ADVANCES IN
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Editors: KEITH E. DAVIS
THOMAS O. MITCHELL

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Editors: KEITH E. DAVIS
Department of Psychology
University of South Carolina

THOMAS O. MITCHELL
Department of Psychology
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

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PART I

BEHAVIORAL WORLDS: FROM DREAMS TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE

INTRODUCTION

Thomas O. Mitchell and Keith E. Davis

"A person's world is made up of possibilities and non-possibilities for behaving" (Ossorio, 1982b, p. 15). "Persons are inherently world constructors, since they inherently conceive of possibilities of behaving, and . . . what a persons contructs he can, in principle reconstruct, since he might have constructed it differently to being with. Which is not to say that a person could construct just any old world and get away with it" (Ossorio, 1982a, p. 90).

All of the papers in the first section of this volume exemplify applications of these basic insights. Two papers—Roberts and Shideler focus explicitly on world construction and its implication of alternative realities. The other papers—Plotkin and Schwartz, Orvik, and Putman and Jeffrey—seem disparate at first glance but can be tied together by the unifying thread of Ossorio's constructivism.

THE WORLD AS A CONSTRUCTION

The general notion that an individual's reality is constructed rather than given, at least in some major respects, is widely accepted nowadays. Just

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among those working in the United States, influential scholars whose work is congenial to this general constructivist view make up an impressive list: Geertz (1973,1983) in anthropology; Berger and Luckman (1966) and Holzner (1972) in sociology; Garfinkel (1967) and Cicourel (1974) in ethnomethodology; Rorty (1972,1979) and Goodman (1968,1978,1984) in philosophy; Gergen (1982) and Kelly (1955) in psychology; Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in cognitive science; and Watzlawick (1976,1978,1984) and his colleagues (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Frisch, 1974) in communications research.

We do not mean to suggest by this list that the constructivist viewpoint is an American invention. Scholars on the European continent such as Derrida (1976), Foucault (1972), Gadamer (1976), Habermas (1971), and Ricoeur (1983), although not in all instances explicitly constructivist themselves, have had considerable influence on this general view. The work of Shotter (1984; see also Gauld & Shotter, 1977) in England is unquestionably in the mainstream of constructivism and is widely known among American psychologists.

Neither do we mean to suggest that this view is of purely recent vintage: It can be traced back through Schutz (1962) and Dilthey (1976) in Europe and James (1952) in this country, to such thinkers as Vico, Pacal, Kant, and Leibniz (see Steiner, 1978, esp. pp. 75–80; Von Glasersfeld, 1984, p. 17; Watzlawick, 1974, p. 96, note 6). Watzlawick suggests (1984, p. 236) that its origins lie in the far reaches of antiquity, in the thought of Heraclitus.

WORLD CONSTRUCTION: THE DESCRIPTIVE-PSYCHOLOGY ACCOUNT

A review of the massive literature on constructivism and a critical placement of the Descriptive-Psychology view within that literature is clearly beyond the scope of any of the papers in this volume. Because of space limitations, Roberts and Shideler, the two authors most directly concerned with world construction, appropriately address only the implications and applications of the Descriptive-Psychology account of world construction. A few brief observations about the distinctive characteristics of the Descriptive-Psychology treatment of world construction will probably be helpful to the reader who already has some background in this area, however.

Our understanding of world construction is enriched substantially by the focus in Descriptive Psychology on the world as behavioral—as consisting directly in the options for, and limitations on, the behavior of persons. This conception of the world as behavioral has a systematic connection with Ossorio's insight that pathology, including psychopathology, can be seen basically as a matter of ability deficits. In his words, "A

person is sick when he is sufficiently limited in his ability to do what, as a real person in a real life setting, he *ought* to be able to do'' p. 158). That is, his world has too much constraint and not enough opportunity—it is too limited. But, since an individual creates his own world in important respects, alleviation of his pathology is often a matter of reconstructing his world.

Besides its connection with psychotherapy, the behavioral conception of the world has another important implication: It provides a systematic connection with the technical concept of ''boundary conditions'', by which Ossorio accounts formally for the obvious fact that world construction is not open-ended and limitless. As he says,

> In the Descriptive Psychology approach to understanding knowledge of the real world, what replaces the real world as the independent reality within which people live their lives is the more fundamental notion of reality constraints. Reality constraints are limitations on our possibilities for behaving. . . . Reality constraints are thus boundary conditions on the whole domain of persons, behavior, and real world construction. As such, they are categorically different from the real world. (Ossorio, 1982a, pp. 11–12; see Ossorio, 1971/1978, esp. pp. 28–37, for a more detailed discussion of these issues.)

By the use of the boundary-condition concept, Ossorio can coherently say both (a) ''there is no real world completely independent of people to which we can point and say that that's what our merely human understanding is an understanding of '' (Ossorio, 1982a, p. 11) and (b) a person cannot ''construct just any old world and get away with it'' (Ossorio, 1982b, p. 90).

Ossorio thus provides a systematic account of the limitations on the worlds which we can successfully construct and inhabit. This is no small contribution; one often searches the work of influential constructivists in vain for a positive, formal treatment of the constraints on world construction. Rorty (1972, 1979), for example, offers no positive account of reality limits; neither does Gergen, although he does acknowledge the problem and points to Ossorio as one of the few who treat it explicitly (see Gergen, 1982, pp. 208–209).

WORLD RECONSTRUCTION: STORIES AND DREAMS

Roberts illustrates well some of the psychotherapeutic implications of Ossorio's conceptions. First, she takes a person's behavior as limited by the world that person has constructed. Second, she takes psychotherapy as a problem of how to remove unnecessary limitations on behavior, which prevent an individual from participating appropriately in the practices of the society. The implications are obvious: Psychotherapy can be seen in

part as a matter of world reconstruction, in which the reconstructed world offers greater behavior potential than the original world.

Given this fundamental conception, the next question is what methods can be used to facilitate the needed world reconstruction. Roberts selects two: Mutual storytelling and dream interpretation.

Both of these techniques are well known, standard techniques in wide use. The Mutual Storytelling Technique, first formally developed by Gardner (1968,1969,1970,1971a,1971b) is both widely used and widely influential (Brandell, 1984). The interpretation of dreams for therapeutic purposes has been a practice of virtually every culture and society, and in our day detailed descriptions of how to use dreams for personal problem solving and improvement are readily available in popular form (e.g., Faraday, 1972).

The only well-developed systematic context for learning and applying these two techniques has been the psychoanalytic. Gardner is quite eclectic in his initial discussion of Mutual Storytelling (1971b, pp. 1–320). Yet, when he gives a systematic presentation of the technique organized around therapeutic problems, he resorts to psychoanalytic problems and categories as his sole organizing framework (Gardner, 1971b, pp. 322–940). Hall says straightforwardly that "thinking, whether it occurs in sleep or in the waking state, is one and the same process" (1966, p. 10) and that the most important information provided by dreams is "information about dreamer's problems and conflicts" (1966, p. 17). Yet, his discussion of the problems and conflicts which dreams reveal is limited to problems traditionally identified by psychoanalysis.

Roberts, on the other hand, makes available to the therapist and client a broad range of ordinary human knowledge and skills. She shows that a problem can be identified in any terms which make sense to a participant in normal social practice, not just in terms of technical theory, be it psychoanalytic or other. The full range of the therapist's and client's knowledge and experience can thus be brought to bear on the client's problem in a formally justified way, calling on all the resources of Descriptive-Psychology concepts and the armamentum of therapeutic moves developed by Descriptive Psychologists.

Roberts contributes especially to the understanding of dreams. Her model of dreams as a means of world reconstruction accounts systematically for why dreams may provide better solutions to everyday problems than one can develop while awake (the accepted reality constraints may be relaxed enough to allow for the recognition of new possibilities as real), of why dreams often do not appear to make much sense upon awakening, and of why dreams need interpretation. In addition, she gives a critical evaluation of several well-known alternative formulations of dreams, including Freud's, Adler's, Jung's, Hadfield's, ego-analytic, and Aristotle's.

Here she makes clear why some of the classic concepts—dream work, manifest and latent dream content—are not central to a Descriptive-Psychological treatment of dreams.

All in all, Roberts demonstrates how the organizing concepts of world and world construction provide richly suggestive resources which will surely enrich the imaginative creativity of both therapist and client who are involved in story-telling and dream therapy.

ULTIMATE WORLDS: SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Shideler addresses directly a fundamental problem of human knowledge: How can there be disparate, sometimes conflicting, descriptions of reality? Is there a way of finding what the real reality is, against which all descriptions can be measured?

This perennial question of philosophers is fresh and timely today; Rorty (1972,1979) is prominent among contemporary thinkers who would resolve the problem by denying that there is any world knowable independently of the constructions of knowing persons. To leave the question there, however, without offering a positive, formal account of limiting reality is unsatisfying. No doubt many of us have needlessly limited our own behavior potential by constructing worlds that were unnecessarily small and constricted, but we would surely characterize as *non compos mentis* anyone sincerely claiming a literally unlimited power to create and live in worlds of his own choosing.

Shideler's point of departure is the conflict between science and religion. Although this conflict may not be as pervasive or virulent as in other times—say, during the Age of Enlightenment or during the last part of the nineteenth century and the first part of this one—it illustrates well the fundamental problem of choosing between different views of what is.

She shows that part of the difficulty in reconciling disparate accounts of reality stems from the incommensurable points of view that give rise to the various accounts. To the extent that this is the source of the difficulty, the most we can do is to acknowledge that state of affairs in principle, and to recognize that we, too, have our point of view and are no less bound by past experiences and present status than anyone else.

Shideler's examples are homely and everyday, but illustrate well the fact of limits on world construction. For example, she says that although we would expect observers looking from different angle to give different descriptions of the same chair, no one can successfully treat it as a telephone or a screwdriver (p. 58).

Four "transcendental concepts"—ultimacy, totality, significance, and boundary condition—are central to her treatment of the problem of dif-

fering descriptions of realities. These four concepts help us to understand that the domains of science and religion differ in such wise that the primary concerns of each are not included in the domain of the other. As she says, "Where physical and natural science is not concerned with truths that are not empirical, religion is not concerned with truths that are unrelated to ultimate significance" (p. 64).

That the domains are different does not mean that one is superior to the other, however. As she says, "since anything that one could point to is subject to different descriptions, there is no privileged description [in either science or religion] that tells us what it *really is,* independent of human conceptual frameworks" (p. 64).

What are her conclusions? First, she concludes that we should recognize the irremediable limitations on our own knowledge and points of view. We should take advantage of opportunities to acquire at least the formal knowledge-about others' points of view that will help us to appreciate why they see the world as they do, even if we can't see it that same way.

Second, she stresses that reality judgments involve implicit promises that the individual making the judgment will treat the object judged in a certain way—and that furthermore others will be able to treat it that way, too. Here she recognizes that the reality constraints which prevent us from constructing any world whatsoever, willy-nilly, are shared with others—indeed, are a foundation of social intercourse.

Finally, she concludes that ultimate-significance judgments are not confirmable or disconfirmable. Although negotiation over differences is possible, there is no guarantee that agreement will ensue. In the end, Shideler makes a case for what some might "amiable tolerance", but which she calls "compassion and honor" for others on a different journey.

HYPNOSIS: CHANGING WORLDS BY CHANGING REALITY APPRAISAL

Plotkin and Schwartz continue their account of hypnotic phenomena, an account begun in the second volume of this series (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982). Hypnosis is a particularly apt topic for inclusion among chapters on world construction. The key to hypnosis, say Plotkin and Schwartz, is change in an individual's concept of the world—what is real and what is not real. They call the ultimate judgment of whether something is real or not "final-order appraisal" (FOA). In hypnosis FOAs systematically change: The hypnotized individual makes judgments of reality reflecting not his or her own world, but a world suggested by the hypnotist.

Hypnosis is relevant to the fundamental issue of limits on world construction in general, an issue addressed in Shideler's chapter. Hypnotic phenomena pique our sense of the givenness of reality. They remind us

that perceived limits may often be surpassed, but that there are still limits on human behavior: Hypnosis extends the range of human behavior, but not indefinitely. The fascination with hypnosis since its emergence as a scientific phenomenon probably stems in large measure from this challenge it poses to our ordinary conceptions of the possible, and its promise to push back the commonly accepted frontier between possible behavior and impossible behavior.

Hypnosis is also relevant to the problem of relaxing perceived limitations in order to permit therapeutic world reconstruction, a problem to which story-telling and dream-interpretation (see Roberts' chapter) are also directly responsive. Every therapist knows that clients find it hard to accept as real that things can be different, a vital step in the client's reconstructing his or her world so as to remove unnecessary limitations on behavior potential. By hypnosis, the therapist can often get the client to take the world as different, reflecting the fact that some perceived limitations on behavior are made, not given. Reality constraints are thereby substantially loosened, and alternative possibilities become thinkable.

Plotkin and Schwartz demonstrate how various hypnotic phenomena are explained by the change in judgments about an individual's world. They examine various methods of hypnotic induction (absorption, relaxation, confusion) and manifestations of the hypnotic state—e.g., focused attention, automatic behavior, hallucinations, trance, dissociation, recovery of repressed memories, spontaneous amnesia, and postural and kinesthetic effects. They argue in each case that the alteration in final-order appraisal is the critical element in hypnotic phenomena. This alteration makes sense systematically of these phenomena, linking them to ordinary behavior and the ordinary world. It explains why hypnotized subjects will not ordinarily violate their own moral code: Hypnotized subjects do not lose the capacity to generate FOAs altogether, it is simply altered, and the most significant FOAs are still made. It explains the difference between hypnotic and hypnoid phenomena: In the latter the alteration in FOAs is less sweeping, and the subject retains the capacity to form FOAs of the reality of the altered experience itself.

It is clear from Plotkin and Schwartz's analysis that hypnosis is, indeed, an understandable phenomenon, and represents a prime case of world reconstruction. Understanding hypnosis therefore adds significantly to our understanding of world construction, in general.

WORLD RECONSTRUCTION BY RELOCATION: MIGRATION

There is yet another method of world reconstruction, a method which is as old as humankind itself: geographical migration. Since earliest times

people have physically relocated themselves in order to increase their behavior potential—to be able to hunt animals which they couldn't find in their old location, or to grow crops that couldn't be grown in the previous place, or to trade with other peoples who were not practically accessible from their former homes.

The concept of "world" applies so aptly to this process that we can easily forget that the familiar terms "Old World", to designate Europe and the Middle East, and "New World", to represent the Americas, are but applications of the fundamental world concept to characterize situations offering vastly different behavior potential.

Orvik takes this method of world reconstruction—migration—as his focus. The context for Orvik's discussion throughout is Alaska; the migration he is particularly concerned with is the migration of native Alaskans from their native villages and homes to other locales in Alaska. His analysis is not restricted to the example of Alaska, however; his account applies equally well to the general case of world reconstruction through migration anywhere, at any time.

He begins by exploring the concept of migration as a psychological process, stressing that any account of migration which neglects the psychological—e.g., persons, their motives, and the significance of their behavior in terms of social practices—will inevitably be deficient. His strategy of analysis is to develop a paradigm-case formulation (PCF) of migration. This PCF takes as the central instance of migration the process in which a person deliberately relocates permanently from one community to another community which is culturally different and physically distant, because the second community offers greater behavior potential.

This PCF provides a parsimonious framework for understanding a variety of related social phenomena which can also be called "migration." These phenomena include instances in which (a) there is no substantial geographical relocation, and the move is from one social class to another, (b) a geographical change is made without a change in social class, (c) the relocation is involuntary, and (d) the one who decides to relocate does so for the benefit of someone other than himself or herself.

Next, Orvik considers the role of language and culture in migration. As he points out, there is an intimate relation between language and social practice: For both, there are social restrictions in what can be done—"in order to say something, it must be said in one of the ways it can be said" and "in order to do something, it must be done in one of the ways it can be done" (p. 112).

What if a person wants to do something outside the restrictions imposed by the social practices of a particular community? One option is to leave the community—i.e., to migrate. Other options include trying to change the existing community, or accepting its standards and forgoing the alternative behaviors not permitted by it. The fact that there are these options

make migration paradigmatically a deliberate behavior, i.e., a behavior chosen from among alternatives. The critical element in the choice of migration over the other options is the evaluation by the potential migrant of whether physical relocation is the best way to reconstruct the individual's currently deficient world.

Here lies a crucial paradox of social policy. On the one hand, as Orvik points out, the inability to migrate when migration is appropriate may be pathological. That is, the individual's behavior potential may be inescapably limited to a significant, perhaps quite harmful, degree if he or she cannot physically relocate. On the other hand large-scale migration can have undesirable consequences for the larger society, including overcrowding of cities, overloading of supportive infrastructures, displacement of current residents, and disruption of the receiving communities' structures of social practices, to name just a few.

This is not just a problem for idle speculation. We live in a world in which millions of people suffer critically debilitating restriction of behavior potential because of their geographical location; the famine-ridden peoples of Africa are but one salient example. In contrast to previous ages, however, migration is less available as a method of increasing behavior potential. The lands of the New World, for example, are no longer relatively empty and available to starving Africans as they were to the starving Irish a century or more ago.

Orvik's analysis suggests that we should take full account of the fundamental problem—world reconstruction to remove limits on behavior potential—rather than of only one means of accomplishing this reconstruction—migration. This is not to say that migration should be prevented or forsworn, but simply that social policy should be developed with full awareness of alternative measures to meet the world-reconstructive goals of migration.

Orvik's chapter adds importantly to our basic understanding of migration. We have only highlighted some of his contributions to basic understanding; others, such as his observations about the effects on language of migration and implications of community standards of evaluation, are no less valuable. Furthermore, he has outlined some practical applications of this basic knowledge to important social problems in Alaska; we have suggested how these applications can be generalized. Because of the larger social significance of this topic, both the specialist in migration and the general reader will find this chapter informative and stimulating.

A NEW WORLD FOR COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS

If one were to list the factors making the world of today so different from the world of just 40 or 50 years ago, the computer would surely be near

the head of the list. Without the modern computer neither the exploration of outer space nor the exploration of the subatomic environment of particle physics would be feasible; without the modern computer satellite TV communications would be virtually impossible; without the modern computer our current credit-card system would surely collapse under the burden of clerical operations. Indeed, the computer in various forms is so ubiquitous and skilled a servant that few of us have any realization of the role it now plays in such necessities of modern life as the automobile and the telephone.

Is there any limit to the enhancement of our behavior potential possible through computers? One is tempted to say, "No, there is no foreseeable limit; the exponential increase in power, and decrease in cost, of computers over the last 30 years can be expected to continue." But will continuing hardware improvement ensure that world reconstruction through computerization will continue apace? Not at all. Hardware cannot operate without software, and software development has lagged so far behind hardware development that it poses a major constraint to the full exploitation of computers.

It is this "software gap" that Putman and Jeffrey address, pointing out that "software production today remains an extraordinarily difficult, complex task, highly resistant to the concerted efforts of a large number of talented researchers and practitioners" (p. 120). They suggest that a "fundamentally new paradigm for computer software and its development" (pp. 120–121) is required to close the gap, and they offer such a new paradigm.

Putman and Jeffrey describe the traditional paradigm of software development as follows: Software is a mechanistic, causal-deterministic system. Each piece of software is a system having its own logic, which must interface with other pieces of software or with users. Within this traditional paradigm, the process of developing software is described as having three stages: (a) development of requirements; (b) design; and (c) implementation.

Putman and Jeffrey point out that this paradigm militates against the much-desired unification of software development, because it imposes from the outset a sharp division between the internal logic of the program—the object of the requirement-development phase—and the analysis of the causal-deterministic system into parts and definition of the parts' external relations to each other—the object of the design phase.

The new paradigm proffered in this chapter is radically different. In the new paradigm, the system of interest is the community in which the software has a place, rather than as the piece of software itself. In other words, the software is a person in a community of other persons. This implies that what the software does can be thought of as behavior. This being the case, all of the resources of Descriptive Psychology are available for the description of software functioning.

Once one adopts this view, the fundamental question about software concerns what the software person is doing. The general form of the answer to the question is the social-practice description.

Putman and Jeffrey illustrate in some detail the use of social-practice descriptions. They show how software functioning can be described in terms of social practices, and give an example of a working format for developing software within the new paradigm. They describe and give examples of new-paradigm software, and outline the methodology involved in creating such software. Finally, they sketch briefly some of the ways in which new-paradigm software promises to be more powerful than old-paradigm software: Much larger programs will be practical, and the hitherto elusive goal of adequately simulating nonsoftware persons—e.g., by natural language communication, automatic fact analysis, and computerized psychotherapy—will become feasible.

In terms of our world-construction framework, Putman and Jeffrey address the problem of critical limitations on the behavior potential of programmers and computers in the present world of computers. Putman and Jeffrey reconstruct the computer world through the description of the new paradigm for software. They argue persuasively that in their new computer world there will be no software gap, and that the behavior potential of computers and computer users will be far greater than in the current world of computers.

Their accomplishment is substantial. They have offered a credible and attractive solution to what may be the most pressing current problem of today's computer world. Furthermore, since the computer world is now such an integral element of the larger world of our modern society, their work promises to figure importantly in the ongoing reconstruction of the larger world.

A FINAL WORD

The concepts of world, and the world as constructed, have been given extensive treatment by Ossorio in *"What Actually Happens"* (1971/1978) and are the initial focus in his more recent work on status dynamics, *Place* (1982b). The chapters in this section illustrate well the extensive applicability and usefulness of these concepts to a broad range of issues, from psychotherapy to computer technology, and from public policy to theology.

The authors of two chapters in this section—Roberts and Shideler—cast their work explicitly in terms of worlds and world construction. The other authors—Orvik, Plotkin and Schwartz, and Putman and Jeffrey—did not themselves cast their work in these terms. Yet it is striking how effectively the world-construction perspective integrates all of these chapters.

For example, the close relation between dream interpretation and sto-

rytelling (Roberts) and hypnosis (Plotkin & Schwartz)—all of these techniques facilitate world reconstruction by loosening previously accepted reality constraints—is transparent in the world-construction context. For another example, to cast migration (Orvik) in terms of its world-reconstructive role provides a perspective that highlights both the social-policy implications of migration and the ultimate relation of its significance to the psychotherapeutic techniques discussed in some of the other chapters.

The integrative power and applicability of the world-construction concept which is demonstrated in these chapters is due not only to the inherent fecundity of this concept, but also in important measure to its systematic placement within the totality of Descriptive Psychology. The formal connections to the concepts of behavior, of persons, of communities, of social practices, and of language on which our authors rely make available the potential implications of world and world construction to a degree not otherwise possible.

We look forward to an even wider range of applications of these concepts by Descriptive Psychologists in the future. We invite the reader to share in the future development and application of these concepts, and to look for other issues to which these concepts can fruitfully be applied.

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WORLDS AND WORLD RECONSTRUCTION

Mary Kathleen Roberts

ABSTRACT

People construct and maintain worlds that give them behavior potential, and routinely try to reconstruct those worlds in ways that give them more behavior potential. Problem-solving is a special case of world reconstruction, and there is a variety of ordinary activities which we may treat as vehicles for the reconstruction of a problematic world. The systematic use of two such activities—storytelling and dreaming—is illustrated in the context of psychotherapy. In addition, various theories about dreams are examined in light of the concept of world reconstruction.

The real world is what we see when we look around us. In much traditional thought, that world was the given. More recently, we hear such statements as "The world is the way we take it. It isn't given; we have to take it." This current of thought emphasizes that people are active rather than passive in relation to the world. However, this does not go far enough because it leaves the notion of "taking" either parochial or mysterious. Thus, we may go further and speak of the world not as "given" or as "taken", but

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rather as "created". This does not imply a God-like status for persons, of course (see Ossorio, 1981b, pp. 12–13).

If people *create* worlds, what is the relationship of the individual worlds they create to the real world? In order to answer that question, we will review the concept of the real world and the concept of a person's world, and explore the relationship between them. After introducing the concept of world construction in this way, we will briefly discuss world maintenance, and then focus on the concept of world reconstruction.

WORLDS

The concept of the real world involves the following sorts of facts:

1. The real world is what we all live in and are a part of.
2. We find out about it by observation and thought.
3. No one could acquire all of the facts there are.
4. People acquire some of the facts there are by observation and thought.
5. People are sometimes mistaken in what they take to be the case.
6. That someone is mistaken is a state of affairs that can be discovered by observation and thought.
7. Some people are incapable of observing some facts which other people can, and do, observe (e.g., that the trombone is slightly flat or that the signal is red).
8. No one is guaranteed to be correct in what he takes to be the case. (See Ossorio, 1982c.)

From these facts it follows that the real world is not in principle the same as what a given person thinks it is or perceives it to be.

The concept of the real world is the concept of everything there is, whereas the concept of a person's world is the concept of everything there is for a given person. Each concept is the concept of "a totality of related objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs" (Ossorio, 1978, p. 18, Table 1, No. 1). In each case, it is the concept and comprehension of the totality that has logical priority,[1] and in that sense comes first, as contrasted with the various objects, processes, events, and states of affairs that we count as being included in that totality. We do not arrive at the concept of everything there is by virtue of having encountered, experienced, or even thought of all the particular things that come under this heading.

Both concepts are also "placeholder" concepts on the model of "Jack's misfortune" or "what's going on in the next room". Each holds a place for a range of possible facts (states of affairs). The real world, "the state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs" (Ossorio, 1978, p. 29),

has a place for all our personal worlds and much else besides. A person's world ordinarily has a place for other people who have their own worlds, and also has a place for a real world which includes both the person's own world and others' worlds.

Persons' worlds may be incomplete, distorted, or inaccurate relative to the real world. Persons' worlds are incomplete relative to the real world in that we are selective in what we respond to, and we discover new facts all the time. Persons' worlds are distorted or inaccurate relative to the real world in that we sometimes ignore, misperceive, or misconstrue what's there, and we may change our minds about it. From these facts it follows that the real world's being a certain way in no way compels us to see it or treat it as being that way. That it is not inevitable that we see the world a certain way is part of what gives force to talking about a person "constructing" a world. In constructing our worlds, we select among a range of possibilities for seeing and treating the real world, and the world does not compel us to choose one option over another.

For example, my friend may betray me, but I may not see it that way. I may see it and treat it as a test of our friendship, or as the product of unavoidable circumstances, or as a humorous escapade, or as a deserved punishment for some past transgression on my part, or in any one of a variety of other ways. *What* my friend produced the behavior as does not force me to treat it that way. To the extent that I successfully treat it as something else, I *make* my friend's behavior a test, an escapade, a punishment, etc., and construe a world in which our friendship has not been significantly violated. Likewise, I may see the behavior as a betrayal and treat it accordingly, but this is a matter of choice and sensitivity, not necessity.

The objects, processes, events, and states of affairs in the real world provide us not only with possibilities, but also with limitations on what we can and cannot do successfully. These limitations reflect reality constraints provided by our circumstances and our own characteristics.[2] Just as we are not compelled to treat the possibilities provided by the real world a certain way (e.g., I am not compelled to treat my friend's behavior as a betrayal or to see that it could be treated as something other than a betrayal), we are not compelled to recognize limitations on our behavior. We may, like Don Quixote, construct worlds in which the impossible is possible, and attempt to actualize the corresponding behavior potential.

In talking about the possibilities and limitations offered by a given person's world, we may speak of that person's "options" and "givens". The options are the person's behavioral possibilities, and the givens are those states of affairs that offer no real possibilities for alternatives (see Ossorio, 1982c, p. 148). We may compare the options and givens of a person's world with the possibilities and limitations of the real world.

For example, a person may not have certain real world possibilities as

options in his or her world. Suppose that a woman has found out early on in her life that having fun is not a possibility for her. In this case, she will construct a world in which there are no options for having fun. She will not see situations as opportunities for pleasure, but rather will treat them as something else, e.g., as opportunities to do her duty or to do necessary chores. ("Now I've got to get the cookies made, and once I get that out of the way, I've got to. . . .") To the extent that she exploits the obligatory possibilities of situations and does not realize the pleasurable ones, she now creates for herself an exiguous and humdrum world.

Likewise, a person may reject certain real world limitations as givens in his or her world. In the face of death or taxes a man may insist "By God, that's not going to happen to me", and mobilize all his energy into creating a world in which these have no place. To the extent that he insists on this sort of world construction, he becomes more and more "out of touch with the real world" and ends up in a world by himself.

A person may also reject some generally accepted limitations of the real world and create a personal world that reveals new possibilities for himself and others. For example, at one time it was considered impossible for a person to run a four-minute mile. But once Roger Bannister achieved the four-minute mile, other people discovered that running a four-minute mile was an option for them as well.

In addition to not being compelled to see or treat the possibilities and limitations of the real world as possibilities and limitations of our worlds, we also are not compelled to deal with the real world at any particular level of generality or specificity. In formulating the holistic structure of our worlds, and in formulating the states of affairs that fit within that structure, we make decisions concerning the real world. Because the real world does not force us to make these decisions at any particular level of detail, we differ in the degree of specificity of our formulations of the world as a whole and in its parts and aspects.

In talking about the possibilities offered by a given person's world, we may speak of how differentiated that person's world is, and judge the degree of differentiation of that person's world against the standard of what we know as the real world. For example, one person may formulate a world reflective of a high degree of detailed and comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the real world, while another may formulate a less differentiated world. The former world will in general give its creator more behavior potential and call for the person to make decisions of greater complexity (though not necessarily of greater difficulty), while the latter will in general give its creator fewer possibilities but call for less complex decision-making.

To highlight the differences possible among persons in the differentiation of their worlds, we may use the example of being betrayed by a friend.

I could see the betrayal merely as something I don't like or as something bad, and treat it accordingly. I could see it not merely as something bad, but rather, specifically as a betrayal and treat it accordingly. I could see it not merely as a betrayal, but this particular betrayal and treat it accordingly. And I could see it as this particular betrayal by this particular person in these particular circumstances and treat it accordingly. And treating it accordingly would almost certainly be different in each of these cases.

In comparing the options and givens of a person's world to the possibilities and limitations of the real world, or in assessing the degree of differentiation of a person's world relative to the real world, we are using the concept of the real world in the ordinary sense in which it serves as a pragmatic guide to judgment and behavior. We are not claiming to have infallible access to the Truth about how the world is.

As an example of the use of the concept of the real world as a pragmatic guide to making judgments, consider the track coach who says of one of his young runners: "Johnny doesn't believe that he could ever run the 100-yard dash in 9.3 seconds, but he's wrong. And if he had a little more self-confidence, he could do it." In talking about what Johnny can do in the real world, the coach is simply exercising his competence to judge what is in fact the case, and his judgment guides his behavior as a coach. No claims of infallibility or transcendental knowledge are involved in making judgments of this sort.

The distinction between an individual's personal world and the real world is therefore not to be confused with the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena (Kant, 1961). We are not claiming to have a transcendental access to things-in-themselves which we then use as a template against which to measure a person's perceptions, beliefs, etc. Instead, the concept of the real world reflects our having standards of objectivity, completeness, accuracy, and relevance in regard to actualities and possibilities. We are using the concept in this way when we compare a person's world with the real world.

WORLD MAINTENANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION

Worlds are not once and forever things. Once formulated, the overall structure of a person's world and the states of affairs that make up that world have to be maintained or they may be lost. Thus, in general, a person alternates between maintaining his world as a whole and dealing with the particulars of his world.

When a person engages in behavior involving some particular part or aspect of his world, he is maintaining that part but simultaneously ignoring other parts and aspects of his world, including its overall structure. After

a period of time of focusing on some particular aspect of his world, a person needs to break from focusing and "mend his fences", i.e., to shift his attention to those aspects of his world he has been ignoring. Otherwise, a person begins to lose the parts and aspects of his world that he neglects with a corresponding loss of behavior potential.

By way of example, consider a working person who during working hours restricts herself to doing her job and acts (essentially) only on those reasons relevant to her work. She screens out the reasons she has as a wife, as a mother, as a skier, etc., and acts only on those reasons she has as a doctor, lawyer, or whatever. After some period of time of working, she will be ready to take a break and let herself be responsive to the larger context of her life which she has been neglecting. Ideally, she achieves an overall orientation to her world as a whole and puts her work in perspective before returning to it. She thereby maintains a world and a range of possibilities wider than the restricted set of possibilities she is acting on in her working world.

Notice that there is nothing motivational about the concept of a person maintaining a world. It is not that a person is motivated to construct and maintain a world; rather, a person just does or he is not human. The sensory deprivation experiments of Heron, Doane, and Scott (1956) underscore the notion of people as inherent world constructor/maintainers. Subjects deprived of sensory stimulation frequently begin to experience visual hallucinations. This may be seen as people doing what comes naturally, i.e., world-building and world-maintaining. In the absence of a normal, hence perceptible world, subjects experientially create a world of the kind in which behavior is possible. (In so doing, they go one step beyond the mime who elicits from his audience the imaginative creation of the world in which he is acting.)

A person not only constructs and maintains a world, but also can reconstruct that world in ways that give him or her more behavior potential. A person's world would be narrow indeed if he or she approached everything in the same way and treated everything the same way, never trying out new forms of behavior or adding new dimensions to his or her world. Such a person would be more like a machine than a human being, and we might appropriately describe him or her as "stuck in a rut". In fact, people frequently reformulate either their overall world or some part of their worlds. Such reformulation occurs in response to a person's acquisition of new concepts and new forms of behavior, in response to new experience, and in response to a person's assessment that his present world is problematic. The world is problematic for a person when that person's behavior potential is restricted unnecessarily, as judged by reference to some standard, or, colloquially, when the person is "worse off than he should be or needs to be". Under such circumstances, a person

will normally and naturally try for a reconstruction of the world such that it is no longer problematic.

Such reconstruction may occur within the existing framework of a person's world, as when a person tries to solve a practical, everyday problem. After solving such a problem, a person has more behavior potential than before, i.e., he no longer has an unnecessary restriction on his possibilities in that area of his life, but his world as a whole is basically unchanged.

World reconstruction may also involve a change in the structure of the person's world as a whole, e.g., a shift in the division of givens and options. Adolescence is frequently a time of reconstruction of this sort. For example, it is not uncommon to hear an indignant adolescent in effect insist "Why *can't* I have everything I want?" This appears to him or her to be a genuine option, and the adolescent fights against what he or she experiences as unnecessary restrictions. Only gradually does the adolescent conclude that a person can't have everything he wants in part because a lot of a person's wants are contradictory, and because different people's wants are contradictory, so that there's no way everybody can have everything they want. It usually takes some time before the adolescent reaches this conclusion and arrives at a more realistic, nonproblematic formulation of givens and options.

Not all instances of world reconstruction will qualify as problem-solving attempts. For example, a person's choice of a career is an event which may change a person's overall approach to things, so that the person puts his or her world together in a new and different way. But such reconstruction may be as much in response to learning new concepts and new social practices as in response to an assessment of unnecessary restriction.

There are a variety of ordinary activities which can serve as vehicles for the reconstruction of a problematic world. Such activities include realistic problem-solving, brainstorming, guided fantasy, daydreaming, dreaming, and others (see Ossorio, 1982c, p. 90). The activities vary in the degree to which reality constraints are operative in the activity.

When a person reconstructs his or her world via realistic problem-solving, that person works within some strong reality constraints both in formulating the problem and in formulating possible solutions. The person wants to be sure that the problem is identified correctly and that the solution doesn't involve anything unrealistic, impractical, or undoable. By contrast, when a person engages in brainstorming, he deliberately relaxes his critical thinking and verbalizes any ideas that come to his mind, regardless of whether the ideas seem irrelevant, unrealistic, or absurd. Only after the brainstorming session is over does a person evaluate whether the ideas are actual contributions toward a solution. Likewise in daydreaming, a person spontaneously relaxes the requirement that his ideas be realistic or down-to-earth, and portrays the world in such a way that

it is no longer problematic for him. During the daydream, the person does not deal with how to bring into actuality the envisioned nonproblematic state of affairs, but the daydream may nonetheless contain elements of a solution (cf. Ossorio, 1977, p. 258).

The more a person's reality constraints are relaxed, the more world reconstruction is possible. Thus, when a person faces a problem that is insoluble via ordinary problem-solving, he may be able to generate a solution via brainstorming, daydreaming, or dreaming. This is because many insoluble problems are created at least in part by having accepted something as a given that isn't necessarily a given, or by having accepted something as an option that isn't necessarily an option. As long as a person remains within his existing givens and options, he is "stuck". But once a person begins to experiment with new formulations of givens and options, a creative solution may emerge.

Dreaming is the activity in which a person's reality constraints are most relaxed, and correspondingly, the most extreme reformulation is, in principle, possible. Operating within minimal reality constraints, a person produces a dream "top down" (cf. Ossorio, 1982a, pp. 3–5), first coming up with an abstract idea or reformulation of the world and then depicting that idea by filling in some concrete details in a dream.[3] In depicting an idea in a dream, a person is relatively free of constraints regarding sequence of events, continuity of characters, consistency of place, and the like. Because of the minimal reality constraints operative while the person is filling in details, the dream may not appear to make much sense to a person upon awakening.

Accordingly, in order to understand a dream, it is necessary to "drop the details, and see what pattern remains" (Ossorio, 1979). Once the dreamer or dream interpreter sees the essential content of the dream, i.e., the world reconstruction the dreamer had in mind in producing the dream, the dreamer can then see if this reconstruction can be applied to his or her life situation. If the person applies the dream reconstruction to the practical details of his life, he thereby reintroduces reality constraints and may make the dream equivalent to practical problem-solving.

For example, imagine a young man, struggling with a vocational decision, having a dream with a series of scenes in which he repeatedly chooses self-fulfilling alternatives over alternatives which meet other people's expectations. Although the particular images and scenes of the dream vary, the pattern of making self-fulfilling choices is clear to the man when he reviews the dream. When he applies this pattern to his life, he realizes the dream reflects the way he is leaning in regard to his decision: "I'm not going to medical school; I'm going to be a writer." His interpretation connects the dream to his real life, and brings the world reconstruction he accomplished in the dream down to a practical level.

Using dreams as a vehicle for problem-solving involves three steps: First, reformulating the problematic part of the world in a dream with relative freedom from reality constraints; on awakening, dropping the nonessential details of the dream and seeing what the essential reconstruction is; and finally, reintroducing reality constraints by seeing how the dream applies to the dreamer's life situation, and by evaluating whether the reconstruction produced in the dream is an acceptable solution to the dreamer's problem.

Anything a person can do in the course of realistic problem-solving makes sense and is possible in dreaming. For example, in the course of ordinary problem-solving, sometimes we generate problem statements rather than solutions. Sometimes prior to the statement of the problem, we bring into the picture relevant facts. The same holds for dreaming. Some dreams are better understood as problem-stating rather than problem-solving, while others fit more in the category of ''thoughts''. A dream where a person seems to be musing over ideas would fit the thought category. So would a dream in which a person seems to suggest ''Here's a possibility'', but is noncommittal enough about that possibility so that the dream does not portray that possibility as a solution to a problem. The case of a problem-solving dream may therefore be understood as a Paradigm Case (Ossorio, 1981a), and problem-stating dreams and ''thought dreams'' as transformations of the Paradigm Case. Presumably, differences among the three reflect how far the dreamer is from a solution at the outset.

While it is possible in dreams for a person to do all the things he or she can do when involved in realistic problem-solving, the guarantees as to whether a person can act on a solution generated in a dream, as opposed to one produced in realistic problem-solving, are very different. With realistic problem-solving, a person has a reasonable guarantee that any solution generated can be acted upon because of the reality constraints under which the solution is produced. But for activities like brainstorming, daydreaming, dreaming, etc., the more a person's reality constraints are relaxed, the less the guarantee a person has that he can act on the reformulation produced during the activity.

For example, there is no guarantee that a person can act on a reformulation produced in a dream. A woman rebuffed by her lover may dream he has a change of heart. If that were to happen it would solve her problem, but it is not a solution she can implement. In addition, there is no guarantee that the solution generated in a dream will be acceptable to the dreamer on awakening. A man who feels trapped by an unhappy marriage may dream of his wife beheaded, but awake, find such a solution unacceptable. While the relaxation of reality constraints maximizes the possibility of generating solutions to problems, it minimizes the guarantees that the so-

lutions will be real solutions. Thus, brainstorming, daydreaming, dreaming, etc. all require a special situation in which a person will have the opportunity to reintroduce reality constraints and evaluate whether the solution generated is realistic, practical, or acceptable.

Sometimes a person is unable to generate an acceptable solution to a problem. Even in dreaming, the activity in which his or her reality constraints are most relaxed, a person may not be able to reconstruct the world enough so that the limitation on his or her behavior potential is not there. A good example is a recurrent dream in which a person portrays the problematic part of his world but is unable to see his way clear to a solution, and keeps representing the problem over and over again.

If the limitation on behavior potential is of sufficient importance, the person may be left in an impossible position. Unable to reformulate the problem as one that has a solution, and unable to reformulate his world so that he does not have that problem, the person runs out of things he can try. At this point, the person may turn to a friend, a consultant, a counselor, a priest, etc., depending on the nature of the problem. Such an adviser, operating from an observer's position, will be better placed to see where the person is blocked and to help the person reformulate his world.

In the section that follows, two examples of systematic world reconstruction, accomplished with the help of a Descriptive psychotherapist, will be presented. While the examples of world reconstruction will be drawn from psychotherapy, the conceptualization of world construction and reconstruction presented above is not merely a conceptualization for use in doing therapy. The formulation of world construction and reconstruction holds in general, and therapeutic world reconstruction is simply a special case.

THERAPEUTIC WORLD RECONSTRUCTION

If a person turns to a Descriptive psychotherapist for help, the Descriptive therapist, operating in accordance with the choice principles for doing psychotherapy and status dynamic maxims developed by Peter G. Ossorio (1976, 1982c), looks to see what it is about a client's world formulation that is leaving the client in an impossible position. After identifying the problem, the therapist comes up with a reformulation of the client's world, a reformulation that opens up new possibilities and alternatives for the client.

One of the options of a Descriptive therapist is to give the client feedback in the form of "You've been seeing and treating the world this way; try seeing and treating it *this* way instead." To the extent that the client can share the new way of seeing the therapist offers, it becomes potentially

real that the world might be that way. To the extent that the client acts on this reformulation, the world and his place in it are changed.

Mutual storytelling and dream interpretation are two techniques that are useful to psychotherapists for finding out how the client sees the world, and for offering a reformulation to the client. Both involve activities which people may use naturally in trying to reconstruct their worlds. Dreaming has already been discussed as the activity in which a person's reality constraints are most relaxed. By contrast, storytelling is subject to greater reality constraints because of the pressure to be coherent in a story. While the two examples of therapeutic world reconstruction presented below involve the use of stories and dreams, any of the reconstructive activities mentioned earlier, including brainstorming, guided fantasy, and daydreaming, may be helpful in psychotherapy.

Mutual Storytelling

Stories have been used for centuries to get people "not to be limited in the ways that they are, in how they see things, and how they live" (Ossorio, 1977, p. 132). For example, Aesop's fables have been used since the time of ancient Greece to get children not to make the mistakes they are making, and to keep them from going wrong in the ways people commonly go wrong. Likewise, the teaching stories of the Sufis, written between 800 and 1100 A.D., have been used for hundreds of years to free people from unnecessary restrictions and limitations (Shah, 1969). More recently, psychotherapists have been using storytelling as a therapeutic technique (e.g., Bergner, 1979; Gardner, 1971; Gordon, 1982).

One of the advantages of storytelling as a therapeutic technique is that the therapist can portray how the client is restricted without generating a lot of resistance. In fact, rather than defending against what the therapist is saying, "the client is drawn in because a story has a certain intrinsic interest, and he's actually working to understand it" (Ossorio, 1976, p. 214). In addition, the therapist can get the client to try out a new way of looking at things in a story without "laying it on the client" as *the* way. Having gotten across the concept by means of the story, the therapist then can get the person to act on it.

Richard Gardner, a psychoanalytic therapist, has developed the "Mutual Story-telling Technique" for use with children. According to Gardner (1971), a child's story is an "invaluable projection of unconscious processes" (p. 33). In using this technique, Gardner invites the child to participate in a "Make-Up-a-Story Television Program" and has the child tell a story into the microphone of a tape recorder. When the child has finished his or her story, Gardner in turn tells a story, using the same characters, setting, and initial situation as the child, but ending the story

so as to show a healthier resolution of the unconscious conflict portrayed in the child's story.

This technique is extremely useful for therapeutic world reconstruction. Rather than approaching the stories to learn about a child's "unconscious processes", a Descriptive therapist may look at the stories as revelatory of a child's view of the world, and his or her place in the world. A therapist can generally figure out from the child's stories what kinds of life dramas are salient for the child, and further, what restrictions on behavior potential the child has. In understanding the child's stories, the therapist "drops the details and looks for the pattern", just as in understanding dreams.

In responding to the child's stories, the therapist can help the child restructure his world by introducing new ways of relating to the world, by giving the child a sense of what it would be like to have a good place in the world, and so forth. Using the same characters, setting, and initial situation as in the child's story makes it relatively easy for a therapist to be where the child is. And since the new concept or possibility the therapist suggests to the child should be directly responsive to where the child is now, it is likely that the child will be able to act in accordance with the new possibilities that he or she has learned or come to take seriously. In each therapy hour, after the stories have been told, the therapist may use the remaining therapy time to try to see to it that the child is successful in acting on the new concept.

In order to illustrate how a therapist may help a child reconstruct his or her world via mutual storytelling, stories shared with a 9-½ year-old boy over eight months of therapy are presented in Table 1. Table 1 includes selected stories told by the boy, the themes of the stories, and the stories told by the therapist in response. The child's stories reflect the changes in his world and in his behavior potential that occurred during therapy.

The boy was initially referred for therapy because of "poor social adjustment and declining school performance". His fourth grade teacher reported that he had no friends and that he was absorbed in fantasy so much of the day at school that he was failing his schoolwork. As revealed by the child's first story, in which two astronauts die out in space, the boy could aptly be described as "spaced out" and in some danger of losing contact with reality.

Through therapy, however, the child gradually changed from being "nowhere" to being "fully one of us". In response to the view of the world presented by the therapist via stories and made real in the therapy hours, the child began to see and treat the world differently. By the end of therapy, he was no longer spaced out, had caught up on his schoolwork and passed fourth grade, was an active participant in a summer camp program, and had made several friends.

Table 1
World Reconstruction via Mutual Storytelling: Stories Shared with a 9½-year-old Boy

Date	*Child's Story*	*Theme of Child's Story*	*Therapist's Story*
12–9	Two astronauts are out in space, and their rocket ship goes out of control. The astronauts are lost in space, and die out there when they run out of oxygen.	People are nowhere and out of contact and it's hopeless.	Two astronauts are out in space, and their rocket ship goes out of control. As the signals from the rocket ship get weaker and weaker, the people at the space center realize the astronauts are in trouble. They send out a rescue ship that arrives in time and brings the astronauts safely back to earth.
1–12	The people from Earth are at war with the people from a UFO planet. The Earth people have a weapon that can spit out a fluid more destructive than hot lava, and the UFO people have a Doomsday bomb that can destroy Earth. Both planets are destroyed.	People destroy each other and everything else, too.	The people from Earth are furious at the people from a UFO planet for the ways the UFO people have let them down. The Earth people are angry enough to wipe out the entire UFO planet, and they have the weapon to do it. But they decide to give the UFO people one final chance, and this time, they are able to make peace.
2–2	A king who is very, very active lives atop a castle on a very, very steep hill. The hill is so steep that the king has never been down it. But he devises a way: He has his archers shoot down arrows with wires, and he rides a cable car down.	Somebody who's isolated succeeds in making contact and gets no credit for it.	A king who is very, very active lives atop a castle on a very, very steep hill. The hill is so steep that the king has never been down it. But he devises a way: He has his archers shoot down arrows with wires, and he rides a cable car down.

(Continued)

Table 1 (Continued)

Date	*Child's Story*	*Theme of Child's Story*	*Therapist's Story*
	He spends six months seeing the world. When he's ready to go back up, he figures out that he can pole his way back up to the castle.		A man in the valley sees him come down and is so impressed by his ingenuity that he goes to meet him. They make friends and spend six months together, seeing the world. When the king is ready to go back up, he figures out that he can pole his way back up to the castle.
	When he gets back up though, everyone just wants to hear about the world, and no one cares about his cleverness in getting back up.		When he gets back up though, everyone just wants to hear about the world, and no one cares about his cleverness in getting back up. So he comes back down and shares his success with his friend.
3–2	There is a rhinoceros who loves to run on the plains. One day he sees a tour bus full of people. He goes to see them, but they are all petrified with fear and the bus driver quickly drives away. The rhinoceros tries to keep up, but while he is running, his head hits against the bus and he quits.	Somebody tries to make contact and people won't have it. He tries, and then he quits, and then he quits everything, until somebody fixes him.	There is a rhinoceros who loves to run on the plains. One day he sees a tour bus full of people. He goes to see them, but they are all petrified with fear and the bus driver quickly drives away. The rhinoceros tries to keep up, but while he is running, his head hits against the bus and he quits.

	After this, he doesn't have anything more to do with people. Some scientists come, and he lets them do blood tests. He just stands there. He gets lazier and lazier until the scientists decide he must have brain damage. So they do an operation and then he can run again.		After this, he is so angry with people he doesn't have anything more to do with them. Some scientists come, and realize he is immobilized with anger. So they work with him, and he decides to give people another chance. He begins to run on the plains again.
3–23	There is a whale who lives to watch the seagulls. One day a seagull lands on his back, and the whale suddenly swims down deep in the ocean.	One person intrudes on another, and that creates conflict. Ending the conflict creates more conflict so they just back away.	There is a whale who likes to watch the seagulls. One day a seagull lands on his back, and the whale suddenly swims down deep in the ocean.
	The seagull is very angry, and bites the whale, and they get into a fight, with the seagull biting and the whale hitting.		When the whale surfaces, he says to the seagull, "Don't just plop down on me that way. If you want to rest on me, hover in front of me for a moment first and ask me."
	They both decide to give up at the same time, and then they get into a fight about who can give up first. They realize this is silly so they just leave each other alone after that.		The seagull apologizes, and promises to ask next time. The seagull keeps his word, and the two become friends and enjoy many wonderful days together in the ocean.
3–30	A chimpanzee goes down to look at a tour bus. Instead of it being a tour bus, it's a zoo truck, and he is captured and put in the zoo. He doesn't like it at all at first, but he learns to clap his hands like an umpire, and people throw him popcorn. But the baboons in the zoo steal his popcorn, so he figures out that he will only clap when they are out of sight.	A person makes a tentative contact and gets roped in. He learns to manage, but it's not enough. He finds another contact where he can have what fits him.	A chimpanzee goes down to look at a tour bus. Instead of it being a tour bus, it's a zoo truck, and he is captured and put in the zoo. He doesn't like it at all at first, but he learns to clap his hands like an umpire, and people throw him popcorn. But the baboons in the zoo steal his popcorn, so he figures out that he will only clap when they are out of sight.

(Continued)

Table 1 (Continued)

Date	*Child's Story*	*Theme of Child's Story*	*Therapist's Story*
	But a problem arises in that he gets so he doesn't eat vegetarian food. So the zoo keepers work with him, and he becomes the only chimp in the world who gets two meals a day, one from the zoo keepers and one from the crowd.		But he resents having to put on an act, and wishes he could just be himself and do what comes naturally again. He decides to try this, and is surprised when it works out well. The zoo keepers make sure he has good food, and the people treat him with more respect and interest.
4–6	An Elk wants people to know his second name (an Indian name), but he has a hard time communicating. So he goes to a science center where there is a machine that fits on his head and prints out his words.	A person tries to make contact and can't do it on his own. So he finds help and makes an overture. People find it good, and he has the contact he wants.	An Elk wants people to know his second name (an Indian name), but he has a hard time communicating. So he goes to a science center where there is a machine that fits on his head and prints out his words.
	He sneaks in one night and puts the cap on, and the machine prints out his thoughts: "My real name is W_____ . How do I get this off? Thank goodness." When the scientists come the next morning they find his thoughts and search everywhere for him. When they find him, he becomes famous for revealing his Indian name.		He sneaks in one night and puts the cap on, but the machine is not working. He tries all night to get the machine to work, and is thoroughly frustrated by morning. He is so frustrated that when the scientists come to work in the morning, he blurts out his Indian name. He becomes famous for revealing his name.
4–27	There is an orange bird who idolizes the fictional orange bird in Walt Disney's movie. The real bird goes out to find the fictional bird and imitate him.	A real person admires a storybook hero and tries to be like him. The storybook hero knows that a real person has something he doesn't. So there's conflict, but they resolve it positively.	There is an orange bird who idolizes the fictional orange bird in Walt Disney's movie. The real bird goes out to find the fictional bird and imitate him.

	But the fictional bird is very unhappy and is jealous of the real bird. The fictional bird wants revenge on the real bird, and blows orange smoke in many shapes at him. But he discovers that the real bird is invincible. In the end, the two birds become friends.		He meets the bird who plays the part of the fictional bird, and finds out that that bird is very unhappy. He feels trapped in the part, and is jealous of birds who get to be themselves. The bird who has to play the part decides to [Child interprets: "burn his scripts"] burn his scripts. He finds he can be himself with the real bird who came to find him, and the two become friends.
5–18	Three story sequence (abbreviated):		
	#1: about a family who takes turns putting each other in the closet at night.	People treat each other like furniture.	#1: about a boy who makes friends with the family next door and is invited over for dinner.
	#2: about two boys who run away from home and catch a freight train and find food for themselves along the track.	Two people barely manage to make it together.	#2: about two boys who run away from home and catch a freight train and are helped out by some hoboes they meet on the train.
	#3: about two boys who catch a passenger train. They get their courage up and talk to a policeman. When they don't get in trouble, they feel brave and meet all the passengers on the train.	It's safe and OK to make contact.	#3: Same story as the child's.

(Continued)

Table 1 (Continued)

Date	*Child's Story*	*Theme of Child's Story*	*Therapist's Story*
8–2	There is a tortoise who is really a wild cat on the inside. He can run farther than a cheeta, growl louder than a lion, and is bigger than a tiger. He finds the company of other tortoises boring, so he decides to go to the jungle. He gets captured by a zoo truck, however, and is put in with all the tortoises, where he is bored. One day he sneaks away to the cat cage, and lives happily there until he is discovered. Then, he is taken to the circus, and becomes famous since he is such an unusual tortoise.	A person has more power and strength than he needs, so he goes where he can use them and they're appreciated.	There is a tortoise who is really a wild cat on the inside. He can run farther than a cheeta, growl louder than a lion, and is bigger than a tiger. He finds the company of other tortoises boring, so he decides to go to the jungle. He gets captured by a zoo truck, however, and is put in with all the tortoises, where he is bored. One day he notices another tortoise who seems to be unhappy, too. They talk, and each is shocked to find a fellow tortoise who is really a wild cat inside. Together, they sneak away to the cat cage, and live happily thre until they are discovered. Then, they go the the circus and become a famous duo.
8–15	There is a gorilla who is the most unpopular of all gorillas. The head gorilla is getting old, and a new leader needs to be chosen. The unpopular gorilla wants to be the leader, but everyone laughs at him. However, he goes out and kills a lion, and everyone sees that he can do great things, so they choose him as head.	A person is an outsider, but he has the strength and talents people value. He demonstrates that, and becomes an insider.	No story told.

Dream Interpretation

Like storytelling, dreaming and dream interpretation have been recognized for centuries as vehicles for world reconstruciton. For example, the New Testament records a dream of Peter's, in which Peter sees food that is not kosher, and hears a voice insisting that he should eat it (Acts 10.9). Peter interprets the dream as meaning that he should teach the gospel of Christ to Gentiles, rather than restricting his teaching to Jews only. This leads Peter to make a radical social and religious change in his world.

In the twentieth century, dream interpretation has been recognized as a valuable tool for the psychotherapist since Freud (1953) published *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Theorists have developed a number of approaches to interpreting dreams which may be used in psychotherapy, and we will review some of these approaches in the final section of this paper.

One of the advantages of using clients' dreams in psychotherapy is that the therapist can tap into the person's ongoing assessment of the problem. To the extent that a person is willing to share dreams and work with the therapist on them, the therapist has access to the person's changing formulations of the problem and to potential solutions as they are generated by the person. A second advantage of working with dreams is that the therapist has some practical assurance in working with the dream that he or she is working with something important and not will-o'-the-wisp, since the dream medium lends itself to fundamental sorts of problems. Moreover, working with dreams makes it easy for the therapist to be where the client is, since a correct dream interpretation captures the client's own thinking.

In introducing clients to the notion that working with dreams may be helpful in therapy, it is not necessary to discuss world construction and reconstruction. Speaking of dreams as vehicles for problem-stating and problem-solving is a simple heuristic way of talking that usually captures clients' attention and interest. If the client is not already a dream recaller, some suggestions on remembering dreams may also be in order (e.g., Faraday, 1972, Appendix A).

When the client brings his first dream to the therapist, and the therapist successfully "drops the details" and shares the dream pattern with the client, the client may be surprised both to see that the dream is meaningful, and to see the relation of the dream to his life. It is not uncommon for clients initially to treat their own dreams as if they were produced by someone or something else, e.g., by "the unconscious". It is important therapeutically that a person realize that he or she is the creator of the dream. Usually there is a small self-esteem boost when the person realizes "*I* came up with that. . . . How about that!"

In addition, a person needs to realize that as the dream's creator, he or she is in the best position to recognize when an interpretation is right.

In fact, the person's recognition of an interpretation as correct is relatively authoritative, since his recognition is the best single mark of the fact that that's what he produced the dream *as* (cf. "the picture of Winston Churchill" in Ossorio, 1980, chap. 4).

When a person accepts being the creator of his or her dreams, occasionally he or she asks the question "How do I do it?" The therapist needs to illustrate for the client what is wrong with the question, and can often do so by asking several corresponding questions, e.g., "How do you add one and one and get two?" "If you have an idea, how would you put it in image form?"

More frequently the complaint "Why can't *I* just see what my dreams mean?" is heard. In response, reassuring the client that "You *can* see, with the proper practice and experience" may be in order. Dream interpretation is a skill, and like any skill, requires some practice and experience before a person is proficient at it. Part of the skill in dream interpretation involves dropping the right details. A dream interpreter is already responding to the pattern in dropping the details that he does, and it takes some practice before this comes naturally.

In addition, it may be helpful to point out that even when a person is skillful at dream interpretation, when it comes to seeing what his or her own dreams mean, the issue of givens and options enters in. The dream reconstruction was generated while the person's givens were relaxed. Awake, however, the person is again operating within his or her givens, and this may make it difficult to see the meaning of the dream. A person may get around this difficulty by taking an observer's view of his own dreams: "Imagine a friend of yours in this situation told you this dream. What would you make of it?" By shifting to an observer's position, the person may be better placed to see the meaning of his dreams.

In order to illustrate how a therapist may use dreams in helping a client reconstruct his or her world, selected dreams shared by a 24-year-old woman over six months of therapy are presented in Table 2. Notice that while Table 2 includes the dream pattern, i.e., the essential reconstruction accomplished in the dream, the application of the dream pattern to the practical details of the woman's life is not included. For reasons of confidentiality and space, this last step of dream interpretation is not included here, although it is routinely a part of therapy.

The woman's presenting problem was that in spite of having "a good job and a good relation to a man", she was unhappy and nervous. During the day she was ruminating over brutality she had suffered in the past, and at night, she was grinding her teeth and having recurring nightmares about being killed. After the nightmares of October 23 and 30 were reported, the therapist suggested to the client that she "turn and face her killer", similar to the Senoi dream policy of "advance and attack in the

Table 2
World Reconstruction via Dream Interpretation:
Dreams Shared by a 24-year-old Woman

Date	*Dream*	*Pattern*
Childhood around age 5	I remember a recurrent dream about a young girl, dressed up like a woman, walking up to a house, never able to reach it.	A child who has to be an adult in order to be secure, and can't make it.
Early teens	I remember dreaming that I was trying to hold onto something to survive. I'm not sure what I was holding onto.	Someone whose hold on life is precarious, but tenacious, and who succeeds even though she doesn't know what she's doing.
10–23	My boss is shooting friends, family, etc., in the head. There is blood everywhere.	Someone or something is taking away everything I might have counted on. There's no one left on whom I can depend, and it's a bloody sort of realization, a terrifying reality.
10–23	A man is coming into my house to kill me. I struggle with him, and wake up afraid.	Life is a life-and-death struggle.
10–30	I am alone in the family room at my boyfriend's apartment, and I hear a woman screaming outside. My boyfriend's brother and his girlfriend do not hear her, and do not listen to my fears. I go to let a dog inside for protection. As I unfasten the dog's leash, I see the black shadow of a man, approaching me. I wake up afraid.	Someone is alone. Someone is vulnerable. You can't count on anyone. Maybe you can't count on anything in a world of men.
10–30	I am in a house with a lot of people, and my brother Mack is outside going crazy, trying to kill my sister Sharon. "They" take Mack away, but then I realize Sharon is crazy, too, out to kill everybody, but me first. I try to warn people, but no one listens.	Nothing makes sense. No one is safe from anybody. No one can help anyone.
11–13	I am on my way home, and a man is standing outside my apartment building. I want to get away from him, but as soon	Men are deadly. Men are not deadly.

(Continued)

Table 2 (Continued)

Date	*Dream*	*Pattern*
	as I get inside the building, there is another man, out to kill me. I get my key in the door, and feel the warmth of the man, approaching me from behind. He is going to kill me and I am struggling, but then he convinces me it isn't going to hurt. I try to help him shoot me, putting the gun up to my chest. I get very frustrated when the bullets won't go into my body.	
11–24	I am with my 6-year-old niece, but I leave her momentarily. Then I cannot find her. I hire a man to help me look for her. Then, I find Fred (her boyfriend), and he helps me look. At last we find her, frightened and upset. But then I wander off again.	People are not alone. People may help people. People may help people help people. Sometimes. Maybe.
12–3	I let Fred into my apartment via the apartment buzzer, but the man who comes in is not Fred. I scream for help, but no one helps me. The man finally lets go of me, and then people come to help me. I take them into my apartment, but the man has his suitcases there, acts as if he belongs there.	Who goes there: friend or foe?
12–9	There is a woman in the bathroom, trying to fix the toilet. I am holding shit, and the woman helps me dispose of it down the bathtub drain.	Woman are ok. They can do things to help each other. They don't have to put up with all the shit.
12–17	I am going out on a date, except every time I go to meet my date he says "Are you going to wear that?" I keep going back and changing, and we never go out.	People are different: How can they get along? How can they do thing together?
12–26	I am going to be kidnapped by two men and a woman. I try to tell my sister, but she won't take me seriously.	Who's on whose side? Who can work with whom? Who can help whom?

Table 2 (Continued)

Date	*Dream*	*Pattern*
12–26	I am on a roller coaster, holding on desperately because I am not strapped in. Later, I realize I am strapped in.	You can be safe even when you're not cozy.
1–7	My sister is having a birthday party, and my father fails to come.	There are some good things in life, but some people let you down.
1–7	I go with a man to find a girl who has been waiting a long time atop a mountain, and bring the girl back with me.	People help people. Some people you can count on.
1–7	I am helping another woman with a trapeze act, and we are sharing a costume. Later, we are waterskiing, but there is only one bikini bottom. I give it to the other woman, and stand bare-bottomed in the lake.	People not only help other people; sometimes they give things up for each other.
1–14	I am in bed with my friend's boyfriend, but he looks crazy and I'm afraid. In the bed next to me are a number of women. After I notice them, my sense of danger passes.	You don't have to be afraid of men if you're a woman.
1–14	A man is pouring gasoline over me, and is about to light a match. I run in circles in fear until all the gasoline has evaporated.	Men can be risky, but it's not fatal.
1–23	My brother, who is crazy in the dream, has raped my sister. I know I'm next, and run to the police for help. But the police do not take me seriously. Then I realize the cop is on my brother's side. I begin to stick a hat pin into the cop's head, and he does not defend himself. My brother sits and laughs. I wake up crying uncontrollably.	Even in a crazy world, I'm not helpless.
2–6	Fred has his arms around me, and his arms are gradually filling up with air (like a device for taking blood pressure), strangling me.	You have to get past appearances because the reality may be different.

(Continued)

Table 2 (Continued)

Date	*Dream*	*Pattern*
3 2	I am living at a house with my mother and sister, and I'm going out on a date. I end up at a cabin with my date where something strange is going on. tell my date I don't want any part of this, and he does not force me. Later, we're alone in a car and I "come on" to him, but he rejects me.	"Go with the flow . . "Strike while the iron is hot."
3–2	I have an egg in my hand. I know the contents are dead, but when I open the egg, there are two little birds who would have lived, along with one dead bird.	Don't hurry things, or you may kill the possibility.
4–30	I am learning how to ski, and Fred is watching TV at the foot of the mountain. He will not ski with me, but does come up the mountain to kill a small spider for me.	Someone is helpful, but you can't be close to him in the ways that really count.
4–30	I am trapped by an evil man. Whenever the evil man is not around, a good man tries to help me escape over a fence. I almost get over, but cannot quite make it. On the other side of the fence, people are making love. I have the feeling if I can just get the evil man's costume off, things will be ok. I get his shirt off, but it's not enough.	I could love him if only I could wipe out the evil I see in him.

Note: In accord with the "Ethical Principles of Psychologists", all identifying information in the preceding dreams has been disguised.

teeth of danger" (Stewart, 1969, p. 163). As can be seen in the November 13 dream, she was able to do this, and the changes in her world, reflected in her dreams, began.

The dream sequence culminates in the dream of January 23, in which the woman portrays herself as competent even in a crazy world. After this, the dreams change qualitatively as she begins to wrestle with issues like how to make good judgments ("Now that I know it's possible to win at this game, how do I make the right moves?"). The pair of dreams from March 2 is noteworthy, in that the dreams reflect alternative policies for action. These dreams fit the category of thoughts discussed above, in which

a person suggests "Here's a possibility" and "Here's another possibility", but is noncommittal regarding which course of action to take.

As revealed in the dreams, by the end of therapy the woman's world had changed from being a crazy, brutal place to a place where safety and affection were possible. In addition, the woman's ruminations, bruxism, and nightmares had stopped, and her nervousness was diminishing as she learned to recognize and deal with provocations on her job and with her boyfriend.

IN REVIEW: DREAMING

The conceptualization of world reconstruction presented and illustrated above provides a comprehensive, systematic framework in which it is possible to make sense of a range of facts, including facts about dreaming. Within this framework, we have explained why we may come up with better solutions to our problems in our dreams that we do awake, why dreams do not appear to make much sense on awakening, why dreams need interpretation, and why we have recurrent dreams. We will now look at the relationship of some of the major psychological theories about dreaming to this conceptualization, and also address some methodological considerations.

Theories About Dreaming

Three of the major theorists who wrote about dreams—Freud, Adler, and Jung—have presented psychological theories that say in an abstract and universal way what problems there are to be solved by people. The dream theory of each is a statement in his own theoretical language that dreams are a way to solve *those* problems.[4] For example, according to Freud, the universal human problem is how to achieve instinctual gratification. Correspondingly, he sees dreams as providing hallucinatory gratification of repressed infantile wishes (Freud, 1953, p. 553). These infantile wishes are usually disguised in dreams on account of censorship and dream distortion, and the task of dream interpretation is to find the latent wish behind the manifest content of the dream.

Adler theorized that the universal problems to be solved by people are how to achieve power and superiority and how to maintain a life style. Correspondingly, he saw dreams as a way to achieve these things. Adler (1932) says explicitly:

> If, during the day, we are occupied with striving towards the goal of superiority, we must be occupied with the same problem at night. Everyone must dream as if he had a task to fulfill in dreaming, as if he had to strive towards superiority also in his dreams. The dream must be a product of the style of life, and it must help to build up and enforce the style of life. (p. 98)

Adler felt that dreams enforce the life style first by arousing feelings that give a person the emotional power to keep acting in accordance with his

style of life, and second, by appearing to provide solutions to problems, solutions which are in accordance with the life style but which may violate common sense. He felt that we fool ourselves in dreams, and use dreams to justify and maintain our striving towards superiority, rather than learning to adapt to reality and to cooperate. He concluded that "the fact that dreams are designed to fool us accounts for the fact that they are so rarely understood" (Adler, 1932, p. 107). Given Adler's disparagement of dreams, it is ironical that he is frequently described without qualification as having a problem-solving view of dreams (e.g., Webb & Cartwright, 1978, p. 244).

Jung believed that the universal human problem was how to achieve psychic integration and wholeness, and he saw dreams as the expression of an unconscious psychic process towards wholeness. Jung (1969b) writes:

> Since everything living strives for wholeness, the inevitable one-sidedness of our conscious life is continually being corrected and compensated by the universal human being in us. . . . The essential content of the dream action is a sort of finely attuned compensation of the one-sidedness, errors, deviations, or other shortcomings of the conscious attitude. (pp. 292, 295).

If the conscious attitude is too maladaptive, the "merely compensating function of the unconscious becomes a guiding, prospective function" (Jung, 1969a, p. 257), and the unconscious may lead a person towards wholeness through his dreams. Jung acknowledges that he is not "in possession of a generally satisfying theory or explanation of this complicated phenomenon. We still know far too little about the nature of the unconscious psyche for that" (1969b, p. 297).

Although a thorough critique of these three theories will not be presented here, we may note that each theory preempts the kinds of problems a person may be recognized as solving. If a person takes a particular theory seriously and remains within the givens of the theory in interpreting dreams, he will have an unnecessary limitation on his behavior potential because only a narrow range of dream interpretations will fit within the constraints of the theory. In contrast, a person operating within the conceptualization of world reconstruction presented above will not have this problem. Because of the comprehensiveness of the conceptualization, someone using it may recognize when a person is wrestling in his dreams with limitations such as being unsatisfied, powerless, one-sided or fragmented, but also when a person is wrestling with a range of other human problems.

In practice, of course, therapists who work with clients' dreams may not remain within the constraints of their theories in interpreting dreams. This was true for Freud: Freud does not interpret a single dream in *The Interpretation of Dreams* in terms of a repressed infantile wish (see Jones, 1970, pp. 11–12). For therapists who practice outside of their theoretical

constraints, the formulation offered here may provide a rationale for the kinds of interpretations they in fact give.

In contrast to Freud, Adler, and Jung, Hadfield is a theorist whose work on dreams is not formulated within any general psychological theory. He is included here because he is one of the first, and most pragmatic, of modern theorists who take a problem-solving approach to dreams. Hadfield (1954) states that "the function of dreams is that by means of reproducing the unsolved experiences of life, they work towards a solution of these problems" (p. 65).

While Hadfield writes many things about dreams that make sense, there are several problems with his theory. First, his theory is arbitrary and ad hoc, and not grounded in any more general conceptual framework. Second, Hadfield tends to omit persons from his theory, and writes his entire book as if dreams themselves are a kind of agent. In one section (pp. 111–112) he cautions against such "looseness of language", and yet does not come up with a satisfactory alternative. He suggests that "in dreams the rejected side of our problem makes its voice heard" (p. 111), and that a dream "is the voice of the discarded self" (p. 112), and then concludes the section by saying (loosely) that "the dream acts as a corrective to our hasty judgments and often induces us to reverse them" (p. 112).

Finally, Hadfield's formulation involves the use of magical terms in his explanation of how dream solve problems. For example, he states that "the dream solves [our problems] subconsciously more effectively than we can by conscious reasoning. How this comes about we do not know; we can only ascribe it to subconscious processes of which we know little" (pp. 114–115). Again, he recognizes the inadequacy of this way of talking, but is unable to provide an alternative.

In contrast to Hadfield's theory, the conceptualization of world reconstruction presented above does not involve an ad hoc assertion that dreams solve problems, but rather provides a systematic framework in which it is possible to understand why dreams may be useful for problem-solving. It is not subject to the problem of "the ghost outside the [dream] machine" (cf. Ossorio, 1978, pp. 184–186), but rather includes persons within the conceptualization. Finally, the explanations developed within the conceptualization are systematic and mundane, and do not involve any mysterious or occult processes.

Ego psychologists such as Erikson (1954), Jones (1962), and French and Fromm (1964) have also offered problem-solving views of dreams. For example, French and Fromm see the dream as an attempt of the ego to solve a "focal conflict" of the dreamer. This focal conflict has to do with a current problem in the dreamer's interpersonal relationships, which relates to earlier infantile conflicts. The ego substitutes a succession of more manageable problems for the original problem in a series of dreams, in an attempt to find a solution to the current problem. The pattern of sub-

stitutions employed by the ego in the dreams is believed to resemble a similar pattern of successive attempts in the dreamer's past to find solutions to earlier developmental conflicts.

Following the discovery of the physiological relationship between REM sleep and dreaming, theorists such as Ullman (1962), Jones (1970), and Greenberg, Pillard and Pearlman (1972), attempted to integrate ego psychology concepts with physiological concepts, and proposed theories regarding the "adaptive" functions of dreams. For example, Greenberg et al. hypothesized that the function of REM sleep is to assimilate anxiety aroused by stressful situations so that subsequent waking behavior will be more adaptive. They hypothesize that "when an individual meets a situation that is stressful for him, the stressfulness is due to the arousal of memories of prior difficulties with similar situations" (Greenberg et al., 1972, p. 260). REM sleep serves to integrate current stressful experiences with similar experiences from the past, thus enabling the person to use his characteristic defenses for that particular set of memories to deal with the current situation. They have reported several experimental studies using "presleep stress" in support of their theory (Greenberg et al., 1972; Grieser, Greenberg, & Harrison, 1972).

Both the theory of French and Fromm, and the theory of Greenberg and Pearlman restrict the kinds of problems that a person may be recognized as solving in dreams. On these views, only emotional problems or prior problems can be addressed by dreams. In addition, the theories leave much unspecified concerning *who* does the problem-solving in dreams: Is it the ego? Is it REM sleep? These theories also fail to explain adequately how the dream integrates past and present experiences in solving problems.

We will conclude our review of theories by looking at the range of possibilities about dreaming that Aristotle explored. In his essay, *On Divination in Sleep,* Aristotle (1931) recognizes the value of dreams for early diagnosis of medical problems. He notes that when people are awake, they are usually too active to notice slight symptoms of impending illness, but in the stillness of sleep, people are more likely to notice signs of disease. He writes that "even scientific physicians tell us that one should pay diligent attention to dreams", since the "beginnings [of disease] must be more evident in sleeping than in waking moments" (463a).

Aristotle also noted that dreams may predispose a person to certain actions. Just as we may dream about some behavior we engaged in during the day, we may engage in behavior that we dreamt about the night before.

> The movements set up first in sleep should also prove to be the starting-points of actions to be performed in the daytime, since the recurrence by day of thought of these actions also has had its way paved for it in the images before the mind at night. (463a)

Finally, Aristotle wrote about the possibility of precognitive dreams, which he explained by a theory of transmission of movements through the ether.

Examining these ideas in light of the conceptualization presented here, we may categorize dreams that are diagnostic of physical illness under the heading of problem-stating dreams, in which a person is seeking to make explicit and explain some slight interference or limitation in normal functioning. Dreams that predispose a person to a certain action come under the heading of problem-solving dreams, in which a person has decided how to treat a given situation.

The possibility of precognitive dreams may also be understood in light of the conceptualization. Since dreaming is a state in which a person's reality constraints are most relaxed, it is possible while dreaming for a person to be receptive to certain kinds of influence or information about the world, information that does not fit within his or her ordinary reality constraints. The conceptualization therefore allows for the possibility of genuinely precognitive dreams, rather than dreams that are just a self-diagnosis of a medical problem or a self-fulfilling prophecy of what a person has decided to do.

Although this review has not exhausted the areas of interest regarding dreams or the related literature, we have shown the relationship of various dream theories to the conceptualization of world reconstruction. As can be seen, none of these theories comes close to providing the scope or explanatory power regarding facts and possible facts about dreams that the present conceptualization does.

Methodological Considerations

The formulation of dreams presented above is sufficiently different from traditional formulations so that some familiar ways of thinking and talking may create difficulties for the reader. For example, one way of thinking that may be problematic involves the notion that of course one has to distinguish among theories of dream interpretation, dream formation, and dream function.

By way of background, we may note that Freud originally introduced these categories. In *The Interpretation of Dreams,* Freud (1953) devotes separate chapters to setting forth a method of interpreting dreams, to stating principles regarding the formation of dreams, and to speculating regarding "the psychology of the dream-processes", including their function. Jones (1970) reiterates Freud's distinction between dream interpretation and dream function, and attempts to modify Freud's theory about the function of dreaming in light of contemporary knowledge about the physiology of sleep.

The distinction between dream function and dream interpretation corresponds to the difference between asking "Why do people dream?" and

asking "How do I tell what dreams mean (or what this dream means)?" In order to bring to light some of the issues involved in raising "Why do people dream (at all)?" as a separate question, we may examine a parallel question, i.e., "Why do people drink wine (at all)?" Within a psychological framework, the appropriate response would be "It's one of the things that people do. What's the mystery that needs explaining?" Furthermore, we could point out that, as with all behavior, the function of drinking wine depends on the context, so that a given case of drinking wine might serve any one of a number of functions. For example, it might serve religious functions, inebriative functions, business functions, medicinal functions, social functions, assuasive functions, digestive functions, soporific functions, bacchanalian functions, and on and on. Note that if we are treating wine drinking *as* wine drinking, there is no categorical difference between what its function is and what it means (the "interpretation" of the behavior).

If we introduce a nonpsychological framework, however, we may create a necessity for the distinction between function and meaning. For example, one biochemical function of wine-drinking is to depress the central nervous system, and this "function" will, in most cases, be different from the psychological significance of the behavior (although of course a person who knows about biochemistry may drink wine for the sake of depressing his or her central nervous system).

Similarly with dreams, we may take a reductive approach to the study of dreams, and introduce a nonpsychological framework in which dreaming needs explaining. For example, we may introduce a biological framework, and say that "A dream serves to alert the organism in preparation for mammalian fight or flight patterns." We may introduce a physiological framework, and say that "A dream serves to reorganize firing patterns in the central nervous system." And so forth. In these cases, nonpsychological "functions" contrast with the meaning of a dream.

Both Freud and Jones wanted to understand dreams within a biological framework. It is evident in their writings that they assumed that the psychology of persons was derivative of the biology of Homo sapiens. In the case of Freud, the influence of Darwinian thought on Freudian theory is well known. With regard to Jones, a brief quote will illustrate his biological bias: "If dreaming serves purposes of its own, they are purposes which have issued from and based themselves upon pre-existent neurophysiological phenomena" (Jones, 1970, p. 42). The distinction between dream function and dream interpretation used by Freud and Jones was necessitated by their presuppositions.

In Descriptive Psychology, there is no *a priori* assumption that the psychology of persons is a derivative of the biology of Homo sapiens. In fact, Ossorio (1982b) makes a clear distinction between the psychological con-

cept of person and the biological concept of Homo sapiens. Persons, their behavior, and in this case, their dreams, are understood in a fundamental behavioral framework which is not a derivative of any other framework. Thus, the stipulation of a fundamental distinction between the function and interpretation of dreams is not particularly useful here, and the distinctions implied by these terms are codified in other ways (e.g., first person vs. third person description).

Likewise, talking about dream formation was useful for Freud's purposes, but it is not particularly useful for ours. In the context of psychoanalytic theory, where all sorts of subterranean processes are already postulated, one has to discuss what sort of subterranean processes are involved in producing dreams, in addition to discussing the dream itself (i.e., the "manifest" dream). But since the explanations of dreaming given in the present formulation do not involve any occult processes, there is no necessity and little use for Freud's distinction between the processes of dream formation and the dream itself.

For the person who insists upon using the categories of dream formation, dream interpretation, and dream function with respect to this formulation, in spite of their minimal utility, we may note the following:

1. The notion of producing a dream "top down" may be categorized as a concept of dream formation. (In this respect, the production of dreams is no different from the production of behaviors [see Ossorio, 1982a, pp. 3–5])
2. The notion of "dropping the details" may be categorized as a model for interpretation.
3. The notion of world maintenance and world reconstruction may be placed under the heading of function. The formulation has the virtue that function, formation, and interpretation connect directly and systematically to each other.

Another familiar way of talking that may create difficulties for the reader is talking about a "mere clinical demonstration" as opposed to a "rigorous laboratory experiment". Since clinical demonstrations are considered inferior to experimental demonstrations, the reader may be wondering "Aren't you going to present the *research* on dreams as problem-solving?" As Cartwright points out after a thorough review of the research literature, the "hypothesis that dreams are rehearsals or trial solutions to current problems has received no direct test despite the common support for this belief from many writers based on their clinical experience" (Webb & Cartwright, 1978, p. 244).

There are a number of well-known studies which looked at the effect of presleep stimulation on dream content. For example, Witkin and Lewis

(1967) showed films of childbirth and of a male initiation rite to subjects prior to sleep, and then studied subsequent dreams as representations of these waking experiences. Breger, Hunter, and Lane (1971) looked at what they took to be the effects of real life stressors (major surgery and group therapy) on dream content. Cartwright (1974a) instructed subjects to think about changing a personal characteristic (e.g., shyness, laziness) which she had previously identified as being of concern to them, and looked at their subsequent dreams. She notes that a major problem faced by researchers using presleep stimuli to study dream content is that "subjects typically ignore the experimenters' wishes once asleep, and continue to dream their own dreams" (Webb & Cartwright, 1978, p. 237).

There are also studies of the effect of an interval of REM sleep on subsequent waking behavior. The studies of Greenberg and Pearlman cited above fit this category. In one study, Greenberg et al. (1972) showed subjects a film of an autopsy, and found that REM-deprived subjects were more anxious during a second viewing of the film than subjects who had normal sleep or subjects who were awakened in non-REM sleep. Cartwright (1974b) used the Thematic Apperception Test in one of her studies, and found that subjects allowed to sleep for a period of time told endings to stories that were more unsatisfactory for the hero of their stories than did subjects who did not sleep. (Notice that these sorts of studies do not involve an examination of the dream itself.)

While the effects of presleep stimuli on dream content and the effects of REM sleep on subsequent waking behavior are interesting, studies examining these effects cannot be considered to be investigations of the notion that dreams may be attempts at problem-solving. In fact, there seem to be only two studies that would qualify as attempts to demonstrate this idea. Dement (1972), after presenting a delightful collection of anecdotal evidence regarding the problem-solving potential of dreams, also presents a series of three experiments he conducted using undergraduates in his classes as subjects. The problems involved were puzzles similar to anagrams, and Dement developed a scoring system to judge to what extent the subjects' dreams were related to the puzzles. Even though solutions were reported in only seven out of 1,148 dreams, and even though Dement recognized the methodological shortcomings of his experiment, he concluded that the experiment gave "a valid indication of the possibility, albeit rarely evidenced, of problem solving during sleep" (Dement, 1972, p. 100).

Davé (1979) presents a study involving 24 subjects who were "at an impasse in the course of working on an academic, vocational, avocational, or personal problem or project" (p. 295). Half of his subjects received a "rational-cognitive treatment" to help them resolve their impasse, while the other half received a "hypnotic dream treatment" in which dreams were induced using hypnosis. Only one subject in the rational-cognitive

treatment group overcame his impasse, compared to nine subjects in the hypnotic dream group. Davé concludes that the role of dreaming in solving problems has "received initial and encouraging experimental support while awaiting more exacting confirmation" (p. 302).

With due respect to Dement and Davé, it may be helpful to have a set of criteria for doing further experiments to demonstrate the problem-solving possibilities of dreams. For a rigorous experimental demonstration of a dream's problem-solving possibilities, the following criteria are suggested.

1. The problem set by the experimenter has to constitute a real, personally meaningful problem for the subject.
2. Along with being personally meaningful, the problem has to be salient and operative, so that it will not be preempted by other, more serious, personal problems.
3. The experimenter needs to be able to specify for each subject what the problem is for a given dream. Most experimental designs would require that the problem be the same for all subjects.
4. The individual dreams have to be analyzed in some principled way in order to establish that the dreams qualify as an effort to solve the specific problem, and perhaps to what extent this is the case.

Until we have more research as responsive to these criteria as the Davé study, and until our methodology is sophisticated enough to fit the phenomena, clinical examples are the most rigorous evidence that dreams are routinely interpretable as tentative world reconstructions.

A third way of talking that may create difficulties for the reader has to do with the idea that psychological formulations are necesarily theories, and the truth of these theories needs to be demonstrated by research. This thesis is itself apparently a theory which is unsupported by research. A reader who is unfamiliar with Descriptive Psychology might well be wondering, "Are you suggesting that we accept your theory about dreams as God's Truth, even in the absence of experiments to *prove* it?" In fact, the formulation presented here is not a theory about dreams at all, and we have made no claims regarding the truth or universality of the formulation. We will review and clarify what we have done.

In the beginning of the paper, we introduced a set of concepts, including the concepts of a person's world, a person's behavioral possibilities (behavior potential), the real world, world construction, world maintenance, and world reconstruction. We explored some of the conceptual connections between these concepts, and illustrated their use.

After presenting this primary conceptual formulation, we had three possible options: (a) to continue to articulate concepts in greater detail, (b) to introduce a theory, or (c) to introduce a model (see Ossorio, in

press). As Ossorio points out, a model involves a claim that there is a point in talking a certain way and acting accordingly, usually in a given context or for certain purposes, without any associated claim of truth or universality.

We chose the third option, and the model we introduced had to do with considering activities such as brainstorming, daydreaming, or dreaming as examples of world reconstruction. We used the term "problem-solving" as a generic term for all these forms of world reconstruction, and it was in this broader sense that we considered daydreams or dreams as problem-solving efforts. Notice that this is not a theory, and it is not a statement that these activities are in fact problem-solving. Rather, it is a claim that for certain purposes, e.g. psychotherapy, there is a point in talking that way.

We then demonstrated the usefulness of this model in the context of psychotherapy. This is not the only context in which the model has utility, however. It might be used, for example, in understanding the lack of physical and mental disease among the Senoi, a Malayan tribe which includes dream interpretation as an integral part of daily life (Stewart, 1969). It might be used in understanding why a variety of scientific breakthroughs have occurred in dreams (Dement, 1972). It might be used to understand the age-old adage "sleep on it before you decide." And on and on.

In conclusion, we may note that the model presented here provides a systematic basis for understanding and approaching dreams as problem-solving. Moreover, the procedure described for interpreting dreams has a reality check, namely in the application to a person's real life. We therefore have a sensitive empirical basis for finding out in a given case whether or not it is helpful to approach a dream as problem-solving. If it is not, no harm has been done by approaching it provisionally that way. (Note that one interpreter's inability to formulate a given dream in such a way that its problem-solving status is clear does not constitute definitive evidence that that dream is not in fact a problem-solving effort, any more than a given experimenter's failure to demonstrate a given relation experimentally in a given context is definitive evidence that it is not there.)

Using the model presented here helps us to uncover the problem-solving potential which dreams have, so that we do not have an unnecessary restriction on our understanding and behavior potential with respect to dreams. In effect, the present paper provides a problem-solving formulation, as opposed to a God's Truth formulation, of what a dream is.

SUMMARY

Rather than being "given" or "taken", worlds are "created", "maintained", and "reconstructed" by people. People construct and maintain

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SUMMARY

Rather than being "given" or "taken", worlds are "created", "maintained", and "reconstructed" by people. People construct and maintain

worlds that give them behavior potential, and routinely try to reconstruct those worlds in ways that give them more potential. Problem-solving is a special case of world reconstruction, and there is a variety of ordinary activities which we may treat as vehicles for the reconstruction of a problematic world.

The primary conceptualization of world construction and reconstruction having been presented, and the model of treating activities like dreaming as world reconstructive having been discussed, the use of the conceptualization and model was demonstrated in three particular areas: first, in helping children reconstruct their worlds via mutual storytelling; second, in helping people reconstruct their worlds via dreaming and dream interpretation; and finally, in throwing light on various facts and theories about dreams.

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Address: Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program, 10400 East Alameda Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80231.

NOTES

1. What is involved here is primarily a logical priority which it is plausible to suppose is near-universally also a temporal priority, though there is seldom occasion to make a point of it and often good reason not to make a point of it. The logical priority reflects the fact that the reason the parts are there at all is that they are put there as implementations of the whole, and presumably, were they not available the whole would be implemented in other ways (Ossorio, personal communication, December 17, 1983).

2. When we say that "the limitations of the real world reflect reality constraints", we are using the concept of reality as "a boundary condition on our possible behaviors" (Ossorio, 1978, p. 35). Rather than talking about a person's behavioral possibilities by reference to the objects, processes, etc. in the real world which provide persons with possibilities for behavior and constaints on behavior, we are using the concept of reality to talk directly about the possibilities and limitations. The concept of reality is a way of talking "explicitly about the constraints on possible behaviors, rather than talking about objects which provide the constraints" (Ossorio, 1977, p. 220).

3. See note 1, above.

4. Both Freud and Jung also allowed for the possibility of dreams which were the result of traumatic experiences such as war. Jung (1969a) called such dreams "pure reaction dreams", and felt that these dreams were "essentially only a reproduction of the trauma" (p. 261). Freud (1955) saw such dreams as an exception to his wish-fulfillment theory. He writes:

> If we are not to be shaken in our belief in the wish-fulfilling tenor of dreams by the dreams of traumatic neurotics, we still have one resource open to us: we may argue that the function of dreaming, like so much else, is upset in this condition and diverted from its purposes. (p. 13)

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SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND RELIGIONS

Mary McDermott Shideler

ABSTRACT

This paper has a double thrust, theological and psychological. The first has to do with the relations of science with religion, and of disparate religions with one another, as exemplars of the familiar phenomenon, "multiple descriptions of the same thing"—"the same thing" being, in all these cases, the real world. This is a problem which Descriptive Psychology deals with directly, efficiently, and without doing violence to any description of the real world, persons, or behavior. As I shall show, however, that way of handling those issues raises a second, very practical problem of our need for certainties, for absolutes, for dependable truths—one aspect of the basic human need for order and meaning. So I shall end with the Descriptive Psychology approach to meeting that critical need.

Over the past hundred years or so, few problems have exercised theologians more consistently than the two that I am bringing together here. The first is the relation of science and religion. The second is the relation among diverse and often disparate religions. I have chosen to discuss them

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together because they constitute two exemplars of the very common phenomenon called "multiple descriptions of the same thing". We encounter other instances of this phenomenon whenever we hear two persons give different accounts of the same event, whenever we learn something that throws a new light on a situation, whenever we undergo a conversion, whether political, religious, romantic, or whatever. Having seen and described the world in one way, we now see and describe it in another. Closely related is what happens when a person who has been imbued with one culture is transported to another, as in the case of displaced persons, college freshmen, and others suffering from culture shock. And this is not by any means an exhaustive list of instances where different people, or the same person at different times, describe the same thing in very different ways.

I

Scientists purport to describe the real world. So do Christians, Jews, Moslems, Buddhists, atheists, and—no doubt—Australian aborigines, African pygmies, and everybody else between, below, and above. These descriptions are not only diverse; some of them are incompatible. Our first question, therefore, has to do with how we can justify the assertion that we are describing the same thing. The answer is obvious but not simple: that each of us claims to be, and is, describing the real world of people and automobiles, mountains and planets, physicists and laboratories, priests and sacred places, computers and kitchen stoves.

I shall be using "real world" (or more simply, "the world") as a place-holder, like "what is happening in the next room" or "what goes on in a university" or "what this marriage relationship is". Each of these identifies a state of affairs without articulating *what* that state of affairs is, that is, what it is that is happening in the next room, or what it is that obtains in this marriage. Those particulars must be specified separately and, in these cases, they must be discovered empirically. We go into the next room, or we ask questions of the husband and wife and observe their behavior, and so on. Thus in principle, a place-holder is followed by "namely—", a specification of the relevant facts, which may be empirical findings. There are, however, two pre-empirical constraints on such investigations. First, we cannot investigate anything whatsoever, empirically or non-empirically, unless we have some concept of *what* we are investigating, and other concepts of how it might be—the concept of "next room", for example, or of "marriage relationship", and of there being an argument going on or of two people trusting each other. Second, what we do observe will also depend upon what our interests are and what we are competent to observe. In all probability, what a sociologist, for example, observes and describes as going on in the next room will be some-

what different from what an artist observes and describes, or a janitor or a policeman. For all of them, the place-holder will normally be the same, even though what they place in it is not identical.

The place-holder concept "real world" is shared by scientists, theologians, and all the rest of us who have a place in the world as Actors, Observer/Describers, and Critic/Appraisers—that is, as persons (Ossorio, 1976, 1978a, in press; Shideler, in press). Being universally shared, it provides us with a common ground for communicating with others, no matter how diverse. Whatever else divides us, we can be united (at least upon occasion) by the agreement that what we are talking about is the real world—just as, for example, we can be united by agreeing on some other occasion that what we are talking about is colors, not shapes or sizes or sounds or political parties.

For convenience, we can discuss the real world in three ways that are formally, although not practically, equivalent: (a) as the empirical world, what we see when we look around us; (b) as the behavioral world, the world-history of which our life-histories are a part; and (c) as the state of affairs that includes all other states of affairs, the totally inclusive, ultimate domain comprising all that has been, is, and can be.

To begin with the empirical world, what we observe is the real world, but each of us sees it differently, because each of us has not only different personal characteristics, but also different viewpoints, histories, and experiences. To illustrate, let us think of ourselves as sitting in a circle with an ordinary kitchen chair in the center. And let us suppose that each of us has a camera to record what he sees. No two of the resulting photographs will be alike, but we all know that we are photographing the same thing, and all of *us* know that it is a chair because "chair" is one of our shared concepts.

Each of us sees the chair from a different viewpoint, and therefore has a different view of it. And having had vast experience in observing three-dimensional objects from a variety of viewpoints, we find nothing strange in the fact that our views of it are different, as evidenced by the photographs taken from different positions. What *would* be strange, even to us, would be identical photographs taken from in front, behind, above, and below, with one camera equipped with black-and-white film, another with color film, others with lenses having different focal lengths, resolving power, and other optical characteristics. Equally, we ought to find it strange if we heard identical descriptions of the chair (or anything else) from persons with different personal characteristics such as interests or embodiments. An artist, a cabinet-maker, and a second-hand-furniture dealer will describe it differently. So will a blind person, one who is color-blind, and one who has normal sight.

The coordination of view with viewpoint, however, constitutes only part of the story. The other part is what we might call the recalcitrance

of the chair. No matter how hard any of us tries, he cannot successfully treat that object in the middle of the circle as a telephone, a screwdriver, or a pink elephant. Its being a chair constitutes a reality constraint on our possible behaviors in relation to it, including how we view it. We can successfully treat it as something to sit on, stand on, break up to burn in the fireplace, draw a picture of, prop under a doorknob to deter an intruder, or lay across a hallway to keep the dog in his part of the house, but definitely there are limits on what we can succeed in doing with it.

We can walk around a chair so as to coordinate viewpoint and view. But few of us, if any, have had comparable experience in the daily and hourly practice of observing the real world from a variety of different viewpoints. Instead, we have simply observed and described it from the angle of our own knowledge and values, attitudes and interests and embodiments, and our own place in the world as old or young, man or woman, psychologist or sculptor or farmer. Even so, the principle is the same in both cases: our viewpoint makes a difference in what our view is, and every view is an observation from a particular viewpoint—cultural, personal, position in space and history, and so on. Inevitably and immutably, we see the world from where we ourselves are, with our own eyes and our own minds. Through books, travel, study, and perceptive and receptive meetings with others who see the world from other viewpoints, we can see more than we would with unaided eyes or uneducated minds, but still we see the world from where we are.

If we sit in another's chair, still we see with our own eyes. But this does not mean that we need to be cut off from what others experience to an important degree. We can illustrate this with the example of the performer and the knowledgeable spectator. The performer, who may be a musician, a baseball player, a participant in a religious ceremony, or whatever, is able to engage in his activity because he has mastered certain concepts, conceptual structures, and skills. To be knowledgeable, the spectator—music critic, baseball fan, onlooker at the ritual—must have mastered those same concepts and conceptual structures, and must have developed an astute appreciation for the skills. Both performer and spectator are participants in the performance, but they are differently placed in relation to it. Consequently their experience of it differs, and it has a different significance for each of them. What they share is formal access to the performance, but they know it differently, from different viewpoints and with different interests.

To have formal access is to be able to provide "everything needed for an explicit, systematic delineation of a phenomenon in its various aspects" (Ossorio, 1983, p. 14). That is, having formal access is having the concepts that it would take not only to describe the thing, but also to have knowledge about it. Thus it encompasses both knowledge-about and knowledge-by-acquaintance, and contrasts with empirical access—which also cuts across

knowledge-about and knowledge-by-acquaintance. In general, for a given person, a phenomenon is constituted by the concepts he is able to bring to bear on it. To illustrate, some years ago I listened to a long argument between a couple of my friends on whether a certain fictional character was a saint. They ran aground (I realized much later) because one had never acquired the concept of the holy and therefore could not see the distinction the other was making between exceptional goodness and sanctity. The disputants could communicate and negotiate about the fictional character as a case of goodness; they could not communicate or negotiate about the same character as a case of sanctity. A person's repertoire of concepts determines what he has formal access to. His view of things may be solidly grounded if he has adequate concepts, and it may be close to illusion if he does not.

We acquire concepts in the same way that we acquire skills: by participating in social practices that involve the use of that concept or skill. This is in contrast to the way we acquire facts, which is primarily by observation and secondarily by thought. What facts we can assimilate, however, will depend upon what concepts we have acquired, and what concepts we have acquired will depend upon what social practices we have participated in. Moreover, our repertoire of concepts limits what social practices—and hence communities—we are able and eligible to participate in. For example, a person for whom the statement, "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (Wittgenstein, 1963, prop. 1.1), makes no sense will not be eligible to belong among the followers of Wittgenstein. On the other hand, one for whom it makes a great deal of sense may have no interest in becoming a Wittgensteinian. The concepts we share—which is to say, the distinctions we make in common—are crucial to our becoming communities. In turn, those shared concepts codify what the individual and the community take to be the case and are prepared to act on—that is, what they take to be facts.

Facts about a religion or a science can be transmitted without grave difficulty; it is merely a matter of passing on information, like listing every item in a room in its relation to every other item, first in pairs, then in threes, then in fours, and so on. The concrete reality of a science or religion—the whole of which each of these facts is a part—is apprehended in a way comparable to simply walking into that room and seeing all those items together, that is, by hands-on participation in relevant social practices in a way that goes beyond what can be apprehended merely by careful and knowledgeable observation. Even the most assiduous study of the most comprehensive list would not substitute for actually walking into the room and looking around. Similarly, the simple, direct description, "It tastes like an orange—tart, sweet, fruity", will give formal access to that flavor to a person who has never tasted an orange, but it still will not convey what the same description does to a person who has tasted

oranges. At the end-point of describing the taste, instead of elaborating indefinitely, we make a move of another kind. We identify it: ''It tastes like an orange.''

Formal access is available to the Outsider in the form of knowledge-about, as well as to the Insider who generally has both knowledge-about and knowledge-by-acquaintance. But the Outsider who has formal access to something does not thereby automatically move to the inside. People who have never had a mystical experience can and do talk about it, sometimes with great penetration, but this is possible only if they are competent in the use of the concept of transcendence. On the other hand, a person for whom the concept of transcendence has no meaning will have extremely limited access to anything important having to do with mysticism. Or to take another example, one cannot be an atheist without using the concept of a deity. How can anybody deny something if he has no idea what it is that he is denying? Having the Outsider's knowledge-about may sometimes be essential part of the process of acquiring the Insider's knowledge-by-acquaintance or for becoming an Insider, but it does not necessarily eventuate there.

As we can have knowledge-about without knowledge-by-acquaintance, so we can have knowlede-by-acquaintance without the kind of knowledge-about that a well-informed Outsider would have. Many, many people have had mystical experiences without ever having heard of the mystical tradition, and so they did not know that the experience was ''mystical''. Or they have engaged in advanced forms of meditation, without ever discovering that what they were doing was anything more than ''just sitting'' or ''having a quiet time''. Many, many scientific discoveries were made long before there was a philosophy of science that articulated what ''science'' is. It is when a problematical situation arises that formal access becomes indispensable—for example, when my pattern of religious belief and action conflicts with yours, or when we need to differentiate—let us say—scientific from unscientific concepts and procedures. Then, in order to negotiate our differences, we must share concepts that give us formal access to some facts, and it is only those facts that we can negotiate. Although we may also be able to negotiate the fact that one of us has access to facts that the other does not, we cannot negotiate the facts that we do not share.

With this systematic conceptual structure as a background, let us turn to the relation of science with religion and to the relations among religions.

II

What all the sciences and all the religions share is the concept of ''the real world''. Where they differ is in their ''namely—'' specification of

what the real world is. Most of us were imbued in our childhoods with the notion that the real world is what (we were told) physical scientists of the time said it was, which is—essentially and briefly—that the real world is constituted by sub-atomic particles in particular dynamic relationships occurring in space and time, and all larger objects and more complex relationships can be reduced to these "basic building blocks". It follows, according to this understanding, that it is an historical accident that human beings exist and that language developed. Also it follows that the ultimate constituents of the world, their relationships, and the principles upon which they operate, do not depend in any way upon the nature or even the existence of human beings, and in the end, we ourselves are reducible to these basic building blocks and their relationships. Scientists of this persuasion constructed their world from the bottom up by combining the basic building blocks into larger and more inclusive structures, and in reverse, by reducing complex structures to the basic building blocks—thoughts into brain processes, love into electrophysiological transmissions, deliberate actions into muscular and skeletal movements.

Typically, religions specify their worlds from the top down, the top being the ultimate significance of all that is, what life is all about. Other disciplines also, of course, are concerned with all that is—science, history, and philosophy, to name only three examples. Only peripherally if at all, however, do those other disciplines deal with questions like "What is the meaning of life?", "What makes life worth living?", "Why are we here and where are we going?". Answers—very different answers—to such questions are at the heart of religions, and religions can be differentiated according to the content that they specify for the content-free concept of ultimate significance. One religion may say that what ultimately gives significance to life is handing on what has been bequeathed to it by its ancestors; other religions may say that it is the hope of heaven (variously described). For still others, ultimate significance is found in helping others, or in achieving power or knowledge or love, or in submission to a divine will, or in ecstatic experiences. Even the answer, "Ultimately life is meaningless", constitutes a religious stance, insofar as it takes seriously the question of ultimate significance by declaring that there is none.

Questions such as "What is the ultimate significance of all that is?" and "What is life all about?" belong within the domain of spirituality. Three concepts provide an articulation of that domain: totality, ultimacy, and boundary condition (Ossorio, 1977, 1978c), which I shall speak of here as "transcendental concepts". In dealing with religions, a fourth concept is usually called for as well: that of significance. Religions, of course, have other aspects—historical, institutional, ethical, theological, liturgical, social, and so on—but paradigmatically all these are informed by spirituality, so here I shall treat that aspect of religion only. Let us

take these four transcendental concepts—ultimacy, totality, significance, and boundary condition—one by one.

First, ultimates are what cannot be further extended, analyzed, subdivided, or separated, and are logically related to totalities and boundary conditions (Ossorio, 1977, pp. 54, 60–66).

Second, the real world, as the state of affairs that includes all other states of affairs, is not only a totality, but the ultimate totality. However, the game of chess is also a totality, as is an indefinitely large set of numbers, or "everything that is in this room", or one's whole life. Our grasp of indefinitely large totalities is intuitive rather than empirical. We do not have to list every number in the indefinitely large set, or specify every item in a whole life, or know everything there is to know about the real world, to conceptualize those totalities. Because every science and every religion has its own set of concepts, each has access to a different set of phenomena and therefore has its own totality.

Third, the significance, or meaning, concept allows us to codify the place that any real-world element (object, process, event, or state of affairs [Ossorio, 1978b]) has in its context. It can best be explicated by generating a series: the significance of A is B, that of B is C, that of C is . . . N, N being its ultimate significance, i.e., the significance of the sequence as a whole and of each of its separate elements. The significance of drinking the consecrated wine is receiving the sacrament. The significance of receiving the sacrament is obedience to the dominical command. The significance of obedience is approaching closer to God or opening ourselves to His approach, and so on to its ultimate significance, which in a particular religion might be union with God. Each of the elements in the significance series has a place, a status, within a large context. And the sequence itself has a place in the world. We understand that sequence of elements as a whole, and the place of each element in the sequence, by their relation to the ultimately significant which is the significance of the totality.

What particular religions take to be ultimately significant determines their ways of life; in turn, their ways of life determine how their members, individually and as communities, weight their reasons in choosing among possible behaviors. Conversely, the weights they give those reasons reveal what in fact they take to be ultimately significant.

Fourth, the concept of boundary condition reflects the fact that there are reality constraints on our possible behaviors. We cannot successfully treat the chair as a telephone—initially because even the semblance of doing so is difficult, but ultimately because when we try to do so, we are unable to treat our behavior as having successfully treated the chair as a telephone. And if we try that, we are unable to treat *that* behavior as successful, and so on. What constitutes reality constraints may change from time to time, and from person to person: those for an infant will not

be the same as for an ordinary adult; those for a real-world king are not the same as for the king in chess. That there are constraints on our possible behaviors is indubitable. Being human, we are neither omnipotent nor omniscient. Some of those constraints can be specified without difficulty; others we cannot specify exactly. We do not, however, know what all those constraints are. More concretely, to say that human persons are finite is to say something about the nature of the reality constraints on their possible behaviors, but it gives only a partial specification of what those constraints are. Saying that human beings are finite does not say everything there is to be said about their limitations.

The fact that there is an end to the significance series reflects a boundary condition on the domain of religion. What characterizes a boundary condition is not merely that it involves some limitation, but also that the limitation reflects the character of the totality, the whole series, the entire domain. The latter point is essential because the limitation does not appear overtly except in a particular place in the domain, as a limit or limitation. For example, a boundary condition on the domain of knowledge is that "justification comes to an end". Knowledge is not always grounded on further knowledge, ad infinitum, but ends with a move of another kind: "That's the way things are", or "We're playing chess and this is the way it's played". Its not being so grounded in further knowledge does not make it something other than knowledge, but there is nothing peculiar about the specific knowledge at the end of the series. The fact that it does end is a characteristic of the whole domain of knowledge, reflecting something about that totality. What it reflects shows up as an end-point, which is why it makes sense to call it a boundary *condition,* thus differentiating it from a mere boundary. Likewise, a boundary condition on the domain of spirituality is that having significance comes to an end, and that end is, formally, "This is what life's all about". Without such an end to the justification and the significance series, we would be faced with an infinite regress that would make the domains unmanageable and incomprehensible.

Boundary conditions reflect the internal structure of a domain, which in turn reflects its ultimate objects and processes and their relationships. If two domains have different ultimate objects, ipso facto they will be different totalities, and we can expect that different boundary conditions will obtain. A striking example of this is provided by the classic religious conversion, where a person changes and therefore his world changes—or conversely, where his world changes and he becomes a new person. One of the more conspicuous differences among religions lies in what they expect or require as a sign that a person's world has changed. It may be a rite of passage such as baptism or confirmation, a public declaration that one has been born again, a secret initiation, an affirmation of doctrinal conformity, or participation in a new set of social practices. Often we can

specify what reality constraints have been lifted or imposed by this new domain, as contrasted with that from which the convert came. A good many of us have moved, in adolescence, from a world dominated by a gentle, kindly God, or a harsh, dictatorial one, to another one governed by vast, impersonal forces, and found ourselves explosively endowed with what at the time appeared to be an illimitable freedom.

Returning to our concept of the real world as a place-holder, we can compare the domains of science and religion, and any particular sciences or religions, by how each of them fills in the namely-clause, with special reference to how it answers questions having to do with ultimates, totalities, boundary conditions, and significance.

To bring these all together: Given that what is ultimately significant for the domain of the physical and natural sciences is empirically grounded knowledge, its totality comprises all that is, in the sense that there is nothing one could point to that would not fall within its scope. In principle, there is nothing that physical or natural scientists cannot study empirically, although in practice, they do not yet have the conceptual resources, the methodologies, or the technical equipment for some of such studies to be of much, if any, value. Within that domain, particular sciences constitute subdomains with their own limitations. The physical chemist as such is not concerned with comparative anatomy or how to distinguish poetry from prose, nor the botanist as such with quantum mechanics or the artistic value of Calder's mobiles. Although these scientists are free to examine any phenomenon whatever, they are limited in what it is possible and appropriate for them to say about it. Further, since anything that one could point to is subject to different descriptions, there is no privileged description that tells us what it *really is,* independent of human conceptual frameworks.

The religious totality also comprises all that is in the same sense, i.e., that there is nothing one could point to that could not fall within its scope. But theologians likewise are limited in what it is possible and appropriate for them to say, and their descriptions are no more privileged than the scientists'.

Where physical and natural science is not concerned with truths that are not empirical, religion is not concerned with truths that are unrelated to ultimate significance. Certainly some individual scientists have done their work to the glory of God, and some scholars in the field of religion have made important empirical discoveries, as in archaeology. But the best of these would count it a betrayal of their scientific integrity, and a blasphemy against what they took to be ultimately significant, if they misrepresented empirical evidence to sustain a religious dogma, or adulterated a religious doctrine to bring it into conformity with scientific precepts. Just as certainly, other individual scientists have shown nothing but con-

tempt for anything religious, and some religionists have distorted empirical findings unmercifully in defence of a religious dogma. But the fact that persons can relate themselves to these two domains in such very different ways does not imply confusion between the domains themselves, any more than the fact that a single person can be both a chef and a chess-player implies that the domains of cooking and chess coincide, or that the distinction between them is unclear.

The content of scientific knowledge is continually changing. In the high and far-off time when I took chemistry in high school, we were taught that the basic building blocks were atoms. Now, chemists are going beyond subatomic particles to heaven knows what. But the nature of scientific knowledge as empirical does not change. Likewise, what we take to be ultimately significant can change: I remember a noted theologian telling about the little boy who insisted fiercely that he didn't want to go to heaven if the couldn't have his new little red wagon there, and his laughter at himself in later years when he was reminded of that. But the nature of religious knowledge, as having to do with what is ultimately significant, does not change.

In this paper, I have limited myself to an analysis of the worlds of science and religion, and to the concepts of totality, ulitmacy, boundary condition, and significance. This is not, however, the only way to articulate the similarities and differences of those or comparable domains. There are at least three other possible approaches: first, through the parametric analysis of behavior (Ossorio, 1973, in press; Shideler, in press); second, through the parametric analysis of cultures and communities (Ossorio, 1983; Putman, 1981; Shideler, in press); and third, through the paradigm-case study of persons and personal characteristics (Ossorio, 1966, 1976, 1977; Shideler, in press). And yet another might be added: the approach through language (Ossorio, 1966, 1967, 1978a). It may be of interest that none of these descriptive approaches—via the real world, behavior, community, personal characteristics, and language—was developed for describing religions, and this application has come relatively late in the history of Descriptive Psychology. Therefore what we have here is a set of systematically-related concepts that is not peculiar to this subject-matter or applicable only here. Experience indicates, however, that even so this conceptual system is capable of doing full justice to the power, splendor, and uniqueness of the religious domain as such and of specific religions as well, without reductionism, paradox, remainder, or ad hoc formulations.

III

Given that we can describe the real world in the neutral terms provided by the content-free transcendental concepts developed within Descriptive

Psychology, it is imperative to remember that anything that can be described in one way can also be described in other ways. And one of the most striking facts about descriptions of the real world is how varied they are. All scientific descriptions have some features in common, but every scientist describes the world differently, depending on whether he is a physicist, a chemist, a biologist, a social or behavioral scientist, or a philosopher of science. Further, within those domains, individual scientists will give their own distinctive twists to the general view. Religious bodies differ from each other in their official portrayals of the world, and the single members of each body will depict the world generally in a common way but with individual variations. Diversity, not unity, is characteristic of our descriptions of the real world. Which of them, then, is the true, the privileged one? And how can we determine which is true, or more modestly, which comes closest to the truth? To answer these questions of content and methodology, we must again go back to fundamentals.

First, to acknowledge that we describe the world in different ways according to our own personal or communal characteristics and circumstances does not automatically condemn us to anthropomorphism or egocentrism, that is, to casting ourselves in the starring roles in the universal drama, or indeed of our personal dramas. We can just as well cast ourselves, or even humanity, in a supporting role. It is not unusual for a person to value another person, or a cause or a country or a deity, more than himself, or to accept another's knowledge as superior to his own. As individuals, we know what we know, but we know only what *we* know. Our communities describe and define in authoritative ways, but those ways cannot be totally authoritative for all persons in all times and places because each community has a particular viewpoint and can describe the world only from that particular place. These constraints, however, do not compel us to absolutize our own view, and do not prevent us from gaining formal access to other views in the form of knowledge about them.

From one viewpoint, this situation can be described as relativism of the deepest dye. From another—which I share—it can be described as enjoining upon us a decent humility, stemming from the recognition that we are human beings, not gods. As Charles Williams (1952) writes (I have changed the tenses),

> No mind is so good that it does not need another mind to counter and equal it, and to save it from conceit and blindness and bigotry and folly. Only in such a balance can humility be found, humility which is a lucid speed to welcome lucidity whenever and wherever it presents itself. (p. 187)

Second, we seem generally to be convinced that it is imperative for us to know The Truth, absolute, irrefutable, and inviolable, but we have seldom been reminded that truth is a property of statements. An object,

process, event, or state of affairs cannot be true or false; it simply is what it is. Statements about those elements can be true or false, but are not always verifiable. That the book is on the table can be verified; that the world was created in seven twenty-four-hour days cannot be, nor can "The world is the totality of facts, not of things". Truth is a property of statements in the sense that it is a status that we assign to statements. But a statement is the statement it is independently of whether it is true or false, and more generally, things are what they are independently of their status, and can be judged accordingly. Thus a portrait can be judged as a work of art without regard to whether it is also a good likeness of its subject. Who knows—or cares—today whether da Vinci's portrait of Mona Lisa was an accurate representation of the lady? It is the move from portrayal to reality-judgement that is perilous, from "Human beings can be described in terms of what their bodies are made of" to "They really are merely what they can be decomposed into", or from the other direction, "Human beings are participants in world history" to "They really are mere items in a universal process".

The reality-judgement, "they really are", is a status-assignment, a final-order appraisal of what the persons making that judgement take to be real and therefore are prepared to act on. It is also, though less obviously, a value-judgement reflecting what those judges take to be important. Either way, they are saying not just, "This portrait is a good likeness of the subject", or "This is an accurate description of the real world", but also, "This is the only definitive portrait" or "the only true description of the world". So doing, those judges strip themselves of a decent humility and array themselves as gods, and join battle. It is not the claim to be right that sets them on a collision course, but the claim to be exclusively right. Compare this with what Charles Morgan (1961) writes of Thomas Hardy:

> Hardy's saying that he had no philosophy is not to be understood to mean that he had no point of view. He stood on a hill-top and from it surveyed experience, and it was his own hill-top; he was not inconsistent in the sense of being without individuality; he was not for ever blown hither and thither by the opinions of others, joining leagues and clubs and fashionable groups and peering out at life through their blinkers. He preserved his integrity, guarded his individuality, looked out from his own hill-top. But he did not look only north, or only south, or only east or west. He did not fix upon a favourite view and say: "This is Truth. There is no other." He surveyed the whole landscape of experience with what eyes he had, and said to us: "Look: what do you see with your different eyes?" And we looked, and, though we did not see what he had seen, we saw what we had not seen before and might never have seen but for his visionary flash. (p. 13)

Here, viewpoint and view are paired so as to uphold the authority of Hardy's view from his hill-top while denying that it is—or should be—authoritative over persons standing on other hill-tops.

A good many statements, descriptive or otherwise, are not merely statements. What we are doing when we make them is giving a promise that this is how we are prepared to treat whatever it is we are talking about. A paradigm case for such promises is "Here I stand"—another place-holder, tacitly followed by "namely—". In the first instance, "Here I stand" represents our acknowledgement that other persons may take other stands. In the second, the namely clause presents what we are holding ourselves to, and what we expect—legitimately—others to hold us to. My standing where I do many involve my insisting, "And here is where you ought to stand, too", or it may simply designate my place without my imposing on others the expectation or requirement that they should stand there as well.

Promises cannot be wrong in the way that observations can be wrong, because what is at stake in a promise is something over which we have control, our behavior, and beyond that, our identity, because "Here I stand" can be paraphrased into "This is me", or "I cannot do otherwise and still be me". We may be wrong in standing where we do; to say that we are or are not is to take another stand on the matter. Our identity may be commendable or abominable; again, it is a matter of taking a stand on *that*. But this is a commitment we *can* make, and nobody else can make it for us. Someone else can tell us, "I've committed you to being there on time", but if we are not there on time, it is the person who originally made the promise who is responsible, not for our tardiness or absence, but for having promised something which he was not in a position to control, i.e., our willingness, our behavior, our circumstances, and so on. He was the guarantor; therefore any claim must be against him.

Saying "Here I stand" is a way of taking an irrefutable and in some sense invulnerable position equivalent to saying "This is me". We can anchor ourselves there, and we can know where others are anchored by their "Here ***I*** stand". Obviously, over the years we—and they—can change, but we do not make such promises over matters that we expect to change readily or often. And standing firmly, even in a well-defined place, does not deprive us of formal or even empathic knowledge about persons standing equally firmly in different places. We are not cut off from them rationally, imaginatively, or compassionately. Moreover, as a reminder, whether our stand is one of conformity or creativity or rebellion, always we are in community with other persons, because taking a stand occurs only in the context of participating in social forms of behavior.

This one anchor, however, is not enough. With that alone, we could slip too easily into solipsism or fanaticism. While it is important to have a personal anchor that depends upon us and not on others, it is no less important to have an objective one that does depend on others. When I say, "This is a book", I am making a promise. Implicitly I am saying, "I

can successfully treat this as a book—open it, read what is printed on the pages, and so on. *And you can, too,* because there are ways of finding out whether this is a book, and you or anybody else can check out my observation in those ways.'' If you do not share with me the concept ''book'', of course, you will not be able to check me out, but there are ways—practice and experience—by which you can become competent in the use of that concept, and then you will be able to confirm—or disconfirm—that this is indeed a book.

In giving empirical and historical truth-statements, we may be wrong or our information may change. For example, granting that the book is now on the table, yesterday it was not there and tomorrow it may or may not be. In the domain of history, new information discloses that Columbus was not the first European to travel to the American continents. Even so, the empirical and historical constraints on our possible behaviors have an anchoring function, in part because although we can choose how we shall treat the book or any other real-world element, we have no choice as to what our options are. It has its own recalcitrance. We can read it, tear it up to start a fire, use it as a doorstop, throw it at the dog who has been chewing it up, but not use it to quench our thirst or convey us to the other side of town.

Personal and objective truth-statements are not as unrelated as they may appear to be, because the declaration ''Here I stand'' is not only a promise, but objectively a statement of what I take to be real and therefore am grounding my actions on. Thus it is as much of an anchor as any other objective statement.

To bring this all together, let us take the case of a scientist and a mystic (it could equally well be a Buddhist and a Moslem, or a Christian and a Hindu, or an atheist and a Jew) who stand in very different places, and who have specified very different content for the concept ''real world''. Within this range, we have equally vehement affirmations that life as a totality is ultimately meaningful and that it is meaningless; that it is ordered and random, benevolent, malevolent, and indifferent to human concerns, and so on through a wide range of incompatibles, uncomfortably reminiscent of ''This is a book'' versus ''This is not a book but a marble sculpture.'' Which of us are out of our minds? All, or none, or ''everyone except thee and me—and I have my doubts about thee''?

First, there is no way to confirm or disconfirm conclusions of the kind that life is meaningful or meaningless, or ordered or random, because these are not statements of fact, nor are they derived from an assemblage of facts. They are not historical particulars that we are able to discover or disprove empirically, such as that we are sitting in a circle around a chair. Nor are they facts of the noncausal, nontemporal variety such as that circles are round. Instead, such statements as ''The world is mean-

ingless''—or meaningful—are ultimate-significance judgements. They are not summary formulations of facts, but affirmations of what we are prepared to take to be facts, and what we are prepared to assign to the status of error, misrepresentation, dream, or delusion. Indeed we can engage in attempts to prove that life is meaningful or meaningless, and so on, and claim success, but we cannot successfully carry off that attempt any more than we can successfully carry off the claim that we have treated the chair as a telephone.

As we have already seen, status assignments, like descriptions, can be transmuted into ontologies. One person says, ''That which is supremely significant is God''—or goodness or pleasure or power or whatever. Another person says, ''The central fact of human nature is the desire for sexual gratification''—or instinct or curiosity or the urge toward self-fulfilment or whatever. Sometimes these status assignments are expressed as assumptions. The move from description or status assignment to metaphysics is not illegitimate in itself. It becomes so when we do not know what we are doing, or do not identify what the other person is doing, that is, when descriptions are confused with theories, or status assignments with revealed truths. Thus it is not tolerance that we need most in dealing with religions other than our own, but straightforward intellectual clarity in conceptualizing, describing, and appraising.

Clarity may be more difficult to achieve than we like to think, because only rarely can we translate our concepts into those of a science or another religion without loss or distortion . For example, recently I came across a book by a psychiatrist who was proposing as a healthy approach to personal relationships the slogan, ''I'm not O.K. You're not O.K. And that's O.K'' (Kopp, 1981, p. 97)—as neat a paraphrase of the Christian doctrine of original sin as I have ever come across. From the context, I am certain that the author had no idea of the equivalence, but there it is. To state the identity in this way, however, requires that I put his concept into my terms, which results in some degree of distortion. Far more deformation results from the popular attempts to show that all religions are really presenting the same view of the world—for example, that the Aztec Quetzalcoatl is a Christ-figure, or that the only difference between the Buddhist Nirvana and the Christian heaven lies in the names given to them, and so on down the line. To take an illustration from another field, this is like declaring that only nomenclature separates Freud's psychological theories from Skinner's.

If our scientist and mystic give each other flat statements of fact, their conversation will bog down immediately and probably irretrievably, because they do not share enough concepts or agree enough on what are facts to make their interchange productive. Nor are they likely to share the same values. What is highly significant to one may well be inconse-

quential to the other. That is, they do not share a community within which they can hold each other responsible, nor have they a claim upon each other because of that shared community. This is where ''Here I stand'' is not only appropriate but necessary for communication, since it does not necessarily presuppose or generate the kind of community that is presupposed and generated by ''I'm right and you're wrong''. On the ground of ''Here I stand, and there you stand'', persons can describe, explain, and engage in any other of the social practices that will ''get someone to see.'' If, from this, a community eventuates, it will be of a very different kind from the community of those who take their ''Here I stand'' as obligatory upon everyone. To over-simplify, this will be a community of persons who are not holding each other to any promises except those that are basic to any productive interchange: integrity, clarity, and good will.

Ultimately we do not choose where we shall stand, any more than we choose our ways of living. In ordinary situations, our circumstances give us reasons for choosing to behave in this way or that, and when we are asked, ''Why are you doing so-and-so?'', we point to those circumstances and reasons (cf. the Judgement Diagram [Ossorio, 1977, 1978c, in press]). If, however, we are pressed further, to the point where we have exhausted our recourse to circumstances and reasons, we move to how much weight those reasons carry with us. If questions are raised about those weights—which reflect our personal characteristics—we can give rationalizations and justifications, and when we have exhausted our recourse to these, we answer, ''This is me and here I stand''.

People have made serious and sometimes prolonged efforts to live in ways that were neither authentically human nor fulfilling, such as determinism, solipsism, and fanaticism, but always, sooner or later they have failed. And people have compelled others to live inauthentic and unfulfilling lives—in slavery, to take only one example—but these attempts result in degradation if not death. Yet there remains a wonderful variety of ways of life that *are* compatible with human nature, as shown by the great religions of the world such as (in alphabetical order) Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism, as well as the religion which takes science as its authority, and many religions that are not as widely spread or well known as these.

Adherents of any of these can say to the others, ''Your way is less authentic, less fulfilling, than mine'', and given their reasons—reasons which are likely to be grounded in disagreement on what constitutes authenticity and fulfilment for human beings. Two quotations will admirably illustrate such disparities: ''What the Liberal Church strives for is happiness—an undeceived happiness'' (Opton, 1982, p. 29), as contrasted with ''There are certain eternal achievements that make even happiness look like trash'' (Sayers, 1949, p. 40). Persons of any persuasion can claim

that others grossly misapprehend or misrepresent the facts of human nature, and here again we have a boundary condition situation, as in the case of treating the chair as a telephone, and of "That's what life is all about". Such differences are in principle negotiable, remembering that successful negotiation does not necessarily end in agreement. It may end instead in what an Outsider might describe as an amiable tolerance, but an Insider would more likely call compassion and honor for others who are also on a spiritual journey, albeit a different one.

IV

To conclude with a statement of where I stand on the matters at issue in this paper: it is on the ground that the human search for absolute, universal, unchangeable, and unchallengeable Truth (with a capital T) is doomed to failure because we are finite and fallible beings. We are not gods, and therefore we do not have direct access to a divine viewpoint. Thus even if we did possess such truths, we would not recognize them as such or we would not know what to do with them. We can, however, have both objective and personal certainties, and these will serve the same behavioral and ideological functions, but without tempting us into the cardinal sin of pride, or ensnaring us in fanaticism or solipsism.

Finally, as a grace note—in both senses of "grace"—for any who may still be unhappy with anything that smacks even faintly of subjectivism and relativism, herewith a quotation from an "unspoken sermon" written more than a century ago, in which the writer, George MacDonald, defends the importance of relativism and explicates its significance. What he says of knowing God is equally applicable to knowing the world.

> Not only . . . has each man his individual relation to God, but each man has his peculiar relation to God. He is to God a peculiar being, made after his own fashion, and that of no one else; for when he is perfected he shall receive the new name which no one else can understand. Hence he can worship God as no man else can worship him—can understand God as no one else can understand him. This or that man may understand God more, may understand God better than he, but no other man can understand God *as* he understands him. God give me grace to be humble before thee, my brother, that I . . . look up to thyself for what revelation of God thou and no one else canst give. . . . From this it follows that there is a chamber in God himself, into which none can enter but the one, the individual, the peculiar man—out of which chamber that man has to bring revelation and strength for his brethren. This is that for which he was made—to reveal the secret things of the Father. (MacDonald, 1867, pp. 110–112)

As a Descriptive Theologian, I should like to propose that another of the things for which we are made is to reveal to others what we see of the world from where we stand, while looking to them for the view of the

world that they and no one else can give. When we do this in our approach to the relations between science and religion, and among religions, we can have diversity without division, intellectual rigor without reductionism, and certainty without arrogance. And that is no small achievement.

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A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF HYPNOSIS. II:

HYPNOTIC INDUCTION PROCEDURES AND MANIFESTATIONS OF THE HYPNOTIC STATE

William B. Plotkin and Wynn R. Schwartz

ABSTRACT

This article, the second of three introducing a new approach to the explication of hypnotic phenomena, centers on hypnotic induction procedures and various manifestations of the hypnotic state. The discussion of hypnotic induction presents a logic of inductions, with application to preliminary procedures such as Redescription Techniques, and to three formal methods of induction: Absorption, Relaxation, and Confusion. The discussion of manifestations of the hypnotic state include "focused attention," suggested effects, nonsuggested effects, and the consequences of specific induction procedures or demand characteristics.

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In our first article (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982), we introduced a conceptual map of hypnosis which included formal conceptualizations of "psychological state," "Trance state," "Hypnotic state," "Hypnoid behavior," "Hypnotizability," and "Suggestibility."[1] Central to this conceptual map is the notion of final-order appraisal (FOA). By this term we designate an individual's appraisal of the place of an Element in the ultimate context of his real world: "To make an FOA of any element is to decide under what description that Element is real or nonreal" (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982, p. 151).

In the present article, we focus on the concept of "Hypnotic state" and demonstrate how it can order various possible facts concerning the induction of Hypnotic states and several selected manifestations of this state. Some of these possible facts correspond to historically-representative or empirically-ascertained facts. Others involve possibilities that are shown to be within the domain that is formally articulated by our conceptual map, but which have not as yet received any systematic empirical attention.

The reader is reminded that in these articles we are not primarily interested in presenting a review of empirical findings concerning hypnosis; moreover, we are not asserting anything about hypnosis, nor proposing any hypotheses or theories about hypnosis (see Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982, pp. 143–146). Rather, we are (a) demonstrating *how* various historically-representative induction procedures *could* lead to the type of psychological state we formally defined in our previous paper and labeled an Hypnotic state (whether or not a given procedure employed on a particular occasion succeeds in the induction of an Hypnotic state is, of course, an empirical question; see Plotkin & Schwartz [1982]), and (b) demonstrating how various behavioral phenomena—some, but not all, historically identified as hypnotic—would or would not *logically* be manifestations of the Hypnotic state, and if so, why.

HYPNOTIC INDUCTION PROCEDURES

An Hypnotic state, like all personal characteristics, has to be acquired or induced in some manner. The acquisition of *any* personal characteristic (PC) can be conceptualized as follows: If a person has a given PC, he acquired it by having the relevant prior capacity and an appropriate intervening history (see also Ossorio, 1981a, pp. 33–34, 1981b, pp. 63–65). Some of the prior capacities that may be relevant to the induction of the Hypnotic state are the capacities to cease generating final-order appraisals (FOAs), to understand the hypnotist's language, to pay close attention, to become absorbed in one's imagery or fantasy, to relax, and to become involved in various role-enactments.

The appropriate intervening history that produces a change in psycho-

logical state may take the form of a formal hypnotic induction procedure, although this is not logically necessary. An hypnotic induction procedure is here identified as any social episode between a hypnotist and a subject that has the likelihood of leading to a significant reduction in the subject's power and/or disposition to generate FOAs, while maintaining a relationship that both parties can act upon. An hypnotic induction procedure may or may not be successful in inducing an Hypnotic state; it may, instead, result in Hypnoid behaviors, the simulation of hypnosis, or nonresponsiveness. Although the outcome of using the standard induction procedures is never guaranteed, they are understandable as the sorts of procedures that one would, in fact, want to employ in an attempted induction of the Hypnotic state.

In the past, theorists of hypnosis have offered detailed explanations of how one or two particular types of induction procedures may lead to hypnotic phenomena, but they have said little or nothing about how other procedures (such as the Confusion Technique) lead to the same result. As Shor (1970) has pointed out, some types of known induction techniques appear to include procedures that are exactly opposite to those of other known techniques.

All induction procedures will fall into one or both of the following categories: (a) those that attempt to lower the subject's *disposition* to generate FOAs, and (b) those that attempt to reduce the subject's *power* to do so. The known induction procedures fall into three general types; we shall call these the Absorption, Relaxation, and Confusion Techniques. The Absorption Technique is employed to lower the subject's disposition to generate FOAs, while the Relaxation and the Confusion Techniques are more oriented toward reducing his power to do so.

The specific manifestations of the Hypnotic state on any particular occasion will reflect the type of induction procedure employed as well as the personal characteristics of the hypnotic subject and the circumstances of the hypnotic interaction. A formal induction procedure is not logically required for the induction of an Hypnotic state, however; it is possible that a person who already *knows how* to enter an Hypnotic state will simply do so at will, upon request, or following an appropriate cue. The talented hypnotic subject may only require the appropriate context or surrounding and be free of other pressing needs to self-induce a Trance state (although if a hypnotist has no role in the facilitation or maintenance of the state it would not be a paradigmatic Hypnotic state). It may be discovered, then, that formal Hypnotic inductions of the sort discussed here are only required for the induction of Hypnotic states in persons who are new to hypnosis, who have little hypnotic talent, or who are in a circumstance or psychological state that is not conducive to unaided self-induction.

After discussing some general preliminaries to—and characteristics of—

inductions, we consider each of the above three Techniques separately, then illustrate briefly how they can be combined.

Characteristics of Induction

First, it is an essential feature of all hypnotic induction procedures that the subject pay attention to the hypnotist's communications, simply because the hypnotist cannot be effective if he is ignored. Thus, one of the first tasks of the hypnotist is to ensure that his subject has sufficient reasons for paying close attention to the hypnotist's words and/or gestures. It does not at first matter what these reasons are. For example, a person who passionately believes that hypnosis is a lot of nonsense and that he could never be hypnotized might have as much reason to pay close attention to a hypnotist as does a person who is fascinated by hypnosis (Erickson, 1959). A person who is simply bored by it all or a person who is too busy with something else is a poor prospect since he does not have sufficient reason to pay attention to the hypnotist *as* a hypnotist.

Second, redundancy and clarity are features of the hypnotist's communications during almost all induction procedures (the Confusion Technique is a partial exception here; see below). The hypnotist wants to ensure no questions arise about meaning; such questions often entail the generation of FOAs. Constant repetition may be employed to make sure that the communications are clear and understandable.

Third, a typical feature of most induction procedures (again, with the Confusion Technique sometimes being an exception) is for the hypnotist to expend some effort, before and during the induction, to establish rapport with the subject—that is, to establish a trusting relationship. By establishing a trusting relationship with the subject, the hypnotist can create a situation in which the subject may be comfortable in reducing his disposition to generate FOAs. Since it can be a delight to reduce this disposition temporarily, a person needs no further reason to do so other than the fact of being in a relationship (with the hypnotist) in which such a state of affairs is nonthreatening.

A Preliminary to Induction: Redescription

One of the most popular means of establishing and maintaining rapport, reducing resistance to hypnosis, and enhancing the credibility of the proceedings is what we call the "Redescription Technique." This is not an Hypnotic induction per se, but a useful preliminary or adjunct to most inductions. When using this technique, the hypnotist begins by accepting and describing whatever the subject is doing or experiencing; then the hypnotist simply redescribes that behavior or experience to the subject in such a way that the subject understands the hypnotist is aware of and sensitive to the subject's feelings, desires, concerns, and capacities.

In addition, the hypnotist may gradually turn to descriptions that *anticipate* the experiences that will occur naturally in the course of the induction, especially those that the subject may be unaware will occur, such as blurred vision, slowed breathing, or changes in perceived body size or orientation. No matter what the subject actually does or experiences, he is led to believe, through the hypnotist's careful redescriptions, that he is responding successfully and may expect that he will continue to respond well. Thus, with the Redescription Technique, the hypnotist (a) effects a smooth transition into the induction procedure proper while (b) establishing his trustworthiness and expertise, as well as (c) the credibility, harmlessness, and ease of the hypnotic procedures.

Milton Erickson (1959) has made extensive use of Redescription Techniques, which he named "Utilization Techniques". Erickson's writings (Haley, 1967) furnish descriptions of some very sophisticated usages of the Redescription Technique, particularly with subjects who previously were highly resistant to hypnosis. We will quote an instance of this technique below.

The Redescription Technique is also frequently used as a *Hypnoid* induction, in which the hypnotist attempts to evoke a specific (usually anomalous) appraisal. Two common examples (Weitzenhoffer, 1969) are the Postural Sway—in which the subject, who is standing with his feet together and eyes closed, is asked to think of swaying back and forth—and the Chevreux Pendulum—in which a small object, such as a key, suspended from the subject's index finger begins to pendulum back and forth as the subject thinks of the movement. Indeed, the evocation of these sorts of Hypnoid behaviors through the Redescription Technique can be an important initial step of an *Hypnotic* induction: if the Hypnoid induction is successful, the hypnotist will have demonstrated his effectiveness at evoking unusual experiences and at predicting—and perhaps controlling—the subject's behavior. Moreover, Hypnoid inductions can be effective means of generating experiential phenomena which can be employed as a focus for the Absorption Technique.

The Absorption Technique

The central feature of the Absorption Technique is the communication, identification, or evocation of something interesting, absorbing, and greatly worthy of the subject's attention. When employing this technique, the hypnotist attempts to produce in the subject "absorption"—a rapt interest or sense of immediacy. The very notion of being absorbed in something, whether it be theater, film, dance, music, poetry, storytelling, or fantasy, entails a reduced disposition to generate or to act upon FOAs. All esthetic modalities have been used in hypnosis induction (see, for example, Snyder & Shor, 1983). Two forms of absorption need to be contrasted here. The

first, involves an absorption in an imaginary context (a fantasy) such that, although the individual still *generates* FOAs, he does not *act* upon them. This form of absorption is Hypnoid, not Hypnotic, since there is a reduced disposition to act upon FOAs but not a reduced disposition to generate them. The second involves absorption in a fantasy that temporarily constitutes the whole of one's consciously apprehended world. This form is Hypnotic, since its central feature is the loss of one's final-order perspective.

As one becomes more and more Hypnotically absorbed in a given activity, one becomes less disposed to generate FOAs as to what place that activity has in our world. If and when a person reaches the point at which it is only the attended Element that matters and not the relationship of that Element to other Elements, nor its place in the real world, then the person is highly absorbed and not disposed to generate FOAs. At this point, the hypnotist can make certain suggestions with the likelihood that the subject will continue to forgo FOAs, especially if the hypnotist works these suggestions into the ongoing fantasy. To the extent that the subject does not generate FOAs, he will carry out the hypnotist's suggestions, and experience their effects as real (or, more correctly, as neither real nor unreal).

Indirect suggestion, or intimation, is related to the Absorption Technique. By presenting ideas indirectly, for example, by weaving them into the fantasy, the subject's attention is circumvented, and there is less likelihood that FOAs will be generated concerning the suggestions. Imagery and symbolism include this aspect of indirection, which aids the hypnotist in directing the subject's attention away from the current situation and in reducing his vigilance.

One of the major instances of Absorption Techniques is the guided fantasy in which the hypnotist enjoins the subject to imagine in one or more sensory modalities in an attempt to get the subject caught up in a fantasy or feeling. The object of absorption, however, need not be a fantasy. It may be any behavior or experience that the subject finds compelling. For example, some persons may become highly absorbed in the changes in body feelings or perceived body orientation generated by Redescription, drowsiness, or in the ideomotor movements produced by other Hypnoid procedures. In addition, the Absorption Technique can be employed with feelings of alertness or exertion, as in Banyai and Hilgard's (1976) "active-alert" hypnotic induction. (Whether or not actual use of the latter technique produces Hypnotic, and not "merely" Hypnoid, phenomena, is an empirical question that has not yet been investigated; see Plotkin & Schwartz [1982]).

An interesting instance of the Absorption Technique is that which Sarbin and Coe (1972) have referred to as "hypnotic role enactment," discussed

in Plotkin & Schwartz (1982). The subject is either implicitly or explicitly invited to play the role of a hypnotized person—some combination of what he imagines that role to be and what he is led to believe it is by the hypnotist. Often this process will result in simulation or Hypnoid phenomena, but *if* the subject becomes highly absorbed in this role which, in effect, creates a fantasy context, he may in fact become Hypnotized. This is a particularly interesting means of inducing an Hypnotic state, since one becomes Hypnotized by *pretending* to be hypnotized. Like any Absorption Technique, whether or not it succeeds depends upon how absorbing the subject finds this fantasy context.

Another interesting instance of the Absorption Technique is that which Erickson (1964) calls the "surprise technique." This technique involves the sudden evocation in the subject of an extraordinary experience of surprise, or even astonishment. Such a surprise, of course, has a tremendously *absorbing* quality. Another is its kinship to a state of confusion; thus, surprise can be an instance of both the Absorption and the Confusion Techniques; see below.

In a Hypnotic state induced by an Absorption induction the subject may be mostly oblivious to real world Elements because Absorption Techniques often employ fantasy as the domain of absorption, with a result being loss of real world contact—a special case of a reduced power and/or disposition to generate FOAs. This type of Hypnotic state may also be the sort in which the hypnotist acts only as a "doorman": he aids in the induction of the state but does not become eligible to evoke appraisals *within* the fantasy context.

Absorption Techniques differ depending upon whether they are designed to generate Hypnoid or Hypnotic phenomena. Since the aim of a Hypnoid induction is usually the evocation of a very specific appraisal, the suggested imagery is tailored to the specific effect that is desired, such as images of the insensitivity and rubbery nature of one's arm if the goal is to induce an anaesthesia. In contrast, when used as an *Hypnotic* induction procedure, the fantasy-based Absorption Technique usually involves the creation of a complete fantasy context an imaginary world that the subject can find himself in. When a person makes such a super-ordinate appraisal, he will be in a Trance.

The Relaxation Technique

The Relaxation Technique is perhaps the most popular method of inducing the Hypnotic state. Its goal is the reduction of the subject's *power* to generate FOAs. As with the Absorption Technique, the Relaxation Technique depends, at least initially, on getting the subject to overcome his hypervigilance, perhaps by means of the Redescription Technique.

Then the Relaxation Technique consists of any procedure that has the result of getting the subject to enter a state which is between waking and sleeping (the "twilight" state [see Budzynski, 1972]), a type of state that frequently has the physiological characteristics associated with the "relaxation response" (Benson, Arns, & Hoffman, 1981).

The empirically-ascertained characteristics of the twilight state include a heightened awareness of the body, unusual body sensations such as the Isokower phenomena (Isokower, 1938), dreamlike experiences, a loss of volitional control over mentation, an increased production of "primary process material" (Bertini, Lewis, & Witkin, 1969), a loss of "reality-testing" (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965), and a "loosening of the reality-oriented frame of reference" (Budzynski, 1972). In our present terms, what these and other studies have noted is that the drowsy individual typically loses much of his power to generate FOAs; he loses his sense of contact with the real world.

This loss of the power to generate FOAs is what Barber (1957), for example, discovered when he found that subjects were just as suggestible when in a drowsy state as following an hypnotic induction. One of his research participants who had followed suggestions when drowsy said, "I was just asleep enough to believe what you were saying was true. I *couldn't* oppose what you wanted with anything else" (Barber, 1957, p. 59, emphasis added). Here we see that the research participant reported a loss of *power* to generate FOAs.

It is important not to *equate* sleep or the twilight state with the Hypnotic state, however, as did earlier investigators who equated hypnosis with somnambulism (e.g., Puységur, 1811). Drowsy states are not necessary for, nor equal to, the Hypnotic state; rather, since being drowsy is a natural state in which there is a reduced power to generate FOAs, inducing drowsiness is one way to induce hypnosis. As Ronald Shor (1970) has noted, "the altered state [hypnosis] can exist without any drowsiness whatsoever. Drowsiness has a certain indirect instrumental value in teaching an individual how to achieve the altered state, but it is not intrinsic to it nor is it essential to go through drowsiness to achieve it" (p. 234).

A variation on the Relaxation technique is sensory deprivation, which can be used as an Hypnotic induction since it often produces a drowsy state in which the person loses much of his power to generate FOAs (as manifested, for example, in the inability to distinguish hallucination from perception). In addition, sensory deprivation often involves constraints on the subject's motility, reducing the power to generate FOAs since, as Freud (1975) noticed, being able to move about is fundamental to the establishment of reality testing.

Although the Relaxation technique, when successful, induces a Hypnotic state through the reduction of *power* to generate FOAs, it is possible that

the state is *maintained* via a reduced *disposition* to generate FOAs: It is possible that the Relaxation induction shows the subject what it is *like* to be Hypnotized so that he is then capable of maintaining that state by voluntarily relinquishing his disposition to generate FOAs.

Recent studies of arctic isolation and absorption (Barabasz, Barabasz, & Mullin, 1983) have suggested that the long term effects of isolation include an increased skill or liability for absorption. Long term environmental isolation and sensory deprivation enhance conditions for absorption in fantasy and body states. Sensory deprivation and suggestions of relaxation, drowsiness, and sleep can serve as a vehicle for the Absorption technique as well as the relaxation technique. Both the drowsy individual and the one who has been sensorily deprived often become highly aware of unusual body sensations of heaviness, slowed respiration and pulse, drowsiness, altered experiences of limb position, etc. (Isokower, 1938; Zubeck, 1969). The hypnotist can induce the subject to become highly absorbed in these sensations.

The following brief induction of Milton Erickson's illustrates the employment and integration of the Redescription, Absorption, and Relaxation Techniques.

> The suggestion was offered that she select the chair and position she felt would be most comfortable. When she had settled herself to her satisfaction, she remarked that she would like to smoke a cigarette. She was immediately given one, and she proceeded to smoke lazily, meditatively watching the smoke drifting upward. Casual conversational remarks were offered about the pleasure of smoking, of watching the curling smoke, the feeling of ease in lifting the cigarette to her mouth, the inner sense of satisfaction of becoming entirely absorbed just in smoking comfortably and without the need to attend to any external things. Shortly, casual remarks were made about inhaling and exhaling, the words timed to fit in with her actual breathing. Others were made about the ease with which she could almost automatically lift her cigarette to her mouth and then lower her hand to the arm of the chair. These remarks were also made to coincide with her actual behavior. Soon, the words, "inhale", "exhale", "lift", and "lower" acquired a conditioning value of which she was unaware because of the seemingly conversational character of the suggestions. Similarly, casual suggestions were offered in which the words "sleep", "sleepy", and "sleeping" were timed to her eyelid behavior.
>
> Before she had finished her cigarette, she had developed a light trance. (Haley, 1967, p. 18.)

The Confusion Technique

The Confusion Technique aims to reduce the hypnotic subject's *power* to generate FOAs without necessarily producing a drowsy state; it aims to "push" him into the Hypnotic state. The originator of the Confusion Technique, Milton Erickson, describes it as follows:

> . . . a play on words or communications of some sort that introduces progressively an element of confusion into the question of what is meant, thereby leading to an inhibition of responses called for but not allowed to be manifested and hence to an accumulating need to respond . . . the author has added to the play on words the modification of seemingly contradictory, or irrelevant unrelated concepts, non sequiturs and ideas, variously communicated, and each of which *out of context* is a simple reasonable assertion, meaningful and complete in itself. *In context,* such communications given in a meaningful emphatic manner become a medley of seemingly valid and somehow related ideas that leads the subject to try to combine them into a single totality of significance conducive to a response, literally compelling a response. But the rapidity of the communications inhibits any true understanding, thereby precluding responses and resulting in a state of confusion and frustration. This compels a need for some clear and understandable idea. As this state develops, one offers a clearly definite easily comprehensible idea which is seized upon immediately and serves to arouse certain associations in the subject's mind. The medley is then continued and another comprehensible idea is offered, enhancing the associations of the previous clear understanding. And in the process, one throws in irrelevancies and non sequiturs as if of pertinent value, thereby enhancing the confusion. (Haley, 1967, p. 156.)

The net effect, Erickson claims, is that the subject "welcomes any positive suggesions that will permit a retreat from so unsatisfactory and confusing a situation" (Haley, 1967, p.24). When such a hypnotic suggestion is made, the subject is literally more than willing to respond to it (for further illustrations see Bandler & Grinder, 1975; Erickson, Rossi, & Rossi, 1976; Haley, 1967).

Being in a state of confusion is the same state of affairs as being unable to generate certain final-order appraisals. We are in a state of confusion when (a) having observed some anomalous state of affairs, (b) we initiate a FOA of this state of affairs, but (c) we fail to complete this appraisal due to a lack of information or to an inability to make the available information "fit together." We cannot be confused about a state of affairs of which we are not aware. Thus, in order to employ successfully the Confusion Technique, it is important, as in all Induction Techniques, that the hypnotist ensure that the subject has reason to pay close attention to his communication, and that he communicates in such a way that the subject can easily perceive, but not completely understand, the communication. Also, if the subject does not *attempt* to generate FOAs of the communication, then he will not be confused about it. Thus, in order to keep the subject in a state of confusion, the hypnotist must ensure (a) that it is very important to the subject that he makes some kind of sense out of the hypnotist's communication, and (b) that the subject cannot do so.

There are four states of affairs that can occur once the subject is confused: (a) the subject acquires new information about the confusing state of affairs which renders it no longer confusing, (b) the subject "leaves

the field,'' so that generating FOAs about the confusing state of affairs is no longer important, (c) the subject quits trying (i.e., loses his disposition) to generate FOAs, or (d) he keeps trying to generate FOAs, but is unable to. If the Confusion Technique is to be successful, the hypnotist must minimize the likelihood of the first two alternatives, so that the result is one of the latter two: a reduction in the subject's power or disposition to generate FOAs. This may take great skill on the part of the hypnotist, but the successful result may be a deeply Hypnotized individual.

In the employment of the Confusion Technique, one of its results may be that the person remains confused while he is otherwise free to act. He might not even know that he is confused. This is to say that the critical activity of generating or attempting generation of FOAs can go on independent of the individual's other activities. Hence, it is possible that a person's power to generate FOAs might be fully engaged (and he remains confused) in spite of his intact eligibility to perform other acts. The two issues involved here are: 1) people have a limited capacity to problem solve over a given time and 2) people can be unaware that they are trying and failing to solve a particular problem. To the extent and during the period in which a person is fully and unsuccessfully engaged in generating a FOA while at the same time unaware of that fact, he can be said to be unconsciously confused and deficient in his eligibility to tackle other anomalous matters.

Hypnosis and Status-Assignments: Hypnotism Without an Induction

A person will be more disposed to give up his generation of FOAs if he appraises the hypnotist to be effective or compelling, if he sees the hypnotist as, e.g., having the power to make people experience whatever he suggests. To this end, the hypnotist may, at certain times and with certain persons, use such potential status-accruing gimmicks as crystal balls, magic tricks, or mysterious names and appearances. (See Hull's [1933] discussion of ''prestige suggestion.'')

Moreover, a person will be more easily hypnotized if the assigns *himself* the status of hypnotizable. The hypnotist can take advantage of this state of affairs by beginning with Hypnoid suggestions that are very easy to carry out such as the Postural Sway.

In general, the more a person sees the hypnotist as a person having hypnotic powers, and the more he assigns himself the status of being a person who is susceptible to hypnotic powers, the more likely he will be to enter an Hypnotic state, given an appropriate intervening history. An appropriate intervening history need not resemble what we normally consider to be an hypnotic induction procedure, however. Moreover, the hypnotist's status-claims of being a competent, compelling, or even ineludible hypnotist need not involve, on his part, assertions to this effect.

It is the significance of his behavior, not the details of his peformance, that matters. Thus, a person may very well enhance his status as a compelling hypnotist by emphatically *denying* such a status or by denying the very existence of hypnosis or hypnotic states. If there is no such state to achieve, the subject need not worry about his competence to achieve it. By emphasizing the naturalness and universal ease of "simply responding to suggestions," the hypnotist aids his subjects to relinquish their self appraisals of whether or not they are eligible for or capable of such experiences, in the first place.

MANIFESTATIONS OF THE HYPNOTIC STATE

We will divide our discussion of hypnotic phenomena into four sections: (a) focused attention, (b) suggested effects, (c) nonsuggested effects, and (d) consequences of specific induction procedures or demand characteristics. We will find that, for the most part, it is only the nonsuggested effects that are distinctive to the Hypnotic State and that are not in principle producible as Hypnoid phenomena. However, we will also outline our reasons for supposing that at least some of the suggested effects would appear to require the Hypnotic State in order to be genuinely elicited and experienced, although whether or not they actually do require the Hypnotic State is an empirical question.

The explications of the representative hypnotic phenomena offered below are *not* based on the empirical finding that these phenomena occur during the Hypnotic state; there are no well-known procedures for assessing the presence of the Hypnotic state as distinct from suggestibility. Rather, what we hope to demonstrate here is that there is a wide range of phenomena traditionally associated with the subject matter of hypnosis which are *understandable* manifestations of the psychological state we have articulated here as Hypnotic. Since many of these phenomena are, in addition, those that are historically associated with the topic of "hypnotism," then our identification of the Hypnotic state with the "hypnotic state" appears to be a useful one. We will also discover that, logically, some of the phenomena traditionally labelled "hypnotic" are not necessarily or ever Hypnotic.

Focused Attention

Hypnosis has often been described as involving "focused attention". It may be more appropriate to talk about "*restricted* attention". To speak of restricted attention is to call attention to the fact that someone is attending to one or more Elements to the exclusion of some other Elements, especially when, as observers, we have some reason to expect that these

other Elements would normally be attended to. When someone is in an Hypnotic state, we have special reasons for speaking of restricted attention.

First, as we saw in our first paper (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982), a significant reduction in power and/or disposition to generate FOAs corresponds to a loss of sense of real-world context. Hence, the Elements attended to, and behavioral choices made, by a person who has been Hypnotized are significantly different from what they would be at other times.

Second, we saw that in the paradigm case of an Hypnotic state, the hypnotist becomes eligible to evoke anomalous appraisals for the subject. Since it is appraisals that give a person reasons to act, the Hypnotized person may be acting on some normally less salient reasons, and thus paying attention to some unusual Elements. To an observer, this may look like selective, focused, or restricted attention, but to the subject, it is simply attention to what is then of interest.

Third, in evoking appraisals for the subject, the hypnotist is directing the subject's attention to certain Elements and directing it away from certain others. Since a Hypnotized person, who is not disposed to generate FOAs, is a person who is not disposed to question the place of Elements that he encounters, nor to relate encountered Elements to other Elements in the world or to his self concept, the Hypnotized person will not be easily distracted: there *are* few problematic or distracting Elements. Thus, the Hypnotized person seems to be able to hold or restrict his attention to a single Element for long periods of time.

Restricted attention is both (a) an expression of the Hypnotic state and (b) a state of affairs that the hypnotist tries to cultivate during, and for the purposes of, the Hypnotic induction. During the induction, the hypnotist wants the subject to pay special attention to what he is saying—that is, to hold his attention on the hypnotist's communication. The hypnotic induction cannot be effective unless the subject selectively attends to the hypnotist. In particular, selective or restricted attention would be a natural component of the Absorption Technique, since this technique involves getting the subject absorbed in, e.g., a guided fantasy. Also, for the Confusion Technique to be successful, the subject must be extremely interested and committed to figuring out the nature of the confusing state of affairs and so, in some manner, selectively attending to it. Again, in the Redescription Technique, the hypnotist directs the subject's attention to those Elements which he is redescribing. Restricted attention is also a common feature of *Hypnoid* inductions, since the Hypnoid subject is typically trying to perceive some Element in an anomalous manner, and to do so, he must usually restrict his attention, e.g., to the goal-directed fantasy.

Suggested Effects

Anomalous Appraisals

As we saw earlier, when a person is in an Hypnotic state, the hypnotist may become highly effective at evoking special, unusual, or anomalous appraisals for the subject. Many of the subject's Hypnotic behaviors will be a matter of his acting in accordance with these anomalous appraisals, which he will be unlikely to recognize as anomalous. This implies increased suggestibility: If the subject cannot successfully generate self appraisals, he is more likely to comply with a command than might otherwise be expected. An image or instruction can appear to take on a life of its own if it is unchecked by the constraints, demands, and distractions of the ordinary context of self and real world.

One anomalous appraisal that the hypnotist can evoke is that some aspect of the subject's behavior is automatic, spontaneous, or nonvolitional (see, for example, Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman & Stanley, 1983). For example, when the hypnotist says to the subject that he will find his arm spontaneously rising, he is assigning an automatic status to the behavior of arm-raising. If the subject has little disposition or power to generate a FOA of this status-assignment, he may find that his arm does rise spontaneously; that is, he may appraise his arm as doing so.

Assigning the status of automatic is just one, although perhaps the most common, instance of Hypnotic status-assignment. Other examples include the following: assigning the status of "rigid and unbendable" to the subject's arm, "unverbalizable" to his name, "tightly glued shut" to his eyes, "incapable of separation" to his interlocked fingers, "completely gone" to his sense of smell (resulting in anosmia), "insensitive to pain" to his hand (analgesia and anesthesia) and "inaccessible" to certain of his memories (amnesia).

Positive hallucinations involve status assignments. If the Hypnotized subject accepts an appraisal of "on your nose" as the place of an imaginary mosquito, he will experience the mosquito on his nose and act accordingly. Likewise, the hypnotist can assign "in that chair" as the place of a (nonexistent) Dr. X, or "presently coming over the intercom" as the place of a (nonexistent) voice asking questions. These more complex cases involve not just single appraisal, but appraisal of a special *context* that the subject may accept and act upon.

If a person is in an Hypnotic state, he is likely to accept and make the appraisals evoked by the hypnotist, act accordingly, and not be aware of the anomalous nature of these appraisals or behaviors. It is always possible that a suggestion will *not* take effect with a Hypnotized individual, however. This could occur for several different reasons.

First, in certain nonparadigmatic instances of the Hypnotic State, the hypnotist may facilitate the induction and/or maintenance of the state, but not be eligible to evoke appraisals. This would be the case, for example, when the hypnotist was excluded from the Trance context except in a minimal role of "doorman."

Second, in some instances the subject does accept the appraisal but does not act accordingly since he does not have the required competence. Certain negative "hallucinations," for example, may require an "inhibitory" skill which the subject does not possess: he may not know *how* to experience a material object as invisible, or an arm in ice water as comfortable. A person need not possess such "inhibitory" or "dissociative" skills in order to become Hypnotized, although without them there are certain classes of suggestions that he may not be able to experience. Dissociative abilities (Hilgard, 1977) are not to be confused with Hypnotizability—the ability to relinquish one's final-order perspective.

Third, the hypnotist may suggest an anomalous appraisal which is within the range of FOAs that the subject is still (despite being Hypnotized) disposed and able to generate. The Hypnotic State only involves a significant *reduction* in power and/or disposition to generate FOAs; this power and disposition is not necessarily entirely eliminated, and may, in fact, never be. For any given individual, the range of FOAs he will not relinquish will be those which are most fundamental to his real world and/or self-concept. If the hypnotist evokes an appraisal in this range, the subject need not accept it, and may very well come out of Trance. For instance, if the hypnotist suggests a behavior that the subject normally considers to be highly objectionable or immoral, he may generate a FOA of that suggestion and awaken.

Hypnotic Dreams and Fantasy

One of the requests or suggestions that the hypnotist may make is for his subject to dream. It is undoubtedly the case that some dream reports from persons participating in hypnosis experiments are fabricated (Barber, 1962; Tart, 1965). We should nevertheless not be surprised if persons who are in an Hypnotic State are able to experience genuine or nearly genuine dreams, since the Hypnotic state has in common with the dream state a significant reduction in power and disposition to generate FOAs. Moreover, just as an attenuation of power or disposition to generate FOAs accounts for the feeling of reality that Hypnotic fantasies and dreams can have, so this same reduction helps make understandable why our night dreams often have such a realistic quality. There may be some significant differences between Hypnotic and night dreams, however. As Hilgard (1965) points out, the hypnotic state is not the *same* as sleep, and the topic of the hypnotic dream is often a suggested one.

Suggested Nonveridical Identity and Context

One anomalous appraisal that the hypnotist may evoke is that the subject is a different person than he actually is, or that his context (e.g., surroundings, location, or social context) is different than it actually is. These related appraisals of self and context form a sort of capstone in a person's ongoing construction or maintenance of his real world, and constitute a superordinate class of appraisals: they coordinate and generate whole domains of facts and relationships particular to the identity or context in question. The evocation of a single anomalous superordinate appraisal may constitute sufficient grounds for engaging in a wide range of otherwise anomalous behaviors. The entranced person, to the extent that he is able, may automatically "follow-up" such appraisals by generating all the necessary Elements to "complete" the new sense of context or self, reflecting the person's beliefs, knowledge, values, and assumptions about the identity and/or location in question. For example, if I suddenly appraised myself as Benny Profane or the Sand Man, then I would have little reason to be writing this, and would instead engage in behavior attendant upon such altered statuses as hunting alligators in the sewers or trying to put you to sleep, respectively. (Much psychotic behavior can be seen as following from unusual superordinate appraisals.)

This sort of Trance phenomena is attempted in age regression in the Stanford Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) and in suggested personality alteration in the Stanford Profile Scales of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1967).

This sort of trance phenomena corresponds to *Hypnotic* role-enactment, as opposed to *Hypnoid* role-enactment (Sarbin & Coe, 1972). In the latter, the subject is aware of his anomalous role-enactment *as* anomalous and *as* enactment. This corresponds to the typical case of the method actor who can "get inside" his character without losing awareness of his own identity or the context of the play and, e.g., the need to please the audience and/or director. In contrast, the Hypnotic role-enacter corresponds to the highly engrossed actor (Sarbin & Coe, 1972), who becomes so absorbed in his role that he becomes relatively unaware of the audience and of himself as distinct from the role he is playing. This phenomenon is also closely associated wth possession states (Prince, 1968) and certain cases of multiple or split personality (Hilgard, 1977).

One final instance of a suggested nonveridical context appraisal is the "rapport phenomena" (Erickson, 1944; Erickson & Erickson, 1941; Hull, 1933, Tart, 1969), in which the subject loses awareness of any Elements (including other persons) which are not a component of the hypnotist-subject relationship. For example, the hypnotist often makes the explicit suggestion that the subject will pay attention to nothing but the hypnotist's voice and, perhaps, the subject's own body sensations. If the subject ac-

cepts and makes this anomalous appraisal, he will be accepting a special context: "It's just me and you, nothing else." Lower-order anomalous appraisals may follow from the acceptance of that context: e.g., "negative hallucinations" of other people, voices, or sensations that are not an explicit component of the trance context.

Suggested Dissociative Phenomena

Dissociation is an old idea (e.g., Janet, 1889) which is being revived by contemporary theorists (e.g., Bowers, 1976; Erickson et al., 1976; Hilgard, 1977). There appears to be a lack of clarity and agreement as to just what dissociation *is,* however. In particular, what is dissociated from what?

Erickson applies the term to the occurrence of particular behaviors outside of their normal context. He states that "whenever a behavior is successfully dissociated from its usual context, we have evoked a hypnotic phenomena" (Erickson et al., 1976, p. 71). This use of the term "dissociation" relates most readily to our formulation: Regardless of any specific suggestions, the Hypnotic state is, by definition, a dissociated state in Erickson's sense, since the subjects' behaviors are dissociated from their normal context of self and real world.

Bowers (1976), however, employs the term "dissociation" in a different manner. He states that "by dissociation I have meant the ability to register (and sometimes respond to) information that is not consciously perceived" (p. 137). As Bowers (1976), Hilgard (1977), and Jaynes (1976) document, it is well known that persons can make distinctions and engage in behaviors of which they are not conscious, as in the phenomena of sleep learning, nonconscious hearing during general anesthesia, or the everyday phenomena of, say, successfully driving to work without consciousness of the road or our driving.

At any given time, a person is only conscious of those Elements of the world which are intrinsic to his ongoing behavior, and, even then, only of those Elements that are intrinsic to his behavior *as the person himself distinguishes and intends his behavior* (Plotkin, 1981). Other Elements of the real world will not be consciously distinguished unless they represent potential or actual disruptions of our ongoing behavior. We distinguish our own behavior in light of our understanding of our present context, usually the ongoing social practice or episode. Thus, an alteration in our understanding of the context will result in a change in our understanding of our behavior, which, in turn, will result in an alteration of the set of Elements of which we are conscious.

When a person is Hypnotized, the hypnotist becomes eligible to alter the person's understanding of his context, as we saw above, by evoking special appraisals (or by evoking special contexts). By this means, the hypnotist can implicitly direct the subject to attend to a range of Elements

to which he normally would not attend in his present circumstances. The subject may discriminate the other Elements of his situation to which he *would* normally be attending, without being consciously aware of them, just as while driving we are often unconscious of the road while nevertheless making the necessary distinctions. He may also be able nonconsciously to *respond* to them, just as the absorbed driver does. The case of the Hypnotized subject seems more striking than the case of the driver, however, because *we* are attending to those Elements that he is not, and thus we are very conscious of the fact that he is responding to these Elements nonconsciously. The Elements that we find most compelling are not necessarily the same as those that draw the subject's attention, however, since the hypnotist has redirected that attention by evoking or creating a special context.

The ability to dissociate in Bower's sense—that is, the ability to discriminate and respond nonconsciously—is, conceptually, a distinct ability from that involved in entering an Hypnotic State. On the other hand, it is an empirical possibility that a person who has a high ability to dissociate will also be a person who has a high ability to enter Trance, since both abilities may be related to the third ability to become highly absorbed in some activity (Bowers, 1976). In any case, Bowers's use of the term "dissociation" does reduce to an instance of dissociation of behavior from context.

The most complex use of the term "dissociation" is Hilgard's (1974, 1977). Hilgard speaks of "simultaneous or near-simultaneous cognitive activities or structures that show some measure of independence from each other" (1974, p. 305). The range of phenomena to which Hilgard applies his concept of dissociation is quite varied and complex. We will consider just one example, perhaps the one that is best known: that of the "hidden observer." A highly susceptible subject is hypnotized and the hypnotist makes the suggestion that his left hand is analgesic to the pain of circulating ice water. The subject is then able to place his left hand in the ice water without experiencing any pain. That is, the hypnotist evoked a special context (or appraisal) for the subject in which pain from his left hand has no place, and hence, he is not *conscious* of pain.

In one version of the experiment, the hypnotist then tells the subject that, when he places his hand on the subject's shoulder, the hypnotist "can be in touch with the part of you that knows things the hypnotized part does not know, and it can talk to me." With this maneuver, the hypnotist establishes a second context in which the subject *can* be conscious of the pain. When this context is evoked by the hand on the shoulder, the subject reports the pain that he has always discriminated and of which he is now conscious.

In a second, more dramatic, version of this experiment, the subject is

told that through automatic writing (a special skill that is conceptually distinct from Hypnotic ability) his right hand will "tell us what we ought to know" but the subject will pay no attention to that hand and will not know what it is communicating. The right hand then reports as much pain as is felt outside of hypnosis while, orally, no pain is reported. In this case, the Hypnotic context that is evoked has no place for left hand pain *or* right-hand writing, and so both the pain and the automatic report of the pain go on outside of awareness. Although this sort of virtuoso dissociation undoubtedly requires a very skilled and specially trained subject, the effect is of the same general sort that occurs with the normal person who is absorbed in a conversation and is able to simultaneously, albeit nonconsciously, drive his car or negotiate obstacles on a path while walking.

These "hidden observer" findings are dependent upon *suggested* context effects (and thus are not intrinsic to the Hypnotic state), and they require extra-Hypnotic skills. Also, nonconscious discrimination is not unique to Trance States; it is only that it often becomes especially striking during these states due to the often unusual deployment of attention.

The "hidden observer" is not a reified aspect of mind. During the Hypnotic State, the subject does not become two persons, nor is a "hidden" person within the person revealed. Rather, the Hypnotized person may act from independent contexts, only one of which he is conscious, if (a) he has the appropriate skills, and (b) he is given the appropriate instructions that show him how. This type of dissociation is thus best seen not as a dissociation of consciousness from consciousness or of behavior from behavior, but as dissociation of behavior from context.

Nonsuggested Effects

Trance Logic[2]

The description of the Hypnotized person as lacking the disposition or ability to generate FOAs explains "trance logic" (Orne, 1959, 1972).

By trance logic, he refers to a peculiar "tolerance for incongruity" that he believes characterizes "deep hypnosis" (Orne, 1972, p. 427). This is clearly related to our formulation of the Hypnotic State since Orne employs the term "incongruity" in essentially the same way that we speak of "anomaly" (see Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982, pp. 175–182). We must distinguish *tolerance* for anomaly from *noncognizance* of anomaly, however. Tolerance for anomaly could mean either (a) the subject's lack of affective puzzlement upon observing an Element that he recognizes to be anomalous, or (b) the subject's failure to appraise as anomalous an Element that *other* observes appraise as anomalous. Although in *both* Hypnotic

and Hypnoid cases there is a lack of affective puzzlement upon observation of the Element, only in the Hypnotic is failure of appraisal found. This is not to say that he wouldn't perceive the Element that the other observers appraise to be anomalous; rather, he *might* perceive that Element but he would not appraise it to be anomalous. We believe that Orne has in mind the latter sense of "tolerance for anomaly" when he speaks of "trance logic."

Orne (1959) stated that trance logic was "the apparently simultaneous perception and response to both hallucinations and reality without any apparent attempts to satisfy a need for logical consistency" (p. 295). He illustrated this phenomenon by (a) suggesting the hallucination that an actual person the subjects had met was sitting in a (real) chair in front of them, and (b) asking them who the person standing behind them was, this person being the one whose hallucination he had suggested. He found that subjects who were in a deep trance reported seeing the same person in both places, but that subjects who were simulating hypnosis either refused to see the person behind them, or said that they did not recognize the person.

How can we account for these findings? Orne's "hypnotized" subject, assuming he is in the state we have identified as Hypnotic, is appraising the presence of the same person first in one place and then in another. The FOA that the subject does not generate is something on the order of "one or both of these cannot be the same person because in a real world a person cannot be two places at once." Since this FOA is not generated, the subject is left with his two persons.

Orne's simulators, not being Hypnotized, notice the incongruity *as* incongruous and smell a trap, and unwittingly some fall into it. To preserve the integrity of their "hallucinated Ms. Z" they must treat the real Ms. Z as something else, unless, of course, they know the trick.

The Recovery of Repressed Memories

Freud (1975), and many other clinicians since him, have noticed that repressed memories sometimes become available to a person during hypnotic sessions. The problem is often that after hypnosis is terminated, the memory is again defended against. This was found by Freud to be typical of hysteria and the other psychoneuroses. In the case of traumatic neuroses, the situation is different: The memory of the trauma that is recovered during hypnosis usually remains after the hypnotic session ends.

This difference between traumatic neuroses and psychoneuroses can be understood in terms of FOAs as follows. While he is disposed to generate self-appraisals, a person's world will be limited in accordance with the kind of person he sees himself as.

What happens in the case of recovery of lost or repressed memory? Let us say that we have Hypnotized a person who sees himself as a heterosexual who could not possibly have any interest in homosexual experience. He is just not that kind of person. But, while Hypnotized, the person recovers the memory of participating in a homosexual episode. It is not surprising that a person who is in an Hypnotic state can remember a forbidden act or experience that he would not have been able to recollect otherwise; there is no anomaly, because there is no FOA generated by him in accordance with his self-concept. When the person is no longer Hypnotized and is again disposed to generate FOAs, he will have no place for such a memory and will have to treat it in a manner allowed by his self concept; he will forget it or distort it such that it has a place.

On the other hand, in the traumatic neurosis we find that if the memory of the trauma is recovered during the hypnotic session, it is often retained after the session ends because the memory, although painful, is not inconsistent with the person's self-concept. (For this reason, it is also the case that the person need not be Hypnotized in order to recover the traumatic memory.) If the person can recognize the traumatic memory during the session and then cease to appraise it as painful, he will no longer need to avoid it after the session is terminated.

Spontaneous Amnesia

Spontaneous post-Hypnotic amnesia for the events of the hypnotic session, although only rarely noted during hypnosis research, *can* nevertheless occur for three different sorts of reasons. First, the subject may *believe* he will forget, in which case the amnesia is an implicitly suggested or expected phenomenon, and not intrinsic to the Hypnotic State per se. Second, there may be repression because the material encountered while Hypnotized is alien to the subject's normal real world and/or self-concept. The most interesting possibility, however, is the context-dependent effect in which the Hypnotic events are difficult to recall (at least at first) since the act of recalling is taking place in a very different context from the Hypnotic events: a bridge is hard to find. The empirical likelihood of this latter sort of spontaneous amnesia would depend upon, among other factors, the abruptness, distinctiveness, and degree of discontinuity of the Trance-to-waking context change.

Source Amnesia and Disrupted Episodic Memory

"Source amnesia" (Evans & Thorne, 1966) refers to the situation in which a subject can later recall or recognize something that has been learned in an hypnotic session but cannot remember when, or in what

context, he learned it. Our concept of the Hypnotic state furnishes one possible explanation for source amnesia. FOAs locate or assign the place that an Element has in a person's world. To be in a state in which you are not disposed or able to generate FOAs is to be in a state in which you are not concerned with the place that Elements have in your real world (Schwartz, 1978, 1980). The place that something has in a person's world will often include both where and when it was first encountered. Thus, if a person has learned something during an Hypnotic State, the context of the learning, the hypnotic session, will not necessarily be connected to the learned Element, and thus the context may not be remembered with the Element.

Exploring a related phenomenon, Evans and Kihlstrom (1973) found that when hypnotized subjects are given hypnotic test items as part of a susceptibility scale, and then given amnesia suggestions for these items, the highly hypnotized subjects (i.e., those who score high on *suggestibility*), tend to recall these items in less sequential fashion than less hypnotized subjects, who tend to remember the items in the order in which they were presented. Kihlstrom (1972) proposes that the nonsequential recall is not a spontaneous effect of hypnosis, because he found sequential post-hypnotic recall when amnesia suggestions were either removed or not given in the first place.

This finding does not address the question of whether or not recall *during* an Hypnotic state is sequential for items encountered in the state. Recent studies (Schwartz, 1980) of episodic recall obtained within the state demonstrates that order of recall is less sequential for highly suggestible persons than for those either less suggestible or those who are highly suggestible but not adminstered an hypnotic induction.[3] Further, these studies suggest that Hypnotized subjects, during Trance, have a greater difficulty in estimating that period's duration than do those persons who are Hypnotizable but not then in Trance, or those who are not Hypnotizable and who have gone through an induction.

Why? Sequence and duration are important aspects of a person's normal real world and constitute parameters of a person's episodic memory. Sequence is an especially important relationship when the events considered are self-contained and independent of one another, as are most hypnotic test suggestions. It is not surprising that these real world contextual relationships of sequence and duration are precisely what is lost during an Hypnotic state. Such loss is consistent with loss of real world context (hence historical context) since the only *specifically* historical aspects of memory or episodes is succession and duration.

Loss of Initiative

Hilgard (1965) describes as characteristic of deeply hypnotized subjects a "subsidence of the planning function" (p. 6), i.e., loss of initiative and

lack of desire to make and carry out plans on their own. Typically, hypnotic subjects simply sit still and wait for suggestions or commands from the hypnotist. Beyond being a reflection of the demand characteristics and social roles of the hypnotic context, this can be seen as a possible manifestation of the Hypnotic state. The Hypnotized person is not acting in relation to the context of his self-concept. Since many of the reasons that a person normally acts on follow from his self-concept, the Hypnotized individual will have lost a substantial portion of his initiative.

Consequences of Specific Induction Procedures or Demand Characteristics

A third set of hypnotic manifestations, which are neither explicitly suggested nor nonsuggested effects, include "trance stare" (a blank stare and rigid facial expression), limp posture, psychomotor retardation, deep relaxation, and alterations in body awareness, such as feelings of floating, sinking, falling, turning, or complete or partial loss of body awareness. These phenomena are not instrinsic to the Hypnotic state as we defined it, but are either (a) side effects of the particular induction procedure employed or (b) consequences of the subject's expectations about hypnosis, whether derived pre-experimentally or implicitly through the behavior of the experimenter or the laboratory setting (i.e., "demand characteristics" of the experimental setting [Orne, 1962]). Examples of side effects include those of the popular Relaxation Technique, which often produces sensory-deprivation effects attendant upon deep relaxation and immobility: the alterations in body awareness. Other side effects such as the "trance stare" may follow from the rapt attention generated during an Absorption induction, or from the subject's enactment of his understanding of the role of a hypnotic subject. Despite possible empirical associations, there is nothing about the alteration in powers and dispositions that we are identifying as Hypnotic that is conceptually tied to these sorts of trance-like characteristics.

CONCLUSION

We have shown here how a wide variety of facts about Hypnotic states can be accounted for systematically by our conceptualization of the Hypnotic state as characteristically involving a lack of disposition or capacity to make FOAs (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982). Of the three induction techniques we examined, we showed that the Absorption Technique entails lessened disposition to generate FOAs, while the Relaxation Technique and the Confusion Technique involve a lessened *power* to make FOAs. We also examined several manifestations of the Hypnotic state. We showed, for example, that focused or restricted attention involves a di-

minished disposition to generate FOAs, because the subject is not paying attention to possibly anomalous Elements. We pointed out that the lessened disposition to make FOAs clearly explains the subject's acceptance of anomalous appraisals suggested by the hypnotist. We argued that the phenomenon of dissociation can best be understood as the dissociation of behavior from the normal context of self and the real world because of lessened disposition or capacity to make FOAs. We also showed how trance logic is clearly a case of the loss of power or disposition to make FOAs. In each instance we have pointed out that the critical difference between a genuine Hypnotic state, on the one hand, and Hypnoid behavior or simulation of hypnosis, on the other, is the genuine diminution of FOAs in the true Hypnotic state. In conclusion, it seems clear that the conceptualization of hypnosis and related phenomena in terms of FOAs and anomaly integrates this entire field, as well as providing answers to a good many puzzling issues.

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NOTES

1. We capitalize "Hypnotic" and "Hypnoid" to indicate that these words designate our conceptions; we use lower case to refer to "either the empirical findings or the historically distinguished and largely undefined subject matter of hypnosis" (Plotkin & Schwartz, 1982, p. 142).

2. Readers who are familiar with the literature on trance logic may wonder why we include it as a nonsuggested effect when, typically, it occurs as part of the response to a suggestion. There are two reasons: First, even when it *is* part of the response to a suggestion, the trance-logic part of the response is in no way suggested. Second, there is no reason why trance-logic phenomena need be part of a response to a suggestion.

3. In these studies, the SHSS, Form C, was employed. If it turns out to be the case that those who score very high on this scale are, in general, more Hypnotized than those who score very low, then these findings will also hold for Hypnotizability. Strictly speaking, however, this scale indexes only suggestibility and does not allow an empirical separation of Hypnoid and Hypnotic.

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A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR MIGRATION IN ALASKA

James M. Orvik

ABSTRACT

Migration is conceptualized within the framework of Descriptive Psychology. A paradigm case formulation is presented in which migration has five characteristics: permanence, significant distance, two communities that differ culturally, deliberateness, and a basis in the migrator's appraisal of behavior potential. A derivative case analysis shows how other varieties of migration can be included in the concept. The relationship of migration to language, behavior, and culture is discussed as a "top down" formulation. The final section addresses the effect of migration on language and culture using the Alaskan context as a source of examples.

The original working title of this paper included the term "cross-cultural migration." Put on paper, however, the term seems somehow wrong but it takes a moment or two to figure out exactly why. "Migration" is seldom a term we apply easily to ourselves to describe our own residential movements. We may *move* but we don't migrate. To put the point in another way, when the Mayflower transports pilgrims and their possessions they

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are said to have "migrated." When Mayflower transports you and me and our possessions we are said to have "moved."

The main problem with the term "cross-cultural migration," however, is its conceptual redundancy. Migration implies that one crosses cultural boundaries in some degree. If not, the term has no conceptual bite. In fact, distinctions among "moving," "migration," and related concepts are far from arbitrary and are far more important than existing social science taxonomies currently allow.

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a general conceptualization of migration which specifies the psychologically significant characteristics by which migration is best portrayed. The resulting conceptualization is part of a wider attempt to understand migration in the context of Alaska Native communities, especially those aspects of migration related to the maintenance of Alaska's indigenous cultures.

This paper is organized into three parts. The first part comprises the above mentioned conceptualization; it draws upon the explanatory resources of Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1978, 1981, 1982) for its methodology. The second part explores ways in which migration and language are related to behavior and culture; it introduces an additional concept from Descriptive Psychology, i.e., the idea of hierarchically arranged social structures within which migration, language, behavior, and culture are logically positioned. The third section focusses primarily on the effect of migration on culture maintenance, especially on language as a component of culture.

MIGRATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS

In the framework of Descriptive Psychology, *process* refers to a sequential change from one state of affairs to another (Ossorio, 1978). A process has a beginning and an end, specified by initial and final states of affairs, respectively. Processes can include other processes as parts, just as the initial process can be a constitutent part of a yet larger process.

Migration qualifies as a process under the above conditions. A person has an initial residential state of affairs that changes to a final residential state of affairs and the change is sequential over a number of stages. Migration is a psychological process because it paradigmatically involves deliberate action: someone deciding to migrate or not. Other types of relocation, as by being kidnapped or sold into slavery, are not deliberate but, nonetheless, comprise cases related to migration.

Earlier conceptualizations of migration derive from other fields of social science (Sociology, Economics, Political Science, Anthropology, Geography, History). These fields render the concept of migration in their own terms, each introducing theories resident in its own prevailing paradigms.

These earlier treatments of migration were not, nor should they have been, "psychological" treatments of the subject.

Nonpsychological formulations of migration frequently use fragments of psychological explanation, however. As far back as 1889, the "laws of migration" proposed by Ravenstein included a preempirical psychological rule-of-thumb as their main guide:

> Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation), all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of these compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to 'better' themselves in material respect. (Ravenstein, 1889, cited in Lee, 1969, p. 283)

This observation came after an earlier treatise in which the laws were formulated around structural variables such as "distance and urbanization" (Ravenstein, 1885, cited in Lee, 1969, p. 283).

Later attempts to develop theories of migration show similar reliance on psychological fragments of description and explanation. For example, Stouffer (1940) points out the role "intervening opportunity" plays in the process of migration. Lee (1969, p. 287) cites "personal factors which effect individual thresholds and facilitate or retard migration", along with origin and destination factors. Taylor (1969) used motivation as the basis for his threefold classification of migrant types as "Aspiring, Dislocated, and Resultant". For Taylor, the decision to migrate "entails a resolution of the forces which bind the potential migrant to his present situation, and those which pull him away" (p. 124).

The examples given above illustrate the relative importance of psychological concepts in past formulations of migration. There seems, however, a reluctance to use psychological concepts as anything more than sponges for soaking up variance left over after the application of a host of traditional variables.

Another difficulty with earlier conceptualizations of migration is that they often end up as taxonomies that offer only a single basis for classification. For example, the International Encyclopedia of Social Science defines migration as follows: "in its most general sense 'migration' is ordinarily defined as the relatively permanent movement of persons over a significant distance" (Sills, 1968, p. 286). The article then goes on to cite taxonomies that distinguish *innovative* migration (to achieve the new), from *conservative* migration (because circumstances change), in recognition of different motivations for migrating. A second distinction is then made between *impelled* migration (ejection by some state or power), and *free* migration (as with pioneers and pilgrims), thus shifting us to a new realm of causal possibilities unrelated to the first.

Another problem with the taxonomic emphasis of the earlier formula-

tions is that they simply have lacked the scope to encompass the full range of possibilities. What is needed is a descriptive resource by which to portray the phenomenon and its varieties as a single pre-empirical, noninductive, conceptual package. Such a package would, of course, have to include the role of deliberate action as its main structural feature.

Among the resources of Descriptive Psychology relevant to the conceptualization of migration in Alaska is the paradigm case formulation (PCF) (Ossorio, 1981). This device is a way of specifying the characteristics of an unambiguous case of the concept in question. Other varieties can then be expressed as different in specific ways from the paradigm case.

A Paradigm Case

In the current instance I offer as paradigmatic the case of migration that has the following characteristics:

1. Some person makes a permanent relocation of residence;
2. there are two communities involved, a sending community and a receiving community, that differ culturally;
3. the relocation is far enough away to make simultaneous participation in the social practices of both communities impossible;
4. the migration is a deliberate act; and
5. the decision to migrate is based on the migrator's appraisal that the behavioral possibilities in the sending community are fewer, more narrow, or less satisfying than those in the receiving community.

The first characteristic, that migration is permanent, is only to remind us that we do not ordinarily regard intentionally impermanent relocation as a paradigmatic instance of migration. Impermanent relocation can be accounted for under two distinct derivative cases discussed later.

Regarding the second paradigm characteristic, the reference to communities serves to bring into the discussion any and all facts about communities that bear on the subject of migration. For example, communities are repositories not only of social practices but of the settings in which one can participate in these practices. What there is for a person to do is bounded by the community as a cultural entity. If a person migrates, the migration is away from more than a place; it is also migration away from the whole set of social practices and settings characteristic of that community. The same can be said of the community to which one migrates: It embodies some new set of social practices and settings. The significance of this feature of the paradigm case is in the likelihood that the migrant will be faced with a cultural adjustment of some empirically specifiable magnitude.

As to the third characteristic, the significance of any distance the migrant travels to relocate lies in whatever distance or equivalent condition it takes to make the sending community unavailable to the migrant as a setting for direct social participation. The point is that distances are significant by virtue of socio-cultural factors that have relatively little to do with miles.

The fourth and fifth features of the paradigm case, that the decision to migrate is deliberate and based on an appraisal of circumstances in the two communities, remind us that communities embody all the means by which some set of persons can successfully carry out a way of life in one of the ways it can be done. No account of migration as a deliberate act would be complete without reference to the conceptual necessity for the migrant to have evaluated the prospects of satisfactorily living a life under the new conditions.

Related to this part of the formulation is the inescapable fact that the act of migration on the part of one of its members is subject to evaluation by the sending community. Going even further, it is safe to say that each community has built in or evolving standards for evaluating such acts, along with built in standards for their correct application in any particular case. These same considerations, of course, hold for the receiving community as well.

Migration is something that is done in order to do something else. The paradigm case is the one in which migration is done to improve one's own potential for engaging in culturally patterned behavior to meet one's basic human needs. If one can't meet these needs in one location, reason enough exists for going to another place, if one does anything at all.

Derivative Cases

We turn now to the specification of other cases related to the paradigm case. Table 1 summarizes one possible way of generating new cases by systematically changing the five components of the paradigm case, one component at a time. Each variety of migration shown in Table 1 represents a real possibility for which examples come readily to mind. The first line represents the paradigm case, the one that fulfills the conditions specified earlier. The next five cases are derived from the first by transforming each individual characteristic.

Derivative Case One comprises patterns of migration identical to the paradigm case except that the relocation is not permanent. Care must be taken here to distinguish between instances of unsuccessful migration and migration where a return to the sending commuity is part of the intended pattern from the beginning, since the psychological significance of the two types is clearly different.

Table 1
Varieties of Migration
Derived from the Pardigm
Case Formulation

	Paradigm Characteristics				
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
Varieties					
paradigm case	+	+	+	+	
derivative one		+	+	+	+
derivative two	+		+	+	+
derivative three	+	+		+	+
derivative four	+	+	+		+
derivative five	+	+	+	+	
derivative K					

(1) permanent relocation; (2) significant distance; (3) cultural displacement; (4) deliberate action; (5) differential appraisal

Unsuccessful migration should not be included under Derivative Case One for several reasons. One reason, of course, is to maintain the distinction between defective cases and derivative cases. The main reason, however, is that success is a performance criterion to which all cases of migration, including Derivative Case One, are subject. A relevant example is the following. In Alaska, it is not uncommon for residents of villages to participate in the cash economy by taking jobs elsewhere, but only for as long as it takes to make a subjectively adequate sum of money. The adequacy of the sum is controlled by conditions of need in the sending community to which the migrant intends to return. Experience during the construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline brought this dynamic to the attention of contractors more often than some of them would have wished. The point is that if the basis of the difference in appraisal of the migrant's two communities is financial, it can be removed by a temporary relocation for a period of time more or less known in advance. When the financial goal is accomplished, the migrant returns as planned. While this pattern is culturally unfamiliar to some of us, it is not only intelligible, it can be completely successful as well.

Derivative Case Two is migration where a significant physical distance is not part of the relocation. It may at first appear that migration without physical and geographical relocation is a contradiction in terms. There is a point, however, to making conceptual room for this kind of possibility. In the paradigm case, the significance of the distance is specified as whatever distance it takes to make the sending community unavailable for social participation. Under Derivative Case Two, one finds new settings for social

participation *within* the sending community, generally in one of two ways: first, by establishing oneself in a new social class or cultural milieu substantially different from one's original class or milieu; second, by getting the sending community to accept a substantially large set of new behavioral possibilities. In the social science literature these two ways are recognized as *social mobility* and *social change,* respectively (Tajfel, 1978).

Derivative Case Two is the case in which one interacts equally well in two cultures, but a clear choice has been made to assimilate into the new one. The autobiography of Richard Rodriguez (1981) is an articulate account of one such instance of social mobility. Many instances of interethnic marriage can also be seen to exemplify this derivative case of migration.

Social change under Derivative Case Two can be exemplified by history. Agents of massive social change such as Christ, Marx, Hitler, and Gandhi come readily to mind as persons credited with the introduction of new social practices on a global scale. To varying degrees, of course, anyone is a potential change agent relative to someone. Few persons have the motivation, capacity, or opportunity, however, to effect change in whole cultures. The point here is not to suggest that social change is merely a form of migration in disguise; to do so would trivialize the notion of social change. Rather, it is suggested that the two concepts are related in that they both comprise the improvement of personal states of affairs as their basis, even though they differ in scale.

In Derivative Case Three, component three of the paradigm case is modified such that the sending and receiving communities do not differ culturally. In this case new sets of social practices do not need to be learned in order to participate in the social practices of the new community; cultural displacement is at a minimum, making the chances of success correspondingly high. Some forms of executive relocation provide reasonable examples of this kind of migration; those forms where the move is perceived as permanent. More common, however, is the simple case where one moves because of or in order to find a new job in a community "just like" the community one has left. Meeting new people and making new friends is done as a set of familiar social practices with relatively little cultural displacement involved.

Derivative Case Four is characterized as not being the result of a deliberate action on the part of the migrant. This case has appeared in previous taxonomies (Sills, 1968) under the general description of forced, or coercive migration. Derivative Case Four is broader than such conceptions; it includes all conditions under which one might migrate without choosing to do so, not just those in which the sending community excludes the migrant. Children of migrants, for example need not be *persona non grata* in order to migrate at the wish of someone else. Likewise, persons stranded outside their own country during an outbreak of war may become involuntary migrants. The young men who migrated to Sweden and Canada

out of moral opposition to their draft status during the conflict in Vietnam, while having done so deliberately, can hardly be said to have had a choice in the matter and so their relocation might well be classed as an instance of Derivative Case Four.

Finally, there is Derivative Case Five, under which migration takes place even though the differential appraisal of the two communities is not large. The person who makes the decision to migrate can do so for the benefit of someone else. All that is required to qualify as this kind of migration is that someone makes the decision to migrate other than the one whose circumstances are improved by the relocation. Non-Native school teachers in Alaska's rural communities ironically exemplify Case Five when they leave the village so their own children can have a "proper" education. Another example is a husband's leaving a satisfactory position for him in order to relocate where the wife's prospects are significantly improved. It is the wife's circumstances that take precedence in this context, the possibility that the husband will benefit from the move notwithstanding.

These, then, are five derivative cases of migration generated by a simple algorithm. The reader is now free to derive other possible cases by expanding the algorithm to include transformations of more than one paradigm characteristic at a time. For example, the kind of relocation undergone by military families involves the transformation of at least two, and possibly three, paradigm characteristics: Permanence, deliberateness, and perhaps differential appraisal. Another example, migrancy as a way of life, involves a change in perhaps all five components, although some forms of nomadism would keep component four, deliberate action, intact.

MIGRATION, LANGUAGE, BEHAVIOR, AND CULTURE

We turn now to the problem of fitting the concept of migration into its place relative to language, behavior, and culture. To do this I turn to another kind of device used in Descriptive Psychology, the "top-down" formulation. This kind of formulation is nonreductive, works from the general to the specific, the whole to the parts, the pre-empirical to the empirical, and from possibilities to actualities (Ossorio, 1982).

With the top-down approach, the life of any particular person is seen as being structurally arranged in a hierarchy of inclusion relationshps that begin with ways of living at the most general and progress through cultural patterns and social practices to individual actions down to the specific movements by which these actions are carried out in particular cases. These processes are all going on at the same time, but the smaller pieces occur as part of the larger pieces. Thus, "the primary phenomenon is the smaller elements occuring *because* they are ways for the larger elements

to be implemented; the latter are not seen as accidential or epiphenomenal consequences of the former'' (Ossorio, 1982, p. 4).

An analysis from the top down is a general reminder that the selection of units of analysis for research can be a complex affair. In the case of migration one is tempted immediately to regard the act of relocation itself as the basic unit of analysis. In a sense, this selection is justified in most instances. But, if one sees, relocation as an element of a part-whole relationship, the event as a specific act taking place at a specific time has no more extension than a point has on a line. The line is the appropriate unit of analysis, not the point, because of this part-whole relationship.

Migration requires a set of circumstances prior to its occurence which become reason enough for its occurence. This is not to say that similar circumstances for someone else would inevitably lead them to migrate. Because migration is a response to one's appraisal of one's circumstances it also has the characteristics of optionality built in to all social practices. What options apply to a given situation is an empirical question. Related to this aspect of migration is the fact that the act of migration on the part of one of its members is subject to appraisal by the sending community as to whether it is called for or not. Going even further, it is safe to say that part of the social practices of any community entail the application of standards for when and under what circumstances migration should occur. The receiving community has standards for appraisal as well, of course.

Thus, migration is a package of events, states of affairs, objects, processes, and relationships which virtually all other conceptual models treat as coming into being only after a move occurs. The top-down formulation introduces the large inclusion relationship that treats migration as an option selected under a set of evaluated circumstances. If there weren't this feature of optionality, and if only cases involving relocation counted as migration, there would be no such thing as not migrating. Not migrating when the situation calls for it deserves as much explanation as any other aspect of the phenomenon. The present formulation is designed to allow the circumstances of the relocation as well as the relocation itself to be placed in perspective. As with any deliberate action, migrating or not can only be judged according to whether the situation calls for it or not, and only persons in a position to make such a judgement can do so for a particular case.

Language relates to migration primarily as a parameter of culture. In any culture the things that are said are said in certain ways and certain ways only. i.e., there is a linguistic analog to cultural displacement; linguistic displacement. From the migrant's point of view the linguistic practices in which the new community differs from the old community rep-



Figure 1. Migration possibilities among four cities and two languages.

resent a subset of the new social practices the migrant must become able to participate in for successful migration to occur.

The relationship between language and migration involves, parametrically, three languages: the language of the sending community (LS), the language of the receiving community (LR), and the language of the migrant (LM). For the first two parameters, LS and LR, the significant relationship is how different they are from one another. Their difference corresponds roughly to cultural differences; how roughly depends empirically on particular part-whole configurations of particular language/culture entities. For example, the cultural differences between (a) Saskatoon and Quebec and (b) Sarasota and Calais are not equivalent to their linguistic differences. Figure 1 shows the twelve two-city migration possibilities among these four cities (each arrow represents two possibilities; e.g., from Quebec to Calais and from Calais to Quebec). Of these twelve, eight involve language differences of about equal magnitude. Of the latter, however, the cultural differences are not all of equivalent magnitude. Migration between Saskatoon and Quebec carries cultural significance that simply doesn't apply to migration between Sarasota and Calais, even though the task of overcoming language differences is roughly the same.

For the migrant, LM represents his or her current status relative to linguistic access to the social practices of the sending and receiving communities. The relationship between language and social practices can be specified further as a set of analogous restrictions on the possibilities for action: For language—in order to say something, it must be said in one of the ways it can be said; for social practices—in order to do something, it must be done in one of the ways it can be done. Whether a social practice has a linguistic performance as one of its parts is an empirical state of affairs. Whether the linguistic performance is mandatory, optional, or contingent on other states of affairs is also empirical and has to be learned as part of the social practice.

If a particular person wants to say or do something outside the formal

restrictions the community lives by, there are three basic options available. The first is for the person to find a way to get the restrictions lifted within that community. How, when, and for what reasons new social practices can be introduced into a community are, of course, specified in the standards of particular communities at particular points in time. The second is for the person to find a community where the restrictions (or standards for their being lifted) are thought to be acceptable or, at least, negotiable. The third option, of course, is to do neither and accept the restrictions and the consequences of their being breeched.

These options correspond to distinctions made earlier as part of the paradigm and derivative case analyses. The first two correspond roughly to the difference between social change and social mobility discussed earlier. The third alternative is, in most cases, simply the option chosen by those who have a possibility to migrate but decide not to do so. Therefore, the interrelations among the concepts of migration, language, and culture comprise part of the coherent and intelligible behavior of a person living a way of life.

THE EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

In this section I address the question of the effect of migration on language and culture. In the previous section three language parameters were said to be involved in migration: the sending community language (LS), the receiving community language (LR), and the migrant's language (LM). The vast majority of studies relating migration and language are devoted to language change in LR and LM. These works are sometimes concerned with the effect of the migrant on the language of the receiving community (e.g., Verdoodt, 1971). More often, it is the migrant's language, LM, that the investigator regards as the principal target of influence. For example, with the exception of Verdoodt (1971), the entire 1971 Spring issue of the *International Migration Review,* devoted to the impact of migration on language maintenance and language shift, was concerned with the migrant in the receiving community.

I shall focus here on the possible roles migration plays in the language of the sending community. It has been pointed out elsewhere (Dubbs, 1975, 1976; Orvik, 1980) that analyses of the effects of any sort on the sending community are relatively rare. Why this should be the case takes no great insight to see: The subtractive effect of rain on the cloud that drops it almost always escapes scrutiny; it is the rain's reception on the land that gets the press. Nevertheless, important questions abound concerning the effect of migration on the community the migrant leaves.

A community has cultural policies regarding the significance of migra-

tion. At the very minimum, an occurence of migration is evaluated as having been called for or not. What constitutes reason enough for someone to migrate in a particular case is, of course, an empirical question subject ot the particular standards of particular communities. It would seem to make a great deal of difference if someone migrates in opposition to the standards of the sending community. For example, in one community an unemployed household head may be socially eligible to migrate, but a teenager in the same community socially ineligible. For others migration may even have a mandatory quality, for example, those given "24 hours to get out of town," and other instances of Derivative Case Four.

Ko-Ko's appraisal that "they'd none of 'em be missed" notwithstanding, the effect of migration on a sending community may legitimately be viewed as a subtractive process, but not as a passively subtractive one. In the play *Day of Absence* (Ward, 1971), the white folks of a small Southern town awake to discover that all the black folks have mysteriously disappeared during the night. The point of the play was to reveal with sardonic wit (all the players were black actors in white-face) the extent of dependence of whites on blacks for more than goods and services: The whole psychological support of social roles was at stake. Part of the significance of migration, therefore, lies in the extent to which persons important to the interdependent functioning of the community become unavailable for social-system maintenance.

Keeping in mind that the effect sought is both subtractive and active, what is actively subtracted from a sending community's language are its linguistic change agents. It has been proposed elsewhere (Orvik, 1980) that differential migration in Alaskan Native communities has a conservative effect on the varietal forms of English spoken there. That is, those most motivated to acquire ways of speaking representable as standard code are more likely to migrate to communities where that code can be learned and used. In Alaska, differential migration from villages on the basis of age and sex has been observed (Dubbs, 1975, 1976; Orvik, 1980). Females of working age have been particularly prone to migrate to Alaska's cities in recent years. Although no empirical studies of age and sex in the acquisition of standard code have been done in Alaska, other studies have shown them to be systematically related (Labov, 1972). The logic of this dynamic can be extended to culture insofar as when something happens to a part, LS, corresponding things happen to the whole, the culture of the sending community.

One additional point from the repertoire of Descriptive Psychology needs to be made. Redescribing an event, process, state of affairs, or relationship is a way of giving it significance. For example, by redescription, the movement of persons from point A to point B can become a troop movement, an impending attack, and reason to sound the alarm all at the same

time, and all with respect to the "same thing". With respect to the relationship between migration and the sending community, significance by redescription is a factor in the development of cultural policies regarding migration. Three stages are seen in the development of these policies. First, someone migrates or contemplates it. Second, someone redescribes these facts relative to whatever existing standards for evaluating the act the community has. Third, the existing standards are, themselves, subject to reformulation given the new empirical consequences generated by the first two stages. At the very least, an act of migration can be redescribed as being or not being a new variety, one with which the community has no previous experience.

CONCLUSION

What controls migration? The short answer is, "evaluation." A paradigm case of migration requires an evaluation of the relative circumstances in at least two communities to have occured prior to the relocation. No commitment is implied in this requirement that the evaluation be accurate or even realistic in order for it to apply.

What evaluations result in migration? First, notice that evaluation occurs paradigmatically in the sending community because it is there that one is guaranteed to have had the requisite experience with some community's social practices and, thus, have a basis for comparison. Logically, therefore, the migrant's circumstances in the sending community relative to its social practices, behavioral restrictions, available opportunities, etc., constitute the primary locus of evaluation criteria. What the migrant's circumstances will be in the receiving community are logically hypothetical. Except for cases where the migrant has direct experience in what will become the receiving community, the basis for appraisal of future circumstances, given relocation, is symbolically represented in whatever forms the migrant has access to, e.g., television, memories of earlier experiences, word of mouth. Evaluations that result in migration, then, are those in which the differences between the sending and receiving communities are appraised as large enough to provide a person reason enough to relocate.

What makes differences that large? One class of factors includes any state of affairs that reduces the value of the sending community. Of special concern are circumstances that comprise new restrictions on deliberate action. The most notable exemplars of this class are situations where the economic base of the community no longer supports its membership.

Another class of factors are those that create behavioral possibilities

that can't be actualized in the sending community. In rural Alaska, schooling is the clearest example of this class. The more obvious aspect of schooling in this regard is its institutional commitment to train children in the skills necessary to lead productive adult lives anywhere—except in one's home village where there are virtually no jobs and where large discontinuities often exist between the social practices of the community and those of the school. As noted in the previous section, one of the more subtle forms this process takes is in the area of language, where the language goals of the school often conflict with the language traditions of the community. The subtlety is that the new linguistic potential can't be actualized in the present community, thus creating a bias toward migrating to communities where the new linguistic potential has a place. More generally, it can readily be seen that all forms of training, informal or formal, that lead to the acquisition of behavioral possibilities that can't be enacted in one's present community increase one's reason to migrate.

The third class of factors comprises anything that increases the value of the receiving community. Remembering that receiving communities are generally hypothetical in nature, information relevant to their evaluation is necessarily symbolic. The clearest example of this kind of factor is television, particularly network and cable television. The state of Alaska has taken active interest in promoting the use of sophisticated telecommunications to improve various aspects of the quality of life in rural Alaska. Millions of dollars have gone into the delivery of rural telecommunications, including multimillion dollar appropriations for the state to subsidize entertainment programming to over 200 villages. Whatever other purposes might be served by these developments, one thing is certain: There is now a high volume of information about other possible communities culturally distinct from those already familiar to rural Alaskans.

It is too early to tell if these developments will have a substantial effect on migration in Alaska. Among the processes to consider, the role played by face-to-face interaction in establishing the significance (plausibility, attractiveness, etc.) of symbolic representations of possible receiving communities is worth noting (Gearing & Sangree, 1979, chap. 1). This face-to-face reworking of information, of course, takes place mostly in the sending community and is thus influenced, even shaped, by the existing community standards for evaluating such representations.

As a final note, let me return to a point made earlier that no conceptualization of migration could be considered adequate if it did not have a place for the possibility of not migrating. This is by no means a trivial matter: The circumstances that call for migration do not necessarily exclude conflicting reasons not to migrate. Furthermore, one for whom migration is attractive but impossible suffers a reduction in behavior potential; a restriction on the ability to engage in deliberate action. In Descriptive

Psychology, situations lead to pathology to the extent they reduce someone's ability to engage in deliberate action (Aylesworth & Ossorio, 1983). Again, there is no current knowledge as to the amount of pathology in Alaska that might be relatable to not being able to migrate when a situation calls for it.

The brighter side of not migrating, however, is in seeing the possibilities for reducing the evaluation differential by means of increasing the behavioral possibilities in the sending communities. Again, there are no easy answers. Most certainly I would start with an examination of all institutions whose purpose is to train people. Training people to do things that can't be done where they live is an expensive way of improving anyone's quality of life. The history of training institutions in Alaska, however, is a history of just this sort of policy. There is no reason to believe that these policies are inevitable for the future. A move toward training people for intellectual self-sufficiency, combined with a commitment to promote an environment that is self-sustaining, would make the general idea of not migrating a psychologically healthy option.

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A NEW PARADIGM FOR SOFTWARE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

Anthony O. Putman and H. Joel Jeffrey

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a new paradigm for computer software and its development. It includes a new concept of software, a new methodology, and a radically different end product. The paradigm is to treat the software as a person engaged in the social practices of a Community. The social practice description, an extension of the basic process unit, is used to completely describe all that the software does and how it does it, until reaching an action that can be done with a small, easily written program comparable to a single skill. We have written an executive program, which selects and carries out the appropriate version of a social practice, using the description of the practice. The executive program works for any set of social practice descriptions; it is not rewritten for new software. In the traditional paradigm, one produces requirements and design and then writes the software. In the new paradigm, the requirements and design (in social practice description form), plus the skill programs, *are* the software. The new paradigm has been successfully used in two applications. It appears to be much more effective in building software, and particularly well suited for producing programs that engage in specifically human practices, such as understanding natural language and analyzing real world knowledge.

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The development of computer software has become an enterprise of very substantial scale and increasing importance in today's world. Computers have permeated every aspect of our lives in ways that were quite literally unthinkable just 30 years ago; the explosive and continuing advances that have been made in computer technology in this brief span of time constitutes a technological achievement that may well have no parallel in recorded history. It is widely recognized, however, that the software required to utilize these computers to best advantage has not kept pace with the hardware; indeed, a "software gap" of enormous and growing proportions is widely acknowledged to exist.

A close inspection of the state of the art reveals a further disparity between the development of hardware and software. The design and production of computer hardware has gone through several generations of development since the original ENIAC. Today's computers are enormously faster, smaller, more reliable, and cheaper to build than their predecessors of 30 years ago. Such advances are reflections of the enormously more sophisticated *design* and *production* methods of today's hardware engineers.

The design and production of software has of course not remained static. The development and widespread utilization of high level languages was a substantial advance over programming in machine language. More modern languages (e.g., Pascal) represent a further advance. Recent methods of design, such as Yourdon data flow methodology (Yourdon & Constantine, 1979), stepwise refinement, or Jackson design methodology (Jackson, 1975) have in many cases provided a marked improvement (Bergland, 1981). Further, a good deal of recent work in Computer Science has attempted to improve software production by allowing the programmer to express what is to be done in a form somewhat closer to ordinary language and, in some cases, by preventing the programmer from writing code that does not make sense in terms of the real world objects and actions the code represents (Brodie & Zilles, 1981).

In spite of these advances, software production stands in marked contrast to hardware production with respect to productivity gains. While hardware costs have been reduced exponentially over the past three decades, software costs over the same period have been reduced at best a few percent (Infotech, 1982). Whereas few, if any, software practitioners would care to give up modern software languages and techniques, equally few would claim that there has been progress comparable to that of hardware, or that there is any work extant which shows such promise. Software production today remains an extraordinarily difficult, complex task, highly resistant to the concerted efforts of a large number of talented researchers and practitioners.

We suggest that closing the software gap requires a fundamentally new

paradigm for computer software and its development. This paper presents what we believe to be such a paradigm. It includes a new concept of what software is, a new methodology for developing software, and a radically different end product (which, nonetheless, runs on and controls computers as software today does). Developing software within this paradigm seems to hold promise of substantially reducing the time and effort to produce software. As will be discussed later in this paper, there are sound logical grounds for this claim. We acknowledge from the beginning, however, that such a claim can only be verified through substantial experience and actual practice. We hope that this paper will provide sufficient motivation and knowledge to enable interested software developers to accumulate such experience.

THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM

The usual concept of software is that of a system (in the technical language of Descriptive Psychology, a Configuration; See Ossorio, 1971/1978b, pp. 54–56), with its own internal structure and logic, which interfaces with other systems or users (which have their own logic in turn). Each piece of software has its own logic, or sense of internal coherence, which is what makes it ***that*** piece of software and not any other. This fact, while seldom formally represented in accounts of software, is nonetheless one of the central distinguishing features of software and is widely, if informally, acknowledged throughout the industry. (It is further a fact known to every programmer, and decried by every programming manager, that each piece of software's logic is extremely seductive.)

Consider, for example, the following part of a design (a close paraphrase of an actual design document written by one of the authors):

> The translator scans the source file, recognizing a "DICT" or "dom" statement. When either is encountered, the information for the item is stored in an internal table, of the form
>
> name dict-flag dom-flag
>
> When the structure items are encountered, the translator checks each item name in the table, issuing an error message if the "dict-flag" or "dom-flag" is false.

Constituent processes mentioned in this design are "scanning the source file," "storing the information for an item in an internal table," "looking up a name in the table," and "issuing an error message." The internal table is an object component; it has constituents "name," "dict-flag," and "dom-flag."

The technical device in Descriptive Psychology for representing such a combination of objects and processes and their relations is the state of

affairs unit (Ossorio, 1978c). It is the division into immediate constituent objects and processes, and their relations, that define a given configuration; further, the choices made in making these divisions are what cumulatively generate the logic of the software.

Thus, when designing software within the traditional paradigm, the fundamental questions are (a) what will the internal logic of the system be, and (b) how will the system interface with other users and/or systems. In answering these questions, the traditional software designer basically is concerned with inputs, operations, and outputs. In other words, the designer views the software as a mechanistic, causal-deterministic system (or, to be less precise but more clear, a machine).

(At this point, we expect that many readers will object: "But what's wrong with that? That's exactly what a computer is—a mechanistic, causal deterministic system, or if you prefer, a machine." We do not view this traditional paradigm as unreasonable or wrong: we merely view it as having certain problems and limitations that the new one does not.)

The traditional view of the social practices known as "software development" can be broken down into three stages: (a) develop the requirements for the software; (b) design the software; and (c) implement the software (Horowitz, 1975; Jensen & Tonies, 1979). It is widely agreed in the computer software field that a unified approach to these three stages is needed, such that the outcome of the requirement stage is immediately useful in the design stage and the outcome of the design stage is immediately useful in the implementation stage (Brodie & Zilles, 1981; Infotech, 1982). Such a unified approach may exist in theory, but it is virtually never seen in practice. There have been many attempts at the unified approach, including requirement techniques and languages, design languages, and myriads of implementation languages, all of varying degrees of usefulness and complexity. Approaches include formalism (Gries, 1981; Wulf, Hilfinger, & Flon, 1981), predicate calculus (Kowalski, 1979), and many program design methodologies (Bergland, 1981). The field is in fact quite broad and active today (Brodie & Zilles, 1981; Infotech, 1982). None, however, has succeeded at being the unified approach; indeed, the lack of such success can be taken as both a fundamental shortcoming of the current paradigm of software development and a standard of adequacy of any new paradigm which claims to replace it.

We suggest that the root of the loose connection among the tasks of software development (requirements, design, implementation) lies in the traditional concept of what software is. Specifically, it lies in there being a division between the internal logic of the system and its interface with other systems. In writing requirements, one is specifying what the system will do, from the outside. In designing, one is dividing the system into pieces and defining their interactions. The classic phrasing, constantly

encountered in computer science literature and textbooks, is "Requirements state *what* the system will do; design states *how* it will do it."

The fragment of translator design at the beginning of this section is representative; it tells how the translator will do a certain task. The requirements for that task are:

> The translator will check that each field in the structure has a "DICT" and a "dom" statement preceding the structure itself, and issue an error message for any field that does not.

One can, and typically does, repeat this breakdown, until one reaches a small enough piece that one can write the code for the piece straightforwardly. At that point, one can "implement" or "code" the software—that is, produce the actual code, in a language the computer can process, to carry out the task given in the requirements.

Using the technical language of Descriptive Psychology, we can see that in the case of requirements one is defining (or describing) social practices; in design one is, at best, giving the social practices of a different community, and more typically is giving state of affairs or basic object unit descriptions (Ossorio, 1978c). Implementation is even more divorced from the other stages, as it consists in giving purely performative descriptions, with no framework within which to state the relationship between these descriptions and the social practices described in the requirements and design.

It is this lack of a complete, coherent framework that is critical. One can, and in fact often does, discuss the relation between the requirements, design, and code, but the language (the locutions, concepts, and behaviors) for discussing each are distinct, with no common ground (other than ordinary language). The result is that developing requirements is a separate enterprise from developing designs, and each is separate from the third enterprise, coding, in which one actually produces the software.

In a nutshell, we can characterize the traditional concept of software as drawing its boundary around the system being built. Having made that initial move, one then defines, or refines, one's descriptions of the parts of the software and their interactions, and the interfaces with other systems or users. It is precisely this initial move that the new paradigm makes differently; having made a different initial move, what follows is not merely different, but in some cases radically so.

THE NEW PARADIGM

The paradigm we are presenting is a new concept of software and its development. It includes both a language and a methodology. It is a coherent language such that requirement specification leads directly to, and is part

of, design, which leads directly to, and is part of, implementation. The methodology is a fully worked out, implementable method for developing software within this new paradigm. The advantages of working within this new paradigm stem from having software development to be one enterprise rather than several separate ones, as is now the case.

We have seen that the traditional paradigm results from drawing the boundary around the software itself. When this is done, the result is what might appropriately be termed a "technical system." The new paradigm results from drawing the boundary in a different place: around the community in which the software has a place. This represents a direct acknowledgement that software is *used,* either by people or other software. There are people and other software objects that communicate and interact with the new software: The new paradigm draws the boundary to include the software, all the people who interact with it, and all other pieces of software that it communicates and interacts with. In other words, the new paradigm is to treat the software as a Person in a Community of other Persons.[1]

"Person" here is the technical concept of one who engages in the Practices of a Community. We do not mean to indicate that the software is to simulate human thinking or feeling or that it has attitudes, interests, and so on, but rather that the software engages in social practices and that the description of what the software does is contained in Social Practice descriptions. Social Practice descriptions thus become the language for specifying the software; as it turns out, they also serve as the language for designing and implementing the software.

Whereas the usual view of software yields a technical system, this one yields a *human* system.

The fundamental question for software production becomes, "What is this (software) person doing in this community, and how is it doing it?" rather than any question of internal state, memory contents, etc. As we shall see, the form of the answer to this question is the Social Practice description, as it is for a person of the more usual sort.

It may be useful to note an analogy between the concept of software we are introducing and attempts to define a person in psychology in general and Descriptive Psychology in particular. Defining a person has traditionally been done by referring to some part or structure that was considered to be essentially human, the possession of which defined the possessor as human. This is analogous to what we have noted as the traditional approach to software, in which what defines a particular piece of software is its internal structure and logic. In Descriptive Psychology, on the other hand, we note the (logical) fact that what makes an object a person is the place it has in the practices of the human community. Specifically, a person is someone whose behavior is paradigmatically Deliberate Action (Ossorio,

1978a). We are introducing a parallel distinction for software: What defines a piece of software is what it does, i.e., the practices it engages in, not its internal structure.

To sum up, the new paradigm consists of viewing software as part of a human system, and acting on that concept with a set of technically useful concepts and practices, the outcome of which is a new form of software. Let us now examine these technical elaborations and their pragmatic implications.

A UNIFYING LANGUAGE FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

In the new paradigm, the basic move is to ask, "What practices does this software have a place in?" (a more technical rendering of, "What does it do?"). Asking this question, per se, is hardly new; it is the very question that leads to traditional requirements, design, and implementation, especially when coupled with its natural counterpart, "How does it do it?"

What is new is the form of the answer to the question: Social Practice descriptions, as defined in Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1981), in a technically elaborated format which is adequate for representing all of the facts about a Social Practice. The capability of giving this sort of answer, in a technically usable format, is the linchpin of the new paradigm.

Social Practices are, fundamentally, what people (human or software) *do*. A Social Practice is "a pattern of actions engaged in by one or more persons" (Ossorio, 1981). Everyday examples include (a) writing a paper for a technical journal, (b) dining, (c) negotiating, (d) writing information to a temporary file, (e) translating a program from a high-level language to machine code, and (f) finding the outgoing line for an incoming telephone call.

Examples (d), (e) and (f) illustrate two points. First, the actor need not be a human (an obvious point, but one which in ordinary usage we tend to pass over). Practice (d) could appropriately be seen as being done by a human or piece of software; practice (e) (commonly known as compiling) could be done by a human but is virtually always done by a compiler; practice (f), historically, used to be done by human telephone operators and now is almost always done by an electronic switching machine controlled by software.

The second point is that differing Practices constitute one of the aspects by which one distinguishes one Community from another, and that the concept of Social Practice is inextricably linked with the larger concept of Community (Putman, 1981). Just as not every person plays chess or runs marathons, not every person compiles programs or hooks telephone circuits together. Pragmatically, the persons who communicate and interact

with the software to be built form the Members of the Community. This is the anchoring point in using the paradigm, for asking what Practices a piece of software has a place in, is to make use of what is called technically a Part Description (Ossorio, 1966); it is elliptic for, "What Practices of which Communities does this software have a place in?" Note that it is not at all uncommon, especially for software persons, for one to have one place in the Practices of one Community and another place in the Practices of another Community, with no larger community subsuming them both.

The nucleus of a Social Practice description is the specification of the Intentional Action parameters of the Practice, to wit:

W	the name of the State of Affairs desired
K	the distinctions one must make to engage in this Practice
KH	the skills one must have to engage in this Practice
P	the performance (i.e., observable episode) one engages in, in engaging in this Practice
A	the achievement, or outcome of engaging in this Practice
PC	personal characteristics that make a difference in this Practice
S	the Significance of this Practice; the larger Practice one is engaging in, by engaging in this Practice

A major portion of giving a Social Practice description is specifying the process aspect, the Performance. To do that, we have the basic process unit (BPU), as defined in Ossorio (1978c, pp. 41–51) and elaborated in Jeffrey and Putman (1983). The BPU, consisting of Stages, Elements, Individuals, Eligibilities, Contingencies, and Versions, codifies all of the process aspects of a Practice and the structure of which participants in the Practice may engage in each action in which way.

The use of the BPU as a notational device for representing, in a technically useful form, the information about the Performance of a Practice is discussed at some length in our report on the MENTOR project (Jeffrey & Putman, 1983). In order to use Social Practice descriptions technically, one must have a comparable representation for the remaining aspects of the Practice: the skills, knowledge, available performances, and the connections of the Practice to larger contexts. That representation format which had been developed, is the unifying language needed.

With this language, one answers the question, "What practice does this software engage in?" In any but the most trivial of Communities, a tremendous amount of detailed information must be given to describe the Practices at a technically useful level of detail. The Social Practice description (SPD) format allows one to specify that information, in a way

that the logical connections between the items of data are preserved. (For example, the objects involved in a Practice, together with the information on which actual historical individuals may serve as each, is specified as part of the description of the Practice.) Further, one may specify the Practice at any level of detail desired, again preserving the appropriate logical connections between practices, subpractices, sub-subpractices, etc.

Social Practice Descriptions and Program Logic

Paradigmatically, one specifies what an ordinary human person is doing by reference to Social Practices. When one has given Social Practice descriptions for the Practices that some person engages in, one has specified everything that that person does, and all of the ways of doing each of the things, all of the conditions under which any possible optional things will be done, and which actual objects will fill which roles. This description is complete (at that level of detail), since the BPU is a codification of all of the facts about a process (Ossorio, 1978b) and the Social Practice is a specification of the action (Ossorio, 1978a).

In other words, all of the logic of what to do at any point, and what to use in doing it, is captured in the SPDs.

Programs, on the other hand, are traditionally viewed as nothing more than a set of instructions to be executed in some order. Each actual set of instructions executed is accomplishing a version of a process (or processes). The process is the Performance parameter of some Practice. In order to ensure that the execution sequences of the program correspond exactly to the Versions of the Practice, some of the statements in the program have the logical task of capturing the logical constraints of what may follow what, what to do under various circumstances, what items to use in doing the action, etc.—that is, the logical constraints represented in the Contingencies, Elements, Individuals, Eligibilities, and Versions of the basic process unit. In traditional software development, a great deal of effort and care goes into ensuring that only those sequences of instructions corresponding to the Version of the Practice appropriate to the circumstances will be executed.

Here is an example. The following function, written in the C language (except for the line numbers at the extreme left), searches an existing list of numbers for a new one. If it finds it, it returns the location of the item in the list; if not, it returns the value -1.

```
1                       char items[ 100 ] [ 20 ];
2                       int Nitems;
3
4 find( item )
5 char item[ ];
```

```
 6 {
 7                    int i;
 8                    int place;
 9
10                    place = -1;
11                    for( i = 0;
12                                 i < Nitems;
13                                                i++ ){
14                         if( strcmp( item, items[ i ] ) == 0 ) {
15                                      place = i;
16                                      break;
17                               }
18                    }
19                    return( place );
20 }
```

(For expository purpose, we have written this program in a form that is correct but not compact.)

If the variable "Nitems" has the value 3, the possible sequences of statements that could be executed are:

10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19
10, 11, 12, 14, 13, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19
10, 11, 12, 14, 13, 12, 14, 13, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19
10, 11, 12, 14, 13, 12, 14, 13, 14, 13, 12, 19

corresponding to finding the item in the first, second, or third list position in the list, or not finding the item in the list at all.

The Stage-Options and Contingencies of a BPU description of this process are:

- NAME: Find finds the place of an item in a list

  Stages:

  1. Find searches for the new item in the list
     Option 1: Find finds the new item in the list
     Option 2: Find discovers that the new item is not in the list
  2. Find tells the caller the position of the new item in the list
  3. Find tells the caller that the new item is not in the list

  Contingencies:

  1. Stage 2 only if Stage 1-Option 1
  2. Stage 3 only if Stage 1-Option 2

In the example program, Lines 15 and 19 comprise the Performance of the Practice named in Stage 2; lines 10 and 19 comprise the Performance of the Practice of Stage 3; lines 11, 12, 13, and 18 control the repetition

of Stages to produce the appropriate Version of Stage 1-Option 1; line 16 (which stops the repetition produced by the "for" statement on line 11) is an explicit example of a statement selecting a Version: when the item matches the list item (a Contingency), line 19 is to be done next.

Thus, the execution of a program may be seen as having two logical functions:

- Selecting the Version of the Practice to be done;
- Carrying out the selected Version.

In the new paradigm, we are capturing all of the logic of what the (software) person is to do in Social Practice descriptions; therefore, the code itself need contain none of it.

(At this point one may suspect that a program within the new paradigm is going to be substantially different from a traditional program. We shall see later that this suspicion is correct.)

Producing Software with Social Practice Descriptions

To produce software, one must design and implement it—that is, produce a program that can be executed by a computer. The key conceptual move here has been to note that Social Practice descriptions can be used for this purpose. We have noted that making technical use of this approach requires a technically elaborated format, or language, for giving those Social Practice descriptions, just as the BPU makes possible technical applications of the concept of a Process (Jeffrey & Putman, 1983).

The Social Practice representation format has been developed and is in use. Known as DIAMOND[2], it is essentially the extension to Social Practices of the BPU. DIAMOND serves as the specification, design, and implementation language for software. To specify a piece of software, one specifies the Practices within which it has a place, giving SPDs in the DIAMOND format. These Practices include, as we have noted before, all the persons, human and otherwise, who interact or communicate with this software, i.e., who engage in any Practice with it.

Having specified completely the Practices the software is to engage in, one then elaborates the specifications. This means simply breaking down each SPD into successively more detailed descriptions. Since one begins with the SPDs from the first stage, and adds to them further descriptions in the same format, the specification stage is in fact immediately useful in the design stage, and design is the same enterprise, involving the same concepts and the same practice as specification.

The breakdown of each description into more and more detailed SPDs continues until a point is reached at which one has a Performance that cannot be meaningfully broken down into behaviors. (Beyond this point,

further breakdown would be giving movement descriptions, such as "First I moved my right arm six inches forward, then I moved my thumb and forefinger one inch apart.") The BPU can be used to continue the breakdown if there is a point in doing so. The choice to stop the breakdown process is almost entirely a pragmatic one (with perhaps some esthetic component). One stops when one can simply and straightforwardly write a program that does the Practice. Until this point, there is a meaningful answer to, "How does it do X?"; the SPD gives that answer. At this point, there is no "how"—that is, there is no answer in terms of "It does A, B, and C, and those things, in that order, are a version of X." Rather, the software person has a program such that the execution of the program is an instance of the Performance of X. Such a program may appropriately be viewed as a skill of the software person being constructed. Just as when discussing the behavior of the more usual sort of persons, there is a point beyond which one says, "There is no how; he just *knows how* to do it," so with software persons at such a point one says, "It simply *knows how* to do that; there is no other how."

The "find" program above is an example of a program at the bottom level of detail. A piece of software that included the Practice of finding an item in a list of items as a Stage of another Practice would find the item by executing "find." While one could give a BPU breakdown of finding an item in a list of items (as the Stage-Option breakdown illustrates), one would not ordinarily do so.

It may seem somewhat arbitrary to say that "specification" stops after the first description step. In fact, one might well raise the question of why we are distinguishing separate tasks here at all. This is a reasonable question, because one "stage" flows naturally into the next. There is no difference, logically, between the two. It would not be surprising if the specification-vs.-design distinction were to wither away in the future.

WHAT DOES SOFTWARE DONE THIS WAY LOOK LIKE?

It is commonplace, when one paradigm replaces another, for ordinary, everyday objects to change quite substantially, even to the degree that they may appear to have disappeared entirely, to be replaced with something entirely different but with the same name. (What does your digital quartz "watch" have in common with your grandfather's pocket "watch," other than both being used to tell the time?) We have seen that this is a genuinely new paradigm. It is not surprising, therefore, that the software produced is quite different.

Social Practice Descriptions and Program Logic Revisited

We have seen that the execution of a traditional program can be seen as having two (logically) separate tasks: selection of the Version of the Practice, and the carrying out of the selected Version. In traditional software these two tasks are very closely intertwined, with statements that are part of selecting a Version juxtaposed with those that are part of doing that version, and whose execution may come before or after those of the other type. Indeed, it is not uncommon to have statements that are doing both tasks. In the new paradigm, these tasks are accomplished in a different way.

Suppose we have a set of Social Practice descriptions, as discussed above. We can conceive of a program, an Executive, which operates as follows:

1. Knowing which Practice it is to carry out, the Executive selects, from the Version list in the description, the next Version. Since the Versions are a list of all of the possible ways this Practice can take place (Ossorio, 1978c), we are guaranteed that if this Practice can be done at all, that way of doing it will appear in the Versions (subject of course to limitations on the knowledge of the person who gave the SPD).
2. Using the Eligibilities, the Executive verifies that there is an Individual to instantiate each Element that appears in the Version.
3. The Executive verifies that any attributional constraints in the Contingencies are satisfied, checking the status of the state of affairs whose name appears in the contingency.
4. The outcome of these steps is a Version of the Practice that is appropriate to the persons (human or otherwise) and their eligibilities in the Practice, and the facts as they currently stand. The Executive now examines each Stage-Option in the Version, and either finds a Version of Stage-Option Practice, via the same steps (1) to (3), or notes that it has a program that is the skill for carrying out the Practice. It then carries out the Version, executing each program that comprises the skill by which it engages in each Practice.

Such an Executive program would, essentially, embody the logic of acting on Social Practice descriptions. It would operate independently of any particular Practice, engaging in any Practice by finding out how (using an SPD) or by having the relevant Know-how, a program.

Such an Executive is not merely conceivable. It has been written, and it works. It has been tested in an actual organizational setting, with SPDs describing the Practices of the organization, down to the level of issuing

commands (including the actual commands themselves) to other software. The first version was the MENTOR program (Jeffrey & Putman, 1983). Further work has extended this version, particularly in the areas of adding skills for checking the status of states of affairs and for carrying out Practices. (In the tradition of "Boy Friday" and "Girl Friday," the second version has been christened "Thing Friday", nicknamed "Friday.")

Having been written once, there is no need to write a new executive for a new piece of software; for the new piece of software, one needs the Social Practice descriptions and the skills.

New Paradigm Software

Software produced within the new paradigm consists of:

1. The Social Practice descriptions that describe all of the practices this software person is to engage in. Since the descriptions include the information in the BPU for specifying the Performance parameter of the Practice, all of the information pertaining to how to do each Practice is contained in these descriptions.
2. Programs that provide the software person's skills, including the means for acquiring necessary knowledge (e.g., assigning appropriate status to the states of affairs involved).
3. The executive program, which does a major portion of the software's work, but which is content-free. (All of the content is in the SPD data base.)

An Example

Let us take another look at our translator example. Suppose one has a language, "R," which includes all of the forms of the C language as well as certain others: (a) a statement of the form "RID n" (where "n" is an integer greater than zero), (b) a statement of the form

```
RD {
    data item 1
    date item 2
        ...
    data item n
}
```

and (c) a statement of the form

```
REL name {
        name 1   number 1
        name 2   number 2
            ...
        name k   number k
    }
```

Further, each element of the REL structure is required to have a "DICT" and "dom" declaration, preceding the REL structure. Programs in the R language are to be translated into programs in C, as follows: C statements remain unchanged; "RID n" is translated to "#define *name* n"; "REL *name* {" is translated to "struct *name* {". (This example, as before, is a slight modification of actual software written by one of the authors.)

The translator consists of the Social Practice descriptions and the skill programs (plus the executive, which does not change from one software person to the next), as follows (although we will only give the Stage-Options of certain Practices and one of the skills):

The requirements:

- Name: The translator translates an R program into a C program

  Stages:

  1. The translator reads a program in the R language
  2. The translator produces a program in the C language
  3. The translator produces a data file containing the information in the RD statement

The design (of Stage 2):

- Name: The translator produces a program in the C language

  Stages:

  1. The translator prints a C statement unchanged
  2. The translator produces a "#define *name*" statement
  3. The translator produces a "struct *name*" statement
  4. The translator checks that each element in the REL structure has a "DICT" and "dom" declaration

- Name: The translator checks that an element in the REL structure has a "DICT" and "dom" declaration

  Stages:

  1. The translator makes a list of all elements encountered before the REL statement
  2. The translator checks each element in the REL structure against the list of elements

- Name: The translator checks each element in the REL structure against the list of elements

  Stages:

  1. The translator reads the element name from the source file line
  2. The translator looks up the element name in the list *by* itemno = find (name);
  3. The translator issues an error message for an element

Stage 2 is at the bottom level of detail. The italicized "by" in its Name indicates a specialized form of behavior description, a procedure description, in which one gives a different name to the Performance parameter. The way the translator does this Stage is by executing "find," the skill for engaging in this Practice.

Any one familiar with software as it is traditionally done will note that this bears only slight resemblance to software as it has existed. The most direct parallel to traditional software is the skills. The Social Practice data base contains all of the logic of the practices the software engages in i.e., what it is to do. From a traditional perspective, new paradigm software appears to be a combination of requirements, several levels of design, and a collection of what are usually called "utility routines."

The central point of the new paradigm is not that one is proceeding in a top-down fashion, nor even that the language (Social Practice descriptions in a form comparable to the BPU for Process Descriptions) is different. Rather, it is:

> In the old paradigm, one produces requirements and design, and then writes the software. In the new paradigm, the requirements and design, plus the small skill programs, *are* the software

Those familiar with programming language and operating system research in computer science may note that the executive program and Social Practice description language can be seen, from that perspective, as the long-sought universal operating system and programming language, respectively. Such a perspective may shed some light on why these universals have been so difficult to achieve: They (logically) require an adequate conceptualization of action, an adequate language for representing actions, and an appropriate embodiment of the logic of acting on the action descriptions.

An Analogy

One can draw an analogy here which may be useful in understanding the relationship between traditional software and new-paradigm software. The executive program can be compared to a variable speed electric motor, which can supply the motive force for a great variety of machines simply by being positioned appropriately with the other equipment. With such a motor, an equipment designer need pay no attention to how to power a refrigerator, a watch, an elevator, etc. He need only make sure that the equipment being designed and built allows the motor, which he takes off the shelf, to be put in. Traditional software development is like equipment development in which one has to design and build a specialized motor for every application.

Of course, such a motor does not make equipment design and construction trivial. One still has to supply the proper connections for it and connect the drive shaft appropriately. Similarly, the SPD data base has to be produced, and the skill programs written, some of which will undoubtedly be difficult and sophisticated. It could turn out that doing this is as difficult and time consuming as traditional software production. But such a result would be quite surprising for, as we have seen, much of the work of the software is now being done by the executive program, which is not rewritten but simply "plugged in" to the new SPDs and skills that comprise a new piece of software. Further, the logic of what the software is doing is contained in a format, the Social Practice description, which was designed for the purpose of representing the actual logical structure of actions, and which has been demonstrated (Jeffrey & Putman, 1983) to be a powerful and compact representation methodology.

METHODOLOGY

To build software using the new paradigm, one produces a complete specification of the human system (the Community) of which it is a Member. Step by step, the way in which one does that is:

1. Identify all of the users of the software, human and otherwise. (This is specifying the Members of the Community.)

2. Specify the interactions the Members will have with the software. This includes specifying what they are doing, what the software is doing, and the role (or status) the software plays in these interactions. The specifications are given in action terms, not metaphor, abstraction, or purely nominal language (e.g., not "passes data to X").

For example, "A manager gets a copy of the Department budget" is the name of an action; it is intelligible as a Social Practice as are "An employee fills out an expense account statement," "the accounting system sends a copy of the statement to the budget maintenance program" or "the expense account verification program checks an expense account statement for errors." On the other hand, "The accounting system sends information to the budget maintenance program" is not intelligible as a Social Practice, much as "Gil told Will something" is not. Neither is "The expense account verification program processes an expense account form."

3. This task continues until the appropriate people (the software's designers, appropriate managers, users, etc.) agree that the specification is complete—i.e., that these are all of the Practices the software has a place in.

4. For each of the Practices, ask

- What knowledge (facts or discriminations of states of affairs) is required to engage in this Practice?
- What skills are required to engage in this Practice?
- What performance is needed to engage in this Practice?
- What actions does the software engage in to get each item of knowledge?

5. Given these knowledge and skills, can the Executive straightforwardly do the Practice, with (at most) a small, obvious piece of code? If not, then this Practice is decomposed into other, smaller Practices (with the SPD format), and the process repeated.

The outcome of this procedure is a set of Social Practice descriptions that, together with whatever additional skill programs are needed, constitute the new software.

NOW WHAT?

The obvious next step is to carry out the methodology given in the previous section with more pieces of real software. We have utilized this methodology twice in the afore-mentioned MENTOR and Friday projects to excellent effect; now it needs to be used for more traditional (software) applications. We believe it is clear that there is good reason to expect the new paradigm to be substantially more effective in building software, but this expectation must be tested.

Assuming that the outcome of such tests is positive, what benefits might be expected to come from using this paradigm (other than economic ones)? We have two hypotheses:

First, it seems to us that this paradigm would make possible software that is larger and more complex than what can be written within the traditional paradigm. For example, it is not possible today to write a program of one billion lines of code (that works properly).

Second, the new paradigm seems to us particularly appropriate for programs that engage in specifically human practices. Natural language understanding, automatic fact analysis (Ossorio, 1978b), and any task in which understanding an actual human is paramount, such as counseling or psychotherapy, are examples. In this way, it may become possible to achieve a long-anticipated goal of computing: the creation of an artificial intelligence device that can appropriately be said to simulate the functions of a (non-software) person.

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NOTES

1. Here, and throughout this paper, we have used capitalization to indicate a technical term from Descriptive Psychology, in hopes of making the paper more accessible to those outside that field.
2. DIAMOND is a proprietary product of Descriptive Systems, Inc.

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PART II

THE DEFICIT MODEL OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: CLINICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Keith E. Davis and Thomas O. Mitchell

We are fortunate to have for this volume an extended treatment of the deficit model of pathology by Ossorio, in which he develops the general logic of pathology notions and places them in their social (e.g., normative, judgmental, and relativistic) and clinical contexts. The other authors then give us an opportunity to examine some implications of this model. Vanderburgh explicitly connects the positive health developmental model with the deficit model. Bergner provides a subtle exposition of the deficits that are prototypical for paranoid disorders. Roberts develops ideas about personal relationships that grow out of the Existentialist heritage, giving them a richness of implication by placing within the systematic context of Descriptive Psychology and by showing the operation of deficits in such relationships. Marshall uses the conceptual device of a scenario to tie together an intricate web of considerations, including deficits, that are involved in alcoholic relationships.

In this introduction, we shall highlight major features of the deficit model—particularly in contrast to traditional models—and point out implications of the model used by our other contributors. Because the approach

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of Descriptive Psychology is notable not only for the conceptual distinctions drawn but also for the conceptual-notational devices employed, we shall draw attention to which devices have been used by different contributors.

THE DEFICIT MODEL

"When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction on his ability (a) to engage in deliberate action and, equivalently, (b) to participate in the social practices of the community" (see Ossorio, p. 158).

The Systematic Characteristics of the Deficit Model

This definition is embedded in the entire framework of Descriptive Psychology, and hence the full force of the definition will be appreciated only when one follows its connections to a number of other concepts. For example, the deficit model separates the issue of what pathology is from the issue of how to explain it, allowing us to use systematically the entire resources of the person concept for explanation. Physiological, biochemical, and other nonbehavioral facts may be integrated into explanations of pathology via the Embodiment parameter of persons. By connecting facts about the status of a person's Embodiment (e.g., damage to specific areas of the brain, missing enzymes, excessive sensitivity to particular food stuffs, etc.) to facts about other Personal Characteristics (the level of knowledge, motivational prorities, or capacity of the person to do certain things) one has the basis for direct explanations of the pathology because all of these facts are also capable of redescription as limitations in abilities.

Cases in which the apparent issue is one of an overriding motivation, e.g., the husband who kills his wife and her lover out of jealousy pose a potential problem for the deficit model. Such behavior may or may not be pathological: We can distinguish two cases, pre-emptive motivation and strong motivation. A traditional metaphor for the contrast to be drawn is "in the heat of passion vs. in cold blood." In one case, pre-emptive motivation, the husband was carried away by a jealous rage and thus had a temporary limitation in his ability to give a proper consideration to his other interests. In effect, he was out of touch with relevant considerations. This is the "heat of passion" case, in which we regard the individual's responsibility as diminished. In the second case, the husband places such a value on revenge that he was willing to sacrifice all other values and relationships, e.g., he no longer gives other considerations any weight. This is the "in cold blood" case in which we regard the individual as

having almost full responsibility. A case of this second sort is generally taken as one of wilfulness not illness: We are inclined to see the actor as not wanting to stop badly enough rather than as being unable to help himself. As Ossorio notes, it is only a short step from this view to the conclusion that there is really no such thing as mental illness. But one can hold another person with a defect responsible for his behavior without denying the defect; e.g., we hold the blind responsible for not taking account of their blindness and acting accordingly. In therapy, to hold the person responsible may be one of the most important possible accreditations of his or her full status as a person.

Relativity of Pathology Judgments

Although, the definition proposes a universal criterion of pathology, Ossorio's exposition draws our attention to the ways in which applications of the criterion will be dependent upon social, historical, and personal contexts. Disabilities are relative to social practices. A person's inability to count change, or to hear what another is saying, or to tell right from wrong is revealed by that person's failure to do so under appropriate circumstances. Because failures have social consequences for the person and for other members of the community, the community cannot be indifferent to them. If the lapses are regular or severe enough, we judge that the person needs to be disqualified from full participation in community practices. Disqualification may range from extreme—protective custody or expulsion from the community—to mild—systematic avoidance or making allowances for the person's limitations.

This conceptualization makes it clear that the attempt to define specific pathologies in terms of readily observable behaviors or symptoms is unlikely to be successful. Take the case of partial deafness as an example; what are the common behaviors exhibited by partially deaf persons? Some wear hearing aids, others do not; some ask to have things repeated frequently in conversation, others do not; some tend to withdraw from social interactions, others do not; and so on. What they have in common is not being able to hear, but their observable behaviors, what they do about that inability, are as variable as their circumstances and personal characteristics allow.

The deficit model directs our attention to the central issue in a pathology attribution. The question is, "Is the person's ability to do what he ought to be able to do in real life situations significantly limited?" Not surprisingly such judgments are relative to the context in which they are made—the norms of the community, the personal characteristics of the judge, and the requirements of the relevant social practices. Thus the relativity of

judgments of pathology is an essential feature of the concept, not an unfortunate characteristic which will go away with scientific advances.

DSM III: A Noncommittal Model

On the basis of the deficit model, Ossorio carries out a critical examination of DSM III, the American Psychiatric Association's (1980) *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*. By virtue of the political considerations that went into the make-up of the committee that created DSM III, the product created is so seriously noncommittal about its subject matter that it provides almost no guidance at all with respect to such questions as "What does a mental disorder consist of?" or "Why are the categories and criteria of mental disorder what they are?" The categories employed fair little better than the "definition" offered. They are not systematically derived, and this lack shows up in a multitude of ways: (a) inconsistency in the definition of syndromes within the same general category, (b) inconsistent principles of classification, (c) low reliability, and (d) modest correlations with external criteria.

Ossorio, however, is not content just to expose the limitations of DSM III; he tackles the task of showing how the deficit model could provide a conceptual definition of pathology that applies equally well to all competing theories and also makes sense out of the inconsistencies and the abundance of *disability* criteria that are actually used in the exposition of specific syndromes in DSM III. Finally, he briefly makes the case that taxonomies of pathology are necessary neither for principled and effective treatment nor for scientific progress in the understanding of specific disabilities. For therapeutic progress, individual case formulations drawing on all the systematic resources of one's conceptual framework suffice. Within Descriptive Psychology, the systematic resources are set of more than 90 status-dynamic principles, a variety of therapist policies and sets of images and scenarios that are relevant to specific types of cases. For scientific progress, typologies need apply only to the range of cases being examined, and they do not have to be identical with each other to be useful.

Other Issues

In his chapter, Ossorio also deals with a number of issues that can be given only passing notice here. He shows that taking determinism seriously is pathogenic, and how the concept of mental illness can be made to serve the ends of political oppression. He also examines the connection of basic human needs and pathology, a fuller treatment of which is available in Volume 3 of *Advances in Descriptive Psychology* (Aylesworth & Ossorio, 1983; Lasater, 1983; Ossorio, 1983; Silva, 1983; Torres, 1983).

NON-SELF STATUS ASSIGNMENTS: A FUNDAMENTAL DISABILITY

Three of the chapters focus on pathologies in which a central feature is a limitation in the person's ability to assign himself or herself a realistic status with significant eligibilities and behavioral options. Bergner, Marshall, and Roberts all develop this theme while showing that the manifestations of the fundamental deficit is strongly influenced by the nonself-status assigner's personal characteristics and the circumstances (including relationships) available to him or her.

The Paranoid Style

As Bergner shows, the heart of the paranoid style lies in how the person deals with his own assignment of himself to marginal status. The characteristic self-status assignments are those of *marginal agent* and *stigmatized person.* In combination, these assignments provide the reality basis for a high level of shame and a very low level of authority and substance in the community. Being in a barely livable position, he feels it imperative to suffer no further loss of status. "The paranoid person characteristically attempts to solve these dilemmas by erection of status preserving or enhancing cover stories, by [vigilance against] further degradation, by hostile counterattacks, and by a presentation of the self to others which amounts to a claim to superior, exalted status" (p. 220).

By virtue of his use of the paradigm case formulation of the paranoid style and his access to status-dynamic principles, Bergner has been able to integrate the various behavioral manifestations of paranoia in a way not heretofor accomplished. The different and seemingly unrelated characteristics are shown to have a common core—rooted in the marginal status assignment and the exercise of a limited options in dealing with that assignment.

As has been characteristic of Bergner's (1981, 1982) series of papers on the classic disorders, a very important part of his contribution is the delineation of a set of policies and procedures for dealing effectively with the syndrome. The fundamental goal of therapy with paranoid individuals is to get the person to reformulate his or her own status in a realistic and accrediting manner. Difficult as paranoid clients have been found by therapists, Bergner shows how to do that successfully.

I-Thou Relationships

Roberts takes five characteristics as central to "I-Thou" relationships. I-Thou relationships prototypically involve mutual status assignments. Each participant thus takes cognizance of the other's own world in relation

to his or her world. They show an appreciation of the other's personal characteristics. They recognize the other's freedom to negotiate the standards applicable in a relationship. And as a result of the mutual status assignment and its implications, each person's behavior potential in the relationship is relatively unrestricted.

I-Thou relationships are contrasted through transformations of the paradigm case with I-Them and I-It relationships. Imperialist-Doormat relationships are classic cases of the I-Them pattern: One person is the world creator who unilaterally lays down the law to the other person, who serves as a handy prop in his or her life drama. To the degree that Imperialists do not see themselves or others as engaging in status assignment, they respond to the world by upholding their view of the truth. The place that others have in an Imperialist world is non-negotiable. Failures to go along are typically seen as the fault of the other person, as indication of his low character or intelligence.

The Rote Status Assigner is a good example of I-It relationships. Here the defect in assignment is that neither person takes seriously the opportunity for the creation of personal worlds. Rather they are busy building prefab worlds out of ready-made materials. The received status and role distinctions of the society are good enough for them, and they tend to conform rigidly to the conventional standards and to enforce the same conformity on others.

Robert's empirical work was partly inspired by the insight that some persons seem capable of participating in friendship or love relationships without any exterior motivations whereas other's seem determined to make such relationship conform to other standards, e.g., to make all attractive women into conquests, to play king of the mountain with everyone with whom they associate, to place excessive demands for loyalty on their friends. These examples illustrate some of the mistakes that Imperialists and Rote Status Assigners make. As a shorthand label, Roberts calls those persons who are capable of appreciating the characteristics of I-Thou relationships, ''insiders'' and those who cannot, such as Imperialists, Doormats, or Rote Status Assigners, ''outsiders.''

Using an elegantly simple procedure, Roberts classified persons as ''insiders'', ''outsiders'', and ''mixed cases'' on the basis of several of their earliest relationship memories as rated by judges. Then the persons so classified judged relationships that varied as to whether they were I-thou vs. I-Them relationships, and also how happy the relationships currently were. Roberts predicted (and found) that ''Insiders'' tended to report a greater difference between I-Thou and I-Them relationships than did outsiders, and they saw unhappy I-Thou relationships as more similar to happy I-Thou relationships than did outsiders. Thus a deficit in appreciation of the intrinsic qualities of person relationships is both conceptually impli-

cated and empirically involved in the kinds of relationship pathologies found in I-Them and I-It patterns.

Scenarios of Alcoholic Relationships

Marshall takes the conceptual device of a scenario, which is a historical pattern of interaction that has the structure of a drama, and uses it as the central conceptual device for organizing the patterns of alcoholic relationships. A central feature of alcoholic relationships is the tendency of one participant to co-opt others into his personal drama. Berne (1964) forcefully drew our attention to these patterns with his *Games People Play*. A strength of Marshall's account is that the scenarios give a clear sense of the significance of the participants' behavior—i.e., what the participants are doing by continuing to stay in such relationships.

Formally, scenarios connect to the deficit model by providing a specification of what the person(s) are doing which prevents them from doing what they should be doing. The deficit is identified by descriptions of the kinds of normal achievements that the person is not making and by the failures of appreciation and skill that are involved in the players' choices. Marshall combines the scenario device with a paradigm case formulation by which she represents major variations in the actual historical patterns as transformations of the original paradigm case. Two scenarios are presented: One for the woman as the alcoholic spouse and one for the man as the alcoholic spouse. In each case the scenario consists of five major themes, each of which has some internal complexity.

For the woman as alcoholic spouse, the fundamental deficit is that of being a non-self status assigner. Her own behavior potential is defined by a partner who gives her a place in his world, in which they share a commitment to high standards. As the relationship develops, this commitment comes back to haunt them. The man typically relates to others by noting their failures and by being highly critical of them. As the wife's inability (in his view) to meet his standards becomes apparent, he becomes more critical and demanding, and she begins to escape from criticism by drinking and denying responsibility for her failures. As Marshall notes, "A destructive cycle . . . has begun. The female alcoholic tends not to live up to the implicit agreement 'to meet joint standards', compensating by doing something that she *can* do (i.e., escaping through drink) thus, making herself ineligible to succeed. . . ." (p. 273).

As her behavior becomes more of an embarrassment or humiliation to him, he increases his private criticism of her (even though remaining publicly supportive). She in turn will often be remorseful after a drinking episode and will be eager for his forgiveness. When the relationship pattern has developed to this point, the couple may have greater behavior potential

in this relationship than in any perceived alternative; they therefore stick together to maintain their shared world construction despite the growing difficulties. As long as she continues to acknowledge his position as top dog—as the definer of their standards—he will be reluctant to give up his world, for by so doing he would both lose his top dog status and make others aware of the difficulties in the relationship.

In the case of the alcoholic male with a non-alcoholic spouse, the critical deficit is his inability to assign himself the status of ordinary person: He regards himself as a special person to whom ordinary rules and constraints do not apply. At first, everything may go well in such relationships, for the wife may accept the unique quality of their relationship and his claims to a special status. Problems arise when the wife begins to look for accomplishments and practical results that one would associate with a special person. He is happy merely *being* special; she expects to have their specialness validated by results. Marshall suggests that for the man talking about a plan or stating it as a goal is just as good as enacting it, since the plan's central function is to express who he is. He reacts to his wife's demands for accomplishments as personal assaults to be resisted. And he knows how to show her that no one can tell him what to do by going out drinking whenever or for however long it suits him. In this context, drinking heavily has become a means of self-expression and a way of rejecting external constraint.

Marshall shows that what happens once the destructive cycle has begun depends on many factors—the financial resources of the couple, the level of accomplishment of the husband, and the tendency of the wife to forgive and to hang onto their shared worldview. Marshall also develops a number of the therapeutic implications of the scenario, particularly those having to do with making genuine changes in the relationship so that the couple will be less likely to slide back into the pathological scenario. We expect that practioners will find this paper quite useful in their work on alcoholic relationships.

The Positive-Health Developmental Model

The PDM is a complex typology that distinguishes three major dimensions. The first of these is the approach that a person prefers—relationships, power, or information. The second is the developmental level, graded on an 11 step scale, of the person's participation in the social practices of his community. The third is the person's degree of self-regulation or Mastery. Because Vanderburgh indexes her entire system in terms of accomplishments and abilities/disabilities, the PDM meshes very well with the deficit model. Its relevance is illustrated well by the following passage from her chapter:

> In general, then, Relationship disabilities take forms in which desirable or necessary judgments and assessments are not made, and in which full and responsible self-regulation is lacking; Power disabilities are exemplified by judgments made without full Observer/Critic participation; and Information disabilities are manifested in inability or unwillingness to act effectively on information and judgments'' (p. 292).

Any classification system highlights some dimensions or characteristics rather than others. Thus it is unlikely that any system of classification will be universally preferable. Which system any given person finds most useful will depend on such factors as the purpose of the user, his or her level of skill in the system, and the range of cases to which the system is applied.

We therefore should not ask Vanderburgh to prove that her system is preferable to all others. What she can do and, has gone a long way towards doing, is to make the PDM salient for us and clearly relevant to a kind of clinical practice that gives a priority to the noncoercive growth of clients.

Overall, then, these five chapters give us a view of the deficit model and some of its major implications, and they provide important elaborations of the Descriptive Psychology approach to classification and treatment in psychopathology.

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PATHOLOGY

Peter G. Ossorio

ABSTRACT

The Deficit Model of pathology is presented in contrast to the traditional Medical Model and Behavioral Model. The structure of the Deficit Model as a Descriptive-Psychology formulation is given. Explanations of pathology are contrasted with the concept of pathology itself. The social, normative, judgmental, and relativistic aspects of pathology and pathology attributions are discussed. The conceptual structure of explanations of pathology is explicated and the relation of pathology to personal problems is discussed. The current psychiatric taxonomy, DSM III, is critically analyzed and the relation of the Deficit Model to the DSM III approach is analyzed. The value of classificatory schemes is discussed.

PATHOLOGY

The purpose of this paper is to sketch the Descriptive-Psychology concept of pathology, which is arrived at by articulating the primary concepts of *Person* and *Behavior*. The Descriptive Psychology formulation is conventionally designated as the Deficit Model of pathology. It contrasts in a variety of ways with the more familiar models of pathology found in

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PARANOID STYLE:
A DESCRIPTIVE AND PRAGMATIC ACCOUNT

Raymond M. Bergner

ABSTRACT

The present study comprises two parts. The first of these is a paradigm case formulation of the paranoid individual. This formulation takes the form of a narrative description of this individual, with especial emphasis placed on his characteristic dilemmas and attempts at solution of these dilemmas. The formulation is also designed to be pragmatic, that is, to heuristically suggest rational courses of therapeutic action for the practitioner. The second part of this study is an explicit presentation of a large number of therapeutic recommendations for working with paranoid persons.

The purpose of this study is to provide a clinically useful conceptual formulation of paranoid individuals. This purpose will be accomplished in a two-fold manner. First, a paradigm case formulation of the paranoid individual will be presented in detail. This will include both a delineation

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of the paradigm case characteristics and an account of the intelligibility of these characteristics. Secondly, based on this paradigm case formulation, a set of therapeutic strategies for approaching and helping paranoid individuals will be detailed.

The conceptualizations and therapeutic recommendations to follow will be largely status dynamic in nature. I am thus indebted to Peter Ossorio (esp. Ossorio, 1976), the originator of this point of view. I am also indebted to the earlier work of Freud (1959), Shapiro (1965, 1981), Goffman (1963), Sullivan (1953, 1956), Colby (1975, 1977) and Cummings (1970). The present account at many points either builds upon the work of these authors, or is formulated in reaction to it.

A PARADIGM CASE FORMULATION OF THE PARANOID STYLE

I shall begin this account of paranoia with the provision of a paradigm case formulation (see Ossorio [1981] for details of this methodology). In order to ensure continuity with a surprisingly small but excellent body of literature on this topic (esp. Cameron, 1959; Colby, 1975; Cummings, 1970; Freud, 1959; Shapiro, 1965, 1981; Sullivan, 1953, 1956) I have chosen as my paradigm case the archetypal picture of the paranoid individual as it emerges from this literature. This picture might be expressed most succinctly in the following way. Paradigmatically, the paranoid individual is one who exhibits the following personal characteristics on an enduring basis:

1. Extensive resort to the "defense mechanism" of projection.
2. The entertainment of delusional beliefs, which might be persecutorial, grandiose, referential, or influential in nature.
3. Proneness to excessive mistrust and suspiciousness of others.
4. Guardedness and secretiveness in dealings with others.
5. A tendency to be hypersensitive or "touchy" in the face of perceived slights from others.
6. A proneness to excessive hostility.
7. A proneness to an underlying sense of great personal shame.
8. A tendency to live continually mobilized in a state of hyperalertness and emergency preparedness (see esp. Shapiro, 1965, 1981).
9. The exhibition of a great deal of constant, biased, focused, searching attention, the object of which is to apprehend "clues" confirming prior, fixed beliefs (again, see esp. Shapiro, 1965, 1981).
10. A proneness to tremendous rigidity in beliefs and approaches to life.
11. A proneness to arrogant, megalomaniacal, grandiose self presentation.

12. A tendency to take action on the basis of delusional beliefs, and to thus incur considerable difficulties in relationships with others.

Expressed in this fashion, the above formulation bears more than a passing resemblance to the "symptom check lists" contained in many diagnostic manuals and books. In this study, however, I would like to forsake this approach to paradigm case formulation, and in its place present a formulation which has more the character of a coherent portrait of a coherent person. In painting this portrait, however, an attempt will be made to do justice to the above symptom check list formulation by seeing to it that the intelligibility of all of the elements in this list is conveyed.

Selection of the archetypal portrait as my paradigm case has substantially guaranteed faithfulness to two other rules of thumb which are suggested by Ossorio (1981) in erecting paradigm case formulations. The first of these is that of selecting an indubitable case, a case which any competent employer of the concept in question may look at and conclude: "Certainly if anything is a case of X, this is." The second rule of thumb is that of a selecting a complex case, a case which contains many or even all of the essential ingredients which a case of a given concept could possess. This enhances the likelihood that, when other instances of the concept are encountered, they will prove equally or less complex, but not more complex, and thus will be "covered" by the paradigm case formulation.

A paradigm case formulation of paranoia opens up the possibility that, by adding, deleting, or substituting elements contained in the formulation, one can handle the empirically observable variety of features which paranoid individuals do in fact exhibit. Thus, one need not be at an impasse when a given paranoid individual differs in even important respects from the paradigm case formulation; one need not resort to a nosology with many, many different categories of paranoia (e.g., paranoid state, paranoia, paranoid personality, paranoid schizophrenic, etc.); and one need not resort to the "check-list" approach to diagnosis ("If the patient exhibits 5 out of 8 characteristics in this list, he may be considered paranoid; if he does not, he should not be so considered"). I shall in a later section enumerate some of the more empirically common and important transformations of the paradigm case.

The formulation which I shall present in the pages to follow is organized around two central rubrics, those of "the paranoid dilemma" and "the paranoid solution" to this dilemma. Let me begin.

The Paranoid Dilemma: Status

An individual's *status* is the totality of his relationships with all the elements of the world. It is, to put the matter most simply, all his relationships to everything. This status is divisible into any number of subrelationships. For example, some of these subrelationships for a particular

individual might be that he is a father to his children, an author of his actions, a teacher to his pupils, a rejector of himself, a victim of an economic recession, a professor of his faith, and so forth. Critically, to occupy certain positions in relation to other persons, objects, states of affairs, and even oneself enhances one's freedom and ability to act (relative to other possible positions, of course); to occupy others constricts one's freedom and ability (see Ossorio [1976] for a more extensive treatment of this concept).

We may distinguish between an individual's *actual* status and this individual's appraisal of, or *formulation* of his own status, (i.e., his *self-concept)* which may or may not represent an accurate appraisal of his actual status. For example, we may observe that a given individual actually occupies the position of "loved one" for another, but that he does not take it that he has this standing with her. In contrast, he may know that he is beloved, in which case we may say that his actual status and his own formulation of his status are in accord in this respect. Finally, of course, it is possible that an individual take it that he is loved by another, when in fact he is not.

Both an individual's actual status and his formulation of his own status, his self-concept, are intimately linked with his ability to behave, his behavior potential. An individual's actual status corresponds to his actual opportunities and eligibilities to behave. If one overestimates one's status in certain important respects, one's behavior will ordinarily (but not inevitably) prove unsuccessful (to pursue our example, a man presumes to the privileges of a loved one when in fact he is not, and is rejected and branded "presumptuous"). If one underestimates one's status in certain respects, then the likelihood arises that one will fail to exploit the eligibilities and opportunities open to one, and thus fail to participate as fully in living as one otherwise could (e.g., presuming that he is not loved when in fact he is, an individual despairs of a desired relationship and fails to pursue it).

The paranoid individual is typically one who in certain respects overestimates his status, and in others, underestimates it. However, what is more important here because it is more fundamental is his tendency to underestimate his own status. *A cornerstone of the paranoid dilemma is that he has at bottom assigned himself a status which borders on the unlivable; that is to say, it borders on one which would make behavior impossible.* Self-concept wise, one might say, the paranoid individual on an enduring basis barely keeps his head above water.

I shall get into the modal content of the paranoid individual's formulation of his own status presently. First, however, it is extremely important to note that *what the paranoid individual cannot afford is any further degradation of his position (status) in his own eyes, and in fact, he stands badly in need of an enhancement of this position.* The first of these is,

psychologically speaking, a matter of life and death. For should the paranoid individual take it that his status is reduced yet further, he will correspondingly take it that his eligibilities and opportunities to participate with other members of the human community is reduced to unbearable, unlivable levels. It is instructive in this connection to note that Harry Stack Sullivan, whose first "therapeutic" step with paranoid individuals was in effect to see to it that a self-degradation was accomplished, routinely drove his patients into states of psychotic decompensation (Sullivan, 1956).

It is thus that the paranoid individual cannot afford, and must avoid at all costs, taking it that he has suffered any status loss or degradation at all. This applies even in seemingly "small" matters such as slights, minor indignities, and other failures to accord respect. But it applies all the more when paranoid individuals are confronted with life events with drastic degrading implications, such as being dismissed from a job, being divorced by a spouse, being publicly branded as an "undesirable" (e.g., by being admitted to a mental hospital or taken to court on criminal charges), and so forth. It is typically events such as these which precipitate the crises which bring the paranoid individual, one way or another, to the attention of the mental health establishment.

The Paranoid Dilemma: Content of the Modal Self Status Assignments

Paradigmatically, the paranoid individual has made two status appraisals with respect to himself which have rendered his overall status so marginal. The first of these, and the more specific, is the appraisal of himself as a *marginal agent* or *virtual non-agent*. The second, and less specific, is the appraisal of himself as a *stigmatized individual*. While the specific content of this status appraisal may vary, in appraising oneself as a stigmatized person, one has taken it that self is the possessor of some moral, physical, or social blemish which disqualifies one from having the status of a "normal" or full-fledged member of the human community. The stigma renders one subnormal or less than fully human, and thus the incurrer of restricted behavioral eligibilities and opportunities, particularly with "normal" others (Goffman, 1963).

The Status of Agent

To appraise oneself as an agent is to take it that certain relationships obtain between oneself and one's actions. It is to take it that one is related to these actions as their *initiator* and *chooser,* and further, that these actions are *expressive of one's own reasons* for doing as one is doing. To take it that one is an agent, then, is to have "a sense of", or, to use Erikson's (1963) vivid phrase, to have a "somatic conviction" about, oneself as the perpetrator of one's own actions, as choosing these actions

from among options which one also might and could have chosen, and as doing what at that moment one personally had reason enough to do.

Where any or all of these elements are enduringly absent or attenutated, the sense of oneself as an agent, will also be absent or attenuated. Where one does not believe that one is the perpetrator or initiator of one's actions, the sense will be created that these actions are something which *happen* to one (a claim frequently made by hysterical and impulsive individuals). Where one does not in general have the sense of oneself as having selected from among possible options, the sense will be created that actions engaged in are the only next thing that one could do, that one in general is "hemmed in" by circumstances and has no choice. Finally, where one's sense is that reasons acted upon are not one's own reasons but arise from other persons or from powerful forces, or at least that one is terribly prone or liable to act on such externally imposed reasons, then the sense created is of oneself as "weak", as "not one's own person", as "deficient in will", and so forth.

Let us return from these general considerations to our present concern with paranoid individuals. These people, while they may feel all of these things, are especially prone to appraise themselves as defective agents in the last mentioned sense. That is to say, they appraise themselves as too vulnerable to acting on the whims, pressures, and wants of others or on external or internal "forces" (e.g., fear), and thus as weak-willed, vulnerable, and overly malleable vis-à-vis others. It is in this sense primarily, I believe, that they appraise themselves as insufficiently autonomous.

An important aside here: an obvious prerequisite for one to consistently and enduringly take it that one is acting on one's own reasons is that one *know* one's reasons. There are (at least) two important ways in which such knowledge can be impaired which are particularly relevant in considering the paranoid individual's sense of personal autonomy. First, where an individual has not clearly defined *his* wants, interests, values, obligations, and life goals, defined "who he is" in this sense (cf. Erikson [1963] on the "sense of identity"), this individual is thereby impaired in his sense of what enduringly and importantly are *his* reasons for acting. The paranoid individual, despite his characteristic facade of seeming certitude in such matters, is in reality most often a person who has *legislated* such a set of directives (or "directions") for himself, but actually is quite uncertain. He is thus not clear on his reasons for acting in many significant contexts, and thus less than clear, when he acts, that the reasons acted upon are *his* reasons (see also Bergner [1981a] for a more detailed discussion of this dilemma).

Secondly, I have noted earlier that paranoid individuals fundamentally cannot afford any degradation of their status. At the risk of getting ahead of my story a bit, an important implication of this is that they correspondingly cannot take it that they are acting for certain sorts of reasons. For

example, to use Freud's (1959) classical examples, many such persons could not afford to take it that they are acting as they are acting out of either hatred or homosexual interest. To do so would be to correspondingly take it that they are a certain sort of *unthinkably degraded* person, and this they cannot do (cf. the traditional concept of "ego defense"; see also Ossorio [1966, 1976] on unconscious motivation). A fundamental consequence of this state of affairs is that certain actions are engaged in which, phenomenologically, are divorced from a corresponding sense of *"acting for my genuine reasons"* (see Kaiser [1955] and Shapiro [1981] for further excellent anaylses of the effects of having such unconscious reasons on one's sense of autonomy and personal responsibility).

The Status of Stigmatized Person

As previously noted, to see oneself as a *stigmatized person* is to take it that one is the possessor of some defect or defects which disqualify one from having the status of "normal" person or "member in good standing of the human community" (Goffman, 1963). This defect may be some appraised moral blemish (e.g., homosexuality, gratuitous hatefulness, perverse sexual interest, or characterological evilness), physical blemish (e.g. some deformity or disfigurement), or social blemish (e.g., mental illness, rape or incest victimization, membership in an ethnic or racial outgroup, or immigrant or refugee status). Further, I have mentioned in the previous section the defective sense of autonomy with which paranoid individuals are beset. This represents a doubly impactful state of affairs inasmuch as it creates not only the problems already mentioned, but also a very troubling concern with the *stigmatizing aspects* of being a "weak-willed" person. This is an especially painful stigma to paranoid individuals, particularly those males who are impressed by the traditional mores which define what it is to be masculine.

Stigma elicits shame, and face-saving (Bergner, 1983; Ossorio, 1976). Just as the discrimination of provocation elicits hostility, and that of danger elicts fear, so the discrimination of one's own transgression of social norms regarding what qualifies one as normal and acceptable, elicts shame (assuming, and this is an important point, one also *personally subscribes* to these norms and these implications). The paranoid, therefore, is an individual who is deeply implicated in the emotion of shame (Shapiro, 1965; Sullivan, 1953). Further, being so ashamed, he is understandably motivated to engage in face-saving activity—to maintain his stigma as a secret (if possible), to avoid intractions in which his stigma would be revealed or prove a social impediment, to "protest too much" that his stigma is something to be proud of, to engage in compensatory actions which would mitigate or cancel out the degrading implications of his stigma, and so forth, (see Goffman [1963] on strategies for "managing a spoiled identity").

In sum, the paranoid individual, given his formulation of his own status as a stigmatized, discredited one, has prima facie reason both to feel ashamed and to engage heavily in all manner of face saving maneuvers.

R. D. Laing (1965), in his excellent treatment of the phenomenology of schizophrenic individuals provides us with an especially apt description of how the status assignments of marginal agent and of stigmatized person leave the paranoid individual feeling about himself: "He may feel more insubstantial than substantial, and unable to assume the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, and valuable" (p. 42).

The Paranoid Person's Consciousness of His Status Assignments

There are some paranoid individual's, certainly the minority, who are able to articulate the sorts of things I have been describing to this point. They are quite aware, to use Erikson's (1963) apt phraseology, of their senses of (defective) autonomy, of shame, and of doubt. I have had the good fortune to have as a personal friend and colleague, an individual who was quite cognizant of his considerable paranoia and of the personal issues necessitating this approach to life, and who was extraordinarily articulate in his descriptions of same. It is to persons such as this that I am indebted for my formulation of the paranoid individual's modal self status assignments (as well, of course, as to the classical authors on this subject).

Paradigmatically, however, the paranoid individual does not, and often enough cannot, articulate these matters. It would be literally unthinkable for him to admit that he suffered from painful senses of weakness, insubstantiality, and radical personal defect. What, therefore, justifies my allegations that "underneath" he does indeed suffer from such self-appraisals?

These allegations rest on two evidential bases. The first of these involves extrapolation from those rare cases just mentioned in which demonstrably paranoid individuals are able to articulate their fundamental appraisals of themselves. By implication, I am arguing that those paranoid individuals who do not do so have at bottom formulated their status in the same way, but are unwilling or (probably most often) unable to articulate these (shameful) matters to another person.

Secondly, we have an honored cultural epigram which says that "actions speak louder than words" (cf. also the Biblical recommendation that "by his *works* ye shall know him"). The paranoid individual, in his guardedness and secretiveness, his enormous sensitivity to matters of face, his inordinate resistance to complying with the desires of others, and many other matters, does not *act* like a person who is genuinely as proud of himself and as strong and indomitable as he makes out. His protestations to the

contrary ring hollow; his account of his own actions strike us as not conveying reason enough; and the conclusion which strongly suggests itself is that we are confronted here with a person who has genuine and fundamental doubts regarding his own strength, goodness and acceptability.

The Paranoid Dilemma: Additional Constraints

Paranoid Persons Are Not Self-accreditors

Other persons who assign to themselves stigmatizing statuses may have personal abilities, perspectives, and inclinations with which to subsequently combat this status assignment. They might, for instance be prone to charity; that is, to exploiting the nondegrading conceptual possibilities in their appraisals of self and others. Thus, perhaps in time, they are able to achieve a more charitable, less degrading, and yet fully realistic reappraisal of what they had initially apprasied as stigmatizing.

A constraint, however, from which paranoid individuals typically suffer is that they are not prone to self-accreditation (or, for that matter, the accreditation of others). In fact, they tend to be among the harshest and most unrelenting of self critics (cf. Bergner [1981a] regarding the "overseer regime" and Ossorio [1976] regarding the "hanging judge" and the "supercritic"). This has to be considered among the most important contraints under which paranoid individuals labor.

Paranoid individuals receive few corrective reappraisals from others. In the lives of paranoid individuals, there is typically a substantial absence of frank, intimate dialogue with others. Such an absence reduces the possibility that more charitable, status-enhancing perspectives on and characterizations of themselves might be obtained from such others.

The Relative Imperviousness of Status Assignments to Contradictory Empirical Evidence

Status assignments in general are relatively impervious to change through the reception of apparently contradictory empirical evidence. This is a matter which has been amply discussed by previous authors (see, e.g., Ossorio, 1971/1978). For the present, I shall only present a heuristic reminder. Let us suppose that the public at large assigns the status to a certain politician of "one who is motivated solely by political expediency." Once such an assignment is made, it becomes quite possible to assimilate virtually anything he does to this status. If the politician votes "no" on a farm subsidy bill, he is "playing to his urban constituency"; if he votes yes on such a bill, he is "trying to shore up his weakness with the farmers". If he espouses a popular stance, he is "taking the politically popular po-

sition''; if he takes an unpopular stance, he is ''trying to deceive people into believing he can take the tough stand''. And so forth.

In the same way, once a paranoid individual has assigned to himself a degraded status, it becomes easy for him to assimilate new and seemingly contradictory information about himself to this prior prejudice. At best, such information might be taken as evidence of how strongly, courageously, or virtuously a *weak, degraded person* may act at times.

The Paranoid Dilemma: Characteristic Solutions

What does a person who has assigned to himself a virtually unlivable status, and who suffers under the constraints just enumerated, do to prevent a further degradation of his position? What does he do to prevent that catastrophic possibility, or to enhance his status to a point where he is not so imperiled?

It may be noted that, thus far, the dilemmas that I have described are hardly unique to paranoid individuals. Hysterical persons, for example, also suffer from radically impaired senses of personal autonomy. From the present point of view, what gets a person labelled ''hysterical'', or ''paranoid'', or anything else, is not so much their dilemmas but the solutions which they characteristically employ to deal with them. Hysterical individuals, for example, frequently resort to what might be termed ''blotting out'' maneuvers in the face of threatened degradation. They deny, or forget, or faint, or perhaps in dire circumstances even manage to lose cognizance of just who it is that is in danger of degradation. What do paranoid individuals do?

Paranoid Solution #1: The Invention of Cover Stories

If to take it that reality is a certain way would entail for a person an unthinkable loss of status and therefore ability to behave, then this individual will not take it that reality is this way (Ossorio, 1976). For example, if to take it that one is homosexually inclined, or that one has been justifiably dismissed from a job for incompetence, or that one has been hospitalized legitimately for schizophrenia represents an unthinkable status degradation for a person, then this individual will, quite simply, not take it that any of these is the case.

However, if we are not simply to eliminate such events or states of affairs from conscious awareness, then we require an alternate account of them, a ''cover story'' if you will. And further, since what we are about from the outset here is the avoidance of status degradation, this alternative account must be such that it entails no more than a survivable loss of status. Ideally, it would even enhance such status.

The paranoid, as one of his core strategies for dealing with the dilemmas

posed earlier, is an inventor of such cover stories. Confronted with events and states of affairs which represent potential degradations of, for him, drastic magnitudes, the paranoid person is one who *routinely formulates alternative conceptions of reality,* which conceptions entail no more than an endurable loss of status. This notion, while different from and broader than previous accounts, is similar in certain essentials to the positions of Freud (1959), Sullivan (1956), Colby (1975, 1977), Shapiro (1965, 1981), and Cameron (1959).

Example. A college student, when she began to fail in certain courses, would predictably begin to both degrade the teacher in question, and also to see him or her as having singled her out. She would assert such things as that the teachers in question only wanted docile "yes men" because they were so insecure in themselves, and that they feared and resented any student such as herself who exhibited both superior intelligence and the courage to disagree with their "cherished" opinions.

Example. A very proud and arrogant man, when hospitalized against his will after taking drastic action based upon persecutorial beliefs, reported that he regarded his hospitalization, not as legitimate, but as part of a conspiracy to discredit him and to get him out of the way of the conspirators, for whom he represented a formidable threat. He compared his hospitalization to that which befell certain completely sane Russian dissidents who were hospitalized by the state as a means for controlling and discrediting them.

Example. Senate President Schreber, in Freud's celebrated case, when confronted with undeniable homoerotic feelings, ultimately concocted an explanatory theory in which God had selected him to accomplish a special mission on earth, which mission entailed his transformation into a woman with feminine sexual longings (Freud, 1959).

Example. A middle aged woman, in response to anger from her husband which was clearly and obviously provoked by her having nagged and bossed him for several hours, stated that the reason he got so angry had nothing to do with her, but arose out of problems with his mother which he was "transferring" to her.

In each of these examples, we see the same theme. An individual is in danger of suffering a degradation or is in need of undoing an already accomplished degradation. His or her circumstances could readily be interpreted as having the implications that the person in question was, respectively, a failure, a schizophrenic, a homosexual, or an impossible nag. And, in each case, the individual erected a cover story in which these

identical circumstances were construed in such a way that no status loss, and even a certain degree of status enhancement, occurred.

It should be clear that, in speaking of status preserving and enhancing cover stories, I am using this concept to designate the same phenomena which traditional authors have captured under the rubrics of "projection" and "delusion". However, to avoid confusion and also to anticipate the possible criticism that I am merely putting "old wine in new bottles", let me clarify some important similarities and differences in these conceptions.

Projection: Similarities and Differences

The traditional, and I believe still predominant (e.g., White and Watt, 1981), conception of the defense mechanism of projection, is that it is a process in which an individual, for ego-defensive reasons, denies to awareness (represses) some intolerable impulse, affect, or personal characteristic of his own, and subsequently attributes this to another individual. The essential similarity between this conception and the cover story one is that in both cases the transformation of reality is accomplished for the express and vital purpose of keeping oneself from knowing or believing something about oneself which would prove extremely injurious if one did know it. Although the classical psychoanalytic account has posed this danger as that of an "influx of stimuli too great for the ego to master" (Brenner, 1974), the more commonplace account poses the danger as that of severe damage to self-esteem (e.g., Sullivan, 1956). The similarity between this notion and the notion of a status preserving or enhancing cover story is obvious.

A second similarity I will note only briefly. In both accounts, there is an element which we might term attribution based more on the individual's needs than on either available evidence or the employment of ordinary rules of evidence (cf. the classical concept of "autistic perception").

Let me now delineate some of the important differences between the present cover story account and the traditional conception of projection.

1. If one examines only the four examples I described above, one can observe that the status preservation or enhancement was accomplished through (at least) (a) reinterpretation of one's stigma as a mark of distinction, (b) reallocation of the locus of blame to others for one's own apparent failure, and (c) disqualification of one's potential degraders as legitimate critics (status assigners) of oneself. It seems extremely implausible to try to reduce these individuals' portrayals of other persons (their "projections") to the simple process of attributing their own impulses, affects, and characteristics to other persons. On its face, each of these cases is a much more complicated and sophisticated accomplishment than this.

2. The present account regards *threatened degradation* as the danger. One's own characteristics, affects and impulses (or, less occultly, temptations) represent only *special cases* of possible sources of degradation. Again, if one examines the cases described above, only one of these cases, Freud's, can plausibly be construed as being initiated by an impulse or affect. The other three are most cogently intelligible as initiating with threatened degradation at the hands of other persons. (N.B.: In fact, Shapiro's brilliant 1981 reinterpretation of the Schreber case supports the contention that his paranoia too began with a feared degradation vis-à-vis his fellow jurists. His homoerotic feelings were only a later *consequence* of this).

3. Shapiro (1965) has argued, and I agree, that the traditional conception of projection cannot in itself account for the fact that projections invariably have a self-reference. That is to say, even where mere expulsion is involved, persons not only reallocate their repudiated affects "out there," but they then take it that those affects are directed *back to themselves*. The cover story account, which holds that the stories erected must provide alternative accounts of *one's own* apparent degradation, makes it amply clear why they must always of necessity have a self-reference.

4. Finally, the present account does not entail a commitment to the rather mysterious, often unpsychological, and at times even magical, process and mechanism notions which the traditional account of projection implies (e.g., "transformations" of love into hate, unobservable censoring processes, and the existence of reified repressed contents "somewhere"). Rather, it requires only a person capable of alternative interpretations of reality, operating under certain observable constraints regarding what he as a person can take to be the case about himself and his world (Ossorio, 1976).

A Note On The Concept of Delusion

"Delusion" *conceptually* implies falsehood. If an allegation proves to be true, it cannot *by definition* be a delusion. "Cover story," in contrast, does not conceptually imply falsehood; it implies merely that the account given is other than that which the individual genuinely believes. This attribution is correctly made, for our present purposes, under conditions where (a) the evidential basis for some allegation is insufficient, (b) ordinary rules of evidence are in good measure suspended, and (c) circumstances are such that it can plausibly be alleged that the function of some construction of reality is to preserve or restore an individual's status. It is a logical possibility, and an empirically observed occurrence, that cover stories so erected may at times contain more than a kernel of truth.

Pragmatically, assuming that the content of some construction of reality is plausible or possible, confirming that it is a *delusion* requires confir-

matory evidence about real world states of affairs external to the therapy hour (e.g., evidence that the client's wife is indeed having an affair). Confirming that it is a cover story requires no such further evidence. Everything that ne needs to know to make this "diagnosis" can in principle be obtained by observations and reasoning within the constraints imposed by the therapy hour.

Concluding Comments About Cover Stories

Finally, to relate the present account to traditional thinking and terminology, if a given cover story is both relatively complex and internally coherent, it is said to be "systematized". If it fails significantly in these respects, it is said to be "unsystematized". If the story is erected by a very desperate person, usually one who has already suffered significant degradation and is attempting strenuously to recover, and as a result this person begins to grasp wildly at improbable straws, one begins to talk about this individual as "schizophrenic". (This is in accord with Freud's brilliant observation in 1911 that "the delusion formation, which we take to be a pathological product, is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction" [p. 174].)

Paranoid Solution #2: Emergency Preparedness

It stands to reason that, if a person exists chronically on the brink of unlivable status levels, and if this individual believes himself at heart to be weak, vulnerable, and thus in actual danger of further degradation of his position, he would do well to live his life in a state of emergency preparedness. Since degradation does represent such a radical danger to him, like a soldier on guard duty in a combat zone, he cannot afford to be taken by surprise or to be wrong, and must entertain the possibility that any event which could plausibly (even if remotely) be interpreted as a signal or clue to impending dangers be actively inspected and considered. Thus, it makes sense that he remain alertly mobilized in a continual state of anticipation and emergency preparedness (Shapiro, 1965).

All of this makes it amply clear why the paranoid individual, like our hypothetical soldier, would be inordinately given to scanning his environment in a search for potential dangers, to an intense, biased, focused sort of attention to "clues" apprehended, and to chronic states of tension (Shapiro, 1965).

It also serves, at least partially to clarify the policy of paranoid individuals with regard to trust. For the paranoid, others are "untrustworthy till proven otherwise" (Ossorio, quoted in Cummings, 1970). Theirs is a sensible, for them, policy of withholding trust until such time (if ever) that others prove themselves trustworthy. And, given the chronic danger in which they find themselves, and the imperviousness of status assignment

(here, ''untrustworthy'') to contradictory empirical evidence, it is hardly surprising that, often enough, many others will never be trusted.

Finally, here, all of this helps account for the characteristic controllingness of paranoid individuals when they do become involved with others. To control another is to be able to avert any potential dangers posed by the other such as subjugation by them or other degradation (e.g., rejection, infidelity). All of this is consistent with Solomon's (1960) finding that greater control over another is empirically associated with greater trust of that other.

Paranoid Tactic #3: Hostility

To be provoked (e.g., insulted, slighted, or cheated) and to accept this provocation without effective response, is ordinarily to suffer a degradation. It is to be ''one who takes it lying down'', a ''doormat'', a ''weakling'', or ''one who can be abused with impunity''. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, nonresponse represents a tacit acknowledgement of the validity of the degrading *content* of the provocation (e.g., Mary calls John ''wishy-washy'', and John does not respond, but ''takes it''). In contrast, to respond to a provocation with hostility is ordinarily both to refuse the content of this provocation (e.g., ''I am not wishy-washy'') and to refuse the degradation implicit in non-response (''I'm not the sort of person who takes abuse lying down'').

The paranoid individual has typically constructed a world which is amply provocative. He thus has reason for hostility. In addition, he lives under the already noted constraint that he can afford no further degradation; status wise, his ''back is to the wall''. He is thus doubly constrained, in the face of appraised provocation, to respond to this provocation with hostile attack. In the present view, these states of affairs constitute the fundamental intelligibility for the inordinate hypersensitivity and hostility of paranoid individuals.

Paranoid Stragegy #4: Making Claims to Exalted Status

One way in which to attempt to prevent degradation and to secure accreditation is to make status claims to the effect that one is a personage of exalted status (cf. Raimy [1975] on the ''special person''). One lays claim to such statuses as ''expert'', ''brilliant person'', ''tough'', or ''man of unwavering will''. One insists that others extend the prerogatives of one's roles to an exaggerated degree and in situations in which such roles do not even come into play. For example, a doctor or a military officer might insist on the use of titles and or special respect due to persons with such titles in situations having nothing to do with medical or military matters, such as casual social gatherings.

This strategy, of course, is responsible in part for paranoid individuals being seen as prideful, haughty, arrogant, megalomaniacal, and in extreme cases, possessed of delusions of grandeur.

The Intelligibility of Some Other Personal Characteristics

Why rigidity?

To say that an individual is "rigid" is to allege that he has an enduring disposition to persevere in his beliefs and/or his strategies for conducting his life in circumstances where some change in these is indicated. Given the tremendous perceived dangers inherent in the abandonment of cover stories, the cessation of emergency preparedness, and so forth, it is easy to understand why a paranoid individual would cling so tenaciously to these beliefs and strategies. They do him an inestimable good and he is usually at a genuine loss as to how else he might accomplish this end in a less painful and costly manner.

Why Delusions of Reference?

I have deliberately not included these under the general heading of status enhancing or preserving cover stories for the simple reason that they typically seem not to be that. These beliefs, which entail insufficiently supported interpretations of social events to mean that one is being ridiculed, criticized, held in contempt, laughed at, and otherwise ill-regarded, can scarcely be seen on balance as status enhancing (although their centrality aspect i.e., their overestimation of the degree to which events have self as a central character—may be so enhancing).

Shameful secrets seem in general to breed a great deal of self reference, and I believe that this self reference has an at least twofold intelligibility. First, and more fundamentally, is the general tendency of persons to take it that others will appraise them as they at heart appraise themselves (cf. the concept of "superego projection" [Shapiro, 1965, 1981]). Secondly, the anticipatory proclivities of paranoid persons figure importantly here. The policy here, one might say, is that, given ambiguous cues, it is best to assume the worst possible implications lest you be lulled into complacency and then surprised.

The Paranoid "Real Community"
(Lemert, 1962)

It is certainly true, as has often been noted (see especially, Lemert, 1962; also Cameron, 1959; Cummings, 1970; Sullivan, 1956) that an individual who can brook no criticism, who is hostile and touchy, who is guarded and secretive, who is controlling, who is haughty and arrogant,

and who tends to attribute the worst possible motives to others, is bound to encounter a great deal of difficulty in his relationships with others. He is likely to drive them away and make them "*real* enemies" (Cummings, 1970). He is likely to give them reason, if they are not driven away, to attenuate their communication with him and to keep him from certain truths and opinions (Lemert, 1962). He is likely to give them reason to interact with him in degrading ways; for example, to humor or to patronize him to avoid conflict (Lemert, 1962). And he may, in certain circumstances, even provide others with ample reason to conspire to get him out of their company, neighborhood, or other organization (Lemert, 1962). Thus, through his actions, the paranoid individual will frequently bring about a "real community" (as distinguished from Cameron's famous "pseudo-community") of enemies, conspirators, detractors, condescenders, and so forth.

The paranoid, of course, will be sensitive to all of this, and new events of these sorts will give him fresh reasons for continued and heightened cover story erection, emergency preparedness, hostility, guardedness, etc., and this in turn will tend to make matters with other persons even worse. By such a "deviation amplifying process" (Hoffman, 1971), matters become ever more unbearable for paranoid persons in terms of their alientation, isolation, tension, divorce from shared perspectives, and much, much more.

Important Transformations of The Paranoid Case

As noted at the outset, an advantage of paradigm case methodology is that it permits us to erect a portrait of some phenomenon without committing us to saying, "and all cases will be exactly this way". Paradigm case formulations permit deletions, additions, or substitution of elements, with the results (a) that the product of these permutations remains a genuine case of the phenomena in question and (b) that substantial intelligibility will be provided for these permutations by the successful paradigm case formulation.

With respect to the paranoid style in particular, the following constitute some of the more empirically common, and thus important, paradigm case transformations.

1. *Substitution*. The paranoid individual is not unaware, but aware, of the lowly status he occupies in his own eyes.
2. *Substitution*. The paranoid individual entertains cover stories, not because they preserve or enhance his status, but because he has adopted the paranoid outlook of another dominant and/or influential person (folie a deux).
3. *Substitution*. Cover stories and other paranoid strategies are em-

ployed, not by an individual, but by a group of individuals (group paranoia).

4. *Substitution.* The paranoid individual's way of managing his stigma is, not by a hostile, arrogant, controlling bravado, but by a cowering, withdrawing furtive stance (cf. Cummings' [1970] portrait of the paranoid as a "fugitive").
5. *Deletion.* The paranoid individual comes to his paranoid stance, not through a lengthy, historical, evolutionary process, but through the sudden acquisition of a sense of defective autonomy and/or stigma (e.g., through an experience of rape, physical disfigurement, incest, immigration, arrest, mental hospitalization, etc.).

Summary

In our paradigm case formulation, the paranoid emerges as an individual who has formulated his own status in such fashion that it is barely livable. Thus, it is imperative that he suffer no further loss of status (degradation), and that he find ways to enhance his status. The modal self status assignments of the paranoid person are those of *marginal agent,* resulting in very defective senses of personal autonomy, authority, and substantiality, and of *stigmatized person,* resulting in a tremendous sense of personal shame and inordinate needs to save (or enhance) face. The paranoid person characteristically attempts to solve these dilemmas by the erection of status preserving or enhancing cover stories, by the maintenance of a continual state of emergency preparedness vis-à-vis possible further degradation, by hostile counterattack, and by a presentation of self to others which amounts to a claim to superior, exalted status. Through his actions and attitudes, the paranoid individual frequently gives other reasons to dislike, conspire against, reject, or otherwise mistreat him, resulting in a deviation amplifying process which renders his level of community with others ever more untenable, and his life ever more lonely and painful.

PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH PARANOID INDIVIDUALS

Any account of human problems counts for little if it does not heuristically suggest specific courses of therapeutic action. In the second part of this paper, I shall show that the present account does possess such heuristic suggestiveness, and I shall do so in a threefold manner. First, the key goals of psychotherapy with paranoid individuals will be specified. Secondly, some common pitfalls involved in doing psychotherapy with these people will be delineated. Third, and finally, some recommendations regarding positive therapeutic means for accomplishing the stated goals will be made.

The Goals of Psychotherapy With Paranoid Persons

The fundamental goal of psychotherapy with paranoid individuals is that these individuals come to reformulate their own status in a realistic, viable, and accrediting manner. This goal is utterly consonant with the paranoid individual's own purposes and ways. If one recalls here that the basic purpose of erecting cover stories is precisely to reformulate one's status in the same way, but that the effort for these persons miscarries, then we can say that the goal of the therapist is to join the paranoid client in helping him to erect accounts or "stories" which really work because they are realistically strengthening and because they foster community, not isolation and antipathy. Consistent with what was stated in the first part of this paper, the status enhancement in question entails movement in two directions.

From Marginal Agent to Agent

The goal here would ideally be that the paranoid individual come to realize, to have a "somatic conviction" to the effect that, he is an agent; that is, (a) an initiating perpetrator of his own actions (as opposed to a passive instrument of forces acting upon him); (b) a chooser from among genuine options, each of which he could have acted on (as opposed to one whose choices are utterly constrained by his circumstances); and (c) an actor whose actions are an expression of his own reasons (as opposed to those of others).

From Stigmatized Person to Member in Full Standing of the Human Community

The goal here would ideally be that the paranoid individual come to discard that formulation of his own status wherein he is the possessor of inclinations, emotions, or other personal characteristics which disqualify him from being fully human, and that instead he come to assign himself the status of fully entitled member in good standing of the human community.

In the present analysis, it is the assignment to self of these two problematic statuses which constitutes the paranoid individual's core dilemma, and which necessitate his employment of paranoid solutions or strategies. If therapy is to be adequate to its task, and not superficial, it must address these core dilemmas, and not merely the solutions devised to handle them.

Psychotherapy is a means-ends affair (Holmes, 1970). From the present perspective, *any* ethical way to accomplish these goals constitutes a valid approach, and there is probably a virtual infinity of such ways. What I will be describing in the pages to follow are some of the "do's and don'ts"

which, from my own experience and my observation of other therapists, seem most sound and most helpful.

Pitfalls

How can we do psychotherapy with an individual who is likely to be (a) unwilling or unable to admit to having any personal problems, (b) resistant to being influenced, (c) rigid in beliefs and behavior, (d) mistrustful or even distorting of our intentions, (e) hypersensitive to even the slightest hint of criticism, (f) allergic to intimacy, and (g) hostile? Not every paranoid individual, of course, will exhibit all of these characteristics. Wittgenstein's policy—"Don't say what must be; look and see what is"—is, as it so often is, appropriate (Wittgenstein, 1953). The therapist must assess in each instance the particular impediments and constraints within which he or she must work, and proceed accordingly. The following suggestions are all offered then, not as positive means for achieving the therapeutic goal of status enhancement, but as some ways not to go wrong with paranoid clients given all of the obstacles mentioned.

Maintain a Personal Distance the Paranoid Individual Can Tolerate

Sullivan long ago remarked that "paranoids are not especially fond of friendly, intrusive strangers". It should be abundantly clear by this point that, for many reasons, paranoid persons do not do well with intimacy, and this of course will be true in the therapeutic relationship as well. Thus, Cameron's (1959) recommendation that therapists maintain a "friendly, interested, but somewhat detached" posture vis-à-vis paranoid clients is well heeded. Particulars such as maintaining formal modes of address (e.g., "Mr. Smith" as opposed to the more familiar "John"); monitoring and modulating the degree to which one probes into sensitive areas; creating slightly more than the usual geographical distance in seating arrangements; using self-disclosure sparingly and carefully; and inhibiting the client's disclosure on those (rare) occasions where one senses he will reveal too much and then perhaps become acutely uncomfortable or even terminate, are all possible means of implementing this policy.

Don't Encroach on the Client's Autonomy

This is, of course, a prudent policy with every client. However, I believe that it merits a special reminder here. For nowhere is it more true that "coercion elicits resistance" (Ossorio, 1976) than with paranoid clients. In fact, it is likely to elicit much more, such as hostility, an increased wariness of the therapist as bent on his subjugation, and termination. It is thus doubly important not to "push" paranoid clients.

On the occasions where it is necessary to set and enforce limits, it becomes very important how the therapist handles this. I shall use a territoriality metaphor (all talk of personal "boundaries" seems to me to be an unlabeled metaphor of this sort) as the best way I know to illustrate this. If we conceive of therapist and client as having their respective "territories", should the therapist wish to set a limit, this limit is best posed in terms of *defending his own territory,* not in terms of *invading the client's territory*. Thus, a statement by the therapist that he is personally unwilling to spend the therapy hours being attacked (i.e., invoking *his right* not to be so abused) is preferable to one in which he insists that the client behave otherwise, which will be experienced by the paranoid client as an unfair, threatening attempt to "invade", control, or subjugate him.

Maintain Scrupulous Honesty and Trustworthiness (Cameron, 1959)

Again this is a general policy, and an obvious one, but one which merits reminder because it is so utterly vital in the present connection. Inasmuch as the paranoid individual's personal policy is to regard another as "untrustworthy until proven otherwise," trust must be established through the therapist's honesty, consistency, loyalty, fulfillment of made commitments (e.g., confidentiality), and, perhaps most important of all, steadfastness in treating the client in a respectful, accrediting manner.

Pose Problem Descriptions in Status Enhancing Ways

Paranoid persons tend not to be especially fond of admitting that they have any problems, since problems, of course, represent faults, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Thus, in opening up problem areas for therapeutic discussion, it is best that the therapist use his descriptive ingenuity to the utmost to find *realistic yet status preserving or enhancing* ways to portray problems. For example, a young paranoid woman had become very enmeshed with a family for whom she worked as a sort of governess. Her involvement with this family became such that, when the parents divorced, she became distressed to the point where she was hospitalized with a psychotic episode (the diagnosis given was "paranoid schizophrenia"). Her therapist wished to find a way to open up discussion of her tendency to over-empathically identify with others to such a degree that she literally took on their feelings as her own. His portrayal of this was that she was "too sensitive," and that her tendency to imaginally and empathically put herself in others' predicaments endangered her when she carried it to extremes. Few of us, if told we were "too sensitive" or "too empathic," would experience this as a particularly damning criticism. In fact, it seems almost a compliment—yet in context its status as a personal difficulty is very clear. The portrayal was accepted by the client,

an extremely touchy individual where criticism was concerned, and subsequently discussed.

Some Positive Means for Promoting Status Enhancement

As noted above, the lynchpins of the entire paranoid style are his assignments to self of the statuses of marginal agent and stigmatized person. Since, by virtue of his being a person, the paranoid individual is ipso facto an agent, we as therapists are in the nice (and, contrary to our cognitive brethren's beliefs, somewhat rare) position of being able to regard the first of these as a prima facie misconception. The second status assignment, however, is a trickier matter. It will typically involve both unrealistic and realistic appraisals of reality, as well as numerous matters of ethical and normative justification. While I am not of the mind, which seems to me predominant in psychological circles, that these are matters of taste or of arbitrary convention (see Flew [1976] for an excellent discussion of the merits of subjectivist and objectivist ethical positions), still these are matters which often permit a multiplicity of cogent justifications on different sides of an issue.

Earlier, I noted that a fair number of paranoid individuals cannot or will not admit to having any personal problems. With these persons in mind, therefore, let me begin with a set of procedures (the first five) which do not require much in the way of admission to problems on the part of paranoid clients.

Acknowledging and Amplifying the Client's Successes, Competencies, and Virtues

In any discourse, whether it be the recounting of a personal history, complaining about one's detractors and persecutors, reciting the events of the previous week, or whatever, a listener has choices as to what out of all that is said he will elect to ask questions about, express interest in, or otherwise treat as being of especial importance. With paranoid clients, one of the selections that I would especially recommend to the therapist is that of singling out, acknowledging, and amplifying what seem like *genuine* successes, competencies, and virtues of the client. Thus, for example, should the client mention that he finished college, or that he has worked steadily for many years, or that he excels at mechanical tasks, etc., the therapist might respond by simply saying "hmm" (in a way implying interest and affirmation), by asking questions requiring elaboration, by stating a shared interest, or by dwelling on the matter at some length (see also the section on "exploiting cancelling statuses"). All of this will be most effective when it does not represent compliance with an obvious bid on the part of the client to present himself a certain way (e.g., by bragging),

but rather, when the therapist picks up on what was mentioned in passing, what was implicit, or on what was implied by the client's action (e.g., when a client was guiltily berating himself for staying with a woman after he ceased to care for her, even though he had been completely honest with her, the therapist commented on how "his integrity seemed to be a very important matter to him").

Placing the Client in Status Enhancing Role Positions

The social practices of a culture tend to have a rule-like, multi-person structure which the members of that culture have ordinarily learned. This structure is such that, like a board game, the making of a move by one party may be taken as a bid, and tends to elicit a predictable sort of move by the second party. Thus, just as in chess, my moving of a white piece is an invitation for another to move black, so in the "game" of "care-taking" my making of a helpless move invites and tends to elicit a helping move from another, or in the "game" of education, my presentation of myself as an expert invites and tends to elicit others taking the role of learner vis-à-vis me.

The therapist may utilize this rule-like, bid-accept structure of social practices by making behavioral bids which, if complied with, involve the paranoid client in the taking of status-enhancing roles vis-à-vis the therapist. Let me provide a simple example of such a transaction. Having established that a certain client was quite expert in all aspects of the home building trade, a therapist informed him during one session that he (the therapist) was in need of a new hot water heater, and asked the client what brand he would recommend. The client made a recommendation, the therapist wrote this down, thanked the client, and they proceeded to discuss other matters. In this rather brief, unobstrusive transaction, the client, by accepting the therapist's bid, became the expert, while the therapit became his student.

An extensive account of a totally sincere and thorough, but apparently unwitting, placement of a paranoid individual in status enhancing roles occurs in Freud's (1959) account of the Schreber case. Judge Schreber, following a very unproductive period in one hospital, was transferred to another. In the second hospital, Dr. Weber, the superintendent of the hospital, was extremely impressed by the judge's intellect and character. Accordingly, he invited him to dine with his family almost every evening, engaged him in extensive conversation and debate about matters of politics, philosophy, and religion, and in numerous other ways extended to him the same sort of social bids that one would extend to a respected friend. Schreber accepted these, and the two became friends. While Freud does not attribute any curative role to this status-enhancing treatment of Schreber, it is true that at this time Schreber did increase his functioning to the

point where he was released from the hospital vastly improved. (See also Goldstein and Palmer's [1976] account of the case of Dr. McD., especially the sudden improvements which occurred after hospital staff decided to "stop treating" him.)

Psychotherapy itself has a structure—viz., psychotherapist as helper, client as recipient of help—which most paranoid clients find degrading. Notwithstanding this, it does call for their participation in forms of social behavior which are needed additions to their lives and behavioral repertoires (e.g., intimate dialog, seeking others' perspectives). Thus, anything which a psychotherapist can do to see to it that the experience of psychotherapy is on balance a safe, non-degrading, status enhancing one is entirely worth the thought and effort.

Disqualification of The Stigmatizing Community As Legitimate Critics

Goffman (1963), as noted previously, has commented that the stigmatized are *sharers* and *believers* in the social rules as to what qualifies one as a "normal." It is because they share belief in these rules that they disqualify themselves from full membership in the human community. Where others, such as Hasidic Jews, simply do not share society's depreciatory attitude towards them, they do not suffer the pain of stigma, except insofar as they are excluded by others from certain forms of participation. But they do not hate themselves, or devalue themselves, or long to be what they are not. In fact, they might be quite proud of what they are and even feel that they belong to an elect group.

This possibility provides a glimpse into the advantages for a paranoid individual should he be able to personally review and forsake certain relevant stigma rules, and thereby both cease to employ them and to disqualify the stigmatizing community as a legitimate critic of him. Critical review and questioning of any norms whose justification can go little beyond, "Well, that's customary" or "Well, that's just the way we take things" (see Ossorio [1981] on the justification ladder), may then be a very profitable therapeutic enterprise. Social disqualifiers such as shortness, slightness, physical anomaly or deformity, functional handicap, skin color, many sexual preferences, many sex role standards, and many others bear little intense scrutiny as disqualifiers of persons from full membership in the human community. The next section, on story telling, contains an example which is also an example of this sort of activity.

Story Telling

Yet another way to engage therapeutically with paranoid individuals, even when they are not disclosing very much, is to relate stories. The stories of course should be stories which are tailored to the specific client's

dilemma (Bergner, 1979). For example, a paranoid client had previously been hospitalized with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Despite her disavowals, the therapist had ample reason to believe that this had been a tremendous degradation for her. With this in mind, he related the story of how some clinical investigators had themselves admitted to mental hospitals under false pretenses, and how they had observed that, in this context, all of their ordinary human actions had become transvalued and deligitimized by the hospital staff (Rosenhan, 1973). The therapist related this in a light, fun-poking way; a way such that both his repudiation and the intrinsic absurdity of this outlook were implicit but obvious.

Story-telling here might include stories about oneself. If one elects to do this, however, it is important not to do so in a way which threatens the client with an intimacy he is not ready for, and not to relate any stories about oneself that a hypercritical individual is likely to seize upon and use to disqualify the therapist (e.g., as stupid or sentimental or weak).

Exploit Cancelling Statuses

Statuses have a quasi-mathematical ''cancelling'' quality when they exist in certain configurations. For example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as Goffman (1963) has pointed out, enjoyed so many accrediting statuses that it is doubtful he suffered much from his physical handicap qua stigma. This fact has obvious procedural implications for the clinician, as it raises the possibility that the intense focus of paranoid (and other stigmatized persons) may be shifted from their stigmatizing concerns to other more accrediting statuses. This may take place through the therapist's placement of emphasis on the latter (cf. the section above on focusing on successes, competencies, and virtues), or by his encouragement of the client to shift his emphasis. Thus a therapist might make much of his client's being a writer or a musician or a person of integrity, or whatever else seems accurate and status enhancing. Or he might take a cue from Don Juan in Castaneda's (1972) account of his apprenticeship. At one point, Don Juan scolds his apprentice Carlos for focussing on himself as a fearful person when the spirits are trying to tell him that he is an ''escogito,'' a chosen one (p. 32).

A ''Freedom Exercise''

This is directed at paranoid clients' concerns about their status as agents, i.e, as initiating, choosing individuals whose actions are an expression of their own reasons. It was reported by Swanson et al. (1970). Here, a psychotherapist suggested to his paranoid client, who was extremely concerned about his autonomy, that he spend an entire day going about his city and making conscious, deliberate choices about where to go, what

to do, whom to visit, what to eat, and so forth; and to be as fully aware as he could of himself as the free author of all of these choices. This activity, according to the authors, had a considerable positive impact on this individual's sense of personal autonomy.

The Use of Images

Ossorio (1976) has provided an extensive rationale for the use of images in psychotherapy, and an extensive list of same. An image is a therapeutic device which is designed to capture and to highlight important aspects of a client's position or dilemma. Expressible in a code word or phrase, which facilitates the retention and recall of the entire associated idea, many images have the desirable feature that they portray individuals in active, perpetrating (vs. victim) roles and thus, if accepted, enhance their sense of personal power, responsibility, and freedom; and enable them to attack their problems in living from a more powerful position (see Bergner [1981b] on "Victims and Perpetrators"). Some images which are of especial relevance to paranoid individuals are the following.

"Three Umpires." A story has it that three umpires are questioned as to their practice of their trade. The first umpire responds that "I calls them as they is"; the second umpire responds that "I calls them as I sees them"; and the third umpire responds that "How I calls em *is* how they is." The third umpire is the status assigner: he tells us that his assignment of a status to a pitch (e.g., "strike") *makes it what it is and determines how it will be treated.* This is also the power enjoyed by the paranoid individual insofar as he (like all of us) is the ultimate binding judge with respect to his self status assignments. As he calls them, they are. If he degrades himself, though the rest of the world protest, he is degraded (i.e., if he assigns himself a status of a certain reduced sort, he appraises his eligibilities accordingly and lives accordingly). In contrast, if he decides, *really decides,* to accredit himself, he is accredited. "Really decides" here implies the making of an appraisal with complete conviction, and this in turn implies that it be erected on a bedrock of realistic reasons, not on a willy-nilly grasping at evidential straws.

To take it that one is an "umpire" in this sense, to take it that one has this sort of judgmental bindingness vis-à-vis one's own status, is to realize that one occupies a position of considerable power, and the paranoid needs all the real power he can get. From this position, it makes sense to review and rethink his previous formulation of his status. Hopefully, he will draw less degrading conclusions.

The "Hanging Judge" (Ossorio, 1976; Driscoll, 1981). The "hanging judge" metaphor is used to designate individuals insofar as they are the

consistent perpetrators of extremely harsh indictments. Paradigmatically, the paranoid individual is an obvious hanging judge in his appraisals and treatment of *others*. What is less clear, but no less true, is that his harshness and vindictiveness is a two-edged sword which also cuts him. He himself is the object of his own vilification and degradation; he pronounces himself less than human. And, when he recognizes this, he is in a better position to review his approach to himself and to do otherwise if he so elects. It should be noted in the interests of realism here that only a minority of paranoid individuals will be able to do this. (N.B.: In line with my earlier comment about language, one may wish not to use the locution "hanging judge" with most paranoid persons. An expression which works better here, if one can elevate it from its banality and give it real meaning for the client, is the expression that an individual "is too hard on himself." This locution, which does capture the essence of the matter, has the ring almost of virtue and will not be so quickly repudiated by a hypersensitive individual).

CONCLUSION

In the second part of the paper, I have (a) presented what from the present point of view are the core goals of psychotherapy with paranoid clients, (b) related some general procedural recommendations concerning ways not to go wrong with paranoid clients, and (c) proffered a set of procedures for the accomplishment of therapeutic goals. Hopefully, the conceptualizations contained in the first part of this paper, which were formulated with the express purpose of conveying heuristic suggestiveness, will suggest to the practicing clinician many more such therapeutic activities.

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I AND THOU:
A STUDY OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Mary Kathleen Roberts

ABSTRACT

In order to provide formal and systematic access to facts and possible facts about personal relationships, logical interconnections among the concepts of person, world creator, status assigner, and I and Thou are clarified, and a paradigm case formulation (PCF) of personal relationships is presented. In the PCF, the Paradigm Case is a relationship between mutual status assigners (an I-Thou relation), and the transformations of the Paradigm Case include relationships between unilateral status assigners (I-Them relations) and relationships between rote status assigners (I-It relations). The concepts of insider and outsider are introduced and related to the formulation, which is then applied successfully in predicting differences among persons in their judgments of similarity between I-Thou relationships. In the second half of the paper, the concept of authenticity is explicated as a Critic's concept, and access to additional facts about relationships is provided by a PCF of authentic personal relationships. This formulation is used in understanding differences among persons in their degree of disappointment with romantic love relationships.

Existentialists draw attention to the phenomena of personal relationships by talking about I-Thou relationships and about authentic relationships,

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but traditional behavioral scientists tend to reject such ways of talking as too "murky and ineffable" to be of use in scientific work (cf. Ossorio, 1978, p. 152). My aims in this paper are to provide a systematic representation of the phenomena of personal relationships to which the existentialists have drawn attention, and to demonstrate that behavioral scientists need not eschew facts formulated in terms of concepts such as I and Thou and authenticity. To achieve these aims, I will articulate the concepts of I and Thou and authenticity within the conceptual structure of the Person Concept (Ossorio, 1966, 1978), present paradigm case formulations of I-Thou relationships and authentic personal relationships, and illustrate the use of this conceptualization by reference to two empirical studies. In presenting the conceptualization and illustrating its use, I will be demonstrating how it is possible to take scientific account of the phenomena of personal relationships which the existentialists have made salient without preempting or endorsing existential theory as such.

I AND THOU

In order to articulate the concepts of I and Thou within the conceptual structure of the Person Concept, I will clarify the logical interconnections among the concepts of person, world creator, status assigner, and I and Thou.

World Creators and Status Assigners

For a person to behave, there has to be a set of relationships and a context within which he behaves. A person naturally formulates all the states of affairs he distinguishes empirically as elements of a conceptually single totality, i.e., as elements of the world. The formulation of such a world gives a person an overall context within which behavior is possible.

The world a person creates may be understood as a structure of related statuses (cf. Ossorio, 1982a, pp. 151–152). This structure has places for the person himself as well as for others. Each place within the structure carries with it certain behavior potential, as well as certain limitations on behavior potential, for an individual who embodies that status. Each place that is distinguished is in part distinguished by the standards in terms of which an individual occupying, or embodying, the status is properly to be judged.

Persons assign particular individuals to embody the statuses in their worlds and treat them accordingly. Correspondingly, they judge these individuals by how well they play the parts to which they have been assigned. If an individual plays a given part too poorly, a person may decide that that individual is miscast and reassign the individual to a different part in his world.

"Person" is itself a status, a general place within the structure of statuses persons create. This status logically carries with it the potential to create worlds and assign statuses. An individual is not a person if he is not eligible to actualize these possibilities, and he is miscast as a person if he does not have the ability to do so. Thus, to assign an individual to the status of person is automatically to assign him to the statuses of "world creator" and "status assigner" as well. The status of person also carries with it the eligibility to make self-status-assignments. If an individual assigns himself the status of person, that automatically makes him a person, since only persons can self-assign statuses.

"I" and "Thou" are a pair of statuses for persons which signify the making of mutual status assignments. These statuses are characterized by symmetry, mutual dependency, and what the persons in the statuses share. The statuses are symmetrical in that persons in the statuses are equally eligible to assign statuses. The statuses are interdependent in that each person's status depends on the other person's having assigned him a status, and not merely on a self-status-assignment. And what persons in these statuses share is human relationships and interactions.[1]

The statuses of I and Thou also signify the mutual construction of a world. Again, the statuses are symmetrical: Both persons in the statuses are world creators. The statuses are interdependent: The construction of a world together is dependent on each person's contribution. And what persons in these statuses share is a world, i.e., their world. It is within the context of this shared world that persons stand in I-Thou relationships to each other.

I-Thou Relationships

Being in an I-Thou relationship with another person does not involve any special capacities or mysterious processes, just normative human competence to create worlds and assign statuses. Not everyone has normative human competence, however. Persons may have deficiencies in their abilities as status assigners and world creators, and a range of relationships is possible between persons with such deficiencies. In this section, I will use a unique conceptual-notational device from Descriptive Psychology, the Paradigm Case Formulation (Ossorio, 1981a), to provide access to a range of relationships possible between persons. The Paradigm Case is a relationship between persons with normative competence, and the transformations of the Paradigm Case are relationships in which persons have restrictions on their abilities to assign statuses and create worlds.

In a relationship between people who have normative competence at status assigning, the places the people have with each other, and the corresponding standards by which each is to be judged, are mutually agreed upon. Moreover, the places are subject to negotiation between the two

people. For example, Person X may assign Person Y a status, but Y may refuse to play that part in X's world. Y may also refuse to be counted as a failure at it. In this case, X and Y may negotiate what status Y can have in X's world. Symmetrically, Y may assign X a status, and X may refuse to play that part. The two may then negotiate what status X can have in Y's world. Such negotiation will continue until the two people reach a point where mutual statuses, acceptable to both, have been assigned.

In mutually assigning statuses and treating each other in accordance with these statuses, the two people create a shared world. The relationship between the shared world and the individuals' personal worlds is one of mutual inclusion: The shared world has a place in each person's individual world, and the shared world has a place for each individual to have his or her own world. In personal relationships, the places the two people have in the shared world are, normatively, ones that allow them to be themselves: Neither person has to restrict the reasons he acts on in order to fit his position in the shared world. Instead, each person's world is enriched by the new possibilities offered by sharing with another.

In the shared world, each person recognizes the other as a fellow person, with his own interests, values, potentials, etc., and treats him accordingly. Each appreciates how the other counts things, what he or she gives value to, what reasons carry weight with him or her, and so forth. Each takes the other's interests into account and acts with them in mind.

Because each person appreciates the kinds of reasons and the force those reasons have for the other person in a given situation, each is able to recognize *what* the other person is doing in a given context. Each is able to understand behaviors that are unique (because context dependent) expressions of the relationship they have to each other, as well as behaviors that are conventional expressions of just such relationships. Each responds in ways called for by the particulars of who each is, the relationships between them, and the situation they are in.

Finally, each person appreciates both his own freedom and that of the other person. Each chooses *which* place the other is to have in his life, and accepts having the place he has in the other's life. Of course, each is free to renegotiate the place he has with the other if he changes in such a way that the place is no longer one in which he can be himself.

I-Them: Imperialistic Status Assignments

In contrast to the Paradigm Case, in which statuses are mutually assigned, consider a relationship in which one person unilaterally, or imperialistically, assigns another person to play particular parts in his life. An imperialistic status assigner selects people to fill certain positions in his or her life, insists that these people play their parts, and insofar as possible, ignores the ways in which and extent to which they do not play

their parts. If a given person refuses to play his part to such an extent that it cannot be ignored, the imperialist counts that person as a failure, degrades him, and casts someone else for the part. At no point is the assigned person eligible to negotiate his place, or the standards by which he is to be judged, in the imperialist's world.

The imperialist does not appreciate other persons as fellow world creators with whom the imperialist might negotiate shared worlds. Rather, other people exist primarily to embody statuses in the imperialist's world, thereby enabling the imperialist to enact the scenario he or she has created. (Compare to the classic line: "I couldn't have done it without each and every one of you—or people very much like you.")

The imperialist tends not to think of people in terms of their own interests, values, abilities, etc., and so is insensitive as to whether or not a given place in his or her world fits for a particular person. Having assigned someone to a place in his or her world, the imperialist treats him in the way that one would treat a person who is employed in a particular job. His behavior is guided by the place he has given the other person in his life, and not by an appreciation of how to treat this particular person filling that place.

The imperialist relates to the other person insofar as he or she *acts as* husband, wife, mother, father, or whatever in the imperialist's world. The person who has been cast, e.g., as wife and mother-to-the-children by an imperialist may complain "I wish you loved me for myself, and not just as your wife."[2] If she complains, it is because she senses that the status the imperialist puts her in does not allow for the possibility of being fully herself, and she resents the way in which the range of what is possible for her is narrowed by the place the imperialist gives her.

The imperialist will probably not understand her resentment and will not be able to respond appropriately. The imperialist expects the other person to fit in his world wherever the imperialist puts him or her, and does not recognize the person's freedom to reject that place, to negotiate a different place, or to create his or her own world in which the imperialist has a place.

The imperialist does not recognize his own freedom or appreciate himself as a world creator, either. When it comes to his world creation, it appears to him that "That's just how things *are.*" It is primarily as the upholder of Truth that he tyrannizes over others and over himself.

Don Juan is an example of an imperialistic status assigner. He repeatedly casts women for the part of "Great and True Love" and tries to carry off the corresponding scenario. At no point, however, does he find out what the women he is involved with are really like. Instead Don Juan treats them in the way that a man would treat a woman he loves. When he can no longer sustain the illusion that he has a love relation with a

given woman, Don Juan degrades her and moves on. As an imperialist, he is not in a position to appreciate a woman who would be the right person for him.

In some senses, the perfect match for a person who imperialistically assigns statuses is a person who is willing to accept whatever place another gives him or her without question, protest, or resentment. Such a person is colloquially known as a "wimp" or a "doormat". The world formulation of a doormat includes only a sketchy place for the doormat himself, and has a place for another person who will tell the doormat how the world is, and what the doormat's place in the world is.

Because the doormat's own place is too tenuously defined to be of much help in guiding behavior, the doormat needs the other person to tell him what his behavior potential is. As soon as the other person tells him what's allowable, what makes sense, what's okay for him to do, and so forth, the doormat then can engage in that range of behaviors.

Even though the other person may give the doormat a bad place (with limited or degrading possibilities), the dormat tends to accept that place because he or she needs it in order to have any behavior potential at all. The doormat assigns himself no behavior potential except that which corresponds to the place that other people give him in their worlds. Without a place in another's world, the doormat is very nearly "nowhere", i.e., he has no status and no behavior potential.

Doormats also tend to accept whatever places others give them because they do not realize their freedom to give themselves a status in a world of their own creation, or to negotiate their status in another's world. They also do not realize that other persons are doing these things. Doormats accept whatever places others give them because it appears to them that "That's just how it is."

Just as doormats do not realize they can assign themselves statuses, they also do not realize that they can set their own standards. Instead, doormats want their accreditors to supervise, criticize, and in general provide feedback as to how they are doing. Even though the doormat may try hard to meet the accreditor's standards and to please him or her, the doormat may end up annoying his accreditor by persistent checking to see if what he is doing is pleasing, acceptable, etc.[3]

Shirley, in "The Case of Shirley" discussed by Ossorio (1976, pp. 88–98), is an example of a doormat. Shirley lives with a man named James who has a stated principle of "no commitments." Shirley supports both of them while he has affairs with other women. She tries several times to leave James but finds she is unable to do so. In explaining why she cannot leave, Ossorio points to her inability to self-assign statuses. Shirley cannot leave James because her behavior potential is contingent upon his accredidation, and she would be nowhere without him.

Although the inability to self-assign statuses represents a deficiency in

an adult, it is relatively normal for children at a young age. Initially, a child's statuses are assigned by other people and the child fits in. At some point in normal development, however, the child begins to assign his own statuses and to negotiate with his parents about what he can do and about the standards by which he is judged. Through practice and experience the child becomes a competent status assigner who can function autonomously, and not be dependent on others for a ground for his existence in the way the doormat is.

I-It: Rote Status Assignments

Both competent status assigners and imperialistic status assigners draw upon the patterns of their cultures in creating the status frameworks that they do. From the range of cultural patterns available, these people choose those patterns and social practices which fit who they are, and put these together into a framework within which they can be themselves. Sometimes they invent new social practices, but their creativity comes mainly in which practices they choose and how they put these together to form a world (cf. Ossorio, 1976, pp. 178–180). Some people, however, do not exercise their freedom or creativity when it comes to choosing cultural patterns that fit them. Instead such people assume that everybody fits into conventional social templates. They lay these templates on themselves and others regardless of how well they do or do not fit.

When two people who operate with social templates in this way are involved with each other, they may be said to "share a world" only in the sense that both use the same template ("a prefab world"). This world is unlike the world shared by mutual status assigners in that it is not co-created by the two people, and it does not have a place for each person to have his or her own world. At the extreme, people in a template world have no possibilities apart from their statuses in the conventional framework they have accepted. They do not distinguish themselves from their place in this framework.

The description of schizogenic families presented by Kantor (1977) provides an example of such people. In a schizogenic family the accepted template requires that the family be "the successful, the happy, the normal family". Each person must enact his status as a member of "the normal family". Unfortunately for the child growing up in a schizogenic family, parental discipline is such that the child's behavior potential is restricted to that of acting as "the child". Because the parents need the child to continue to be "the child" so that they in turn can enact their statuses as "the parents", and because the child's possibilities are severely restricted by their discipline, the child's transition to adulthood is difficult for everyone.

What is the difference between a dormat who accepts the place given

to him by an imperialist, and a person who accepts the place available to him in a social template? One difference is in behavior potential: The doormat usually has a range of behaviors available to him, as long as someone else says it's okay to engage in these behaviors. (If the doormat is involved with an imperialist who okays the full range of the doormat's possibilities, the doormat might not be dissatisfied.) The person identified with a social position, however, is barred from acting on any concepts, skills, or reasons other than those conventionally called for by his position.

Because the person identified with a particular social position essentially behaves by rote, enacting his position without needing much understanding of how his position fits in a larger social pattern, or how this pattern could be meaningfully incorporated in a human life, I will call such a person a "rote status assigner". Compared to mutual status assigners, imperialists, and doormats, the rote status assigner is the most deficient at negotiating, at understanding individual difference, and at recognizing human freedom.

In the world of the rote status assigner there is very little to negotiate. People already have their designated parts to play ("the mother", "the child", "the banker", etc.), and the general fund of social knowledge provides enough guidelines so that people know how to treat each other. Decisions as to who does what or what people will do together are not a matter of negotiation, but rather are made on the basis of convention and conformity to their positions. The rote status assigner therefore does not develop competence at negotiation. His situation is comparable to that of a 'chessplayer' who merely replays games recorded in a book.

The rote status assigner also does not develop competence at understanding individual differences. To the extent that people in his world behave on the basis of what is conventionally called for by their positions and do not distinguish themselves from those positions, there is little place for the rote status assigner to learn to use individual difference concepts. Questions of how to treat this particular person or what allowances to make for that person do not arise for the rote status assigner, or are answered by knowing the person's status. It is as if the rote status assigner lives in a world of "standard normal persons" who have no personal characteristics and only do what is called for by the situation (Ossorio, 1983).

Finally, there is little question of freedom in the rote status assigner's world. Issues of giving places in one's life to other people or of creating one's own world simply do not arise. In fact, there may be some tendency toward engaging in performances that will predictably have the effect of getting the other person to engage in corresponding performances.

Access to a range of relationships among persons has now been provided via a paradigm case formulation. The Paradigm Case is a relationship between mutual status assigners and world creators, and the transformations of the Paradigm Case include relationships between unilateral status as-

Table 1
Paradigm Case Formulation

	Paradigm Case: Mutual Status Assigners	*Transformation: Unilateral Status Assigners*	*Transformation: Rote Status Assigners*
Worlds	Shared world is co-created by both people, and has a place for each person to have his or her own world	Only one world, that created by the imperialist, and accepted by the doormat	Only one world, which is a conventional social template (''a prefab world'')
Behavior potential	Full range of behaviors available; neither person has to restrict reasons he acts on to fit position in shared world	Significant restriction on behavior potential; range of what is possible tends to be narrowed by statuses	Extreme restrictions on behavior potential, since a person is barred from acting on any reasons other than those called for by the person's position
Negotiation	Places, standards for each person are mutually agreed upon and are subject to negotiation	Places, standards tend to be non-negotiable; imperialist lays down the law about ''how it is''	Places, standards are based on convention, not a matter of negotiation at all
Personal Characteristics	Each recognized and treated as a fellow person, with his or her own interests, values, potentials, etc.	Each expected to fit his position, and to suppress any characteristics which make a position a bad fit	Each identified with his position; no personal characteristics (i.e., depersonalized)
Freedom	Human freedom appreciated; each recognized as creating a world, assigning statuses	Freedom not recognized; couple primarily upholding 'Truth' about how the world is	Performances engaged in for the sake of getting the other person to engage in corresponding performances
Relationships	I-Thou	I-Them	I-It

signers (imperialists and doormats) and relationships between rote status assigners. Table 1 highlights some of the differences among these cases.

This formulation could be further elaborated, with attention paid to intermediate cases. For example, I might introduce a case in which a person is aware of the freedom of other people, but deliberately selects people who do not value their own freedom to fill the parts in his or her life. Or I might introduce a case in which people choose cultural patterns that do not fit them, and wind up creating frameworks in which they cannot be themselves. But because the Paradigm Case and the deficit cases discussed above are sufficient for my purposes, further transformations will not be introduced.

The introduction of two status pairs is apropos, however. *Pace* Buber (1958), these pairs are the statuses of I and Them (or more formally, I and One-of-Them) and the statuses of I and It. Just as mutual status assigners may be described as having I-Thou relations, unilateral status assigners may be described as having I-Them relations and rote status assigners as having I-It relations.

Insiders and Outsiders

A final set of concepts will be introduced to complete the formulation. These are the concepts of social practice, person, insider, and outsider.

Social practices are teachable, learnable, and repeatable patterns of behavior, and they vary in extensiveness from short, simple patterns to larger, more extensive ones. Many of the shorter practices are components of more extensive ones, e.g., doing arithmetic as part of the social practices of making change, filing tax returns, determining areas, etc. (cf. Ossorio, 1978a, p. 72).

Social practices which need not be part of any other social practice but are intelligible as being engaged in for themselves are known as intrinsic social practices. Games are clearcut examples of intrinsic social practices, since playing a game is intelligible in itself. We can understand someone playing a given game for its own sake, without ulterior motives and without any further end in view.

The concept of a social practice is pivotal for the connections among the concepts of persons, world creation, and status assignment. To be a person is, categorically, to be eligible to create worlds and assign statuses. In creating a world, a person draws upon the resources of his culture, including social practices, and puts these together into a framework which gives him behavior potential. In assigning statuses, a person gives other people places that are available within the structure of the social practices which he has chosen for inclusion in his world. And in behaving, a person selects among the options provided by one or more social practices included in his world and enacts versions of these social practices with other

persons. (Of course, persons can also invent new practices, but these practices must be accepted by others as social practices before they give a person behavior potential.) Given these conceptual connections, to be a person is, categorically, to be eligible to participate in human social practices.

"Insider" and "outsider" are ability-type personal characteristics, i.e., sensitivities, appreciations, judgment, which determine whether a person participates normatively or non-normatively in particular social practices. An insider with respect to a given social practice is someone who can participate in that particular social practice in normative ways, while an outsider is someone who has a certain kind of limitation on his ability to participate in normative ways.

For example, an insider with respect to golf is someone who obtains the intrinsic satisfactions that go with playing golf and who can play golf for its own sake. An outsider with respect to golf is someone who can at most go through the motions of playing ("walking around on grass and knocking little white balls into holes in the ground"), without getting or appreciating the kinds of satisfactions intrinsic to the game (cf. Ossorio, 1976, pp. 116–117). If a person merely goes through the motions, his behavior will be relatively meaningless. If a person goes through the motions of playing for some ulterior motive (e.g., in order to sell insurance, in order to be a member of the club, etc.), his behavior will not be meaningless, but he will not realize the non-ulterior satisfactions that are possible from golf itself.

Paradigmatically a person is an insider with respect to social practices which express personal relationships.[4] This is because persons do not simply treat each other as fellow persons in the abstract. Rather, they give each other places in particular relationships, e.g., in friendships, in romantic love relationships, in parent-child relationships, and so forth. Normatively, persons find such relationships intrinsically satisfying, and engage in them without a further end in view.

This is not to say that it is normative for persons to be insiders with respect to all the social practices and relationships they include in their worlds. A person may not appreciate a given social practice, but will include it in his world because he knows that other persons find it meaningful and satisfying. While he cannot participate in normative ways in that particular practice, he can still relate in a personal way to others who appreciate the practice (e.g., "I really don't like football, but I'd like to be with you.").

When persons have deficiencies in their ability to treat others as fellow persons, they tautologously lack appreciation of the non-ulterior satisfactions possible in particular kinds of personal relationships. For example, imperialists, doormats and rote status assigners are all outsiders who miss out on many of the intrinsic satisfactions of personal relationships.

SIMILARITY STUDY

There is a tradition in psychology of talking about things which are hidden from view as inner things (e.g., inner thoughts, inner feelings, inner desires, etc.), and those things which are readily visible as outer things. Skinner, for example, rejects the notion of inner causes of behavior and prefers to deal exclusively with that which is 'observable'. For the reader trained in accordance with this tradition, confusion could arise regarding the use of the Descriptive concepts of insider and outsider. The traditionalist might assume that insiders with respect to particular kinds of relationships are persons who have access to something hidden or mysterious about these relationships rather than something public and obvious.

In fact both insiders and outsiders are seeing something public and obvious about social practices. The outsider, however, recognizes and responds to only the conventional, performative aspects of social practices. He is like the tone-deaf person who goes to a symphony concert, observes all the motions that the musicians go through, follows the conventions of concert-going, shows good taste in music, etc., without appreciating the music itself.

In contrast, the insider recognizes not only the performative aspects of social practices, but also appreciates the intrinsic satisfactions that go with these performances. Thus, if a person with normal sensitivity to pitch, who is also an insider with respect to music, goes to a concert, he may appreciate the music itself, as well as participating in other relevant social practices in normative ways. In appreciating the music, the insider is not responding to something inner, private, inaudible, mysterious, etc., although it may seem that way to the outsider. Rather, what the insider hears and appreciates is readily accessible to and may be shared by other members of the community who have the relevant sensitivity.

The insider with respect to a particular relationship who recognizes when a relationship of that kind is an I-Thou relationship also is responding to a public, observable state of affairs. Other insiders may see that the relationship is an I-Thou relationship. Outsiders, however, cannot recognize this state of affairs, just as the tone-deaf person cannot hear a melodic line. The fact that outsiders with respect to particular relationships miss the realities that are obvious to insiders is demonstrated empirically in the Similarity Study presented below.

The basic approach used in the Similarity Study was to ask participants to make judgments regarding the similarity of a range of personal relationships among men and women. Two specific predictions were made concerning the differential judgments of similarity expected by participants, depending on whether they were insiders or outsiders with respect to personal relationships.

PREDICTION 1. Participants who are insiders, when compared to participants who are outsiders, will see less similarity between I-Them and I-Thou relationships.

PREDICTION 2. Participants who are insiders, when compared to participants who are outsiders, will see more similarity between I-Thou relationships.

The indicators used in testing these predictions are described below, followed by a description of the study's participants and a summary of results.

Indicators

Memories Form

This form was used to determine if individuals were insiders or outsiders with respect to particular personal relationships. It was not possible to rely upon self-report for this information, since persons who have deficits in understanding generally do not know this about themselves. The imperialist, for example, tends not to know he is missing out on anything in terms of his relationships to other people, because it appears to him that his way of relating fits the way things are in the world. Rather than relying on self-report to determine individuals' degrees of mastery of particular personal relatioships, memories were used to give persons a standard situation and task in which they could demonstrate the understanding they had.

Participants recorded five memories: (a) earliest memory of a friendship, (b) earliest memory of a competitive relationship, (c) earliest memory of a romantic attachment, (d) earliest memory of when someone broke his or her word, and (e) earliest memory of a supportive relationship. During the study it was found that participants had difficulty with the memory of someone breaking his word, and this was then changed so that participants were asked instead to record their earliest memory of a relationship in which each person had an obligation to the other. Three of these memories were used for the Similarity Study—the earliest memories of a friendship, of a romantic attachment, and of a relationship in which an obligation was involved. The other two memories were included for reasons not connected to the Similarity Study (cf. Roberts, 1980, p. 83).

On the basis of pilot work, a five-point coding system had been developed, with codes ranging from "1" (Insider) to "5" (Extreme Outsider). When the memories for the Similarity Study were actually coded, however, there were very few "4" or "5" codes given on any of the memories. Essentially a three-point coding system was used, with a code of "1"

indicating that the person was an insider with respect to a particular relationship, a code of "3" indicating that the person was an outsider, and a code of "2" indicating that the person could not be unambiguously classified either as an insider or an outsider on the basis of a particular memory. (Guidelines used in coding the memories are presented in Roberts [1980, p. 231].)

The coding of the memories was done by two doctoral candidates in clinical psychology at the University of Colorado, both of whom had previous experience in categorizing memories. They first coded the memories independently. In 57 percent of the cases the two judgments were identical. Of the remaining cases, 94 percent showed the least possible difference, i.e., one point on the original five-point scale. In the case of disagreement, the final coding was arrived at as a result of negotiation between the two judges.

Sample memories of romantic attachment are presented below. The first memory was coded "1" (Insider) and the second memory was coded "3" (Outsider).

> In first grade, I seemed to have had a crush on a girl named Lisa. Every time someone yelled "Ooh, Jim loves Lisa!" both Lisa and I would take fits. Still, we always considered ourselves boyfriend, girlfriend. Each afternoon, we sang a song to the Virgin Mary (I went to a Catholic school) which included the words "I love you." Every time we came to that part, Lisa and I looked at each other and giggled. (Any other details?) The only recollections I have are running around the playground denying my "girlfriend", as Lisa denied her "boyfriend". But every afternoon, we sang "I love you" to each other!

> This is, if you could call it an attachment, my earliest memory. It was more of a fling. In kindergarten, there was this girl, I forget her name, I wanted to kiss, I think just because it was taboo. Anyway, one day after school I did. That was it. It made me feel proud and brave, like Hillary on Everest's summit. I felt I had conquered.

Similarity Form

On this indicator, participants read a set of six descriptions of relationships between men and women written especially for the study. Three of the relations were I-Thou relationships, and three were I-Them relationships. An I-Them relationship included on the form is presented below.

> Marianne was a dynamic woman, and was the leader of a group devoted to protecting the environment. She spent a lot of time organizing the group. She liked to bring people together to talk about the environment, and she could find a place in the group for anyone interested in helping promote environmental legislation. Sometimes however, so many different ideas were expressed at the group's meetings that Marianne was at a loss about how to proceed.
>
> At such times, she was glad her boyfriend Mark was there. Mark was in pre-law, and he had a gift for bringing order to such situations. He could see what the major

issue was, and once he spoke, it was clear how to proceed. Marianne felt that they made a good team: She could get everyone warmed up and involved, and he could bring out the basic issues and arrange a solution.

Mark agreed that they were a good team "in more ways than one." But he had a vague feeling of something missing, although he didn't know what it could be. Marianne met all his expectations in terms of age, political party, family background, etc., and he enjoyed their activities. When he told Marianne how he felt, she seemed puzzled, but said she was glad he had been open and honest about his feelings.

After reading the relationships, participants were instructed to consider each of the relationships as personal relationships and to rate the degree of similarity between specified pairs. In six of the comparisons an I-Them relationship was paired with an I-Thou relationship, and in three of the comparisons an I-Thou relationship was paired with another I-Thou relationship. Ratings were done on ten-point scales with scale points ranging from "0" (Not at all similar) to "9" (Very similar). The mean of a participant's ratings of the six I-Them/I-Thou pairs was used as an index of the similarity the participant saw between I-Them and I-Thou relationships, and the mean of a participant's ratings of the three I-Thou/I-Thou pairs was used as an index of the similarity he or she saw between I-Thou relationships.

Participants

Participants in the study included 166 students who were enrolled at the University of Colorado during the summer and fall of 1979. They ranged in age from 17 to 46, with the median age being 18.9. One hundred fifty-four of the participants, approximately 93%, were single. There were 71 men and 95 women.

When the participants' responses on the Memory Form were coded, 24 people were designated as insiders (received codes of "1") on at least two of the memories. These people were taken to have in general mastered the concept of a personal relationship. Fifty-two people were designated as outsiders (received codes of "3") on at least two of the memories and were taken to have general deficits in their mastery of the concept of a personal relationship. For informational purposes, the proportion of participants classified as insiders or outsiders with respect to particular kinds of relationships is presented in Table 2.

Results

Ratings made on the Similarity Form by the insiders and outsiders described above were analyzed using *t*-tests. Because the direction of the differences between the means was predicted, one-tailed tests were used. A probability level of .05 or less was considered significant. As the results

Table 2
Proportion of Participants Classified as Insiders or Outsiders With Respect to Particular Kinds of Relationships

Relationship	*Insider* "1"	"2"	*Outsider* "3"
Friendship	33%	34%	33%
Contractual	22%	24%	54%
Romantic love	13%	33%	54%

in Table 3 show, Prediction 1 was not verified, although the difference between the means almost reached significance. Prediction 2, however, was verified.

Discussion

The overall pattern of results in the Similarity Study serves to establish the predictive applicability of the conceptualization presented above. The success of Prediction 2 indicates that the conceptualization can be used effectively in predicting differences among persons in their judgments about I-Thou relationships.

But what of the failure to achieve statistical significance for Prediction 1? Since both predictions are tautologies (cf. "Individuals who have normal hearing, as compared to individuals who are tone-deaf, will be better able to judge similarities between melodies."), the most plausible explanation for the failure with respect to Prediction 1 is that the I-Them relationships on the Similarity Form were not clear-cut enough to bring out statistically significant differences in judgments between insiders and outsiders. These descriptions could be rewritten with greater clarity and this hypothesis tested out.

Table 3
Comparison of Insiders and Outsiders on Ratings of Similarity

Groups	n^a	$\bar{X}$	*SD*	*t*	p^b
Similarity between I-Them and I-Thou Relationships					
Insiders	24	3.10	1.15		
Outsiders	49	3.58	1.42	1.44	.077
Similarity between I-Thou Relationships					
Insiders	24	6.04	1.38		
Outsiders	49	5.08	1.55	2.55	.007

[a] Three outsiders had missing data.
[b] All probability levels cited are for one-tailed tests.

Although the Similarity Study serves to establish the applicability of the conceptualization, application in understanding persons in a wider range of circumstances and contexts is what is of scientific significance, rather than merely predictive applicability as was established here. I will therefore continue to map out the range of applicability of the conceptualization in the discussion of authenticity below.

AUTHENTICITY

The second concept to be articulated within the conceptual structure of the Person Concept is the concept of authenticity. My starting point in articulating this concept is to ask what a person is doing when he or she says of something "It's authentic." To say that something is authentic is to say that it is real or genuine. Ordinarily a person does not bring into question the genuineness of things. He simply takes it that things are as they seem (Maxim 1) and acts accordingly. However, when a person has some reason to question whether or not something is genuine, on that occasion he may comment on its authenticity. If the person says "It's *in*authentic", he is saying that it isn't really what it seems; the thing is a counterfeit or a pretense. If the person says "It's authentic", he is using a double negative ("not inauthentic") in order to deny that the thing is counterfeit and to say that no criticism of that sort is applicable.

Saying that something is authentic is not a way of talking about something called "authenticity" that is in addition to the thing being judged. To illustrate this point, Ossorio has students "Consider the difference between a cup of tea and a real cup of tea." There is no difference: A real cup of tea is not a cup of tea with something called "real" added; it is simply a cup of tea without a certain kind of defect. Likewise, an authentic personal relationship is not a personal relationship with something special added; it is simply a relationship that has not failed in one of the ways it might have failed.

In making judgments of authenticity, a person is functioning as a Critic-appraiser (cf. the Actor-Observer-Critic Schema created by Peter G. Ossorio [1981b, pp. 109–110]). As clarified in the Schema, a person functions as a Critic by deciding whether things are going right or going wrong. When things are going wrong, a person formulates "(a) a diagnosis, i.e., an account of what it is that has gone wrong, and/or (b) a prescription, i.e., a practical guide in regard to what to do differently so as to improve matters" (Ossorio, 1981b, p. 109). In appraising something to be inauthentic, a person is diagnosing what is wrong.

A person may also use the concept of authenticity in classifying things. Those things which are genuine may be assigned to the category or class of authentic, and those that are counterfeit to the category of inauthentic.

The concept is not useful, however, to a person functioning as Actor. Although the concept of inauthentic is diagnostic of what is wrong, it is not prescriptive. Knowing that something is inauthentic does not tell a person what to do differently so as to improve matters. "Authentic" is used to criticize and classify something after-the-fact but not to guide behavior before-the-fact.

In functioning as a Critic-appraiser, a person may judge varying degrees of authenticity in a variety of contexts relative to various standards. For example, over the life history of a personal relationship there may be a great deal of heterogeneity in regards to the authenticity of behaviors. For such a relationship to be judged authentic, a certain balance of the behaviors over the history of the relation need to be expressive of an I-Thou relationship. Given that the balance of such behaviors is positive, varying degrees of authenticity may be judged based on the relative frequency and significance of authentic or inauthentic behaviors.

If the number of authentic behaviors is below a certain threshold, the relationship may be judged inauthentic as a personal relationship. But there is always another context in which a person in such a relationship is doing something authentically. For example, an imperialist involved in a romantic love relationship may be authentically enacting the part of a romantic man or woman and will be being himself or herself in such a relationship. In this case the relationship may be judged authentic as an I-Them relationship.

In each context, the person as Critic sets a standard against which to judge relationships. The person is free to set the behavioral threshold for authenticity so high that every relationship is judged to be a failure in regards to genuineness, or so low that every relationship is judged a success. Of course, a person as Critic is in turn subject to criticism for using standards which are too severe or too lax. Where there is disagreement, standards may be negotiated so that they are appropriate for a given phenomenon.

Historically, the concept of authenticity has been used primarily in two domains. The existentialists focused principally on authenticity in the domain of individuals' lives, while sociologists have focused on authenticity in the context of the majority of people's lives in a particular milieu. Social psychologists have also looked at authenticity in the domain of personal relationships (e.g., La Gaipa, 1977; Davis & Todd, 1982), and this will be my focus here.

Authentic Personal Relationships

When is a personal relationship authentic? As a Paradigm Case of an authentic relationship, we take it that a person has it in him or her to be

in a particular kind of relationship, and that the person is an insider with respect to that relationship. When that person enacts that relationship in good faith with an appropriate person, he or she gets the intrinsic satisfactions possible with that relation. When this is the case, there are no questions to be asked. Questions of authenticity may be raised, however, when one or more of these requirements are missing.

The first requirement has to do with whether a person "has it in 'em" to love, be friends, etc. Just as not everybody who knows how to play golf has it in him to appreciate it and enjoy it, not everybody has it in him to be, for example, in a romantic love relationship and be satisfied. If a person does not, he or she will be trying to be somebody else in doing these things. While a person is free to try to be somebody who enjoys golf or who appreciates romantic love, if in fact he does not, when he does these things it will be inauthentic.

Certain personality characteristics create difficulties when it comes to actualizing personal relationships. For example, people who are selfish, or super-critical, or suspicious, and so forth have strong constraints on their behavior in a relationship (cf. Davis & Todd, 1982, p. 84). If a person is too selfish, when it comes to having a love relation we may say that "He doesn't have it in him. Nobody could count that much with him." What counts with such a person is primarily getting what he wants and needs, not another person's interests and wants. Likewise, a person may be too particular about whom he loves, and feeling that no one is good enough end up like "the gourmet who starved to death". Or the person may not believe another person enjoys being with him or could have a good life with him, and hence be unable to accept a love relation for what it is.

In addition to having it in him, a person's behavioral history must be such that the person has in fact acquired appreciation of the relevant relationship. In acquiring such appreciation, the person may initially go through the motions of participation. Romeo, for example, before he met Juliet, would pace under the sycamores by night, pen sonnets in a dark room by day, and do all the things which a young man in love in sixteenth century Verona would do. While he performed the rituals of love, he did not seem to appreciate what a real love relationship was like. By the time he met Juliet, however, he had acquired sufficient appreciation of romantic love so that he was an insider and could share a genuine love relationship with her.

If a person is an insider with respect to a particular relationship, the next requirement is that a person enact the relationship in good faith. Relationships enacted in bad faith are perhaps the most familiar cases of inauthenticity (e.g., "All the things he said that night. . . . to think it was just a line." or "I wonder if she loves me or my million dollars?"). Even

though a person appreciates the intrinsic satisfactions of a relationship, he or she may nonetheless participate in a given relationship out of some ulterior motivation.

For behaviors to be authentic expressions of a personal relationship, they must be engaged in under Deliberate Action Descriptions, in which a partial specification of the value of the cognitive parameter of the behaviors includes an appraisal of the personal, I-Thou relationship between the particular people. Since an appraisal is defined as "a discrimination which carries tautologous motivational significance" (Ossorio, 1978, p. 128), the appraisal in the cognitive parameter logically guarantees a correspondingly appropriate value of the motivational parameter, so that the behaviors are engaged in for non-ulterior reasons. In contrast, if behaviors are expressive of a personal relationship *only* under Activity Descriptions (which are noncommittal in regard to motivation; cf. Ossorio, 1978, p. 32), the relationship will be inauthentic as a personal relationship. In accordance with the origin of the word "authentic" in the Greek αὐθέντης, which means a perpetrator, a murderer, a self murderer, "a doer of the deed", the motivational aspect of the behavior is crucial for authentic enactment.

The partner in the relation must also be appropriate. For example, a man may appreciate the kind of relationship possible between colleagues and have it in him to be a colleague. But if he tries to enact such a relation with his young son, most of the possibilities of a collegial relation could never be realized. Given the capabilities of a child, the limitations on the relationship would be serious enough and central enough so one could just as well say it's not a collegial relationship. Since the father and young son are not in fact colleagues, the most they could have in this case is the pretense of a collegial relationship. By contrast, if a man appreciates his boy in the way a father appreciates a son, they may have an authentic father-son relationship. Instead of being disappointed when his son doesn't act like a colleague, he will enjoy his son for who he is.

The final requirement for an authentic relationship is the enjoyment of the intrinsic satisfactions that go with having or enacting that relationship. In each case where a relationship is inauthentic, either because an individual does not have it in him to be in such a relation, does not appreciate the value intrinsic to the relation, is acting on ulterior motives, or is using a relationship paradigm that is wrong for the particular people involved, the individual misses out on the intrinsic satisfactions that are possible.

AUTHENTICITY STUDY

In conjunction with the research reported above, there was an unanticipated opportunity to demonstrate the relationship between authenticity

for romantic love relationships and personal satisfaction with such relationships. The 166 participants in the Similarity Study, in addition to reporting memories and completing the ratings on the Similarity Form, also completed two additional indicators, the Disappointment Rating Form and the Paradigm Form. These indicators, reported on earlier in *Advances* (Roberts, 1982, pp. 70–72), will be presented in light of their use here. Following this presentation, the rationale and groups of participants used in the Authenticity Study will be explained, and the results reported and discussed.

Indicators

Disappointment Rating Form

In this form, participants were presented with descriptions of twelve masculine-feminine relationships, with four relationships exemplifying the romantic love paradigm, four relationships exemplifying the friendship paradigm, and four exemplifying the contract-partnership paradigm. A sample description of a romantic love relationship included on the Disappointment Rating Form is presented below.

> The Shulamite, a simple country girl living in Israel during the reign of King Solomon, was seen one day by the King, who desired her for one of his wives. The King had her brought to his palace, and ordered her to live there for a while, hoping she would consent to be his wife. The Shulamite enjoyed her new life at the palace: She was freed from the endless hours of work she had to do in the family vineyard; she slept in a soft spacious bed rather than in a tent; and she delighted in unlimited possessions, fine clothing and jewelry.
>
> Before the King saw her, however, the Shulamite had been betrothed to a shepherd who loved her. Her shepherd, knowing she was inexperienced and might easily be overwhelmed by Solomon, took his flocks and walked a great distance to Jerusalem to protect her. When he arrived, however, the Shulamite treated him as a threat to her new life, and did not want to see him. He withdrew, promising to stay near Jerusalem in case she changed her mind.
>
> After she sent him away, the Shulamite realized she valued him more than anything the King could offer her. That night she dreamt of him: "By night on my bed I sought him whom my soul loveth: I sought him, but I found him not. . . ." Waking up afraid, she went into the streets alone to find him. Despite being beaten by watchmen, she kept going until she came to him on the outskirts of the city as he had promised. They renewed their betrothal, and made the journey home together.

Participants were instructed to rate "How disappointed would you be if this was the best relationship you ever had?" for each of the relationships on the form. The ratings were done on ten-point scales. The mean of a person's ratings of the four relationships exemplifying romantic love was used as an index of the person's tendency to be disappointed with a romantic love relationship.

Paradigm Form

This indicator, which involved the use of the same twelve relationships included on the Disappointment Rating Form, was administered after the Disappointment Rating Form. Participants were asked to rate "How well does this relationship get at the essentials of a masculine-feminine relationship?" for each relationship on the form. In addition, participants were asked to indicate which relationship "best gets at the essentials".

On the basis of responses on the Paradigm Form, a person was designated as having romantic love as his paradigm if he met two criteria: (a) on the average, the person rated romantic love relationships above the other relationships, and (b) the person indicated a romantic love relationship as best getting at the essentials.

Opportunity and Rationale

When participants' responses on the Paradigm Form were analyzed, 109 people were found who rated romantic love relationships higher than friendship or contractual relationships. But a surprising number of these people did not meet the second criterion for having romantic love as their paradigm, i.e., they did not choose a romantic relationship as best getting at the essentials of a masculine-feminine relationship. Out of 109 people, only 57 met both criteria, while 52 people did not meet Criterion (b). Two people who did not meet Criterion (b) had missing data and were excluded from further analysis.

When a check was made to see if there were any significant trends in which relationships were top-ranked by the maintaining 50 participants who did not meet Criterion (b), it was discovered that 70 percent chose one of two friendship relationships as best getting at the essentials. Twenty-two of the participants chose a relationship between VISTA volunteers, and thirteen chose a relationship between Pierre and Marie Curie.

In explaining this unexpected finding, it was suggested that participants may have been influenced by the humanitarian ideal exemplified in the Peace Corps when it came to top-ranking a relationship.

> In conjunction with a historical trend toward denying the validity of romantic love (e.g., Rougemont, 1940), there came a trend in the 60's toward elevating the Peace Corps ideal—the young couple serving humanity together under difficult conditions—as a model for man-woman relationships. The Peace Corps was founded in 1961, the same year that many of the subjects in the study were born, and was at its height during their years of socialization. The young couple serving in VISTA, the domestic peace corps, is a prime exemplar of the ideal, and the Curies' relationship is a close second. (Imagine the Curies' laboratory, an abandoned hangar, in Africa.) It would not be surprising if subjects were influenced by the Peace Corps ideology when they top-ranked these two relationships. (Roberts, 1980, p. 134)

The Peace Corps ideology involves more than a personal relationship; it involves do-gooding in one form or another. For anyone accepting this ideology as true, a merely romantic relation would be seriously deficient, because romantic love relationships do not paradigmatically involve social consciousness or a commitment to doing good. For example, in light of the Peace Corps ideal, the relationship of Romeo and Juliet seems both selfish and wasteful, since it did not contribute to society except accidentally.

Unfortunately, the acceptance of the Peace Corps ideology makes a romantic love relationship inauthentic. No matter how much a person appreciates romantic love, if he or she has accepted this ideology, a romantic love relationship by itself is not enough. A merely romantic relationship falls short of the ideal relationship for men and women, i.e., a combination of friendship and do-gooding. Romantic love therefore differs in its authenticity for participants depending on whether or not they have accepted the Peace Corps ideology.

Romantic love also differs in its authenticity based on whether participants are insiders or outsiders with respect to romantic love to begin with. Romantic love is more authentic for an insider who appreciates the intrinsic satisfaction of a love relationship than for an outsider who does not fully realize what there is to be appreciated in a love relationship. Thus, among those participants who have not been influenced by an ideology, romantic love will be more authentic for insiders than for outsiders.

But what of those participants for whom romantic love has been ruined by the acceptance of an ideology? In this case, will romantic love be less authentic for insiders or for outsiders? If a general insiders appreciate human relationships and social practices more, it seems likely that insiders with respect to romantic love will also be insiders with respect to friendship and humanitarianism. (There was some empirical support for this hypothesis in the coding of the memories. Sixteen of the 22 people who received a code of "1" on the romantic love memory also received a code of "1" on the friendship memory, and 4 more people received at least a "2" on the friendship memory.) If insiders are more appreciative of the combination of friendship and humanitarianism, then romantic love will be more inauthentic for insiders who have adopted this ideology than for outsiders who have adopted the ideology, because insiders will be more sensitive to what is missing from love relationships in light of the ideology.

On account of these differences in this authenticity of romantic love for participants, I have an opportunity to demonstrate empirically the relationship between authenticity and satisfaction by comparing participants on their ratings on the Disappointment Rating Form.

Table 4
Degree of Disappointment with Romantic Love Relations

Groups	$\bar{X}$	*SD*	*n*
Insiders/Meet both criteria	2.5000	1.6298	9
Outsiders/Meet both criteria	3.0093	1.1529	27
Outsiders/Fail to meet Criterion(b)	3.7596	1.2990	26
Insiders/Fail to meet Criterion(b)	4.5556	1.6478	9

ANOVA Summary

Source	*df*	*SS*	*MS*	*F*
Between Groups	3	26.7755	8.9252	4.995*
Within Groups	67	119.7175	1.7868	
Total	70	146.4930		

* $p < .0035$

Participants

Of the 107 participants who had complete data on the Paradigm Form, 71 were included in the data analysis for the Authenticity Study. Table 4 shows the distribution of these participants into four groups, based on whether or not they had acquired appreciation of the intrinsic satisfactions of a love relation (as reflected in their romantic love memory), and whether or not their apprectiation of romantic love had been affected by ideological influences (as reflected in their choice of a "best" relationship on the Paradigm Form). Thirty-six participants were excluded from the data analysis because they received codes of "2" on the romantic love memory and could not be unambiguously classified as insiders or outsiders.

Of those participants who did not choose a romantic love relation as best getting at the essentials of a masculine-feminine relation (i.e., who did not meet Criterion (b) on the Paradigm Form), seven out of nine insiders (78 percent) chose either a relationship between VISTA volunteers or a relationship between the Curies as best getting at the essentials, and 20 out of 26 outsiders (77 percent) top-ranked one of these humanitarian relationships.

Results

On the grounds that romantic love has different degrees of authenticity for each of the groups discussed above, a one-way analysis of variance was performed using ratings on the Disappointment Rating Form as the dependent variable. A summary of the analysis of variance is presented

in Table 4. As expected, participants for whom romantic love was less inauthentic were significantly less disappointed with love relationships than participants for whom romantic love was more inauthentic [$F(3,67) = 4.995$, $p < .0035$]. A Student-Newman-Keuls test for subsets of different sizes indicated that this significant F was attributable to differences between the means of those participants who met both criteria for having romantic love as a paradigm and those who did not.

Since the multiple range test indicated that only those differences attributable to acceptance or non-acceptance of an ideology were statistically significant, I am required by convention to treat differences in the means of insiders and outsiders as simply caused by chance. With due respect to this convention, I will nonetheless note that the pattern of results in Table 4 corresponds to the pattern of results to be expected based on the differences in the authenticity of romantic love for insiders and outsiders discussed above (cf. Ossorio, 1981b, p. 107).

Discussion

The overall pattern of results in the Authenticity Study serves to establish that the conceptualization of authenticity presented above can be used effectively in understanding differences in personal satisfaction with human relationships. The study also illustrates the use of an "unless" clause, which may be added to the formulation of authenticity in personal relationships.

The unless clause may be stated as follows: A person who is an insider with respect to a particular kind of relationship may enjoy the intrinsic satisfactions possible with that relation, *unless* the relationship has been ruined for him or her by the acceptance of an ideology that makes the relationship inauthentic. The addition of this clause to the formulation serves as a reminder to watch for ideological influences not only in the context of romantic love relationships, but also in the context of other personal relationships as well.

The unless clause represents only one of many possible extensions of the formulation of authenticity. By making additional connections between the concept of authenticity and other concepts, I could continue to extend the formulation. For example, one possible extension would be the clarification of the relationship between inauthenticity in personal relationships and the inauthenticity of a person's life as a whole. Given the salience of personal relationships for a satisfying human life, it seems likely that a person's life as a whole would be inauthentic if the person were inauthentic with respect to all his personal relationships.

A second area that could be developed is the effect of inauthenticity on others. I have focused primarily on the price of inauthenticity for the

individual, but both people in a relationship are affected by inauthenticity. As an example, consider a relationship in which one person is an insider but the other person is not. Unless the insider has ulterior motives for being in the relationship, the insider may end up disappointed and disillusioned, while the outsider may end up frustrated because he cannot understand why his partner is so dissatisfied.

The clarification of connections such as these would not be an idle exercise. Given the low proportion of insiders represented in the studies presented here (cf. Table 2), and the effect of ideological influences on those who are insiders (cf. Table 4), the problem of inauthenticity is pervasive and important to understand. Each conceptual connection that is clarified may further our understanding of inauthenticity and open up new possibilities for empirical application.

SUMMARY

In the conceptual parts of the paper, the concepts of I and Thou are explicated as status concepts, and the concept of authenticity is explicated as a Critic's concept. Two paradigm case formulations are presented. In one formulation, the Paradigm Case is a relationship in which persons mutually assign statuses (an I-Thou relation). In the other formulation, the Paradigm Case is the case of an authentic personal relationship. In the empirical parts of the paper, studies are presented which demonstrate that the conceptualization can be used in predicting differences among persons in their judgments of similarity between personal relationships, and in understanding differences among persons in their degree of disappointment with romantic love relationships. In presenting the conceptualization and illustrating its use, I have provided conceptual access to facts and possible facts about personal relationships, and demonstrated that behavioral scientists need not eschew facts formulated in terms of concepts such as I and Thou and authenticity.

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Address: Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program, 10400 East Alameda Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80231.

NOTES

1. Although the discussion here focuses on I-Thou relations between human beings, the concept of an I-Thou relationship with God may also be developed within this framework. In this case, God is conceived of as an ultimate status assigner (cf. Shideler, 1975).

2. The complaint of "I wish you loved me for myself, and not just as. . . ." is not legitimate if used concerning all the areas of a person's life. One of the marks of a personal relationship between status assigners is that each person's interests carry weight with the other. If one person rejects the caring expressed by the other for him as, e.g., a skier, a lover, a cook, a lawyer, and so on in all the areas of his life, what interests remain to carry weight with the other? (Ossorio, 1982b)

3. In psychotherapy with doormats, a Descriptive therapist may use the image of "Scorekeeping". A person who is a scorekeeper is someone who uses other people's reactions to keep score on himself ("If he likes me, I'm okay."). Unfortunately, such a person usually feels that he has to keep scoring to continue to be okay.

4. Regarding the connection between social practices and relationships, we may note that a social practice is a process. Processes generally involve object constituents, and these objects (e.g., persons) have certain relationships which change over time. The changing of these relationships over time *is* the occurring of the process, or in this case, the occurring of the social practice (cf. Ossorio, 1981b, p. 117).

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SCENARIOS OF "ALCOHOLIC" RELATIONSHIPS

Kate MacQueen Marshall

ABSTRACT

Paradigm case scenarios are used to give an integrated representation of relationships involving one alcoholic member. The scenarios show how these relationships develop over time and how they function at any given time. Questions addressed are: (a) What significance does alcohol use have to the abusing partner? (b) What are the bonds that hold the couple together? (c) How does the non-alcoholic spouse contribute to the problem? (d) How does the relationship change over time? (e) What treatment options are suggested by the answering of these questions? The two scenarios cover the cases of (a) a male alcoholic and a non-alcoholic spouse and (b) a female alcoholic and a non-alcoholic spouse. It is anticipated that these scenarios (and some variants discussed briefly) will be useful to those engaged in the treatment of alcoholic relationships.

PARADIGMS FOR RELATIONSHIPS WITH AN ALCOHOLIC MEMBER

There has been an increasing interest on the part of pyschologists and other social scientists in understanding the phenomenon of alcoholic abuse.

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A generally accepted conservative estimate is that there are 9 to 12 million alcoholics in the United States (Steinglass, 1976), effecting an additional 20 to 30 million family members.

In this paper, I want to present a systematic account of the role that alcohol abuse can play in the lives of husband and wife pairs. My recognition of the need for a new, systematic formulation grew out of my work as a supervisor of alcoholism counselors and my own clinical work with alcoholic relationship pairs. What became apparent in this work is that none of the major systematic positions that take cognizance of relationship features of alcoholism do justice to the complex facts that are routinely encountered in treating relationships in which one member has a serious alcohol problem. A series of questions that need to be answered by a systematic formulation are: (a) What significance does alcohol use have to the abusing partner?; (b) What are the bonds that hold the couple together?; (c) How does the non-alcoholic spouse contribute to the problem?; (d) How does the relationship change over time?; and (c) What treatment options are suggested by the answering of these questions?

Thus, I concluded that a systematic account of alcoholic relationships was needed which would be *specific* enough to the dynamics of alcoholism to cover the range of facts relevant to that phenomenon, have a place for the changes that occur over time, and be sufficiently comprehensive to give a coherent account of alcoholic relationships.

In examining the family/alcoholism literature of the past 25 years, four major positions may be discerned. These are interactionism, systems approaches, stage theories and game theories. These are summarized briefly below.

Interactionism

Communication theorists, such as Gorad, McCourt, and Cobb (1971), have analyzed the interpersonal significance of drunkenness, describing it as a responsibility avoiding maneuver that places the drinker in an advantageous position. Gorad (1971) has also characterized the style of the spouse of the drinker as responsibility accepting. Their contribution lies in their focus on the instrumental value of drunkenness and a recognition of the conflict-ridden quality of the marriages.

Role theorists such as Sharon Wegsheider (1980) tend to characterize families with an alcoholic member in terms of particular family positions that such individuals hold. She offers six roles that characterize "alcoholic" families. She associates each of these roles with typical feelings and behaviors. They include: The substance abusing person, the chief enabler, the family hero, the scapegoat, the mascot, and the lost child.

Berenson (1976), who can be classified as both a role and a systems

theorist, utilizes Fogarty's (1976) characterization of the pursuer (non-alcoholic spouse) and distancer (problem drinker) in analyzying the dynamics and functioning of the "alcoholic dyad".

Systems Theorists

Steinglass, Weiner, and Mendelson (1971) discuss alcoholic behavior in terms of how it contributes to the maintenance of an ongoing system. It is described as an indicator of stress or strain in the relationship or family situation. Steinglass (1981, p. 213) also looks at the "developmental sequences" in recovering families, noting that many such families cycle between a stable wet and stable dry phase, after passing through a transitional phase. Alcohol is seen as a central organizing principle for interactions in such families.

Bowen (1974, 1978) describes families that are prone to alcoholic episodes as reciprocally responding to anxiety within their spousal system. Bowen also views the potential alcoholic as not yet fully differentiated from a primary relationship (usually mother). Such an individual responds poorly to stress (e.g., with counterphobic superindependence) and then drinks to compensate for this when under stress. The potential female alcoholic is described as "deselfing" in a marital relationship in order to preserve that dyad. Drinking for her is a reaction to this situation.

Bowen's conceptualization, although interesting in some important ways, does not succeed in distinguishing alcoholics from other diagnostic categories. His core concepts such as differentiation of the self, pseudo-self, etc. are utilized equally as explanations for the phenomenon of schizophrenia, as well as a family member's vulnerability to the loss of an important member. Hence, although his formulation captures some of the reactivity in relationships with an alcoholic member, his conceptualization is not specific enough to be sufficiently useful as an explanation for continuous excessive drinking in a family.

Thus, systems theorists have made significant contributions to the family-alcoholism field. They have brought attention to the fact that the individual drinker cannot be fully understood without reference to the circumstances and context within which he or she operates. What is lacking is a framework specific enough to the phenomenon of alcoholism to be effective in distinguishing these dynamics from those of other clinical phenomena.

Stage Theorists

A third group of family theorists take into account the "stages of development" in relationships with alcoholic members. Jackson (1954) in a

classic paper on the adjustment of the family to the crisis of alcoholism, divides the adaptation to excessive drinking into seven basic stages. These include: (a) Attempts to deny the problem; (b) attempts to eliminate the problem; (c) disorganization; (d) attempts to reorganize in spite of the problems; (e) efforts to escape the problem; (f) reorganization of part of the family; and (g) recovery and reorganization of the whole family. The emphasis here is on the alcoholic's contribution to the family disruption. There is little focus on the personal characteristics or influences of the spouse. Lemert (1960) disputed Jackson's sequence of events, making a case instead for two broad stages: (a) The reorganization of the problem, and (b) the transfer of the husband's role to the wife.

The stage theorists take into account the evolution of the "alcoholic" dyad through time. The basic premise of their arguments, however, is that whatever occurs in a family reflects the family's reaction to changes in the alcoholic. This analysis does not provide a full picture of the contribution made by the spouse in negotiating and renegotiating the relationship.

Game Theorists

Although Claude Steiner (1971) also analyzes the behavior of the alcoholic in an interpersonal context, and implies the notion of patterned development in such relationships over time, his formulation is sufficiently different from the interactionists and systems theorists to merit separate discussion. In what is suggestive of a drama-like format, Steiner, a transactional analyst, describes the behavior of an alcoholic as the "endless repetition of certain games" (p. 83).

He discusses three common alcoholic games, each representing an essential aspect of the unfolding of a particular script. Steiner's three games include: 1) "Drunk and proud", where the other participant is in the position of persecutor and/or patsy. This is a part usually played by the spouse or the employer of the drinker. The second game described is that of "lush". It is usually played with a partner "who is unable or for whom it is difficult to give strokes" (p. 92). The partner is characterized as switching from persecutor to rescuer. Lush is a game often played by women. The third paradigm is that of "wino". This individual is described as "getting strokes by making him or herself physically ill" (p. 96).

Steiner's characterization of the alcoholic's interaction with his/her significant others provides a way of articulating the facts of alcoholic behavior that includes many essential ingredients of a solid formulation. His work represents the development of a single coherent explanation of the drinker's interactions with his or her world. His theory is not anchored in any systematic way, however, with other concepts. In addition, he is somewhat weak in articulating the progression of relationships with an alcoholic member through time.

Summary

The four theoretical positions that have been presented on the preceding pages can be classified in terms of the size of the unit of analysis and the degree of closure and systematization of the formulation. The interactionists provide the smallest segment for analysis. They describe the significance of drinking in human terms, although their unit of conceptualization is small and fragmentary. Systems theorists provide a broader picture of relationships with an alcoholic member, being cognizant of the context within which the family is functioning. A somewhat systematic view of "alcoholic" relationships is given. Formal closure is provided, but as the existing formulations don't distinguish the phenomenon of alcoholism from any other, the closure is purely formal.

Stage theorists extend the scope of existing formulations, providing a description of the progressive and changing nature of relationships with an alcoholic member at different points in time. The theories are also constructed more or less in human terms. These theorists do not offer an explanation of the drinking per se, however.

Game theorists such as Claude Steiner provide a broad-based analysis of "alcoholic" scenarios and include some degree of systematization, as well as a motivational explanation of the drinking in their conceptualizations. Steiner's formulation is somewhat weak with respect to the developmental changes over time. The statuses of the other players in the scenario are also not developed. The work of Steiner and others suggests several important ingredients for an effective characterization of alcoholic relationships.

In the following pages, a new formulation of relationships with an alcoholic member is presented that incorporates the insights developed in the conceptualizations surveyed above. In addition, the explanation is systematic in nature, and formulates developmental and interactional aspects of the phenomenon.

In order to avoid stereotypical universal explanations, on the one hand, and excessive *ad hoc* explanations on the other, the Paradigm Case Formulation methodology is adopted here. As described by Ossorio (1981), a Paradigm Case Formulation (PCF) is a way of systematically dealing with a range of cases. A PCF is accomplished in two stages. In Stage I a Paradigm Case is introduced. The Paradigm Case description directly applies to some of the cases which are of interest. In Stage II a number of transformations of the paradigm case are introduced. Each transformation has the force of saying "Change it [the paradigm case] in *this* way, and you'll still have a genuine case." Ultimately, all the cases which are of interest are covered. The overall procedure is one which does justice to both the coherence of the entire set and the heterogeneity of its constituents.

Table 1
Paradigm Case Scenario 1: Male Alcoholic; Female Nonalcoholic Spouse

Time Line	*Male Alcoholic*	*Female Spouse*
A	Special world construction →	← Special world construction
	↓	
B1	← Self expression drinking	← Pushing for relationship
	↓	
B2	Genuine remorse →	← Forgiveness
	↓	↓
C	← Self expression drinking	Disillusionment
	↓	↓
D	← Non-relation	Non-relation

Note: Arrows inward (→ or ←) indicate an affirmation of the relationship. Arrows outward (← or →) indicate a rejection of the requirements of the relationship to which both were committed. The letters in the Time Line (A, B, etc.) represent phases in the relationship history.

One variation on the basic Paradigm Case Formulation allows multiple paradigm cases rather than only one. The present paper makes use of this option. Two paradigm cases of alcoholic dyads are presented. The first is the case of the alcoholic husband and non-alcoholic wife; the second is the case of the alcoholic wife and the non-alcoholic husband.

Each of the paradigm cases is structured as a "scenario" (Ossorio, 1976). A scenario is a historical pattern having essentially the dramatic structure of a play. It is this structure that gives coherence and intelligibility to the behaviors of the participating individuals. In this way, the requirement, noted above, for "a conceptual structure which would make an historical account genuinely explanatory" is met.

PARADIGM CASE I: ALCOHOLIC HUSBAND AND NON-ALCOHOLIC WIFE

The scenario is presented schematically, rather than dramatically, in Table 1. Major characteristics and change points in the relationship are shown in the vertical dimension and cyclical changes are illustrated in the horizontal dimension. The arrows indicate whether or not an individual is operating within the relation (points towards the center), or outside of it (point directed away from the center). The developments in this scenario are as follows.

A Special World Construction

The Paradigm begins at Point A (Table 1; Special World Construction) where the potential mates meet and are mutually attracted. Both partners have a world construction which expresses a kind of fairytale outlook on life. The woman characteristically believes that she need only meet "Mr. Right" to have a "happily ever after", magical, romantic existence. The man is seen as somebody who could provide her with that happiness. Even if at the onset of the relationship she recognizes that he has some rough areas, his potential is also quite obvious to her. She is fairly certain that, given time, she can help to change him for the better.

The male partner is also pleased to find a person to whom he is attracted, who validates and encourages him. He generally sees himself as a fairly special person who is not necessarily bound by the rules and constraints which apply to ordinary people. This has some similarity to Raimy's (1975) special person misconception. Ossorio (1976) poses an image which he entitles "Two Mayors". He contrasts the first mayoral candidate, who wants to be mayor in order to do the things that mayors do, with the second candidate, who rejects the activities and simply wants to *be* mayor. Similarly, the alcoholic male in the scenario is more concerned with *being* somebody important than with the actual job description.

If all goes well, these two unite as partners, forming a two-person community. This community is essentially structured by two myths. The first is that he, and therefore they, are quite special and superior to most other people. The second is that, primarily for her, the relationship is unique and superior to most others, having a "made in heaven" quality. At Point A, both share this common world construction, and each has the status with the other as validator and happiness provider in a "larger than life" romantic existence.

B1. Male Spouse Attempts Self-Expression via Drinking—Female Spouse Pushes for Relationship

As time passes, an increasing asymmetry develops. In order for the female spouse not to be living a pretense, she must work to make their world construction real. This may include striving to realize togetherness as a couple, or pushing for the development of some of his possibilities. The couple begins to function at cross-purpose. As the wife deals with actual accomplishments by requesting couple activities, chiding him about work performance, or encouraging certain business moves, the husband begins to experience these overtures as critical demands which interfere with his choices.

As related previously, the husband views himself as a person for whom the usual constraints don't apply. For him, the verbal affirmation of the achievement of a plan has much the same significance as the enactment

of it, since it's essential function is to be an expression of who he is. Hence, he fights his spouse's attempts to control him, and does so with increasing vigor over time. Her overtures and her constant reminders pertaining to practical matters are experienced as personal assaults or defections and are resisted accordingly.

Hence, a mutual tugging routine is begun in which escalation of demands for attention, closeness, and time on the part of the female spouse, and rejection of these demands by the male, are the major features.

One way in which the husband manages his life is by drinking heavily. The drinker sees himself as constantly having to act under external constraints as contrasted with really being himself. In order not to be fenced in (to be himself), the alcoholic adopts drinking as a primary form of self expression. In addition, it affords him an opportunity to temporarily reject rules and limitations, as well as offering a buffer in painful and stressful situations. It is important to note that the drinker typically has utilized this doubly effective response since adolescence (a traditional period of limit testing and rebellion). At this point in his life, increased alcohol consumption has become a means of affirming who he is.

B2. Husband's Genuine Remorse—Wife's Forgiveness

As previously mentioned, the couple is now "at odds" with each other. Despite this "tugging" routine, the couple still maintains a particular kind of two-person community where both members are potentially validated e.g., a two person community with relational and specialness/greatness components. It is important to mention here that these two elements are not necessarily compatible. An individual's way of acting in accordance with one of them often negates the other. The drinker, for example, typically violates the spouse's version of the relational component, whereas she too frequently violates his version of the specialness aspects.

After some number of transgressions by either party, the relationship begins to change. The alcoholic is starting to become disillusioned with his mate. Whereas she was once his primary source of support and validation, she now seems impossible to please or satisfy. The female spouse, on the other hand, is beginning to question the drinker's credibility, as he appears to have made a lot a promises that he has not fulfilled.

At this juncture, the two-person community is becoming endangered. The alcoholic is being called upon to match words with action or to suffer a considerable status loss, since it is relatively unthinkable for him not to be a member of *that* two person community. Without his wife's validation and encouragement, he would lose significant behavior potential. It is also relatively unthinkable for the female spouse to not be a member of that community.

The drinker did not, of course, act without reason. It is of interest to examine the nature of his defense thus far, and the kinds of options that he has at this point. As previously noted, it is essential to the alcoholic that he *be* somebody. It was mentioned that what was sought by the second candidate in the image of the two mayors, i.e., *being* mayor, rather than doing what mayors do, describes his desires well. Although this is sufficient for him, any affirmation that he receives for *being* somebody carries with it a demand for later behavioral follow-through, and acceptance of that affirmation carries with it an implicit promise for such behavioral follow-through. Therefore, after a brief "honeymoon" period, he is often in the position of being under some pressure to make good on some of his commitments. From his perspective, though, the world is always making unreasonable and unfair demands on him.

Given that it is unthinkable for the problem drinker not to be "somebody", evidence to the contrary is almost never taken as such. Instead, it is experienced as a reflection of the capriciousness and unfairness of the world. Hence, in order to maintain his sense of self-esteem, his difficulties in the world are rationalized justified and/or denied.

In some instances, the drinker is not able to deny or justify the accusations of his spouse or the community. In the face of this sort of confrontation, he may change the nature of his claim. In most instances, the drinker is sincere in maintaining that his destructive actions were not genuine expressions of his character. His major defense here is that his intentions were not adequately represented in the "misdeed". "I really was planning to be home for dinner, but I had a chance to be in on a once in a life-time real estate deal. I had the family in mind when I looked into that situation." Hence, the problem drinker tends to redescribe negative incidents positively, and whatever the ouctome, is able to demonstrate that he had good reasons for the action that he had to take.

Another reason that the drinker is able to rationalize his behavior to himself and others for such a long period is that to some extent, for him, the future is merely an element in present being. Therefore, he readily makes commitments and promises, in spite of past performance, without doubting that he will honor them at a later time. The fact that he may not follow through is merely accidental and is explained away or denied in the manner of the above.

The net result of the foregoing is that at this point the alcoholic is maintaining, in the face of a mounting stack of IOUs, that his actions, as described by others who find fault with them, were not genuine expressions of his character. His spouse and others are becoming skeptical, and the alcoholic is therefore being called upon to demonstrate good faith.

Several options are available to him. He often experiences genuine remorse (accepting in part, the status claim of his critics that he has failed

in some significant areas). This acknowledgment is frequently accompanied by a public resolution to make up for past errors. He may make a sincere effort to renew his marriage vows when he becomes aware of what a good marriage he may be about to lose. The drinker may not be able to maintain this position for long, however, without concurrent changes on the part of his spouse, as some of the tacitly agreed upon demands and expectations for his behavior are unrealistic.

Another position that the husband can take that often results in the achievement of a status quo in the relationship, is to humor his spouse by doing anything he has to do to regain his former standing. The enactment of each of these stances is, of course, in most respects identical, and may include brief periods of alcohol treatment, presentations of candy and flowers and exceptional consideration in his treatment of her. He is honestly appalled that some people refuse to take him very seriously. This reaction is understandable in light of his being special and living, for the most part, in the present.

When his spouse sees her husband's efforts, she is usually quick to forgive him, since he has now visibly come over to her way of thinking. She, too, is very invested in this two-person community. Because her behavior potential (the sum total of a person's possibilities for behavior at a given time) has become increasingly dependent upon that relationship, she desperately wants the relationship to be successful. Despite potential misgivings, she too wishes to return to the spirit of their marriage vows, and to move forward with their plans as a couple. Status quo is achieved when the pair return to Point A (A Special World) after completing an entire revolution of the cycle A-B1-B2-A.

With the reaffirmation of the two-person community, the alcoholic is again in a position to act on his status as a special person, thus setting the stage for a reenactment of the cycle. The female spouse also returns to preserving the couple's standing in the community at large. She rises to the occasion of having to cover up for her husband by making excuses for him to friends and bosses, thus demonstrating to them that his misadventures were not genuine expressions of his character. The more that she is in a position of maintaining fidelity to this relationship, the more she limits her behavior potential elsewhere. At this stage, the spouses are taking an "us against the world" position, where police and other protesting parties are seen as meddlers and busybodies.

The A-B1-B2-A cycle is repeated some number of times as each time the greatness/specialness dimension again takes priority over the relational aspects of the arrangement for him. Over the course of these repetitions, his wife continues to actively cover for him, although in most instances, less and less willingly.

C. Male Spouse Attempts Self-Expression via Drinking—Wife Becomes Disillusioned

The old Spanish saying, "A cynic is a disillusioned idealist" summarizes some of the changes that have occurred here. The wife's romanticism is rapidly being replaced by a biting cynicism. Her satisfactions are derived more from a sense of martyrdom than from a willingness to work to fulfill her dreams in the relationship. The statuses of saint and sinner are being more deeply etched in the dyad, as she continues to go through the motions of maintaining their appearance as a compatible couple.

At this stage, the wife is highly ambivalent about her marriage. As a result of her circumstances, she has been relying to a greater extent upon the support of the community. It may now be her coworkers that give moral support, provide child care, and give her shelter. In taking advantage of these options, the female spouse has acquired additional behavior potential outside the relationship. She is looked upon as a noble and sacrificing woman by many of her friends, a position that often provides her with more reason to "tough it out" with her husband.

At point C, the drinker continues to act more fully in accordance with his status as a special person. It has become increasingly difficult to reverse the negative cycle within the dyad. As the husband's stack of IOU's continues to accumulate, his credibility is now always in question. This is particularly hurtful for him with respect to his wife, who was once his foremost validator. His luck is bad and the world is against him. He blames his spouse for his lack of follow-through, and he accuses her of undermining many of his plans. She, as always, sees him as responsible for her unhappy life. His moments of remorse are less frequent, and he starts to feel really justified in his womanizing and other reactions to her.

If a couple evolves to Point C (self-expression via drinking-spousal disillusionment) in their relationship, they frequently remain at this stage for relatively long periods of time. The wife, although cynical and bitter, is still refusing to part with her vision of the ideal life and the fantasy that it is possible with him. Some wives are waiting to collect on some of their husbands' accumulated debt, and others may wish to exact revenge. At C, it remains important for the alcoholic to be a member of that two-person community, for all of its drawbacks. Home is a roof over his head, and a mate who will, at least publicly, stand by him.

D. Bankruptcy of Relation for Both Drinker and Spouse

The spouses move to the point where the drinker can no longer maintain the status claim that his actions are merely accidental and not genuine expressions of his character. His wife decides that her husband's debt

has amassed to a point which jeopardizes their relationship. The drinker's consistent failure to meet obligations has finally convinced her that they have been living a lie. The husband may leave his wife, and move in with another woman friend immediately. In many instances, the wife leaves the drinker, files for divorce or otherwise publicly renounces him. (In certain situations, this may be sufficient impetus for the alcoholic to make permanent changes in his way of life, thus revitalizing the marriage.) Many wives make repeated attempts to leave the relationship, but find themselves unable to do so, as most of their behavior potential is still centered in that dyad.

If the final sequences of this scenario is reached (with the alcoholic denouncing his mate or vice versa), each frequently seeks another mate. The individuals that they are drawn to are, unfortunately, often similar in outlook and personality to the characters that are described in Case 1. The former spouses enter the new liaison with a renewed sense of hope and appreciation. Against all odds, this relationship will *really* be different. The scenario has thus begun again for each at Point A (Special World Construction).

Clinical Implications

One of the most important uses of the paradigm is that it offers treatment personnel a distinctive method of assessing a relationship with an alcoholic member with respect to the particular stage of the relationship a couple is in. This information, as well as facts gathered in other ways can then be utilized in developing a working treatment formulation. Therepeutic strategies are often different for beginning, middle, and late stage "alcoholic" relationships, and the paradigm can thus provide some guidelines for both assessment and treatment.

Paradigm Case 1 can also be utilized with some spouses of drinkers to help attune them to the ingrained patterning of their relationships. Although the circumstances and details of each case differ, with certain individuals, this therapeutic maneuver can facilitate a spouse's disengagement from this nonproductive scenario. This might in turn alter the circumstances of the drinker, perhaps contributing to his accumulated reasons to alter his life course.

Paradigm Case 1 brings to light the fact that the drinker sees himself as constantly having to act under external constraints as contrasted with really being himself. In order not to be fenced in (to be himself), the alcoholic adopts drinking as a primary form of self-expression and rejection of constraint. Helping the drinker to appreciate acting from a restricted set of reasons as well as assisting him in being himself without the use of alcohol is therefor a promising strategy if it can be effectively implemented on a case by case basis.

The fact that any therapy effort would need to take into account the "alcoholic relationship" is strongly suggested by this paradigm. The spouse's involvement initially as a prime motivator and later as an important contributor to the difficult family situation is obviously related to the treatment progress and outcome. Given the drinker's personal characteristics, what seems to carry the most weight with him are modifications in circumstances such as job loss, the threatened loss of a significant relationship, and potential or actual negative shifts in social standing; changes here can produce transformations in his motivation for seeking treatment.

Once counseling has been initiated, the paradigm suggests that maintaining the drinker and his spouse's continued motivation for making the necessary changes in values, priorities, competencies, etc., that would permit the couple to engage in the social practices of their community would be difficult. This question of continued accessibility to these clients has long been an area of interest and concern to alcohol counselors. Given the drinker's sense of personal specialness, and his and his spouse's "larger than life romantic" world construction, any significantly new position that is taken is seen as reflective of their (particularly his) true character. Therefore, any further change is seen as unnecessary. The spouse is either eager to "go along" with this "solution" or has long since stopped believing that he has it in him to change. In either case, she does not push for further change. Helping the spouse and drinker to maintain a hopeful outlook and to anticipate premature termination, by reiterating the notion that new behavior potential, outlooks and perspectives are only acquired through much practice and experience is in order here.

PARADIGM CASE 2: ALCOHOLIC WIFE AND NON-ALCOHOLIC HUSBAND

A paradigmatic scenario involving an alcoholic wife and a non-alcoholic husband is presented below. Table 2 outlines the major change points in this temporal pattern. As previously described for Table 1, shifts in the relationship across time appear vertically. Similarly, directionality of the arrows indicate whether or not the person is acting as a member of this two-person community or as a representative of another reference group.

A. Shared World Construction

The scenario begins at Point A, (shared world construction), where the prospective couple meet and are mutually attracted (Table 2). The female alcoholic, usually a non-self status assigner, is often drawn to a mate who has hypercritical tendencies and who easily assumes the position of the leader in the relationship. A non-self status assigner is an individual who accepts for him or herself the status other people assign. This is in contrast

Table 2
Paradigm Case Scenario 2: Female Alcoholic; Male Nonalcoholic Spouse

Time Line	*Female Alcoholic*	*Male Spouse*
A	Shared construction of special world	Shared construction of special world
	↓	↓
B	Fails →	← Criticism
	↓	↓
C	Retaliation	Criticism, etc. →
	←	
	Resists criticism etc.	
	↓	↓
D1	Retaliation	Retaliation
	←	
	Resists criticism	Renewed criticism
	↓	↓
D2	Degradation/	Degradation
	←	→
	renunciation	Possible renunciation

Note: Arrows inward (→ or ←) indicate an affirmation of the relationship. Arrows outward (← or →) indicate a rejection of the requirements of the relationship to which both were committed. The letters in the Time Line (A, B, etc.) represent phases in the relationship history.

to people who judge situations for themselves (assign themselves status) and resist the status or judgments assigned to them by others. The developmental history of a non-self status assigner usually includes a substantial history of degradation. Hence, a choice of a "supercritic" as a mate tends to represent an affirmation that the person does have eligibility as a self-status assigner.

The female in this pair is usually keenly aware of how people, including herself, go wrong, although she does not have a firm sense of direction for her own behavior. Hence, her judgements are readily superceded by an individual who is both a strong critic and a firm direction setter.

Her potential mate is often desirous of a companion who will agree with, encourage, and validate him. He is usually most comfortable in the position of leader, director, and initiator (high power position). The nonalcoholic spouse is attracted to the acceptance of and the acknowledgement of him as an authority that he usually experiences from her. Each seems to have a defined place with the other and tends to see the other as a person with whom a happy future is possible.

As in Paradigm Case 1, if all progresses smoothly, these two unite as partners, forming a two-person community with (a) relational aspects including defined high power and low power statuses, and (b) a shared world construction where a belief in the maintenance of high standards is of considerable importance.

The pair functions at Point A (Special World Construction) for some period of time. This arrangement continues to be mutually satisfying as long as the couple doesn't interact too intimately. It is only after they make a commitment to the relationship (via marriage or living together) that both have additional reason to take each other more seriously. This may be reflected in increased criticism from the husband, since it is now no longer as easy to overlook "less than acceptable performances" on the part of his mate. The wife may also be less willing to go along with her husband's requirements, and begins to register disagreement by behaving less competently.

B. Female Spouse Fails to Meet Requirements—Male Spouse Criticizes

The couple moves to B, when the female alcoholic is unable (or unwilling) to meet the previously mutually agreed upon standards imposed upon her. She then moves from doing something that she can't do (i.e., performing up to standard) to doing something that she can. One of the commonly utilized options that she has available is to drink. This action puts her in a position of being able to deny responsibility for her actions and to escape the arena.

A destructive cycle therefore has begun here. The female alcoholic tends not to live up to the implicit agreement "to meet joint standards", compensates by doing something that she *can* do (i.e., escaping through drink) thus, making herself ineligible to succeed and disqualifying the situation. The husband often responds by attempting to be helpful. He may reassert his position in the relationship, criticizing her even more strongly. She in turn frequently reacts with a repeat performance (i.e., failing and escaping the dilemma by drinking).

Another feature of B (alcoholic fails, spouse criticizes), is that the male spouse begins to shoulder more of his mate's load. This notion is similar to Bowen's (1974, 1978) characterization of the underfunctioning spouse (drinker) and the overfunctioning (non-drinker). The underfunctioning drinker deselfs as the relationship progresses. The non-drinker or the spouse rises to the occasion of protecting her and himself from public scrutiny as he justifies her irresponsible behavior to friends and associates in terms of illness, overwork, or lack of experience. These actions reflect the fact that both parties are committed to demonstrating to the world that they are a functioning couple.

The husband's public support of his wife is often followed by renewed private cajoling and criticism, as he feels that he is justified in being even more displeased with her. She has, after all, failed to live up to her side of the bargain and has humiliated and embarrassed him.

The female alcoholic is usually apologetic after one of her drunken episodes. Genuine remorse may be experienced, and forgiveness may be sought from her mate. When granted, it is often accompanied by pledges of change and improved performance. At this point, status quo is again achieved in the relationship, and the couple may renew their commitment to each other. The A-B cycle (A. shared world construction to B. female spouse fails to meet joint standards—male spouse criticizes) may then be repeated some number of times before the pair moves to the third stage of this scenario.

C. *Female Alcoholic Retaliates and Resists Criticism—Male Spouse Continues Criticism*

As the two become more solidified in their respective positions, both begin to lose hope that their shared world construction is negotiable. Point C (Table 2) marks the juncture at which the mates begin to become more cynical about the future of their relationship. The female spouse starts to doubt that she will ever really be appreciated. Her husband begins to wonder if she will ever stop embarrassing him and act more like a proper wife.

At this stage, her "failures" and apologies are looking more like retaliation. His criticisms are now taking the form of putdowns, as he responds to this retaliation by reasserting *his* position as chief status assigner in the marital pair.

A reasonable question to ask here is why the couples doesn't separate. Although a certain percentage of mates do so, this is not generally the case. As described in Paradigm Case 1, both spouses are sufficiently invested in this dyad to work for its continuance despite the ambivalence experienced by each party. Although the wife may have serious doubts about her situation, her husband remains the center of her life. She is unable to function independently, as her behavior potential is almost completely centered in that relationship. The husband also has a vested interest in maintaining the relationship. In addition to the considerable validation that he obtains from having a monopoly on being right, he is also concerned about preserving the image in the community at large of himself and his wife as essentially a normal couple. He has also, to some extent, burned his bridges in supporting the relationship and is stuck with the consequences of that action. For many husbands and wives, the prospect of living *without* each other is far worse than the familiarity of being together.

D1. Retaliation by Both Parties

The couple evolves to Point D1 (retaliation), when the female alcoholic adopts another position vis-à-vis her mate. At some juncture, retaliation via self-deprecation seems to count for less with her and she resists her husband's criticisms more directly. At this stage, physical abuse may be at a high pitch, and drinking episodes are frequent. The most salient change here, however, is the fact that the alcoholic is more openly defying her mate, and that he is reacting accordingly.

One strong move that she can make in this interaction is to go into alcoholism treatment. Although her husband has been dissatisfied with her drinking, this decision, if it is her idea, can be interpreted as a disqualification of him as high power person in the dyad. It can also be seen as an opportunity for her to humiliate and degrade him publicly. Hence, this is a difficult period for the non-alcoholic spouse.

At the far end of the spectrum, the spouse may be on the periphery of his wife's treatment involvement or other activities, as he has written off the marriage some time back. He may have reinvested himself in work, other interests, or in outside relationships. This type of husband may be difficult to involve in the family aspects of alcoholism treatment, as the prospects of investing energy in what he may consider a "hopeless situation" gives him more reason to maintain his distance.

The husband who is actively participating in the relationship is prepared to push for his former status as director and initiator. He usually attempts to enforce status quo in a number of ways. This may include establishing himself as the authority on his wife and her "condition," or the utilization of less direct types of criticism or disqualification. If the alcoholic permits her spouse to assume leadership of her life, and returns home under these conditions, the B-C-D1 cycle of criticism, failure, drinking, and re-entering treatment is usually resumed after a brief period of abstinence.

D2. Alcoholic Renounces Relationship—Spouse Renounces Relationship

If the wife continues to openly resist her husband's authority and directives, the couple will engage in a fairly symmetrical pattern of criticism-defense or criticism-counter criticism. This is a continuance of the trend that has been established in the relationship. The couple may now be engaging in open warfare. If the escalation is sufficiently great, one or both parties may renounce the marriage.

Another possibility (that may occur even as late as D2), is that one or the other may temporarily "win" his or her point, i.e., the male spouse may succeed in reasserting his high power position, or the wife may persuade her husband to join her in a constructive manner in treatment. If the husband "wins", he has reasserted his leadership, and this may again

cycle the relationship to Point B (mild criticism-failure cycle). As can be gathered from the above, status quo can be reestablished at any stage in this scenario. The relationship can also be terminated at any juncture. This response is unlikely prior to C (criticism cycle), however, given the particular personal characteristics of the mates and the sort of relationship that has been established.

This concludes the description of Case 2, a paradigm case scenario of the relationship of the alcoholic wife and her non-alcoholic husband.

DISCUSSION

Two paradigm case scenarios of alcoholic dyads have been presented. The cases are alike in a number of respects, but also differ in certain important ways. If we take these two temporally structured scenarios as paradigmatic, we can understand a substantial proportion of actual couples as going through all or part of these scenarios in one of their many versions. Two additional issues need to be addressed in connection with these paradigms. These include the dynamic of movement through the relationship, and the question of the degree of awareness of each party throughout the various stages and sequences of each paradigm case.

Couples tend to move through the scenario at different rates. They become stuck at certain points, sometimes temporarily, and at other times, permanently. In general, Paradigm Case 1 relationships have a tendency to move through the sequence at a somewhat slower pace than Paradigm Case 2 dyads. There is repetition in the various phases for both types of couples, however. For example, with respect to Case 1, some husbands and wives repeat the A-B1-B2-A cycle for a lifetime, while others move through the complete cycle in six months. In Case 2 relationships, the A-B cycle may be repeated some number of times before the pair enters a new phase. A larger percentage of both types of mates never move beyond Point C.

These variations can be explained, in part, in terms of differences in personal characteristics of the mates, and in circumstances that would enable some couples to more effectively negotiate their mutual world construction. A key to successful negotiation with respect to Case 1 relationships appears to be the degree to which the alcoholic is able to match his promises with appropriate follow-through. The personality characteristics of the husband and wife as well as the kind of financial and social resources available to the family are also relevant. For instance, if the alcoholic is fairly irresponsible, the wife not very forgiving, and the available financial resources of the couple are severely limited, chances are that the mates will progress relatively rapidly through the various stages of the scenario. If the non-alcoholic, on the other hand, is a sacrificer, the couple has adequate financial back-up (e.g., "helpful" parents), and the husband

comes through a respectable number of times, the pair may never move beyond the A-B1-B2-A cycle.

As was implied in the above paragraph, the level of satisfaction of the "victim" spouse appears to influence the speed with which the mates move through the paradigm. In Paradigm Case 2 situations, the husband is often not unhappy enough (at Point C, for example), to leave the dyad. This seems to be maintained as long as he is the chief status assigner in the relation and his wife doesn't threaten his position in the community too much with public displays of incompetence. For his spouse, remaining in the relationship at this juncture (C) seems to depend upon how hopeful she is that things will change for her, and of course, upon how much of her behavior potential is invested in the dyad.

The satisfaction level is also relevant for Paradigm Case 1 relations. A great many of these relationships tend to remain at C for very long periods. Here, the wife seems to be the kind of person who derives fulfillment from the adoption of a martyr position. When this type of satisfaction is no longer meaningful for her, she may consider renouncing the relation.

In either paradigm, it appears that a central issue is whether or not the "victim" spouse remains sufficiently satisfied to maintain the dyad. Movement through the cycle and equilibrium achieved at any point therefore seems to be related to the satisfaction level of the "victim" spouse, the extent of follow-through of the alcoholic, and the respective personal characteristics of each member of the relationship.

The above variations generate a variety of specific historical patterns. Because the latter are merely variations they may be considered as transformations in the Paradigm Case Formulation. However, it may also be of some value to mention some of these important patterns. In certain Paradigm Case 1 relations, for instance, the alcoholic is very successful in his work for long periods of time. He may have greater intelligence than normal or possess exceptional talent. His degree of follow-through, at least with respect to his career, is greater than described in the PCF. Therefore his spouse is less likely to be dissatisfied than if this wasn't the case. The relationship may become stuck in the A-B1-B2-A cycle or at point C.

An example of a transformation in Paradigm Case 2 relationships is a situation where the husband is less the supercritic and more the very logical and rational type. His spouse might conventionally be described as somewhat hysterical. In this marital pair, the husband attempts being helpful to his wife by providing logical solutions to all of her gripes, whereas she would prefer a sympathetic ear. Often, after a certain length of time, the non-alcoholic simply withdrawals into his work or into outside relationships. His spouse feels rejected and abandoned and frequently begins to drink fairly heavily and usually in secret to ease the pain of her situation.

Her mate is shocked when he discovers that she is an alcoholic. Hence, two possible transformations have been indicated in the above paragraphs.

Another question that naturally arises relates to the degree of awareness of each partner at various change points in the scenario. In scanning the range of relationships that constitute the different versions of Paradigm Case 1 and Paradigm Case 2, it appears that individuals within each relationship operate with differing degrees of conscious decision. A participant may have partial insight, may be totally unaware of the significance of his or her actions, or may be entirely aware of his or her respective motivations. This tends to be the case throughout the course of the scenario, although at certain points an individual's level of insight about a particular issue or motive may change. One feature of these relationships is that those mates who are not attuned to their own motivations may nevertheless be acutely aware of the ways in which their partner is going wrong.

Hence, it appears that certain participants are entirely unaware of their actions or positions in the relationship, others have partial insight, while a third group acts with a great deal of conscious knowledge of the particular behavior.

SUMMARY

Two paradigm case scenarios of relationships with an alcoholic member have been presented. They included Paradigm Case Formulation 1, where the male was an alcoholic and the female spouse a non-alcoholic and Paradigm Case Formulation 2, in which the female was the problem drinker and the male spouse the non-alcoholic. The question of movement through the paradigms and the issue of awareness were also addressed. Some assessment and treatment possibilities of the first case were also discussed.

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THE POSITIVE-HEALTH DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL OF TREATMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

Jan Vanderburgh

ABSTRACT

A Descriptive Psychology approach to psychopathology and treatment is suggested and discussed briefly, using the Positive-Health Developmental Model (PDM) as an example of Ossorio's deficit model. The PDM is a conceptual framework for classifying persons and/or their behavioral capabilities in respect to developmental Level, Degree of Mastery, and personal Approach, or perspective on the world. Because the PDM provides an assessment of a person's abilities or disabilities, it is a fairly direct implementation of Ossorio's definition of pathology: "When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction in his ability to (a) engage in deliberate action, and, equivalently, (b) participate in the social practices of the community." Two brief case studies and some preliminary notes on treatment are included.

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PDM TREATMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

The Positive-Health Developmental Model (PDM) is a conceptual framework for classifying persons and/or their behavioral capabilities (Vanderburgh, 1983). It provides a great deal of differentiating power at a molar, or observational, level of description, and the discriminations are useful in dealing with many individual, family, and organizational problems.

The PDM

To review briefly, the PDM classifies persons and/or behaviors in respect to three major aspects: Developmental Level, Degree of Mastery, and Personal Approach. Eleven Developmental Levels, three categories of Degree of Mastery, and three categories of Personal Approach are distinguished (Vanderburgh, 1983).

Personal Approach

Power, Relationship, and Information are distinguished as Approaches. Each of these corresponds to a personal perspective on the world, including a value orientation. Ossorio's recent (1982) discussion of status as perspective provides an appropriate explication. Just as to be a banker (mother, Baptist, etc.) is to have the reasons that a banker *would* have in a given situation, to be a Power-oriented person is to have the reasons that a Power person *would* have in a given situation. To act on those reasons successfully involves the exercise of a variety of abilities which are different, in general, from the abilities required to act on Relationship or Information reasons. Thus, one can speak of Power, Relationship, and Information abilities as well as perspectives and value orientation. Authentic and satisfying social existence appears to require all three perspectives. Certainly, in general, to live well requires more than minimal sensitivity to all three kinds of reasons, and more than minimal exercise of all three kinds of abilities, or skills.

Although ideally a positively healthy person would have ready access to, and comparable skills based upon, all three perspectives, in practice persons seem to function preferentially and more skillfully in terms of a primary Approach. This most common method of relating to the world affects the social practices in which the person chooses to engage, his most likely forms of describing events and experiences, his acquisition of specific skills, his priorities and values, and his basis for judgments. A person's primary Approach also makes a difference in the forms in which he chooses to use the other perspectives (Vanderburgh, 1983).

Developmental Level

This dimension of the PDM reflects the degree to which the person can manage his affairs as a social individual. Thus, like Approach, Developmental Level is a way of classifying abilities. Because of this, it is also a way of classifying the behaviors which express these abilities and the persons who have these abilities.

At each level, some skills, behaviors, functions, and abilities—cognitive, social, and physical—are identified that would enable a person to engage successfully in the social practices appropriate to a particular age or stage of development, from birth to an outstanding degree of adult function. From Level 0, which indicates the absence or gross impairment of minimal function, the Developmental Levels form a progression roughly by healthy chronological development through adolescence to generally adequate, but not outstanding skills and judgments, Levels 4 and 5. Levels 6 to 8 designate outstanding quality of the same functions developed in prior levels. Levels 9 and 10 refer to extraordinary mastery of the skills, sensitivities, and critical judgments of each of the Approaches—sufficient for the generation of new social practices as well as the significant refinement of existing social practices.

Degree of Mastery

This dimension of the PDM reflects the criterion that full mastery of any form of behavior consists of all three modes—Actor, Observer, and Critic. That makes the behavior accessible to the person's self-regulating structure, and therefore something that he can appropriately choose to do, or not do, or modify. For any practice, the full range of Deliberate Action requires not only the capacity to act (or not to act) in that manner, but also the capacity to reflect upon, and to assess, correct, or modify the action (Ossorio, 1969/1981). Thus, Degree of Mastery is a way of classifying a person's ability to function as Actor, Observer, and Critic with respect to any given behavior, social practice, or type of activity.

Since Approach, Developmental Level, and Degree of Mastery are all ways of classifying abilities, they can be used simultaneously in that task. Correspondingly, they can be used to classify the behaviors which express those abilities; and the perspectives which those behaviors express; and the people who have those abilities, engage in those behaviors, or have those perspectives. Essentially, the PDM provides a vocabulary and taxonomy congruent with the grammar of Descriptive Psychology. While it is neither exhaustive nor in any sense a privileged description, it does suggest a useful set of discriminations for an assessment of a person's ability to engage in social practices at a wide range or levels and varied

proficiency. The developmental dimension is a direct implementation of a Descriptive Psychology definition of health function—the sufficient ability to participate in the relevant social practices. The PDM as a whole is primarily a framework for making judgments about positive resources rather than deficits.

Psychopathology

The PDM as a Deficit Model

Since the PDM was developed as an alternative to pathology-oriented ways of assessing individual capabilities and ways of functioning, it is ironic that one of its major uses lies in the area of psychopathology and treatment. Because the PDM is a framework for classifying what a person can do and prefers to do, it is also a framework for representing what a person cannot and will not do. Assessment of this sort provides one implementation of the deficit model of psychopathology (Ossorio, 1985).

The deficit model generates a specific definition of pathology, i.e., "When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction in his ability to (a) engage in deliberate action, and, equivalently, (b) participate in the social practices of the community" (Ossorio, 1985, p. 158). The basic judgments relevant to psychopathology are normative judgments concerning adequate adult functioning in a cultural context.

Based on these judgments, we can also make normative judgments concerning normal functioning at any age. Any sequence of changes in the personal characteristics of children which, without special intervention, routinely eventuates in normal adulthood may be considered developmentally normal. On the basis of knowledge based on prior observation of which sequences are of this sort and which are not, if we can assess what a person can and cannot do, then we can make judgments concerning pathology and normality of that person at any age. The PDM offers a convenient way of approximating a global assessment of the person's abilities and disabilities with regard to social practices, and provides a systematic conceptual articulation for that process of assessment.

This conceptual structure makes two contributions to Descriptive Psychology. First, it provides a direct implementation of the definition of pathology, since the definition refers to social abilities and disabilities and this is what is assessed using the PDM. In turn, the assessment leads to a general treatment approach and a body of practices which are primarily competence-oriented. This approach provides a desirable complement to other approaches which are primarily motivation-oriented, knowledge-oriented, or performance-oriented.

Second, it provides a framework for stating certain empirical hypotheses

having to do with discrepancies among levels of functioning (the developmental dimension of the PDM) in the nine categories generated by the combinations of Actor-Observer-Critic functioning (the AOC dimension) and Relationship-Power-Information orientations (the RPI dimension). The general hypothesis is that a person who is positively healthy has full AOC Mastery of the skills of all three Approaches (Relationship, Power, and Information) at comparable and age-appropriate Developmental Levels. Corresponding specific hypotheses involving various examples of such discrepancies and normative deficiencies follow from the general hypothesis.

Ideally, then, a positively healthy person will have satisfactory behavior potential in virtually all circumstances, and will also have the means of increasing his behavior potential without undue stress in ways appropriate to the situation. Conversely, a person who lacks AOC Mastery of the skills of all three basic Approaches at appropriate Developmental Levels can be considered to be functioning in a less than optimal—perhaps less than satisfactory—manner. For instance, a five-year-old who has only Actor functions will be unable, as a consequence of that state of affairs (disability), to do what most five-year-olds can do without supervision. He will either be handicapped in his participation or need specially favorable circumstances to function well.

Those conditions which are commonly called pathological correspond to one category of reduced behavior potential, i.e., a disability, as against, e.g., lack of opportunity. It is important to notice, however, that radically limited opportunity can, over time, so drastically reduce a person's behavior potential that it is almost indistinguishable from what is commonly called pathology—and, in the long run, can be literally pathogenic.

Using the PDM

In Descriptive Psychology terms, pathology is seen stemming from significant restrictions in regard to social practices, skills, behavioral options, and judgment, whatever their origin. This enables us to view psychopathology as a deficit resulting from some constellation of such restrictions, rather than an entity of some recondite sort. The disabilities and limitations themselves, rather than any explanations or theories about them, constitute the pathology (Ossorio, 1985). Identification of behavioral restrictions can be made by reference to status assignments, as states, as personal characteristics, as functional deficits or disabilities, or as deficits in experience, and so on.

The personal characteristics identified by means of the PDM assessment may reflect organic or neurological involvement; disorders of thinking, feeling, or behavior; or developmental deficits. Any significant reduction

or limitation in a person's ability to engage in appropriate social practices can be expected to show up in a PDM assessment—often in all three dimensions. With the PDM, then, we are looking at a range of personal characteristics designed to indicate ways in which a person will—or will not—be able to engage in appropriate social practices. Looking at pathology in this way (rather than according to a medical-model or behavioral-model approach) both acknowledges the reality that identifications of personal characteristics as pathological are contextual, and preserves the relationship between a person's characteristics and setting without postulating causality. What is of concern in judgments of pathology is a person's disabilities and the significance of those disabilities for the person himself and for other persons, particularly with regard to how the behavior potential of everyone involved is affected.

To assess a person's available resources and compare them with what he needs and desires for health function does not require that the observer identify a specific "condition", nor is it necessary to refer to standard diagnostic nomenclature to generate a serviceable description of a person's abilities and disabilities (although it is often useful to do so). The primary reasons for such assessment are social (e.g., to assist others in making appropriate decisions about their own actions with that person) and therapeutic (e.g., to assist a person to increase his behavior potential in appropriate ways). Making use of the specific categories presented in the PDM offers a rapid summary assessment, in terms of which specific abilities and disabilities (and consequent probable limitations) are indicated. In this context, the PDM is highly responsive to change, providing a continuous, flexible, easily-corrected status report.

Although the PDM is not directly related to, or dependent upon, either the medical or the behavioral model of psychopathology, certain constellations of behavior (and, therefore, patterns of ratings on the PDM) correspond roughly to the standard diagnostic categories. This phase of work with the PDM is in its early stages.

The structure of the PDM suggests possible avenues of treatment: in general, the most common of these are identification, instruction, and practice (or other enablement procedures) for skills which are below the person's current overall level of function. Particular patterns also suggest specific interventions directly related to the disabilities.

Because the PDM deals with skills, judgments, and values, incongruities or imbalance in a person's resources are considered significant. For instance, a wide spread in Developmental Levels among the three Approaches can limit a person's behavior potential. The person may not see any reason to acquire the skills of the least-skilled Approach unless he is very uncomfortable with things as they are. A person with significant restrictions in his ability to engage in certain social practices may also fail to assess the restrictions accurately.

It appears that positively healthy persons' skills and judgments reflect their values. If, however, a person strongly affirms the values of a less-skilled Approach, that can be regarded as an indication that there is an issue worth examining in that area. Why has the person not acquired the related skills? Why has he chosen to affirm those particular values without reflecting them in his behavior?

In this, as in many instances, the developmental dimension and the person's history provide useful information. Whether or not one understands the process of maturation to include certain specific, sequential, necessary developmental (cognitive, affective, moral, and practical) tasks, one can take it that in a given culture there are clusters of skills and judgments which are generally common to persons of various ages. When a particular skill, or pattern of skills, is deficient or absent, knowing both the roots and consequences of that deficit can be helpful in the process of healthy change.

Significant restrictions in behavior potential can accompany a variety of personal characteristics or circumstances (as, for instance, blindness, extreme poverty, developmental disabilities, or incarceration). Such factors as serious or protracted childhood illness or injury, or the absence or death of a parent or sibling, for instance, can influence the development of a particular cluster of skills and judgments. Each of these possible influences can delay, distort, impair, or prevent the acquisition of a set of abilities necessary for effective function at a particular level (and, often, subsequent levels). However, only if these characteristics or circumstances constitute or produce a *significant* impairment would they be considered pathological (Ossorio, 1985).

Family Influences

Because the family, or a family surrogate, is the common arena for the acquisition of a major portion of the requisite skills for function in the world, family influences, resources, and lacks are considered particularly significant developmentally. We will look briefly at some of the issues involved in a person's growth within his childhood family.

Each family system is well adapted to fostering certain types of development. Family resources, behavioral and cultural, both enhance and limit a child's early options. For example, sometimes a child's natural talents and interests differ greatly from his parents', and no one in the nuclear family is able to provide him with informed support. The child may then be effectively isolated within the family structure, and the parents may find his behavior puzzling or distressing. In these circumstances, the child has several options: He may identify himself as deficient or aberrant (and act accordingly). He may acquire the family resources reluctantly in order to gain parental approval. He may reject the family resources and

pursue his own preferences actively and exclusively. He may—most desirably—choose to learn and use both sets.

Some families interact using a very limited set of behavioral options, and thereby foster the development or manifestation of particular limitations. If family resources for interaction with the rest of the world are meager, for instance, the children of the family may fail to acquire some much-needed skills. If the family is also geographically or socially isolated, the child's opportunity for getting what he needs outside the family is greatly restricted. The child's own primary Approach, Developmental Level, and AOC Mastery affect his development, as well.

If enough of the family behavior is sufficiently limited, inappropriate, bizarre, contradictory, or destructive, the likelihood of some kind of psychopathology among family members is increased. Some examples of such behaviors, characteristics, and practices on the part of parents and other family members are:

1. inappropriate responses or expectations: (a.) rigid or unresponsive schedules for infants; (b.) battering, especially in response to hunger or fear; (c.) expecting a child to take care of parents or of other siblings on a regular basis without consent, training, or support; (d.) denying, making fun of, or resisting the child's perceptions or preferences, particularly in matters of survival or identity (self-assigned status); (e.) radically restricting the child's options for experimentation, success, or failure; and (f.) discounting, or teaching the child to discount, biological needs.
2. inaccurate, irrelevant, or insufficient information: (a.) extreme prejudice; (b.) misidentification of feelings or perceptions; (c.) frequent redefinition; (d.) routine confusion or contradiction; (e.) excessive secretiveness; and (f.) idiosyncratic cognitive processes.
3. severely limited or distorted relationships: (a.) problems of bonding and separation; (b.) inappropriate symbiosis; (c.) extreme isolation or lack of privacy; (d.) incest; and (e.) rôle substitutions [see 1(c)].

Some of these can be present occasionally or to a moderate degree in an otherwise constructive family without apparent serious damage to the family members.

Of course, no small system—family or sub-group—possesses the total range of behavioral resources potentially present in a society. A healthy family *does* have a broad set of cognitive, affective, social-relational, and developmental skills and practices, sufficient for the healthy growth of family members. And an individual does not need every conceivable societal resource to become positively healthy—only a sufficient set.

Some families lack skills in significant areas for several generations, and only acquire the missing skills by marrying into a family that has them, or by outside intervention (e.g., education, therapy, or other deliberate change processes). There appears to be a significant difference between lacking and withholding a particular set of resources (e.g., loving, caretaking, explaining, teaching, supporting, approving, solving problems, etc.). In general, *withholding* family resources from one or more members still permits each person to know that those resources exist and perhaps to acquire them in another context. This is also the case when behavioral options are unequally and inappropriately restricted among family members. A family which *lacks* significant resources, however, may permit persons to grow up unaware of the existence of additional options common in the general culture. This can perpetuate a family pattern of inadequate or inappropriate behavior (e.g., violence, consistent negative judgment, frustration, hostility, spitefulness, isolation, incest, sociopathy, diminished expectations and low self-esteem, and other non-problem-solving behaviors).

Other Factors

There are many possible ways for a person to reach adult life with significant deficits. In addition to the family-related difficulties mentioned above, personal history, physical or developmental limitations, gross lack of experience, and external events can all contribute to restrictions on a person's ability to function appropriately in his setting. For example, historical events that lead to radical changes in behavioral options—natural disasters, emigration and other dislocations, wars, famines, or the Great Depression—and personal crises, like death or severe illness, loss of employment, or marital difficulties, can call for skills a person does not possess and never expected to need. The acquisition of those skills in such circumstances is often accompanied by discomfort or distress; failure to acquire them may constitute a significant abridgement of the person's behavior potential.

Severe disorders of thinking or feeling, whatever their etiology, seriously limit a person's resources and options. The person who believes that the cracks in the pavement are poisonous snakes will attend to different aspects of his circumstances—and walk differently—from the person who does not share that belief. The person who is still actively grieving over his father's death thirty-seven years ago will view his own love, work, and play differently from the person whose attention and feelings are more thoroughly involved in the present. A person whose view of himself and his own status is radically different from what others accept or affirm will have difficulty operating in the world.

A person who is disordered or deficient in the skills and judgments of one Approach is highly likely to show corresponding deficiencies or anomalies in the skills and judgments of the other two Approaches. In general, any disability will lead to other concurrent disabilities, and will inhibit or prevent the later acquisition of certain abilities. For example, being unable to read and write restricts a person's ability to find his way in a strange town, to maintain relationships by telephone or mail, to learn how to operate an unfamiliar machine, or to understand a legal document without assistance. (A person who can read and write, but cannot understand the legal document, is faced with a different problem, as is a person who can read and write, but only in Braille or Urdu.)

Patterns

Although there is a very large number of logically possible configurations in PDM assessment, empirically it appears that most cases of psychopathology exemplify one of the following structural patterns:

1. The person significantly lacks the skills and judgments commonly associated with one or more of the Approaches, and has need of them to function satisfactorily in his setting.
2. The person's range of development in all three Approaches is wider than three levels, and this disparity is related to significant limitations of his behavior potential.
3. The person has a significant deficit in one or more factors in the Development Levels.
4. The disorder is manifested primarily in the person's inability or unwillingness to function in one or more of the AOC modes (e.g., the person's actions are significantly restricted, he fails to make accurate observations necessary for adequate function in his setting, he uses his skills without apparent concern for their appropriateness in a given situation, or he makes inappropriate or inadequate Critic assessments of self, others, or situations).

Similarly, although the possibilities of explanations are almost limitless, most of the actual formulations developed in connection with the use of the PDM would exemplify one or more of the following explanatory patterns:

1. The person has a specific personal characteristic (e.g., blindness, faulty thinking, illness, biochemical or glandular imbalance, development delay), that is manifested in significant disorders or limitations.

2. The person has a personal history which has caused or contributed to his significant disorders or limitations.
3. The person significantly misperceives or misunderstands his status, or assigns himself an impossible status, and therefore cannot function appropriately in his setting.
4. The person shares beliefs with his family or another group which are not commonly held, and which, if acted upon, issue in behavior commonly identified as pathological.

TRADITIONAL NOMENCLATURE AND THE PDM

In looking at psychopathology in terms of the Actor-Observer-Critic/Relationship-Power-Information combinations, it is valuable to consider the ways in which things are likely to go wrong. What kind of failures can there be? If the distinctions made in the PDM are useful in the assessment of function, there may well be constellations of limitations which characteristically correspond to various locations on the model.

The relation of traditional nomenclature and the several common patterns on the PDM is of some interest. No neat or simple correspondence is to be expected. However, anomalies in one of the (Actor, Observer, or Critic) modes in a particular Approach seem to be most closely related empirically to various traditionally-defined psychopathologies. Table I below lists a few of these, along with the initial Approach and Degree of Mastery to which each appears to be related. Note that any significant disability can be expected to manifest itself in more than one location on the PDM, so the full PDM assessment would include a constellation of

Table 1

Relationship	
Actor:	Simple depression, catatonia
Observer/Critic:	Hysterical neurosis
Critic/Actor:	Mild character disorders
Power	
Actor:	Simple schizophrenia
Observer/Critic:	Cyclic disorders
Critic/Actor:	Sociopathy
Information	
Actor:	Anxiety
Observer/Critic:	Paranoia
Critic/Actor:	Obsessive-compulsive neurosis

affected personal characteristics, rather than a single instance. The correspondences shown in Table 1 are elaborated below.

Persons skilled in each of the Approaches make some characteristic assumptions, which are essentially healthy. However, each Approach also carries with it the tendency or temptation to make other sorts of assumptions which are likely to contribute to pathology.

Persons skilled in healthy forms of the Relationship Approach take for granted that people are connected, that appropriate caretaking of self and others is desirable and possible, and that one can be close to others. Persons skilled in healthy forms of the Power Approach take for granted that often someone needs to be responsible and in charge, that there *is* enough to go around, and that achievement and closure are valuable. Persons skilled in healthy forms of the Information Approach take for granted that adequate understanding and accuracy can be attained through [enough] information, that problems can be solved, that one can learn, and that some degree of trust is essential for human relationships. However, even these beliefs can be maintained in such extreme form that a person's behavior potential is significantly restricted.

Although AOC functions in each Approach are both important and interrelated, typically the Mastery functions are differently valued in the three Approaches. In the Relationship Approach, Actor and Observer functions are most highly valued, and Critic functions are often slighted or assigned to other persons. In the Power Approach, Actor and Critic/Actor functions are emphasized, and Observer/Critic functions are less valued. In the Information Approach, Observer and Critic functions are considered more important than Actor functions.

In general, then, Relationship disabilities take forms in which desirable or necessary judgments and assessments are not made, and in which full and responsible self-regulation is lacking; Power disabilities are exemplified by judgments made without full Observer/Critic participation; and Information disabilities are manifested in inability or unwillingness to act effectively on information and judgments.

It is important to notice, however, that, no matter whether it is Actor, Observer, or Critic which is conceptually most closely related to the pathology, in fact, all three kinds of mastery are involved in some way.

Relationship

Some of the common and relatively pathogenic *Relationship* assumptions are: *Reality is what you (or they) say it is; I am what you (they) say I am; you (they) are responsible for what I do; I am responsible for how you (they) feel; feelings and intentions are more important than what one does; it is not all right for me to be overtly and independently angry; it*

is not all right for me to compete openly, effectively, and on my own initiative; I am in danger if you (they) do not like or love me. A Relationship-oriented person who believes some or all of these statements is likely to act in ways that exhibit extremes of feelings, that shift or abdicate responsibility for decisions, and that he believes will please or placate other persons.

So, a person with simple depression is likely to give his feelings priority over actions, and experience himself as helpless with respect to changing the way he feels, and powerless to act effectively in his world. He will assign himself a correspondingly low status, in terms of which he is likely to disclaim responsibility for his feelings and actions. A catatonic person is manifesting a position in which he is essentially refusing to do what Relationship-oriented persons commonly do, e.g., accept the judgments of others and try to please them or take care of them.

A hysteric may attempt to perform in ways that please the most important persons in his environment, whether or not those behaviors are intrinsically pleasing to him or effective in the situation. The accommodations to other-defined reality in these performances often either impeach the person's own Observer/Critic functions or issue in anger which the person believes he may not express. The person defends against accusations on the grounds that he meant well, or did not intend to offend or fail. He will often given his feelings preemptive position over external events, and may reject common understandings of those events.

A Relationship-Approach person may choose to participate in group or gang activities in order to acquire an apparently functional and supportive Critic (the group and/or its leaders); to achieve a satisfying, though derivative, status; and to have a clear chain of responsibility (the leader, members of higher status) outside himself. He may not consider the significance or appropriateness of the group's activities. He is likely to arrange his assessments on the basis of praise and blame, approval/disapproval, or popular/unpopular, rather than true/false or right/wrong. When he is in a pathological state, these characteristics are associated with significant limitations on his ability to function appropriately and effectively in the world.

Power

Some of the common pathogenic *Power* assumptions are: *Reality is what I say it is; what I want is more important than anything else; getting something done is more important than how it is done; if anyone is uncomfortable, someone must be at fault; accepting something new means that the old way (belief, practice, behavior, understanding) was wrong or bad; if something is worth knowing, I should have known it already;*

assigning blame is important; winning is the primary good, and losing is dangerous; what a person does is more important than what he thinks or feels.

The most common Actor disorders in the Power Approach are those in which a person essentially creates or invents a world of his own in which to live, without competent regard for the possibility that things are not that way. We think of many forms of the creative arts, which are also invented worlds, as healthy: a novelist, a dramatist, an artist or musician, an architect—all create something new and original from their own imagination. Political thinkers and philosophers also may be healthy Power-Approach persons, and invent new structures or universes of discourse that increase behavior potential. When there *is* a disorder—when the self-created world is drastically limited or destructive or in some way impossible—it is likely to involve behaviors commonly called schizophrenic. This differs from the Relationship disorders mentioned above in that the person treats his invented world as the *only* real world or viewpoint. Essentially, he fails to construct a world in which he can interact powerfully and effectively with other persons who also have power.

New learnings are sometimes difficult for Power-oriented persons with Observer disorders, because of their belief that change requires the absolute rejection of any prior position. Therefore, new observations to update a prior understanding of reality do not come, as they normally would, as a development of the earlier observations, but are seen by the person to be contradictory to them. For people with this disability, sequential learnings are stressful, and building on experience is difficult. To change from one good thing to another good or better thing seems to go against the highly competitive orientation of the Power Approach; a preferred view is to change from a bad thing to a good thing. However, in order to maintain this position, the person may need to impeach his earlier judgment of the previous state as good. Adequate observation and reality-testing can modify this position considerably, and enable many Power-oriented persons to be highly flexible and effective.

Deficits or distortions in Observer/Critic function support extremes in thinking, feeling, and action. Essentially, the person is considering each aspect of a situation either in isolation or in opposition to some other aspect. This makes it far more difficult for him to maintain a sense of proportion about feelings or events. Such disabilities seem to limit not only behavior potential, but also awareness of the process by which behaviors are chosen or change and growth take place. From the standpoint of behavior, for instance, manic-depressive disorders generally involve a repetitive sequence in which a person's periods of high activity (with inadequate reality-testing and significantly inappropriate behavior) end suddenly with a crash. The crash, a major mood swing, begins a period of

low activity and depression, in which reality-testing is comparably inaccurate. During most of the cycle, the person's Observer-Critic function is faulty or absent, and memory and judgment are impaired. He cannot describe or explain from one position in the cycle how he felt or why he behaved as he did at another position. Only as he moves from depression into the beginning of the next high-activity period does he make effective use of his Observer/Critic skills.

Alternatively, in the absence of effective self-evaluation and self-regulation a Power-oriented person may become actively sociopathic, exhibiting little or no concern for others and working as an independent adversary of common social values and practices. It is the Critic function that provides for acculturation and socialization. A Power-oriented person with inappropriate Critic function may blame society for his own decisions about what to do, or he may simply not care about society's values or the needs and rights of other persons. He may be a dynamic and successful antisocial force, either individually or as the leader of a gang or group of other Power- or Relationship-oriented persons with limited or aberrant Critic functions.

Information

Some of the common pathogenic *Information* assumptions are: *Reality is what I can test absolutely; you can't be really sure of anything; trust is the most important issue; it is more important to understand fully how things work than to get them done; not knowing enough is dangerous; inaccuracy is dangerous; thinking is more important than feeling or doing.*

The most usual Actor disorders in the Information Approach are anxiety-based. The person's world does not have the kind of clarity that enables him to act in one way rather than another. He may immobilize himself when faced with a decision. At the extreme, the person may so complicate the process of decision-making that he may not act in even very important matters. Procrastination is common. Cognitively, the Information-oriented person is likely to overdetail, where both Relationship- and Power-oriented people tend to overgeneralize. Self-esteem depends upon the person's assessment of himself as trustworthy, ethical, moral, and accurate, rather than lovable and approved-of (as for Relationship-oriented persons) or successful and effective (as for Power-oriented persons).

Observer/Critic disorders in the Information Approach have to do with the logical consequences of significant inaccuracy. The most common disorder of this kind is paranoia, an attempt to come to terms with what the person experiences as unbearable inconsistency, or to explain a perception not consensually shared. The person supplies an additional piece of [false] information, or an unverifiable conclusion, in terms of which his experience

then makes sense; e.g., although I have been doing what I think is right (and ought to work), things have gone badly; therefore someone is out to get me. An excellent Descriptive Psychology examination of paranoia is found in Bergner (1985).

The Critic disorders in the Information Approach are usually based upon rigid, perfectionist standards of judgment, inherently impossible of achievement. Obsessive-compulsive neuroses are the most common. The compulsive hand-washer, for instance, (a) considers it of primary importance that his hands be absolutely clean, and (b) defines "clean" so rigidly that he cannot achieve and maintain that state.

Combinations and Sequences

In addition to individual constellations of personal characteristics that correspond roughly to particular traditional diagnoses, we are observing that some combinations of Approaches and deficiencies in Degrees of Mastery are fairly common. For instance, the characteristic behavior of a person who usually functions in a Power-Relationship Approach with an Observer/Critic deficit may be described as passive-aggressive; the corresponding Relationship-Power constellation may be described as passive-dependent.

We are also beginning to notice and identify family and generational sequences, in addition to the individual patterns. This is an area of particular interest in family therapy, though it can be helpful in individual psychotherapy, as well. Some of these sequences are widely discussed in the literature (e.g., battered children often become battering parents). We hope that, over a period of time, looking at persons with these disabilities will give us additional information about such sequences. For instance, we have found several families in which Power-Information parents who are harsh and judgmental raise an Information-oriented child with impaired Critic function (e.g., obsessive-compulsive). This child in turn marries a harsh and judgmental Power-Information person and raises one or more Relationship-Power children with hysteric disorders or anorexia nervosa.

TREATMENT

It is desirable, when working with a person for healthy change, to have an accurate understanding of the way the person himself describes what is going on. A deficit or anomaly in any location in the PDM will of course have consequences elsewhere; identifying and remediating the primary disorder also affects more than that one factor. It is therefore possible to take the client's account of what is wrong as the starting point for treat-

ment, since that account can be reformulated by the therapist as a description of one of the manifestations of the pathology. In this way, the therapist can gain the informed and willing cooperation of the client in the process of his growth and change. With such cooperation, this approach has been useful within a wide range of degrees of dysfunction, and has been particularly effective with a variety of persons showing severe pathology. However, it is not suited for working with persons who are consistently very confused or unable to communicate, and seems less likely to be effective with extreme character disorders and sociopathy than more structured or confrontive methods would be.

Driscoll (1981) and Ossorio (1976) have written extensively about direct clinical uses of Descriptive Psychology. The PDM provides related conceptual guidelines for employing a wide range of ways to improve behavior potential by increasing a person's resources (Know-How) and clarifying options for desire or intention (Want). In general, the process of using the PDM in psychotherapy is as follows:

1. Observe the person and find the placement of his current function on the PDM. Placement may be described by giving Developmental Levels for the nine combinations of Approach and Mastery, or by giving Developmental Level and Level of Mastery for each of the three Approaches.
2. Confirm this evaluation by discussing the person's history and self-perceptions with him and (with his permission, of course) with other persons, as needed.
3. Look for strengths, deficits, patterns of action that do or do not accomplish what the person wants or says he wants.
4. Work cooperatively with the person to increase his options.
   a. Explain, describe, teach, and/or model the missing or less-developed skills, making use of existing skills and strengths.
   b. Provide opportunities for the person to acquire and practice those skills through rôle-playing, homework assignments, direct practice, self designed procedure, and the like.
   c. Explore with the person the belief systems underlying both old and new skills and resources.
   d. Invite the person to consider and incorporate the values which usually accompany the new skills.
5. Encourage the person to use all of the skills, distinctions, judgments, and values he has acquired (including the new ones) as fully and as appropriately as possible. Here is a sample process for structuring this:
   a. Is there a way to do this task (engage in this practice) that makes use of all three Degrees of Mastery and one's highest Developmental Level in each Approach?

b. What would that look like, and how would it work?
c. Would it be effective, useful, appropriate to do it that way?

Psychotherapy is here viewed as essentially a process of increasing a person's capacity to make and act skillfully upon responsible choices.

Case Summaries

The following case summaries briefly illustrate some uses of the PDM in psychotherapy. Note that the practices involved are not greatly different from practices used in conjunction with other theoretical orientations. As in Ossorio's (1983) heuristic of car repair, anything seriously wrong will show up in almost any type of diagnostic framework, and fixing it is likely to look much the same, no matter how it is described. Also recall Ossorio's warning (1983) about certain problems of description (Q: "What do you *do* that's different when you do therapy successfully as against when you do it unsuccessfully?" A: "Nothing—you *do* the same things.")

Case Summary #1

This family consists of:
father—engineer, high Power, high Information, low Relationship, strong negative Critic functions, from high-Power family in which he received approval
mother—teacher, high Relationship, high Information, low Power, strong Observer functions, strong positive Critic functions for others and negative for self, from high-Power family who did not value her skills or priorities
son—high Relationship, moderate Information, very low Power
daughter—high Power (made to look like Relationship), moderate Information, low Relationship
daughter—high Information, low Relationship, low Power

The presenting complaint was constant quarreling between father and son, mostly about father's anxiety that son was homosexual (he was not). An equally serious problem was the psychological battering of mother and son by father and older daughter, and father's occasional physical battering of son.

At the beginning, the therapist worked with the family to gain a common (and reasonably accurate) description of each person's practices and values. During this period, the therapist also taught basic information about the PDM—particularly the Approaches with their skills and values, and Observer and Critic functions. (The family had asked for this in response to the therapist's offer of such information.) Some of the specific skills

were modeled by the therapist and restated in terms of other Approaches. Some information about cultural expectations (e.g., Relationship skills as ''feminine'', Power skills as ''masculine'') was also included. Family members were asked to assess their own skills and values and the skills and values of other family members. Interestingly, father and older daughter both identified older daughter as high in Relationship skills and values; mother, son, and younger daughter (correctly) identified older daughter as high in Power, low in Relationship.

During the first month, the task of stating advantages and disadvantages of all three Approaches was assigned as written homework for all family members. Then, in rôle-playing, each was asked to be himself with his least-skilled Approach as primary. At first father rejected any situation which put him in a primary Relationship position, saying that Relationship skills and values made no sense to him. With the help of older daughter, he began to experiment with new ways of looking at his own and others' behavior.

During the second month, dinner (formerly a particularly stressful time for this family) was set aside as a time for all family members to practice unfamiliar skills. The structure was that each family member would speak to any other person in both his own and the other person's primary Approach. After about two weeks of this practice, family members reported that it no longer seemed stressful or cumbersome to say something both ways or in another person's primary Approach. Each reported new respect for other ways of operation.

During the third month, specific problem-solving structures were developed, to give non-toxic ways of fostering change. With improved communication, it was also possible to address specific issues more directly. Father and older daughter came to appreciate the benefits to them in mother's Relationship skills and orientation. Son began to understand father's anxiety, and reassured father both about his being heterosexual and (perhaps more important) about his respect and admiration for father. All reported a decrease in hostile behaviors and anxiety. A side benefit, not part of the original problems, was the increased respect of other family members, especially father, for younger daughter's logical approach to problems.

Case Summary #2

This 46-year-old woman, clinical director of a social agency, was very high in Information and Observer skills, high in Relationship skills, and very low in Power skills at the beginning of treatment. The presenting complaint was that she found it difficult to deal with Power-oriented psychiatrists and psychologists (both staff and consultants) and with the level

of competition that existed among the administrative and clinical staffs. She was experiencing similar difficulties with her five adolescent and adult children and with her husband, a middle-management administrator in a large manufacturing company.

Treatment involved two concurrent processes. Power skills and judgments were examined and discussed from a non-pejorative point of view (a new experience for this woman) as possible additions to her behavioral repertoire. Low-risk opportunities were designed for her to learn and practice these skills in individual and group sessions with the therapist and in daily life. The accompanying values were presented in positive fashion, and the implications of incorporating them into her existing value system were explored. At the same time, client and therapist traced the development of the client's existing skills and the ways in which her early experience affected her attitude toward—and acquisition of—Power-Approach skills and judgments.

The increase of Power skills enabled the client to function more effectively both at work and at home, with new appreciation of the values and pleasures of closure, achievement, and challenge. Although she continued to prefer and manifest the Information-Relationship skills and values, she made timely and appropriate use of the Power skills to forestall many of the conflicts that she had formerly believed to be an inevitable part of both her job and her family relationships.

Side benefits from this were a significant increase in playful and creative behavior on her part, and an increase in respect for both Information and Relationship skills and values from her family and from the agency staff. For instance, a very Power-oriented young social worker who had regarded the client's Relationship skills and values as a sign of weakness began to see her kindness as admirable, rather than as something to be exploited.

Current Status of PDM

At the present time, both diagnosis and treatment based on the PDM are in the early stages of systematic articulation. The explicit formulation of the PDM was the first step. Diagnosis and assessment are done clinically, although a comprehensive assessment is in its sixth year of development.

In addition to simply using the PDM to provide conceptual guidelines for conducting psychotherapy, the therapist may introduce the model or portions thereof explicitly as part of the procedure. The therapists who are using the PDM commonly offer to teach clients this way of looking at human behavior and resources, just as many proponents of other views teach their own structures to clients. Most of our clients are pleased to be offered an opportunity to look at human behavior in an orderly and

non-pejorative way and to participate actively in their own treatment planning.

Some clients regard the model as very complicated at first; however, most clients learn to use the concepts quickly and fairly accurately. It usually takes about three months for a person to gain an independent working knowledge of the PDM.

Clients report that the following aspects of treatment with the PDM are valuable to them:

1. It provides manageable and positive descriptions of behavior and options.
2. It is not punitive or insulting.
3. It offers considerable flexibility in defining and solving problems.
4. The assumptions made are explicit and by mutual agreement.
5. The client is respected and trusted.
6. Because the PDM deals with the whole range of behavioral options, both client and therapist can retain a sense of proportion about the need for and the processes of change.
7. The material integrates well with prior learning and experience.
8. Values are acknowledged, but neither promulgated or attacked.
9. The resources used in treatment are also useful in other settings—a high transfer of learning.
10. It is not coercive, but fosters cooperation, mutual trust, and respect.
11. Because it is cooperative, it is less stressful for both therapist and client, reducing client dropout and therapist burnout.
12. It is applicable to a wide range of situations, from situational difficulties to psychosis.

SUMMARY

A Descriptive Psychology approach to psychopathology and treatment is suggested and discussed briefly, using the Positive-Health Developmental Model (PDM) as an example of Ossorio's deficit model. The PDM is a conceptual framework for classifying persons and/or their behavioral capabilities in respect to Developmental Level, Degree of Mastery, and personal Approach, or perspective on the world. Because the PDM provides an assessment of a person's abilities or disabilities, it is a fairly direct implementation of Ossorio's definition of pathology: "When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction in his ability to (a) engage in deliberate action, and, equivalently, (b) participate in the social practices of the community." Two brief case studies and some preliminary notes on treatment were included.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE CONTRIBUTORS

Raymond M. Bergner is a clinical psychologist and Associate Professor of Psychology at Illinois State University. His work in Descriptive Psychology has been concerned with its application to the conceptualization of psychopathological phenomena and to psychotherapeutic practice. He was the 1983–84 president of the Society for Descriptive Pscyhology.

H. Joel Jeffery is a member of the technical staff of Management Support Technology, Inc., Denver, Colorado and an Associate Professor in Computer Science at Northern Illinois University. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science in 1974 from the University of Colorado, where he divided his time approximately equally between computer science and psychology (clinical and Descriptive). His interests are in computer applications of Descriptive Psychology technology, clinical psychology, and using Descriptive Psychology to provide a coherent formulation of spiritual concepts and issues. He is editor of the *Descriptive Psychology Bulletin,* and, with Volume 4, he joins the editorial board of *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*.

Kate MacQueen Marshall is a clinical psychologist, working predominantly in private practice, doing therapy with families, couples and individuals. She teaches Advanced Alcoholism/Family Therapy at Metropolitan State College in Denver, and consults at an area alcohol treatment agency. Her undergraduate work was completed at Oberlin College, and her MA and Ph.D. in clinical psychology were from the University of Colorado, Boulder. Her major specialty areas include the treatment of alcoholism and eating disorders from relationship and family perspective.

James M. Orvik is a Professor of psychology at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, where he has taught and done research on a variety of cross-cultural issues. He received his Ph.D. in social-personality psychology from the University of Colorado in 1970, where he developed his initial interest in Descriptive Psychology. A sabbatical at Cambridge University in 1979 provided the opportunity to combine his interest in migration and Descriptive Psychology, resulting in the contribution to this volume.

Peter G. Ossorio has been a member of the faculty of the Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, since 1961. He has been extremely active in the training and supervision both of clinical and non-clinical students. He is the founder of Descriptive Psychology as a systematic formulation, and the author of numerous monographs and technical reports. He is also the founder of the Linguistic Research Institute which has been engaged in research and consultation since the early 1960's. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Los Angeles in clinical psychology.

William B. Plotkin is Staff Psychologist at the Durango Pain Management Clinic and at the Southwest Colorado Mental Health Center, both in Durango, Colorado. He also maintains a private practice in psychotherapy and assessment. He creates and guides nine-day wilderness-based rites of passages (status-change and accreditation ceremonies) for adults. His research has focused upon hypnosis and trance, biofeedback, the placebo effect, dreaming, meditation, and the concept of consciousness. Presently, he is exploring the place of revitalized ritual and ceremony in contemporary culture and their use as a context for psychotherapy. He received his doctorate in psychology from the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1976, and has served on the psychology faculty at the State University of New York at Albany and at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado.

Anthony O. Putman is a Descriptive Psychologist who works primarily with organizations, systems, and communities. He is president of Descriptive Systems in Ann Arbor, Michigan, a firm which provides organizational consulting, modelling, and simulation to a wide variety of clients, and a Director of Management Support Technology in Denver, Colorado. He is a well-known speaker and teacher in the field of human resource development and organizations. During 1982–83, he served as the Society for Descriptive Psychology's President, and is the creator of an artificial intelligence device that consults to mangers of organizations.

Mary Kathleen Roberts works as a licensed psychologist with the Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program, Denver, Colorado. Much of her energy

is devoted to the practice and teaching of status dynamic approaches to therapy, and she is also interested in using Descriptive Psychology to understand a range of esoteric facts. She is currently (1984–85) President of the Society for Descriptive Psychology, and also serves on the editorial board of *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*.

Wynn Schwartz is Assistant Professor of Psychology at Wellesley College. He is a clinical psychologist and maintains a private practice in psychotherapy and assessment. He also serves as a consultant to the Charles River Hospital, the Boston Veterans Administration Hospital, and Powell Associates in Cambridge. Currently, he is a candidate at the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute. He was an undergraduate at Duke University and a graduate student at the University of Colorado, where he did his research and therapy apprenticeships primarily under the direction of Peter Ossorio. He interned at the University Health Services, Harvard University.

Mary McDermott Shideler is an independent scholar who for a number of years has been using Descriptive Psychology as a means of throwing new light on a number of classical problems in theology. She is a past president of the American Theological Society (Midwest Division) and of the Society for Descriptive Psychology, and the author of six books and forty-odd articles.

Jan Vanderburgh is a psychotherapist in supervised clinical practice and a management consultant in the Denver area. She is a graduate of Union Theological Seminary in New York, and is working on her Ph.D. degree in clinical psychology. Her primary interest at present is in positive health from a systematic point of view, and the applications of Descriptive Psychology in that context.

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