THE PRIEST AND THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST

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ABSTRACT

People consult with priests (ministers, rabbis, gurus) and with psychotherapists for many reasons, ranging from preventive care and maintenance of spiritual or psychological health to crisis intervention. In the last case—the only one I am concerned with in this paper—often the sufferer does not know whether what ails him is a spiritual or a psychological malaise; therefore he does not know where to turn for help. Moreover, often priests and psychotherapists themselves have difficulty in determining whether the problem is of the one kind or the other. I begin with the practical plight of the sufferer, and conclude with a Descriptive Psychology formulation of the relation between spirituality and psychology.

It can sweep over any of us at any time, in any place, that engulfing wave of desolation, emptiness, futility, dryness. If it occurs rarely and momentarily, we can pass it off as a transient mood, but if it returns frequently or intensely, or if it

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remains as a settled state, sooner or later we shall come to the point where we must go for help to get our heads above water. But to whom shall we go? Are we suffering from the incurable existential dread which is supposed to be the natural state of human beings, so that we have no hope except to endure it? Is it a psychological depression, or a spiritual malady, or a physiological symptom, or any combination of these, or something else entirely? Since we do not know what is wrong with us, how can we know where to go for treatment or guidance?

The woods are full of people proffering innumerable kinds of help for this kind of undiagnosed malaise, and here, obviously, I cannot canvass all the possibilities. Therefore I am limiting myself to the two that are most readily available to most people: a minister or priest or other person operating primarily within a religious tradition, and a psychotherapist operating primarily within a nonreligious tradition, often exhibiting itself as "scientific." What can we expect when we go to either of these? How do they differ? What can the one do that the other presumably cannot do, if anything? And more basically, how are the domains of religion and psychology related? In what follows, I shall be using the conceptual resources and methodology of Descriptive Psychology to present an alternative to the traditional ways of approaching such questions.

I

Let us suppose that we turn first to a priest or minister. If he—or she or they, this to be understood throughout—if he be of a fundamentalist persuasion, in all likelihood he will assure us that if we take Jesus (or whomever) into our hearts, the Lord will solve all our problems. Distinguishing between spiritual and psychological difficulties becomes unnecessary because in the end all are taken to be spiritual. In contrast, a cleric who has been ordained by one of the so-called mainline churches within recent years almost certainly has had training as a psychological counsellor, at least enough to identify when the people who come to him need more expertise than he possesses. And the chances are fair to excellent that he can deal adequately with many psychological problems short of psychosis. It is less likely that he will be equally competent in spiritual direction. No doubt he will be acquainted with a few books on prayer life or something of the sort, but books are not usually of great help to an individual person afflicted with the mystical Dark Night of the Soul, or bowed down with a sense of sin (which is not the same as feelings of guilt), or tormented by a theological problem as of evil or God, or starved for the sacraments or uncertain whether it is appropriate to pray for healing or a job promotion or the dead, or desperate to find the ultimate significance of everything that is.

Now let us suppose that next we confer with a psychotherapist. It is improbable, though not impossible, that the therapist will know or care very much about spiritual problems, and why should he? They lie outside the domain of psychology. He may assimilate the spiritual to the psychological, as was the case with a

therapist I know of who worked assiduously for years with a friend of mine to persuade him that his devotion to God was a misplaced effort to make up for the loss of his father when he was a small boy. Or the therapist may recognize that spiritual problems are legitimate and important in their own right but decline to deal with them, as in medicine an eye specialist might decline to set a broken pelvis. Another friend of mine, more fortunate than most, described to her therapist a mystical experience she had once had. He listened gravely, paused for quite a long time when she had finished, and then said, "Any of my colleagues who heard that would telephone at once for an ambulance and the men in their little white coats." Instead, the two of them went on to several very valuable discussions on the nature of spirituality and its relations with psychology, although not as spiritual director and directed.

We should not be surprised if these are the kinds of responses we get to our preliminary inquiries. The chances are strong that most priests and most therapists are conceptually confused not only with respect to the nature of spirituality and its place in human life, but also with respect to what their professional functions should be in dealing with persons who are, or claim to be, spiritually oriented.

II

Both spiritual advisers and psychotherapists are agents for producing personal change, and are presumably not only mentors but allies of their clients in the sense that both are committed to the welfare of the persons who come to them for help. From my own experience and that recounted to me, how the helper defines "welfare" depends not so much upon whether he is a priest or a therapist as upon whether he is functioning as a crusader or an emancipator. I differentiate these not by what they claim to intend or to achieve, but by what I have observed them to have accomplished or be accomplishing. The pure cases are rare. All the same, their respective effects are distinguishable, and for the most part readily so.

The crusader possesses a Truth, whether it be The Correct View of the nature of the world, or the Right Way to live. He is what has been called a True Believer: in Christianity, or Freudianism, or est, or atheism, or his own brand of eclecticism or empiricism, or his special charismatic powers or technical skills. Only the extremists among them declare boldly, "I have the truth that will set you free," but this is their mood, their temper.

In contrast, the emphasis of the emancipator—again, be he priest or therapist—can be described as attempting to remove or to make an end run around those restrictions that hinder the person from developing his capacities into abilities. The emancipator's approach is along the lines of, "Until you are free of your hate, your anger, your illusions, your inability to see alternative courses of action, you will not be able to function effectively. I am here to help you increase

your behavior potential." I do not know of any more vivid portrayal of being restricted than in Charles Morgan's novel *The Voyage,* where one character says of another:

> Barbet is limited—or, as you say, imprisoned—by his refusal to recognize anything exceptional—any exceptional power and therefore any exceptional duty in himself. He is like a man fitted to command who wishes always to remain a private soldier, or like a child of rare talent who says always, 'I am not different from the others in my class.' . . . He inhabits a house too small for him (Morgan, 1940, pp. 241–242).

An emancipating therapist of my acquaintance will sometimes set a client the exercise of doing whatever he spontaneously wants to do, subject only to the limitations that it be not dangerous to himself or others, and not by the prevailing standards illegal or immoral. It is a distinctly—not to say distinctively—double-negative approach with a flavor all its own. Compare the crusader's command, "Obey the law", with the emancipating direction, "Don't break the law". Even if both are spoken in a voice of thunder, they generate a different atmosphere and usually a different response. Or to take another example, how confining it is to be told, "Speak only the truth", how liberating to be told, "Don't lie", which leaves us free to dramatize, decorate, joke, and produce poetry or satire or fantasy, as well as to speak the truth plainly and directly.

A great body of nonsense has been uttered about the negativism of such religious edicts as the Ten Commandments, eight of which are "Thou shalt not's," by people who have not taken into account that all eight are *double* negatives: "to kill" is a forbidden act, therefore a negative concept, however positive the act of killing. Thus "Thou shalt not perform" (a negative), coupled with "a forbidden act" (another negative), results in a double negative. By defining the evils we should refrain from, the "thou shalt not's" leave us free to do what we will within those limits, which in this case allow us a considerable range of permissible behaviors. Think of how many things we can do with people short of murdering them, stealing from them, telling lies about them, and so on. We can teach and learn, buy and sell, talk and play and fight, engage in arts and games and work. We can love or hate them, provoke or console them, cooperate with or impede them—take your pick. These particular double negatives do emancipate, unlike positive prescriptions that define for us a set of behaviors that must be complied with to the letter. (Note that not all double negatives are liberating. If we are walking a tightrope, the injunctions "Don't fall off" and "Stay on" are about equally restrictive.)

As priest or therapist can be either crusader or emancipator, so both agents for personal change can use coercive or noncoercive methods to accomplish the desired changes. The one can invoke the fear of hell or impose harsh penances to compel orthodox behavior or to break down a proud and recalcitrant disposition. The other can subject his client to physical or chemical compulsions, or expose him to the violence of, say, Primal Therapy, in order to free him from bondage to

his past history or habits. The one can build up confidence by the laying on of hands, the other by the reassuring word. The one can facilitate release from bitter memories by confession, the other by ventilation. One lifts the burden of guilt by the rite of absolution, the other by a ceremony of accreditation. Either can be as wily as a serpent in order to appear as harmless as a dove, or be a candid and caring collaborator in the joint enterprise of accomplishing change in a direction everyone concerned has agreed upon in advance. So close are their affinities that psychotherapists are sometimes described, justly, as secular priests.

The spiritual adviser can claim to derive his authority from beyond himself, whether directly from God or indirectly from an intermediary presumed to be constituted by God, such as a church. This would carry weight only for those who confess the same God in the same way. But the therapist also can appeal to an external source which has constituted him an authority: a school of thought, or the body usually the state which has licensed him to practise. And in both cases, what is likely to count still more heavily is the personal power of the individual to convey that he "speaks with authority and not as the scribes" (Matt. 7:29).

It has been argued that the decisive difference between religious and secular consultants lies in the irreducible and incontestable nature of the problems which they are respectively concerned with, on the supposition that spiritual disabilities are by their very nature as distinct from psychological disorders as these are from physical ailments—recognizing that none of these are pure cases. Those who take this view are presupposing that we can have a way to determine what the essential nature of the problems "really" is, independently of the viewpoint from which they are observed, that is, of the conceptual framework of the observer. In fact, of course, any phenomenon can be described in more than one way and therefore can be approached from more than one direction, depending on the observers' conceptual resources and personal commitments.

III

There is widespread confusion among priests and therapists in diagnosing when a person's difficulty is primarily spiritual and when it is primarily psychological. This reflects a more basic confusion stemming from a long history of controversy on what is, or should be, the relation between psychology and religion. What are the frameworks, the worlds or domains, within which priest and therapist are expected to operate, and how are those worlds related?

Any world is a domain of possible facts and their interrelationships. Worlds are distinguished from one another by the particular facts that are involved, and the boundary of a world is generated by the internal links among those facts—compare the worlds of fashion and of football, or of science and of spirituality. The worlds that especially concern us here are what we might call the mundane and the transcendental, or the immediate and the ultimate.

Three concepts characterize the domain of transcendence: totality, ultimacy, and boundary condition. That is the world within which we ask questions like, "What is the meaning of everything that is—of the totality of being? What, ultimately, is the nature of the universe? What are the boundary conditions upon our possible behaviors and knowledge?" The mundane is our everyday world of people and personal relationships, jobs, houses, births and deaths, politics and economics, the sciences and the arts, sleep and play. The distinction between transcendental and mundane is so commonplace that it even appears occasionally in comic strips, like the one in which Hagar the Horrible asks his sidekick Lucky Eddie, over their cups, "What is the meaning of life? Why am I here?" After an interval of cogitation, Lucky Eddie answers, "Because if you were home you'd have to help with the dishes, right?" (Dik Browne, 1980).

The transcendental concepts of ultimacy and totality are familiar; that of boundary condition is less so. To clarify it, let me give two examples. The first has to do with the boundary condition of knowledge. Little Susie comes home from school announcing that Columbus discovered America. Her mother asks her how she knows that. Her teacher told her. How did the teacher know? She learned it from a book. How did the author of the book know? The teacher didn't say, and since Susie's curiosity has been satisfied by seeing the book, she happily goes off to play. A historian, however, will not stop there. He will go on and on to documents and their authenticity, to signs that the Irish or Scandinavians or Phoenicians or Chinese got here first, and to the weighing of evidence, but somewhere even the most erudite historian's knowledge comes to an end. As Peter Ossorio says,

> All knowledge has that structure, that you can back up some knowledge with other knowledge, and you can back that up with some other, but there is never an infinite sequence of backing up. You do reach an end point. The fact that you reach an end point is an example of a boundary condition with respect to knowledge, that knowledge is not founded on an infinite set of foundations, nor is it founded on a secure foundation. A secure foundation is just some other fact that one can ask questions about. So knowledge starts somewhere, and it doesn't start from further knowledge, ultimately (Ossorio, Note 1).

Where knowledge starts—the bottom line—is observation, not infinitely regressing knowledge; and the top line, its consummation, is not perfect knowledge but competence. But neither observation nor competence has a place within the domain of knowledge as such.

For my second example: Susie watches while her mother is cooking and asks, "Why are you doing that?" Her mother replies, "I'm fixing dinner." "Why are you fixing dinner?" "Because by dinnertime you'll be hungry and I want to feed you." "Why do you want to feed me?" "Because I love you." Susie is content to stop at that step in the "Why?"—the significance—series, and her mother is content to leave it there for the moment. But long since, she herself began grappling with the question of what place her cooking dinner has in her and her

family's life, and what place their life has in society and in the entire scheme of things, what its ultimate significance is, if any, in the totality that embraces all that is past, present, and future.

Susie's world is mundane, but in using a child to represent nontranscendental living, I do not mean to imply that the mundane orientation is in any sense childish. On the contrary, it would be easy to defend the proposition that a concern with what is beyond the mundane is an indefensible luxury, a waste of energies that should be spent fulfilling more urgent demands, so that it is "transcendentalists," so to call them, who are childishly evading reality. Such appraisals, however, are premature. We need to describe both worlds before we can properly evaluate them, and having described, we may conclude that such evaluations are uncalled for.

Returning to our priest and therapist: by definition, the domain of the priest is the domain of ultimate significance. What is the meaning of life and our lives? From whence do they derive their significance? What is our ultimate destiny? What is our place in the real world—defined in Descriptive Psychology as "the state of affairs that includes all other states of affairs" (Ossorio, 1971/1978, p. 29), the totally inclusive, limiting-case world? Further, how can we answer such questions? What ways do we have to answer them? And how much confidence can we place in the answers? I am not suggesting that any priest or minister is, or should be, able to provide satisfactory answers to all these, but he should certainly be able to recognize when they are the *kinds* of questions that a person is troubled by, even when that person is not sufficiently articulate to state them clearly, or is afraid to.

That fear can be real and daunting. My mother once approached me timidly—and she was not a timid person—with a question which she had not dared to ask anyone else lest she be judged literally, certifiably crazy. Stumblingly and at length she managed to get it said, and it turned out to be—restated in technical language What is the relation between the coherence and the correspondence theories of truth? Having never been exposed to philosophy, she believed it proof of her intellectual inadequacy and psychological abnormality to be exercised by what is in fact a highly sophisticated and important issue. Again and again I have talked with people who had been so firmly persuaded that it was frivolous or stupid or immature or pathological to entertain ultimate concerns that they could scarcely bring themselves to refer even indirectly to intimations of transcendence that had come to them.

I should perhaps add the caveat that although by definition the priest's domain is that of transcendence and ultimate significance, in practice his interests and competence may be wholly mundane, however pious his language. Since he of all people ought to be able to recognize the transcendental dimensions of a problem, if he fails to do so, the consequences can be unfortunate or even tragic.

Whatever the theory, in practice the psychotherapist is expected to deal primarily, if not exclusively, with the mundane, judging from the training required

for his accreditation and from what I know of licensing examinations. He focuses upon the individual's or family's personal characteristics, behavior, and relations with who and what surround him or them the world they live in. That world may be mundane or transcendental; his client—person or family—may or may not be asking ultimate questions and searching for ultimate answers. I do not believe that is within the province of the psychotherapist to attempt to convert a client to or away from a specific religious belief or practice. It is certainly within his province to initiate discussion of such matters, especially if his client has been unwilling or unable to recognize them as relevant through fear or ignorance or any other reason. But I submit that it is emphatically not within his province to impugn to any client the legitimacy and importance of transcendental questions or the search for transcendence, even if his own viewpoint be exclusively mundane.

The therapist is not necessarily excluded from the transcendental. The minister or priest is not necessarily excluded from the mundane. But in practice, we cannot take for granted that either will be competent in the other's domain. Unfortunately, all too often either priest or therapist presumes to a competence he does not have and should not be expected to have, or assimilates what he sees to his own specialty. Thus we find the therapist with no training in spirituality who offers advice on spiritual development, and the minister or priest with no training in psychotherapy who blithely takes on a paranoid schizophrenic, as well as the therapist who interprets spiritual anguish as psychological anxiety, and the priest who fails to recognize psychopathology when it is presented to him in terms of a spiritual orientation.

The solution is not that each should be required to undergo extensive professional education in both domains. That would be impractical for most people. But each needs to know enough about the other's domain that he will humbly confess his personal limits, and needs as well to become sufficiently acquainted with the resources in his community that when he is out of his depth, he will be able to refer a client wisely to other agencies or agents, as a competent family physician can tell that a patient needs a specialist in dermatology or neurology, or a neurologist can tell that the patient needs a dentist. And as the physician may have to know his patient well and expend considerable time in order to make his differential diagnosis, likewise the priest or psychotherapist may discern the person's central need only after careful and prolonged investigation.

IV

Many religious traditions have taken the mundane and the transcendental worlds to be necessarily in conflict, and the experience of many centuries has shown that indeed, a satisfactory adjustment to the mundane world can inhibit spiritual development; likewise, growth in spirituality can disrupt our relations with the mundane. The reasons are clear: at stake are different values, a different range of

knowledge, different attitudes and interests and styles and embodied performances. The domains themselves are not incompatible as, for instance, political parties or religious factions can be. But people whose primary devotion is given to one or the other do sometimes come into conflict, and that conflict, when it occurs, can be bitter. The mundane tend to distrust or resent the exotics in their midst; the spirituals become impatient with the earth-bound. (For a closer look at them both, and the relations between them, see Søren Kierkegaard's fable of the wild and the tame geese [Lowrie, 1962, pp. 360–362].) True, once in a while one will say to the other, "I am glad that you have what I do not. I give you balance and stability; you give me wings." Blessed are they who so respond to each other, but such generosity of spirit is not common.

My assertion that the mundane and the transcendental worlds are not incompatible, however, is based not on empirical observation but on the Descriptive Psychology definition of the real world, already quoted, as "the state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs." Thus the real world is a totality, is ultimately all that is, and there being nothing outside or beyond it reflects a boundary condition. It includes smaller domains, some of which are mutually incompatible, like those I mentioned earlier: fashion, football, science, and spirituality. But no domain can be—*logically* can be—incompatible with the whole of which it is a part, of which all domains are parts. One domain can exclude or contravene or engulf another, but such exclusions and contraventions and absorptions can occur without violating the framework within which they occur. The real world has places for all these disparate domains.

Logically, therefore, the mundane world cannot conflict with the real world within which it has a place, and since the real world, as the limiting case, corresponds to the transcendental world, necessarily they are compatible, as any part must be compatible with the whole within which it has a place. Questions relating to the whole, however, may be irrelevant to a particular part. Sanctity, for instance, does not automatically confer mastery of chess or relieve all physical and psychological ills. For that matter, neither is sanctity conjoined necessarily with competence in spiritual direction. Domain problems must be resolved within that domain, whether it be chess, cooking, psychology, or spirituality. And any transcendental ramifications or implications which a domain or a domain-problem has must be dealt with transcendentally, although in practice, such extensions are often so remote, or of so little concern to the persons involved, that they can be ignored, and the matter be dealt with satisfactorily on the mundane level.

This is not a new portrayal of the relation of psychology and spirituality, merely a new formulation of an old one, but historically it has been overshadowed by the Western devotion to dualistic distinctions that were then reified, so that now we tend to think in terms of "a mind" rather than "mental activities", "a body" rather than "an embodied person" (or nonperson), and "a spirit"—a thing—rather than "spirituality", a characteristic way of living, con-

cepts so embedded in our language as now to be almost ineradicable. "What is 'spirit'?" we ask, as if it could be pinned down like a butterfly, and as if "spirituality" were incomprehensible unless we have specified what that thing, "spirit," however immaterial, might be. But spirituality, as a class of ways of living, can be compared to the hedonic, prudential, ethical, and aesthetic value orientations, and who has tried to reify pleasure or prudence or righteousness or fittingness as we and unnumbered predecessors have reified "spirit"?

Taking spirituality as a class of ways of living, on what grounds can we appraise a way of life, our own or anyone else's? When it comes to our own, a good many of us say with St. Paul, "The good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do" (Rom. 7:19). We know how we fall short of, or diverge from, living the way we most want to live. When it comes to appraising others' ways of living, our first concern should be to identify the viewpoint from which we are observing them, with the clear recognition that there is not, and cannot be, one unconditionally "right" viewpoint—unless one is a crusader and, as you may have gathered, I am not very much interested in crusaders in this connection. But as a cardiologist and an orthopedist will look at a patient from different viewpoints, so the spiritual adviser and the psychotherapist will see the person who comes to them from their respective positions, and a friend will see him from a still different one. It is, of course, legitimate to shift from one viewpoint or position to another; it is inexcusable to confuse them, not to know what one is doing.

From my own viewpoint, any way of living is defective to the degree that it fails to meet the theological criteria of coherence, inclusiveness, and elegance, which can also be formulated as personal integrity, community, and—for lack of a better word joy (which is not to be mistaken for mere happiness), in contrast to inconsistency or fragmentation, isolation, and apathy. I invite you to propose your own.

Keeping in mind the last of the Descriptive Psychology maxims for behavior description, "Given the relevant competence, behavior goes right if it does not go wrong in one of the ways that it can go wrong" (Ossorio, 1969/1981, pp. 34–35), it may be useful to indicate here some of the more common ways in which spirituality—life *sub specie aeternitatis*—can go wrong to the point where the person's ability to live that way is significantly restricted.

There appear to be five principal ways in which spirituality can go wrong: deficits or defects in our knowledge, our values, our abilities, our dispositions, and our performances—our bodily acts—any of which can result in our not living fully and consistently in the light of ultimacy, totality, and boundary conditions, and so being imperfectly spiritual. Let us consider them one by one.

Defects in knowledge come in two main varieties, factual and conceptual. A nice example of a factual defect is the widespread belief that only the Eastern religions have well-developed techniques for learning to meditate and for practicing meditation, an error that could be corrected by a little attention to the facts of

Western history. Not even to know what the Western methods are, in fact, constitutes a restriction upon behavior potential that could be removed fairly easily. Conceptual deficits are likely to be more difficult to remedy, as anyone can tell you who has tried to work through and with the concept of eternity not as unending time, but as that state which is sometimes called "infinite contemporaneity," in which time and space do not limit action or knowledge or communication. Unless we have acquired the necessary concepts—made the necessary distinctions that notion of eternity will be not just nonsense, but utterly, opaquely unintelligible.

What we most value can restrict us spiritually: "I'm only looking out for Number One," for instance, or the victory of a cause or a country, when we set them up as the highest good to which we subordinate all other goods—love and beauty and wisdom and holiness. Is victory or Number One all that is worth living for? Moral philosophers have propounded more inclusive values: the greatest good of the greatest number, the golden mean, and the golden rule, among many others. But what place do these moral values have for such a value judgement as obedience to God regardless of the foreseeable social and personal consequences? What is the practical or social value of the mystical vision, of the contemplative life, of sacraments as means for infusing the holy into the mundane? Many people, including some priests and some therapists, will say there is none. And if there be none, there is no point in exploring the realm of transcendence at all, or building on our peak experiences, or venerating whatever or whoever opens to us the vastness of the transcendental domain. If there be no value, moral or otherwise, in living *sub specie aeternitatis*, our behavior potential is sorely limited. But let us note that the behavior potential of those unworldly souls who despise the mundane values of utilitarianism and the like is also significantly restricted.

Briefly to illustrate defective abilities, we can take the inability to imagine beyond the mundane, which can sometimes be traced to conceptual poverty. On a more practical level are such defects as the inability to concentrate. Concentration can be learned, and let no one underestimate its importance for spiritual development.

It should go without saying that certain dispositions, such as the trait of hardheartedness, or the attitude of cynicism about anything religious, will close a person off from the domain of transcendence. So can simple lack of interest. But these represent more nearly impediments to any form of spiritual life than ways in which spirituality itself can go wrong.

Some religious traditions teach that the very fact of embodiment is a hindrance to spirituality, that inevitably the letter (so to speak) cramps or distorts the spirit. Others refer in one way or another to "the spirit waiting for the letter, without which it cannot perfectly be" (Williams, 1950, p. 166): spirit without body is incomplete. All the masters of the spiritual life that I know of, however, have taught that not to give physical expression to what one has learned will

eventually, if not immediately, arrest spiritual development. The bodily performance need not be a perfect or completely adequate expression, but some fitting action must ensue upon every increase in knowledge or ability, and every change of values or attitudes.

V

By redescribing spirituality in terms of the transcendental concepts—ultimacy, totality, and boundary condition, with special emphasis on ultimate significance—we acquire formal access to a domain which for the most part has been treated either as essentially closed to all but a few, or else has been reduced to some mundane description that deprives it of its essential characteristics. Be it noted that "formal access" is not the same as "experiential access": the outsider who has had no spiritual experience is still outside. But with these resources, both priest and psychotherapist can identify what the person's special needs are as—to return to the earlier illustration—the physician can tell whether to refer his patient to a surgeon or to a physical therapist.

Moreover, this redescription can guide us more precisely than heretofore in our choices when to use mundane or transcendental concepts in our own lives and in relation to others. If we are alert, what another person says and how he says it will clue us in before long as to whether he is tormented by a mundane purposelessness or a transcendental meaninglessness, by a need for immediate satisfactions or by the passion toward ultimate consummation.

Thus what matters most as the waves and the billows pour over us is not so much whether we seek out a minister or priest or a psychotherapist, as whether the one we choose to work with has at least formal access to the domain of transcendence, and whether he is primarily a crusader or an emancipator. The crusader will direct his efforts toward replacing our previous errors with what he takes to be The Truth. His aim is to restrict our behavior potential—and hence our responsibility to save us from falling into whatever he sees as pathology or sin. The emancipator will be concerned to remove whatever is preventing us from achieving what we want to achieve, and will thrust upon us the responsibility for what we do when the constraints upon our knowledge, values, dispositions, and embodiments have been reduced, and our behavior potential is correspondingly increased.

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