component of the Absorption Technique, since this technique involves getting the subject absorbed in, e.g., a guided fantasy. Also, for the Confusion Technique to be successful, the subject must be extremely interested and committed to figuring out the nature of the confusing state of affairs and so, in some manner, selectively attending to it. Again, in the Redescription Technique, the hypnotist directs the subject's attention to those Elements which he is redescribing. Restricted attention is also a common feature of *Hypnoid* inductions, since the Hypnoid subject is typically trying to perceive some Element in an anomalous manner, and to do so, he must usually restrict his attention, e.g., to the goal-directed fantasy.

### Suggested Effects

#### *Anomalous Appraisals*

As we saw earlier, when a person is in an Hypnotic state, the hypnotist may become highly effective at evoking special, unusual, or anomalous appraisals for the subject. Many of the subject's Hypnotic behaviors will be a matter of his acting in accordance with these anomalous appraisals, which he will be unlikely to recognize as anomalous. This implies increased suggestibility: If the subject cannot successfully generate self appraisals, he is more likely to comply with a command than might otherwise be expected. An image or instruction can appear to take on a life of its own if it is unchecked by the constraints, demands, and distractions of the ordinary context of self and real world.

One anomalous appraisal that the hypnotist can evoke is that some aspect of the subject's behavior is automatic, spontaneous, or nonvolitional (see, for example, Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman & Stanley, 1983). For example, when the hypnotist says to the subject that he will find his arm spontaneously rising, he is assigning an automatic status to the behavior of arm-raising. If the subject has little disposition or power to generate a FOA of this status-assignment, he may find that his arm does rise spontaneously; that is, he may appraise his arm as doing so.

Assigning the status of automatic is just one, although perhaps the most common, instance of Hypnotic status-assignment. Other examples include the following: assigning the status of "rigid and unbendable" to the subject's arm, "unverbalizable" to his name, "tightly glued shut" to his eyes, "incapable of separation" to his interlocked fingers, "completely gone" to his sense of smell (resulting in anosmia), "insensitive to pain" to his hand (analgesia and anesthesia) and "inaccessible" to certain of his memories (amnesia).

Positive hallucinations involve status assignments. If the Hypnotized subject accepts an appraisal of "on your nose" as the place of an imaginary mosquito, he will experience the mosquito on his nose and act accordingly. Likewise, the hypnotist can assign "in that chair" as the place of a (non-existent) Dr. X, or "presently coming over the intercom" as the place of a (nonexistent) voice asking questions. These more complex cases involve not just single appraisal, but appraisal of a special *context* that the subject may accept and act upon.

If a person is in an Hypnotic state, he is likely to accept and make the appraisals evoked by the hypnotist, act accordingly, and not be aware of the anomalous nature of these appraisals or behaviors. It is always possible that a suggestion will *not* take effect with a Hypnotized individual, however. This could occur for several different reasons.

First, in certain nonparadigmatic instances of the Hypnotic State, the hypnotist may facilitate the induction and/or maintenance of the state, but not be eligible to evoke appraisals. This would be the case, for example, when the hypnotist was excluded from the Trance context except in a minimal role of “doorman.”

Second, in some instances the subject does accept the appraisal but does not act accordingly since he does not have the required competence. Certain negative “hallucinations,” for example, may require an “inhibitory” skill which the subject does not possess: he may not know *how* to experience a material object as invisible, or an arm in ice water as comfortable. A person need not possess such “inhibitory” or “dissociative” skills in order to become Hypnotized, although without them there are certain classes of suggestions that he may not be able to experience. Dissociative abilities (Hilgard, 1977) are not to be confused with Hypnotizability—the ability to relinquish one’s final-order perspective.

Third, the hypnotist may suggest an anomalous appraisal which is within the range of FOAs that the subject is still (despite being Hypnotized) disposed and able to generate. The Hypnotic State only involves a significant *reduction* in power and/or disposition to generate FOAs; this power and disposition is not necessarily entirely eliminated, and may, in fact, never be. For any given individual, the range of FOAs he will not relinquish will be those which are most fundamental to his real world and/or self-concept. If the hypnotist evokes an appraisal in this range, the subject need not accept it, and may very well come out of Trance. For instance, if the hypnotist suggests a behavior that the subject normally considers to be highly objectionable or immoral, he may generate a FOA of that suggestion and awaken.

#### *Hypnotic Dreams and Fantasy*

One of the requests or suggestions that the hypnotist may make is for his subject to dream. It is undoubtedly the case that some dream reports from persons participating in hypnosis experiments are fabricated (Barber, 1962; Tart, 1965). We should nevertheless not be surprised if persons who are in an Hypnotic State are able to experience genuine or nearly genuine dreams, since the Hypnotic state has in common with the dream state a significant reduction in power and disposition to generate FOAs. Moreover, just as an attenuation of power or disposition to generate FOAs accounts for the feeling of reality that Hypnotic fantasies and dreams can have, so this same reduction helps make understandable why our night dreams often have such a realistic quality. There may be some significant differences between Hypnotic and night dreams, however. As Hilgard (1965) points out, the hypnotic state is not the *same* as sleep, and the topic of the hypnotic dream is often a suggested one.

*Suggested Nonveridical Identity and Context*

One anomalous appraisal that the hypnotist may evoke is that the subject is a different person than he actually is, or that his context (e.g., surroundings, location, or social context) is different than it actually is. These related appraisals of self and context form a sort of capstone in a person's ongoing construction or maintenance of his real world, and constitute a superordinate class of appraisals: they coordinate and generate whole domains of facts and relationships particular to the identity or context in question. The evocation of a single anomalous superordinate appraisal may constitute sufficient grounds for engaging in a wide range of otherwise anomalous behaviors. The entranced person, to the extent that he is able, may automatically "follow-up" such appraisals by generating all the necessary Elements to "complete" the new sense of context or self, reflecting the person's beliefs, knowledge, values, and assumptions about the identity and/or location in question. For example, if I suddenly appraised myself as Benny Profane or the Sand Man, then I would have little reason to be writing this, and would instead engage in behavior attendant upon such altered statuses as hunting alligators in the sewers or trying to put you to sleep, respectively. (Much psychotic behavior can be seen as following from unusual superordinate appraisals.)

This sort of Trance phenomena is attempted in age regression in the Stanford Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) and in suggested personality alteration in the Stanford Profile Scales of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1967).

This sort of trance phenomena corresponds to *Hypnotic* role-enactment, as opposed to *Hypnoid* role-enactment (Sarbin & Coe, 1972). In the latter, the subject is aware of his anomalous role-enactment *as* anomalous and *as* enactment. This corresponds to the typical case of the method actor who can "get inside" his character without losing awareness of his own identity or the context of the play and, e.g., the need to please the audience and/or director. In contrast, the Hypnotic role-enacter corresponds to the highly engrossed actor (Sarbin & Coe, 1972), who becomes so absorbed in his role that he becomes relatively unaware of the audience and of himself as distinct from the role he is playing. This phenomenon is also closely associated with possession states (Prince, 1968) and certain cases of multiple or split personality (Hilgard, 1977).

One final instance of a suggested nonveridical context appraisal is the "rapport phenomena" (Erickson, 1944; Erickson & Erickson, 1941; Hull, 1933, Tart, 1969), in which the subject loses awareness of any Elements (including other persons) which are not a component of the hypnotist-subject relationship. For example, the hypnotist often makes the explicit suggestion that the subject will pay attention to nothing but the hypnotist's voice and, perhaps, the subject's own body sensations. If the subject ac-



cepts and makes this anomalous appraisal, he will be accepting a special context: "It's just me and you, nothing else." Lower-order anomalous appraisals may follow from the acceptance of that context: e.g., "negative hallucinations" of other people, voices, or sensations that are not an explicit component of the trance context.

### *Suggested Dissociative Phenomena*

Dissociation is an old idea (e.g., Janet, 1889) which is being revived by contemporary theorists (e.g., Bowers, 1976; Erickson et al., 1976; Hilgard, 1977). There appears to be a lack of clarity and agreement as to just what dissociation *is*, however. In particular, what is dissociated from what?

Erickson applies the term to the occurrence of particular behaviors outside of their normal context. He states that "whenever a behavior is successfully dissociated from its usual context, we have evoked a hypnotic phenomena" (Erickson et al., 1976, p. 71). This use of the term "dissociation" relates most readily to our formulation: Regardless of any specific suggestions, the Hypnotic state is, by definition, a dissociated state in Erickson's sense, since the subjects' behaviors are dissociated from their normal context of self and real world.

Bowers (1976), however, employs the term "dissociation" in a different manner. He states that "by dissociation I have meant the ability to register (and sometimes respond to) information that is not consciously perceived" (p. 137). As Bowers (1976), Hilgard (1977), and Jaynes (1976) document, it is well known that persons can make distinctions and engage in behaviors of which they are not conscious, as in the phenomena of sleep learning, nonconscious hearing during general anesthesia, or the everyday phenomena of, say, successfully driving to work without consciousness of the road or our driving.

At any given time, a person is only conscious of those Elements of the world which are intrinsic to his ongoing behavior, and, even then, only of those Elements that are intrinsic to his behavior *as the person himself distinguishes and intends his behavior* (Plotkin, 1981). Other Elements of the real world will not be consciously distinguished unless they represent potential or actual disruptions of our ongoing behavior. We distinguish our own behavior in light of our understanding of our present context, usually the ongoing social practice or episode. Thus, an alteration in our understanding of the context will result in a change in our understanding of our behavior, which, in turn, will result in an alteration of the set of Elements of which we are conscious.

When a person is Hypnotized, the hypnotist becomes eligible to alter the person's understanding of his context, as we saw above, by evoking special appraisals (or by evoking special contexts). By this means, the hypnotist can implicitly direct the subject to attend to a range of Elements

to which he normally would not attend in his present circumstances. The subject may discriminate the other Elements of his situation to which he *would* normally be attending, without being consciously aware of them, just as while driving we are often unconscious of the road while nevertheless making the necessary distinctions. He may also be able nonconsciously to *respond* to them, just as the absorbed driver does. The case of the Hypnotized subject seems more striking than the case of the driver, however, because *we* are attending to those Elements that he is not, and thus we are very conscious of the fact that he is responding to these Elements nonconsciously. The Elements that we find most compelling are not necessarily the same as those that draw the subject's attention, however, since the hypnotist has redirected that attention by evoking or creating a special context.

The ability to dissociate in Bower's sense—that is, the ability to discriminate and respond nonconsciously—is, conceptually, a distinct ability from that involved in entering an Hypnotic State. On the other hand, it is an empirical possibility that a person who has a high ability to dissociate will also be a person who has a high ability to enter Trance, since both abilities may be related to the third ability to become highly absorbed in some activity (Bowers, 1976). In any case, Bowers's use of the term “dissociation” does reduce to an instance of dissociation of behavior from context.

The most complex use of the term “dissociation” is Hilgard's (1974, 1977). Hilgard speaks of “simultaneous or near-simultaneous cognitive activities or structures that show some measure of independence from each other” (1974, p. 305). The range of phenomena to which Hilgard applies his concept of dissociation is quite varied and complex. We will consider just one example, perhaps the one that is best known: that of the “hidden observer.” A highly susceptible subject is hypnotized and the hypnotist makes the suggestion that his left hand is analgesic to the pain of circulating ice water. The subject is then able to place his left hand in the ice water without experiencing any pain. That is, the hypnotist evoked a special context (or appraisal) for the subject in which pain from his left hand has no place, and hence, he is not *conscious* of pain.

In one version of the experiment, the hypnotist then tells the subject that, when he places his hand on the subject's shoulder, the hypnotist “can be in touch with the part of you that knows things the hypnotized part does not know, and it can talk to me.” With this maneuver, the hypnotist establishes a second context in which the subject *can* be conscious of the pain. When this context is evoked by the hand on the shoulder, the subject reports the pain that he has always discriminated and of which he is now conscious.

In a second, more dramatic, version of this experiment, the subject is

told that through automatic writing (a special skill that is conceptually distinct from Hypnotic ability) his right hand will “tell us what we ought to know” but the subject will pay no attention to that hand and will not know what it is communicating. The right hand then reports as much pain as is felt outside of hypnosis while, orally, no pain is reported. In this case, the Hypnotic context that is evoked has no place for left hand pain or right-hand writing, and so both the pain and the automatic report of the pain go on outside of awareness. Although this sort of virtuoso dissociation undoubtedly requires a very skilled and specially trained subject, the effect is of the same general sort that occurs with the normal person who is absorbed in a conversation and is able to simultaneously, albeit nonconsciously, drive his car or negotiate obstacles on a path while walking.

These “hidden observer” findings are dependent upon *suggested* context effects (and thus are not intrinsic to the Hypnotic state), and they require extra-Hypnotic skills. Also, nonconscious discrimination is not unique to Trance States; it is only that it often becomes especially striking during these states due to the often unusual deployment of attention.

The “hidden observer” is not a reified aspect of mind. During the Hypnotic State, the subject does not become two persons, nor is a “hidden” person within the person revealed. Rather, the Hypnotized person may act from independent contexts, only one of which he is conscious, if (a) he has the appropriate skills, and (b) he is given the appropriate instructions that show him how. This type of dissociation is thus best seen not as a dissociation of consciousness from consciousness or of behavior from behavior, but as dissociation of behavior from context.

### Nonsuggested Effects

#### *Trance Logic*<sup>2</sup>

The description of the Hypnotized person as lacking the disposition or ability to generate FOAs explains “trance logic” (Orne, 1959, 1972).

By trance logic, he refers to a peculiar “tolerance for incongruity” that he believes characterizes “deep hypnosis” (Orne, 1972, p. 427). This is clearly related to our formulation of the Hypnotic State since Orne employs the term “incongruity” in essentially the same way that we speak of “anomaly” (see Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982, pp. 175–182). We must distinguish *tolerance* for anomaly from *noncognizance* of anomaly, however. Tolerance for anomaly could mean either (a) the subject’s lack of affective puzzlement upon observing an Element that he recognizes to be anomalous, or (b) the subject’s failure to appraise as anomalous an Element that *other* observes appraise as anomalous. Although in *both* Hypnotic

and Hypnoid cases there is a lack of affective puzzlement upon observation of the Element, only in the Hypnotic is failure of appraisal found. This is not to say that he wouldn't perceive the Element that the other observers appraise to be anomalous; rather, he *might* perceive that Element but he would not appraise it to be anomalous. We believe that Orne has in mind the latter sense of "tolerance for anomaly" when he speaks of "trance logic."

Orne (1959) stated that trance logic was "the apparently simultaneous perception and response to both hallucinations and reality without any apparent attempts to satisfy a need for logical consistency" (p. 295). He illustrated this phenomenon by (a) suggesting the hallucination that an actual person the subjects had met was sitting in a (real) chair in front of them, and (b) asking them who the person standing behind them was, this person being the one whose hallucination he had suggested. He found that subjects who were in a deep trance reported seeing the same person in both places, but that subjects who were simulating hypnosis either refused to see the person behind them, or said that they did not recognize the person.

How can we account for these findings? Orne's "hypnotized" subject, assuming he is in the state we have identified as Hypnotic, is appraising the presence of the same person first in one place and then in another. The FOA that the subject does not generate is something on the order of "one or both of these cannot be the same person because in a real world a person cannot be two places at once." Since this FOA is not generated, the subject is left with his two persons.

Orne's simulators, not being Hypnotized, notice the incongruity *as* incongruous and smell a trap, and unwittingly some fall into it. To preserve the integrity of their "hallucinated Ms. Z" they must treat the real Ms. Z as something else, unless, of course, they know the trick.

### *The Recovery of Repressed Memories*

Freud (1975), and many other clinicians since him, have noticed that repressed memories sometimes become available to a person during hypnotic sessions. The problem is often that after hypnosis is terminated, the memory is again defended against. This was found by Freud to be typical of hysteria and the other psychoneuroses. In the case of traumatic neuroses, the situation is different: The memory of the trauma that is recovered during hypnosis usually remains after the hypnotic session ends.

This difference between traumatic neuroses and psychoneuroses can be understood in terms of FOAs as follows. While he is disposed to generate self-appraisals, a person's world will be limited in accordance with the kind of person he sees himself as.

What happens in the case of recovery of lost or repressed memory? Let us say that we have Hypnotized a person who sees himself as a heterosexual who could not possibly have any interest in homosexual experience. He is just not that kind of person. But, while Hypnotized, the person recovers the memory of participating in a homosexual episode. It is not surprising that a person who is in an Hypnotic state can remember a forbidden act or experience that he would not have been able to recollect otherwise; there is no anomaly, because there is no FOA generated by him in accordance with his self-concept. When the person is no longer Hypnotized and is again disposed to generate FOAs, he will have no place for such a memory and will have to treat it in a manner allowed by his self concept; he will forget it or distort it such that it has a place.

On the other hand, in the traumatic neurosis we find that if the memory of the trauma is recovered during the hypnotic session, it is often retained after the session ends because the memory, although painful, is not inconsistent with the person's self-concept. (For this reason, it is also the case that the person need not be Hypnotized in order to recover the traumatic memory.) If the person can recognize the traumatic memory during the session and then cease to appraise it as painful, he will no longer need to avoid it after the session is terminated.

#### *Spontaneous Amnesia*

Spontaneous post-Hypnotic amnesia for the events of the hypnotic session, although only rarely noted during hypnosis research, *can* nevertheless occur for three different sorts of reasons. First, the subject may *believe* he will forget, in which case the amnesia is an implicitly suggested or expected phenomenon, and not intrinsic to the Hypnotic State per se. Second, there may be repression because the material encountered while Hypnotized is alien to the subject's normal real world and/or self-concept. The most interesting possibility, however, is the context-dependent effect in which the Hypnotic events are difficult to recall (at least at first) since the act of recalling is taking place in a very different context from the Hypnotic events: a bridge is hard to find. The empirical likelihood of this latter sort of spontaneous amnesia would depend upon, among other factors, the abruptness, distinctiveness, and degree of discontinuity of the Trance-to-waking context change.

#### *Source Amnesia and Disrupted Episodic Memory*

"Source amnesia" (Evans & Thorne, 1966) refers to the situation in which a subject can later recall or recognize something that has been learned in an hypnotic session but cannot remember when, or in what

context, he learned it. Our concept of the Hypnotic state furnishes one possible explanation for source amnesia. FOAs locate or assign the place that an Element has in a person's world. To be in a state in which you are not disposed or able to generate FOAs is to be in a state in which you are not concerned with the place that Elements have in your real world (Schwartz, 1978, 1980). The place that something has in a person's world will often include both where and when it was first encountered. Thus, if a person has learned something during an Hypnotic State, the context of the learning, the hypnotic session, will not necessarily be connected to the learned Element, and thus the context may not be remembered with the Element.

Exploring a related phenomenon, Evans and Kihlstrom (1973) found that when hypnotized subjects are given hypnotic test items as part of a susceptibility scale, and then given amnesia suggestions for these items, the highly hypnotized subjects (i.e., those who score high on *suggestibility*), tend to recall these items in less sequential fashion than less hypnotized subjects, who tend to remember the items in the order in which they were presented. Kihlstrom (1972) proposes that the nonsequential recall is not a spontaneous effect of hypnosis, because he found sequential post-hypnotic recall when amnesia suggestions were either removed or not given in the first place.

This finding does not address the question of whether or not recall *during* an Hypnotic state is sequential for items encountered in the state. Recent studies (Schwartz, 1980) of episodic recall obtained within the state demonstrates that order of recall is less sequential for highly suggestible persons than for those either less suggestible or those who are highly suggestible but not administered an hypnotic induction.<sup>3</sup> Further, these studies suggest that Hypnotized subjects, during Trance, have a greater difficulty in estimating that period's duration than do those persons who are Hypnotizable but not then in Trance, or those who are not Hypnotizable and who have gone through an induction.

Why? Sequence and duration are important aspects of a person's normal real world and constitute parameters of a person's episodic memory. Sequence is an especially important relationship when the events considered are self-contained and independent of one another, as are most hypnotic test suggestions. It is not surprising that these real world contextual relationships of sequence and duration are precisely what is lost during an Hypnotic state. Such loss is consistent with loss of real world context (hence historical context) since the only *specifically* historical aspects of memory or episodes is succession and duration.

#### *Loss of Initiative*

Hilgard (1965) describes as characteristic of deeply hypnotized subjects a "subsidence of the planning function" (p. 6), i.e., loss of initiative and

lack of desire to make and carry out plans on their own. Typically, hypnotic subjects simply sit still and wait for suggestions or commands from the hypnotist. Beyond being a reflection of the demand characteristics and social roles of the hypnotic context, this can be seen as a possible manifestation of the Hypnotic state. The Hypnotized person is not acting in relation to the context of his self-concept. Since many of the reasons that a person normally acts on follow from his self-concept, the Hypnotized individual will have lost a substantial portion of his initiative.

#### Consequences of Specific Induction Procedures or Demand Characteristics

A third set of hypnotic manifestations, which are neither explicitly suggested nor nonsuggested effects, include “trance stare” (a blank stare and rigid facial expression), limp posture, psychomotor retardation, deep relaxation, and alterations in body awareness, such as feelings of floating, sinking, falling, turning, or complete or partial loss of body awareness. These phenomena are not intrinsic to the Hypnotic state as we defined it, but are either (a) side effects of the particular induction procedure employed or (b) consequences of the subject’s expectations about hypnosis, whether derived pre-experimentally or implicitly through the behavior of the experimenter or the laboratory setting (i.e., “demand characteristics” of the experimental setting [Orne, 1962]). Examples of side effects include those of the popular Relaxation Technique, which often produces sensory-deprivation effects attendant upon deep relaxation and immobility: the alterations in body awareness. Other side effects such as the “trance stare” may follow from the rapt attention generated during an Absorption induction, or from the subject’s enactment of his understanding of the role of a hypnotic subject. Despite possible empirical associations, there is nothing about the alteration in powers and dispositions that we are identifying as Hypnotic that is conceptually tied to these sorts of trance-like characteristics.

### CONCLUSION

We have shown here how a wide variety of facts about Hypnotic states can be accounted for systematically by our conceptualization of the Hypnotic state as characteristically involving a lack of disposition or capacity to make FOAs (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982). Of the three induction techniques we examined, we showed that the Absorption Technique entails lessened disposition to generate FOAs, while the Relaxation Technique and the Confusion Technique involve a lessened *power* to make FOAs. We also examined several manifestations of the Hypnotic state. We showed, for example, that focused or restricted attention involves a di-

minished disposition to generate FOAs, because the subject is not paying attention to possibly anomalous Elements. We pointed out that the lessened disposition to make FOAs clearly explains the subject's acceptance of anomalous appraisals suggested by the hypnotist. We argued that the phenomenon of dissociation can best be understood as the dissociation of behavior from the normal context of self and the real world because of lessened disposition or capacity to make FOAs. We also showed how trance logic is clearly a case of the loss of power or disposition to make FOAs. In each instance we have pointed out that the critical difference between a genuine Hypnotic state, on the one hand, and Hypnoid behavior or simulation of hypnosis, on the other, is the genuine diminution of FOAs in the true Hypnotic state. In conclusion, it seems clear that the conceptualization of hypnosis and related phenomena in terms of FOAs and anomaly integrates this entire field, as well as providing answers to a good many puzzling issues.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors wish to offer their grateful thanks to Thomas O. Mitchell for his invaluable assistance in the editing of this manuscript. Author's Addresses: 421 12th St., Durango, CO 81301 and 36 Service Dr., Wellesley, MA 02181.

## NOTES

1. We capitalize "Hypnotic" and "Hypnoid" to indicate that these words designate our conceptions; we use lower case to refer to "either the empirical findings or the historically distinguished and largely undefined subject matter of hypnosis" (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982, p. 142).

2. Readers who are familiar with the literature on trance logic may wonder why we include it as a nonsuggested effect when, typically, it occurs as part of the response to a suggestion. There are two reasons: First, even when it *is* part of the response to a suggestion, the trance-logic part of the response is in no way suggested. Second, there is no reason why trance-logic phenomena need be part of a response to a suggestion.

3. In these studies, the SHSS, Form C, was employed. If it turns out to be the case that those who score very high on this scale are, in general, more Hypnotized than those who score very low, then these findings will also hold for Hypnotizability. Strictly speaking, however, this scale indexes only suggestibility and does not allow an empirical separation of Hypnoid and Hypnotic.

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