

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR MIGRATION IN ALASKA

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ABSTRACT

Migration is conceptualized within the framework of Descriptive Psychology. A paradigm case formulation is presented in which migration has five characteristics: permanence, significant distance, two communities that differ culturally, deliberateness, and a basis in the migrator's appraisal of behavior potential. A derivative case analysis shows how other varieties of migration can be included in the concept. The relationship of migration to language, behavior, and culture is discussed as a "top down" formulation. The final section addresses the effect of migration on language and culture using the Alaskan context as a source of examples.

The original working title of this paper included the term "cross-cultural migration." Put on paper, however, the term seems somehow wrong but it takes a moment or two to figure out exactly why. "Migration" is seldom a term we apply easily to ourselves to describe our own residential movements. We may *move* but we don't migrate. To put the point in another way, when the Mayflower transports pilgrims and their possessions they

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are said to have “migrated.” When Mayflower transports you and me and our possessions we are said to have “moved.”

The main problem with the term “cross-cultural migration,” however, is its conceptual redundancy. Migration implies that one crosses cultural boundaries in some degree. If not, the term has no conceptual bite. In fact, distinctions among “moving,” “migration,” and related concepts are far from arbitrary and are far more important than existing social science taxonomies currently allow.

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a general conceptualization of migration which specifies the psychologically significant characteristics by which migration is best portrayed. The resulting conceptualization is part of a wider attempt to understand migration in the context of Alaska Native communities, especially those aspects of migration related to the maintenance of Alaska’s indigenous cultures.

This paper is organized into three parts. The first part comprises the above mentioned conceptualization; it draws upon the explanatory resources of Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1978, 1981, 1982) for its methodology. The second part explores ways in which migration and language are related to behavior and culture; it introduces an additional concept from Descriptive Psychology, i.e., the idea of hierarchically arranged social structures within which migration, language, behavior, and culture are logically positioned. The third section focusses primarily on the effect of migration on culture maintenance, especially on language as a component of culture.

MIGRATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS

In the framework of Descriptive Psychology, *process* refers to a sequential change from one state of affairs to another (Ossorio, 1978). A process has a beginning and an end, specified by initial and final states of affairs, respectively. Processes can include other processes as parts, just as the initial process can be a constituent part of a yet larger process.

Migration qualifies as a process under the above conditions. A person has an initial residential state of affairs that changes to a final residential state of affairs and the change is sequential over a number of stages. Migration is a psychological process because it paradigmatically involves deliberate action: someone deciding to migrate or not. Other types of relocation, as by being kidnapped or sold into slavery, are not deliberate but, nonetheless, comprise cases related to migration.

Earlier conceptualizations of migration derive from other fields of social science (Sociology, Economics, Political Science, Anthropology, Geography, History). These fields render the concept of migration in their own terms, each introducing theories resident in its own prevailing paradigms.

These earlier treatments of migration were not, nor should they have been, “psychological” treatments of the subject.

Nonpsychological formulations of migration frequently use fragments of psychological explanation, however. As far back as 1889, the “laws of migration” proposed by Ravenstein included a preempirical psychological rule-of-thumb as their main guide:

Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation), all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of these compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to ‘better’ themselves in material respect. (Ravenstein, 1889, cited in Lee, 1969, p. 283)

This observation came after an earlier treatise in which the laws were formulated around structural variables such as “distance and urbanization” (Ravenstein, 1885, cited in Lee, 1969, p. 283).

Later attempts to develop theories of migration show similar reliance on psychological fragments of description and explanation. For example, Stouffer (1940) points out the role “intervening opportunity” plays in the process of migration. Lee (1969, p. 287) cites “personal factors which effect individual thresholds and facilitate or retard migration”, along with origin and destination factors. Taylor (1969) used motivation as the basis for his threefold classification of migrant types as “Aspiring, Dislocated, and Resultant”. For Taylor, the decision to migrate “entails a resolution of the forces which bind the potential migrant to his present situation, and those which pull him away” (p. 124).

The examples given above illustrate the relative importance of psychological concepts in past formulations of migration. There seems, however, a reluctance to use psychological concepts as anything more than sponges for soaking up variance left over after the application of a host of traditional variables.

Another difficulty with earlier conceptualizations of migration is that they often end up as taxonomies that offer only a single basis for classification. For example, the International Encyclopedia of Social Science defines migration as follows: “in its most general sense ‘migration’ is ordinarily defined as the relatively permanent movement of persons over a significant distance” (Sills, 1968, p. 286). The article then goes on to cite taxonomies that distinguish *innovative* migration (to achieve the new), from *conservative* migration (because circumstances change), in recognition of different motivations for migrating. A second distinction is then made between *impelled* migration (ejection by some state or power), and *free* migration (as with pioneers and pilgrims), thus shifting us to a new realm of causal possibilities unrelated to the first.

Another problem with the taxonomic emphasis of the earlier formula-

tions is that they simply have lacked the scope to encompass the full range of possibilities. What is needed is a descriptive resource by which to portray the phenomenon and its varieties as a single pre-empirical, noninductive, conceptual package. Such a package would, of course, have to include the role of deliberate action as its main structural feature.

Among the resources of Descriptive Psychology relevant to the conceptualization of migration in Alaska is the paradigm case formulation (PCF) (Ossorio, 1981). This device is a way of specifying the characteristics of an unambiguous case of the concept in question. Other varieties can then be expressed as different in specific ways from the paradigm case.

A Paradigm Case

In the current instance I offer as paradigmatic the case of migration that has the following characteristics:

1. Some person makes a permanent relocation of residence;
2. there are two communities involved, a sending community and a receiving community, that differ culturally;
3. the relocation is far enough away to make simultaneous participation in the social practices of both communities impossible;
4. the migration is a deliberate act; and
5. the decision to migrate is based on the migrator's appraisal that the behavioral possibilities in the sending community are fewer, more narrow, or less satisfying than those in the receiving community.

The first characteristic, that migration is permanent, is only to remind us that we do not ordinarily regard intentionally impermanent relocation as a paradigmatic instance of migration. Impermanent relocation can be accounted for under two distinct derivative cases discussed later.

Regarding the second paradigm characteristic, the reference to communities serves to bring into the discussion any and all facts about communities that bear on the subject of migration. For example, communities are repositories not only of social practices but of the settings in which one can participate in these practices. What there is for a person to do is bounded by the community as a cultural entity. If a person migrates, the migration is away from more than a place; it is also migration away from the whole set of social practices and settings characteristic of that community. The same can be said of the community to which one migrates: It embodies some new set of social practices and settings. The significance of this feature of the paradigm case is in the likelihood that the migrant will be faced with a cultural adjustment of some empirically specifiable magnitude.

As to the third characteristic, the significance of any distance the migrant travels to relocate lies in whatever distance or equivalent condition it takes to make the sending community unavailable to the migrant as a setting for direct social participation. The point is that distances are significant by virtue of socio-cultural factors that have relatively little to do with miles.

The fourth and fifth features of the paradigm case, that the decision to migrate is deliberate and based on an appraisal of circumstances in the two communities, remind us that communities embody all the means by which some set of persons can successfully carry out a way of life in one of the ways it can be done. No account of migration as a deliberate act would be complete without reference to the conceptual necessity for the migrant to have evaluated the prospects of satisfactorily living a life under the new conditions.

Related to this part of the formulation is the inescapable fact that the act of migration on the part of one of its members is subject to evaluation by the sending community. Going even further, it is safe to say that each community has built in or evolving standards for evaluating such acts, along with built in standards for their correct application in any particular case. These same considerations, of course, hold for the receiving community as well.

Migration is something that is done in order to do something else. The paradigm case is the one in which migration is done to improve one's own potential for engaging in culturally patterned behavior to meet one's basic human needs. If one can't meet these needs in one location, reason enough exists for going to another place, if one does anything at all.

Derivative Cases

We turn now to the specification of other cases related to the paradigm case. Table 1 summarizes one possible way of generating new cases by systematically changing the five components of the paradigm case, one component at a time. Each variety of migration shown in Table 1 represents a real possibility for which examples come readily to mind. The first line represents the paradigm case, the one that fulfills the conditions specified earlier. The next five cases are derived from the first by transforming each individual characteristic.

Derivative Case One comprises patterns of migration identical to the paradigm case except that the relocation is not permanent. Care must be taken here to distinguish between instances of unsuccessful migration and migration where a return to the sending community is part of the intended pattern from the beginning, since the psychological significance of the two types is clearly different.

Table 1
 Varieties of Migration
 Derived from the Paradigm
 Case Formulation

	<i>Paradigm Characteristics</i>				
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>
Varieties					
paradigm case	+	+	+	+	
derivative one		+	+	+	+
derivative two	+		+	+	+
derivative three	+	+		+	+
derivative four	+	+	+		+
derivative five	+	+	+	+	
derivative K					

(1) permanent relocation; (2) significant distance; (3) cultural displacement; (4) deliberate action; (5) differential appraisal

Unsuccessful migration should not be included under Derivative Case One for several reasons. One reason, of course, is to maintain the distinction between defective cases and derivative cases. The main reason, however, is that success is a performance criterion to which all cases of migration, including Derivative Case One, are subject. A relevant example is the following. In Alaska, it is not uncommon for residents of villages to participate in the cash economy by taking jobs elsewhere, but only for as long as it takes to make a subjectively adequate sum of money. The adequacy of the sum is controlled by conditions of need in the sending community to which the migrant intends to return. Experience during the construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline brought this dynamic to the attention of contractors more often than some of them would have wished. The point is that if the basis of the difference in appraisal of the migrant's two communities is financial, it can be removed by a temporary relocation for a period of time more or less known in advance. When the financial goal is accomplished, the migrant returns as planned. While this pattern is culturally unfamiliar to some of us, it is not only intelligible, it can be completely successful as well.

Derivative Case Two is migration where a significant physical distance is not part of the relocation. It may at first appear that migration without physical and geographical relocation is a contradiction in terms. There is a point, however, to making conceptual room for this kind of possibility. In the paradigm case, the significance of the distance is specified as whatever distance it takes to make the sending community unavailable for social participation. Under Derivative Case Two, one finds new settings for social

participation *within* the sending community, generally in one of two ways: first, by establishing oneself in a new social class or cultural milieu substantially different from one's original class or milieu; second, by getting the sending community to accept a substantially large set of new behavioral possibilities. In the social science literature these two ways are recognized as *social mobility* and *social change*, respectively (Tajfel, 1978).

Derivative Case Two is the case in which one interacts equally well in two cultures, but a clear choice has been made to assimilate into the new one. The autobiography of Richard Rodriguez (1981) is an articulate account of one such instance of social mobility. Many instances of interethnic marriage can also be seen to exemplify this derivative case of migration.

Social change under Derivative Case Two can be exemplified by history. Agents of massive social change such as Christ, Marx, Hitler, and Gandhi come readily to mind as persons credited with the introduction of new social practices on a global scale. To varying degrees, of course, anyone is a potential change agent relative to someone. Few persons have the motivation, capacity, or opportunity, however, to effect change in whole cultures. The point here is not to suggest that social change is merely a form of migration in disguise; to do so would trivialize the notion of social change. Rather, it is suggested that the two concepts are related in that they both comprise the improvement of personal states of affairs as their basis, even though they differ in scale.

In Derivative Case Three, component three of the paradigm case is modified such that the sending and receiving communities do not differ culturally. In this case new sets of social practices do not need to be learned in order to participate in the social practices of the new community; cultural displacement is at a minimum, making the chances of success correspondingly high. Some forms of executive relocation provide reasonable examples of this kind of migration; those forms where the move is perceived as permanent. More common, however, is the simple case where one moves because of or in order to find a new job in a community "just like" the community one has left. Meeting new people and making new friends is done as a set of familiar social practices with relatively little cultural displacement involved.

Derivative Case Four is characterized as not being the result of a deliberate action on the part of the migrant. This case has appeared in previous taxonomies (Sills, 1968) under the general description of forced, or coercive migration. Derivative Case Four is broader than such conceptions; it includes all conditions under which one might migrate without choosing to do so, not just those in which the sending community excludes the migrant. Children of migrants, for example need not be *persona non grata* in order to migrate at the wish of someone else. Likewise, persons stranded outside their own country during an outbreak of war may become involuntary migrants. The young men who migrated to Sweden and Canada

out of moral opposition to their draft status during the conflict in Vietnam, while having done so deliberately, can hardly be said to have had a choice in the matter and so their relocation might well be classed as an instance of Derivative Case Four.

Finally, there is Derivative Case Five, under which migration takes place even though the differential appraisal of the two communities is not large. The person who makes the decision to migrate can do so for the benefit of someone else. All that is required to qualify as this kind of migration is that someone makes the decision to migrate other than the one whose circumstances are improved by the relocation. Non-Native school teachers in Alaska's rural communities ironically exemplify Case Five when they leave the village so their own children can have a "proper" education. Another example is a husband's leaving a satisfactory position for him in order to relocate where the wife's prospects are significantly improved. It is the wife's circumstances that take precedence in this context, the possibility that the husband will benefit from the move notwithstanding.

These, then, are five derivative cases of migration generated by a simple algorithm. The reader is now free to derive other possible cases by expanding the algorithm to include transformations of more than one paradigm characteristic at a time. For example, the kind of relocation undergone by military families involves the transformation of at least two, and possibly three, paradigm characteristics: Permanence, deliberateness, and perhaps differential appraisal. Another example, migrancy as a way of life, involves a change in perhaps all five components, although some forms of nomadism would keep component four, deliberate action, intact.

MIGRATION, LANGUAGE, BEHAVIOR, AND CULTURE

We turn now to the problem of fitting the concept of migration into its place relative to language, behavior, and culture. To do this I turn to another kind of device used in Descriptive Psychology, the "top-down" formulation. This kind of formulation is nonreductive, works from the general to the specific, the whole to the parts, the pre-empirical to the empirical, and from possibilities to actualities (Ossorio, 1982).

With the top-down approach, the life of any particular person is seen as being structurally arranged in a hierarchy of inclusion relationships that begin with ways of living at the most general and progress through cultural patterns and social practices to individual actions down to the specific movements by which these actions are carried out in particular cases. These processes are all going on at the same time, but the smaller pieces occur as part of the larger pieces. Thus, "the primary phenomenon is the smaller elements occurring *because* they are ways for the larger elements

to be implemented; the latter are not seen as accidental or epiphenomenal consequences of the former” (Ossorio, 1982, p. 4).

An analysis from the top down is a general reminder that the selection of units of analysis for research can be a complex affair. In the case of migration one is tempted immediately to regard the act of relocation itself as the basic unit of analysis. In a sense, this selection is justified in most instances. But, if one sees, relocation as an element of a part-whole relationship, the event as a specific act taking place at a specific time has no more extension than a point has on a line. The line is the appropriate unit of analysis, not the point, because of this part-whole relationship.

Migration requires a set of circumstances prior to its occurrence which become reason enough for its occurrence. This is not to say that similar circumstances for someone else would inevitably lead them to migrate. Because migration is a response to one’s appraisal of one’s circumstances it also has the characteristics of optionality built in to all social practices. What options apply to a given situation is an empirical question. Related to this aspect of migration is the fact that the act of migration on the part of one of its members is subject to appraisal by the sending community as to whether it is called for or not. Going even further, it is safe to say that part of the social practices of any community entail the application of standards for when and under what circumstances migration should occur. The receiving community has standards for appraisal as well, of course.

Thus, migration is a package of events, states of affairs, objects, processes, and relationships which virtually all other conceptual models treat as coming into being only after a move occurs. The top-down formulation introduces the large inclusion relationship that treats migration as an option selected under a set of evaluated circumstances. If there weren’t this feature of optionality, and if only cases involving relocation counted as migration, there would be no such thing as not migrating. Not migrating when the situation calls for it deserves as much explanation as any other aspect of the phenomenon. The present formulation is designed to allow the circumstances of the relocation as well as the relocation itself to be placed in perspective. As with any deliberate action, migrating or not can only be judged according to whether the situation calls for it or not, and only persons in a position to make such a judgement can do so for a particular case.

Language relates to migration primarily as a parameter of culture. In any culture the things that are said are said in certain ways and certain ways only. i.e., there is a linguistic analog to cultural displacement; linguistic displacement. From the migrant’s point of view the linguistic practices in which the new community differs from the old community rep-




Figure 1. Migration possibilities among four cities and two languages.

represent a subset of the new social practices the migrant must become able to participate in for successful migration to occur.

The relationship between language and migration involves, parametrically, three languages: the language of the sending community (LS), the language of the receiving community (LR), and the language of the migrant (LM). For the first two parameters, LS and LR, the significant relationship is how different they are from one another. Their difference corresponds roughly to cultural differences; how roughly depends empirically on particular part-whole configurations of particular language/culture entities. For example, the cultural differences between (a) Saskatoon and Quebec and (b) Sarasota and Calais are not equivalent to their linguistic differences. Figure 1 shows the twelve two-city migration possibilities among these four cities (each arrow represents two possibilities; e.g., from Quebec to Calais and from Calais to Quebec). Of these twelve, eight involve language differences of about equal magnitude. Of the latter, however, the cultural differences are not all of equivalent magnitude. Migration between Saskatoon and Quebec carries cultural significance that simply doesn't apply to migration between Sarasota and Calais, even though the task of overcoming language differences is roughly the same.

For the migrant, LM represents his or her current status relative to linguistic access to the social practices of the sending and receiving communities. The relationship between language and social practices can be specified further as a set of analogous restrictions on the possibilities for action: For language—in order to say something, it must be said in one of the ways it can be said; for social practices—in order to do something, it must be done in one of the ways it can be done. Whether a social practice has a linguistic performance as one of its parts is an empirical state of affairs. Whether the linguistic performance is mandatory, optional, or contingent on other states of affairs is also empirical and has to be learned as part of the social practice.

If a particular person wants to say or do something outside the formal

restrictions the community lives by, there are three basic options available. The first is for the person to find a way to get the restrictions lifted within that community. How, when, and for what reasons new social practices can be introduced into a community are, of course, specified in the standards of particular communities at particular points in time. The second is for the person to find a community where the restrictions (or standards for their being lifted) are thought to be acceptable or, at least, negotiable. The third option, of course, is to do neither and accept the restrictions and the consequences of their being breeched.

These options correspond to distinctions made earlier as part of the paradigm and derivative case analyses. The first two correspond roughly to the difference between social change and social mobility discussed earlier. The third alternative is, in most cases, simply the option chosen by those who have a possibility to migrate but decide not to do so. Therefore, the interrelations among the concepts of migration, language, and culture comprise part of the coherent and intelligible behavior of a person living a way of life.

THE EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

In this section I address the question of the effect of migration on language and culture. In the previous section three language parameters were said to be involved in migration: the sending community language (LS), the receiving community language (LR), and the migrant's language (LM). The vast majority of studies relating migration and language are devoted to language change in LR and LM. These works are sometimes concerned with the effect of the migrant on the language of the receiving community (e.g., Verdoodt, 1971). More often, it is the migrant's language, LM, that the investigator regards as the principal target of influence. For example, with the exception of Verdoodt (1971), the entire 1971 Spring issue of the *International Migration Review*, devoted to the impact of migration on language maintenance and language shift, was concerned with the migrant in the receiving community.

I shall focus here on the possible roles migration plays in the language of the sending community. It has been pointed out elsewhere (Dubbs, 1975, 1976; Orvik, 1980) that analyses of the effects of any sort on the sending community are relatively rare. Why this should be the case takes no great insight to see: The subtractive effect of rain on the cloud that drops it almost always escapes scrutiny; it is the rain's reception on the land that gets the press. Nevertheless, important questions abound concerning the effect of migration on the community the migrant leaves.

A community has cultural policies regarding the significance of migra-

tion. At the very minimum, an occurrence of migration is evaluated as having been called for or not. What constitutes reason enough for someone to migrate in a particular case is, of course, an empirical question subject to the particular standards of particular communities. It would seem to make a great deal of difference if someone migrates in opposition to the standards of the sending community. For example, in one community an unemployed household head may be socially eligible to migrate, but a teenager in the same community socially ineligible. For others migration may even have a mandatory quality, for example, those given "24 hours to get out of town," and other instances of Derivative Case Four.

Ko-Ko's appraisal that "they'd none of 'em be missed" notwithstanding, the effect of migration on a sending community may legitimately be viewed as a subtractive process, but not as a passively subtractive one. In the play *Day of Absence* (Ward, 1971), the white folks of a small Southern town awake to discover that all the black folks have mysteriously disappeared during the night. The point of the play was to reveal with sardonic wit (all the players were black actors in white-face) the extent of dependence of whites on blacks for more than goods and services: The whole psychological support of social roles was at stake. Part of the significance of migration, therefore, lies in the extent to which persons important to the interdependent functioning of the community become unavailable for social-system maintenance.

Keeping in mind that the effect sought is both subtractive and active, what is actively subtracted from a sending community's language are its linguistic change agents. It has been proposed elsewhere (Orvik, 1980) that differential migration in Alaskan Native communities has a conservative effect on the varietal forms of English spoken there. That is, those most motivated to acquire ways of speaking representable as standard code are more likely to migrate to communities where that code can be learned and used. In Alaska, differential migration from villages on the basis of age and sex has been observed (Dubbs, 1975, 1976; Orvik, 1980). Females of working age have been particularly prone to migrate to Alaska's cities in recent years. Although no empirical studies of age and sex in the acquisition of standard code have been done in Alaska, other studies have shown them to be systematically related (Labov, 1972). The logic of this dynamic can be extended to culture insofar as when something happens to a part, LS, corresponding things happen to the whole, the culture of the sending community.

One additional point from the repertoire of Descriptive Psychology needs to be made. Redescribing an event, process, state of affairs, or relationship is a way of giving it significance. For example, by redescription, the movement of persons from point A to point B can become a troop movement, an impending attack, and reason to sound the alarm all at the same

time, and all with respect to the “same thing”. With respect to the relationship between migration and the sending community, significance by redescription is a factor in the development of cultural policies regarding migration. Three stages are seen in the development of these policies. First, someone migrates or contemplates it. Second, someone redescribes these facts relative to whatever existing standards for evaluating the act the community has. Third, the existing standards are, themselves, subject to reformulation given the new empirical consequences generated by the first two stages. At the very least, an act of migration can be redescribed as being or not being a new variety, one with which the community has no previous experience.

CONCLUSION

What controls migration? The short answer is, “evaluation.” A paradigm case of migration requires an evaluation of the relative circumstances in at least two communities to have occurred prior to the relocation. No commitment is implied in this requirement that the evaluation be accurate or even realistic in order for it to apply.

What evaluations result in migration? First, notice that evaluation occurs paradigmatically in the sending community because it is there that one is guaranteed to have had the requisite experience with some community’s social practices and, thus, have a basis for comparison. Logically, therefore, the migrant’s circumstances in the sending community relative to its social practices, behavioral restrictions, available opportunities, etc., constitute the primary locus of evaluation criteria. What the migrant’s circumstances will be in the receiving community are logically hypothetical. Except for cases where the migrant has direct experience in what will become the receiving community, the basis for appraisal of future circumstances, given relocation, is symbolically represented in whatever forms the migrant has access to, e.g., television, memories of earlier experiences, word of mouth. Evaluations that result in migration, then, are those in which the differences between the sending and receiving communities are appraised as large enough to provide a person reason enough to relocate.

What makes differences that large? One class of factors includes any state of affairs that reduces the value of the sending community. Of special concern are circumstances that comprise new restrictions on deliberate action. The most notable exemplars of this class are situations where the economic base of the community no longer supports its membership.

Another class of factors are those that create behavioral possibilities

that can't be actualized in the sending community. In rural Alaska, schooling is the clearest example of this class. The more obvious aspect of schooling in this regard is its institutional commitment to train children in the skills necessary to lead productive adult lives anywhere—except in one's home village where there are virtually no jobs and where large discontinuities often exist between the social practices of the community and those of the school. As noted in the previous section, one of the more subtle forms this process takes is in the area of language, where the language goals of the school often conflict with the language traditions of the community. The subtlety is that the new linguistic potential can't be actualized in the present community, thus creating a bias toward migrating to communities where the new linguistic potential has a place. More generally, it can readily be seen that all forms of training, informal or formal, that lead to the acquisition of behavioral possibilities that can't be enacted in one's present community increase one's reason to migrate.

The third class of factors comprises anything that increases the value of the receiving community. Remembering that receiving communities are generally hypothetical in nature, information relevant to their evaluation is necessarily symbolic. The clearest example of this kind of factor is television, particularly network and cable television. The state of Alaska has taken active interest in promoting the use of sophisticated telecommunications to improve various aspects of the quality of life in rural Alaska. Millions of dollars have gone into the delivery of rural telecommunications, including multimillion dollar appropriations for the state to subsidize entertainment programming to over 200 villages. Whatever other purposes might be served by these developments, one thing is certain: There is now a high volume of information about other possible communities culturally distinct from those already familiar to rural Alaskans.

It is too early to tell if these developments will have a substantial effect on migration in Alaska. Among the processes to consider, the role played by face-to-face interaction in establishing the significance (plausibility, attractiveness, etc.) of symbolic representations of possible receiving communities is worth noting (Gearing & Sangree, 1979, chap. 1). This face-to-face reworking of information, of course, takes place mostly in the sending community and is thus influenced, even shaped, by the existing community standards for evaluating such representations.

As a final note, let me return to a point made earlier that no conceptualization of migration could be considered adequate if it did not have a place for the possibility of not migrating. This is by no means a trivial matter: The circumstances that call for migration do not necessarily exclude conflicting reasons not to migrate. Furthermore, one for whom migration is attractive but impossible suffers a reduction in behavior potential; a restriction on the ability to engage in deliberate action. In Descriptive

Psychology, situations lead to pathology to the extent they reduce someone's ability to engage in deliberate action (Aylesworth & Ossorio, 1983). Again, there is no current knowledge as to the amount of pathology in Alaska that might be relatable to not being able to migrate when a situation calls for it.

The brighter side of not migrating, however, is in seeing the possibilities for reducing the evaluation differential by means of increasing the behavioral possibilities in the sending communities. Again, there are no easy answers. Most certainly I would start with an examination of all institutions whose purpose is to train people. Training people to do things that can't be done where they live is an expensive way of improving anyone's quality of life. The history of training institutions in Alaska, however, is a history of just this sort of policy. There is no reason to believe that these policies are inevitable for the future. A move toward training people for intellectual self-sufficiency, combined with a commitment to promote an environment that is self-sustaining, would make the general idea of not migrating a psychologically healthy option.

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