ADVANCES IN DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

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ADVANCES
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FOREWORD

When work on Volume 7 of *Advances in Descriptive Psychology* began, we anticipated that it would have a single theme, communities. To a large extent it has turned out this way. The majority of the papers in this volume address various aspects of life as a person in a community, ranging from the human community (Bergner's work on destructive self–criticism and Felknor's on schools) to national cultures (Lubuguin's on immigration and enculturation) to the temporally limited but, as anyone who has seen one knows, highly significant, youth soccer team.

The first Section, though, would seem at first glance a substantial departure from the theme. That Section is entitled "Worlds." The papers of this section have been included in part because *Advances* is intended to be the publication of record for work in Descriptive Psychology, regardless of theme. However, there is a more fundamental reason. Communities are not merely groups of people, even groups of people who engage in practices together. As Putman points out in his seminal formulation, "Communities" (*Advances, Vol. 1*), members of a community share

a world; part of what it means to be a member of a community is to share a world with other community members. That world consists of everything that is real to a member of the community, as a member. It is what a member can see (or touch or hear or smell or feel) and act on. Thus, when a person becomes a member of a new national culture, i.e., is enculturated, he acquires a new world. The same is true when one joins a soccer team. And so, to talk about someone's world is to talk about the community (or communities) of which they are members.

One of the most distinctive and profound of Ossorio's contributions is his formulation of worlds and their connection to life and action. We have therefore included Ossorio's most recent work in this area, and three papers that explore aspects of worlds and persons as the opening section of this Volume.

It is one thing to say, "Let's have a Volume of *Advances* devoted to communities," but quite another to bring it into existence. The gap seems to be bridged primarily by plain hard work, and we heartily thank those whose labor and willingness to meet deadlines made the volume possible. We particularly wish to thank Lisa Putman for the many, many hours of work transforming a collection of papers into a bound volume. Without her effort and dedication this Volume would never have happened.

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H. Joel Jeffrey
July 15, 1998
DeKalb, Illinois

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PART I

WORLDS

Introduction

H. Joel Jeffrey

One of the most striking characteristics of Descriptive Psychology, one that is often either intriguing or puzzling to newcomers to the field, is its extraordinary range of applicability. It is fair to say that there are few if any other disciplines that apply, in other than a trivial way, to issues ranging from the most fundamental questions of philosophy to machine intelligence to athletic coaching. The papers in this volume address this range of issues. The first section is entitled "Worlds" because it addresses questions of what there is in the world and aspects of the relationship between a person and the world.

The first paper of the section, Ossorio's "What There Is, How Things Are," alerts the reader that something out of the ordinary is going on here. Ossorio addresses some of the most fundamental of all questions: What is real? What exists? What is a person? His treatment unique and provocative. Most "hard" scientists today regard such questions as answered: What is real is fundamental particles, and a person is an organism. Other than philosophers, most of us ignore such questions, finding them and the accepted "scientific" answers unsatisfying but the philosophical discussions unenlightening at best. Ossorio gives an entirely different kind of answer. Starting with the mundane example of a car leaving a parking lot, he shows the necessity for a conceptual framework for reality concepts that includes objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, and shows how a number of the apparent paradoxes of what exists result from attempts to make part of the framework do the job of the whole. He then moves to a similarly unusual treatment of the old, old chestnut, "What is a person," and answers it with, "A person is an

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individual whose history is paradigmatically a history of deliberate action in a dramaturgical pattern." Of objects we can say, "It is this thing here." Of a person we can never say only that; a person is always "the person who did this, in this life that makes sense in this way," and a person is never simply (or merely) "this thing here." A person someone "who lives life as *this* character in *this* human drama."

Jeffrey's paper on consciousness follows Ossorio's, a natural juxtaposition since Jeffrey's treatment of consciousness is a direct extension of Ossorio's analysis of real world concepts. Just as behavior is characterized in Descriptive Psychology with the 8–parameter Intentional Action formulation, Jeffrey articulates consciousness as that phenomenon any instance of which can be specified with three parameters: the individual that is conscious, the world that individual is conscious of, and the position in that world that the person is conscious as. It follows from this formulation that an individual (human or otherwise) will be conscious whenever that individual has a world and the relationship to that world that persons as we know them have. Any such formulation can only be as rigorous as the formulation of the concept of world, and for this Jeffrey uses Ossorio's analysis, the State of Affairs System. He discusses this system, and the technical representations of worlds, to show how using the State of Affairs system rigorously articulates the concept of world. He then applies this formulation of consciousness to a number of related issues, such as change of consciousness, experience, and feelings. The paper closes with a section on the possibility of computer–based consciousness, using directly the idea that what is necessary for consciousness is that the individual have a world, and what it would take for that individual to be a computer. (Of course, such an individual would no longer be just a computer, just as a person is not just a body.)

Cognitive psychology, and the associated information–processing model of a person, has overtaken both psychoanalytic and behaviorist psychology in scientific psychology today. As a computer scientist, Jeffrey brings an unusual perspective to discussions of information processing models of behavior, and in "Cognition Without Processes" he uses this perspective to look at cognitive psychology and cognitive processes in a different light. His aim in this paper is to "expand the field of inquiry" and methods available to cognitive scientists, an interesting goal when one considers the seeming ubiquity of the cognitive model in current psychology. He first discusses the status of cognitive process explanations, not from the standpoint of truth or falsity, but rather from that of explanatory value, concluding that the difficulty with cognitive process descriptions of behavior is not that they are wrong, but that they are simply re–descriptions, in the language of processes, of observable results. That is to say, information processing descriptions are not explanations. However, it is not his contention that cognitive psychology is without value. Rather, after providing definitions of cognition and cognitive psychology in terms of the discrimination of aspects of the world, he suggests formulating cognition not in terms of "how," i.e., of underlying processes, but in terms of

"what," i.e., what a person discriminates and what they must be able to do, in order to do so. This allows a shift of focus from the details of "internal processes" to the cognition itself, a cognition of object, process, event, or state of affairs. By focusing on the structure of what is observed, the range of inquiry and methods for those interested in cognition are significantly enlarged, and the paper closes with a discussion of some of the new possibilities.

Roberts' "Kurosawa's Relativity," is a tour–de–force in applying the Descriptive Psychological formulation of person and their world to the existential agony portrayed by Akira Kurosawa, the famous Japanese film artist. Roberts uses the Face in the Wall image, due to Ossorio, to elucidate the issues Kurosawa was grappling with. In *Rashomon*, the film that established Kurosawa as an internationally famous film maker, Kurosawa presents the shattering realization: No one can tell the Truth; no one has the courage to see things as they really are; everyone "lies." This situation is, as a character of *Rashomon* agonizes, horrible beyond anything, even mass murder and natural disaster. Forty years later, *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams* presents Kurosawa exploration of this issue and its meaning for human life. Since it consists of the presentation without comment of seven actual dreams, Roberts must interpret the dreams to find the themes Kurosawa is dealing with. One of the pleasures of this paper is the elegance and skill with which Roberts applies the rules of thumb for dream interpretation: Don't make anything up; drop the details and see what pattern remains; and check the applicability of the interpretation to the real life of the person. Following these rules, Roberts shows us how the films show Kurosawa struggling with an impossible situation: The realization that there is no one True Story of what actually happens, and the belief that without that One True Story all of life is grotesque, meaningless, and obscene. Roberts shows us that Kurosawa suffers from a version of what she calls the Old Lament, "If only I knew for sure": "If only we knew the Truth, then we could live good lives," and the converse, "Without the Truth, life is impossible and I am no one."

Roberts concludes her paper with a contrasting view of The Truth. One of the great revolutions of modern physics was to learn that there is no absolute velocity, no privileged frame of reference from which to measure the "True" velocity. There is rather a set of correspondences: From frame A, the velocity is a; from frame B, the velocity is b; and so forth. The "true velocity" is this "relativity set." And so it is with any question of "What really happened?" There are many true stories, the story as seen from a specific position, and the Truth is the "relativity set of behavior description/person characteristic pairs." *Rashomon* presents irreconcilable accounts, not a relativity set, because Kurosawa, having noticed that there is no One Truth, took it that the only other alternative was lies. Roberts concludes with a wistful note that we can but wonder what Kurosawa's genius might have enabled him to produce had he discovered this alternative view.

Descriptive Psychology is a language and systematically related set of concepts for describing persons, behavior, and the world. As these domains are closely and inextricably entwined, any discussion of one necessarily entails some discussion of the others. Development in Descriptive has, however, been primarily focused on behavior: what people do and why they do it. It has long and widely been recognized, though, that there is another class of questions entirely, those that are concerned with what one is, rather than what one does. It is these questions that Putman addresses in the final paper of this section, "Being, Becoming, and Belonging." This article provides the sort of systematic treatment of these domains, or aspects of being a person, that has until now been missing from Descriptive Psychology. Starting from the concept of status, Putman discusses consciousness, feelings, authenticity, soul, personal change, and the birth, growth, decay, and re-birth of communities. He provides a rigorous conceptual framework for understanding these phenomena, thereby enabling, as with all of Descriptive Psychology, persons to do a better job of living their lives in the world.

What There Is, How Things Are

Peter G. Ossorio

ABSTRACT

This paper addresses what it means to be real, what it means to say that something exists, and what is means to say that something is a person. Four kinds of things can be observed in the real world: Objects, processes, events, and states of affairs. These four concepts, and their inter-relationships as articulated by the State of Affairs System, are a conceptual structure adequate for describing all of the phenomena of the real world. All four (together with their formal relations) are required for understanding the real world. Assigning any of the four a privileged position as what is "really real" can be expected to produce bizarre and mysterious results, and this is just what has happened with the field of Ontology, which assigns that privileged method- ological status to objects. "What sort of thing is a person" is then addressed *via* the SA system. Formally, a person is a state of affairs, with object aspects (or constituents), including the body, process and event aspects, and other state of affairs constituents. In particular, certain of these aspects involve the assignment of other objects to positions in one's life, i.e., are dramaturgical. This leads to an expansion of the traditional Descriptive Psychology definition of a person: A person is an individual whose history is, paradigma- tically, a history of deliberate actions in a dramaturgical pattern.

COGNITION WITHOUT PROCESSES

H. Joel Jeffrey

ABSTRACT

A different approach to cognition that does not rely on "mental processes" is presented. Based on the premise that a person distinguishes some part of the real world, which may be specified completely and in detail *via* Object, Process, or State of Affairs descriptions, we show that "mental" or "cognitive" structures and processes are unnecessary and in fact are not even explanations. Information processing descriptions are encodings, in process language, of achievement descriptions. We show that cognitive tasks are more fully, accurately, and parsimoniously conceptualized and described as achievements, specifically the achievement of the tasks and subtasks codified in the Object, Process, and State of Affairs Units. This allows us to address the issues of interest to cognitive psychologists while avoiding the logical difficulties of the traditional "underlying process" approach. The approach expands the field of inquiry for cognitive scientists, allowing scientific investigation of a much wider range of cognitive phenomena. Finally, we discuss implications for diagnosing and treating a number of cognitive disorders.

Comparatively little work has been done by Descriptive Psychologists in the area of cognitive psychology. This appears to be due in significant part to the

fundamental conceptual incompatibility between the goals and conceptual framework of cognitive psychology as it exists today and Descriptive Psychology. The aim of cognitive psychology is to "explain the workings of the mind" in terms of underlying, computational, processes (Johnson-Laird, 1988, pp. 26-27). Descriptive Psychology, on the other hand, has as its stated aim the precise, systematic, comprehensive formulation of the concepts of person and the behavior of persons, including language, in the real world. There is literally no place in Descriptive Psychology for "internal constructs" or "underlying processes." (For readers not familiar with Descriptive Psychology, we must note that this does not mean that Descriptive Psychology is a form of behaviorism; the difference between Descriptive Psychology and both behaviorism and cognitive psychology is much more profound than that.) The aim of this paper is to show how one can study the subject matter of cognitive psychology without having to adopt the pre-empirical commitments to underlying constructs and information processing explanations usually considered part of the discipline. For Descriptive Psychologists, this expands the realm of facts about persons and behavior amenable to Descriptive methods. For more traditional psychologists (cognitive and other sorts), this approach expands the concepts and methods available for studying cognitive phenomena.

Since the conflict between Descriptive Psychology and cognitive psychology as traditionally practiced is not a historical accident, but reflects serious conceptual incompatibility, we begin by discussing that conflict, in order to resolve it. Following that, we present a different way to formnlate and approach questions of cognition and perception. Finally, we discuss some of the pragmatic implications of the new formulation.

THE UNDERLYING-PROCESS APPROACH

A variety of internal constructs have been proposed to explain and predict human behavior (Barsalou, 1992, pp. 8-9). Freudians explain behavior in terms of constructs such as ego and id; personality theorists rely on traits such as aggressiveness or extroversion; social psychologists focus on attitudes; philosophers claim the causes are knowledge and beliefs; people in "everyday life" rely on motivation, emotions, and states. Cognitive science is one of the more recent entries in this field, in which the fundamental element is the cognitive construct, and the fundamental processes are those that manipulate and transform those constructs. To the cognitive scientist, an explanation of behavior is a description in terms of cognitive constructs and processing or, equivalently, in terms of information processing.

Each of the various kinds of internal construct is assigned the status (i.e., the logical place) in their respective communities of being the basis for explaining and

predicting behavior. The constructs are mutually incomparable, and each conceptual framework is non-falsifiable. However, all internal-construct approaches have two factors in common. First, they all equate behavior with the physical processes organisms (including human beings) carry out, and consider these processes to be what is real. That concept is immediately recognizable to Descriptive Psychologists as the Performance parameter of Intentional Action (Ossorio, 1981). Thus, all of the internal-construct frameworks equate behavior with performance.

Second, all of the various internal-construct approaches share the view that the performances (which they equate with behaviors) are to be explained and predicted in terms of other facts, events, objects, and processes, in most cases not directly observable, which "operate" to produce the observed performance. Each discipline has its own fundamental object and process, but all of the various disciplines and communities have the same commitment to what constitutes an explanation: The real thing (the performance) must be described, using the theoretical objects, processes, events, and states, so that the performance is literally the outcome of the underlying process. Further, these processes are of the sort that can be carried out by machines (Johnson-Laird, 1988), and therefore underlying process explanations are mechanistic explanations. Underlying process explanations are regarded as having the status of "scientific," which is to say that underlying process descriptions are the only form of description acceptable as an explanation, and to give any other sort of description is to give a defective or non-scientific explanation, or not to give an explanation at all. For example, to one who has made this methodological status assignment, the question, "Why did he get a cup of coffee?" must be answered with an internal-process explanation. "Because he likes coffee, and because he's tired and knows it will help him wake up a bit" does not count as an explanation.

A Specific Underlying Process: The Cognitive Process

Cognitive psychology is the study of "the processes allowing an organism to know or be aware, including perception, reasoning, conceiving, and judging." (Wolman, 1973) Its central theme is the study of these abilities in terms of information processing: bow information is acquired, stored, retrieved, and transformed to produce these activities. The advent of computers has given great impetus to the field, as computers would appear to provide a case in which a physical machine produces behavior in the real world, and the behavior of the machine can be explained in terms of information processing. The fact that both brains and computers can be described as mechanisms that take in input and produce output is often taken as evidence of the appropriateness of the information processing model of behavior.

Since the late 1970s, a technical development in the field of artificial intelligence has seemed to add further plausibility of the cognitive–process approach: expert systems. An expert system is a computer program that reproduces a certain range of the reasoning abilities of an expert. Such systems use a set of rules for drawing conclusions, and program to combine or "chain" these rules together. The rules are if–then rules, much like the classic Socratic syllogism:

> If X is a man, then X is mortal.
> Socrates is a man.
> Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

To see the operation of the rules and the process of chaining conclusions, consider the following very small example of such a "rule base" (as they are called), a set of rules for identifying various animals based on their characteristics:

> 1. If the animal is a carnivore
>   and   is tawny
>   and   has dark spots
> Then the animal is a cheetah

> 2. If the animal is a mammal
>   and eats meat
> Then the animal is a carnivore

> 3. If the animal has sharp teeth
>   and   has claws
>   and   has eyes pointing forward
> Then the animal is a carnivore

Given a set of observations, the program (called an "inference engine") uses the rules to identify an animal, as follows:

The first rule with a conclusion that is an animal type is Rule 1. Rule 1 states that in order to be a cheetah, the animal must be a carnivore, be tawny, and have dark spots. Known facts are checked. It is not known whether the animal is a carnivore, so the engine examines the other source of facts about animals, the rule base, for information about how to tell whether an animal is a carnivore. The first rule that tells how to conclude that an animal is a carnivore is Rule 2, which states that if the animal is a mammal and eats meat, it can be concluded that it is a carnivore. The engine now repeats: it searches for information about "mammal" in the list of known facts. If it fails to find this fact in the known facts, it examines the rule base for a rule that would allow it to conclude that this is a mammal. There is no such rule, so the engine gives up on trying to satisfy Rule 2, and looks at the next rule that

would allow it to conclude that the animal is a carnivore, Rule 3. Each of the if–clauses in Rule 3 is an observable fact. If these facts are observed to be true, Rule 3 is satisfied, so the engine concludes that the animal is a carnivore, adding that fact to its list of known facts. If "tawny" and "dark spots" are observed to be true, Rule 1 is satisfied, and the engine concludes that the animal is a cheetah.

Since deductive logic is a kind of reasoning people engage in, an expert system is reproducing one kind of task traditionally considered a paradigm case function of the human mind. Further, in many cases people observably do act on logical rules of this form. If, for example, a person is asked, "How did you know it was a cheetah?," they will cite Rule 1; if asked, "Well, how did you know it was a carnivore, they will cite Rule 2 or Rule 3. These facts have been taken as evidence that persons have a "mental process" for doing this kind of reasoning. These facts lend considerable plausibility to the picture that a person is following this process without knowing it, i.e., "unconsciously."

Thus, while a cognitive psychologist will often acknowledge logical problems at the foundations (to be discussed below), he is well within the accepted norms of the scientific community at large when he says, "Those issues are no doubt important, but I am sure they will yield to further investigation, and in the meantime we have this valuable approach to the fundamental questions of human behavior, whose utility has been demonstrated by modeling of human information processing by computers."

Difficulties with Cognitive Process Explanations

There are a number of problems with the traditional cognitive process approach, including reductionism, the explanatory value of cognitive process descriptions, *prima facie* plausibility, and usefulness in practical situations.

Reductionism and Determinism

Cognitive processes are processes that can be carried out by machines; they are processes that can be described formally as Turing–computable, i.e., can be done on a computer (Johnson–Lard, 1988). Cognitive process accounts are therefore mechanistic accounts, and cognitive process accounts of human behavior are a version of the argument that people are machines and behavior is determined.

This is not universally seen as a problem. Within cognitive psychology, for example, the accepted view is that "the fundamental laws of the physical world determine human behavior completely" (Barsalou, 1992, p. 91). Many other scientists, and educated people generally, hold that although behavior is not determined, there must be underlying mental processes to explain memory,

reasoning, etc., and they are simply untroubled by deterministic implications. However, among those interested in a broader range of human phenomena, such as the problem of consciousness and its relationship to the brain, any such consensus fragments rapidly. (See for example Velmans, 1996; Velmans, 1995; Chalmers, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose, 1996; Hardcastle, 1996; and Chalmers, 1997.)

The cognitive process approach is to search for and study processes that are presumed to underly "behavior." However, behavior is not a species of process (Ossorio, 1997, p. 108). Process is one aspect, or constituent, of behavior, i.e., the process is one of the things one must specify in order to specify a particular instance of behavior, but there are several others. One of the other aspects is the set of distinctions the person is acting on (Bergner, 1991, p. 142; Ossorio, 1985, p.171). An everyday example of this distinction is the very young child that "makes a telephone call" by pushing the buttons on the telephone. The process the child engages in is identical in all relevant aspects to that of an adult making a telephone call, but we all recognize that the child is not acting on the distinction of "telephone number." (The full set of constituents of a given behavior is given by Formula (1), in the following section.)

Since computers and computer processing are the pervasive metaphor in cognitive science, it is illuminating to consider another example of the distinction between the concepts of behavior and process. Consider a paradigm case of a task commonly done today both by persons and computers: balancing a checkbook. To say that a person is balancing a checkbook is to say among other things that (1) his goal is to have the balance, and (2) he knows that the amounts he is subtracting are the amounts on checks, i.e., is acting on the distinction of check amount vs. other things. If, for example, the person did not know he was subtracting check amounts, but only that he was subtracting numbers, or that the result was the amount of money in the bank, we would not say this was a case of the *behavior* of checkbook balancing, even though the result was numerically correct.

Since process is only one part of what makes a given behavior what it is, no description of a process, whether in information–processing or physiological terms, could be a description of the *behavior*. It follows that no description of processes, no matter how complete or detailed, can be the description of the behavior of a person. Since persons engage in behavior, and mechanisms by definition are the kind of thing whose "behavior" can be completely described by processes, it follows further that a person is not a mechanism, of any sort.

To one not familiar with Descriptive Psychology, this may seem to be begging a very old philosophical question, but it is not. It is an instance of the distinctive approach of Descriptive Psychology: In the spirit of Wittgenstein, and more generally of science, one examines what is, rather than what "must be." "What is" in this case is that the concept of person and the concept of mechanism are not the same. "A person is not a mechanism" is not an assertion of an empirical

proposition; it is a reminder of a logical fact, comparable to "Chess is not a form of checkers."

This does not mean that one could not discover empirically that a given individual that had appeared to be a person was in fact a mechanism. It does mean that it is not possible to reduce the concept of behavior to that of process, or the concept of person to that of mechanism.

There remains the possibility of asserting that while person and mechanism are not the same concept, the objects that are usually called "persons" are in fact mechanisms, and that choice is an illusion, a cognitive phenomenon to be explained by cognitive processes (Barsalou, 1992, p. 91). This would be comparable to saying, "Certainly the concept of unicorn is not the same as that of horse. But in reality there are no unicorns, only horses." Is it possible then that we are all mechanisms whether we know it or not, i.e., is it possible that none of us are persons?

The logical difficulties with such an assertion are of two sorts (Ossorio, 1978). First, if the sentence is a statement, and is true, then it follows immediately that all "persons" are the logical equivalent of tape recorders, i.e., are devices that emit sounds, not persons that make statements. (Think of a cash register that emits the sounds of "Thank you"; do any of us seriously count this as a "statement of appreciation?") Only a person can make a statement (although many machines can print characters or emit sounds that would make up a sentence appearing to be a statement). Being a statement is a matter of having a certain status, and that status is a status in the community of persons. When a person makes a statement, he is acting as one who can know the facts and act on them, and assign statuses and act on them. Tape recorders cannot assign status or know things; they are logically ineligible. In particular, a tape recorder can emit sounds, but cannot assign itself the status of "mere tape recorder." Thus, one who attempts to assert that all behavior is determined and persons are mechanisms can continue to make the assertion only until he makes his point, for when he does, he has succeeded (probably only momentarily) in claiming to be an attractive nuisance, namely a tape recorder that looks like a person.

The situation, in which what fails is the attempt to treat the sentence as a true statement, is akin to the famous Liar's Paradox: One can say with no difficulty, "You all lie all the time," but "All of us lie all the time" is nonsense: If the statement is true, then it is false. Similarly, "You are all tape recorders" is logically coherent, albeit insulting; "We are all tape recorders" is literally nonsense.

Since "all behavior is determined by physical facts," or the equivalent "we are all mechanisms," are not statements, i.e., are not sentences that could be true or false, what else might they be? Noting that the key issue is one of the status of the sentences, and the status of one who assigns a status to a sentence, it is clear that what is at issue is not a matter of truth, but of standing: the standing of being one who assigns status. The result of treating the sentence as a true statement is the loss

of status as a status–assigner, because mechanisms are logically ineligible to assign status. The sentence is thus an attempt to degrade the status of the speaker and all other persons from status–assigner to mechanism; it is a degradation ceremony.

In more detail, referring to the elements of the degradation ceremony (Ossorio, 1978), the deterministic thesis is presented as a truth which is important to know, and therefore is being presented to a community of individuals who (1) are capable of distinguishing truth from untruth, (2) value truth over untruth, (3) are capable of choosing to act on beliefs regarded as true, and refusing to act on untrue ones, (3) value acting on true beliefs over false ones, and (5) hold each other accountable for so acting. In this community, the thesis presenter is denouncing as perpetrators (i.e., violators of the community standards) everyone in the community, for the thesis states that all behaviors of everyone in the community are not chosen on the basis of beliefs about what is true, but are determined irrespective of beliefs, and in fact that the belief in choice is an illusion. Since acts are based on other antecedents, none of us is responsible for our actions, at any time, including those of the denouncer as he denounces.

In short, to attempt to present the deterministic thesis in any form, cognitive or otherwise, is to attempt to say that none of us, including the would–be presenter, is one of us. The "thesis" is not true, nor is it false; it is logically incoherent.

Cognitive Processes: Are They Underlying, and Are They Explanatory?

Perhaps as a solution to the old intractable problem of how purely mental processes could affect physical actions, the customary view within cognitive psychology today is that "the relation between the neural and cognitive accounts of the brain [is] analogous to the relation between electronic and information processing accounts of computers" (Barsalou, 1992, p. 58). Consider again the task of balancing a checkbook, but this time being done by a computer. The computer may be described as processing information (the starting balance and the amounts of the checks written) with arithmetic operations to produce the ending balance. If we describe the activities of the components of the computer running this program (its transistors, wires, etc.), we have an electronic account of the process. Analogously, the person balancing the checkbook carries out an arithmetic process with numbers that represent balances and amounts of checks, and this process can be described neurophysiologically. Thus, arithmetic processes are said to "underlie" balancing the checkbook, and physiological or electronic processes to "underlie" arithmetic processes.

There is no question that one can give information processing descriptions of human behavior. However, such descriptions are seriously deficicient, in at least two ways. The first is that since describing a process is not the same thing as describing a behavior, any description of the process alone is incomplete. In the checkbook balancing case, a description of the arithmetic process, whether carried

out by a person or computer, does not include a specification of what the numbers represent (balances and amounts), nor of the fact of representation, i.e., that the number represents the real world amount. Balancing a checkbook and doing sums and differences are two different behaviors; for the behavior to be that of balancing a checkbook, the numbers must be amounts of balances and checks. Therefore the description of the arithmetic process does not specify the behavior of balancing the checkbook.

Since behavior paradigmatically involves a process, and processes have sub-processes or stages, it makes sense to say that a behavior involves sub-processes. Recursively describing sub-processes at finer and finer levels of detail, one can arrive at specifications of neural or electronic processes involved in a behavior. These processes are "involved in" the behavior in just this way, namely, they are redescriptions of the process aspect of the behavior. However, they do not "underlie" the behavior, because to say that would be to say that the behavior is *nothing more than* the underlying processes. In the same way, one may specify the physical movements necessary to move a pawn in chess, but these movements do not "underlie" pawn moves.

The second deficiency of information processing descriptions is that they are not explanations, even of the process aspect of behavior. Information processing descriptions are merely redescriptions.

To see why this is so, let us examine a paradigm case cognitive task and cognitive explanation of it: The spreading activation model of word recognition. Barsalou (1992, p. 45) presents the "process" of recognizing the word "butter" with this model: Innate detectors detect features found in letters: Straight lines, curves, circles, etc. Outputs from feature detectors feed into (acquired) detectors for individual letters ("b," "u," etc.). Outputs from letter detectors feed into word detectors. The process of recognizing "butter" is as follows: The feature detectors detect the features in a "b"; the "b"-detector is activated and sends a signal to the "butter" detector. The same thing happens with the other letters. The six inputs from the letter detectors result in the activation of the "butter" word detector, and thus "butter" is recognized.

Examining this model we find the following: (1) The recognition of individual letters, (2) recognition of features, and (3) a description of these achievements as the operation of objects (detectors) carrying out processes. If these objects and processes were actual objects and processes, then this description would certainly be an explanation, in the same way that the flow of blood through the veins and arteries, pumped by the heart, is an explanation of the observed fact of the human pulse.

However, as Barsalou emphasizes, *the objects and processes (detectors and activation signals) are not objects and processes in the brain.* This means that "detector" and "sending a signal" are simply ways of talking, not descriptions of real objects and processes. They therefore cannot "underlie" observed behavior, nor

can they serve as explanations. By way of illustration, consider the following "explanation" of the pulse:

> "The observed pulses can be modeled as a process in which a pump pumps a fluid through tubes, but the pump, tubes, fluid, and the pumping are *not* actual objects and processes in the body."

Such a description would be saying no more than, "It is as though there were something that pushed fluid. . ." Describing something by saying, "It is as though . . ." is a metaphor. Metaphors are often useful, but they are not explanations.

The spreading activation network account is a redescription in process language of the sub-tasks required to accomplish a recognition task, including temporal relationships among the sub-tasks. The objects and processes used in the redescription re-state the achievements and their temporal relationships in a different form. The redescription, which is customarily called a model, is thus an *encoding of achievement descriptions.* An encoding is not an explanation; it is a re-statement, in encoded form. If one examines the various subject matters studied by cognitive psychology (categorization, skill acquisition, perception, reasoning, memory, language, etc.), one finds that cognitive-process models are all of this sort: A description of a set of achievements involved in some task and the redescription of those achievements in the language of processes.

In other words, it is not that cognitive-process descriptions of behavior cannot be given; it is that these descriptions are not explanations.

The Status of Internal Mechanism "Explanations"

Internal process descriptions of behavior are not explanations, but this does not mean they are of no value. Internal process descriptions are redescriptions in another form (i.e., encodings) of achievements, and in general have the value that encodings do: they generally are compact representations of the data, are often technically interesting in their own right, and may in fact have some predictive utility. Consider the following hypothetical experiment: An experimenter asks a subject to write down "random" numbers, i.e., numbers with no particular pattern. After 20 numbers have been written down, the experimenter examines them, and finds that he can write down an algebraic formula that correlates highly with the sequence the subject has written. In such a case, the experimenter would have reason to predict that the next number would agree with the formula as well. In general, if one actually has a specification of a computational procedure whose outputs correlate highly with the achievements of some set of experimental subjects in some task, one has reason to predict that those subjects will continue to produce results describable in terms of that procedure, if they continue to do that task under those conditions. The flaw with internal-process descriptions is not giving them, or using them, but assigning them the status of explanation.

Plausibility

The plausibility problem is that in many cases there is simply no process observable, even on close inspection. In such cases, we have a number of observations of behavior in a variety of circumstances, such as recognizing words or recalling nonsense syllables, and a description of the outcome in terms of a process. But in almost every case the phenomenon reported is, "I saw it, that's all." The usual explanation of this is, "The process was unconscious," or "It happened so fast that they did not know it." A traditional cognitivist, committed to underlying process explanations, would not see any problem here, but there is one nonetheless: These "explanations" both amount to an insistence that there must have been a process, not evidence that there was one.

Practicality

The practicality problem is that if one needs elaborate and complete descriptions of complex cognitive tasks, such as one does in building expert systems, assuming that there are internal cognitive process is of very limited practical value. There are many things people do for which they simply have no answer to the question, "How did you do that?" In such cases the model is of little help, and in actual fact is often harmful, as it imposes a preconceived framework that in some cases fits the facts poorly. Many human abilities, including some that have been reproduced to some extent with expert systems, are of this sort. Diagnosis tasks, recognition tasks, and decision tasks are all common examples. The cognitive model can only be used by insisting that the person "must have the rules in his head." This amounts to insisting that the person give descriptions in terms of rules. One would expect that a human expert, faced with such insistence, would often respond with rule descriptions, and they do. One would also expect such insistence to change the behavior of the expert, and in fact this is a common report from experts whose knowledge has been "extracted" and represented this way.

THE PERSON CONCEPT: A DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK

Descriptive Psychology is also a conceptual framework with a fundamental object and process. That object is the Person, and the process is the behavior of a Person. Very briefly, the concept of behavior in Descriptive Psychology is that articulated by the parametric formulation of Intentional Action (Ossorio, 1981):

$$IA = <I, W, K, Kh, P, A, PC, S> \qquad \text{Formula (1)}$$

in which   I is the individual whose behavior this is;

W (Want) is the goal, the state of affairs the individual is trying to bring about

K (Know) is what the person knows, i.e., the set of distinctions being acted on

Kh (Know-how) is the skills involved in carrying out the behavior

P (Performance) is the observable performance

A (Achievement) is the state of affairs that is the actual result of the behavior

PC (Personal Characteristics) is the personal characteristics that this behavior is an expression of, including abilities, knowledge, values, traits, attitudes, interests, styles, capacities, embodiment, and states

S is the larger social practice that this behavior is a part of

(As noted above, the P parameter, the observable process, is what is singled out as the "real" behavior in the underlying-process approach to explaining behavior.)

Bergner (1991) presents a very instructive example, a person playing a trump card in bridge:

I	=	Jill, the individual whose behavior it is
W	=	winning the trick
K	=	trumps vs. non-trumps, hearts vs. other suits, what trump is in this contract, a trick in bridge
Kh	=	Recognizing trumps, recognizing an opportunity to play a trump, playing the trump card
P	=	Pulls the card from the hand and lays it down on the bridge table
A	=	The trick is won
PC	=	Jill's intelligence, knowledge of bridge, interest in bridge
S	=	Playing a game of bridge

As the example illustrates, none of these parameters refer to "internal" constructs or processes; describing a person's behavior is a matter of specifying these eight parameters, each of which is public and observable. Specifically, the K parameter does not refer to an "internal" state or construct, but to the distinctions the person is acting on. In any particular instance of behavior, the value of the K parameter is a list of the states of affairs the person is distinguishing (and acting on): trumps in the contract, that the window is open, that the argument is flawed, that the person is joyful, that the fly is buzzing around, etc. To say, "A knows X" is to say, "A has distinguished that X is the case." That a person has distinguished X is a fact, i.e.,

a state of affairs, and so to say, "A has distinguished X" is to give an *achievement description* (Ossorio, 1981) of A's behavior.

The paradigm case of behavior is that a person distinguishes X (the K parameter) and acts on it in an observable way (the P parameter). Many of the cases of interest in cognitive psychology are derivative ones, in which there is no observable performance. Doing arithmetic is an instructive example. The paradigm case of arithmetic involves wanting the numerically correct result (W parameter); distinguishing various numerical facts (K parameter); engaging in visible performances, such as adding up numbers with pencil and paper, doing long division (P parameter), etc.; getting numerical results (A parameter); and so forth. However, we are all familiar with "mental arithmetic," in which one gets the answer but goes through no observable performance. This behavior is described by setting the P parameter to null, indicating that the person is making arithmetic distinctions and getting results as in the paradigm case, but there is no observable performance.

The states of affairs a person can distinguish (and those they may want, the W parameter) are not limited to those that involve individuals present at that moment, or actual individuals at all. I may remember that I read a book yesterday, think over how I'd like my children to behave, imagine Dorothy in the Land of Oz, or consider the possibility of war breaking out next week. In each case, the state of affairs is an actual one: that I read the book; that war may break out; that my children could behave in certain ways; that Dorothy and the Land of Oz are elements of an actual story (a description), and that the story is *this* one and not some other one. In each case there are behaviors that are cases of acting on these distinctions: I could discuss the book, congratulate my children on how they are dealing with a situation, draw a picture of Dorothy in the red shoes, or begin stockpiling food. (The concept of state of affairs is elaborated in the following section, "What Is There To Be Distinguished?")

It could be argued that this is simply another framework, and that Descriptive Psychology is merely using a different concept of behavior. However, as Ossorio has discussed (1995), this is not a matter of simply having competing concepts, in which "you pays your money and you takes your choice." Intentional Action formulates the concept of behavior *we, as persons, already* have, the concept we share that makes it possible to have theories and disagreements about behavior. (If two people do not have the same concept of something, they cannot disagree about it. They can only misunderstand one another.) Formula (1) is a reminder of what it takes to give a complete description of a behavior, and that any description that leaves out one or more parameters is incomplete. "Jill knew what trumps were," "Jill took the trick," and "Jill pulled a trump from her hand and laid it on the table" each specify Jill and one other aspect of the behavior (K, A, and P, respectively); each is incomplete. Underlying process descriptions are in effect Intentional Action descriptions with several parameters unspecified, i.e., partial descriptions.

Our task here however is not to defend or otherwise appraise the relative merits of the two conceptual frameworks, a job that has been done comprehensively by Ossorio (1978, 1995). It is rather to show where cognition, perception, reasoning, and judgment, the subject matter of cognitive psychology, fit in the study of persons, and that all of what is of value in understanding these facts about persons may be retained, and enhanced, without the necessity of adopting the underlying–process approach. Specifically, we seek to show how to study cognition without having an information processing or any other underlying process model.

Defining Cognition Without Processes

Despite their problems, cognitive process descriptions are in some ways attractive: They address a very significant range of phenomena of considerable interest to many, are technically elaborate and often useful, and in many cases do seem to correspond to what people do. To dismiss the study of perception, cognition, and reasoning entirely would be extreme, to say the least. Fortunately, it is not necessary.

We must first clarify what is meant by cognition. The traditional definitions will not do, for they are in stated in terms of underlying processes. The above–cited "processes that allow an organism to know or be aware" (Wolman, 1973) is typical. However, if we examine the definitions, and the use of the defined terms, we can see two constituent concepts: (1) processes, and (2) outcomes of those processes. The spreading activation network model of recognition described earlier is an example. When one perceives that something is the case, one distinguishes this state of affairs from others, and that this state of affairs is actual, not merely possible. When a person reasons about something, the person arrives at a new description of that thing, of its components and their relationships, or of its relationships with other parts of the world. Judging and conceiving are both types of this redescription. We therefore adopt the following:

Definition 1: Cognition is the discrimination of states of affairs, including perception, reasoning, conceiving, and judging.

Definition 2: Cognitive psychology is the study of the abilities of persons to discriminate and redescribe constituents of the world.

Studying Cognition Without Processes

Cognition refers to a range of facts about persons. The study of cognition is the study of the abilities of perception, reasoning, etc. As is the case for any set of

abilities, the context of cognition is behavior, the behavior of persons. To say that a person engaged in a particular behavior is to say (among other things) that they acted on particular distinctions. The cognitive process approach would be to ask, "How does a person distinguish a spade from a heart?" We ask, instead, "What must a person be able to distinguish in order to be able to tell that this is a spade, not a heart?" In general, the cognition–without–processes approach is:

> Rather than *how* a thing is distinguished, ask: *What* is the person distinguishing, and *what must they be able to do* in order to do that?

The traditional approach is to take it that people build "models" that somehow make a coherent picture of "sense data" or "bits of information" from the external world. The new approach is to note that persons make discriminations and act on them, that what can be discriminated is elements of the world, and that these elements have structure, i.e. they have constituents in specific relationships to each other. For a thing to be what it is it must have that structure, and therefore distinguishing an X is the same thing as distinguishing that one has the constituents of X in the relationships that they have in an X.

(We must at this point emphasize what is *not* being said here: We have said nothing about the allowable kinds of constituents and relationships. This will be addressed in the following section, but let us note in preface to that discussion that these constituents are not limited to physical objects, and the relationships not limited to physical, or even to mathematically definable, relationships. In fact, the relationships a person distinguishes and acts on far outnumber the relationships for which there are explicit names. Finally, the fact that distinctions are made in no way implies that they are made *via* the manipulation of symbols.)

Looking back at the example of recognizing the word "butter," we see that in order to be this word, it must have the six letters it does, and these letters must be next to each other and in the correct order; if these constituents and relationships are present, we have the word "butter." The constituent letters themselves have various features that make them what they are: a "b" must have vertical line connected to a circle; the circle must be to the right of the line; the circle must be touching the line; the line must be taller than the circle. (Other descriptions, with other constituents and other relationships, are of course possible.) If these constituents are present, in these relationships, we have a letter "b"; and so on.

Thus, the spreading activation network model is not incorrect; it is just not a depiction of a process. It is a depiction of the *logical constraints on what one must have to have the word "butter."* Since this is what one must have to have "butter," to recognize "butter" a person must be able to make these distinctions. Therefore, the network is simultaneously a depiction of the logical constraints to be "butter," and the distinctions one must be able to make in order to recognize "butter."

WHAT IS THERE TO BE DISTINGUISHED?

If cognition is the discrimination of what is the case, then what is there to be distinguished? In general, states of affairs. However, this is the barest beginning of what there is to say. Distinguishing is the distinguishing *of* something in the world, and we must therefore ask, "What is there in the world that a person could distinguish?" In *"What Actually Happens"* Ossorio (1978) has discussed this question in great detail, giving a systematic presentation of the concepts of states of affairs, objects, processes, and events, and the logical connections between them. The following discussion is based on Ossorio's analysis.

The contents of the K parameter, i.e., the specification of what the person takes to be the case, are states of affairs. Each state of affairs consists of some constituents, which must be related in certain ways for that state of affairs to be the case. The constituents of states of affairs may be objects, processes, events, or other states of affairs.

For example, I see that my pencil is on my desk. I am observing (perceiving) a state of affairs. That state of affairs has two constituents, the object named "my desk" and the object named "my pencil," and the relation named "on." If I could not discriminate a desk, a pencil, my desk in particular, my pencil in particular, (i.e., distinguish this from other things), and the relationship "on," I could not distinguish this state of affairs. (We note in passing that there is language for each of these varying cases: "There's a pencil on my desk, but I don't know if it's mine"; "There's something on my desk, but I don't know what," "There's something on that black thing, but I don't know what either thing is.")

In addition to objects, the state of affairs that I distinguish may have constituent processes, events, and other states of affairs. I could see my pencil rolling toward the edge of the desk (a process), that the pencil had just bumped into the stapler (an event), that the pencil was now next to the coffee mug, which contained coffee (two states of affairs), and so forth. Each of the constituents may themselves be further described in terms of their own constituents and relationships: The pencil consists of an eraser and a pencil body, the desk consists of a top and legs, and so on.

As this small example illustrates, the structure of what there is in the world, i.e., of what one may distinguish, is complex. Further, objects, processes, events, and states of affairs are inter-related. To use these concepts, we need "a systematic specification of the ways in which one object (or process, etc.) may resemble another or differ from another" (Ossorio, 1978, p. 35). These specifications provide the basis for systematic investigation of person's abilities to distinguish what there is, that is to say, they provide the basis for the scientific study of cognition without processes.

Specifying What Is Distinguished

There are four kinds of "things" in the world, and therefore four kinds of distinctions that a person can make: Objects, processes, events, and states of affairs. Each kind of thing has a representation format one may use to specify instances: A *State of Affairs Unit (SAU)*, an *Object Unit (OU)*, a *Process Unit (PU)*, and an *Event Unit (EU)*. Each type of Unit is a specification of how things of that type can differ or be the same. Equivalently, each type of Unit is a specification of what it takes to distinguish one of these things from others of its type. An Object Unit description of a desk, for example, states what must be specified in order to specify a desk; an OU of my desk states what must be specified in order to specify my particular desk. A bit more informally, a Unit description of X is a specification of exactly what it means to identify something as an X. Conversely, such a Unit specifies what must be distinguished in order to distinguish an X.

States of Affairs

A state of affairs is specified by a State of Affairs Unit (Ossorio, 1978, pp. 66–67). A State of Affairs Unit is an ordered pair (N, D), in which:

N is the name of the state of affairs. It may be a sentence, a clause, a formal name, a formal symbol, etc. SA1.1.01, "the gun was fired," and "The cat is on the mat" are examples.

D is the description, composed of:

Constituents: A list, by name, of the objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states affairs

Relationships: Specification, by name, of the n–place relationships among the Constituents that characterize this state of affairs. An attribute or property is a unary relationship.

Elements: A list of the N elements, specified by name, that are the logical roles of the relationships.

Individuals: A list of the actual historical individuals, identified by name, number, symbol, or any other identifying locution. ("Individual" is not the same as "object.")

Classification: Identification of each constituent as an object, process, event, or state of affairs.

Eligibilities: A specification of which Individuals may or must participate as which Elements in the relationship.

Expansions:

Elaborating the Classification of a given Individual *via* an Object, Process, Event, or State of Affairs Unit.

> Elaborating the Classification of a given Individual as an Attribute by giving an SAU description of the state of affairs in which the Attribute is the Relationship.

Contingencies:

> Specification, involving either attributes of the individuals or combinations of conditions of constituents, that specify which combinations may occur and still be a case of this state of affairs.

> Constraints on the use of a particular Name as contingent on the use of other Names for other Elements. For example, "the Bishop took the 10-gram mass" is nonsensical because the Names violate this kind of contingency specification.

> Constraints such that the use of a particular Element is contingent on its being an element of the SAU in which it is an Element. For example, "the right rear leg of the table is dirty" names state of affairs including relationships between the top of the table and the legs; the relationship between the legs and the top is Supports(leg, top). If the table is disassembled, there is no longer any such thing as the right rear leg of the table, because the state of affairs in which the legs are in those relationships to the top no longer is the case. (However, the individual that was assigned to that Element still exists, and in ordinary discourse we move between these descriptions fluently, barely if at all noticing the change.)

For example, at this moment, my stapler is sitting on my desk. That sentence is a description of a situation, i.e., a state of affairs. A SAU description of this state of affairs is:

> Name: My stapler is on top of my desk.
> Description:
>> Constituents: Stapler, Desk
>> Relationships: One binary relation, with the name "on top of"
>> Elements: Stapler, Desk
>> Classification: Stapler and Desk are both objects
>> Individuals: my stapler, my desk
>> Eligibilities: my stapler is eligible to be Stapler; my desk is eligible to be Desk
>> Elaborations: none
>> Contingencies: none

A more complex example, and one in some ways more illuminating, is the following of two humans in a traditional two-person marriage (Shideler, 1988):

> Name: John and Jane's Marital Relationship

Description:
    Constituents: Husband, Wife
    Relationships:
    One binary relation, with the name "married"
        Elements: Husband, Wife
        Husband, Wife each have the unary relation (the attribute)
        "Human"
        Classification: Husband and wife are both objects
        Individuals: John, Jane
        Eligibilities: Jane is eligible to be Wife
                    John is eligible to be Husband
    One unary relation, "Human"
        Elements: Husband, Wife
        Classification: Husband and wife are both objects
        Individuals: John, Jane
        Eligibilities: Jane is eligible to be Wife
                    John is eligible to be Husband
Elaborations: none
Contingencies: Husband, Wife not in the relation "married" with anyone else;
John and Jane were Groom and Bride, respectively, in a Wedding Ceremony.

This example illustrates the difference between giving a (Name, Description) specification and attempting to "define" the state of affairs or describe all the myriad details and complexities of how a one state of affairs is related to others. Much of what would ordinarily be called the "meaning" of the term "married" includes facts (states of affairs) about how one is treated differently if one is married. This aspect of meaning is not excluded; it is just not represented in *this* SAU. In general, these connotative meanings are made explicit by the presence of the Name of this SAU in other object, process, event, and state of affairs descriptions. Thus, for example, "being married means being invited as a couple to others couples' homes for dinner" (a state of affairs noticed by many recently–divorced people), is a reference to a contingency in another Unit description, namely the Process Unit description of having someone over for dinner. The SAU, and the other representational formats, are thus not limited to what can be formally defined in the usual mathematical sense.

It is perhaps inevitable that as we elaborate the cognition–without–processes approach technically it begins to bear a family resemblance to older formal approaches that have attempted to define what is real in terms of a set of logical "atoms," such as the many types of mathematical logic, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus,* Schank's conceptual dependency theory, or others of that sort (O'Nuallain, 1995, pp. 237–240). However, this appearance is misleading, because the constituents and relationships are not limited to those definable in terms of physical constituents

and relationships, formally or not. More fundamentally, giving a Name and (optionally) a further Description of something is not at all like giving a definition or complete description of it. The paradigm, and by far the most common, case of behavior is to act on distinctions without having a complete specification of everything about the thing distinguished. The (Name, Description) formats allow us to specify what is being distinguished, with no implication that the description is complete.

Objects

One kind of state of affairs is that there is an object. That object may be further described. One might, for example, distinguish that the word "butter" is present; "butter" is an object whose constituents are the letters "b," "u," "t," "t," "e," and "r," in certain spatial relationships.

In general, objects have sub-objects, i.e., constituents that are objects, and these objects must be related in various ways. The letters of "butter," scattered over a page, are not the word "butter;" the parts of a car, disassembled and lying on the floor of a garage, are not a car. In addition, one may give more than one decomposition into sub-objects. An automobile, for example, may be divided into left and right halves; electrical system, fuel system, chassis, suspension, and drive train; etc. The Object Unit codifies these and related (logical) facts about what it takes to specify a particular object. An Object Unit (Ossorio, 1978, pp. 52) is an ordered pair (N, D) in which:

N is the name of the object (or a list of names that are all names of the same object)

D is the description, a specification by name of alternative decompositions of this object into immediate constituents. For each decomposition, the following are specified:

Constituents: A list, by name, of the sub-objects of this object

Relationships: Specification, by name, of the relationships $R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_m$ that must hold among the Constituents. Each relationship R_j is an n_j-place relationship. For each R_j, the following are specified:

Name

Elements: A list of the Elements related by R_j

Individuals: A list of actual historical individuals which are serving as constituents of this object

Eligibilities: A list of which Individuals may or must participate in this object as which Elements

Contingencies: Attributes or condition that must be satisfied in order for an Individual to be Eligible to be a given Element

Attributes of this decomposition

The OU allows representation of an object's structure. However, sometimes what distinguishes an object is not a particular set of parts arranged in a particular way, but the object's place in some other object, process, event, or state of affairs. Consider for example two clocks, one a pulley-and-weight grandfather clock, the other a digital clock in a plastic case. OU descriptions of these clocks would be completely different, but both are clocks, because they can be used to tell time, i.e., can have that role in the process of a person finding out the time.

This kind of object is specified with an *Extended Object Unit (EOU)* (Ossorio, 1978, p. 53). An Extended Object Unit is a specification, for the object with this Name, of

Attributes of this Object

Applicability of a particular name due to the object being a part of a larger unit. For example, "Black's pawn is at KB-3" names an object as part of a game of chess.

Contingencies: Attributes a constituent must have

Relationships other than those between immediate constituents

States of affairs in which this object may or must be found

Processes

There are two fundamental facts about the concept of a process, which are codified in the Process Unit. First, processes divide into sub-processes; if there are no sub-processes, we do not call it a process. Second, actual instances of processes involve actual historical individuals (human and otherwise), which must be in certain roles and have certain attributes. The pawns on a chessboard are not alive; if they are, the game is not chess. Likewise, the Black Bishop cannot move off the Black diagonals; if it does, the game is not chess; if the individual who is attempting to act as Denouncer in the process of a degradation ceremony is not a member of the community, the individual's actions are not a degradation ceremony, no matter how much they resemble one.

A Process Unit (Ossorio, 1978, p. 42) is an ordered pair (N, D) in which:

N is the name of the process; as with the other Units, a formal name or any other identifying locution

D is the description, a specification by name of Paradigms, i.e., the major varieties, of this process. For each Paradigm, the following is specified:
Stages: The sub-processes that must be present for it to be an instance of this process. A Stage may have more than one way in which it can be done; these are the Options for that Stage.
Elements: The logical roles in the process
Individuals: The actual historical particulars filling the roles

Eligibilities: Rules as to which Individuals may be each Element
Contingencies: Rules which state which combinations of Stages and Options
    may occur, and rules which state that the occurrence of a Stage or Option
    is contingent on some State of Affairs involving one or more Individuals
Versions: The actual combinations of Stages and Options that can occur, as
    a result of the Contingencies, i.e., the actual ways this process can occur

Events

Events Units have a very simple structure, reflecting the fact that an event is a direct change from one state of affairs to another (Ossorio, 1978). An Event Unit is and ordered pair (S, T), in which S and T are each State of Affairs Units (perhaps only the Name portion). S and T are customarily called "before" and "after."

Teach People to See

It is common in ordinary discourse to hear a person say, "Now I see." Such statements are rarely taken literally, particularly in the traditional scientific study of cognition. They are considered, if at all, to be metaphors at best. It is worthwhile to see how the formal treatment of distinctions allows us to give a technical rendering of such statements, thereby both clarifying the meaning and providing an entre to studying such cognitive achievements carefully and systematically (i.e., scientifically), but non–reductively. This is one of the ways in which the present formulation provides a marked expansion in what one can study as a cognitive psychologist.

A karate teacher teaches sparring with bamboo swords. He says, "It teaches people to see." The teacher is stating that with this kind of practice students learn to distinguish processes (attack vs. feint, etc.) and states of affairs ("my opponent is tired").

An art teacher says that she teaches people to see what is around them. Formally, we can describe her meaning as, "I teach people to distinguish larger and/or different states of affairs, whose constituents are the everyday objects, processes, and states of affairs they were already able to distinguish." This is the case with all the instances in which a person learns to discern patterns, of any sort.

A religious person says, "I saw that it was the will of God." We need not (and scientifically should not) treat this as an excuse, evasion, poetic license, or anything other than a straightforward account of the distinction the person recognized and acted on. (This does not imply that he was justified or correct, which are critic's language for "He engaged in the practices that in this community constitute justification" and "The description is correct," respectively.)

State of Affairs vs. State of Affairs Descriptions

"The map is not the territory." "The name is not the thing itself." "The finger pointing at the moon is not the moon." These and similar statements are all reminders of a fundamental logical fact: what is recognized is a state of affairs, but the state of affairs is logically distinct from any of its *descriptions*. The state of affairs is that which the state of affairs description is a description *of;* and there is no special, ontologically privileged, "objective" description. And yet, we have no way to specify a state of affairs other than by a description.

This is more than a philosophical fine point. There are at least two significant pragmatic implications. The first is that any description is given by a person in some position *vis a vis* the thing described. Persons describing the same thing from different positions will give different descriptions, and none is "the right one." (This does not mean that all descriptions are valid, correct, appropriate, etc.) In an organization, for example, a person whose job is to carry out some social practice will virtually always describe that practice differently from someone whose job is to administer the organizational unit. However, it is one practice, not two, and frequently to properly participate in it the member of the organization needs to understand it as one practice. One who does not is likely to make mistakes involving distinctions of paramount importance to a person in a different position. A particular situation in which this phenomenon may be observed is the construction of computer systems to be used in a work setting. Computer system designers not uncommonly base the system on a description given from one perspective (such as a manager's), and then find that the persons using the system find it confusing and a poor match with how they would describe their work.

Second, if a person encounters a state of affairs (or process or object) only under one description, that description will codify the distinctions the person must be able to make in order to distinguish this "thing." He may then be unable to recognize it, or verify it, under another description. Such an inability would be a significant restriction on his ability to act on it, and one would expect such a disability to be ameliorated by having the person engage in practices that involve the state of affairs under a different description. A simple form of such intervention occurs when one tells such a person, "Think of it this way," an invitation to use an alternate decomposition or description. Child development and enculturation into a new organization, or a new country, appear to be areas in which this approach may hold promise.

The Appearance of a Process

Why, then, does it often seem that there is a process operating "underneath?" Empirical results in many recognition, reasoning, and memory tasks show temporal

relationships quite reminiscent of those seen in the carrying out of observable, public processes. This appears to have been an important reason for creating process models (i.e., redescriptions) of these tasks. Response time is of key importance in a very large portion of cognitive psychology experimental work today (Greene, 1992, p. 89).

Any number of experiments demonstrate that subjects take longer to respond to a stimulus when the response or the pre-conditions of the stimulus are more complex. If the subjects must respond with X to stimulus A, but Y to stimulus B, they will take longer than if they must simply respond to the presence of the stimulus. Subjects are able to recognize words faster when the words are preceded by a similar word; if the preceding word is only partly visible, there is less speed improvement over no "priming" (as this is called). When a subject must decide whether a presented letter was a member of a previously presented set of letters, the length of time needed to decide is proportional to the size of the previously presented set (Greene, 1992, p. 89).

Sternberg's serial exhaustive scanning model is a classic example of this kind of experimental result and the theoretical language invented to describe it. Sternberg asserted that subjects compare the new stimulus (the "probe") with each of the previously presented items (the "memory set"), and that a *search process* was followed in which the probe was compared to each item in the memory set, serially. This account proved to be extremely influential in cognitive psychology (Greene, 1992, p. 88).

The serial exhaustive scanning model is a particularly clear example of using process language to re-state achievements, in this case the discrimination of items that have been previously seen from those that have not. One could hardly argue with the "model" as simply a description of the data. (One could also hardly avoid noticing the marked similarity to computer algorithms and data structures.) Let us see how the cognition-without-processes framework may be used to make sense of this kind of experimental data without the need for process talk.

The Unit descriptions specify the distinctions (the constituents and their relationships) that may potentially be involved in distinguishing some state of affairs, object, etc. In any actual case, only some portion of these distinctions will be made, depending on the person, the situation, and the description the person is acting on. To recognize one's car, for example, one does not rely on recognizing all of the constituents and relationships in a full Object Unit description of the car. Making these distinctions is a set of achievements. Recall that to say a person has an ability is to say that they can achieve some outcome; it says nothing about a process. A paradigm case is judgment: people can make judgments, but this does not imply that there is a process of "judging." However, actual cases of perception, judgment, etc., take place in the real world, and one would expect some of the results to be achieved before others. Further, in some cases verifying that some constituent of a state of affairs is present, or that some relation holds, may

(logically) mean another state of affairs description must be acted on. For example, if the state of affairs I am acting on is that a cheetah is a carnivore that is tawny and has dark spots, I may (depending on my personal characteristics) need to act on another description to verify that the constituent named "carnivore" is present. To do this, I may act on the SAU that a carnivore is an animal with sharp teeth, claws, and eyes that point forward. Thus, there are a number of immediate or non–immediate constituent states of affairs that may be relevant to whether this is a cheetah, and acting to find out if these states of affairs is the case will typically take time. This results in observable temporal relationships between the achievement of recognitions. I may, for example, verify that the animal has sharp teeth before (in time) I conclude it is a cheetah. (On the other hand, it would not call for explanation if I distinguished a cheetah, and then verified that distinction by examining the teeth.) In other words, there may be a variety of temporal relationships between the various recognitions that logically must take place. However, this does not mean that I either (1) first recognize a number of physical attributes, such as sharp teeth, and then deduce new "beliefs," or (2) that I first hypothesize that this is a cheetah, and then verify that hypothesis based on my knowledge of cheetahs. I might, for example, recognize that the animal looks like a cheetah, that it has sharp teeth, that it has eyes that point forward, that it has dark spots, and that it is tawny, simultaneously.

Such temporal relationships *could* be described as a process. Such a redescription would be similar to fitting a curve to a set of data points. Since there are a number of logically related outcomes to be achieved, but in general no necessity that they be done in any order, one would expect that a set of experiments in which several conditions were varied would produce quite a complex set of sequences of outcomes, and in fact this is what occurs in such experiments as learning nonsense syllables.

With this complex statement of sequences of outcomes in hand, one could then describe them as the outcome of a computer program. We could then write that program, run it on a real computer, and study how well the program reproduces the achievements. This has been the research program of much of cognitive science. But the program is not the achievements, and this analysis makes clear that there is no justification for concluding that the program is a depiction of a real process, any more than finding that a curve fits a set of data points means that the data is produced by a "mechanism" following a formula for the curve. Such programs may be interesting, suggestive, intriguing, revealing of the personal characteristics of different populations, etc., but such attributions do not imply that the program, or its equivalent, is "underlying" a recognition. In a similar way, it is easy to write a program for modeling the process of a ball rolling down an inclined plane. No one would claim that this was evidence that the ball had such a program "inside" it, or "underlying" its behavior.

PRAGMATIC IMPLICATIONS

While it is satisfying to set the record straight, it is more so when the new account makes a difference in what we can do. The most serious drawback of the cognitive process assumption is that it narrows one's field of inquiry and the methods one can use. Once one is committed to the underlying process assumption, the natural and appropriate thing to do is study that process, to find out how it works, its parameters, etc. With a different language and set of concepts for talking about the phenomena, a number of new possibilities become available. In this section we discuss some of these new possibilities.

In general one would not expect to be able to list specific applications of a new conceptualization of a subject matter as broad as cognition. We shall discuss several areas in which the cognition–without–processes formulation would seem to have the most immediate impact. It is to be expected (indeed, hoped) that it will be found useful in other areas, perhaps to a greater extent than these.

Artificial Intelligence

A great deal of work in the field of artificial intelligence has been devoted to modeling "underlying processes" and "cognitive structures." In recent years, models of neural networks have been the basis of another approach, "connectionism." In both cases, the field has been a "bottom–up" effort, i.e., an attempt to build up to human behavior from computable elementary processes. The approach we have presented makes the opposite approach conceptually and technically feasible. Rather than ask, "How are computable basic processes combined to produce intelligent behavior," we can ask, "What behavior are these people engaging in, and how can we describe it in sufficient detail that we can see how to have a computer, in effect, recognize and act on these distinctions in order to bring about this state of affairs?" Having seen that the key question is the description of *what* is done, in greater and greater detail, one is not tempted to ask such things as "How does a person make that judgment" or "How does a person recognize that face," and attempt to model the assumed process. For example, by treating subject matter relevance judgments as a kind of achievement rather than the outcome of a process, Ossorio developed a technique for simulating such judgments using vector spaces derived from factor analysis of expert human judgment data (Ossorio, 1966, 1995). This technique was used to produce a document retrieval system whose performance was found to be superior to any of the existing ordinary retrieval systems (Jeffrey, 1991).

Top–down description of behavior was used to produce computer–processable descriptions of social practices, as the basis for several expert systems (Jeffrey and Putman, 1983; Jeffrey 1989), including one of the first two industrial expert systems ever produced (Jeffrey and Putman, 1983). In building these systems, one

asks, "What practice is happening here, and how do we describe it," rather than, "What knowledge does this person have and how is it combined?" When one has a description of the behavior as an Intentional Action, one then elaborates the P parameter (the Process), asking, "How is that step done?." The crucial difference here is that the system builder is asking for an elaboration of an *observable* process, not a "mental model"; he is asking how something is done, not "how the person knows." The approach has allowed the production of working computer systems based on knowledge of practices not reducible to formally definable sets of bottom–level processes, and thus has significantly expanded the domain of tasks that can be addressed with computer technology.

Cognitive Psychology

The field of cognitive psychology, having begun with a focus on human abilities such as radio signal transmission rates (Barsalou, 1992, p. 7) has moved so strongly in the direction of underlying processes that it often appears to be a branch of computer science. In addition, perhaps in a search for the most "fundamental" processes, the actual abilities that have been studied have been limited to the most basic in virtually all of its specialties, such as memory, categorization, language, perception, and reasoning. A detailed discussion of the results in the field of cognitive psychology and how those results can be reconceptualized in the framework we have presented would be beyond the scope of any single paper. We can present here only a brief summary of what research in the each of several fields within cognitive psychology looks like in the new framework.

Perception

Perception is the perception *of something*: a state of affairs, an object, a process, or an event. Studying perception in the framework of cognition without processes is straightforwardly the study of what can be perceived, under various conditions. However, as illustrated by the examples of the karate teacher and art teacher, the range of perceptual phenomena that can be directly studied is markedly increased, for we can now systematically describe a much larger range of states of affairs, objects, and processes. This allows one to study the abilities of persons to perceive these states of affairs, objects, etc., and what learning histories help improve them.

Memory

Persons remember, and sometimes forget. What they remember is objects, processes, events, and states of affairs in the world, which have structure, as discussed at length above. The treatment of memory in traditional cognitive psychology is perhaps the area in which it is most obvious that the process language used is nothing more than a restatement of what is remembered. It would seem relatively straightforward that the study of memory is the study of what

persons remember, i.e., what descriptions of the world a person is still able to act on in various circumstances, including passage of time and the conditions under which the person encountered the states of affairs.

Reasoning

Reasoning and thinking are defined in traditional cognitive psychology as "transformations of the contents of working memory" (Barsalou, 1992, p. 275). The "contents of working memory" is a way of talking about the distinctions (descriptions of the world) the person has, i.e., is prepared to act on. A person may recognize relationships among observed or otherwise known states of affairs, objects, processes, and events, and these recognitions may be arrived at with or without any observable process. In short, thinking and reasoning may be described as redescription of constituents of the world, paradigmatically including distinguishing those that describe real things from those that do not. The value of this articulation of reasoning is twofold. First, it makes clear that one need not theorize that any particular form of reasoning is being used, or indeed that "reasoning" and "thinking" are processes at all. Further, since cognition is discrimination and redescription, the appropriate focus of investigations into reasoning is the states of affairs, objects, and processes the person is reasoning about.

By examining the descriptions of the world that the experimental subjects are acting on, an experimenter is then in a position to find out the logical relationships between the given descriptions and the redescriptions. When the relationship is deductive, i.e., a chain of deductions leading to the result can be demonstrated, one can say, "*Under an achievement description*, the subject deduced the new fact," i.e., the subject achieved this result. The existence of a deductive relationship between two descriptions does not justify the claim that a *process* of deduction *was followed*. (It should be noted in this context that a number of mathematicians have pointed out that while their results are stated as deductions, this in no way means they achieved the results by following that process.)

Second, formulating reasoning as redescription allows us to formulate induction in a non–problematical way. The standard formulation of induction is that it is a process in which "People make observations, induce a generalization, and extend it to new situations" (Barsalou, 1992, p. 293). To make a valid induction, it is argued, a "space" of possible generalizations and a "space" of possible further observations is "searched" and otherwise processed to arrive at a generalization confirmed by observation. But we have seen this kind of description earlier: It is an underlying process description. It has a surface plausibility, due to its recognizable correspondence to observed facts, such as the fact that people make generalizations, but it is no more than a restatement of these facts in process language.

Specifically, induction is not an answer to the question, "How do people transform the contents of working memory" or "How do people arrive at redescriptions that are not deductive." "People induce a generalization" is a restatement of the fact that people make generalizations. Both are achievement descriptions, but in the second "make" has been replaced by "induce."

How then does one study thought and reasoning, without conceiving of them as processes? One begins by noting that thinking and reasoning refer to *achievements*, achievements of redescriptions of observations. Examining the descriptive Units, one can see that they provide a tremendous richness of possibility for redescription: Each constituent may be elaborated with another descriptive Unit, the relationships may be elaborated by being included by name in other Units, and relations may be described as similar to one another to greater or lesser degree, which is a state of affairs. Further, elements of the world are parts (constituents) of other elements, as codified in Unit descriptions of those elements. An enormous range of redescriptions may thus be recognized. In general reasoning is the achievement of a redescription of a set of descriptions. These achievements depend, at a minimum, on the abilities to recognize when X is a case of Y, and when to elaborate a description of X, i.e., to in effect compose and decompose descriptions. Some of the redescriptions are such that a deductive relationship holds between them, but a great many are not. *Induction is the recognition of a larger state of affairs*, one that includes the observations as constituents (or elaborations of constituents at some level of detail). The study of thinking and reasoning is the study of the achievement of redescription.

Pragmatically, treating reasoning and thinking as the achievement of redescription opens a new area of investigation for those interested in reasoning:

- Of all the possible redescriptions, which types of descriptions are in fact achieved by various types of persons under various circumstances?
- How do persons learn the skills needed to recognize which possible re-descriptions to make, i.e., what practices enable persons to acquire these skills?
- What differences do persons exhibit in recognition skills, both of possible redescriptions and of which possible redescriptions are called for or useful?
- Are there cultural or sub-cultural differences in the answers to the above questions?
- Can techniques be found to enable a person to use redescription skills acquired in one area of his life to another area?

Language

In one way there seems little disagreement between the traditional treatment of language and how one might treat it without underlying processes: Language has syntactic structure, and persons have the ability to recognize whether an utterance

in their native language is grammatically correct. Phrase structure grammars are elaborate, elegant, and technically useful mathematical descriptions of this structure. Such grammars codify what is a grammatically correct utterance. The state of affairs, object, and process units may be seen as a "grammar" for the aspect of language whose analysis has proven much more difficult, namely the semantics or meaning of what is uttered. Thus, in both syntax and semantics we have a formulation in which processes play no part. As with other areas of cognitive psychology, far from making the study of language impossible, discarding process talk puts the study of language on another footing, and in fact expands the potential for investigation by language researchers, for now the research questions include the entire range of linguistic behavior.

Just as Intentional Action Formula (1) articulates the concept of behavior, Ossorio (1981) has shown that language behavior may be formulated parametrically as:

$$V = <C, L, B>$$ Formula (2)

in which   V is the verbal behavior
                L is the locution uttered
                C is the concept, i.e., the distinction being acted on
                B is the set of behaviors that are instances of acting on this
                concept.

C, the distinction, like the K parameter of Intentional Action, is specified with a State of Affairs description.

This formula makes clear the logical relationships between the utterance, the meaning, and action. As a logical analysis of the concept, it provides the framework for addressing empirically all the questions about what people say, how they say it, and what they are doing by saying that. As a heuristic example, consider the several ways one can ask another person to pass the salt: "Can you reach the salt," "Please pass the salt,," "Give me the salt," "Could you give me the salt," "Salt," and so on. Each of these is recognizable by a native English speaker as having the same meaning (C): The speaker is asking the listener to pass the salt. The paradigm case behavior is the social practice of passing the salt; this behavior is the first Stage in that practice. A few examples of empirical questions based on this framework are:

- What sentences can be uttered and understood, by groups of persons with various personal characteristics?
- Are there actual (not logical) limits on the complexity of concepts that can be stated, by various groups of persons (such as groups of varying age)?
- What utterances can be used to say a particular thing (such as wanting the salt)?

- What behaviors can persons engage in by particular linguistic performances?
- Are there cultural or sub-cultural differences in these answers?

Conspicuous by their absence are questions such as, "What is the process by which a person says 'salt' when they want salt," or "What is the process by which a person selects the form to use in requesting the salt?"

Cognitive Abilities and Disabilities

The complexity and richness of the descriptive Units provide fertile ground for investigating cognitive abilities and disabilities. Complete specification of a state of affairs, object, or process involves the specification of all constituents and their relationships. However, this does not mean that a person always, or even commonly, distinguishes all these constituents and their relationships in order to recognize the state of affairs (or object, etc.). This raises several interesting research questions, such as:

- How many constituents are in fact needed for a person to recognize various classes of states of affairs, or which combinations of constituents and relationships for various classes?
- Is there an identifiable threshold proportion of constituents and relationships above which persons are certain that the given state of affairs is the case?
- If there is such a threshold, does it vary from culture to culture?
- What are the accepted practices and choice principles in various cultures for verifying that a state of affairs is the case, in those cases in which one or more constituents or relationships have not been observed?
- What differences are there in whether a person relies for recognition on the structure of a state of affairs (or object, etc.) or on that thing's relationships to other parts of the world (states of affairs, objects, etc.)?
- Are there differences in the state of affairs *descriptions* by which a person becomes familiar with a state of affairs, and if so how do the various descriptions affect the person's abilities to recognize those states of affairs?
- If there are such differences in descriptions, do they vary from culture to culture?

Having an underlying process model of cognition almost inevitably leads one to ask questions about the process model, and to formulate disabilities in terms of deficiencies in the underlying process. Formulating cognition in terms of achievements and abilities broadens the possibilities for research into cognitive disabilities, both in general and in pragmatically-oriented research. Examples of disability research questions with the new formulation are:

- Is there a particular aspect of this kind of state of affairs the person is unable to distinguish: constituents, relationships, contingencies, assignments, etc.?
- Is there a particular sort of constituent this person is unable to distinguish?

- Are there particular relationships between constituents this person is unable to distinguish? For example, dyslexia can be described as significant difficulty in distinguishing the spatial relationships between letters and words.
- Since the normal situation is for a person to distinguish some, rather than all, of the constituents, relationships, contingencies, etc., that characterize a state of affairs, there are norms for which constituents, relationships, etc., must be verified, and for practices to be followed in that verification. For example: I see a dog's head poking out from behind a fence; under what conditions am I justified in taking it that a dog is behind the fence? Is this person significantly restricted in his ability to judge which SAU constituent needs to be verified?

The reader familiar with Descriptive Psychology will recognize that we are formulating these questions in terms of significant restrictions on a person's abilities, i.e., as pathology is defined in Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1985). As with psychopathology, a significant benefit of this kind of formulation is that it leads easily to questions of treatment. Rather than trying to find ways to correct an aberrant *process*, one is led immediately to ask, "What does this person need to be able to do," i.e., what social practice does this person need to be able to engage in? This in turns leads directly to, "How can this person acquire the skills needed to do these things?," or "How can we enable this person to do this task without this skill?"

For example, if one is treating dyslexia, an underlying-process approach leads most naturally to questions such as, "How do we correct the process by which the person recognizes letters, words, and sentences?" By contrast, with the new formulation, the most immediate questions become: (1) In more detail, what relationships and objects does this person have significant difficulty recognizing; and (2) What techniques and skills could this person acquire that will enable him to read, in spite of these deficiencies in recognition abilities? The question as phrased illustrates an important aspect of this formulation. One is always engaged in trying to help a particular person with particular personal characteristics, including traits and abilities, and therefore, as therapists of all kinds know well, the individual differences are critically important. Since there is no underlying process, but rather a set of distinctions a person must be able to make, one is led naturally to include individual differences in the treatment plan, rather treating them as details of application of a general model.

CONCLUSION

A new formulation of cognition has been presented, one which does not use or rely on underlying processes of any kind, including cognitive or

information-processing ones. Whereas the traditional approach has been to study the structure and processing of "mental models," the new approach is to study the structure of what persons perceive and reason about. Persons make discriminations and act on them, and what can be discriminated is constituents of the world. What makes a thing what it is is its structure and its relationships to other parts of the world, as articulated by the State of Affairs, Object, and Process Units. These Units codify what it means to discriminate any part of the world, and therefore they codify the logical requirements for a person to perceive or reason about any part of the world. Cognitive psychology may defined as the study of the abilities of persons to discriminate and redescribe parts of the world, including perception, reasoning, conceiving, and judging. Cognitive abilities refer to cognitive achievements, not processes, and underlying process language is an unnecessary distraction in the study of these complex achievements. In addition to avoiding the serious logical problems that cognitive psychology has had since its inception, formulating cognition and cognitive psychology without processes significantly expands the realm of cognitive phenomena that may be studied scientifically.

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CONSCIOUSNESS, EXPERIENCE, AND A PERSON'S WORLD

H. Joel Jeffrey

ABSTRACT

An approach to conceptualizing, analyzing, and formally representing the phenomenon of consciousness is developed. The basis of the approach is the State of Affairs System. The State of Affairs System formulation provides a conceptual and technical basis for formal, rigorous, but non-reductionist descriptions of the real world, including a person acting in the world. With this formulation, consciousness can be formulated as $C = <I, W, P>$, where I is the individual whose consciousness this is, W is the world the person is conscious of, and P is the position in that world that the person is conscious as. Experience and feelings are shown to be aspects of the relationship between a person and their world, specifically of the unique position a person occupies in their world. A Consciousness Change Formula is presented, which specifies in terms of actions and worlds the principles that govern consciousness change. The formulation is used to address (1) how consciousness arises, (2) the physical basis for consciousness, (3) the rigorous but non-reductionist scientific study of consciousness, and (4) the possibility of computer-based consciousness.

This paper takes an entirely different approach to consciousness. It begins in a different place, uses different techniques, and arrives at different answers. The end result is a foundation for a science of consciousness that is precise, systematic, and formal, but is entirely non-reductionistic.

The paper has two primary goals. The first is to provide an articulation of the concept of consciousness, using the concepts of a world and a person's place in the world, based on the formulation of real world concepts by P. G. Ossorio, the State of Affairs System (Ossorio, 1978), and to show that the phenomena of experience and feelings are aspects of the relationship between a person and the world. The second is to use the formulation to address the questions of how consciousness arises, the physical basis of consciousness, logical and non-reductionist foundations for the scientific study of consciousness, and the possibility of computer-based consciousness.

The paper thus presents a conceptual basis for research in a science of consciousness that is different from what has previously been available. This basis is formal, systematic, and comprehensive, but in no way based on any reductionist methods or assumptions.

There are two separate tasks involved in presenting this approach: (1) Presenting the concepts, their logical connections, and how they form a logical foundation for the study of consciousness; and (2) showing how the foundational concepts are elements of a formal system. In Section 1 we present Ossorio's formal system for real-world concepts, and use them to give formal meaning to the terms "world" and "a person's world." We discuss how the formalization makes practical a different approach to formal models of the world. In Section 2 we formulate consciousness as a phenomenon due to the logical relationships between a person and their world, and in Sections 3 and 4 we show how experience and feelings are logical outcomes of the unique relationship of a person to their world. Section 5 addresses the questions of how consciousness arises, the physical basis of consciousness, the non-reductionist scientific study of consciousness, and necessary conditions for computer-based consciousness.

Most of the formalism in this paper is in Section 1. Readers with little interest in formalism, or those who would like to see the treatment of consciousness, experience, and feelings before examining a formalization of the concept of real world, may wish to go directly to Section 2. The formalization is not superfluous, however; it is what makes the approach rigorous and systematic.

THE CONCEPT OF A WORLD

The different place that this treatment of consciousness begins with is the concept of a world. The primary way of proceeding from that beginning is to articulate the concept of the world and a person's place in it, and certain aspects of the relationship between a person and the world.

We do not have in mind, however, the concept of world most commonly used by a physicist or other physical scientists, namely the physical world, that world defined by all the configurations of fundamental objects (more commonly termed particles) describable in principle by a set of physical relationships.

Failure to distinguish between the physical world and the more general concept of a world is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that the concepts are not identical. We begin with the recognition that there is a distinct concept of "real world." (This is not the issue of reductionism, even in disguise. It is simply an acknowledgment of the fact that there are two different concepts, of real world and physical world. Whether the real world can or cannot be reduced to the physical world is the question of reductionism, and is not addressed here.)

The concept of world we are using is that the real world is the all–inclusive whole that encompasses all of the objects, processes, events, relationships, and states of affairs that we can observe or do, and all of their parts, sub–parts, etc., both material and non–material. It includes pencils, atoms, computers, windows, coffee cups, and flying airplanes, but also includes friends and friendship, love and loved ones, anger, joy, fear, and satisfaction. It includes the objects, processes, events, and states of affairs we now know of, those we could come to know of, and those that could come to be the case. As such, it is analogous to the concept of the physical universe as all possible configurations of particles in 4–dimensional space–time. However, the analogy is a limited one, for this conceptualization is not limited to those objects, processes, and relationships definable in terms of physical dimensions such as mass, extension in physical space and time, etc.

To use this conceptualization, especially if we are to have a formulation that can serve as a rigorous foundation for addressing fundamental questions of consciousness, we need a technically rigorous elaboration of it. We need, for example, to say precisely what is meant by object, process, event, and state of affairs, how they are related, what it takes to specify an object, process, and so on.

In the following sub–section, we elaborate the fundamental concepts of object, process, event, state of affairs, and relationship. These concepts are defined in terms of the relationships they have to each other, not in terms of other concepts. In this sense, the concepts are formal, and they and their relationships comprise a formal system of concepts, just as the concepts of point, line, and plane and their relationships comprise the formal system of plane geometry, or force, mass, time, and velocity comprise a formal set of concepts in Newtonian physics. We will not, therefore, "define" any of the basic concepts, in the sense of presenting them in terms of other, more fundamental, things.

This lack of definition may seem a bit peculiar and uncomfortable, just as plane geometry often seems peculiar and uncomfortable at first, especially as accustomed as we are to the injunction, "Define your terms." The injunction is so common that the important exception to the rule is typically neglected: fundamental concepts cannot be defined, other than in terms of each other. Just as point, line, and plane

are defined in terms of each other in the discipline of plane geometry, and there is no question such as "but what is a line, *really*," object, process, event, state of affairs, and relationship are logically fundamental concepts that taken together comprise the fundamental concepts with which we articulate the concept of world. Following Ossorio's usage, we refer to these as "reality concepts."

This does not constitute any claim that these concepts are the only ones possible, or that it could not be discovered that one or more of these concepts could be defined in terms of one of the others or another system of concepts. We wish only to articulate these concepts and their relationships without having to assume that they can be reduced to some other concepts.

The system of reality concepts is presented *via* a list of relationships between them. The analogy to plane geometry may be carried a bit further. Geometry is the formalization of something we are all already familiar with. It is a formalization of the subject matter because it is a set of descriptions, in terms of the formally defined concepts of point, line, and plane, and the derivation of logically implied facts from those concepts. In the same way, what we are presenting here is a formal system that corresponds to the real world we all know, live in, use elements of, do things in, and generally are extensively familiar with. We are not describing something new, or giving a theoretical construct; we are articulating the concept of the real world.

The analysis and conceptualization that follow are due to Ossorio (1978), and follows the form and style of Shideler (1988).

Objects, Processes, Events, and States of Affairs

People observe objects, processes, events, and states of affairs. Each of these is a different kind of thing that may be found in, and observed in, the world. Further, any description of the world of any kind, including scientific theories and any other sort of description, are descriptions in terms of these four kinds of things.

As Ossorio (1978) discusses extensively, there is considerable ambiguity in describing any actual piece of the world. "The same thing" can be described as a situation (state of affairs), an object with certain attributes ("the world at war"), the outcome of a process (as is usually done in scientific explanations), and so forth. This re-descriptive possibility is an inseparable aspect of our notions of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, in the sense that any set of concepts without such possibilities would not be usable for giving the descriptions that we in fact give. The rules that present the basic relationships between objects, processes, events, and states of affairs are called "transition rules" because they are logical rules for how one thing can be re-described in terms of others, and the two descriptions still be descriptions of "the same thing." Thus, for example, we have

Transition Rule 1. A state of affairs is a totality of related objects, processes, events, and states of affairs.

Thus, for example, "The cat is on the mat" names a state of affairs with two objects, the cat and the mat, related by "on."

The result of applying this, or any, of the transition rules is some number of objects, processes, events, or states of affairs. This and all the rules therefore can be applied recursively.

Anticipating for a moment the next section, in which we address the question of how to describe the world or parts of it, this rule is a reminder that states of affairs in general have constituent objects, processes, event, and states of affairs, in various relationships, and thus to describe a state of affairs we will need to specify these constituents and their relationships.

Transition Rule 2. An object, process, event, or state of affairs is a state of affairs that is a constituent of some other state of affairs.

This rule captures a critical fact about worlds as contrasted with sets of objects: the concept of the world includes the concept of composition, that elements of the world "come as" part of some larger thing (which may be a larger object, process, event, or state of affairs). At minimum, any object, process, event, or state of affairs is a constituent of the single, all-inclusive thing, the world (see Limiting Case I, below), sometimes called "the universe" in ordinary discourse, although this is more commonly used synonymously with "the physical universe."

Transition Rule 3. An object is a state of affairs having other related objects as constituents.

This rule is the formal statement of the logical fact that objects divide into sub-objects. Applying the rule recursively produces descriptions in terms of sub-objects, sub-sub-objects, etc., in the familiar way. With a few repetitions a describer moves from everyday objects to molecules to atoms to sub-atomic particles, in the way that is familiar to anyone who has gone through high-school science and is perhaps most clearly articulated in the early chapters of *The Feynman Lectures in Physics* (Feynman, 1963). However, there is an important caveat to be given here. There is no *a priori* ontological superiority of one level of description over any other here, and this is not the usual account of "levels of description" in which, explicitly or implicitly, the atomic or sub-atomic level of description is considered the "real thing" or more fundamental than the others.

Transition Rule 4. A process is a successive change from one state of affairs to another, having at least one intermediate state of affairs.

Transition Rule 5. A process is a state of affairs having other, related, processes as immediate constituents.

Transition Rule 6. An event is a direct change from one state of affairs to another, i.e., a change with no intermediate states of affairs.

Transition Rule 7. An event is a state of affairs having two constituent states of affairs. (The two states of affairs are customarily called "before" and "after.")

A word of explanation about events and processes is called for, since one commonly encounters something that would ordinarily be described as a direct change revealed as the last of a sequence of intermediate states of affairs. A lightning flash, a light bulb going on, a clap of thunder, or the now–famous freeze–frame photographs of a bullet going through a light bulb are all examples. In fact, this is so common that the idea of some changes happening directly, with no intermediate stages, is one of the hallmarks of quantum theory: the quantum transition. This rule articulates the more exotic cases, but equally (or more) important, it codifies the everyday cases such as the beginning of the Boston Marathon, the ending of the lecture, etc.

The Transition Rules provide the "raw material" for giving any description. They do not in any way state which things "really are" or "really are not" events or processes. They codify the logic embodied in statements such as "Closer examination reveals that event E is really the result of process P," which is to say that Event E can be re–described as Process P, for at least one intermediate state of affairs has been identified. The lightning flash, the light bulb going on, the clap of thunder, and the bullet going through the light bulb are all examples. Conversely, to describe a transition from one state to another as a "quantum" event" is to say, "There is no process P such that Event E can be re–described as Process P."

Several of the above rules include the term "related." Rule 3, for example, refers to "other, related, objects." This means that the particular state of affairs, objects, etc., is characterized by having one or more particular relationships. The next two rules capture the logical connection between relationships and states of affairs and make explicit the other part of the connection: they note that having a particular relationship constitutes a state of affairs.

Transition Rule 8. That a given state of affairs, object, process, or event has a given relationship R to another state of affairs, object, process, or event, is a state of affairs.

Transition Rule 9. That a given object, process, event, or state of affairs is of a given kind is a state of affairs.

Due to this close connection between states of affairs and relationships, and following ordinary usage, we will occasionally in the following refer to "objects, processes, events, states of affairs, and relationships," when it seems useful to emphasize the relationship aspect. By Rule 8, whenever we identify a relationship, we are identifying a State of Affairs (the one that includes this relationship), so by referring to relationships we are not indicating a fifth kind of thing to be found in the world.

Finally, two rules codify the connection between events and other things:

Transition Rule 10. That an object or process begins is an event and that it ends is a different event.

Transition Rule 10a. That an object or process occurs (begins and ends) is a state of affairs having three constituent states of affairs (customarily called "before," "during," and "after.")

The set of rules taken together is referred to as the *State of Affairs System* (SAS). It should be noted that, as in (Ossorio, 1978), we are not claiming that these rules are minimal, i.e., that some could not be replaced with a smaller, equivalent, set. Nor are we claiming they are complete, in the sense that the need for another rule could not be discovered. It is simply that this set appears to capture the concepts of object, process, event, and state of affairs and their interrelationships.

As we noted above, these rules are recursive, both in composition and decomposition. The natural question is then the usual one of where to stop the recursion. There are five limiting cases, two of which are of particularly relevant to our purpose:

LC–I: The state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs (and thus all objects, processes, events, and states of affairs and all their constituents at any level of detail).

LC–II: A type of object that has no constituents and thus is a "basic building block."

LC–I is the limiting case which is most important for the development in this paper, for it, together with the State of Affairs System, amounts to a formal articulation of the world as the transitive closure of all of the objects, processes, events, and states of affairs we see around us, where the "operations" that introduce new states of affairs, objects, processes, and events are the Transition Rules. It should be noted that this conceptualization of the world is open–ended and allows for any kind of re–description that may be discovered to apply. This is as it must be if we are trying to articulate the actual concept of what it means to be a world, rather than a limited subset.

The SAS thus defines a set of concepts for describing the world, LC–I. A description of a world using these concepts is a set of specifications of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs. However, nothing in the SAS requires that any object, process, etc., be a particular part, a particular kind of part, have particular parts, or have any special "connections," i.e., relationships, with other parts. The rules that define the system are entirely permissive, in this sense. Any re-description, including any relationship with any other objects, processes, etc., is allowed, but none are required.

While the world is a single thing, the state of affairs that includes all other states of affairs (and object, processes, and events), the permissiveness of the SAS makes explicit the (logical) fact that *which* world it is is not logically, physically, or in any other way determined. This is a recognition of the everyday fact that what any particular set of facts add up to is ambiguous. Using the language of states of affairs, the SAS system and the representation Units codify the fact that *which* state of affairs a given set of object, processes, etc., are constituents of is logically, and practically, indeterminate. I cannot decide that the ring on my right hand is not there; I can decide to look at it or not, to recall where I got it, to think about my father (who gave it to me), to count the gift as part of one relationship or another, ad infinitum. The "brute facts," in other words, do not determine the world they are part of, or the position P of the person in that world.

Describing the World

The Transition Rules are a formal system of concepts that appear to capture the proper intuition of what the world is, but in themselves they give little guidance in distinguishing kinds of objects, processes, events, or states of affairs, or describing actual things of each sort. We need a systematic way of specifying the ways in which one object (or process, etc.) can differ from another, if we are to use these concepts for technical work. As Ossorio (1978) points out, such a specification of how particulars can vary amounts to a parametric analysis of the reality categories of object, process, event, and state of affairs.

Any particular object, process, event, and state of affairs is described by an Object, Process, Event, or State of Affairs Unit. This Unit is a specification, by formal name, of the constituents that make up the thing being specified, along with a specification of any relationships necessary to that thing being what it is.

The Descriptive Units, or formats, are the public, observable forms of the corresponding reality concepts, in much the same way that mathematical symbols are the public, observable forms of mathematical concepts (Ossorio, 1978). They provide a different, and in some ways more straightforward, answer to, "What do you mean by a process (or object or event or state of affairs)?" For example, the State of Affairs Unit, defined immediately below, is an answer to "what is a state

of affairs?": A state of affairs is something described by a State of Affairs Unit (or State of Affairs Description).

In this section we present only the State of Affairs Unit (SAU). The Process Unit (PU), Object Unit (OU), and Event Units (EU) may be found in (Ossorio, 1978) Examples in which the Process Unit is applied to a complex real–world domain may be found in Jeffrey & Putman (1983).

Each of the descriptive Units is comprised of a name and a description. The description is a formal specification of what must be the case, in order for this thing to be what it is: its constituent parts, the way those constituents must be related, etc. The specification is complete, at that level of detail, i.e., while there may be more to say about this thing, whatever else that remains to be specified will be a further elaboration of some constituent. The State of Affairs Unit is presented below. Object, Process, and Event Units may be found in Ossorio (1971/78).

A State of Affairs Unit is an ordered pair (N, D), where:

N is the name of the state of affairs. It may be a sentence, a clause, a formal name, a formal symbol, etc. SA1.1.01, "the gun was fired," and "The cat is on the mat" are examples.

D is the description, composed of:

Relationship: A specification, by name, of the n–place relationship that characterizes this state of affairs. An attribute or property is a unary relationship.

Elements: A list of the N elements, specified by name, that are the logical roles of the relationship.

Classification: Identification of each constituent as an object, process, event, or state of affairs.

Individuals: A list of the actual historical individuals, identified by name, number, symbol, or any other identifying locution. ("Individnal" is not the same as "object.")

Eligibilities: A specification of which Individuals may or must participate as which Elements in the relationship.

Expansions:

Elaborating the Classification of a given Individual *via* an Object, Process, Event, or State of Affairs Unit.

Elaborating the Classification of a given Individual as an Attribute by giving an SAU description of the state of affairs in which the Attribute is the Relationsbip.

Contingencies:

Specification, involving either attributes of the individuals or combinations of conditions of constituents, that specify which combinations may occur and still be a case of this state of affairs.

Constraints on the use of a particular Name as contingent on the use of other Names for other Elements. For example, "the catcher threw out the mammal at second base" violates this kind of contingency specification.

Constraints such that the use of a particular Element is contingent on its being an element of the SAU in which it is an Element. For example, "the right rear leg of the table is dirty" names a state of affairs including relationships between the top of the table and the legs; the relationship between the legs and the top is Supports (leg, top).If the table is disassembled, there is no longer any such thing as the right rear leg of the table because the state of affairs in which the legs are in those relationships to the top no longer is the case. (However, the individual that was assigned to that Element still exists.

For example, at this moment, my stapler is sitting on my desk. That sentence is a description of a situation, i.e., a state of affairs. A SAU description of this state of affairs is:

Name: My stapler is on top of my desk.
Description:
  Constituents: Stapler, Desk
  Relationships: One binary relation, with the name "on top of"
  Classification: Stapler and Desk are both objects
  Individuals: my stapler, my desk
  Eligibilities: my stapler is eligible to be Stapler; my desk is eligible to be Desk
  Contingencies: none

This SAU illustrates some important points. First, *all* objects, processes, events, states of affairs, and relationships are given by name. This is the same idea as using relationship names such as friend, mother of, etc., in predicate calculus formulas (see, for example, Ginsburg, 1993). The appearance of ordinary English sentences as names may appear odd, but is not different in principle.

Second, this description is obviously "incomplete," in the sense that nothing about the desk is described, nor the stapler, its condition, etc. Thus, "my stapler" is hardly a complete description. Just as with other forms of description of the real world, further information is given by other descriptions, including Object Units.

In giving a state of affairs description, one first specifies a name, with any kind of identifying name or description. For example, "the necklace is more expensive than the ring." (Shideler, 1988) In ordinary discourse, in English, the most common usage is to give brief descriptions. Just as in ordinary discourse, much more might be said, but we do not need to say it all (and indeed could not). Whatever more needs to be said is given in the Expansions, the OUs, PUs, EUs, and SAUs that give the details of the constituent objects, processes, events, and states of affairs. That one object in this example is a necklace is a state of affairs (Rule 9), and that the necklace has a price of $900 is a state of affairs, that the ring has a price of $700 is a state of affairs, that they both have prices is a state of affairs, and that one price is greater than the other is a state of affairs (Rule 8). The expansions allow explicit representation of decomposition, the inclusion of all objects, processes, events, and states of affairs that are constituents of the one named "the necklace costs more than the ring," systematically and to any level of detail. Contingencies (particularly No. 2) allow composition, the specification of larger states of affairs of which this state of affairs is a constituent (following Transition Rule 2).

Specification of relationships by Name should not be taken to imply that the relationships are of any particular kind, such as physical, mathematical, or Turing-computable. It is often the case that the relationship that is central to the state of affairs being what it is is not a physical one. A relationship is specified simply by name. The relationship named "on top of" is physical, but "friend of," "in love with," "understood by," and innumerable others are not *per se* physical. (We would not be inclined to say that since we cannot give a definition of "friend" in terms of physical quantities and relationships there is no such thing as friend.) In fact, many of the relationships central to the conduct of physical science are not physical: that a conclusion is justified or not, that an empirical result is consistent with a given theory, that a reader agrees or does not agree with a theory, etc.

There is nothing in the State of Affairs System to keep a describer from taking a position that only those relationships reducible to a finite set of physical relationships are acceptable (which is the materialist position). However, this formulation reveals that position for exactly what it is: an *a priori* commitment to only giving, or accepting, certain kinds of descriptions. Nothing is gained in the way of precision by such a commitment, although the narrowing of scope it affords may be useful to the describer. In general, limiting oneself to physical, or any particular kind of, relationships, objects, processes, events, and states of affairs does not make one's descriptions more, or less, scientific.

Additionally, while relationships and constituents are named explicitly, this does not indicate that actual cases are always "all or nothing." That two constituents have a relationship to some degree is a common occurrence, one which itself is a state of affairs. Thus, fuzzy, unclear, or approximate cases are included, like any other states of affairs.

A more complex example, and one in some ways more illuminating, is the following one, due to Shideler (1988) of two humans in a traditional two–person marriage:

Name: John and Jane's Marital Relationship
Description:
    Constituents: Husband, Wife
    Relationships: One binary relation, with the name "married";
    Husband, Wife each have the unary relation (the attribute) "Human."
    Classification: Husband and wife are both objects
    Individuals: John, Jane
    Eligibilities: Jane is eligible to be Wife
    John is eligible to be Husband
    Contingencies: Husband, Wife not in the relation "married" with anyone else; John and Jane were Groom and Bride, respectively, in a Wedding Ceremony.

In addition to illustrating the description of non–physical states of affairs, this example illustrates an important and somewhat subtle point about these descriptions: they are descriptions, not definitions. The names of constituents and relationships are not intended as definitions, but (depending on the use of the descriptions) as simply formal names for identity coordination or for identifiers usable by persons with the knowledge and competence to recognize instances of them. Certainly this simple SAU could not "define" the state (or relation) of marriage, in the sense of giving the particular characteristics that distinguish this state of affairs from others, or describe any of the myriad details and complexities of how that state of affairs relates to others. (In general, though, considerable detail can be represented by the contingencies of the description.)

In particular, much of what would ordinarily be called the "meaning" of the term "married" includes facts about how one is treated differently if one is married. This aspect of "meaning" is not excluded here; it is just not represented within this state of affairs description. Such connotative meaning is explicitly included by representing it in other Object, Process, Event, and State of Affairs descriptions of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs in which the original state of affairs is involved. As an example, part of the concept of (traditional, two–person, Western) marriage is that neither Husband or Wife is married to someone else, which we see in the above State of Affairs Description.

Sometimes the further detail needed involves some part of one of the constituents of the state of affairs. Further description of constituent objects, processes, events, and states of affairs are given by Object, Process, Event, and other State of Affairs Units. Any object, process, event, or state of affairs may be further described, down to any level of detail necessary or appropriate (as discussed in some detail by Ossorio, 1978).

Names and Definitions

As accustomed to definitions as we are, there is a tendency to think of the Name of the unit as a definition, but it is not, nor is the entire Unit. The descriptive format approach allows one to specify all that is known about some element of the world, at that level of detail, without having to have a definition. The thing (object, state of affairs, etc.) being represented is identified by a formal name; when further information is needed, it is represented by the appropriate descriptive format, which is always of the form (Name, Description). The Description gives the immediate constituents and their relationships. Any component, at any level, can be further described *via* the appropriate object, process, event, or state of affairs description. A particular set of descriptions, giving further description about constituents at various levels of detail, is however only that: further information. Further description is only that, however, not definition or a complete specification of all of the constituents and their (recursively specified) sub-constituents.

For example, one commonly encounters the statement that ordinary objects are "really" sets of fundamental particles, and therefore to "really" specify, say, a pencil, one would have to specify the attributes of all the particles the make up the pencil. By contrast, following the descriptive format approach, to describe a pencil, one gives an Object Unit, specifying the pencil's immediate constituents and their relationships, and as much further detail as necessary or useful *via* further Object Units. The set of Units does not define the pencil, nor say everything that could be said about it and its parts, but this does not make the description defective. It is worth noting that this is the form of description persons most commonly employ in describing the everyday world.

As the above example of "John and Jane's marital relationship" illustrates, this device allows us to name, describe, and use the descriptions of states of affairs, objects, processes, and events that we would be hard-pressed to define. It is hard to imagine what a definition of a particular couple's marital relationship could even look like.

In the same way, the following are also names of states of affairs, whose description at this level can be given by specifying their constituent states of affairs and how those constituents are related: (1) "The nation experienced wide-spread social unrest in the 1960's"; (2) "Runaway inflation contributed to the rise of Nazi Germany"; (3) "Oppression by the patriarchy has led to the current status of women in the world" (Ossorio, 1982). While each of these names can be treated as assertions, they are not serving that function here. They are rather brief descriptions, being used as formal names. Their "meaning" is specified by giving the corresponding Description: the constituents, relationships, etc., from the SAU.

Thus, the (Name, Description) format is a technical device that provides the capability for stating and describing a far greater portion of the world than can be defined. It allows us to formally specify the objects, processes, etc., of any part of

the world, or the world itself, by identifying the elements of interest and representing whatever information we have about those elements.

The Relationship to Frames

There is an obvious similarity between the Object, Process, Event, and State of Affairs Units and the notion, familiar in the Artificial Intelligence literature, of frames (Ginsburg, 1993). Ossorio's work can be seen as a development of the concept of frames, and the descriptions using the Units could be termed "frame-based." However, while not actually incorrect, such a characterization would be misleading.

Ossorio's analysis is a conceptual analysis of the relationships between objects, processes, events, states of affairs, and relationships, and of what it takes to specify one of these things. Whereas the basic concept of a frame is "a group of things usually found together," the basic concept of a Unit is the quite different, and much more rigorous, concept of what it takes to *be* that object, process, event, or state of affairs.

The descriptive formats are a technical resource for representing situations, objects, and aspects of human behavior much more completely than previously. They have been used to allow the direct representation and technical use of actions and circumstances that have never been possible before, including unique formulations of intention, choice, and concepts (Jeffrey and Putman, 1983; Jeffrey *et al*, 1989). Also, it should be noted that historically Ossorio's work pre-dates all published work on frames by several years.

Identity Coordination

One other aspect of the concept of a world needs a bit more discussion, that of identity coordination. This is the notion of the "connectedness" of a world, and of the real world in particular. There is a familiar reminder that "it's one world." I am writing this article on a particular computer (which I might identify by the phrase "my computer"), looking at the specific monitor and typing on the specific keyboard that are object constituents of "my computer"; People reading it receive it on paper by delivery by a person; The paper is manufactured at a specific site by a process involving several objects; These objects are manufactured by other persons, at other specific sites, using other objects; ad infinitum. All of these objects (including the special kind of object, a person), processes, events, and states of affairs are part of the same single one world, which is referred to above as Limiting Case 1. However, what makes it one, connected, world is identity

coordination, i.e., that this piece of paper is *the same thing as* the piece of paper manufactured at the paper–manufacturing site, and so forth.

We refer to this logical phenomenon as "identity coordination." This is one aspect of the world being the actual world, the one we live in and are parts of, rather than theoretical, hypothetical, or merely possible worlds. If the pen I use to make notes on the paper beside me is not the same pen as the pen I lay down on the desk a moment ago, and nothing has happened to change the pen, then my description of the world is recognizably defective.

We now turn to the central goal of the paper, formulating consciousness. We use the logical fact that the world is a single whole to provide a logically consistent and coherent account of the phenomenon of experience. We will show that the relationship between a person's experience of a thing and the thing itself, and the inaccessibility of one person's experience by another follow from the fact that a person has a world, and that it is a world, i.e., a single thing, not something else.

CONSCIOUSNESS

The previous section presented a formal system of reality concepts that can be used to describe, *via* the (Name, Description) format, a world or any portion of one as both a single all–inclusive whole and as consisting of its constituents at any level. In this section we address a crucially important special case: A world that includes the person whose world it is as a constituent, i.e., the ordinary case of a person in the world. We shall show that consciousness, experience, and feelings are the logical outcomes of a person having a world, and having a very particular place within that world.

Parametric Formulations

One of the difficulties in talking about consciousness is that the word has been used in so many ways and so many contexts that clarification is necessary. It is very easy to give examples of phenomena that fit one aspect or another of our notion of consciousness, but it is very hard to do more than that. Guzeldore (1995) has nicely summarized the current situation, as well as the past 100 years, with the following: "To make matters worse it is not clear whether everyone *means* the same thing by the term 'consciousness', even within the bounds of a single discipline." In this vein, Penrose (1989) has stated that it is "premature" to try to give a definition of the term, and in view of the tremendous range of phenomena to which the word is applied he may be right. Certainly the great array of incompatible definitions currently in use would seem to point in that direction.

However, giving a definition is not the only way to clarify a concept. Another is to give a *parametric formulation.* A parametric formulation of something is a formulation of the possibilities for what the thing could be and still be a thing of that kind—a color, a chair, a baseball game, a theory, etc.

For example, one would be hard–pressed to give a definition of color, but a parametric formulation can be given, as follows:

Color = <H, S, I>, where

H is the hue
S is the saturation
I is the intensity

Any particular color is then specified by specifying actual values for each parameter.

The obvious questions are which parameters are appropriate, and how one decides. A choice of parameters is similar to a choice of a coordinate system. One selects a set of parameters necessary to capture the distinctions desired, and one decides by deciding whether a possible set of parameters do that job. Thus in the case of color, one decides whether hue, saturation, and intensity are appropriate parameters for the concept of color by examining the phenomena already recognized as examples of the concept of color, and determining whether these parameters capture those examples. (In this sense, and in this sense only, choosing a set of parameters is empirical, i.e., subject to verification, by observation, that they "work.") Just as one can have more than one coordinate system (e.g., Cartesian and polar), one may have more than one parameterization.

The color example also illustrates two additional points. First, a parametric analysis is not a definition, in the sense that one who did not have the ability to distinguish colors, and these aspects of colors, could not gain it from this analysis. Second, the same holds for the parameters. The analysis would be meaningless to one who did not have the concepts of hue, saturation, and intensity.

A parametric formulation is particularly useful when one can identify certain aspects of a phenomenon that are crucial to its being what it is, but cannot find an "underlying" explanation for those aspects. In the case of color, there is no further breakdown of hue, saturation, and intensity (although there could be such), and no such breakdown is necessary for characterizing the phenomenon of color, as long as one has the concepts used in the parameters.

Parametric Formulation of Consciousness

The phenomenon of consciousness has two fundamental aspects. One of those aspects is what one is aware of. We say that one is aware of, or conscious of, the

table, the pencil, the football, the relationship between the mother and daughter, the falling leaf, and so forth. Referring to the previous section, we see that elements of one's world can be "decomposed," i.e., described in terms of their constituent objects, processes, etc., as codified by the Descriptive Units, and they can be composed into larger objects, states of affairs, etc., i.e., described as constituents of larger, containing, objects, states of affairs, etc. A person's world is the totality of all of these objects, processes, events, and states of affairs. This is limiting case LC–I, the state of affairs that includes all other states of affairs, and thus all objects, states of affairs, etc., and all their constituents, at any level of detail.

More colloquially, one might say that a person's world is everything that the person sees around them, and all of the parts of those things, and all of the things those things could be parts of.

By "aware of" something, we mean that a person (1) observes the thing, and (2) knows that they are observing that thing. Thus, awareness is somewhat similar to cognizant action (Ossorio, 1981), in which the person knows X (i.e., is acting on the distinction between X and not–X), and knows they are. It is important to note that what a person can observe is not limited to objects, processes, events, or states of affairs physically present. One can be aware that war is imminent, that someone not present is a close friend, that one failed to turn off the oven before leaving on vacation three days ago, etc. In each case, one is observing a state of affairs involving various elements of the world.

This does not mean that the person is at any time, or ever, actually aware of each part of their world. It means only that they can be. In particular, all of the common phenomena such as "fringe of awareness," "back of the mind," and Heidegger's "readiness to hand" (Winograd & Flores, 1986) are phenomena related to the logical fact that a person has a world and can be aware of elements of it.

One particular element of a person's world is critical, namely, the person whose world it is. A person must be a part of a world; for any person, their world is the one that includes a place for them as an active agent, observer of their actions, and critic responsible for assessing the success of their actions (Ossorio, 1982). This is the logical minimum for a person to act at all.

The second fundamental aspect of the phenomenon of consciousness is that one's consciousness changes in more basic, profound ways than are accounted for by ordinary states of awareness. Further, this is an ordinary, everyday occurrence, that one ordinarily takes in one's stride without noticing it unless something goes wrong. "Altered states of consciousness" are more extreme or exotic forms of the same phenomenon. When one is at work, one is aware of various aspects of the work world: work relationships, things used at work, situations involving work, events at work, and so on. The phrase "work world" is not merely poetry. It reflects the reality that the elements at work comprise a world, as we have articulated that concept above. When one leaves work, and goes to home to one's family, for example, one's world is different: different objects, processes, events, states of

affairs, and relationships. The all-encompassing transitive closure of that set of things is a world, just as the work world is a world. When at work, one is conscious *as* some element in that world; when at home, one's consciousness is that of a family member, specifically as the position one holds in one's family. (Psychotherapists have found great value in examining exactly what that position is, as an explanation for a number of apparently intra-personal problems, and as a source of therapeutic strategies.) In other words, one is now conscious *as* an element of a different world. The second fundamental aspect of consciousness is what one is conscious as.

One need not change worlds entirely to be conscious as something different. That is merely the most common way. Other examples are also familiar and unremarkable. A university professor who audits a class in another discipline, for example, will be conscious as student in that class, but as a professor at other times, in the same world.

One special case of a person's world is extremely important: one's *entire* world. One's work world, family world, hobby worlds, etc., are worlds in the way discussed above, but they do not encompass everything about the person. One's entire world is the world that encompasses *all* of one's relationships, processes, objects, events, and states of affairs in one's life. While one can, and commonly does, move between one world and another, one cannot step out of one's entire world, for whatever one is conscious as is part of one's (entire) world.

The relationship between a person's worlds, and their entire world, is complex. Worlds logically are entirely separate. The world of baseball and the world of computing, for example, have no concepts in common. However, the worlds are related: they are parts of a person's entire world, and that person can routinely and without fanfare move between them. A computer scientist can play in a faculty-student softball game. Further, in the paradigm case we take objects, processes, etc., from one world to another and recognize them as the same object. Thus, I know that the pen I use to grade papers is the same thing I use to sign the credit card slip when I go out to dinner with my family. One need only try imagining a person who could never see connections between the events, objects, etc., in one world and another to notice that such a phenomenon would not correspond to our concept of consciousness. If, when I left work and went home, I retained no knowledge of my work world or anything in it—nothing about events, nothing about which processes were at which stage of completion, none of the people there, etc., and could never recognize when something in one world was the same thing as in another world, I would not be functioning in the way that people observably do.

There are exceptions to this automatic retention of knowledge as one moves from one world to another, cases in which recognizing something as the same object from two different worlds does not happen without some effort. The state of affairs in which one historical individual is "the same thing" as something in

another world, that is, is the same historical individual but is an Element in states of affairs in different worlds, is more complex than one which the two constituent states of affairs are in the same world, and it would not be surprising if the recognition of the more complex state of affairs sometimes went wrong or did not occur without deliberate effort. Colloquially, we say, "I had to think about it." A common example of this phenomenon is knowing someone in one setting and then being unable to recognize them in another.

Thus, a person's world is the entire world of that person, encompassing all the objects, processes, events, relationships, and states of affairs, including all their behaviors and possible behaviors. Or, to put it another way, a person has a unique position in his (or her) world: he (or she) is the one whose world it is.

Examining the foregoing, we see that there are two kinds of facts about a person and their world: (1) A person must exist in a real world, i.e., must have place in that world, and (2) The person recognizes and acts on elements of their world *as elements of a world*, i.e., as parts of the single connected thing they themselves are also parts of. A more poetic formulation of this, and one that perhaps is more informative, might be to say, "A person is in the world and the world is in the person." We summarize this by the reminder that a person has a world.

A person's consciousness thus has two irreducible aspects: (1) The world the person can be conscious, or aware, *of*, and (2) What the person is conscious *as*, in the world.

Deciding whether a set of parameters characterizes a phenomenon is a matter of deciding whether the parameters capture all the cases of interest, and only those case. In the case of color, hue, saturation, and intensity are an accepted parametrization of color because every actual color can be described by specifying values of these three parameters. In the case of consciousness, the world the person can be conscious of and what the person is conscious as appear to parameterize consciousness: any actual instance of consciousness can be specified by giving particular values for these two parameters, the name of the world and the name of the position in that world.

Thus, consciousness may be described as that phenomenon characterized by

$C = <I, W, P>$, where

I is the individual whose consciousness it is
W is the world of the things the person can be conscious *of*
P is the position in the world that the person is conscious *as*.

W and "Degrees" of Consciousness

Characterizing consciousness as phenomena involving the world of things which one can be aware of provides immediate conceptual access to all phenomena

to as "edge of awareness," "fringe of consciousness," and so forth. When I am typing this paragraph, I am immediately aware of the words I am typing and whether they convey what I am trying to convey; I am "peripherally aware" of the television in the room next to my home office; if I work long enough my hunger will "intrude" on my consciousness. These states of affairs are part of my world, but I may not be doing anything involving them. We have a rich language for first–hand reports of elements of our world that we could, under the proper circumstances, be aware of, but are not at that moment. Thus, the W parameter allows us to represent precisely many, perhaps most, of the ordinary phenomena we would consider as falling under the heading of consciousness.

Relationships Between P and W

P Must Be in W

Not all possible values of P and W are meaningful. P must be the name of a position, or place, in W. As an example, consider the world of baseball, in which there are batters, pitchers, fielders, gloves, baseballs, umpires, diamonds, baselines, and so forth, i.e., the kinds of the things mentioned in the rules that define the game of baseball. In that world, there is no such thing as an accountant, and thus one cannot be conscious *as* an accountant and be part of a game of baseball.

However, the same individuals may be parts of more than one world. The scorekeeper for a baseball game is conscious as an accountant, but is conscious of balls, strikes, runs, and so forth. Scorekeeper is a constituent of a different world, one that includes many of the same constituents as the baseball world, but includes others as well: scorekeepers, score books, batting averages, RBIs, and so forth. The world of baseball has no place for an accountant, but baseball can have a place in the world of an accountant.

Baseball further exemplifies the common observation that two people in different positions may be aware of the same things, but in another sense their awareness of those things is very different. A player and a scorekeeper are conscious not only as different constituents, but as different constituents of different worlds; both P and W have different values.

Conversely, to be conscious of some element E of W, one must he conscious not only as some element of W, but as an element of W that can be aware of E. When a baseball player is negotiating for a salary, he must be conscious of objects, processes, and states of affairs that are not parts of the baseball world, such as number of years in the contract, economic goals for the future, expenses, etc., and to be conscious of these things he must be conscious not as a baseball player but rather as a person, perhaps an economically concerned person, and that person is a member of the human world.

More generally, the position P must be a position in which an individual can be aware of the constituents of the world W. The pen on my desk is an object in my world, but it makes no sense (other than metaphorically) to speak of the pen's consciousness, or being conscious as the pen. (One could however sensibly speak of being conscious as a person acting as though they were a pen.)

Personal Identity

A person cannot be in a world without being in some particular position within it. Most commonly, this position is that of an Element that is a constituent of states of affairs in that world: researcher, teacher, professor, father, husband, mother, wife, man, woman, human, and so forth. In some cases there is no name for the position other than what might be called "derivative," i.e., names that refer to other objects, processes, events, or states of affairs. For example, "tight end" is a position on a football team, but so is "the guy that caught the pass that won the last Super Bowl." Similarly, "mother" is a position in a family, but so is "mother who went back to school to complete her graduate work." Thus, a person is always conscious *as* some element of their world.

A number of psychological phenomena, including several of direct interest to psychotherapists, are related to this fact. The familiar "identity crisis," in which the person reports, "I don't know who I am," can be seen as a report that the person does not know just what their place is in their world. One way (although not the only way) such a situation can arise is if a person finds themselves doing things that they do not see as consistent with any of the positions they can name. This phenomenon has become familiar as the women's movement has grown. In such a case an effective therapeutic strategy is often to enable the person to see just what their position in their world is, even though it does not have a simple name.

Wechsler (1995) has discussed in some detail how post–traumatic stress syndrome is a dramatic example of this logic. In PTSD, events have occurred which were, literally, not thinkable in the person's world, as they took the world to be. This leaves the person with the (quite appropriate) question, "What the hell kind of a world is it anyway where *this* kind of thing can happen?" The follow–on question is usually not far behind: "And if it's *that* kind of world, what's my place in it?" In such a case the person has the task of almost literally re–constructing their world.

Perhaps the most extreme example of problematical phenomena related to a person and their world is multiple personality disorder. The most striking characteristic of this situation is that the "personalities" are, in effect, different persons, with different worlds, and therefore distinct positions in those worlds. The therapeutic process is one of "integrating" the personalities, and the worlds, into one world. Ossorio (1995) has noted that there is some evidence that the crucial difference in the history of persons with this disorder is not only the occurrence of events impossible in their world, but that they were forced to act in ways that had

literally no place in their world, and hence were forced to act as though they were not any part of their own world.

The Consciousness Change Formula

It is a fundamental fact about relationships and actions that relationships are changed by actions. Ossorio has neatly formulated this fact with the Relationship Change Formula (Shideler, 1988):

If: A person P has relationship R1 with person Q,
Action A is inconsistent with R1,
A is consistent with relationship R2,
P engages in A with Q,

Then the relationship between P and Q will change in the direction of R2, i.e., will change to a new relationship R3, more similar to R2 than is R1

The interesting empirical questions are of course what characteristics of P and Q lead to what changes in which relationships, based on which actions.

We can generalize this to the *Consciousness Change Formula*:

If: A person is conscious as P1,
The person acts as P2.
i.e., the person engages in the actions one does in position P2,
these actions are not consistent with being in position P1,

Then the person's consciousness will change in the direction of consciousness as P2, i.e., will change to consciousness as P3, a position more similar to P2 than is P1.

As with the Relationship Change Formula, this formula is deliberately stated in such a way that it is not a claim to empirical truth. What must be determined empirically is which actions, for which kinds of persons, produce what degree of change from which P1 to which P2.

This formula has applications in diverse areas, of which we will mention two. First, a number of people are specifically interested in how to change someone's consciousness, including their own. This principle says that, to change someone's consciousness, have them do things that are characteristic of the position desired. In practice this is not simple, and the formula implies the reason: the person must be capable of the actions; the actions must not be consistent, in the person's world, with the position they already have; and the actions must not be so inconsistent with the person's current position in their world that they are unable to do them. One would expect variation in skill in judging these factors (which are states of affairs), and in fact that is what one finds.

Certain kinds of psychotherapy involve exactly this change of consciousness, either as part of the process or as an end result. Many of the techniques of Milton Erickson, the famous therapist who often used hypnosis in therapy, are of this sort (Haley, 1973). Erickson also exemplifies the above-mentioned importance of skill.

One would not expect, from the Consciousness Change Formula, that exhortation would be an effective technique to change someone's consciousness, and empirically it is not. (It may however provide sufficient reason for the person to do different things, in which case their consciousness may change, as codified by the formula.)

A rather different example can be found in large organizations. It is commonplace to want members of one part of the organization to understand and act on the point of view of members from some very different area. When an engineer and a marketing expert are working on a project, for example, this is necessary. Based on the formula, we would expect that for a person to actually see things from a different position they would have to do something other than simply receive the instruction to see things differently. Also, we would expect that, when the people go back to their respective usual positions their consciousness would revert to what it normally is, because they go back to doing what they normally do. Implications of this situation for software development organizations are discussed in more detail in Jeffrey (1996).

EXPERIENCE

Clearly, any conceptualization of consciousness that is limited to what is public and observable is not adequate. Some of the most striking and important aspects of consciousness, i.e., some of the most significant phenomena that are accepted as part of this subject matter, concern the relationship between what a person is conscious of "within themselves" and what is public and observable by others, the ancient and venerable domain of the "inner" and "outer" lives.

Experience clearly has some relationship to knowledge. I can know that I experienced the cold as biting, the words as hurtful, and so on. It seems clear, though, that experience is more than knowledge. Knowledge of the orange is not the same as the taste of the orange; knowing that an oboe is being played is not the same thing, categorically, as hearing an oboe.

Two characteristics of experience seem particularly important in distinguishing it from other phenomena. First, it is "immediate," in that there is nothing else one does in order to find out one's experience. This is perhaps the aspect that has led many to treat experience as what is real, and the public world, or the "real world" as a construct of "raw feels," "sensory impressions," or something similar. However, observational immediacy is a characteristic of the objects, processes, events, and states of affairs that make up one's world. There is nothing intervening

in one's experience, and there is nothing intervening in observations of the real world. I observe my fingers typing, hear the sound of the fan, smell the apple juice, feel the heat, etc., without first doing something else, and likewise I notice how it feels when my fingers hit the keys, how the apple juice tastes, and so on. Thus, immediacy is common to experience and to observations of the public world.

Second, experience is not public. You cannot feel the pain if I hit my thumb with a hammer; when you eat an orange I cannot have your taste of it. Thus, one's experience is unique to him or herself, and this non–public aspect of experience is logically necessary for the phenomenon to be part of what it is to be experience, rather than an ordinary observation. (If, for example, my thumb bleeds when I hit it, we do not say, "My experience was that my thumb bled.")

This uniqueness is of a particular sort, and one must be careful not to claim too much. There seems nothing in principle impossible with the idea of a telepath, as fantasized in science fiction, that could observe my experience of tasting the orange. However, he/she would be observing, perhaps even tasting, *as* themselves, not as me. That person's experience would then be whatever they experienced when they observed my experience of tasting the orange.

To articulate the concept of experience, i.e., to include the phenomenon and say how it is related to consciousness, using the parametric formulation, we must first examine certain aspects of the concept of position, and the logical relationship between position and behavior.

In general, what a person can observe depends on the position from which they are viewing a situation. As a heuristic analogy, consider looking at a chair in a room. The chair may be viewed from any position within the room, and what the observer will see varies with their position. The same principle holds with respect to the more general situation of position in the world. If I am in position P, there are various things I will not be able to observe. (Of course, I may be able to imagine what those things look like, if I have ever observed them or if I know someone else's description.) If I have observed them, I could not be said to be aware, or conscious, of them (although I could certainly be aware of others' reports of them).

The critical issue with respect to what one can see from one place in a room or another is the particular physical, geographic, relationship with respect to the object being viewed. There are any number of such relationships, and in general it is useful to be able to refer to a place, or position, in the room as a representation, or codification, of all the physical relationships. Cartesian 3–space is a scheme for giving names to positions. Similarly, in the more general case of the real world, the position of something in the world is a description, or codification, of the thing's relationships to all the constituents of the world.

A person's overall position in their world includes a number of different, less inclusive, positions: man, woman, computer scientist, psychologist, child, artist, runner, and so forth. (How many people have had the experience of things looking

different when they go visit their parents' home as adults? Or perhaps I should ask, is there anyone who has not had that experience?) This is almost the same phenomenon we began with, the fact that a person can be conscious as different elements of their world, and being conscious as those things makes differences in what they can be aware of.

With most positions in the world, many individuals can occupy that place. The position of Supervisor, professor, teacher of a class, child, student, coffee cup, bucket, car, etc., can be filled by any number of individuals. I used to have one accountant and now I have another, and I expect both individuals to look at my finances from the position of accountant. This is the ordinary, unremarkable situation with most positions. When I occupy that position in the world, I am in principle able to observe the things anyone else in that position can observe.

However, there is an exception: the position of *that person*. A person's overall position in their world is unique, much as the 0–point of a set of Cartesian coordinates is unique; it is *that* person's world, the one in which they are the actor, observer, and critic. No other individual can be in the position of me, i.e., the person whose world this is. Or, more succinctly, no one else can be me. For any person, there is in their world a position only they can hold, namely, the position of the person *whose world it is*.

Since what one can observe depends on the position from which one views the world, some of what a person observes of their world is not observable by anyone else, due to the fact that no other person can occupy the place from which these things are observable. In this sense, some parts of a person's world are irrevocably *private*; the only access another observer can ever have to these parts of a person's world are through observation of the person and their behavior, including that person's language (i.e. what they say about it).

One additional logical fact about experience is relevant here, namely, experience is not a separate kind of thing, somehow associated with real things. Rather, the term refers to things one observes when something happens in the world. Thus in the paradigm case (and the overwhelming majority of cases) we speak of the experience *of* something. My experience of hitting my thumb is what I experience when I hit my thumb, or, using the formulation above, my experience of hitting my thumb consists of those parts of the world that only I can observe when I hit my thumb. (And thus Ossorio's observation that my experience of walking across the street is whatever I experience when I walk across the street.)

These four facts appear to capture the concept of experience: it is the experience of something; it is real to the person who has it, i.e., part of that person's world; it is related to knowledge but categorically unlike it; and is essentially and irrevocably private. I believe we can, accurately and without doing injustice to the phenomenon, characterize experience as those aspects of a person's world that are observable only by that person, by virtue of it being that person's world. We can summarize this as follows:

A person's experience of X consists of the irrevocably private portions of the person's world, when X is the case.

We should note that nothing here indicates that experience is always present, or logically necessary. This is consistent with the observed fact that a person may have no experience of a thing or situation; I might walk across the street and have no experience of it.

Historical uniqueness of individuals plays a key role here. It is this uniqueness that makes the states of affairs the experience of *this* person. Nothing in principle prevents an observer from knowing of another's private states of affairs (as with the hypothetical telepath), but the observer cannot know them *as* that person because the observer does not have the same relationship to the states of affairs as does the person whose world it is. In other words, I cannot have your experience, because you and I are distinct persons and so have distinct places in our respective worlds.

Uniqueness of individuals, and permissiveness of the State of Affairs System, provide an explanation of another aspect of experience: the unpredictability of the experience of something. That two people can observe the same object, and yet have dramatically different experiences of it, is a commonplace occurrence. Since the two people have, from the outset, different relationships to the things observed and done, we have the "raw material" for two different worlds. In each of these worlds, a portion will be shared and public, and a portion will be unique to the person whose world it is, because it is the states of affairs, objects, processes, and events related to the state of affairs whose Relationships include the one in which the person whose world it is is an Element. Less technically (but perhaps more clearly), Peter and Paul have different experiences of the same thing because Peter is not Paul, and so must have a different relationship with the thing.

We note that characterizing experience as the essentially private aspects of a person's world is not derived from, but is consistent with, Wittgenstein's observation that the essentially private aspects of one's world have no special priority or reality, and in fact are in some sense secondary to the public ones (Wittgenstein, as quoted in Grayling, 1988).

FEELINGS

Other than terms specifically from the realm of religion and spirituality, probably none is more traditionally antithetical to scientific accounts than "feelings." However, an account of consciousness without a discussion of feelings is clearly not complete. In this section we show that we can make sense of feelings, that is, incorporate them into the conceptual model of consciousness and experience we have developed. We show that feelings can be treated as a particular

kind of a person's experience, i.e., a particular kind of private aspect of a person's world.

First, recall the concept of appraisal (Shideler, 1988). States of affairs do not all have the same behavioral status. Some descriptions are descriptions of states of affairs that have no particular immediate implication for action. Others, however, tautologically imply that an action is called for.

Ossorio's paradigm case example is that of danger and escape. I am standing in an empty room, the door opens, and a lion walks into the room. I take one look at the lion and leap through the window. Outside, someone (perhaps a psychologist) asks me why I did that, and I reply, "There was a lion in the room." "Oh, you mean that the lion caused you to jump out of the window?" "Why, no. The lion was dangerous and I escaped from the danger."

Notice that there is no further explanation called for, beyond the recognition of danger and acting to avoid it. Telling you I recognized danger is telling you escape was called for, i.e., danger and having reason for avoidance are tautological. "The lion is dangerous" is an *appraisal*. Other descriptions, by contrast, carry no implications for action (although they of course may be part of other states of affairs that do). "The lion is yellow" is such a *mere description*.

The lion example illustrates one further characteristic of certain kinds of actions: when the lion walks into the room, I immediately, with no further deliberation, leap out of the window. If sat quietly, examined a number of alternatives, tried one or two, and then jumped through the window, it is a different kind of action. In this case one would probably say I was behaving prudently, but not "reacting out of fear." Emotional behavior is an action such that: (1) It is acting on a recognition of a state of affairs that carries tautological implications for action, i.e., an appraisal, and (2) There is a learned tendency to act without further deliberation.

Recalling also that a state of affairs is characterized by its immediate constituents and the relationships between them, as codified in the SAU, we can say further one of the critical features of the appraisal and action is the specific relationship being acted on. As with the lion, this relationship is a real, public, relationship. The lion and I have the relationship that the lion is dangerous to me, and my recognition is a recognition of that public, real-world relationship. Finally, notice that the relationship involved in the appraisal must be a relationship between *that* individual and some part of their world. If I recognize that the lion is dangerous to you, that state of affairs in itself has no implications for my behavior. (I can of course recognize that your being in danger is in turn a state of affairs that is a danger to me, and most of us would.) Appraisals are thus always "first person."

Public, observable emotional behaviors, as defined in the above paragraph, are universally understood and recognized (although of course the specific relationships and the ways of acting on them will vary greatly from culture to culture). They are the unmistakable cases of a person publicly acting, without further deliberation, on an appraisal.

What then are feelings, and how are they related to the public, observable-by-others, world? Feelings are what a person experiences when they make an appraisal, i.e., feelings are the private, observable only by the individual, parts of a person's world that are present when a person recognizes a relationship between themselves and some part of the world that tautologically implies a kind of action. In short:

Feelings are the experience of appraisal.

A short hand form of this is to say that the feeling of fear is whatever you feel when you are afraid, if you feel anything. As discussed by Shideler (1988), the feeling of anger is whatever you feel when you are angry; the feeling of guilt is whatever you feel when you are guilty (in your own judgment); the feeling of joy is whatever you feel when enjoy good fortune; and so forth.

Just as one may have no experience of walking across the street, one may make an appraisal and have no feelings about it; the lion walks into the room and I jump out the window, but I have no feeling of fear. Thus, to be more complete, we might say, "Feelings are what a person experiences when they make an appraisal, if they experience anything."

Several points are worth noting here. First, this formulation encompasses both the real-world situation involved in the appraisal as well as the experiential, private, aspects. In addition, if we remember that we are talking about a person's world here, and how connected the parts of a world are, it is not surprising that a person's experience, or feeling, in a situation is not predictable and is highly individualistic.

Second, the formulation captures the undeniable connection between feelings and appraisals. This the reason why asking a person how they feel about something is often (although not always) a way to find out about what their actual appraisals of a situation are. However, it also is a reminder that the real issue is never the feeling itself; it is the person's appraisal of the world, specifically of their relationships to the elements of their world.

One may or may not be conscious of one's appraisals, and simply knowing one is expected to appraise a situation in certain ways is not the same as actually doing so. This formulation thus provides a different conceptualization for understanding language such as "I know it but I don't feel it," and the famous split between intellect and emotion. It also includes the situation in which a person does not know they are acting in an angry (or sad, etc.) way, and has no feelings about a situation, person, etc., but is recognizably acting in angry, etc., ways, i.e., ways a person acts when that is the relationship, whether they know it or not.

Finally, focusing on the public, real-world basis of feeling provides a basis for including feelings and experience as subjects of scientific study, without having to assume they can be reduced to physiology. An observer's only access to another

person's experience, including their feelings, is by observation and language. As a result, a person's report of their feelings is not subject to the same kind of direct observational verification that ordinary observation reports are. If I tell you I feel calm and peaceful, but you see my face turn red and my hands clench into fists, you can observe that my state and behavior are inconsistent with my report, but that is categorically different from what you can do if I tell you that there is an elephant on my desk. For this reason, statements such as "It's true that he is feeling X" cannot simply be taken literally.

Such a statement can however be understood in another way: It can be understood as, "That feeling is not the feeling one has when relationship R is the case, and the subject is not acting in any of the ways a person (in this culture, with this background) acts on that relationship." By doing this, the investigator has moved to the public realm of relationships and actions, where there are statements, theories, and conceptualizations, where things are observable by others and evaluations done.

We can summarize this with Ossorio's formulation: "Telling you my feelings is like making you a promise." Promises are not true or false, and so it would be nonsensical to ask, "Is it true that the subject made a promise?" Just as with feelings, though, we can observe the person who made the promise in situations in which, as far as can be determined, they have real opportunities to do what was promised, and determine by observation whether they did any of the things a person who had made such a promise would have done.

A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In this section we use the parametric formulation of consciousness to address a few of the important questions about consciousness: (1) How does consciousness arise? (2) What is the physical "basis" of consciousness? (3) How can consciousness, experience, and feelings be studied scientifically but non-reductively? and (4) Can a computer be the basis for consciousness, i.e., is a conscious artifact possible?

How Does Consciousness Arise?

The usual formulation of the question of how consciousness arose in the course of evolution is in terms of a random development that provided a survival advantage. Further, it usually assumes that consciousness is some sort of process that takes place in addition to intelligence, problem-solving, etc. Certain aspects of consciousness have an obvious advantage in terms of survival, such as imagination (constructing portions of the world that the constructor knows are not real), planning, etc. There has been little success in assimilating the overall phenomenon to the model of survival advantage, however. For example, it is hard

to see how having an experience of eating an orange provides any survival advantage over simply knowing one is eating an orange, being able to recognize oranges, etc.

The parametric formulation of consciousness gives a different answer. We have seen that, as formulated in Equation (3), an individual's consciousness is not an independent attribute, but is rather the phenomenon articulated in terms of the individual's world and their position in it. The phenomena of consciousness are phenomena of one's world and one's position in it. "How does consciousness arise?" can therefore be re-stated as, "How do worlds arise?," i.e., how does it happen that individuals of some species acquire worlds, as such?

Since a world is a single totality, or more colloquially is connected in the way it is, having a world and having access to all aspects of one's world means that the individual has the potential for experience, i.e., aspects of their world that are in principle not directly accessible to any other person. Feelings, a kind of experience, are similarly a logical possibility. Thus, consciousness, experience, and feelings are names of phenomena that are aspects of an individual having a world. (Using the SAS concepts presented in Section 1, we can state this more precisely as follows: Consciousness, experience, and feelings are names of states of affairs that are constituents of the larger state of affairs of an individual having a world.)

The key issue is connectedness, the kind of connectedness a world exhibits. The question of how consciousness arises in intelligent beings is therefore the question of how beings who have a world evolve. The answer to this would seem to be similar in kind to customarily proposed accounts to the effect that over time individuals acquire greater and greater brain capacity. By formulating the question in terms of worlds, we can sharpen this notion: What develops is the capacity to recognize and act on the various aspects of a real world, in particular composition and identity coordination, until the individuals have a world, rather than partial or defective portions of one. Having a world means both being an element of a world and having a complete description of it, in the sense of including a representation for the being as actor, observer, and critic, and having the requisite capacities for re-description, including composition and decomposition. (Having a description here means only having the functional equivalent of a representation of the information the descriptive Units, not literally having those Units encoded in the brain.)

Giving detailed answers and explanations, and alternative theories of the details of this process, appears to hold great promise as a fascinating scientific endeavor.

The Physical Basis of Consciousness

Since consciousness is an aspect of a person having a world, and we have an independent characterization of what it means to have a world (Section 1), the question of the physical basis of consciousness takes on a different meaning. We suggest that the following reformulation of the question addresses the scientific

issue, but without having to make the assumptions other formulations require, and is more suitable as the basis for mathematical and empirical investigation. We ask:

What are the computational requirements for a brain to be the brain of an individual who has a world?

In a little more detail, what capabilities must a brain have in order for it to be the brain of an individual that has the capabilities with the real world concepts of object, process, event, and state of affairs that are codified in the State of Affairs Transition Rules? More informally, we are asking, "What has to go on in the brain for a person to have a world?"

This is in principle amenable to mathematical analysis and analysis of what operations must be done to maintain the knowledge of the world that persons observably have. Thus, we can ask, "What brain operations must occur for a person to make change X to their knowledge of their world, and how do those operations occur" "What must a person's brain be capable of for them to be able to recognize Y," etc.

Since the descriptive formats of OU, PU, SAU, and EU parameterize what must be specified to identify a particular object, process, etc., and the transition rules specify the kinds of composition and decomposition a person must have the capacity to do, and the names of the relationships that appear in the Units specify the relationships the person must be able to distinguish, this formulation seems directly amenable to analysis that could yield very specific and quantitative answers. It seems plausible, for example, that using this approach we could develop quantitative answers to questions such as when some entity has the capacity to have a world, i.e., could be a person in the usual sense of the word. Such an approach would be somewhat like information–processing arguments, but might more appropriately be termed a *description capacity* approach. (Some of the technical implications for the "processing" requirements are discussed in "computer–based consciousness" below.)

The Scientific Study of Consciousness

Before the question of the scientific study of consciousness can be addressed, a methodological and foundational issue must be dealt with. That issue is whether "scientific study" is synonymous with "reduction to physics." Most physical scientists, for example, seem to take this methodological assumption on faith. Further, the assumption seems to be rooted in the ages–old insistence that what is real is what is reducible in principle to physical objects, processes, events, and states of affairs. Given that assumption, scientific study has to be explanation in terms of physics.

We do not want to attempt to address that topic more than we have already done in passing. It is discussed thoroughly and definitively by Ossorio (1978). For

purposes of this paper, we simply wish to take the most conservative position possible: objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, and the relationships that are part of what it takes to be those things, are real if they are in principle observable or constituents of observable things, and there are ways of acting on them. Some of the actions may be linguistic, such as naming them, describing them, explaining them, including them in other descriptions, and so forth.

The relationships between constituents of an object or state of affairs are crucial to the thing being what it is, rather than something else, and this (logical) fact is codified in the SAU and OU. Examining the SAU and OU, it will be seen that nothing is specified as to whether the relationship is physical or not, or whether the relationship is computable. Limiting ourselves to physical (or computable) things and relationships does not allow for describing the full range of things and relationships one might need to describe a real world. (For example, the discussion of whether one description can be reduced to another, physical, one takes place in the real world. Reducibility is therefore a relationship of interest in the real world, and reducibility is not a physical relationship; it is a logical one.)

We indicated briefly in the previous section a different way to proceed with a science of consciousness. Ossorio's formulation of real world concepts provides a systematic and rigorous basis for formulating the twin phenomena of a person being conscious and a person having a world, i.e., a rigorous way to say what these phenomena are, without accepting any part of the reductionist program.

With the formulation of consciousness as a logical outcome of the (logical) fact that a person must have a world, and that a world is all one thing, "connected" in the ways discussed earlier, we are now in the position to make the first, fundamental, move of a scientist in any field: We can say precisely what phenomenon X *is*, independent of any assumptions or theories about what may "underlie" it, and then ask, "What physical processes are occurring when phenomenon X is occurring?"

Examples of non-reductionist inquiries and research based on this formulation are: (1) What are the differences in the brain of a person whose consciousness is different in the following ways? (2) For population P, what actions are most likely to succeed in changing a member of that population's consciousness from C1 to C2? (3) What changes in the brain of a person who becomes able to state something previously on the fringes of their consciousness? (4) What must take place physiologically for a person to become conscious of something they were not previously aware of? (5) How is the consciousness of a person who voluntarily becomes an element of a new world different from that of a person who is forced to become that element in that world? and (6) What kinds of changes take place in the brain of a person when they suddenly are forced to move from consciousness as an element of world W1 to consciousness as an element of world W2?

In short, an entirely different kind of research program is in order, in which the aspect of consciousness of interest is rigorously formulated as completely and

precisely as necessary, entirely without reference to brain processes of any kind, and empirical relationships between the two are researched experimentally, without having to accept anyone's philosophical position about what "must be" true. Within this paradigm, the hard and interesting questions remain, but in a different form. For example, with a rigorous formulation of the phenomena of consciousness, the question of the "basis" for consciousness is transformed into "how does the brain carry out the processes necessary for a person to be able to see the world in a certain way?"

Experience and Feelings

Experience and feelings constitute a special case. Since one person's experience and feelings are not directly accessible to another observer, research involving them can only be done indirectly. This does not invalidate them as candidates for scientific study. It does mean that it is impossible to reify them, and study them as though they were a type of object, process, event, or state of affairs observable in principle like any other.

For example, a person reports that they feel like they have a hot ball in their stomach when they see a certain picture. The straightforwardly scientific way to study such a phenomenon is not to try to find out how big, how hot, how heavy, etc., the ball "really is," because "really" is a meaningless term in this context. However, nothing prevents us from giving formal descriptions of the person's experience as completely as we like, using Unit descriptions or any other formalism.

With such a description of what is the case for the person reporting the experience, two kinds of scientific questions become possible. One is the kind described above, in which one is investigating what happens physically when the person has the experience. This kind of investigation occurs now, of course. When an investigator connects an PET scanner to a subject and has them visualize, say, a beach with gentle waves, they are creating a situation (a state of affairs) in which the subject has some (private) experience and the investigator is trying to find out what happens in the brain when they do. How do we know the subject is "really" visualizing the beach? We don't, of course, other than by the subject's language behavior, i.e., they say so.

The other kind of scientific study of feelings and experience is the behavioral investigation discussed earlier, in which one first determines the reality basis of the experience, the part of the world this is an experience *of*, and then asks to what degree, and/or in what ways, the person is acting in the ways a person in that situation acts.

The more usual questions, however, have no meaning. If my friend promises to pay me $10 next week, but doesn't, I cannot say that he did not really promise. I might, after investigation, say that he did not do any of the things a person does when they have made such a promise. There is no possible way to determine

whether he never really made the promise, i.e., "didn't mean it," or whether he changed his mind later. I can, in principle, determine that there is strong, even overwhelming, reason to take it that he never actually promised, but there is no possibility of direct observation. Analogously, I cannot say that you are not really feeling a cold feeling in the pit of your stomach. I might, after investigation, say that you are not acting in any of the ways a person would act if they had such a feeling. But your feeling might have changed, and there is no such thing as my determining that you did not really have the feeling, beyond your reports of it.

Certainly it is possible that extensive empirical investigation could result in a large body of findings about what kinds of physiological things happen when various experiences or kinds of experience are reported by subjects, so that we could have a statistically reliable body of correlates. In such a case one might be in a position to say that a subject appeared to be mis-reporting their experience because they did not show any of the physiological correlates known to accompany experience X. This would not constitute proof that the subject was not experiencing X, although it might well constitute basis for skepticism.

In summary, with this conceptualization, we have a way to incorporate the phenomena of (private) experience, rigorously and with as much precision as desired, without having to be uncomfortable about a lack of "proof" about what the subject is "really" experiencing. When a subject says that they are visualizing a beach, they are not giving a defective, pre-scientific report that we can hope will one day be replaced with a precise neurophysiological account. Rather, they are giving a straightforward account of a portion of their world, to which the investigator has no access other than their report, and to which the investigator can add a precise neurophysiological account of what is happening when the person has that experience. In this way, experience and feelings can be the subject of legitimate science, rather than inferior substitutes we have to live with until a real science of feelings comes along.

Computer-Based Consciousness

The question of what capabilities a brain must have for it to be the brain of an individual with a world was discussed above. In this section we apply that formulation to the question of whether an artifact with a digital computer as its brain could be conscious, and we discuss what appear to be the key elements necessary for developing a conscious individual whose brain is computer, i.e., a conscious artifact.

Having a World

The individual must have a world, as we have formulated that statement earlier. One way to implement a world on a computer is with a set of explicit

representations of the objects, processes, events, and states of affairs making up that world. This is, however, only the most obvious way. If a set of neural networks provided the requisite capabilities for the system to make the appropriate distinctions and act on them appropriately, including naming or describing them, it would have the functional equivalent of representations, and thus would have a world.

The State of Affairs, Object, Process, and Event Units provide the technical means for representing any set of states of affairs, objects, processes, and events. The (Name, Description) format allows one to describe any desired domain, at any desired comprehensiveness and level of detail. Further, the highest level states of affairs, processes, etc., are specified in the same form and with the same precision as the lower level processes commonly given formal representation. (Jeffrey and Putman1983; Jeffrey *et al*, 1989) and others have constructed several computer systems based on extensive sets of Process Unit descriptions, including descriptions of both very high-level, broad processes, and very low-level, detailed ones.)

In short, the SAU, OU, PU, and EU representation formats provide the capability of describing a world, including the place of the person whose world it is.

Actor Status

Knowledge is not sufficient. The necessity for the individual to have a place as an actor means that it must carry out actions in the world of which it is a constituent. In order for a computer-based individual, for example, to know the taste of an orange, it must taste the orange, and tasting must be part of its world, i.e., the processes, objects, events, and states of affairs involved in the act of tasting must be connected, in the descriptions that represent the individual's world, to other objects, states of affairs, etc. The physical machinery of this action is merely a technological problem. What makes it tasting *per se*, and not the processes of chemical sensors, is what makes human tasting what it is: it is part of a world. Since it part of a world, the taster has the experience of tasting the orange, and we can say knows the taste of an orange.

Since the individual, whether computer-, protoplasm-, or some other material-based, must have a world, and a world is the structured, all-inclusive thing it is, in order for an individual to be conscious it must have autonomy, the ability to recognize non-computable relationships, and the capacity for private experience.

Autonomy

Persons as we know them value some states of affairs over others, and act to achieve them. (This position may appear radical to one who holds a determinist or physicist position, but in actuality is not. It is simply a reminder that there is a concept of a person as an active agent, choosing actions based on valued goals, and

that ordinarily that is what we mean when we say someone is a person.) As Ossorio (1978) has discussed in considerable detail, these values and the way they are used in selecting actions can be represented elegantly by the maxim that a person will not choose less behavior potential over more.

It is not clear, at this point, whether a computer-based individual must value some states of affairs over others. While they must be actors, it may be that they can "do what they are told." They must make appraisals, because appraisals are the descriptions directly related to action, but perhaps these appraisals can be relative to a goal imposed by some other individual. However, a conscious individual not acting on its own would seem to violate our ordinary intuition of what it means to be a person.

Enabling the computer-based entity to act on its own is, however, is within the capabilities we have described. If the computer system incorporates values, such as its continuation as a conscious being, appraises possible actions according to hedonic, prudential, esthetic, and ethical standards, and selects its action in accordance with those appraisals, it would be, in effect, acting on its own.

Recognition of Non–Computable Relationships

If a computer-based system can only recognize relationships reducible to physical or computable ones, it would be so limited that it could not be said to have a world, because the set of relationships reducible to computable ones is so limited that any set of descriptions would qualify only as a caricature of a world. The technical feasibility of computer-based consciousness therefore depends crucially on the system being able to recognize relationships not reducible to computable ones.

This would appear to be the end of any discussion of computer-based consciousness, and has been considered to be such by a number of authors (Dreyfus, 1991; Winograd & Flores, 1986), for the limits of computability are known and well-understood. Much of the work in the physical basis of consciousness is an attempt to show the possibility of a physical mechanism not limited by computability (see, for example, Penrose, 1993). However, there is a different approach to this problem, originally due to Ossorio (1966), and since used by the author (Jeffrey, 1991; Jeffrey, 1993) and others to produce practical, working computer systems with the equivalent of the ability to recognize certain relationships that are not reducible to numerical ones.

The relationship investigated in Ossorio (1966), subject matter relevance, is one of the clearest examples. We desire a computer system that can judge the degree to which document D is relevant to subject matter field F. A vector space with an orthogonal basis is produced such that calculating the location of a document in the space reproduces the judgment of the degree to which the document is relevant to each of the types of subject matter represented by each of the orthogonal axes. The space is produced by factor-analyzing a matrix of judgments, by human experts,

of the degree to which each of a set of terms t_i is relevant to each of a set of subject matter fields F_j. The measurable factors are the basis of the space. New items are indexed in the space, giving in effect a judgment of the subject matter relevance of the item, by finding all known terms in the item and combining their vectors in the space into a single vector, a location in the space. (The procedure is described in some detail by Jeffrey, 1991.)

Ossorio used the factor-space technique to reproduce the ability to recognize other relationships as well:

- R2, a means-end space, in which the judgment data matrix consisted of the degree to which means M_i is an effective means of accomplishing state of affairs E_j.
- R3, an attribute space, in which the judgment data matrix consisted of the degree to which X_i has attribute A_j. An item's location in the space is calculated by combining the vectors for its constituents and relationships. Calculating this location is, in effect, judging the attributes of the overall item, based on the attributes of its constituents and their relationships.
- R4, a functor space, in which the judgment data matrix consisted of the degree to which D_i is a significant dimension of variation of object X_j, i.e., what is important to know item X_j. An item's location in the space is calculated as in R3. In this case, locating the item in the space is, in effect, judging its significant dimensions of variation.

The technique is not merely theoretical, but has been used to produce working computer systems. A subject matter relevance space has been used to create a document retrieval system whose performance exceeded that of all keyword-based document-retrieval systems (Jeffrey, 1991). J. D. Johannes (1977) created a system to diagnose thyroid disorders, using two factor spaces: One to do initial diagnosis based on patient signs and symptoms and one to recommend tests.

What has happened here is not that uncomputability has been somehow circumvented, but that computations, such as a location in a vector space, are being used to represent relationships that themselves have nothing to do with numbers.

Privacy of Experience

That an individual may have experience, i.e., states of affairs directly accessible to no one else, is a logical consequence of having a world in which the being is the unique individual whose world it is. How then can a computer-based system, in which one can obviously insert probes, have intermediate readouts, and so forth, have states of affairs that are inaccessible to any other being?

Consider first a related case, the telepathic human hypothesized earlier. The telepath can observe directly what I experience when I taste an orange. However, this is not enough; they cannot observe *from my position*. Specifically, the telepath

is not the person whose world it is, and therefore he/she is not having the same experience I am: The telepath is engaged in the action of observing me; I am engaged in the action of eating an orange. The actions, and the positions in the world, are different. Thus, the telepath can *know of* my experience, but cannot *have* my experience. My experience of eating the orange includes states of affairs dependent on the fact that I am the actor in my world in this instance, i.e., that I am playing the role (Element) of "eater." That it is me, not someone else, is a state of affairs, and therefore represented in the description of my world, which includes my actions and my role in those actions.

The same logic holds for a computer-based individual. It can be observed as it acts, and complete knowledge of the states of affairs involved in the processing in the computer is possible. However, assuming the computer-based individual has a world and knows (i.e., has a representation of) its place in that world, it knows that *it* is engaged in the action, not someone else, and therefore the states of affairs in its world that include it as a constituent will be different. Thus, the individual observes that it is engaged in the action, and knows that it is observing that state of affairs, i.e., it is aware that it is doing this thing.

Recalling the SAU, to be a description of *this* individual in *this* world, the description of the computer-based individual's world must include a specification of the particular historical items that are in the logical roles designated by the Elements. Otherwise, it is a description of a class of individuals or a possible individual, not this individual and its world.

As with the case of experience for human beings, it is historical uniqueness that makes the states of affairs that comprise the computer-based individual's experience unobservable by any other person, for it is this uniqueness that makes the states of affairs the experience of *this* individual.

Nothing prevents an observer, such as a human being, from knowing of the computer-based individual's private states of affairs, but the observer cannot know them *as* that individual because the observer does not have the same relationship to those states of affairs as does the individual whose world it is. In other words, an observer cannot have the computer-based individual's experience, because the two are distinct individuals and so have distinct places in their respective worlds.

One candidate for the private states of affairs of a computer-based individual is those states of affairs involving objects physically unique to it: its embodiment. If the computer-based individual had the capability of observing states of affairs including its embodiment, and incorporating them as states of affairs in its world, it would have the basis for sensations, experience, and feelings. It would make sense in such a case to talk of that individual's experience of printing a paper, turning on a light, and so forth, in the same way that it makes sense to talk of a human's experience of writing on a piece of paper, etc. The computer-based individual's experience, involving its bodily states of affairs, would be inaccessible

to others because no other individual has those unique body parts, and thus their experience would be different.

Acknowledgments

The observation that one of the basic questions to ask about a person's consciousness is, "What is he conscious of?" is due originally to Ossorio. The observation that a second key fact about a person's consciousness is what they are conscious as is due to Putman (1981, p. 206).

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Kurosawa's Relativity

Mary K. Roberts

ABSTRACT

Akira Kurosawa is a Japanese film maker who is known as "the master of relativity." Two of his films, *Rashomon* and *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams*, are analyzed using concepts from Descriptive Psychology. Questions about what the relativity problem means to Kurosawa, how the problem plays out in his dreams and in his life, and why he is unable to solve it, are examined.

Akira Kurosawa is a Japanese film maker whose career has spanned more than five decades. In these years he has directed 29 feature films, including such well-known films as *Seven Samurai*, *Red Beard*, and the Academy Award–winning *Dersu Uzala*. But Kurosawa is best known for a movie he made when he was 40 years old: *Rashomon.*

In *Rashomon*, a samurai and his wife are traveling through the forest. A bandit captures a glimpse of the wife's beauty and wants her. So he tricks the samurai into following him into a bamboo grove, ties him up, and then rapes his wife in front of him. Later the samurai is found dead.

Who killed the samurai? This is the focal question of the movie. Each member of the trio claims to be the murderer. The dead samurai attests *via* a medium that

he took his own life. The wife testifies that she killed her husband because he spurned her after the rape. The bandit swears that he knifed the samurai in a duel following the rape.

Kurosawa succeeds in making all of their claims convincing. His portrayals of all of their stories are visually and psychologically compelling. Because of this achievement, Kurosawa is known as "the master of relativity."

But who *really* killed the samurai? We do not know. Ironically, the master of relativity does not solve the relativity problem in *Rashomon*, nor does he provide a paradigm for how to deal with it. At the end of the film Kurosawa leaves us with a set of compelling stories about the murder. But however compelling they are, the stories cannot all be true. They are fundamentally irreconcilable.

What is Kurosawa doing by laying out these irreconcilable stories? Is he simply presenting us with an unsolved murder mystery? Is he merely showing us the relativity of the perspectives? If not, what is the point of *Rashomon*?

There is a point, and it is worth understanding, both in terms of the film itself and in terms of Kurosawa's personal life. At age 72, in writing *Something Like an Autobiography*, Kurosawa found himself at an impasse when he reached the filming of *Rashomon*. After writing about his early life and films, he stopped abruptly with the making of this film. In an Epilogue he noted:

> I have come this far in writing something resembling an autobiography, but I doubt that I have managed to achieve real honesty about myself in its pages. I suspect that I have left out my uglier traits and more or less beautified the rest. In any case, I find myself incapable of continuing to put pen to paper in good faith. *Rashomon* became the gateway for my entry into the international film world, and yet as an autobiographer it is impossible for me to pass through the Rashomon gate and on to the rest of my life. Perhaps someday I will be able to do so. (Kurosawa, 1982, p. 188)

Why is Kurosawa stuck at the Rashomon gate in writing his autobiography? What is the personal significance of *Rashomon* to him? How else does the problem he portrays in *Rashomon* play out in his life?

The One True Story

Rashomon is based on a short story by Ryunosuke Akutagawa, a Japanese writer who suicided at age 35. His story "In a Grove" consists of seven conflicting testimonies about a murder, presented starkly without any connecting narrative or commentary. In *Rashomon*, Kurosawa uses some of the conflicting testimonies from Akutagawa's story, but he does not use his stark format. Instead, Kurosawa introduces a trio of characters to discuss the accounts and attempt to make sense of the differences for us.

This trio—a firewood dealer, a commoner, and a Buddhist priest – come together in the ruined gate, Rashomon, seeking shelter from the pouring rain. The firewood dealer and the Buddhist priest have just come from the prison, where they heard the accounts of the murder. As the rain pours down, the priest moans in anguish, "War, earthquake, wind, fire, famine, plague... Yes, each year is full of disasters. And now every night the bandits descend upon us. I, for one, have seen hundreds of men dying like animals, but I've never before heard anything... anything as horrible as this. Horrible... It's horrible! There's never been anything as terrible as this."

Once Kurosawa has our attention riveted on the question of "What is so horrible?," he uses the dialogue among the men to make the point of *Rashomon* clear. First the firewood dealer declares that the accounts are "lies... all lies." Then the commoner matter-of-factly observes, "Well, men are only men. That's why they lie. They can't tell the truth, even to themselves." And the priest tentatively acknowledges, "That may be true." He adds, "It's because men are so weak. That's why they lie. That's why they must deceive themselves."

In *Rashomon*, Kurosawa is not simply presenting a murder mystery, and he is not merely showing us the relativity of the perspectives. He is raising the question "Can anyone tell the Truth?" And the answer he gives is "No. No one can tell the Truth. No one has the strength of character to see things as they really are."

Kurosawa assumes that if only people were stronger, they would tell the Truth. They would do this by telling their stories. The stories would be like the lies they tell except they would be *true*. But Kurosawa's message is that no one, not even the priest, is able to see or tell the One True Story about the murder. This is the relativity problem that Kurosawa portrays in *Rashomon*.

Akira Kurosawa's Dreams

To the extent that the question of *Rashomon* ("Can anyone tell the Truth?") is personally salient for Kurosawa, we would expect him to explore this and/or related issues in his dreams (cf. Roberts, 1985). We turn, therefore, to *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams*. This film, made when Kurosawa was 80 years old, consists of eight dreams that Kurosawa singled out as being significant in his life.

In understanding *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams*, we follow some basic rules of thumb for interpreting dreams given by Ossorio (1976). The first rule of thumb is "Don't make anything up." Notice what we do *not* know about Kurosawa's dreams. We do not know what age he was when he dreamt them. We do not know the order in which he dreamt them. We do not know what events were occurring in his life when he dreamt them. We do not know which dreams, if any, came before *Rashomon* and which dreams came after. What we do know is that Kurosawa considered these dreams significant and chose to include them together in one set.

Other rules of thumb for interpreting dreams are "Drop the details and look for the pattern that remains" and "Check the applicability of the interpretation to the real life of the person." The use of the rules of thumb is illustrated both in understanding the individual dreams and in understanding the set as a whole.

The order of the dreams in the film is as follows: "Sunshine through the Rain," "The Peach Orchard," "The Blizzard...," "The Tunnel," "Crows," "Mount Fuji in Red," "The Weeping Demon," and "Village of the Watermills." Four of the dreams are introduced in this section, and the others are discussed later.

"Sunshine through the Rain," the opening dream of the movie, features an unusual wedding procession, one that is especially intriguing because it is forbidden for us to see.

It is raining but the sun is shining. A boy's mother tells him, "You're staying home. Foxes hold their wedding processions in this weather and they don't like anyone to see them. If you do, they'll be very angry." In spite of this, the boy goes into the forest where he watches a fox wedding procession until the foxes frighten him.

He runs home, but his mother will not let him enter. She gives him a dagger in a sheath, which she says was left for him by an angry fox. She tells him: "You're supposed to kill yourself." She offers him only one way out, to go and ask the foxes for forgiveness. Then she adds, "They don't usually forgive. You must be ready to die."

The boy counters: "But I don't know where they live." She replies: "You'll find out. On days like this there are always rainbows. Foxes live under the rainbows." She slams the door and bolts it against him. He tests the doors, studies the dagger, and then sets out.

This synopsis does not begin to do justice to the existential dismay and despair that we experience when we see Kurosawa's portrayal of the dream in film. Frightened after his childish indiscretion, the little boy comes running home, seeking the reassurance and protection of his mother. She meets him at the door, but she does not offer him protection. Instead she acts against him as an agent of arbitrary, inimical forces. His own mother, whom he ought to be able to trust above all others, hands him a dagger to kill himself, bolts the door against him, and sends him out alone to die. We watch in horror as the boy sets out, his odds of "making it home" next to impossible.

In the fourth dream of the movie, "The Tunnel," we see a military officer traveling alone.

As he approaches a tunnel, the officer hears howling from within it. A dog, wearing a body vest with ammunition, emerges and growls savagely at the officer. Nonetheless, the officer proceeds.

Just as the tunnel is behind him, the officer hears something else and turns back. He sees the ghost of a private who served under him during the war. The private asks him: "Commander, is it true? Was I really killed in action? I can't believe I'm really dead." The private looks out to a home on the hillside and adds, "My parents don't believe that I am dead." The officer tells him that he died in his arms. He salutes the dead man and waits as he returns to the tunnel.

But as he waits he hears marching. A ghostly platoon emerges and presents arms: "Third Platoon returning to base, sir. No casualties." The officer asserts that all the men are dead: "They call you 'heroes' but you died like dogs." He confesses that his own thoughtlessness and misconduct contributed to their deaths, and then asks them to go back and "rest in peace." When no one moves, he orders them back.

When they are gone, he falls to the ground and weeps. The growling dog emerges from the tunnel and threatens him again.

The war is apparently over, and the officer seeks to leave the guilt, the lies, and the horrors of war behind him. But wherever he goes, he encounters the ghastly aftermath of war. There is no escape for him. The horrors of war pursue him even from beyond the grave.

The ghost of a young private, and then an entire platoon of ghosts, present themselves before him, claiming to be alive. In spite of their uncanny appearance, the officer does not shirk from engaging with them. He tries to comfort them, to confess to them, and to appeal to them, but his attempts all fail. There is nothing the officer can do to get them to believe that they are dead.

Recall that one of the claimants in *Rashomon* was the dead samurai who communicated through a medium. By including his testimony with those of the living, Kurosawa emphasized that there is no illumination beyond the grave. Even the dead deceive themselves. That idea is powerfully reiterated in "The Tunnel" dream. In contrast to the Corinthian belief that "now we see through a glass, darkly, but then face to face...," Kurosawa shows us that there is no clarity to hope for in the future. The dead cannot know or tell the Truth any more than the living.

In the fifth dream of the movie, "Crows," we enter into the world of the artist. (Note that "Crows in the Wheat Field" is one of the final works that van Gogh painted just before his suicide.)

A young artist is in a gallery of van Gogh's paintings, standing before "The Langlois Bridge with Women Washing." He literally enters the painting and asks the women where he can find van Gogh. They tell him the way but also warn him, "Be careful. He's been in a lunatic asylum."

The artist moves through van Gogh's landscapes until he finds van Gogh painting in a wheat field. Van Gogh speaks to him about his work and tells

him, "I consume this natural setting. I devour it completely and wholly. And then when I'm through, the picture appears before me, complete."

Van Gogh reveals that he drives himself "like a locomotive" to paint. The day before, when he could not get his ear right in a self-portrait, he simply cut it off. Abruptly van Gogh takes off: "The sun compels me to paint. I can't stand here wasting my time talking to you."

The artist runs after him through several van Gogh landscapes. But in "Crows in the Wheat Field," Van Gogh disappears over the horizon. The black crows swirl and screech maniacally around the young artist.

The young artist rejoices in seeing the world through van Gogh's eyes. He marvels at van Gogh's personal style and vision as a painter, and yearns to achieve that kind of sensitivity and vision himself. But then van Gogh reveals to him who he is: He is driven like a locomotive. He chops off body parts if they do not fit his (complete) picture. He runs off like the White Rabbit in *Alice in Wonderland*. For the young man, the meeting with his hero turns into an encounter with the grotesque. It is as if van Gogh had pulled back the skin on his arm and laid bare a network of wires underneath. The young man is left aghast, realizing that his hero is a machine, a robot, not human.

The sixth dream, "Mount Fuji in Red," takes place in the world of the scientist.

There are throngs of people trying to escape as six nuclear reactors behind Mount Fuji explode. A young man, a mother with two children, and a scientist flee together to the edge of a cliff. The whole area is strewn with abandoned luggage, bicycles, baby strollers, etc.

The scientist explains the different effects of deadly radioactive gases, each of which has been given a distinctive color by scientists. The mother cries out: "The scientists told us that nuclear plants were safe... No accidents, no danger. That's what they told us. What liars! If they're not hanged for this, I'll kill them myself." The scientist then identifies himself as "one of those who deserves to die."

The young man and mother see a cloud of red gas engulfing the area. They try to fight it off and protect the children, but the scientist is gone.

Here an entire community reacts in shock, horror, and terror as the nuclear reactors explode. This dream parallels the first dream. Just as his mother is someone that the boy ought to be able to trust, scientists are a group that the community ought to be able to trust. Instead they lie like everyone else and the consequences are horrible. People are suiciding en masse with their children. Those who do not suicide will die slow, gruesome deaths, poisoned by the radioactive gases that the scientists have meticulously made identifiable.

The Face in the Wall

The sense of trauma is powerful and pervasive in *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams*. Just as the priest in *Rashomon* is in a state of shock where he can do little more than mutter "It's horrible... horrible," the dreamer/viewer is left stunned and traumatized by the individual dreams we have seen.

The nature of the trauma in both films is captured by the image of "The Face in the Wall" (Ossorio, 1976, pp. 6–8).

> Imagine that we're sitting here talking, and we're the only ones here, and you're the only one who can see the wall in back of me. Imagine that as we're sitting here talking, a huge Easter Island type of face emerges from that wall, glares at you threateningly for a second, and then fades back into the wall. You have two main options there. One is you can say, "You know, I just had the most interesting hallucination." The other is you can walk out of here knowing that the world is a vastly different place from what you thought it was.

For the priest in *Rashomon*, the realization that no one can tell the Truth is like seeing the face emerge from the wall. If he could dismiss the testimonies he heard at the prison merely as "tales told by idiots," he would be like the person who says "I just had the most interesting hallucination." But being who he is, the priest cannot so easily and cheaply explain away what he has seen.

Instead, he begins to consider the implications of what he has seen. What kind of world is this where a demonic face can emerge from a wall? What kind of world is this where no one can tell the truth? In the film the priest realizes that if no one can tell the Truth, then no one can trust anyone. He moans in agony, "It's horrible. If men cannot trust one another, then the earth becomes a hell."

The priest is like a mathematician who appreciates what a contradiction does to a logical system. If there is a contradiction, then all of the interrelationships within the system are undermined. The whole system is poisoned. The priest sees that if people cannot tell the Truth, then all of the relationships between people are undermined. Life is poisoned.

The Face in the Wall represents a paradigm for psychological trauma (cf. Wechsler, 1995). If a face like that can emerge from the wall, that is such a violation of everything familiar and understandable that anything – literally anything – might go along with that. When a person accepts the face as real, the person's entire world is shattered, and it becomes wholly uncertain, wholly problematic. There is no basis for acting or for anticipating or for expecting or for hoping. In the vernacular, we say that the person is "nowhere." (We could also say that the person is "no one.")

In *Rashomon*, we are primarily observers of the trauma of the priest. We do not have a Face in the Wall experience ourselves. In *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams*, however, our Face in the Wall experiences are direct and powerful. We are devastated when the little boy is betrayed by his own mother in "Sunshine through the Rain." We are overwhelmed by the uncanny engagements of "The Tunnel," and we are wiped out by van Gogh's inhumanity in "Crows." If this is what life is like and it is not "just a movie," then the world is a vastly different place from the one we take for granted.

With each of these dreams, our experience fits the paradigmatic experience captured by the Face in the Wall image. But a few of the ways that Kurosawa intensifies the experience are worth noting. In "Sunshine through the Rain," for example, the Face in the Wall experience is magnified by the fact that the boy completely accepts his mother's degradation of him. He only speaks once in his own behalf, and then it is more of a question than a protest ("But I don't know where they live."). His silent acceptance of her edict dramatically heightens our sense of his vulnerability and of her betrayal. Inside we scream, "What kind of mother are you? He's just a child. He doesn't stand a chance..."

In "Crows," the Face in the Wall experience is intensified by the anticipation and hopefulness of the young artist as he moves through van Gogh's landscapes. The young artist even seems to have found a promise of the One True Story when van Gogh says that he "devours [a situation] completely and wholly. And then ... the picture appears before me, complete." The prelude of hope and beauty makes the experience much more shattering when van Gogh reveals what kind of being he is.

Ways of Living

Four of the dreams from *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams* have been introduced, each encapsulating a vision of how horrible the world can be, and each evoking a Face in the Wall experience in the dreamer/viewer. Kurosawa's genius as a maker of films is evident not only in the way that he creates the Face in the Wall experience in the individual dreams, but also in the way that he combines the dreams to create a Face in the Wall experience from the set as a whole.

The Face in the Wall aspect of the set as a whole attests to the overwhelming impact of ... what? What links the dreams? What is the common significance that can have such an impact?

Kurosawa offers no help in answering these questions. In creating the script for *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams*, he uses the stark format of the Akutagawa short story on which *Rashomon* was based. Just as Akutagawa's testimonies are separated only by subtitles, Kurosawa's dreams are separated only by black screens with subtitles. Noticeably missing are commentators like the firewood dealer, the commoner, and the Buddhist priest of *Rashomon* to make explicit the meaning of the dreams.

Missing, too, are any comments by Kurosawa himself. I was unable to find any explanation from Kurosawa in the film reviews and interviews that I searched. One film reviewer notes that even the press handout was "unusually austere, a sequence of stills and the cast-list" (Le Fanu, 1990, p. 204).

Rather than looking to Kurosawa for explanation, we need to take another look at the film. So far we have seen the way of life of a military man, the way of life of an artist, and the way of life of a scientist. In the dreams to be discussed below, we will also see the way of life of a mountain man, the way of life of a farmer, and the life of tradition and nature. What these ways of living have in common in *Dreams* is that they all fail in fundamental, dismaying ways. They lead to betrayal, torment, insanity, despair, suicide, etc.

Obviously the set of ways of living portrayed in the film is not an exhaustive set of all known ways of living. But given that all of the ways of living that Kurosawa includes in the film are failures, it is easy to conclude that for Kurosawa, all existing ways of living fail. The question of the movie is "Can anyone live a good life?" and the answer is "No."

Showing that no one can live a good life would be enough for the film to have a traumatic impact, but Kurosawa's portrayal does more than merely convey this conclusion. Rather, we are overwhelmed by his vision of evil, grotesque inhumanity, needless suffering, and complete futility in human life. This is the Face in the Wall impact of the film as a whole.

Where else has Kurosawa portrayed a set of failures? In *Rashomon*, of course. Notice the parallels between the two films. In the way that Kurosawa lays out murder testimonies for inspection in *Rashomon*, he lays out worlds for inspection in *Dreams*. In the way that he surveys the stories of the samurai, the wife, and the bandit in *Rashomon*, he surveys the ways of living of a military man, an artist, a scientist and others in *Dreams*.

But *Rashomon* is not merely a survey of stories. It is an indictment of them. The stories in *Rashomon* are "lies, all lies." Likewise, *Dreams* is not merely a survey of ways of living. It is an indictment of them. The ways of living in *Dreams* are failures, all failures.

Surely this is more than coincidence.

The Old Lament

"If I only knew for sure..." This ubiquitous lament has many versions: "If I only knew for sure what I really want..." "If I only knew for sure who I really am..." "If I only knew for sure how she really feels about me..." "If I only knew for sure what he really thinks..." "If I only knew for sure what really happened..."

At face value, each of these statements looks like a lament over the absence of knowledge: "If I only knew for sure..." And of course, each one *is* overtly that kind

of lament. But in the real life settings in which the lament occurs, there is a suppressed final clause.

The missing clause is "...then I'd know what to do." If this clause is not volunteered by people expressing the lament, it is easily elicited from them. "If I only knew for sure what I really want, then I'd know what to do." "If I only knew for sure what really happened, then I'd know what to do."

In its full rendering The Old Lament shows the connection between knowledge and action. In general people do not want to "know for sure" for its own sake. (What would be the point?) They want the assurance about knowledge for the sake of the assurance it gives them about action and living.

In *Rashomon*, Kurosawa's concern with knowledge is explicit: "If we only knew who *really* murdered the samurai..." But the message of *Rashomon* is not about knowledge for its own sake. The priest is horrified because he has a glimpse of what it does to human life if no one can know the Truth.

Kurosawa's concern with action and living is evident in *Dreams*. He seeks a humanly satisfying way of living, one in which things are not arbitrary and capricious, one in which people do not deceive themselves, one that allows people to be people, one in which people do not lie. But what he finds is that all our ways of living are failures.

Taken together, *Rashomon* and *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams* may be understood as expressing "Kurosawa's Lament." A variation of The Old Lament, Kurosawa's Lament is "If only we could know the Truth, then we could live good lives."

Notice the "we" in Kurosawa's Lament. Kurosawa's concern is with communities and cultures more than with individuals. This is vividly seen in the "Mount Fuji in Red" dream introduced above, and will also be evident in "The Way the World Ends" dreams to be discussed below.

In light of Kurosawa's Lament, we can understand the ending of *Rashomon*. In the end, all the stories/lies about the murder have been told and commented upon when out of nowhere, an abandoned baby is heard crying. After the commoner finds the baby and steals its clothes, the firewood dealer decides to take the naked baby home. Because of the firewood dealer's choice, the priest says "I think I will be able to keep my faith in men."

This ending has been criticized as arbitrary and irrelevant to the film, and indeed there is no connection between the baby and the Truth about the murder. We know that the episode involving the baby was in fact "tacked on." Kurosawa reports that when he gave the original script for *Rashomon* to the film company, the head of the company did not understand it and kept asking "But what is it about?" In response Kurosawa "put on a beginning and an ending" (Richie, 1970, p. 70).

Both the trauma of the priest at the beginning of the film, and his affirmation of hope at the end, serve as indicators that Kurosawa's primary concern is with living rather than with Truth per se. At the end of *Rashomon*, the priest holds on to the hope that even if people cannot know the Truth, maybe they can nonetheless be good to one another. Maybe life will not become hell...

The Hell of the Egoists

By the time of *Dreams*, that hope is gone. All of the dreams we have seen show that people cannot be good to one another: A mother betrays her own child. An officer betrays the men who serve under him. Scientists betray their entire community. All of the dreams portray life as hell.

Kurosawa's most explicit portrayal of life as hell, however, is in "The Weeping Demon," the seventh dream of *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams*.

A man, making his way across a radiation–polluted landscape, meets a groaning demon. The demon says that he himself was once human. When he was a man, he was a farmer, and he used to dump gallons of milk and bury potatoes with a bulldozer to keep the prices up. Now he feeds upon other demons.

He shows the man how the earth is poisoned, how nature has vanished, how all the surviving creatures are deformed, and how monster dandelions grow taller than houses.

Then he takes the man to see the suffering of the "powerful and pretentious" demons, who are condemned to live for eternity tortured by their sins. The man hears the demons moaning and sees them moving continually, their shadows reflected blood red in a lake.

Suddenly the demon tells the man "Go." When the man does not leave at once, the demon demands of him "Do you want to become a demon, too?" The man flees with the demon in pursuit.

Our guide in Kurosawa's hell is not the noble Virgil, ever concerned for the safety and well–being of Dante. Instead our guide is a demon, scratching himself with dungy nails, crouching with hunger, clutching his horn in pain. When he shows us what life is like in the post–nuclear world, we are filled with revulsion: "A life like *this*?" Our Face in the Wall reaction crystallizes when we see the monster dandelions, obscenely thriving in a world where nothing else can live.

Kurosawa's vision of hell includes a special place for the "pretentious," for those who have embellished their own importance. Their dwelling place is beside the lake of blood that is said to exist in Buddhist hell. There they walk eternally round and round, moaning in misery, or they writhe in pain on the ground. Watching the suffering of these lost souls, we cry out like the priest in *Rashomon*, "Horrible... It's horrible!"

Why does Kurosawa single out the pretentious to suffer for eternity? Why does he choose this sin as opposed to all the others? Recall Kurosawa's Lament: "If only we could know the Truth, then we could live good lives." The most heinous sin for Kurosawa would be the sin that keeps people from knowing the Truth. He identifies "egoism" as this sin in his autobiography. He writes:

Human beings are unable to be honest with themselves about themselves. They cannot talk about themselves without embellishing. This script [*Rashomon*] portrays such human beings – the kind who cannot survive without lies to make them feel they are better people than they really are. It even shows this sinful need for flattering falsehood going beyond the grave – even the character who dies cannot give up his lies when he speaks to the living through a medium. Egoism is a sin the human being carries with him from birth; it is the most difficult to redeem. (Kurosawa, 1982, p. 183)

Those who cannot survive without lies are condemned to live forever in a Kurosawan hell.

The Way the World Ends

Not all of the dreams in *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams* evoke in us a Face in the Wall experience. In some of the dreams, there is no sheath knife, no dog/soldier, no flock of screeching crows. There is not the traumatic wiping out of behavior potential that we experience in the Face in the Wall dreams.

In "The Peach Orchard," the second dream of *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams*, the boy's life with his family does not end abruptly like the boy's in "Sunshine through the Rain." Even though the boy in "The Peach Orchard" acts in violation of a rule, he is not dealt a single, annihilating blow.

A boy takes a tray to his sister and her friends, who are celebrating the Doll Festival. He studies the set of festival dolls in the room with them, and then realizes that one of the girls is missing.

He tries to confront his sister about the missing girl, but his sister acts as though he's crazy. He sees the missing girl in a soft peach kimono just outside the room. He runs after her even though his sister warns him, "You're not allowed out."

Suddenly his way is blocked by tiers of dolls who have come to life. They confront him: Because his family cut down the trees in the peach orchard, the dolls will never again share their exquisite beauty with his family. The boy, crying, affirms that *he* loved the peach orchard.

The dolls relent and dance for him once more. Their dance evokes the orchard in bloom and the boy sees the girl again. He runs to her, but she vanishes. He finds himself in the razed orchard.

The boy tries to be helpful, but he does not really fit in his family. His values and concerns are different from theirs, and he seeks a kindred spirit. In the face of

misunderstanding and degradation, he affirms who he is. He is able to create a temporary illusion of a world where he belongs, and he enjoys the loveliness of the peach orchard and sees the girl he seeks. But a good heart is not enough. In the end the boy is back in the destructive world of the larger community.

The boy's life goes on at home, but what kind of life is it? It is a life in which the boy suffers for the sins of his family. It is a life in which the values and choices of the community present him with only a procrustean pattern for who he can be and what he can do. This is the life that continues for him at home.

Another dream where life goes on is "The Blizzard...." The opening of the dream is almost six full minutes of men plodding in waist-deep snow with near-zero visibility, their only connection the rope that joins them.

A group of mountain men, obviously exhausted, is struggling to keep going. It is getting dark from another impending storm and the morale of the men is failing. One man declares the storm is simply "waiting for us to die."

The men insist on stopping, and their leader finally agrees to a short break. Then the men hear someone coming. The leader asserts "No one's coming. It's an illusion." He exhorts the men to stay awake, but they fall asleep in the snow.

The leader himself collapses at the edge of a ravine he cannot see. While the storm is raging, the leader sees a beautiful woman who drapes a shroud over him and gently pushes him down into the snow.

Suddenly he wakes up. He wakes his men, and they realize that the snow is letting up. They see their campsite very close ahead.

The men come close to being completely obliterated by the blizzard. They are delusional from exhaustion when they fall asleep in the raging storm. Ordinarily this would mean certain death, but by sheer luck they survive. Having been lucky, what do they get? They get to keep trudging, half-crazed, through waist-deep snow until some future date when their luck does run out.

The final dream of the film, "Village of the Watermills," also ends without a wipe-out. Instead there is a powerful sense of life moving endlessly in circles.

A man comes to a village on a river where stately watermills turn. Children are picking wildflowers and leaving them on a huge stone. As the watermills turn, an 103-year-old man explains to the man that the villagers try to live the way men used to, preserving the changeless patterns.

The visitor asks the old man why the children leave flowers on the stone, and the old man says that "not only the children but most of the villagers do not know why." His own father told him once long ago that a sick traveler died and was buried there.

There are joyful sounds in the distance, the sounds of a "nice, happy funeral." The body of an aged woman is being carried to the hills for burial to the raucous sounds of a brass band and the noisy shouts and claps of the villagers. The old man says that the woman was his first love. "But she broke my heart. She left me for another."

Adding that "life is exciting," the old man joins in the funeral procession. The visitor watches, then leaves a flower on the huge stone and goes on his way.

Life moves forever round and round in the "Village of the Watermills," and it is a life in which individuals do not matter. Everyone goes through the same motions in life, not knowing why, and everyone is carried to death in the same way.

Two memories included in Kurosawa's autobiography are helpful in appreciating this dream. When Kurosawa was in fourth grade, his favorite sister died, and he could not sit through her funeral service. He left in the middle because it seemed so absurd and idiotic to him. His sister was "delicate and fragile," and Kurosawa doubted that she would have been "consoled" by the service, with its noisy drum and sounding gong (Kurosawa, 1982, pp. 18–19). Watching the dream, we doubt if the elderly woman would have felt valued or appreciated by the villagers who "paid their final respects" to her (and to everyone else who died) in this way.

The second memory relevant to the dream comes from Kurosawa's middle school years, when he made several visits to his father's home in the country. He recalls that:

Near the main thoroughfare of the village stood a huge rock, and there were always cut flowers on top of it. All the children who passed by it picked wild flowers and laid them atop the stone. When I wondered why they did this and asked, the children said they didn't know. I found out later by asking one of the old men of the village. In the Battle of Boshin, a hundred years ago, someone died at that spot. Feeling sorry for him, the villagers buried him, put the stone over the grave and laid flowers on it. The flowers became a custom of the village, which the children maintained without ever knowing why. (Kurosawa, 1982, p. 63)

In contrast to the children, the sojourner in the dream pays his respects knowingly to the fellow traveler before he goes on his way.

These three dreams – "The Peach Orchard," "The Blizzard...," and the "Village of the Watermills" – are not traumatic in the way that the Face in the Wall dreams are. They do not overwhelm us. Rather, they drain the life out of us. They leave us dismayed, disheartened, discouraged, and, perhaps, resigned.

The hope for a good life ends not with a bang but a whimper.

The Rashomon Gate

Kurosawa presents his relativity formulation in *Rashomon* with the priest as his spokesman. Like the priest, Kurosawa had seen more than his share of horrible disasters by the time he made *Rashomon*. He had experienced the Great Earthquake in Tokyo where 40,000 people died. He was in Japan when bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But if we take the priest's word for it, these were not as traumatic for Kurosawa as seeing that no one could tell the Truth.

Akira Kurosawa's Dreams may be seen as an exploration of the possibilities inherent in the problem Kurosawa raised in *Rashomon*. If no one can know and tell the Truth, how can we live good lives? A good heart is not enough ("The Peach Orchard") and neither is good luck ("The Blizzard..."). Knowledge of the Truth is essential as the foundation for a good life, for otherwise we have only arbitrary and capricious rules ("Sunshine through the Rain"), meaningless and absurd social practices ("Village of the Watermills"), and destructive self-interest ("Mount Fuji in Red"). If no one can tell the Truth, life is hell: uncanny, grotesque, obscene ("The Tunnel," "Crows," "The Weeping Demon").

Given the way the issue plays out in Kurosawa's dreams, the personal significance of *Rashomon* to Kurosawa seems obvious. In the film that established his international reputation as a film maker, Kurosawa portrayed the intractable problem of his life.

Why does Kurosawa insist on the Truth, the One True Story, as a foundation for his life? We know that Kurosawa's father was extremely strict and had very definite ideas about how his sons should live. The sons had to "toe the line" or be nowhere. Kurosawa's closest brother, Heigo, refused to toe the line. Confrontations between the father and brother were frequent. Kurosawa reports:

> In father's eyes Heigo was always wrong. His way of life was too much for him because father was a former soldier and retained a soldier's outlook. Heigo liked to play around with art and it looked frivolous – that is why father always had it in for him. When Heigo said that he wanted to go and live with his girl, father got furious and threw him out of the house. (Richie, 1970, p. 11)

The brother, whom Kurosawa loved very much, ended up committing suicide.

In order to stand up to his father, Kurosawa needed a solid foundation like Truth, something that would enable him to show his father that he was *right*. Otherwise, he would just be acting arbitrarily if he clashed with his father. But if he knew the Truth, then he would be on solid ground. Then he could refuse to toe the line and still be somebody.

In *Rashomon*, however, Kurosawa portrays that all we have are arbitrary, conflicting points of view. No one can know the Truth. This left him without a foundation for his life, and we have seen the resulting despair and hopelessness in

his dreams. Kurosawa's despair and hopelessness were not restricted merely to dreams. In December, 1971, a maid found Kurosawa in a half-filled bathtub with twenty-two slashes on his neck, wrists, and hands (Erens, 1979).

In light of Kurosawa's problem formulation in *Rashomon*, we can understand why he could not pass through the Rashomon gate in writing his autobiography. The making of *Rashomon* appears to be the time when it crystallized for him that no one, including himself, could tell the One True Story. In the years before *Rashomon*, he may have had hope that this was possible and he was able to write about those years. Beyond this crystallization point, however, Kurosawa was unable to write in good faith.

His choice of format for *Akira Kurosawa's Dreams* may be understood in the same light. Recall that Kurosawa presented his dreams separated only by subtitles, without any explanatory dialogue either in the movie or in press handouts or interviews. If we cannot tell the Truth, perhaps it is better to say nothing.

"If I only knew for sure, then I could tell you."

Another View

For Kurosawa, it was a given that there had to be one single, right answer to the question "Who *really* murdered the samurai?" Likewise, for many physicists it was a given that there had to be one single, right answer to the question "How fast is the earth *really* moving?"

Of course, physicists had known since the time of Galileo that all motion is relative to a frame of reference. To illustrate the relativity of motion, Galileo used the example of a fish swimming in a large bowl of water aboard a ship moving steadily over the sea. The movement of the fish with respect to the bowl of water is very different from the movement of the fish with respect to the sea. The frame of reference, e.g. fish bowl or sea, is an essential part of any description of motion.

While appreciating the relativity of motion, physicists nonetheless assumed that there must be an absolute frame of reference, one that is truly at rest. They would find the *real* velocity of the earth relative to this absolute frame of reference, if only they could find the absolute frame of reference. Physicists knew that the earth could not be the absolute frame of reference, because it is not at rest. The sun could not be the absolute frame of reference, because the sun moves with respect to the center of our galaxy. Our galaxy could not be the absolute frame of reference, because the galaxy is moving...

At the start of the century, Einstein showed that there is no frame of reference that we can claim as being at absolute rest. His work established that one frame of reference is as valid as another. No frame of reference is legitimately privileged.

This means that there is no One True Story to be told about the motion of an object, and there is no single, right answer to the question "How fast is the earth

really moving?" Instead, what we have is a set of correspondences among motion descriptions within particular frames of reference. The earth moves at *this* velocity with respect to the sun, at *this* velocity with respect to the Milky Way galaxy, at *this* velocity with respect to the center of a more distant galaxy, etc.

Each motion description/frame of reference pair gives a true answer to the question "How fast is the earth *really* moving?" And each pair is consistent with every other pair. By the simple addition of velocities, a motion description within one frame of reference can be transformed into a motion description in another frame of reference. (Part of Einstein's genius was to give a formula for the addition of velocities close to the speed of light.)

But isn't there One True Story to be told about the murder? Isn't there One True Story to be told about our behavior? Ossorio (1978) uses the analogy of relative motion to help people see that there is not.

Every description is someone's description. Every description is given by a person from some point of view. There is no "view from nowhere." In order to see the world at all, we have to see it *from* some place.

"Where a person is coming from" is therefore an essential part of any description of behavior, just as the frame of reference is an essential part of any description of motion. Usually these are not specified in ordinary conversation but are understood from the context. Only in special circumstances do we need to make them explicit, e.g. "I was driving at 55 mph relative to the earth" or "Here's what happened from my point of view."

If we consider each person as a frame of reference, it is easy to see that there is no privileged frame of reference for giving descriptions of behavior. No one has a God's Eye View. One person's point of view is as valid as another person's.

This means that there are many true stories, but there is no One True Story. A given behavior in a given situation is something that would be described *this* way by this kind of person, *this* way by this kind of person, *this* way by this kind of person, etc. A behavior corresponds to a relativity set of behavior description/person characteristic pairs, just as the motion of an object corresponds to a relativity set of motion description/frame of reference pairs.

Does this mean that all we have are arbitrary, conflicting descriptions? No. While our descriptions may be different, that does not make them arbitrary and/or conflicting. Our descriptions differ systematically depending on who we are ("where we are coming from"). Just as the addition of velocities enables us to transform a motion description given in one frame of reference into a motion description in a different frame of reference, person characteristics enable us make the adjustments that are needed to understand how someone else sees the world.

Understanding a behavior as corresponding to a relativity set gives us a different perspective on agreement among people. Across a wide range of situations, agreement requires that people see things differently. In general if someone is a different kind of person from me, that person needs to give a different description

from mine in order to agree with me, i.e., in order for both of us to be describing the same thing. Given who the other person is and given who I am, our descriptions could not be the same and be in agreement.

This is not to say that people always or necessarily give different descriptions if they are coming from different places. Consider people looking at a simple sphere from different positions in a room. Given normative competence, descriptions of the light reflecting from the sphere will vary depending on a person's position, but descriptions of the shape of the sphere will be the same regardless of position. Likewise with human behavior, descriptions of simple behaviors ("He is drinking coffee") tend to be the same, whereas descriptions of less simple behaviors or less visible behaviors (e.g. what he is doing by drinking the coffee) show more of the variability that reflects person characteristics.

A normative relativity set for behavior is made up of behavior description/person characteristic pairs that are true and reconcilable. This means that we do not include just any old description in a normative relativity set. Some descriptions are dismissed as inaccurate, incomplete, etc. In these cases, person characteristic descriptions may be used to identify the nature of the deficit, disability, or motivation that kept the person from giving a true description. "He was too scared to notice." "She's tone deaf." "He doesn't know how to do arithmetic." "She wasn't paying attention." "He's insensitive to things like that." "He was purposely exaggerating because..."

But how can we live good lives if all we have are relativity sets? In fact an understanding of the relativity of behavior description is what *enables* us to interact effectively with one another without insisting that we all tell the same story. We can recognize when our differences are legitimate and treat each other appropriately without imputing shortcomings or defects because we do not see things the same way. We are not missing anything if we are missing the One True Story.

This understanding of relativity is, of course, orthogonal to Kurosawa's. People have sometimes taken it that Kurosawa is presenting a normative relativity set in *Rashomon*. But notice that Kurosawa's set is *not* a set of true, reconcilable descriptions about a murder. Instead, each of the descriptions is a lie, and each description is fundamentally irreconcilable with every other.

For Kurosawa, the One True Story *is* the solution to the relativity problem, and there is no evidence that he ever considered that there might not be One True Story. Even though the assumption of the One True Story was questioned in physics and philosophy during his lifetime, he apparently never considered another view of the relativity problem.

Conclusion

Given Kurosawa's genius as a film maker, it is difficult not to lament that he did not know of any alternative to the One True Story, and that he never explored in film the resolution of the relativity issue that comes with a better understanding of person characteristics. To be sure, if he had resolved the relativity issue, we might then have missed many of the extraordinary movies for which we are indebted to him.

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Being, Becoming and Belonging

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ABSTRACT

"Doing" has been the primary intellectual concern of psychologists—including Descriptive Psychologists—in the 20th century, but "doing" is not the only aspect of the Person concept which warrants attention. This paper concerns itself with three domains which have been less extensively articulated within the Descriptive Psychology canon: being, becoming and belonging. Conceptual and practical links are articulated between each domain and the others ("being" informs "belonging" in various ways, and vice versa, for example), to "Person", and to "doing" in its various forms. Some of the material here is already part of the common canon in Descriptive Psychology; the rest is meant to be original contributions by the author.

Introduction

"Doing" has been the primary intellectual concern of psychologists in the 20th century. Indeed, it defines the domain; the standard definition of psychology is "the study of behavior", an acceptably academic term for "doing." Descriptive Psychology set out to make a "fresh start," as Ossorio famously put it in his

introduction to *"What Actually Happens"* (Ossorio, 1971/1975/1978), but it did so
by recognizing and utilizing the power of conceptual articulation, not by changing
the subject. Accordingly, "doing" (in its various forms of Intentional Action,
Deliberate Action, Social Practices, and so forth) has been a central concern for
Descriptive Psychologists since the earliest writings of Ossorio in the early 1960's.
In *Persons* a Person is said to be one whose life history "paradigmatically is a life
history of Deliberate Action;" person characteristics are all articulated by means of
their relation to the person's actions. Thus, Person and Doing were, for Descriptive
Psychologists, the initial central, focal concepts and domains of interest. In
retrospect, it is clear that this was well-chosen; a great deal of good has come from
putting them at the conceptual core.

"Doing," of course, is not the only aspect of the Person concept which warrants
attention. Just as "Person" conceptually implies "doing" (it is absurd on the face of
it to postulate a paradigm-case Person who never does anything—what kind of
Person would *that* be?), "Person" also conceptually implies some other domains.
In particular, this paper will concern itself with three domains (aspects of the
Person concept, to be technically exact) which have been less extensively
articulated within the Descriptive Psychology canon: being, becoming and
belonging.

"Less extensively articulated" means just that—being, becoming and belonging
have all been part of Descriptive Psychology's conceptual apparatus from the
beginning (as aspects of the Person concept they would have to be). It seems fair
to say that for the first twenty years or so, the Descriptive Psychology community
paid a great deal of attention to persons and doing, and significantly less attention
to the aspects of being, becoming and belonging. It also seems fair to note that over
the past twenty years or so, a number of Descriptive Psychologists, including
Ossorio, have explicitly dealt with and within these domains.

My intention in this paper is to explore each domain—being, becoming and
belonging—*as* aspects of the Person concept. As such, we will recognize conceptual
and practical links between each domain and the others ("being" informs
"belonging" in various ways, and vice versa, for example), to "Person," and to
"doing" in its various forms. The entire canon of Descriptive Psychology (at least
to the extent it is known to the author) is explicitly assumed and used here; while
I mean this paper to effectively stand on its own and be usefully intelligible to
non-Descriptive Psychologists, and I will strive for clarity and ease of
understanding, it is not my intention to include a basic course in Descriptive
Psychology.

The conceptual articulation of these domains within Descriptive Psychology has
been largely piecemeal, done as needed for specific topics of interest and often
presented only in spoken, undocumented presentations at the Descriptive
Psychology Annual Conference. (The present author admits to being undoubtedly
the worst offender in that regard—hence this paper, in exchange for numerous

intellectual I.O.U's.) As a result, the origin and development of some of the articulations presented in this paper are at best murky—sorting out exactly who said what, when, would be a difficult and thankless task and one which this paper explicitly does not undertake. Some of the material here has become part of the common canon in Descriptive Psychology. Some items were first articulated by a known individual, written down in a specific document, and then worked their way into wide understanding and acceptance; when the author of such items is known to me, I will acknowledge their authorship. Some items emerged from undocumented presentations or dialogue, were picked up and adapted by others, and then became widely used, perhaps even written down as accepted canon; these I shall simply use and acknowledge as canon. (I ask any Descriptive Psychologist who finds his or her work wrongly attributed here to kindly inform me of my mistake and I will correct it in a running "Errata" attached to this paper.) The rest of the items in this paper are meant to be original contributions by the author, some of long-standing and wide acceptance within the canon ("Coercion elicits resistance," "People become what they are treated as being," and "Conscious *as* ..." come immediately to mind), some new to this paper. My primary concern here is for articulation, not attribution; as The Rubiat puts it so memorably, I prefer to "Take the cash, and let the credit go." (See, in addition, the "Acknowledgments" below.)

Being

A Person is an Individual whose life history is paradigmatically a history of Being.

By "Being," I do not mean mere existence within the scheme of things, nor do I mean fundamentally to distinguish thereby a Person from the dead or the imaginary—"live" and "real" serve quite adequately for those purposes. Rather, I intend the usage of the word "Being" which is active and participative. Just as we say "He lives his life" to point to his active engagement by contrast with passive existence, we can say "After all, she *is* the Mayor" as a means of pointing to one way of understanding her actions, thinking and judgments. *Being* the Mayor (or Bob's friend, the point guard, a plumber, etc.) connects strongly to a large set of actions she takes; indeed, it is not stretching things too far to take "Being the Mayor" in many cases as a meaningful description of what she is doing. Thus, "Being" and "Doing" are strongly connected conceptually and practically. (The obvious parallel of this "life history of Being" formulation with Ossorio's classic "life history of Deliberate Action" formulation is intentional, of course, and is complementary rather than competitive—two views of the same thing, rather than two alternative solutions to the same problem.)

Whenever a Person acts, he acts *as* a particular someone—that is, he is being and enacting a particular status within the status structure available in the community within which he is currently participating. (These linkages will be explored in some depth in "Belonging.") In the paradigm case, his actions are the enactment of a single status, which he knows himself to be, and the enactment of which forms part of his reasons for acting as he does here and now. At times, his actions may be a case of acting on more than one status at a time—indeed, even acting on statuses within different communities at the same time—more or less successfully. (This complexity will be explored in more depth in "Belonging.") Whereas statuses are discrete (in the mathematical, not the social, sense), Being is continuos; while one can cease to enact the status of Banker without immediately taking up the status of third baseman, one cannot routinely cease to *be*. One always remains oneself; when one is not enacting a particular status, one still *is* "me." "Me" is who I "be" during those transitions from one status or community to another—and, of course, while I am enacting all those other statuses as well. (Enacting a status while ceasing to be "me" is possible, but generally problematic; see for example Ossorio, 1997a, pp. 163–193.)

"Being," as in "Being the Mayor," is substantially more than a summary category for a cluster of actual and possible actions. It also refers to what one sees (and does not see), has reason to act on (or to not act on) and how one chooses (or chooses not) to act—among other things. Ossorio articulates many of these aspects of "Being" in his collection of status–dynamic maxims with commentary, *Place*; let us focus for now on that aspect of Being which is both most familiar to us as persons and problematic to us as behavioral scientists: consciousness.

Being and Consciousness

To be a Person is to be conscious.

This is the paradigm case, of course. We recognize states such as sleep and coma in which persons are understood to be not conscious, and by recognizing such, we thereby acknowledge the fact that "not conscious" is an atypical state for persons, calling for an account and perhaps even a remedy. We also, as psychologists, recognize states of affairs of which a person can properly be said to be "unconscious;" steering clear of Sigmund's swamp, we take "unconscious knowledge" to be a variation of the paradigm case, calling for an account whenever attributed.

All of this is straightforward and inarguable. Again, try the thought experiment of imagining one who we would call a person, but of whom we would also say, "Of course, he is not conscious." We would immediately recognize this as a severely limited person. If I took the further step and said, "And this is our paradigm case person" you would (charitably) assume I was joking; after all, if the paradigm case

person is not conscious, how could I expect you or anyone else to know (or care about) what I just said?

A slight digression. As we all know, attributing consciousness to persons is rank heresy in many academic circles these days. In some British circles it is referred to as the "C-word"—a word as unutterably offensive to academic aesthetic sensibilities as the "N-word" is to the moral sense of most contemporary Americans. To vastly understate the issue, this is an unfortunate state of affairs. Let's be clear that by reminding us that persons are conscious, I am in no way implying (nor for that matter denying) the existence of some substance or transcendental entity called "consciousness." That's a matter for theologians. "Consciousness" here refers to the state of affairs of being conscious, nothing more nor less (for a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Jeffrey, 1998).

Granted that a person is conscious, it makes obvious sense to ask, "Conscious *of* what?" This directs our attention to the *content* of consciousness. Answers to that question take the form of identifying the particular objects, processes, events, states-of-affairs, relationships and concepts which the person currently discriminates in her world, and in relation to which she is therefore in a position to act. Less obviously, but equally cogently, it makes sense to ask "Conscious *as* what?," directing our attention to the *context* of consciousness. Answers to this question take the form of identifying a status within the social practices of the individual's community, which the person is currently being, and which bound and influence the contents of consciousness.

To expand a bit: Being a banker, I am conscious *as* a banker. I look for opportunities to do what a banker does; I pay particular attention to those states of affairs of interest to a banker; I appraise and respond to a situation in one of the ways a banker does. As the third baseman on our softball team, I am conscious of a very different set of things because I am conscious *as* a third baseman—not as a banker. This is an ordinary, everyday fact about persons: what we are conscious *of* depends largely on who we are conscious *as*, and this changes routinely and dramatically as we change who we "be." (We will expand further on this in the section "Being and Versions.")

Consider the special case of "conscious as" implicit in the classic Descriptive Psychology "Actor-Observer-Critic" schema... "A person has a status in the world as an Actor, as an Observer, and as a Critic." (Status Dynamic Maxim G3, Ossorio, 1982/1998). As such, a person can be conscious *as* an Actor, an Observer and a Critic, and the content of the person's consciousness will surely vary as the status varies. What one knows as an Actor, and indeed how one knows it, is significantly different from what and how one knows as an Observer or Critic. Let us look next at one important aspect of Actor's consciousness—what and how a person knows when being an Actor.

Being and Feeling

"Feeling" has been as close to a dirty word as one can find in Descriptive Psychology. Ossorio assessed the predominance of "feeling talk" as a pernicious influence in both psychology and our culture at large, and undertook a classic well-poisoning operation to undermine its influence. He insisted on the reality basis for emotions as primary, and essentially dismissed feelings with the classic formulation: "Feelings of anger are whatever you feel when you are angry." A great deal of good has come of this move.

Having taken the antidote and effectively recovered from the poison, we are left to wonder if in fact we might discover an important place within Descriptive Psychology for the concept of feelings. In recent years, some Descriptive Psychologists have begun a grass-roots rehabilitation campaign for "feelings," e.g. Jeffrey's formulation of feelings as "the experience of appraisal" (Jeffrey, 1998). I suggest that a proper place for "feelings" as part of the Person concept can be seen as part of the concept of Being—specifically, as Actor's knowledge.

To quote Ossorio:

> "For the Actor, the World is essentially an arena for action, and he treats it accordingly by incorporating it into his actions. Acting as Actor has several distinctive features:
>
> His behavior is spontaneous: he does what comes naturally. ... His behavior is creative rather than reflective. ... His behavior is value-giving rather than value-finding. ... His behavior is a before-the-fact phenomenon, since he creates it (he is not *finding out* what behavior he is engaged in—he is *doing* it.") (Ossorio, 1982/1998, p. 104).

> Additionally: "But I don't wait for my behavior to find out about it. I have to know about it in advance, in a different way. ... My knowledge of my behavior is an author's knowledge, not an observer's knowledge. And an author's knowledge is ahead of time, not after the fact." (Ossorio, 1997a, p. 145)

> And finally: " ... it is not surprising that our self-knowledge should have much of the general character of 'feelings,' since the latter both are a critical aspect of person characterizations and, on the performance side, involve skills which can be exercised without requiring deliberation and thus could be continued long past the point where deliberation was no longer possible." (Ossorio, 1966/1995, p. 93).

Being an Actor, then, requires a person to be conscious as one who is spontaneous, creative and knowing what he knows before the fact—an Actor's knowledge is ahead of time. To act, we generally need to know who and where we are, that is, what status we are acting from ("being") and what our place is vis-a-vis other relevant elements in our world—and as Actor, we generally need to know

these things spontaneously and "before the fact" (by contrast with, for example, figuring them out from observation.) Feelings are just that sort of spontaneous, before-the-fact knowledge—we know them directly, not by observation (although of course we can be mistaken, and observation then is a good corrective)—and acting on feelings is a paradigm case of spontaneous, creative, value-giving behavior. Feelings, then, seem on the face of them to be a type of Actor's knowledge.

But what type? I suggest the following simple formulation:

Feelings are Actor's knowledge of relationship.

As such, feelings are also Actor's knowledge of status, or standing vis-a-vis other elements in the World, importantly including other people. How does an Actor know what behavior is called for in this situation? Well, "he does what comes naturally," that is, he does what seems called for, which in many cases is equivalent to, "he does what feels right."

Let me be clear that I am not implying that feelings are the only type of Actor's knowledge, or that all Actors are acting on their feelings, or that feelings are the only way Actors can know relationship accurately. Knowledge is indispensable in all cases of successful action (save those we attribute purely to luck); feelings, an Actor can do without at times (but at a potential cost of spontaneity and flexibility, which we recognize as Actor's deficits.)

That said, the link between feelings and emotions is straightforward. Feelings are Actor's knowledge of relationship; emotions are appraisals of relationship, which is knowledge which carries built-in motivational significance. Many feelings correspond to relationships on which one can act, if one chooses, but there is no built-in motivation to act. We have few words for such feelings because we generally have little need to talk about them—paradigmatically, feelings are acted on, not talked about. Emotions, by contrast, are generally identified with specific words which enable us to compactly articulate both the relationship which exists and the behavior to be expected. (See, however, Ossorio (1997a, p. 120) on why there appear to be many negative emotions but few positive ones.)

Thus, "Feelings of anger are whatever you feel when you are angry" can be seen *not* as a statement of the general dispensability of the concept of feelings, but rather as a part-description, like "the smell of bacon," where that which is being identified (the feelings) "cannot be described independently of a description of the primary context" (the emotion of anger). (Ossorio, 1966/1995, p. 61). (Although of course the feelings can exist independently of the context, as when a stage actor recreates her feelings of anger to give a convincing portrayal despite the lack of any actual provocation.)

Being an Actor requires spontaneous, before-the-fact knowledge, and when it comes to relationship/status/place, feelings are that sort of Actor's knowledge.

Being and Versions

I would like to offer anyone reading this paper a "sucker bet." (It's a sucker bet because, as with Pete's famous "how will we eventually reach the stars" bet with his friend Lowell, neither party will be around to collect on it.) I bet that when intellectual historians of the 22nd century write their accounts of the 20th century, in their chapters on Descriptive Psychology (no bets—that's a gimme) they will assess Ossorio's formulation of the Dramaturgical Model as his most significant contribution. (Ossorio, 1998; Ossorio, In Preparation). One of the Dramaturgical Model's profound strengths is the way in which it helps us make fundamental sense of the inescapable but otherwise inexplicable "clustering" of things in the world. And nowhere does that "clustering" occur both more profoundly and significantly than in "being."

As previously observed, what we are conscious *of* depends largely on who we are conscious *as*, and this changes routinely and dramatically as we change who we "be." This is an ordinary, everyday fact about persons, but one which we routinely fail to take into account. Perhaps because of the continuity of consciousness implicit in being myself (essentially no matter what else I am being), we tend to think of ourselves and other persons as a continuous whole: our skills, knowledge, attitudes, motivations, interests, etc. are thought of as like the ingredients of a well-stocked kitchen, always equally available to us depending on what we happen to be doing. There is a point to conceiving of the whole and complete person in this way, but it misses some essential facts—the "clustering" of person characteristics easily observable in day-to-day life. Jill is an accomplished, compassionate therapist; but when it comes to the disaster area of her personal relationships, it looks as if she forgot where the skill and attitude shelves are in the kitchen. Bob is a gentle, friendly clerk at the health food store; on the touch football field he becomes a loud, hyper-aggressive kamikaze. If this sort of shift in observable person characteristics were not so commonplace, we would suspect Jill and Bob of multiple personality disorder (or whatever we're calling it these days); as it is, we simply take it that we have seen two different *versions* of the same person.

Once pointed out, it is easy to notice that every person comes in many different versions. These versions correspond to statuses (see Ossorio, 1998, p. 122–125), which are what there is to "be." Each version is a cluster of consciousness and person characteristics, including attitudes, skills, etc. which are most fitting to the status being taken. And, as just noted, these person characteristics can be significantly, even startlingly, different as one moves from status to status.

"Versions" gives us a different way of understanding some of the observable complexity of people. The same person can be one way one time, and its opposite another, and this calls for no particular explanation nor remedy since on those two occasions the person is being different statuses. It also suggests some practical approaches to the thorny, age-old problem—how can we get a person to change?

Ossorio once famously remarked about psychotherapy: "People change slowly, and little." That's the bad news about changing people. The good news is, we may not need to change people; we may need only to change the version of the person that shows up. And we do that by changing the status the person is being—either by inviting them into a different status altogether, or by successfully redefining the status they are already being. Since we are dealing with Actors here, this invitation or redefinition needs to take place while the Actor is engaged, not merely through engaging the Observer/Critic. (Much more on this topic in "Becoming.")

Being an Actor, then, means being a particular version of oneself, and these versions can be significantly different from—even contradictory with—each other. Not surprisingly, this state of affairs creates a context for a question of both formal and deeply personal importance: who am I, really?

Being and Authenticity

Authenticity, like consciousness, is tricky conceptual stuff. If you are not very careful, you find yourself postulating the existence of an entity called the "true" or "real" self, which is who you *really* are, and which contrasts with the apparent self which can be observed acting in the world more or less authentically. I mean to neither affirm nor deny the existence of such a "real" self—again that's a matter for theologians and mystics—but as a Descriptive Psychologist I am required to do justice to the facts of "being and authenticity" without making anything up. Let's see if we can do justice to the facts regarding authenticity without making up an entity called the "real self."

What facts need accounting for? Every day, as we go along being and doing in the world, we experience actions ranging from ones that seem straightforwardly an expression of "who I am," to ones where we are just going through the motions and know it. We are interested here in the ones that are *not* an authentic expression of "who I am." "My heart says one thing, but I do another." "My job (school, church, marriage) requires me to act in certain ways, but that's not the real me."

Some of these instances drop out of the picture as soon as we acknowledge that a person can deliberately choose to engage in an action which she knows is not an authentic expression of who she is. These choices are often made on prudential grounds ("Better not burn that bridge just yet"), moral/ethical grounds ("The fact that it's true doesn't outweigh the harm I would cause by saying it") or even hedonic grounds ("Let's just take the easy way this time.") If these choices are inauthentic at all, they are at most "garden variety inauthenticity" and not likely to cause too many sleepless nights so long as they are balanced with a sufficiency of authentic acts.

The difficulties—again both formal and personal—arise when we consider those actions which are not so easily explained. The person appears, both to us and to himself, to be making his best effort, and yet it still seems hollow. He is going through the motions as best he can, but he is clearly not getting the satisfaction that

accompanies   straightforward   participation.   ("Satisfaction   accompanies
participation" — see "Belonging.") What's going on?

Again, let's put aside for the moment those instances where we would be
inclined to offer a classic psychodynamic explanation: the person is stuck in some
past trauma or scenario, and his present behavior is best understood by reference
to some portion of his history. Formally, we already have accounts for this type of
"inauthentic" behavior; it does not surprise us (although as therapists it of course
concerns us) when someone in this situation asks "who am I, really?" (We will
return to this "symbolic hangover" in "Becoming").

What we are left with looks a lot like genuine existential dilemma: a person, with
no apparent psychodynamic sticking points, who is doing her very best and still
coming up empty. What, indeed, is going on?

We need three conceptual pieces to understand this situation:

1. First, let's recall that an individual person, while certainly complex and flexible
   as previously noted, is nonetheless bounded in specific, individual ways. Joe is
   really good at some things and not so good at others; Carolyn is tremendously
   interested in some things and couldn't care less about others; Daniel is driven to
   achieve certain outcomes and actively opposes others (which happen to be at the
   top of Mary's all-time To–Do list.) Further, generally over time we come to
   know ourselves pretty well, and our self-knowledge is Actor's knowledge, that
   is, direct, spontaneous and differentiated, although not always verbally
   well–articulated. What we know (Actor's knowledge) about ourselves is
   considerably more extensive, and indeed may conflict with, what we can say
   accurately about ourselves (Observer's knowledge.) (There is of course no
   guarantee that our Actor's knowledge of ourselves is accurate, and again,
   Observer's knowledge is useful in correcting that sort of mistake.)
2. Second, not all of us are perfectly suited to every status we are called upon to
   take. Indeed, one of life's major and enduring challenges is finding and being
   statuses for which our personal characteristics are a good match. Good match or
   not, we can see (and may well be reminded) that we are called upon to be a
   spouse, a mother, a mentor, banker, third–baseman, employee or whatever—and
   we do the best we can. This latter is publicly validated by the community around
   us, that is, it is Observer's knowledge.
3. Third, recall the above formulation of feeling as "Actor's knowledge of
   relationship/status/standing." This is knowledge of *actual* relationship/status/
   standing—where we *really* are—which may or may not contrast importantly with
   where we are *supposed* to be, that is, with the *nominal* relationship/status/
   standing we are seen by our community (and ourselves, as Observer) as being.

Putting these together, we can understand authenticity as referring to the
situation where a person is well–cast in the status she is being. Who she is and
knows herself to be, is a good match for what the status requires her to be; what she

is called upon tu do in this status gives her good opportunity to express who she really is; as she "be's" this status, she feels like her "true self" because the version of her this status calls for includes some of her most important personal characteristics.

Inauthenticity can be seen, then, as miscasting. The status he knows (Observer/Critic knowledge) he must be, is a poor match for the status he in fact is being in the world (Actor's knowledge via feeling.) He is called upon to act on personal characteristics he in fact does not have, or which are weak in his overall scheme; the version of him this status calls for includes little of central importance to him. (As the Wizard of Oz said to Dorothy: "I'm not a bad man. I'm a very good man. I'm just a bad wizard.") Small wonder, then that he feels phony or inauthentic or empty (which we might understand as the feeling equivalent of taking the phone off the hook because you already know it's going to be bad news.) One can take only so much of this miscasting before beginning to wonder, "Who am I, really?" because it has been a long time since "I have felt like myself"—that is, "since I have been well-cast in a status where the version of me I was being included important aspects of me, and matched well what the status required me to be."

"Real self," then, is how we refer to a particular state of affairs. A person is his "real self" when who he is at the time (Actor's knowledge of version) is a good match for who he called upon to be by the Status he is currently being (Observer's knowledge). Said slightly differently, we say we are our "real self" when Actor's knowledge of who we are, matches well with Observer's knowledge of who we are. We will consider some implications of this in "Belonging."

It seems we have done justice to the facts about authenticity without resorting to reference to a entity called "the real self." (As often is the case, on closer examination what seems to call for an entity can be better understood as a state of affairs.)

Or have we? After all, not just any match will do—we need some versions that include *important* aspects of who we are. Why are these particular person characteristics centrally important to Mary, but not to Joe? Why does Joe seek and find great satisfaction in this status, which Mary avoids? We will take up this issue further in the next section.

Being and Soul

Many in our culture take soul to be a central fact of existence (the "*real* real self" as it were); many, including most academic behavioral scientists, dismiss it as on a par with ghosts, poltergeists, and other entities "of uncertain status," to borrow Tee Roberts' delightful locution. (Roberts, 1991). Bill Plotkin presented at last year's conference an initial account of his life's work on Soulcraft; until then, it is fair to say that virtually no conceptual work explicitly on "soul" had been done by Descriptive Psychologists. (Although Ossorio has chosen to avoid the word "soul" in his writings, it is clear that his work on the Dramaturgical Model and on

self-concept cover some of the same ground.) Plotkin is a passionate advocate of the central necessity for a concept of soul, the crucial importance of doing one's particular "soulwork," and the utility of various "Soulcraft" methods. He intends in his writings nothing short of a cultural transformation to a "soulcentric" culture. All this comes through in his presentation—clearly, his intentions are greater than merely offering a Descriptive formulation of soul. That said, he is also an astute and committed practitioner of Descriptive Psychology, who means his formulation to be rooted in and a contribution to our shared conceptual discipline.

I personally am greatly impressed with Plotkin's work, and intrigued by his quest. The questions of soul which I wish to address in this section are considerably smaller, and almost exclusively focused on conceptual issues, specifically:

1. What facts suggest a concept of soul?
2. Do we need a concept of soul to account for these facts?
3. What conceptualization gives us formal access to the domain of soul?

I have no intention of competing with, or building upon, Plotkin's work here. I mean to be mindful of his conceptualization while proceeding independently of it. As we shall see, the end points of both approaches turn out to be substantially similar.

What facts suggest a concept of soul? Our literature and folklore are replete with examples of young (and not-so-young) people suddenly "finding themselves": seeing a great performer/ tending to a sick animal/ defending someone from a bully/ hearing a piano played for the first time, and suddenly recognizing: "That's it!" As one popular novel put it: "He knew all at once that this was it; this was what he was born for ..." Less dramatic, but equally cogent, are the many day-to-day instances of self-discovery and self-affirmation, when a person recognizes that, all appearances and expectations to the contrary, they surprisingly fit (or do not fit) in a particular status. "This gives me deep satisfaction; it feels like the real me" as well as "I can fake it, but I just can't be this and still be me."

All these point to the fact that individuals from time to time recognize themselves, in a way that seems to them deep and unmistakable, when they find themselves called upon to be a particular status. The use of locutions such as "what I was born to be ..." "who I really am ..." and "who I was meant to be all along ..." underscore the significance of these recognitions; the fact that the recognition often comes in an unexpected context that is only inevitable in retrospect underscores what Ossorio has referred to as "the essentially mysterious" nature of this kind of self-knowledge. ("By essentially mysterious, I mean that there is no way to find out." Ossorio, 1997b). Further, these recognitions have powerful impact on our view of ourselves in the world; like the classic "face in the wall"(Ossorio, 1971), once seen, they can be ignored only with great difficulty. This "me" which I recognize on these pivotal occasions seems central to my true nature, at the core of my being, an essential aspect of my identity—my "soul," if you will.

These, then, are facts which suggest the need for a concept of soul in Descriptive Psychology. But do we actually need a concept of soul to account for these facts? I suggest that we do. The primary candidates within the Descriptive Psychology conceptual canon for accounting for "soul" facts would be "authenticity," "capacity," and "Identity." As we have noted above "authenticity" overlaps with but does not completely subsume the concept of "soul." "Capacity" looks initially promising, in that it is another of those "essentially mysterious notions," but it seems best reserved for Personal Characteristics, the Observer's parallel to the Actor's self-concept, and knowledge of "soul" is clearly Actor's knowledge. "Identity" again seems clearly to overlap, but not subsume, "soul"—while "soul" may be seen as at the core of my "Identity," clearly not all matters of Identity are also matters of "soul." Thus, it seems we need the concept of "soul" to do justice to the facts of essential self-recognition.

How, then, shall we conceive of "soul" within Descriptive Psychology? Ossorio addressed some aspects of this issue informally during the Rap Session at 1997's conference. His remarks paralleled my own thoughts on the matter. To quote some relevant passages (Ossorio, 1997b):

> "You don't have soul as original capacity. You have the capacity to have a soul, to be somebody with a soul. There's not something called soul that's in your original capacity.

> "Self-concept leaves room for my being mistaken about it. Self does not. The self is the real thing about which I have this self-concept. I can be in error about the first, but the second is simply what it is."

> "When it comes to thinking and talking about yourself, you can either be talking PCs [Person Characteristics] or Identity. I can tell you what characteristics I have, and I am often mistaken about them. Why? Because I have to find out about those the same way everybody else finds out about them, and my life history may be such that I wasn't in optimal circumstances to find out. So I may have characteristics that I don't know about. I may not have characteristics that I think I have because I succeeded in situations that were not representative. On the other hand, the Identity ones have to do with who I am. I may be wrong but not that way. It's a different kind of error, and that would be a more serious one. It would be more closely tied into pathology."

With the above in mind, I would like to offer the following requirements for a concept of "Soul" within Descriptive Psychology:

- "Soul," like "self," does not leave room for my being mistaken about it. Soul is the reality about which I have self-knowledge—about which I may or may not be mistaken.
- "Soul" is related to my Identity—but it is not a part-whole relationship. Soul is not part of my Identity.

- "Soul," like capacity, is essentially mysterious—knowable only to the extent that relevant history has transformed Soul into Identity. (Soul is to essential Identity as Capacity is to Personal Characteristics.)

The choice of the word "reality" in the first requirement was intentional and provocative. Recall Ossorio's landmark distinction between "real world" and "reality" (Ossorio, 1969/1978) in which "reality" is seen to be a set of boundary conditions on real worlds. From here it is a short step to the following formulation:

"Soul" is a set of boundary conditions on an individual's Identity.

Specifically, Soul is a set of constraints on what the individual will recognize as essential to her Identity. As such, Soul is "knowable" only when the individual has the relevant life history to recognize that this particular place in the world is essential to who she knows herself to be. "Soul," then, is not a "thing" or entity at all—once again, what our object-biased language leads us to think of as an entity (Ossorio, 1997/1998) on closer examination turns out to be more appropriately seen as a state-of-affairs (the state-of-affairs of there being constraints on what an Individual will recognize as being essential to his Identity).

We will look next, and finally, at some other aspects of Being and Boundary.

Being and Boundary

Let us conclude our look at "Being" with some speculations about boundaries. Boundaries are fascinating because they demark a categorical change: what is within the boundary is one sort of thing, what is outside is quite another. The boundary itself often turns out to be intimately related to what is within, but categorically different. What, then, might we say about the boundaries of being?

"To be" is to be a particular someone. What might we say about the boundary of being—being in which one was *not* a particular someone, but not yet outside the category entirely into non-being? This is not mere fanciful speculation; the canon of many spiritual traditions includes something called "pure (or "absolute") being" (Sanskrit: "Sat"), which fits the description given above. Further, "to be" is to be conscious *as* a particular someone. The boundary of consciousness might be described as conscious, but not *as* any particular someone—again, in some spiritual canons, "pure (or "absolute") consciousness" (Sanskrit: "Chit"). What might we say about pure consciousness? And what might one be conscious *of* when one is conscious *as* ... nothing? Whatever we might say about "pure being" or "pure consciousness," we will not be surprised if, as boundary conditions, they turn out to be *categorically* different from being and consciousness as we know them.

Recall that both capacity and characteristics are aspects of a person. What capacity and characteristics might be ascribed to "pure being"? One possible answer is: "Why, none at all; only a particular someone has particular characteristics." And since capacity is essentially mysterious, known only in its manifestation through

actual characteristics, the capacity of "pure being" is therefore essentially and forever mysterious. This answer has some intriguing parallels in spiritual traditions which insist that nothing can be said of "pure being;" it is both unknown and unknowable; it cannot be described; it has no characteristics or aspects; it can only be experienced or encountered. Another possible answer is: "Since capacity serves as constraint on what characteristics a person can develop, pure being has no constraints whatsoever. Its knowledge is not constrained; its skills are not constrained." Again, this perhaps parallels spiritual traditions which depict "pure being" as omniscient and omnipotent.

And what of "pure consciousness?" What is one conscious *of* when one is conscious *as* nothing? Perhaps one is conscious of—nothing at all (which is not the same as being *not* conscious.) The Buddhist description of the Void—consciousness with no object—seems perhaps relevant here. And this perhaps sheds some light on traditions that say pure consciousness limits itself in order to have something to experience. Or perhaps one is conscious of everything equally, all at once, with no special interest in any particular thing. This perhaps resonates with spiritual traditions that speak of "equality vision," which characterize "pure consciousness" as dispassionate or beyond "attraction and aversion," or which state that "not a sparrow falls but what He knows."

These are all speculations, of course. But if they have any merit at all, they may serve to make intellectually accessible an otherwise inaccessible domain: the domain of mystical experience. Mystical experience is the ultimate paradigm case of the subjective; no amount of observer's knowledge will get you there. But mystical experience certainly is among the facts (or possible facts) of the behavior of persons; as such, Descriptive Psychology must include mystical experience in its purview. Perhaps these speculations may contribute to that end.

One final note: Those Sanskrit terms "Sat" and "Chit" are typically found in a single, tripartite word denoting the Supreme Being: "Satchitananda." Ananda means "Pure or Absolute Bliss." Let's leave *that* to the mystics—at least for now.

Becoming

"Becoming" is a long-standing, central concern of psychologists, in particular psychologists interested in psychopathology and psychotherapy. We seek insight into what people can and do become, how they become it, what prevents their becoming what they could be, and how to support them in becoming what they want or need to be. Descriptive Psychologists have created a distinctive approach to these matters of becoming, at the heart of which is a set of distinctions and methods collectively referred to as "status dynamics." This is not the place for a review of the canon of status dynamics; that ground has been covered elsewhere (e.g., Ossorio, 1976; Ossorio; 1982/1998). Instead, I propose to revisit these

questions of becoming from a somewhat different viewpoint, and to offer some idiosyncratic thoughts on "status dynamics" (some of which have long been incorporated into the Descriptive Psychology canon.) To see the point and purpose of this proposed revisiting, kindly allow me to fill in a bit of personal professional background.

I first heard that evocative phrase, "status dynamics," in 1970. I was a third-year graduate student in clinical psychology at the University of Colorado; Prof. Ossorio, with whom I had been studying intensively since 1965, was my therapy supervisor. As we would review and discuss the individuals I was seeing in therapy, from time to time Pete would drop in that phrase: "status dynamics." It was clear that "status dynamics" was meant in some way to characterize the approach to understanding Pete was trying to teach me, and that it contrasted meaningfully with "psychodynamics," but I only got hints and dribbles regarding just what the conceptual content of "status dynamics" might be. (At the time, there had been no formal presentation of these concepts in papers or courses.) I tried some of Pete's other graduate students; they were as baffled as I was. My approach to therapy changed and improved, but I would have been hard put to say exactly what it was past, "You know, status dynamics."

There matters might have remained save for the timely interventions of two individuals. I had the good fortune of interning in 1972–73 at the Volusia County, Florida, Community Mental Health Center under the supervision of Ray Mulry, Ph.D. Ray was a rare individual who was both a knowledgeable, skilled therapist, and a nurturing supervisor who saw his job as supporting my own discovery rather than teaching me his approach. He was intrigued by how I did therapy and how I talked about it, and commented that he thought I might find some food for thought in the works of the great hypnotherapist, Milton Erickson. This was a few years before Milton Erikson was made famous in the Neurolinguistic Programming formulations of Bandler and Grinder; what was available was Erickson's own collected papers, most of which were case formulations and contained little in the way of grand conceptualization (which seemed to hold little interest for him.) I read everything Erikson had published, and saw Dr. Mulry's point: there was something familiar here, different in detail but similar in intent, and certainly dealing with the dynamics of status in a direct way. And I began to see why Pete had gone to the trouble of offering a detailed status dynamic explication of some of Fritz Perls's work; Fritz, in his own way, was working with status dynamics ... interesting.

The second timely intervention came next year when my new boss, Dr. James Farr, asked me, a newly minted Ph.D., to write up a concept paper on a "non-clinic clinic" where we could offer "therapy" without using the concepts or terms of the medical model. This gave me the opportunity to stretch, so to speak. Freed of the academic straightjacket imposed on dissertation writers (and the more strenuous but subtle restraint of trying to say things in language that would not cause Pete to wince) I was able to formulate and assert, based on nothing more defensible than

my own understanding, what I thought I knew about "what makes people tick—and stick" (to quote a chapter heading from the paper.) That paper was entitled "Life Development Center: Concepts and Practices" (Putman, 1973). It was an extremely mixed bag: some gems ("Coercion elicits resistance" and "People become what they are treated as being," for example, first appeared here), some garbage, with a few atrocious puns mixed in. But at its core was my serious attempt to formulate exactly what was meant by "status dynamics." Based on my triangulation of the hints and examples from Ossorio, the written works of Milton Erickson, and the theories of Fritz Perls, I thought I finally understood what Pete had been getting at. I believed I was simply writing down what Pete had been trying to get me to see. I sent a copy of the paper to Dr. Ossorio and a few friends, and forgot about it.

Fast forward to 1978 to complete this historical prologue. After an absence of 5 years, I reconnected to the Boulder Descriptive Psychology community to discover that, in the meantime, Pete had given a seminar on clinical topics in which he laid out "status dynamics" in great detail. Imagine my surprise when I discovered that what he had meant by status dynamics, and what I had written in that paper, barely overlapped at all! Therapeutic images, scenarios, three-minute lectures, behavior potential, et. al.—what we now know as the canon of status dynamics was nowhere to be found in my paper. And as I looked closer, I saw Pete had covered much of the ground I had attempted to cover—but differently. And he had not covered all of it.

Over these past 25 years I have come to believe that some of the content of that paper, both that which has worked its way into the canon and some which has not, nonetheless has merit, as an additional view of status dynamics which supplements and complements Ossorio's. Leaving off this historical prologue, then, I propose straightforwardly to offer some conceptualizations of becoming, some of which will be very familiar to Descriptive Psychologists, some of which will not be—and all of which I take to be part of the Descriptive Psychology understanding of the dynamics of status. Let us now begin.

Becoming Basics

A Person's Identity and Personal Characteristics are works in progress; they are neither fixed nor indefinitely fluid. Like most works in progress, Identity and Personal Characteristics can appear to change rapidly and dramatically in the early going, while seeming far more finished in form and content as time goes by. Thus, while "becoming" is part of a Person's life-history throughout her life, it is particularly noticeable in childhood and adolescence. Accordingly, we will first direct our attention to those early years of becoming.

Babies have personal characteristics from (at least) the moment of birth. Whether they *really* have these characteristics, or we just think they do, is irrelevant here (and perhaps, like capacity, essentially mysterious)—what matters is that *we* adults see them as cute, or cranky, or cuddly, or intense, or placid, etc.,

and we treat them accordingly. Thus begins the key dynamic of status—by which I mean the process whereby "who I am" and "who I be" changes over time. This key dynamic can be summarized in a cluster of four maxims (or one maxim with three corollaries, if you prefer):

1. A person becomes what he acts as.

2. A person acts as who he takes himself to be.

3. A person takes himself to be what he is treated as being.

4. A person becomes what he is treated as being.

[NOTE: I take the first Maxim to be a specific instance of Maxim D8 in *Place* ("Relationships follow behavior"); the third Maxim can be seen as a restatement of Maxim D10 ("A person takes the world to be as he has found it to be.") These are logical relationships, not historical.]

This is the paradigm case of becoming. Of course, not all instances of becoming are paradigm case—there are important "unless" clauses to consider here. And, as we shall see, problems related to becoming can and do arise from apparently straightforward, paradigm case instances. Let's take these maxims one–by–one and note the important variations on the paradigm case.

"**A person becomes what he acts as.**" Not all instances of "acting as ..." are successful. Not all instances of successful "acting as ..." are satisfying, or worth the cost in foregone opportunity; the person may conclude, "I can do this, but it's just not me." (Think of the class clown who succeeds in acting as a serious student for a while, but sees the opportunities for wisecracks and misses the laughs he could have gotten.) Not all instances of "acting as ..." are serious attempts; some are playful, or intentionally experimental. Each of these instances refers to an unless clause for this maxim: "... *unless* acting as an X is unsuccessful, or leads to loss of behavior potential, or is found to be unsatisfying." These unless clauses are particularly relevant for child and adolescent persons, who are constantly trying on ways of being for fit. Problems can arise when the person does not become what he acts as, but is seen by others as being that way, who then treat him as they have found him to be. This is an "incongruent relationship": a person treated as being what he is not and has reason to avoid becoming. "Incongruent relationships" are a major component of problems of becoming and being; we will return to this topic later in this paper.

"A person acts as who he takes himself to be." ... *unless* he lacks the skills, knowledge or capacity to be that, or acting as that leads to loss of behavior potential, or is found to be unsatisfying, in which case he will change who he takes himself to be *if he can*. Problems arise when a person in fact changes who he takes himself to be in the face of insistence from someone in a position to insist, like a parent, or when he cannot change who he takes himself to be because such a change leaves him in an impossible position and is therefore unthinkable. Such

insistence or unthinkability can lead to problems of becoming and being; again, see below.

"A person takes himself to be what he is treated as being." The same unless clauses detailed above apply here, with some additions: *"... unless* he has a stronger reason to be something else, or he doesn't recognize what he is being treated as, for what it is."* Being treated as an X is parallel to Move 1 in a Social Practice, while taking oneself to be what one is treated as is parallel to Move 2; and although "Move 1 invites Move 2" (*Place*, F5), it is also the case that "Move 2 preempts Move 1" (*Place*, F6). The person generally can simply decline the invitation; again, unthinkability and insistence can lead to problems here.

"A person becomes what he is treated as being." This is the overview maxim, dynamically linking who a person is to how he is treated. All the above unless clauses apply, of course. This maxim will serve as our touchstone reminder as we turn to issues of how problems of becoming and being develop.

Becoming Ambivalent

Becoming, although an adventure at times, need not be problematic. Mary is treated as being in a particular status or being a particular sort of person; she is willing and able to be that way; she successfully acts as what she is treated as being, and becomes that. Problems arise when she is either not willing or unable to be that, but cannot simply decline the invitation. As noted above, this can stem from either insistence or unthinkability. Unthinkability seems to be the more severe case; by contrast, insistence, and the resultant issues arising from incongruent relationships, is commonplace. (Can any among us truthfully say that our parents and teachers never insisted on treating us as being persons we were unwilling or unable to be? It happens, about as often as does buying clothes right off the rack that fit perfectly every time.) Accordingly, we will look carefully into the status dynamics of insistence, and leave unthinkability for another time.

Insisting on treating someone as who they cannot be or do not want to be is a straightforward case of coercion. This launches a key dynamic, because:

Coercion elicits resistance.

Coercion—the inappropriate limiting of a person's choices by another person—elicits resistance—a motivation to *not* do whatever you are trying to get me to do. Resistance is a state-of-affairs, and as such can continue over time long after the incident of coercion is gone and even forgotten. (In this way it is parallel to emotions, such as anger, on which see Ossorio, 1997a, pp. 99–161).

So long as all we have in the picture is coercion eliciting resistance, along with my abiding antipathy for being the X you are insisting I be, matters are fairly straightforward: I have two strong reasons for not being X, and that's that. But that is seldom just that. Resistance is a motivation to not do what you are trying to get me to do. Generally, the more and the stronger you push, the stronger my resistance

becomes, and that resistance can be to either being an X, or to you—or, commonly, to both. Thus, I not only resist being the X I don't want to be; I also resist being anything else you are trying to get me to be, including ways of being Y and Z which I both can be and want to he. Furthermore, I may discover on further investigation that I both have the ability to be X, and actually rather like it. (Ways of being, like olives, may be an acquired taste, and tastes can change over time.) So I want to be X, Y or Z while simultaneously wanting to not be X, Y or Z. One way of being, two simultaneous and opposed motivations: I am stuck, and the technical term for this way of being stuck is ambivalence.

Ambivalence has been an acknowledged human dilemma for as long as we have records of these things. The Roman poet Catullus wrote about ambivalence in the first century B.C.E.:

> I hate and love at the same time,
>
> For heaven's sake, Catullus, how?

Freud directed the attention of therapists toward anxiety as the root of problems in psychodynamics. In doing so, he directed our attention away from the root of problems in status dynamics, namely, ambivalence. I suspect that problems rooted in ambivalence may be as common as problems rooted in anxiety, if not more so.

People will go to remarkable lengths to avoid experiencing ambivalence. This is not surprising, in light of the discussion earlier in this paper of feelings as Actor's knowledge of place. If a person is ambivalent about being X, she has two feelings about it simultaneously, that is, she finds herself in two different places at once *vis–à–vis* being X—a disorienting place to be—or else finds herself literally nowhere at all. Either way, she has no place from which to be or act, no behavior potential in any situation involving being an X, and therefore no way to improve her situation. Not surprisingly, people tend to avoid experiencing their ambivalence at almost any cost.

What to do? On the face of it, it would seem that the thing to do is just to bite the bullet, choosing "to be or not to be" and then just do it. But experience shows that it is seldom that easy. After the initial burst of energy that comes from doing something (almost anything is better than being nowhere) we often see discouragement and loss of enthusiasm for the chosen pole; eventually the person winds up back where he started, stuck worse than ever. This happens because "just choosing" ignores the central reality of ambivalence—both poles are *legitimate* but opposed aspects of the person's motivations. Treating oneself as being one of the poles of the ambivalence is a form of self–coercion—and coercion elicits resistance. Putting energy into one of the poles of ambivalence strengthens the other pole, which is then acted on, which thus strengthens its opposite, which ... The person is well and truly stuck.

Unresolved ambivalence often leads to incongruent relationships of a particularly troublesome sort. Gil is ambivalent about being an independent, self–determined individual. He presents himself as dependent to Jill who, taking him as she finds him to be, treats him as dependent. Jill has now inadvertently taken on one of the poles of Gil's ambivalence. The more she treats him as dependent (unknowingly coercing him by doing so), the stronger becomes his resistance, and therefore his motivation to act on being independent. Gil had improved his situation; the ambivalence is now in the relationship, not within him, and he has a clear place and way to be. Jill can take Gil as she now finds him, treat him as independent, and thereby strengthen his dependence pole, which he then acts upon, and then round and around we go; or she can insist that Gil is really as she first found him to be, thereby getting really locked into his ambivalence. This later is especially powerful when Jill herself is ambivalent about the same X as Gil; then both act out the opposite pole of the other's ambivalence for them. The relationship is profoundly incongruent—both Gil and Jill regularly treat the other as being what he or she is not and has reason to avoid becoming—but it beats being nowhere, at least for a while.

This sheds some additional light on why people who lose important relationships may wind up in pretty poor shape for a while: in addition to losing the behavior potential involved in relating to Jill, poor Gil is now stuck once again with both poles of his ambivalence. Gil may immediately seek someone else to take on one of his poles for him; failing that, he may seek therapy, where he just may get his therapist to jump in and take on one of the poles. Again, almost anything is better than being stuck with both poles of one's own ambivalence.

A therapist engaged with an ambivalent client is well advised to avoid buying into either pole of the ambivalence (unless, like Fritz Perls, you decide to use coercion and resistance as dynamite to blow up the client's self-sustaining system, which at least makes for exhilarating therapy.) Treat the person as they actually are—that is, as ambivalent. This gives them a place to be from which to act, and therefore to become, without resistance. The route out of ambivalence appears to lie, not in acting it out, but in seeing your way clear of it.

Becoming Stuck

"Becoming" has two related but different meanings. Up to now, we have been dealing with "becoming" in its developmental sense—what a person becomes (and therefore is able to be) over time as the result of his capacity and relevant history. In these instances of "becoming" a person changes her Personal Characteristics and/or Identity. Let's now turn to the second sense of "becoming": what a person becomes in a given situation based on who she is and what opportunities and requirements exist in the situation. In these instances of "becoming" a person manifests her Personal Characteristics and/or Identity. Along the way, we will look at how some other problems of becoming commonly arise.

Persons are far more complex than we ordinarily give them credit for. In particular, people are capable of becoming an astonishing variety of versions of themselves, given the right circumstances. We can capture some of that complexity in the following maxim:

5. A person becomes what the situation calls for him to be.

Since this is a maxim rather than a law of nature, we won't be dismayed to find a person *not* becoming an X when the situation calls for it; we will, however, look for an explanation. The person may have stronger reason to become something else that the situation gives her opportunity to become; she may lack the capacity to become an X; she may have stronger reasons to avoid becoming X; she may mistakenly think she has become an X; she may take it that the situation calls for her to become a Z. Our paradigm case, nonetheless, is as the maxim states.

This maxim is particularly relevant in understanding what goes on in communities and organizations. "The situation" is shorthand for the more complex "his place in the current on-going practice(s) of his community." Since place paradigmatically is known by the Actor as feelings, without any particular reflection or thought, this "becoming what is called for" typically occurs with a kind of automatic regularity which can surprise or even dismay the Observer/Appraiser. ("I promised myself I wouldn't let myself get sucked into being the bad guy again, and before I knew it ...") Therapists and Organizational Consultants in particular recognize the difficulty in translating good intentions (i.e., what the Observer/Appraiser wants) into reality (what the Actor sees as called for and therefore becomes.) It is a commonplace occurrence: people get well and truly "stuck" in becoming as Actors what they (Observer/Appraiser) really do not want to be.

How, then, can we help a person get "unstuck"? As suggested above in "Being and Versions," we do so by inviting her into a different status altogether, or by successfully redefining the status she is already becoming. Since we are dealing with Actors here, this invitation or redefinition needs to take place while the Actor is engaged, not merely through engaging the Observer/Appraiser. There are two basic approaches:

1. We can invite her into a different status altogether by changing "the current on-going practice" to a new or alternative version of the practice. This requires the involvement and perhaps the cooperation of others in the community, who, via Move 1 or Move 2, enact the practice differently. This might be called the "family therapist" or "community dynamics" approach—change what people become ("the versions of the people that show up") by changing the practices they engage in.

2. We can successfully redefine the status she is already becoming by arranging for her to observe it being enacted differently, and then supporting her in practicing the new way until she can become it readily. This could be called the "coaching"

approach, and might well involve the coach in modeling the different enactment of the status.

Neither of these is likely to work well, however, when the person is stuck in "symbolic hangover." In this case, the person sees the current situation as being symbolically similar to some *earlier* situation, and therefore becomes what that earlier situation called for him to become. (As always with symbolic behavior, we are not assuming the person is consciously aware of the similarity, merely that he in fact acts on it.) Here we need the therapist's repertoire, as extensively delineated in the canon of status dynamic therapy, to engage the Observer/Appraiser as well as the Actor.

Becoming Me

I would like to conclude this consideration of Becoming by briefly revisiting some considerations of Identity. If becoming is a work in progress, it is perhaps best understood as a work of art. Each of us is creating our own Identity; to put it differently, each of us is actively engaged in a life–long process of becoming ... *me*. Not all works of art succeed, of course, even by their own lights; not all journeys of becoming result in greater clarity and certainty regarding who I am. But clarity and certainty are the paradigm case, and are the standards by which we ultimately appraise our creation of self. "Who am I?" is the core question of Identity. "I am me" is the core answer, both signifying that we have arrived at the boundary of that inquiry, and positively affirming there is no further point to asking the question.

But if a person can assert, "I am me" with clarity and certainty, what room is there for "becoming"? Haven't we already become what we are, and from here on it's just a matter of playing out the hand, so to speak? Does our creation of self, our active journey of becoming, end in effect when we no longer need to ask, "Who am I?"

No—far from it. The journey of becoming has hardly begun when Identity is certain and clear. Recall Ossorio's provocative distinction between "the vulgarly 'actual' and ... the actually possible." (Ossorio, 1982/1998, p. 106). "Me"—who I am at core to myself—includes both me as an actual colleague, and me as a possible friend. In becoming what is possible for me (again quoting Ossorio, "not *merely* possible, but *actually* possible") I am not changing who I am; I am actualizing ("making actual") who I am. Becoming, then, can be either a process of discovery or a process of self–actualization—and sometimes it is both.

One last point: does Identity itself change for an adult person whose Identity is clear and certain? It can, if the person's "actual possibilities" change. For example, if you have held yourself as ineligible for certain statuses in your community—say, entrepreneur or parent—and see someone like you successfully enacting those ways of being, you may change your view of your possibilities and thereby your view of who you are. Or if you encounter someone who is being in the world in ways

you never before imagined possible (as Carlos Casteneda famously did in the person of Don Juan) and if you become convinced that these ways of being are possible for you, your core Identity—me, who I am—can change dramatically. In matters of becoming, perhaps our final word should be to echo the great Yogi, who said: "It ain't over, till it's over."

Belonging

Issues of "belonging" has received considerable attention from Descriptive Psychologists. Since the early germinal articles on Community and Culture (Putman, 1981; Ossorio, 1982/83) a substantial body of literature has addressed issues of persons in community, in organizations, in various cultures and in cultural transition, along with questions of how best to lead and/or change organizations. This paper acknowledges and applauds this body of literature. Again, it is clear that Ossorio intended from the beginning to include such issues within the purview of Descriptive Psychology, since talk of participating in social practices is found in his earliest writings (e.g., Persons). The fact that we are continuing to explore basic issues of becoming over thirty years later speaks both to the importance, as well as to the complexity, of the topic. In this paper, I wish to articulate some aspects of belonging which connect directly to being and becoming, and again, some of this is familiar ground to Descriptive Psychologists, while some perhaps is not.

Being and Belonging

Being and belonging are connected in the deepest possible way. To be is to be "conscious as" the status one is being at the time. To be a particular status is to have a place within the social practices of a particular community. Thus, consciousness—that most personal and individual aspect of a person's identity—is directly and inextricably connected to the most public aspect of identity, one's place in the social practices of the community.

But this directly contradicts common opinion. Being—especially being one's own authentic self—is frequently portrayed in our culture as in conflict with belonging. One's place in the social practices of one's community is seen as confining or restricting; one's consciousness of that place is portrayed as predominantly the awareness of "this is not me, this is other people's ideas of who I should be." Becoming conscious of "the real me" seems to require rejecting one's place in the community and finding one's own place. This is a conflict experienced by virtually every adolescent in our culture, and a not insignificant number of adults as well.

What are we to make of this apparent contradiction? Must one choose between "being myself" and belonging—and, indeed, can that choice actually be made? If so, how; if not, what is one to do instead? To address these questions, we need to

take a somewhat extended look at the dynamics of communities, to see some important conceptual and actual connections between communities and their individual members.

A community begins with a shared, specific view of the world. Our world is a world in which ... (fill in the blank)—the spontaneous creation of art is the only worthwhile occupation; the spirit of God manifests in every particular; we make automobiles which are accessible to the masses instead of just to the rich; we recreate as closely as possible the life and times of medieval Europe without the nasty bits; etc. ad infinitum. It is easy to talk about the world as being a particular way; what makes a group of people a community is that these people actually *see* the world this way and succeed in treating it that way. Thus, they share this view of the world; they have ways of talking about their world in which they can make the relevant distinctions; they have shared practices, ways of treating the world and each other, that are cases of acting upon their view of the world; and they choose to participate in these practices with no further end in mind.

Let's examine the dynamics of community life by tracking the (wholly fictitious) history of an equally fictitious community—the Children of God. (Again, no reference to any actual community known by this name or known by any other name is intended in any way whatsoever.) The Children of God began in what might be called a shared revelation. One person saw the world as a place where God manifests in every moment and in every particular; as such, she experienced herself as a child of God. She talked about this with another person, who had a similar view; they interacted with others who came to see the world as they did; and the community of the Children of God was born. To reiterate a very important point: the community began with a shared view of the world; its members actually saw and experienced the world and themselves as manifestations of God.

Members of this community talked with each other about their world and their place in it; quickly they found that particular phrases seemed to convey aspects of their experience very well, and so these became a common way of talking. Since being a child of God is a paradigm case of good fortune, and good fortune calls for celebration, they found that many of their activities when they were together had a celebratory aspect; even such simple things as eating together were opportunities for celebration. The first few times they did a particular thing together were spontaneous expressions of how they viewed the world and each other; these worked so well that they tended to repeat them. Thus, the community's language and practices began to form.

Over time some of the practices became core practices, participated in by everyone in clearly understood ways in which everyone knew the available options, and everyone could enact their place accordingly. Thus customs were born—consistent versions of how to do the core practices, and how to be as you were doing them. Some of these were so central, and so often repeated (especially the celebrations) that they became rituals, always done just so; participation in

these required very specific enactment, and therefore the places in them were codified into roles. And they worked; each time the members participated in the core practices in the customary way, or took a role in a ritual enactment, they experienced the satisfaction that accompanies participating in an intrinsic practice, and they experienced their world and themselves as manifestations of God.

As they reflected on their experience and discussed their interactions, as people are wont to do, the Children of God noticed that some versions of their practices seemed particularly satisfying, while others seemed less so or even off the mark entirely. They were able to account for these differences by noting certain features; these became formulated as principles which served as effective standards when they were called upon to assess their own behavior, or the behavior of others (which became more and more necessary as more and more people joined this community).

Here we have the picture of the community of the Children of God in springtime, so to speak: a group of people who share a view of the world; who know how to treat the world and each other in accordance with that view; who can talk among themselves about their world and make the relevant distinctions; who have customary practices and places within them, as well as rituals and roles, in which they participate with great satisfaction; who have shared principles which accurately reflect how and why their world and their interactions are as they are; who know and embrace their place in the life of their community. This is truly the golden age of the Children of God.

Let us now fast-forward many years to the present. The Children of God still exist as a community, but there have been some changes. The community has accumulated physical wealth and property over time; there are buildings to maintain, assets to invest, budgets to meet. People have joined the community for the specific purpose of dealing with this wealth and property, and while they know and respect the principles and rituals ... well, it's not so easy to see everything as a manifestation of God while simultaneously running credit checks and cutting costs, so for some key people in the Children of God, the world is mostly a place of numbers and balance sheets. Everyone still knows exactly how to participate in the rituals, and knows how to enact their role in them. The customs are so ingrained that few people even recognize the possibility of alternative versions of the practices. The principles have become articles of faith which are memorized by new members. But for many people something is missing. Rituals and customs are simply the done thing; it seems that nobody actually experiences them as cases of acting on seeing the world as a manifestation of God, although many still get the satisfaction of participating in an intrinsic practice, since "Satisfaction accompanies participation." The language which once described so accurately the experience of the Children of God is now just formula, empty phrases which mostly show that we know how one of us talks. The principles which once served to keep us focused and

aligned are now at best lofty aspirations; at worst they serve as sticks with which we beat dissidents into line.

What is missing here is—the world. The Children of God still know the roles and rituals and principles; they know how to act and how to be, as one of us. They may even know the world as an arena for lofty aspiration. What they no longer know is the world as a place where God manifests in every particular. They know themselves as Children of God; they no longer know themselves as a child of God. This is the autumn of the Children of God, and like the seasons, it comes naturally in the life of a community. People are born, grow, age and die; communities arise, thrive, decline and eventually fall—but unlike people, communities have at least the possibility of being reborn.

Then into the autumn of this community a child is born. Judith grows up as one of the Children of God; she learns the customs and rituals and language of her community, and comes to know her place and how to enact it. And indeed these practices are intrinsic for her; she experiences satisfaction in her participation. Until one day she notices that something is missing. She finds herself just going through the motions; she gets no satisfaction from participation in her community, in fact she finds herself chafing under the restrictions of her role. Her primary consciousness in this community is "this is not me, this is other people's ideas of who I should be." She reads books on alienation, and finds she fits the description; discussing existentialism with her classmates leads her to decide she needs to search for her "authentic self." It's a short step from here to "I can't be part of the Children of God and still be me. I live in a different world from the Children of God."

So here we are, back where we started. But now we have a little more context for understanding this dilemma. The world as known to Judith differs from the world as depicted by the Children of God. This could be because her upbringing was faulty; she got the moves down but never saw the point of them, in which case she needs someone in the community to help her see the world as we Children of God see it. Or it could be that the customs and roles of this community contain restrictions on how a person like Judith can participate, which were common and acceptable back when the customs evolved but which are not found in other communities she participates in today and which she finds too confining; in that case, she may need to find an alternative community where these restrictions are not customary, or else work actively within the Children of God to legitimize alternative versions of these customary practices in which the roles are more suited to her. Both of these cases assume the community and its world continues to thrive.

But there is another case, which I believe accounts for the common opinion that being and belonging are antagonists. Judith's world differs from the world depicted by the Children of God because the world depicted by the Children of God is no longer in fact the world they share. The practices, language, customs, roles, principles, etc. all developed as ways of being and acting in a world in which God

manifests in every particular, but the Children of God no longer actually see the world that way. There in fact is no world within which Judith's role has its place; small wonder, then that she finds it impossible to be herself in that role. What is required here is nothing less than the rebirth of her community, either a revitalization in which the members rediscover how to see the world as a manifestation of God in all particulars so that the practices etc. once again fit the world, or else a reformation in which the roles, principles, customs, etc. are revamped to express the world as the Children of God have now come to see it. If neither of these happen, Judith is left with either finding a new community is which she can in fact be her authentic self, or else settling for ways of being which she knows to be inauthentic (but which she nonetheless sees as better than nothing, or constant struggle.)

We can summarize the relation between being and belonging in two maxims:

- Being requires belonging. (This is a pithy paraphrase of *Place* Maxim E1, Ossorio 1982/1998: "A person requires a community on order for it to be possible for him to engage in human behavior at all.") Belonging is not just a matter of knowing how to speak the language, or how to act properly at the right time, or which slogans to quote when, or even being recognized and treated as "one of us;" it is a matter of seeing the world as a member of this community sees it, and acting accordingly.
- Satisfaction accompanies participation. Participation is not just doing the done thing; it is doing what the world as we see it calls for now.

Becoming and Belonging

Let's loop back to the Children of God to examine more closely some of the complexities of belonging. Recall the community member—let's call him John—who has responsibility for budgeting and resource allocation. We observed in passing that it's not so easy to see everything as a manifestation of God while simultaneously running credit checks and cutting costs, so for some key people in the Children of God, like John, the world is mostly a place of numbers and balance sheets. We see this in every community and organization, and not just when we look at the keepers of the numbers; we see it in those who engage with the machines, or the technologies, or the suppliers, or the interpersonal relationships, etc. One aspect of the functioning of the community is, or becomes, central and primary for those engaging with it, so that the world they inhabit is not the world of the community itself, but the much more technical world defined by whatever they engage with the most. What seems at first to be a single community turns out on closer inspection to be a number of more-or-less closely connected tribes, each with its own specific technical view of the community. This is another seemingly inevitable progression in the life of communities which contributes to its fragmentation and decline. But is it a one-way, irreversible trend? Can one be a full

participant in the larger community while effectively engaging in one's technical world? If so, how? If not, then what can keepers of the community do in the face of the continual "war of the worlds" which break out among the tribes? A short walk in John's shoes may shed some light on these important questions.

John became who he is in the Children of God by one of two routes:

1. He was a member of the Children of God who became a specialist in numbers in the course of participating in the life of the community. In this case, he knows—or at least *knew*—the world of the Children of God as well as knowing the world of numbers.
2. He was a numbers specialist who joined the Children of God to take care of the numbers. In this case he knows the world of numbers but may only know *about* the world of the Children of God.

If John joined just to take care of the numbers, the situation is relatively straightforward. He is an outsider. He may be an important, valued person in our community, but he is not and never has been truly one of us because he has never shared in our world. So long as we all keep his outsider standing in mind, and we do not expect him to see and appreciate the world as we do (and so long as there are not so many outsiders that they begin to overwhelm the members) John need not be a problem or pose a threat to the Children of God. Of course, there will be practices in which he cannot participate, especially the core practices; if he wishes to participate fully in the Children of God, John will have to actually become one of us. Since there are usually advantages for someone in John's position being a full member of the community, he may decide to join without actually sharing in our world, but this is not a fundamental dilemma: a community that is not able routinely to distinguish those who share our world from those who are merely pretending will not last long.

At this point I would note again that the Children of God is a convenient fiction, and that none of the preceding considerations depend in any way on the focus of the community being spiritual or religious. This applies to any community or organization, even those whose world consists of customers and products and balance sheets. (Recall that an organization is "a community with a mission," viz. Putman, 1990). Every organization faces the challenge of making the most of the talents and energies of people who have joined the organization in order to succeed at practicing their trade or craft or profession; indeed, most organizations these days appear to be made up mostly of people for whom their primary or even their sole world is their technical world. (C. J. Peek has written elegantly about this distinction between practicing a profession and participating in an organization in the context of health care; see Peek, 1998).

Back to John, the technician outsider. As noted, a few such are not a problem for most communities, but typically it is in the best interests of both the community and John if he actually becomes one of us. How does this happen? The short

answer (and the longer answer is just too long for this paper) is: through involvement that leads to participation. Recall Ossorio's classic image of the chess player. A true member of the chess community plays chess for its own sake; she participates and appreciates the satisfaction that accompanies participation. But when you first begin playing chess, you cannot be doing it for its own sake. You can do it to explore new options, to look intellectual, to win friends or influence your uncle—but you can't straightforwardly play chess for the intrinsic satisfaction of playing chess until you *are* a chess player. And you become a chess player by engaging in chess until you start sharing in the world of chess. In Descriptive Psychology we reserve the terms "participation" and "appreciation" to characterize how it is for full-fledged members of a community; with that reminder, I would offer the following maxim to summarize the dynamics of this "short answer":

Involvement precedes appreciation.

Thus, for John the technical outsider to become "one of us" he needs to become involved in our world—and not just in the technical version of our world he brought with him. As a side note: many organizations today are comprised almost wholly of technical outsiders, clustered in tribes, each convinced that their view of the organization is not only the true view, but the *only* view. The challenge of aligning such an organization—that is, of creating and/or nurturing the world of the whole organizational community—is the most important and perhaps the most difficult challenge facing leaders today. It begins by engaging the entire organization as actors in creating or renewing a shared view of where we are and the future we want to create—but that's the beginning of the long answer, for another time.

But what of the other John, who was once one of us but has become just the keeper of the numbers? How did this happen? And what, if anything, can we do by way of remedy, and to prevent it from happening in the future?

The answer to how it happened is simple—suspiciously, perhaps deceptively, simple. We can answer it with a single slogan (which I am loath to call a maxim, but am not sure if it is a half-baked theory, a quasi-empirical generalization, or a wiseacre observation):

Anything, **done long enough or often enough, becomes intrinsic.**

People famously get locked into baffling, self-defeating or just plain useless habits of acting for which we struggle to give an account. Why do they keep doing it? Maxims like "Better the poison you know than the poison you don't" point to something similar. As Tee Roberts often reminds us, world-construction is a core part of what persons do (Roberts, 1985). John constructs his world largely from the materials at hand; when he engages frequently with a particular set of objects, with their attendant processes and logic, it seems almost inevitable that he constructs a world with these as ultimate particulars. And since part of the purpose of world-construction is to have an arena for significant action, participation in this

world would quite reasonably become intrinsic—especially since John finds others who share his world. (This is a conceptual requirement, not a happy accident; as Don Juan said of Don Genaro: "He makes the world real.")

(I recall sitting with a group of Bell Labs software designers when one of them innocently asked: "I wonder what they actually want out there in Userland?" Everyone chuckled at the nice quip. Then someone talked about trying a module out in Userland; then someone else made a remark about getting out into Userland to find out, and within minutes what had been a clever metaphor had become a real place to these people, as tangible as Kansas and twice as interesting. The human ability to construct and inhabit worlds is vast, and vastly underappreciated.)

So John almost inevitably constructs and occupies his numbers world. But *must* he do this by contrast to, or in exclusion of, the world of the Children of God? The fact that it often happens that way does not require that it always be so. It depends, ultimately, on what John takes to be ultimate. The ultimate object in John's numbers world is a number; the ultimate object in the world of the Children of God is a manifestation of God. John could see a number as simply another manifestation of God; if he succeeds in doing so, he has successfully embedded his numbers world in the greater world of his community—which is the proper relation between the world of a community and the worlds of its tribes. Wise keepers of the community will recognize that John will tend to "backslide," if you will; the logic of numbers is seductive and it is easy to lose track of the bigger picture. But the bigger picture is there, for the community and for John, so with appropriate care and reminders we can keep the integrity of both worlds while not fragmenting or degrading the community itself.

Belonging and Boundary

One last speculation: what are we to make of the boundaries of belonging? At one boundary the person belongs nowhere. He is part of no community; he participates in no practices; he therefore has no behavior potential and experiences no satisfaction. This is a reasonable description of a literal non-person. Being requires belonging; non-belonging implies non-being. This may also be a reasonable depiction of the "unthinkable," the total loss of behavior potential to which even suicide may seem preferable.

What of the other boundary? At this boundary the person belongs everywhere. She is one of us wherever she goes. All her actions are participation; everything she does is accompanied by the deepest satisfaction; she is her authentic self with everyone in every situation. What sort of person might this be? Recall the third part of Satchitananda, the Sanskrit term for the supreme being—Ananda, Supreme Bliss. Might that just be another way of saying constant, deep satisfaction? And is such a state truly possible for a human person? *That* we will definitely leave to the theologians and mystics. There are boundaries, after all—even to Descriptive Psychology.

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Part II

Communities

INTRODUCTION

Raymond M. Bergner

In this section, like the preceding one, our theme will once again be the application of the Descriptive Psychological conceptual system to real world endeavors and problems. In the pages to follow, three authors will bring Descriptive resources to bear in the areas, respectively, of (1) the acculturation of culturally displaced persons, (2) education, and (3) psychotherapy for individuals who are destructively self-critical.

The Acculturation of Culturally Displaced Persons: The Case of Pilipino-Americans

In the opening chapter of this section, Fernand Lubuguin returns to, and enriches, territory that was originally explored by Peter Ossorio and others in Volume 3 of Advances. In that volume, iu a chapter entitled "A Multi-cultural Psychology," Ossorio introduced a broad conceptual framework for the scientific study of cross-cultural phenomena. This framework not only provided a more adequate and rigorous way for approaching such study, but did so in ways that avoided the historical pitfalls of ethnocentrism and cultural determinism.

In the work presented in this section, Lubuguin is concerned with understanding the acculturation of culturally displaced persons. As his particular focus, he has chosen Pilipino-Americans who have come to America voluntarily. In essence, the problem confronting many culturally displaced persons is that of adapting to a new, and often quite different, culture, and of satisfying their basic human needs within this new, host culture. Typically, immigrants have been socialized in a native

culture, and have internalized (among other things) its central, intermediate, and peripheral choice principles (e.g., a central choice principle might be "always act to promote harmony in the group"). Thus, when they act on these choice principles, they are being themselves. In contrast, when they experience some pressure to act counter to them, they are in effect being called upon to act in ways that violate core, internalized principles. That is to say, they are being called upon to violate who they are.

In many cases, however, the new, host culture in which the culturally displaced person finds himself or herself will embody choice principles that conflict with those of the native culture (e.g., "to be successful, one must rise above others and make one's mark in the world"). The immigrant (1) may not understand this new culture; (2) may have the wrong behavioral inclinations since he or she was socialized into a different set of choice principles, social practices, and institutions; and (3) may have the problem, in order to remain true to self, of how to function in a culture with rather different choice principles (e.g., "I am committed to group harmony and preserving the face of others, but now I am told I must compete with and triumph over them"). Such difficulties, it goes without saying, will be important for clinicians and community organizers to understand if they are to assist culturally displaced persons in meeting their basic human needs in their new cultures.

In exploring the phenomenon of acculturation, Lubuguin provides us with an excellent review of core Descriptive concepts and formulations pertaining to cross-cultural issues and, employing these, an excellent description of the plight of the culturally displaced person. Subsequent to this review and analysis, he reports results from a study designed to test a number of hypotheses concerning the process of acculturation in first and second generation Pilipinos, with a focus on changes in Choice Principles of varying degrees of centrality. Results in general were supportive of an "Attraction Model" of acculturation, a model whose central tenet is that culturally displaced persons are attracted to the possibility of undergoing personal change that would render them full members of the host culture as quickly as possible.

Kids Interest Discovery Studies (KIDS KITS): A Descriptive Psychology Perspective

In this chapter, Catherine Felknor decries the ability of the vast majority of our current educational practices to prepare children to learn independently and competently. In concert with a host of educational critics whom she cites, Felknor contends that our current curricular practices remain far too passive, teacher-directed, and focused on activities like memorization of facts. Furthermore, she asserts, these practices are by and large directed toward outcomes of dubious perceived value to students. She maintains that such emphases do not lend

themselves to students becoming self-directed learners; i.e., individuals who are able to take questions, issues, and topics of importance to them, and to address them competently and independently.

Moving from critical matters to constructive ones, Felknor describes a recently-developed educational program, the "KIDS-KITS" program, that is designed to be far more effective in enabling children to become self-directed learners. Viewing such learning as a core life skill, she invokes the Descriptive maxim that "a person acquires concepts and skills, archetypally, by practice and experience in one or more of the social practices which call for the use of (and offer opportunities for the use of) that concept or skill" (Ossorio, 1982/1998 p. 9). Thus, rather than have children listen passively to a teacher, KIDS-KITS actively involves them in social practices such as reading, calculating, logically analyzing, debating, searching for relevant information, negotiating with others, and more. Further, all of this active participation is directed toward the achievement of some goal of perceived value to the student. It is purposeful, and clearly so, to students. It does not leave them in the predicament of one alienated student who lamented, "Why am I learning algebra; they say it's important but I can't see the point; I'll never use this stuff in my life."

At the conclusion of her description, Felknor presents results of a research study on the efficacy of the KIDS-KITS program. These results support the contention that KIDS-KITS is a more adequate, and in the bargain involving and satisfying, way to conduct the all-important business of educating our children to become competent, independent learners and problem-solvers.

A Therapeutic Approach to Destructive Self-Criticism

One of the more important and widely-used conceptualizations in Descriptive Psychology is the Actor-Observer-Critic formulation of human self-regulation (Ossorio, 1976, 1981). In this chapter, Raymond Bergner focuses on one aspect of this formulation, that of critic function. The basic premise of his chapter is that the hallmark of successful criticism is that it benefit the behaving individual who is the subject of the criticism (Ossorio, 1976). To this end, the job of the critic is taken to be (a) to recognize and appreciate when things are going right, and leave them alone, and (b) to recognize when they are going wrong, and generate useful diagnoses and prescriptions for change (Ossorio, 1976, 1981). Thus, if they are to participate as fully and effectively in life as possible, it is in the strong best interests of persons to become the most competent critics of themselves that they are capable of becoming.

When it comes to criticizing themselves, however, countless individuals characteristically fail to do so in ways that are beneficial. Instead, they resort to self-critical practices that are not merely unhelpful, but actually quite injurious. In many cases, the extent of this injury is so great that the practices may be considered pathogenic; i.e., they engender significant restrictions in the ability of these persons

to participate in the social practices of their communities (Ossorio, 1985). To borrow a phrase from Freud, these practices severely damage the ability of individuals "to love and to work."

Such destructive, even pathogenic, self-criticism is the subject of Bergner's chapter. In this chapter, he first describes the most commonly observed patterns of such criticism and notes their consequences. Second, he provides a set of therapeutic interventions for helping persons to abandon debilitating self-critical patterns in favor of more effective and constructive alternatives. Third and finally, he relates some helpful responses to common resistances and obstacles that clients present. In the end, this chapter provides a comprehensive, Descriptive Psychologically based, approach to the diagnosis and treatment of destructive self-criticism.

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THE ACCULTURATION OF CULTURALLY DISPLACED PERSONS:

THE CASE OF PILIPINO-AMERICANS

Fernand San Andres Lubuguin

ABSTRACT

This study examined the phenomenon of acculturation among Pilipino-American immigrants. The phenomenon of acculturation was defined as the achievement by a Culturally Displaced Person of a change in Person Characteristics, as the result of living in the new host culture, in the direction of the Person Characteristics of the Standard Normal Person of the host culture. A broad, systematic, and culturally universal conceptualization of acculturation, based on the Descriptive Psychology approach, explicated the concepts of Culture, the Standard Normal Person, the Culturally Displaced Person, Basic Human Needs, and Acculturation. A hierarchy of Choice Principles (or value statements, policies, and slogans) consisting of three levels (Central, Intermediate, and Peripheral) was formulated. In general, a person acts on Central Choice Principles (CCP's) by acting on some Intermediate Choice Principles (ICP's), which in turn are implemented by acting on some Peripheral Choice Principles (PCP's). The Attraction Model and the Conflict Model were developed to account for the nature of the acculturation process. This study tested the following hypotheses that were generated from the conflict model: (a) PCP's would change more readily than

ICP's, which in turn would change more readily than CCP's; (b) high conflict PCP's would change sooner than low conflict PCP's; (c) for the first generation immigrant, at least one CCP would increase in importance and would be transmitted to subsequent generations; (d) the endorsement of the host culture's PCP's and ICP's would increase across generations; and (e) the CCP's across generations were less likely to change and change less than ICP's and PCP's. Cultural analyses of Pilipino and American cultures provided the basis for specifying the particular choice principles that were examined. The Perspectives Questionnaire was created and utilized to assess the levels of endorsement of the particular American and Pilipino choice principles. This questionnaire was administered to first and second generation Pilipino-Americans, as well as a group of Anglo-Americans. The comparisons within and between these groups yielded results that generally supported the hypotheses and conceptualization. However, the pattern of results suggested that the attraction model was more applicable than the conflict model in this population.

INTRODUCTION

Acculturation in its many dimensions and derivatives has been studied extensively since the turn of the century. Various conceptualizations of acculturation have been formulated through the years. However, the concept of acculturation remains ambiguous since there are numerous definitions of acculturation in the literature. An adequate codification of the process of change in adapting to a new culture remains to be done.

The lack of theoretical clarity and consensus about acculturation is particularly salient in the context of recent demographic trends around the world, and especially in the United States. This limitation is particularly problematic given the very large and growing number of people to whom it potentially applies. The rates and volume of people who emigrate and settle in the U.S. are quite substantial. According to the 1990 census, Asian-Americans are the fastest growing ethnic minority population. Moreover, Pilipino-Americans[1] are currently the largest Asian-American population in California and the second largest foreign born group

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[1]None of the major Philippine languages has an "f" sound. Accordingly, the people refer to their country as "Pilipinas" (Philippines), and themselves as "Pilipinos" (masculine) or "Pilipinas" (feminine). This study will use the English term "Philippines" when referring to the country, the native term "Pilipinos" when referring to those in the Philippines, and "Pilipino-Americans" when referring to those in the United States.

in the U.S. About 19 percent of Asian-Americans in the U.S., or 1.4 million people are of Pilipino heritage.

The substantial presence of Pilipino-Americans in the U.S. is rooted in strong historical ties between the Philippines and the U.S. The earliest United States immigrants from the Philippines were Pilipino sailors who settled along what is now the Louisiana coast during the period of Spanish control in the mid 1700's (Pido, 1985). Large scale migration of Pilipinos began after the U.S. acquired and colonized the Philippine Islands in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War.

Since the turn of the century, there have been three distinct periods of immigration (Vallangca, 1987). The first, ending in 1934, consisted primarily of young, unmarried, and unskilled males who were recruited as farm laborers in California and Hawaii. The rest of these immigrants were men who enlisted in the U.S. navy as stewards, or men who were students (called pensionados) supported by the U.S. government or church related groups (Pido, 1985). The second period from 1934 to the mid-1960's was a time of curtailed immigration as U.S. legislation established a quota system based on national origin. The third period was precipitated by the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act which attracted urban, educated, and professional Pilipinos to the U.S. From 1968 until the early 1980's, the Philippines led all Asian countries in the number of new immigrants. Between 1980 and 1990, Pilipino-Americans increased their numbers by 81.6 percent, or more than 600,000 people. These tremendous rates of immigration have led to the current status of Pilipino-Americans in the U.S. as the second largest foreign born Asian-American group.

Despite the long history of Pilipinos in the U.S., not much is known about the pressures and changes they have undergone as a result of living in this country. (In contrast, there is a comparatively extensive general literature on Chinese- and Japanese-Americans.) Because of the size of the Pilipino-American population, understanding the group has significant implications for many U.S. social institutions, including education, labor, social services, and mental health. For these institutions to serve Pilipino-Americans properly, more must be known about the psychological characteristics of this ethnic group.

In general, the literature concerning Pilipino-Americans has been consistently inadequate. In particular, there have been no studies heretofore examining acculturation among Pilipino-Americans. Even the literature on acculturation among Asian-American groups in general is sparse. The body of knowledge about acculturation among Asian-Americans includes studies that have examined its relationship with stress (Brown, 1982; Padilla, Wagatsuma, & Lindholm, 1985; Yu & Harburg, 1980, 1981; Yu, 1984), personality characteristics (Sue & Kirk, 1972), utilization of counseling services (Atkinson & Gim, 1989; Atkinson, Whiteley, & Gim, 1990; Gim, Atkinson, & Whiteley, 1990; Gim, Atkinson, & Kim, 1991), second language acquisition (Young & Gardner, 1990), values concerning occupations (Leong & Tata, 1990), and treatment approaches (Sue & Morishima,

1982; Sue & Sue, 1990). With regard to measures of acculturation, the Suinn–Lew Asian Self–Identity Acculturation Scale (Suinn, Rickard–Figueroa, Lew, & Vigil, 1987) is the only existing acculturation scale for Asian–Americans.

The purpose of the present study is both theoretical and practical. First, it will provide a systematic conceptualization of acculturation. The conceptualization provides a model that yields predictions as to how the process of acculturation will proceed, in general. The predictions are studied empirically for the case of Pilipino immigrants in American culture. In view of the dearth of literature on Pilipino–American acculturation, the data itself is an additional valuable outcome of the study.

CRITIQUE OF THE CLOSELY RELATED LITERATURE

There is apparently no existing literature concerning the acculturation of Pilipino–Americans. The literature critique therefore reviewed two closely related topics, i.e., the models and theories of acculturation, and the acculturation of other Asian–American groups.

Upon reviewing the various studies, it seems clear that on the whole the studies heretofore have been limited in the conceptualization of acculturation. In general, the conceptualizations have dealt with aspects other than the process of change itself. These aspects include the political, social, and cultural context; the factors that affect the rate and extent of acculturation; the effects of character and role structures; and the general classifications of acculturative change. In all cases, the nature of the process of acculturation itself is not clearly conceptualized.

Furthermore, there is tremendous variability in the definition of acculturation across all of the studies reviewed. Some definitions amount to referring to whatever happens when groups of individuals of different cultures come into continuous direct contact (Dohrenwend & Smith, 1962; Kim, 1988; Berry, 1991; and Feldman & Rosenthal, 1990). Other definitions generally refer to the changes in a person's behavior, values, and culture from their native cultural group toward the standard of the host cultural group (Weinstock, 1974; Padilla, 1980; Smither, 1982; Wong–Rieger & Quintana, 1987; Naidoo & Davis, 1988; and Blanchard, 1991). Another general definition amounts to the process of adaption and/or accommodation to a new cultural context (Szapocznik & Kurtines, 1980; and Kagan, 1981). In addition to the tremendous variability in both the conceptualization and definition of acculturation, the distinction between the outcome of acculturation and the process of acculturation is not always clearly described, if at all.

With regard to the operationalization of acculturation, the logical relationship between the conceptionalization and the empirical measure of acculturation is

generally weak, and occasionally questionable. The dimensions that are measured by the various instruments are not always clearly related to the dimensions outlined in the conceptualization (Weinstock, 1974; and Feldman & Rosenthal, 1990). Furthermore, in one case the operationalization does not clearly distinguish between behaviors, preferences, values, and attitudes (Padilla, 1985).

The scope and generalizability of these various models and theories of acculturation is generally limited. Many of them are based on a specific culture or ethnic group (Weinstock, 1974; Padilla, 1980; Szapocznik & Kurtines, 1980; and Kagan, 1981). Some are based on Western cultures or urban settings (Dohrenwend & Smith, 1962; Weinstock, 1974; Kagan, 1981; and Smither, 1982). One model was developed within the framework of a particular type of migrating group, i.e., immigrants and not refugees or sojourners (Weinstock, 1974). Several are modifications or enhancements of preexisting limited–scope theories of human behavior, and as such are limited in scope and/or explanatory power (Weinstock, 1974; Kagan, 1981; Garza & Gallegos, 1985; and Kim, 1988).

In all cases, a central premise is the cultural adjustment model which has clinical implications regarding acculturative stress, maladjustment, and cultural dominance and subordination. Bochner (1986) elaborated on the shortcomings of the clinical–adjustment model of coping with unfamiliar cultures in the following ways. First, the model "has ethnocentric overtones in its insistence that newcomers should adjust to the dominant culture, with the implication that their original culture is inferior, and should be renounced" (p. 348). He referred to this process as assimilation. Second, "the adjustment approach, with its clinical emphasis on intra–psychic determinants of behavior, stigmatizes those who do not readily adjust to their new environment, in the same way as the medical model stigmatizes psychiatric patients in implying that there is something wrong with the people who are unable or unwilling to behave in a conventional manner" (p. 348). Finally, "the process of adjustment and its goal of assimilation represents at best a pseudo–solution to what is undoubtedly a genuine problem, that life was not meant to be easy for the cross–cultural traveler" (p. 348).

On the whole, these limitations in the acculturation literature clearly indicate the need for a broad and systematic conceptualization, which would clarify the nature of the phenomenon and provide clear guidelines for how to study it. The Descriptive Psychology approach appears to have the characteristics needed to support an adequate conceptualization of acculturation and related phenomena (Aylesworth & Ossorio, 1983; Lasater, 1983; Ossorio, 1983; Silva, 1983).

CONCEPTUALIZATION

The Descriptive Psychology literature provides resources for conceptualizing acculturation, the background phenomena within which it occurs, related

phenomena, and factors affecting these phenomena. The primary concept involved is the *Culturally Displaced Person*. Aylesworth and Ossorio (1983) defined a culturally displaced person as one who must live in a culture (the "host culture") which is different from the culture in which that person has been primarily socialized (the "native culture" or "culture of origin"). In the case of the immigrant, a person voluntarily moves to a new country, with or without their family. Upon arrival, the person has to somehow come to terms with a new way of life and manage living in the new culture, in order to survive at all. One common, but not exclusive, way of managing is to become more like a member of the host culture. However, for various and obvious reasons this task is not easily achieved. Immigrants may or may not regard themselves as one of them; that is, they may or may not identify with the new culture. In adapting to the new culture, the immigrant may manage for better or worse, and may learn more or less about the new culture.

A central concept in the phenomenon described above is acculturation. In this study, *acculturation* is defined as follows. A culturally displaced person may, as a result of living in the host culture, undergo a change in Person Characteristics in the direction of the Person Characteristics of the Standard Normal Person of the host culture. When this phenomenon occurs, it is called acculturation. As an achievement by the person and a change in the person, acculturation varies in terms of degrees. The process of acculturation is called *acculturating*. The broader background conceptualization will be described below.

A Parametric Analysis of Culture

Primarily, in order to understand how persons adjust to a new culture, we must first understand how persons function in culture in general; which in turn requires us to primarily understand the concept of culture per se. Accordingly, this investigation will use a Descriptive Psychology approach to articulate the concept of culture and the phenomenon of persons behaving in a cultural context, and to empirically examine the course of adaptation to a new culture.

Descriptive Psychology provides a conceptual device that can be used as part of an approach to understanding culture and how persons function within culture. A Parametric Analysis is a conceptual–notational device that allows us to formulate the possibilities of what a phenomenon could be and still be a thing of that kind. As defined by Ossorio (1983), to give a parametric analysis of a given domain is to specify the ways in which one particular (or kind) within that domain can, as such, be the same as another such particular (or kind) or different from it. Thus, a parametric analysis of culture would specify the relevant set of parameters for culture.

Particular cultures (or groups or classes of cultures) are characterized by specifying values for the parameters in greater or lesser detail. In turn, these

parametric values are the basis for making explicit similarities and/or differences among cultures.

The articulation of the concept of culture gives us an essential resource for understanding how persons function in their native cultures, and this in turn provides a basis for understanding how displaced persons function in other cultures.

A parametric analysis of culture is given as follows:

$$\text{<Cu>} = \text{<WOL>} = \text{<M, W, S, L, SP, CP>}$$

where
  Cu   = Culture
  WOL= Way of Living
  M   = Members (Participants)
  W   = World
  S   = Statuses
  L   = Language
  SP   = Social Practices
  CP   = Choice Principles

Ossorio (1983) described these parameters as follows:

Members

These are the individuals who have participated or currently participate or will participate in the particular culture. In general cultures outlive individuals, thereby the membership of a culture includes the historical totality of members and not merely the current participants.

World

This parameter refers to the context, structure, and principles of the world as it is understood. This includes (a) the place of the community in the world, (b) the history of the community, including its relations and interactions with other communities, and (c) the past, present, and (in principle) future history of the world.

Statuses

This parameter reflects the social structure which involves the differentiation and meshing of activities, standards, and values among different sets of individuals. This social structure can be articulated in terms of statuses.

Social Practices

This term refers to the repertoire of behavior patterns which in a given culture constitute what there is for the members to do. "Social practice" also refers to the

various ways in which a given behavior pattern can be done. Some instances of social practices are having dinner, reading the newspaper, and attending an artistic performance. In general, social practices are components of organized sets or structures of social practices, the latter being referred to as institutions or organizations. Examples of the latter include raising a family, passing laws, educating children, engaging in commerce, and so on. Social practices are either intrinsic or non-intrinsic. An intrinsic social practice is one that can be understood as being engaged in without ulterior motives and without a further end in view. Non-intrinsic social practices are social practices which are not intrinsic. Most institutions generally operate like intrinsic social practices in that people do not generally need reasons to raise families, pass laws, educate their children, and so on; rather, that is simply what one does unless one has a reason not to.

Language

Every culture has at least one language spoken by its members.

Choice Principles

A social practice is a behavior pattern which has a hierarchical structure that reflects the multiplicity of stages and of options through which a person can engage in that social practice. Choices are inevitable since, on any given occasion, a social practice must be done in *one* of the ways it can be done. These choices are usually within the organizational or institutional level, (e.g., one has to make various choices in the course of raising a family). Cultural choice principles are more or less normative and provide guidelines for choosing behaviors in such a way as to express and preserve the coherence of human life as *we* (the members of the culture) live it and (generally) to preserve the stability of the social structure. Choice principles apply to the choice of a social practice to engage in, as well as the choice of options within a practice. Thus, they apply at all levels of cultural participation. Choice principles are generally articulated in the form of value statements, or policies, or slogans, or maxims and mottos, or in scenarios such as myths and fables. Choice principles are most commonly articulated in value terms, and most directly expressed in policy terms; however, any of the forms described above will qualify. Accordingly, the delineation of the choice principles of a specific culture is particularly well suited to portray "the essence" or "the spirit" of that culture and distinguish it from others.

By giving this parametric analysis of culture, we have articulated the phenomenon of culture as such and provided a conceptual framework within which we can now describe how persons function in a cultural context.

The Standard Normal Person

To illustrate how a person functions in culture, we can introduce the notion of a *Standard Normal Person* in a given culture. A standard normal person is someone

who does nothing more than successfully enact (culturally) appropriate choices on appropriate occasions – someone who merely "does what the situation calls for" (Ossorio, 1983). Accordingly, this person is someone to whom other members of the society will not attribute personal characteristics other than double negative ones (e.g., "reasonably friendly," meaning "not really friendly, but not unfriendly either") since, in effect the attributes are merely social, not individual.

As a legitimate member of the community and participant in the culture, the world of this standard normal person is not in gross conflict with the world of the culture, and the person has a place in that world. The person speaks the language of the culture. The culture provides what there is for this person to do in the form of social practices. The person follows the choice principles of the culture normatively in selecting which of the social practices to do and how to do them. When the person engages in a particular social practice, that person does so in one of the statuses that that person has. When the person does all of this, that person is living a particular way of life in a particular culture, rather than engaging in an incoherent series of behaviors without context.

Normative socialization results in *Person Characteristics* that enable and incline persons to follow choice principles and engage in social practices appropriately and naturally. Person Characteristics refer to the Dispositions (i.e., Traits, Attitudes, Interests, and Styles), Powers (i.e., Abilities, Knowledge, and Values), and Derivatives (i.e., Embodiment, Capacities, and States) of a person. Usually, native members of a given culture successfully engage in that culture's social practices.

The Culturally Displaced Person

However, for a variety of reasons not all members of a given culture undergo normative socialization. One such instance is the case of the culturally displaced person. Ossorio (1983) described the various instances of cultural displacement. Cultural displacement can occur as a forced and involuntary move, as in the case of refugees. In those instances where the move is voluntary we have the case of the immigrant. Cultural displacement can also be temporary, as in the case of sojourners such as the diplomat, the Army spouse, the multinational–corporation employee, and so on. Returning veterans are another case of cultural displacement; in this case, they have experienced a second displacement upon their return. Actual geographic movement is not necessary for cultural displacement, as in the case of members of ethnic minorities who must live in the context of a contrasting majority culture. For the purposes of this investigation, the case of the immigrant experience will be the primary focus.

Since a culturally displaced immigrant has not undergone normative socialization into the host culture, the immigrant has an impaired ability to follow choice principles normatively and to appropriately engage in the social practices of the host culture. Immigrants lack the person characteristics that would enable and incline them to act naturally in the host culture. Since they cannot act naturally,

they are generally in a state of psychological distress, and in a position of paying a psychological price for non–normative functioning.

Basic Human Needs

To assess the psychological suffering that an immigrant undergoes, we can introduced the concept of *Basic Human Needs* (BHN's). Since BHN's is a derivative concept, we must first define several fundamental concepts:

1. *Deliberate Action* – When a person engages in deliberate action, the person knows what they are doing and has chosen to do that.

2. *Pathological State* – When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction on their ability to (a) engage in Deliberate Action, and equivalently, (b) participate in the social practices of his community. (Thus, a pathological state is one in which there is significant restriction in one's behavior potential.)

3. *Need* – A need is a condition or requirement which, if not met, eventually results in a pathological state (a state of significantly reduced behavior potential).

Accordingly, we can now derive BHN as a special case of Need. That is, a BHN is a condition or requirement which if not met *at all*, makes Deliberate Action *impossible* (a state in which behavior potential is not merely restricted, but is reduced to zero). The concept of BHN is culturally universal in that as living persons, we all must satisfy BHN's to at least some extent. In principle, there is no definitive set of BHN's for the same reason that there is no definitive list of the ways in which things can go wrong, i.e., there is an indefinitely large number of ways of classifying things. As an example, Lasater (1983) generated the following list of BHN's: physical health; self esteem and worth; love and affiliation; agency and autonomy; adequacy and competence; identity; belonging and acceptance; disengagement; order, understanding, and predictability; personal and social legitimacy; and meaning, hope, and significance.

A viable culture provides us with a repertoire of social practices and choice principles through which we can, in general, meet our BHN's to a significant degree. Different cultures provide different ways of satisfying BHN's, and different degrees of satisfaction. These ways and degrees of satisfaction enable us to articulate differences and similarities between cultures with minimal ethnocentricity.

When we engage in social practices using normative choice principles and reasonable judgment, the satisfaction of BHN's is, in a practical sense, more or less guaranteed. Although social practices are not explicitly designed to satisfy BHN's, we would expect that, in general, for any social practice to endure, it must result in at least partial satisfaction of some BHN's. The extent to which a person satisfies their BHN's corresponds roughly to the degree to which that person effectively participates in the social practices of their community.

This real connection between social practices and BHN's provides a means of indexing the psychological price that an immigrant pays. Since culturally displaced persons cannot normatively engage in the social practices of the host culture, in effect they have an impaired ability to satisfy their BHN's. Normative participation requires knowledge of at least some of the social practices and choice principles of the community, and of their effective enactment. The success and effectiveness of a person's behaviors can then be evaluated in terms of how well they satisfy BHN's and, correspondingly, how appropriate they are as enactments of the social practices of the community.

Acculturation

Since immigrants are cultural misfits in their new culture and they have an impaired ability to satisfy their BHN's, they are faced with great pressure to acculturate in order to adapt to their new host culture. Acculturation, as an achievement or outcome concept, is the degree to which a culturally displaced person has undergone a change in their person characteristics and thereby has internalized the new host culture. When a person internalizes X, X is a natural, right, and real "part" of that person (i.e., he or she really is that way). Internalization entails change through learning. Persons internalize the way of living of the host culture in ways that help them effectively meet their BHN's. The person internalizes the world, statuses, language, social practices, and choice principles, in varying ways and in varying degrees. When a person has internalized the new way of life, the person characteristics of that person have necessarily changed as well.

However, given the immigrant's own personal history, problems arise in acculturating. The problems for a culturally displaced person in general, and an immigrant in particular, are threefold.

First, the immigrant must cope with the newness of the new host culture. The immigrant is more or less uninformed about the culture's social practices, choice principles, statuses, and so on.

Second, not only does the immigrant lack cultural knowledge; the immigrant has the wrong behavioral inclinations, based on experience with the native culture. The immigrant is well prepared to engage normatively in the social practices of the native culture; there, that person has clear knowledge and experience of what is right, and a clear sense of what is natural and what "is me." This predisposition contributes to the active distortion of the immigrant's perceptions and understanding of the host culture.

Third, what is right, natural, and real are all, in effect, prior commitments. These prior commitments must be maintained in the host culture in order to maintain the sense of true self, which is largely equivalent to the person's ethnic identity. Yet, culturally displaced persons must for the most part engage in the social practices of the host culture. The host culture does not provide the environmental support for

maintaining the displaced person's "real self" through engaging in all of the native social practices. The social practices of the host culture are generally non-normative with the native culture. In some cases, the host culture's social practices and choice principles are contrary to those of the native culture. For instance, in many Asian cultures, the wellbeing of the group and maintenance of interpersonal harmony is highly valued. However, in American culture, competition and individuality are generally primary values. These conditions generally lead to the fourth problem that culturally displaced persons face, namely ethnic identity problems.

Despite these significant problems, since the culturally displaced immigrant voluntarily moved to the host culture, the immigrant usually attempts to acculturate in some manner. Immigrants undergo changes which in effect help them engage normatively in the social practices of the host culture, thereby improving their ability to satisfy their BHN's.

A Hierarchy of Choice Principles

The nature of these changes can be better understood by reference to a hierarchy of choice principles. For present purposes, choice principles can be classified as central, intermediate, and peripheral. *Central Choice Principles* (CCP's) are those that have the greatest importance and priority relative to the others. There may or may not be any one central choice principle that is *the* highest in importance and priority. Correspondingly, *Intermediate Choice Principles* (ICP's) are those that have relatively less importance and priority than central choice principles. Finally, *Peripheral Choice Principles* (PCP's) have the least importance and priority relative to the other two.

In general, central choice principles can be acted on in a large number of ways, depending on a large number of circumstances. The full range of possibilities can be divided into a number of groups each of which is the point of application of some less general principles.

Thus, at the intermediate level, there are smaller domains, each having its own set of relevant choice principles. Intermediate choice principles have less scope than central choice principles. Their importance is largely derived from the importance of central choice principles, since intermediate choice principles do not have any intrinsic importance of their own. There is no simple either/or relationship between these intermediate choice principles, since you can act on more than one simultaneously.

There is at best a weak logical relationship between the central and intermediate choice principles, but there is a strong psychological connection. In general, acting on an intermediate choice principle on a given occasion is a way of acting on a central choice principle.

The relationship described above also holds between the intermediate and peripheral choice principles. Peripheral choice principles seem more likely to have

some incidental intrinsic value than intermediate ones, e.g., some can simply be fun. In general, central choice principles are implemented by acting on some intermediate choice principles, which in turn are implemented by acting on some peripheral choice principles.

Significance and Implementation

To elaborate and clarify the logical relationships between central, intermediate, and peripheral choice principles, consider the following scenario: Imagine a situation with several key elements: (a) There are a number of people in a house who are plotting to overthrow the country and they have a good chance of succeeding; (b) There is a man who is aware of this situation and wants to save the country; (c) There is a well of poisoned water near the house; (d) The well is connected to the house by a pipe; and (e) The inhabitants of the house will be drinking the water. The problem this man faces is how to save the country. Given the particular set of circumstances, the man can save the country *by* poisoning the people in the house. How could he do this? In this situation, he can do this *by* pumping the poisoned water to the inhabitants. How could he do this? In this case, he can pump water to the house (since the people are in the house and not elsewhere). How could he do this? Under these circumstances, he can pump the pump. How could he do this? Finally, he can grasp the pump handle and move his arm up and down. Note that at each problem level, you have a behavior description of a man doing X, and that all of these behaviors are being done by this man at roughly the same time and place.

As the series of descriptions is represented above, the relationship between a given preceding description and any of the later descriptions is that the latter is the implementation of the former. *Implementation* refers to a relationship between behavior A and behavior B such that a person is doing A *by* doing B. In the scenario described above, the man saves the country *by* poisoning the inhabitants of the house, and so on down each level of behavior description.

In general, the deliberate action lower on the series is "more concrete" than the deliberate action immediately higher on the series, (e.g., poisoning the inhabitants is "more concrete" than saving the country). Implementation continues until a deliberate action that can be directly implementable is reached, (e.g., moving his arm up and down). This final deliberate action is referred to as the *performance*. This directly implementable performance is what brings the implementation series to a logical end.

Significance refers to the inverse relationship, such that whenever doing behavior A is the implementation of doing behavior B, then doing B is the significance of doing A. For instance, poisoning the inhabitants is an implementation of saving the country; correspondingly, saving the country is the significance of poisoning the people.

The formulation of significance descriptions can be guided by the question, "What is the person doing by doing that?" For instance, what is the man doing by moving his arm up and down? In this particular case, he is pumping a pump. This question can be asked as you continue through the series of deliberate actions until an intrinsic social practice is reached. An *intrinsic social practice* brings the significance series to a logical end, just as a performance brings the implementation series to a logical end. (Recall that intrinsic practices are ones engaged in with no further end in view; we do not need to ask, "But *why* was he saving the country?")

Significance and implementation reflect a logical structure of deliberate actions. In such a structure, deliberate actions are logically nested and arranged in a series. Note that the order is fixed; i.e., the man poisons the inhabitants by pumping water to them – he does *not* pump water to the inhabitants by poisoning them. The deliberate action at the top of the series is an intrinsic social practice, while that at the bottom is a performance.

It is important to note that this logical structure of deliberate actions is an observer's account of behaviors. The person actually behaving almost certainly does not experience his or her behavior in terms of complex significance or implementation patterns or descriptions.

The importance of the notions of significance and implementation is that the hierarchy of choice principles generally reflects the logical structure of significance and implementation. In other words, central choice principles are generally implemented *by* intermediate choice principles, which are in turn generally implemented *by* peripheral choice principles. Conversely, central choice principles are ordinarily the significance *of* intermediate choice principles, which are ordinarily the significance *of* peripheral choice principles.

The hierarchy of choice principles represents the set of priorities among choice principles which operates generally to guide the choices of a person or group of persons. The way in which they function is relatively simple in its general outline, but not so simple when considered in greater detail.

1. For example, it is generally the case that central choice principles are more broadly applicable than intermediate ones. However, the notion of "applicable" may be misleading here. Suppose, for example, that a central choice principle is "Further the interest of the family" (or equivalently, "Don't jeopardize the interests of the family"). To say that this is a "universal" principle is not to say that every issue is a family issue, or that every activity is a family activity, or that every decision has a demonstrable bearing on family interests. Rather, it is to say that the person in question will more or less automatically *consider* every choice or issue from the standpoint of its relevance to the family welfare. Or, to put it differently, the person is always acting *as* a family member, no matter what the issues, choices, or activities are.

2. It may happen that a given culture has a single choice principle at the apex of the hierarchy, but there is no reason to expect that this will generally be the case.

Rather, we would expect a small set of choice principles to be "the most important" with no clear priorities among them. We would expect, further, that this set of central principles would not be inherently in conflict, so that in general the person would be operating in accordance with all of them simultaneously, and in the rare cases where conflict did arise, one of the individual principles would consistently be given priority.

3. Similarly, we would expect that central choice principles would not be inherently in conflict with intermediate choice principles. Technically, we would expect this to be the case on the grounds that central principles such as "preserve the interest of the family" cannot be implemented directly as such. Rather, they must be implemented by doing something else which is more specific and is responsive to the actual context of opportunities, difficulties, and reasons. It is this level of behavior that is governed by the intermediate choice principles.

On theoretical grounds, we would expect the same logical relationships between these concepts. The formulation of a hierarchy of choice principles is, after all, an after the fact analysis of an existing way of living, and (a) a way of living would hardly qualify as such if it was inherently conflict-ridden, and (b) it would be extraordinary if ways of living on the whole evolved toward internal inconsistency rather than toward internal consistency.

4. Similar considerations apply concerning the consistency of peripheral choice principles with the intermediate and central choice principles. In addition, peripheral choice principles are important because they deal with the objects, behaviors, and social practices that are the concrete embodiments of the way of living. Without such concrete embodiments, a way of living could have at best a ghostly sort of existence. (This can be a serious problem for third generation immigrants in search of their "roots.") One cannot further the family's interest except by doing something else of a more specific sort, but one can have a family dinner of fried rice and stewed chicken directly without having to do something else.

The loss of the resources needed for the concrete embodiment of a way of living can be expected to exercise a major influence for change among refugees, immigrants, and other culturally displaced persons. Conversely, in these cases at least some of the concrete embodiments that remain available can be expected to take on increased importance insofar as they carry an increased burden of embodying an entire way of life. Those concrete embodiments that remain are likely to be the ones that are more easily practiced than others in the context of the host culture. For instance, Asian immigrants can more easily maintain their native diet than their native dress. Accordingly, it would not be surprising if having a family dinner of fried rice and stewed chicken had increased importance in the host culture, relative to the native culture.

As an important caveat to this conceptualization of a hierarchy of choice principles, in principle there can be any number of steps from the top central level

to the bottom peripheral level. There may also be no steps in between these two levels. For the purposes of this study, three levels have been identified.

The Process of Acculturation

With this conceptualization in mind, we now move to its connection to the phenomenon of acculturation. To review, as an achievement concept, acculturation is the degree of change in the person characteristics of the culturally displaced person in the direction of the person characteristics of the standard normal person of the host culture.

In light of the foregoing model, we might expect that, on the whole, peripheral choice principles would change more readily than intermediate choice principles, and that the latter would change more readily than central choice principles. Since the implementation of peripheral choice principles is most responsive to the actual concrete context of opportunities, difficulties, and reasons, it would be reasonable to expect that this level changes first because the actual physical contexts in the host culture are different from those in the native culture, in at least some significant ways; and this alone would make it impossible *simply* to continue to do business as usual. Furthermore, the immigrant lacks the concrete props to implement the peripheral choice principles. For example, a person cannot climb the holy mountain to pay homage if access to the holy mountain is no longer possible in the practical sense. Also, in many cases if immigrants simply continue to do business as usual, many of their behaviors may be censured, or at best not get them anywhere. Under these circumstances, it is highly likely that some peripheral choice principles will be no longer viable, and therefore given up. Those few that remain are likely to increase in importance since they carry the burden of embodying the native way of life. These remaining peripheral choice principles that increase in importance will be referred to as *Marker Peripheral Choice Principles*.

Despite the inevitable loss of opportunity and possibility of implementing some of the peripheral choice principles, the immigrant can retain the central and intermediate choice principles, at least in principle. By doing so, the psychological strain experienced is, if not literally minimum, at least not maximum. Since, at least in principle, retaining these particular choice principles is viable, the immigrant's native sense of self is not directly threatened. Immigrants can still act as themselves, but simply do it differently. The fact that immigrants have to do it differently reflects the fact that it is highly likely that immigrants have fewer native and natural ways of acting effectively on their peripheral choice principles in the host country than they did in their native country. Accordingly, immigrants face new choices that they never encountered in their native culture.

The Influence of Generation

This model of acculturation expands when the factor of generation is considered. In the case of the first generation immigrant, the pressure to acculturate is greatest.

The immigrant arrives in the U.S. having been, in the paradigm case, socialized in the native culture. The situational demands on the first generation are the greatest compared to later generations, because the immigrant is the least familiar with the host culture. The novel circumstances of the host culture place immediate limitations on living the native way of life.

As the first generation born in the host culture, the members of the second generation do not come with their native culture. Rather, they receive a modified version of the native culture from their parents and/or others around them. On the whole, they have less of their native culture, and what they have is a weaker version than that of an immigrant. The native culture is likely to be learned less completely. The host culture is acquired from birth first hand and not second hand, as in the case of the immigrant. Consequently, the second generation is likely to have different general person characteristics from the first generation immigrant. A second generation person may still acquire the native central choice principles from their family. However, the intermediate and peripheral choice principles are likely to be more similar to the host culture than to the native culture.

The third generation person has even less of the native culture and even more acquisition of the host culture. This likely occurs at least in part because the parents are more acculturated than the grandparents. Eventually, it becomes likely that many of the third generation develop identity problems. They begin to have questions about who they really are and what it is to be, for example, of Pilipino heritage. The central choice principles of the native culture are likely to be more or less lost. This generation lacks many of the concrete embodiments of their native culture, and consequently their native culture becomes less real. Furthermore, their native culture is more implicit than it is for earlier generations, and therefore it is difficult to retain since it is not supported by either the concrete or symbolic social context.

These conditions faced by the third generation can lead to certain outcomes. Those who place primary importance on aesthetic values are likely to want their authentic culture and try to regain their lost native culture. At best, these persons will usually immerse themselves in the history and social practices of their ancestors. In contrast, those who act on primarily hedonic and/or prudential reasons will more often choose to assimilate expeditiously into the host culture. Consequently, to a greater extent than those who act on aesthetic reasons, these persons will develop their identity based on the values and beliefs of the host culture.

The above account, that acculturating progresses sequentially from the peripheral to the central level, seems intuitively reasonable but it is not logically required. In fact, one would expect to see variations, and the progression of acculturating has not been empirically determined or demonstrated. The influence of generation is one of the factors empirically investigated in this study.

The Attraction and Conflict Models of Acculturation

This broad conceptualization can generate several plausible models that describe the basis of the process of acculturation. Two major models of change are the *Attraction Model* and the *Conflict Model*. These models are not the only viable representations of the process of acculturation, although they are the most reasonable. The two models differ in their implications in regard to the following: (a) the likelihood of the culturally displaced person identifying with the host culture, (b) the ease of adaptation, (c) the rate of change, and (d) the amount of change across generations.

In the attraction model, the culturally displaced person wants to become a full member of the host culture as quickly as possible. This person wants to change and, consequently, embraces and subscribes to most, if not all, of the various aspects of the new way of life. In general, the attraction model seems to be more characteristic of immigrants than of any of the other culturally displaced groups. The consequences of this model are as follows. These people are very likely to strongly identify with the host culture and regard themselves as true members of the host culture. The areas of the greatest change will correspond to those aspects of the host culture that are most attractive. The basis of this attraction may be the nature of the choice principles of the native culture. For instance, in the case of American immigrants, if there is an excessive degree of sociopolitical control in the native culture, the immigrant may be quite attracted to the freedom in American culture. However, despite the strong reasons and desire to become a full member of the host culture, adapting to the new way of life is not easily achieved. The problem can be described as "how can I really, and not just officially, be one of them." Those aspects of the host culture that are readily accessible to the person are at the level of peripheral choice principles, since these correspond to the concrete manifestations of the new way of life. The person has comparatively less access to the intermediate and central choice principles since those levels are much less visible, especially to someone unfamiliar with those choice principles.

In the conflict model, culturally displaced persons have to somehow manage to live in the host culture while maintaining their identity as much as possible. The conflict is between the person and the behaviors that are required by the situations in the new culture. The conflict can be described as "how can I, being who I am, do that." The person does not really want to participate normatively in the host culture, since doing so requires that person to give up what is normal and natural, at least to some significant degree. The consequences of this model are as follows. Despite the strong resistance to the kind of participation that results in personal change, the pressures for such participation are inherent in living in a new culture and managing a new way of life. Moreover, the pressures are greatest at the points of conflict between the native culture and the host culture. These pressures are expected to be greatest at the level of peripheral choice principles, less at the level

of intermediate choice principles, and least at the level of central choice principles; with variations within levels depending on the degree of conflict between specific choice principles. The pressures decrease as the level of generality increases, since the degree of compatibility across circumstances and cultural contexts also increases. In comparing these two models, the case of adaptation, rate of change, and amount of change are comparatively greater in the attraction model than in the conflict model. The likelihood of identifying with the host culture is lower in the conflict model than in the attraction model.

These two models are not mutually exclusive, since it is highly unlikely that the process of acculturation occurs purely in terms of one model or another. It is plausible that both dynamics occur simultaneously to varying degrees, both within a generation and across generations. For the first generation immigrant, it is likely that although it is very important to retain most aspects of the native way of life, some aspects of the way of life of the new host culture may be attractive. For subsequent generations, it is likely that attraction increases over generations as conflict decreases. This attraction is based on the greater behavior potential that corresponds with the host culture over the native culture. Furthermore, unlike the first generation, the later generations do not have to give up something, namely their native culture based on first hand socialization. In either the attraction model or the conflict model, the changes that occur in acculturating can be derived from the broader conceptualization of a hierarchy of choice principles.

The present study will test hypotheses that have been generated from the conflict model. Although other models and hypotheses can be derived from the broad conceptualization and may actually apply, the hypotheses developed from the conflict model are most interesting from practical and clinical perspectives. Studying the difficulties in acculturation has traditionally been problematic, as indicated by the review of the literature. These difficulties are going to be maximum in the conflict model relative to the attraction model. Even though the attraction model is likely to be characteristic of immigrants, there are difficulties in acculturating in either model and the primary interest in acculturation is the difficulties. This study will develop the implications of the conflict model and examine the extent to which it accounts for what actually happens in the process of acculturation. This study will not examine the differences between the conflict model and attraction model. Although in principle these hypotheses apply to any two cultures, they will be tested as they apply to Pilipino and Anglo–American cultures. Parametric descriptions of these cultures are provided in Appendix A to identify the major differences between these two cultures, from which the particular predictions have been derived.

HYPOTHESES

The process of acculturation, if any, will proceed along these lines:

Hypothesis 1: As the immigrant acculturates, PCP's will change more and more quickly than ICP's, which in turn will change more and more quickly than CCP's.

Hypothesis 2: For the first generation immigrant, the PCP's of the native culture that are in the greatest conflict with the PCP's of the host culture will, other things being equal, change sooner than the native PCP's that are in less conflict with the host culture.

Hypothesis 3: For the first generation immigrant, as PCP's change and some are given up, of those that remain there will be at least one Marker PCP (i.e., a Pilipino PCP that is rated higher than the rest of the PCP's) that will increase in importance in the first generation and will be transmitted to subsequent generations.

Hypothesis 4: For those American choice principles where there are initial differences between the Anglo-American and Pilipino-American ratings, the Pilipino-American ratings of the American PCP's and ICP's will change across generations in the direction of endorsing the host culture. The PCP's and ICP's of the second generation (first born in host country) will be more similar to those of the host culture than those of the first generation immigrant.

Hypothesis 5: The CCP's across generations are less likely to change and change less than ICP's and PCP's.

PROCEDURES

Subjects

Pilipino-American Subjects

Members of the Philippine American Society of Colorado (PASCO) and the Kaibigan Filipino American Club (KFAC) at the University of Colorado at Boulder were recruited to volunteer for this study. Both organizations are Pilipino cultural groups. Additionally, churchgoers at the Queen of Peace Catholic church in Aurora, Colorado were recruited. Finally, subjects were recruited through various professional and personal contacts of the experimenter.

Anglo–American Subjects

Subjects were recruited from three sources. About one-third of the subjects were recruited from the Department of Psychology experimental subjects pool at the University of Colorado at Boulder. To broaden the demographic characteristics of the Anglo subject pool, subjects were also recruited from the Queen of Peace Catholic church in Aurora, Colorado and from the Albertson's supermarket in Longmont, Colorado. Those who were recruited from the supermarket were paid a \$10 honorarium for completing the questionnaire. In order to get a broad distribution across ages, the supermarket sample was stratified in three levels (i.e., 18 to 30 years old, 31–40 years old, and 40 years old and older).

Instrument

Perspectives Questionnaire

This study utilized the *Perspectives Questionnaire*. This questionnaire was constructed to assess the cultural values that were derived from the cultural analyses of American and Pilipino cultures. The Perspectives Questionnaire consisted of an introduction page, a general information sheet, and a list of questions. Each of these sections is described in detail below.

Introduction Page

This section provided a general overview of the nature and procedures for the questionnaire. A statement about their rights as participants was included.

General Information Sheet

Two distinct general information sheets were devised for the Pilipino–American and Anglo–American subjects. For both groups, general basic demographic information was gathered (i.e., age, birthplace, ethnicity, sex, level of education, occupation, and marital status). For the Pilipino–American subjects, additional questions were asked to determine the generation of the subject, and whether the subject is pure Pilipino.

List of Questions

A list of questions that assess the particular Anglo–American and Pilipino cultural values was generated. From this list of questions, four forms were generated, two for each culture. The Anglo Form 1 questionnaire consisted of the Introduction page, the Anglo General Information sheet, and the four sections of questions. The Anglo Form 2 differed only in the sequence of the four sections of questions; that is, the last two sections of Form 1 are used as the first two sections of Form 2. The Pilipino Form 1 questionnaire consisted of the Introduction page, the Pilipino General Information sheet, and the four sections of questions. The same arrangement principle was applied to generate the Pilipino Form 2 questionnaire. This sequencing procedure was performed to minimize order effects.

Feedback Sheet

A Feedback Sheet was written to provide the participants a more thorough description of the study, as well as the means to reach the experimenters for further questions and information.

Experimental Procedure

Data Collection

Pilipino Subjects

For the Philippine American Society of Colorado and the Kaibigan Filipino American Club, the investigator contacted the head of the organization to request some time during a regularly scheduled meeting. At the meeting, volunteers were recruited to participate in the study. A general verbal description of the study was provided. The participants were informed of their rights as experimental subjects in verbal and written form. The questionnaires were distributed. Verbal and written step–by–step instructions for completing the questionnaire were given. The investigator answered questions and provided assistance in completing the questionnaire. Upon completion and collection of the questionnaires, the Feedback Sheet was distributed and reviewed.

For the churchgoers, the investigator recruited volunteers during the regularly scheduled social hour that immediately follows the mass. During that time, the same questionnaire administration procedure described above was followed.

For the subjects who were recruited through professional and personal contacts of the experimenter, copies of the questionnaire were mailed out. The experimenter made several follow–up phone calls to answer whatever questions arose, and facilitate the completion and return of the questionnaires.

Anglo Subjects

For the subject pool participants, a particular meeting time and place was specified. For the churchgoing subjects, the same recruitment procedure employed for the Pilipino–American churchgoers was performed. The same questionnaire administration procedure described above was performed for the subject pool and church samples.

For the supermarket sample, the investigator initially contacted the store manager for permission to collect research data. The experimenter then set up a table with chairs in front of the supermarket, and recruited subjects as they walked by. The same administration procedure outlined above was performed. Upon completing the questionnaires, these subjects were given their cash honorarium.

Operational Definitions

1. Marker PCP – The Marker PCP for group n is the PCP that is the highest of the 5 PCP means for group n (n=1 or 2 for first and second generation, respectively).

2. Preferred PCP – The Preferred PCP for group n is the Marker PCP for group n that is significantly higher than each of the 4 remaining PCP means.

Criterion for Significance

For all of the predictions, the criteria for acceptance was a t-test of the means of the group scores as indicated by the corresponding indices.

Data Coding

Indices were generated from the raw scores in order to test the hypotheses. Indices representing mean ratings for individual subjects and groups of subjects are indicated below in Table 1:

Table 1 – Data Coding

Index Name	Subject or Group Performing Rating	Choice Principle Being Rated
Anglo(Anglo P)	Anglo—American	Anglo PCP
Anglo(Anglo I)	Anglo–American	Anglo ICP
Anglo(Anglo C)	Anglo–American	Anglo CCP
Pilipino1(Anglo P)	First Generation Pilipino–American	Anglo PCP
Pilipino1(Anglo I)	First Generation Pilipino–American	Anglo ICP
Pilipino1(Anglo C)	First Generation Pilipino–American	Anglo CCP
Pilipino2(Anglo P)	Second Generation Pilipino–American	Anglo PCP
Pilipino2(Anglo I)	Second Generation Pilipino–American	Anglo ICP
Pilipino2(Anglo C)	Second Generation Pilipino–American	Anglo CCP
Pilipino1(Pilipino P)	First Generation Pilipino–American	Pilipino PCP
Pilipino1(Pilipino I)	First Generation Pilipino–American	Pilipino ICP

Index Name	Table 1 – Data Coding Subject or Group Performing Rating	Choice Principle Being Rated
Pilipino1(Pilipino C)	First Generation Pilipino–American	Pilipino CCP
Pilipino2(Pilipino P)	Second Generation Pilipino–American	Pilipino PCP
Pilipino2(Pilipino I)	Second-Generation Pilipino–American	Pilipino ICP
Pilipino 2(Pilipino C)	Second Generation Pilipino–American	Pilipino CCP
Pilipino Pn (n = 1 to 5)	First Generation Pilipino–American	nth Pilipino PCP
(Anglo)(Anglo P)	Anglo group	Anglo PCP
(Anglo)(Anglo I)	Anglo group	Anglo ICP
(Anglo)(Anglo C)	Anglo group	Anglo CCP
(Pilipino1)(Anglo P)	First Generation Pilipino–American Group	Anglo PCP
(Pilipino1)(Anglo I)	First Generation Pilipino–American Group	Anglo ICP
(Pilipino1)(Anglo C)	First Generation Pilipino–American Group	Anglo CCP
(Pilipino2)(Anglo P)	Second Generation Pilipino–American Group	Anglo PCP
(Pilipino2)(Anglo I)	Second Generation Pilipino–American Group	Anglo ICP
(Pilipino2)(Anglo C)	Second Generation Pilipino–American Group	Anglo CCP
(Pilipino1)(Pilipino P)	First Generation Pilipino–American Group	Pilipino PCP
(Pilipino1)(Pilipino I)	First Generation Pilipino–American Group	Pilipino ICP

Index Name	Table 1 – Data Coding Subject or Group Performing Rating	Choice Principle Being Rated
(Pilipino1)(Pilipino C)	First Generation Pilipino–American Group	Pilipino CCP
(Pilipino2)(Pilipino P)	Second Generation Pilipino–American Group	Pilipino PCP
(Pilipino2)(Pilipino I)	Second Generation Pilipino–American Group	Pilipino ICP
(Pilipino2)(Pilipino C)	Second Generation Pilipino–American Group	Pilipino CCP

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Sample Characteristics

Pilipino–American Subjects

The sample consisted of 47 subjects. Thirteen subjects (27.7%) were recruited from the Philippine American Society of Colorado (PASCO). Four subjects (8.5%) were recruited from the Kaibigan Filipino American Club (KFAC) at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Twenty–two subjects (46.8%) were recruited from the Queen of Peace Catholic church in Aurora, Colorado. The remaining eight subjects (17.0%) were recruited through various professional and personal contacts of the experimenter.

For the purposes of this study, the following guidelines were used to classify this group into generations. Those who immigrated at 14 years old or later were classified as first generation (N=27). Those who immigrated from 5 to 13 years old were classified as an ambiguous intermediate group between first and second generations (N=5). Lastly, those who were born in the U.S. and those who immigrated at 4 years old or younger were classified as second generation (N=15). Table A summarizes the demographic characteristics of the three generations.

For the entire group, the mean age was 34 years, 16 were male (34%), and 31 were female (66%). The mean number of years of education was 15 for all but ten subjects who did not provide this information. In terms of occupation, 5 were blue collar workers (10.6%), 13 were white collar workers (27.7%), 7 were professionals (14.9%), 12 were students (25.5%), 2 were homemakers (4.3%), 3 were classified as other (6.4%), and 5 did not specify an occupation (10.6%). Regarding marital status, 24 were never married (51.1%), 21 were married

(44.7%), 1 was divorced (2.1%), and 1 was widowed (2.1%). On average, they had been in the U.S. for 17.6 years.

For the first generation group, the mean age was 40 years old. Twelve of these subjects were male (44.4%), and 15 were female (55.6%). The mean number of years of education was 15 for 19 of the 27 subjects. Regarding occupation, 5 were blue collar workers (18.5%), 6 were white collar workers (22.2%), 6 were professionals (22.2%), 2 were students (7.4%), 1 was a homemaker (3.7%), 3 were classified as other (11.1%), and 4 did not specify their occupation (14.8%). Regarding marital status, 8 were never married (29.6%), 17 were married (63.0%), 1 was divorced (3.7%), and 1 was widowed (3.7%). On average, they have lived in the U.S. for 13.5 years.

For the intermediate generation group, the mean age was 29.4 years, 1 was male, and 4 were female. The mean number of years of education was 14 for 4 of the 5 subjects. Regarding occupation, 2 were white collar workers, 1 was a professional, and 2 were students. Regarding marital status, 4 were never married, and 1 was married. On average, they have lived in the U.S. for 20.8 years.

For the second generation group, the mean age was 24.7 years, 3 were male (20%), and 12 were female (80%). The mean number of years of education was 15.1 years for the 14 subjects who provided this information. Regarding occupation, 5 were white collar workers (33.3%), 8 were students (53.3%), 1 was a homemaker (6.7%), and 1 did not specify an occupation (6.7%). Regarding marital status, 12 were never married (80%), and 3 were married (20%). On average, they have lived in the U.S. for 23.9 years.

Table A – Demographic Characteristics of Pilipino–American Sample

Generation	N	Males	Females	Mean Age	Mean Years of Education	Mean Years in U.S.
First	27	12	15	40.0	15.1	13.5
Intermediate	5	1	4	29.4	14.0	20.8
Second	15	3	12	24.7	15.1	23.9
Across Generations	47	16	31	34.0	15.0	17.6

Regarding hypothesis 1, the testing of two predictions was contingent on the availability of subjects who have been residents of the U.S. for 5 years or less. Eleven subjects were in this category. The range of years of residency is as follows. Five have been in the U.S. for 1 year or less, 1 for 2 years, 3 for 3 years, and 2 for 4 years.

Anglo–American Subjects

The sample consisted of 45 subjects. Seventeen of these subjects (37.8%) were recruited from the Department of Psychology experimental subjects pool at the

University of Colorado at Boulder. Thirteen subjects (28.9%) were recruited from the Queen of Peace Catholic church in Aurora, Colorado. The remaining fifteen subjects (33.3%) were recruited from Albertson's supermarket in Longmont, Colorado. Table B summarizes the demographic characteristics.

For the entire group, the mean age was 32.2 years, 22 were male (48.9%), and 23 were female (51.1%). The mean number of years of education was 13.9 for the church and supermarket samples. Regarding occupation, 9 were blue collar workers (20.0%), 8 were white collar workers (17.8%), 2 were professionals (4.4%), 18 were students (40.0%), 4 were homemakers (8.9%), and 4 were classified as other (8.9%). Regarding marital status, 21 were never married (46.7%), 18 were married (40.0%), and 6 were divorced (13.3%). Regarding birthplace, 7 were from the West coast (15.6%), 11 were from the Mountain states (24.4%), 11 were from the Midwest (24.4%), 12 were from the East coast (26.7%), and 4 were from the South (8.9%).

Table B – Demographic Characteristics of Anglo–American Sample

Source	N	Males	Females	Mean Age	Mean Years of Education
Subject Pool	17	11	6	18.8	N.A.
Church	13	6	7	44.4	15.0
Supermarket	15	5	10	36.9	12.9

Hypotheses Testing

Primarily, two central premises of the hypotheses, predictions, and analyses will be explicated before reviewing the results. First, the overall expectation is that the Pilipinos living in the Philippines, on the whole, endorse all three levels of Pilipino choice principles equally highly. People who are living in their native country naturally live their way of life. Accordingly, most if not all of the choice principles are naturally followed and highly endorsed. The absolute degree of endorsement is secondary to the expectation that the level of endorsement is roughly equivalent across all three levels of choice principles. As explicated in the conceptualization, the phenomenon of cultural displacement prevents people from living their native way of life naturally. Under these circumstances, changes in the degree of endorsement and enactments of the native choice principles are expected to occur. These changes were expected to be in the negative direction.

Second, in examining the timing and the rate of these changes, the model that was applied is as follows. In general, the changes begin at a certain time and progress at a decelerating rate. The direction of the changes is toward decreasing endorsement of the Pilipino choice principles and increasing endorsement of the American choice principles. The changes of the different choice principles within a particular level (but not across levels) will occur at roughly the same rate, but at

different times. When the changes are examined at a given time, if the level of endorsement has not yet reached the comparative Anglo–American level of endorsement, then one can expect that those choice principles that started changing earlier will show greater change than those choice principles that started changing later. In the case of the Pilipino choice principles, those that started to change earlier will be endorsed less than those that started to change later. In the case of the American choice principles, those that started to change earlier will be endorsed more than those that started to change later.

For all of the analyses for which a t–test applied, a two–tailed t–test was performed.

Hypothesis 1

As the first generation immigrant acculturates, PCP's will change more and more quickly than ICP's, which in turn will change more and more quickly than CCP's.

Prediction 1.1:
The (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) index will be less than the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) index.
A t–test was performed to compare these two indices. The analysis yielded significant positive findings. The (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) index of 5.63 (S.D.=1.05) is significantly less than the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) index of 6.81 (S.D.=0.75, t=−6.20, p<<.001, N=27). Table 1.1 summarizes these findings.

Table 1.1 – First Generation Pilipino–American PCP and ICP Ratings

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Pilipino PCP	5.63	1.05	−6.20	<<.001
Pilipino ICP	6.81	0.75		

Prediction 1.2:
The (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) index will be less than the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino C) index.
A t–test was performed to compare these two indices. The analysis yielded significant positive findings. The (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) index of 6.81 (S.D.=0.75) is significantly less than the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino C) index of 7.29 (S.D.=0.95, t=−3.60, p=.001, N=27). Table 1.2 summarizes these findings.

Table 1.2 – First Generation Pilipino–American ICP and CCP Ratings

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Pilipino ICP	6.81	0.75	−3.60	.001
Pilipino CCP	7.29	0.95		

Prediction 1.3

As duration of residency in the U.S. increases, the difference between the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) index and the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) index will increase.

This prediction was contingent on the availability of Pilipino–Americans who have been in the U.S. 5 years or less (N=11). The difference between the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) and (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) indices was correlated with the duration of residency in the U.S. The analyses yielded an r–value of –0.148 and a p value of .664. This finding does not support the prediction. Instead, the findings indicate a nonsignificant negative correlation. Table 1.3 summarizes these findings.

Table 1.3 – Correlation of Difference Between Pilipino PCP and Pilipino ICP Ratings with Duration in the U.S.

N	r–value	p
11	–.148	.664

Prediction 1.4:

As duration of residency in the U.S. increases, the difference between the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) index and the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino C) index will increase.

This prediction was also contingent on the availability of Pilipino–Americans who have been in the U.S. 5 years or less (N=11). The difference between the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) and (Pilipino1)(Pilipino C) indices was correlated with the duration of residency in the U.S. The analyses yielded a r–value of 0.21 and a p value of .952. This finding indicates a nonsignificant positive correlation. Table 1.4 summarizes these findings.

Table 1.4 – Correlation of Difference Between Pilipino ICP and Pilipino CCP Ratings with Duration in the U.S.

N	r–value	p
11	.021	.952

Both primary predictions for the first hypothesis were supported by the data. The Pilipino PCP's changed more and more quickly than the Pilipino ICP's, which in turn changed more and more quickly than the Pilipino CCP's. The difference between the PCP index and the ICP index was greater than the difference between the ICP index and the CCP index. Furthermore, the higher t–value and lower p–value of the prior difference compared with the latter strongly confirms this hypothesis. The conceptualization of the differences in the degree of retention of choice principles was definitely confirmed.

Hypothesis 2

For the first generation immigrant, the PCP's of the native culture that are in greatest conflict with the PCP's of the host culture will, other things being equal, change sooner than the native PCP's that are in less conflict with the host culture.

Two methods were employed in determining the Pilipino PCP's that are in greatest conflict with American culture. Primarily, the experimenter rank ordered the five Pilipino PCP's in terms of degree of conflict. The experimenter based this ranking on the cultural analyses and personal impressions. This procedure yielded the following results. The two Pilipino PCP's are (a) eat with your hands instead of using utensils (PCP5), and (b) use titles, sir, or madam when addressing people in authority (PCP2).

Secondly, the experimenter administered a rating instrument to three Anglo-American raters. These judges were asked to rate each Pilipino PCP on a 10-point scale in terms of the extent to which each behavior was out of character or incompatible with the American way of life. The range of the scale was 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). The two PCP's with the highest incompatibility ratings were regarded as those in greatest conflict with American culture. This procedure yielded the following results. The two PCP's with the highest rating was PCP4 (when in a group, forgo your personal needs for the good of the group) and PCP2 (use titles, sir, or madam when addressing people in authority). Both PCP's had a mean rating of 6.33. The third most incompatible PCP was PCP1 (use euphemisms to avoid the displeasure of an important person) with a mean rating of 5.0. PCP3 (whenever you go out, dress up so you won't look sloppy) was rated as the fourth most incompatible PCP with a mean rating of 4.33. The least incompatible PCP was PCP5 (eat with your hands instead of using utensils) with a mean rating of 3.33. These findings are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2 – Rank Order and Mean Ratings of Degree of Incompatibility by Anglo-American Raters

Rank Ordering	PCP4	PCP2	PCP1	PCP3	PCP5
Mean Incompatibility Rating	6.33	6.33	5.00	4.33	3.33

Prediction 2.1:

The (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) index of the PCP's that are in greatest conflict will be less than the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) index of the PCP's that are in less conflict.

As determined by the experimenter's ratings, the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) indices of the two PCP's that are in greatest conflict were compared with the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) indices of the three PCP's that are in least conflict in two ways. Primarily, each index was individually compared with the remaining 3 indices by utilizing a t-test. This procedure yielded the following results.

The comparison of the PCP5 index (eating with your hands) with each of the three low conflict PCP indices showed that it was significantly less in all cases. The

index for PCP5 was 3.17 (S.D.=2.51). In comparison, the index for PCP1 (using euphemisms) was 7.02 (S.D.=1.16, t=−8.13, p<<.001). The index for PCP3 (dress up whenever you go out) was 6.48 (S.D.=1.61, t=−6.96, p<<.001). Finally, the index for PCP4 (forgo personal needs in a group) was 4.89 (S.D.=1.66, t=−3.40, p=.002). These findings support the prediction. See Table 2.1a for a summary of the results.

Table 2.1a – Comparison of PCP5 with Low Conflict PCP's

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
PCP5	3.17	2.51	−8.13	<<.001
PCP1	7.02	1.16		
PCP5	3.17	2.51	−6.96	<<.001
PCP3	6.48	1.61		
PCP5	3.17	2.51	−3.40	.002
PCP4	4.89	1.66		

The second PCP determined by the experimenter to be in greatest conflict was PCP2 (use titles, sir, or madam when addressing people in authority). The comparison of the PCP2 index with each of the three low conflict PCP indices showed that it was not significantly lower. In two comparisons, the PCP2 index was actually higher. The PCP2 index (M=6.59, S.D.=1.73) was significantly higher than the PCP4 index (M=4.89, S.D.=1.66, t=3.40, p=.002), but not significantly higher than the PCP3 index (M=6.48, S.D.=1.61). In the last comparison, the PCP2 index was not significantly lower than the PCP1 index (M=7.02, S.D.=1.16, t=−1.21, p=.238). These findings do not support the prediction. See Table 2.1b for a summary of these findings.

Table 2.1b – Comparison of PCP2 with Low Conflict PCP's

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
PCP2	6.59	1.73	−1.21	.238
PCP1	7.02	1.16		
PCP2	6.59	1.73	.28	.780
PCP3	6.48	1.61		
PCP2	6.59	1.73	3.40	.002
PCP4	4.89	1.66		

The second comparison procedure utilized a t-test to compare the mean of the indices of the two high conflict PCP's with the mean of the indices of the three low conflict PCP's. This analysis yielded significant positive results.

The mean of the PCP2 and PCP5 ratings was 4.88 (S.D.=1.71). The mean of the PCP1, PCP3, and PCP4 ratings was 6.13 (S.D.=0.94). The mean of the high

conflict PCP's is significantly less than the mean of the low conflict PCP's ($t=-4.11$, $p<.001$). These findings support the prediction. See Table 2.1c for a summary of these findings.

Table 2.1c – Comparison of High Conflict PCP Ratings with Low Conflict PCP Ratings

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
High Conflict PCP's	4.88	1.71	-4.11	<.001
Low Conflict PCP's	6.13	.94		

As determined by the Anglo raters, the two PCP's that are most in conflict with the American way of life were PCP4 (when in a group, forgo your personal needs for the good of the group) and PCP2 (use titles, sir, or madam when addressing people in authority). The selection of PCP2 by the Anglo raters as a high conflict PCP was consistent with the experimenter's ratings. The indices for these two PCP's will be compared in the same ways described previously. This analysis yielded the following results.

The PCP4 index was significantly less than two of the three low conflict PCP indices. In one comparison, the PCP4 index (M=4.89, S.D.=1.66) was significantly higher than the PCP5 index (M=3.17, S.D.=2.51). These findings partially support the prediction. Table 2.1d summarizes these findings.

Table 2.1d – Comparison of PCP4 with Low Conflict PCP's

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
PCP4	4.89	1.66	-6.00	<<.001
PCP1	7.02	1.16		
PCP4	4.89	1.66	-3.33	.003
PCP3	6.48	1.61		
PCP4	4.89	1.66	3.40	.002
PCP5	3.17	2.51		

The PCP2 index was not significantly less in any of the comparisons. The PCP2 index was less in only one comparison. The PCP2 index (M=6.59, S.D.=1.73) was less than the PCP1 index (M=7.02, S.D.=1.16, t=−1.21, p=.238), though this difference was nonsignificant. The PCP2 index was significantly higher than the PCP5 index (M=3.17, S.D.=2.51, t=6.77, p<<.001), but not significantly higher than the PCP3 index (M=6.48, S.D.=1.61, t=0.28, p=.780). These results do not support the prediction. Table 2.1e summarizes these findings.

Table 2.1e – Comparison of PCP2 with Low Conflict PCP's

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
PCP2	6.59	1.73	–1.21	.238
PCP1	7.02	1.16		
PCP2	6.59	1.73	0.28	.780
PCP3	6.48	1.61		
PCP2	6.59	1.73	6.77	<<.001
PCP5	3.17	2.51		

In comparing the mean of the high conflict PCP's (PCP4 and PCP2) with the mean of the low conflict PCP's (PCP1, PCP3, and PCP5), the mean of the high conflict PCP's was not significantly lower than the mean of the low conflict PCP's as predicted. Instead, the mean of the high conflict PCP's was higher than the mean of the low conflict PCP's, though the difference was nonsignificant. These findings did not support the prediction. Table 2.1f summarizes these findings.

Table 2.1f – Comparison of High Conflict PCP Ratings with Low Conflict PCP Ratings

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
High Conflict PCP's	5.74	1.09	.71	.483
Low Conflict PCP's	5.56	1.33		

The data partially supported the predictions for the second hypothesis as it was specifically tested. In analyzing the PCP's that were determined by the experimenter to be in greatest conflict, the endorsement of PCP5 (eating with your hands) was consistently and significantly less than the endorsement of the other PCP's. The practice of eating with one's hands instead of using utensils as one does in the Philippines is generally in conflict with the American way of life and, as such, not culturally or socially sanctioned. Moreover, publicly engaging in this practice will likely provoke criticism from those around you, since it is generally regarded as uncouth and offensive according to American standards. The size of the difference in levels of endorsement strongly indicates the extent to which this PCP is generally incompatible with the Anglo–American culture. Since it is a practice that is regarded as ill-mannered in American terms, Pilipino–Americans would not publicly engage in this behavior in order to avoid social undesirability.

The second conflictual PCP as determined by the experimenter was PCP2 (using titles, "sir," or "madam" when addressing people in authority). The data did not support this prediction. The endorsement of this PCP was lower than one PCP, and higher than the other two PCP's. In one of the latter comparisons, the difference was significant. "Using titles, 'sir,' or 'madam' when addressing people in authority" (PCP2) was endorsed significantly higher than "forgoing your personal

needs for the good of the group" (PCP4). These findings indicate that PCP2 was not regarded as being in great conflict with the American culture, as had been predicted.

In comparing the mean of the two high conflict PCP's with the mean of the three low conflict PCP's, the data supported the hypothesis and prediction. The interpretation of this finding must be done in light of the two previous comparisons. Given the results of the comparison between PCP2 and the three low conflict PCP's, the significance of this comparison is likely due to the marked difference between PCP5 and the three low conflict PCP's. Taken together, the results provide a qualified confirmation of the hypothesis.

The analysis of those PCP's that the Anglo–American raters judged to be in conflict also provides partial support for the hypothesis and prediction. The two conflictual PCP's were PCP4 (when in a group, forgo your personal needs for the good of the group) and PCP2 (use titles, sir, or madam when addressing people in authority). Although each comparison between PCP4 and the three low conflict PCP's was significant, one comparison was in the opposite direction than predicted. The endorsement of PCP4 was significantly higher than the endorsement of PCP5 (eating with your hands). The non–selection of PCP5 by the Anglo–American raters may likely be due to the misunderstanding of the actual meaning of "eating with your hands instead of using utensils." The standard American cuisine includes items that are considered "finger food," and other food that can easily be eaten with one's hands. Many appetizers, snacks, fast–food meals, main courses, and desserts can be eaten with one's hands, if not customarily so. In this sense of PCP5, the degree of conflict with the American way of life is reasonably low. The actual meaning of eating meals without using utensils in the same way that this is done in the Philippines was not clearly conveyed or understood.

The results of the comparison between PCP2 and the three low conflict PCP's failed to support the hypothesis and prediction. The only significant comparison was the significantly higher (and not lower as predicted) endorsement of PCP2 over PCP5. These results further indicate the low degree of conflict that PCP2 has with the American culture. The comparison of the mean of the low conflict PCP's with the mean of the high conflict PCP's also failed to support the hypothesis.

Despite the inconsistent support of the hypothesis from the analysis procedure that was performed, the data supported the hypothesis in the general sense. In the specific terms of the prediction, the results only partially supported the hypothesis. However, in the broader perspective, PCP5 and PCP4 were the two PCP's that were most in conflict and were endorsed accordingly. In this general sense, the hypothesis was clearly supported. The prediction of these two PCP's as the ones that were most incompatible with the American culture was inconsistent. The experimenter rated PCP5 as highly incompatible, but not PCP4. Whereas, the Anglo–American raters rated PCP4 as highly incompatible, but not PCP5. This inconsistency in ratings may reflect a misunderstanding of PCP5 by the

Anglo–American raters, and a misinterpretation of the feasibility of PCP4 by the experimenter.

With regard to the broad conceptualization, the results generally supported the notion that those native PCP's that are in greatest conflict with the PCP's of the host culture will change earlier than those that are in less conflict. Most typical American contexts do not support eating with one's hands nor forgoing one's wishes for the good of the group. Despite the specific miscalculations and imprecise predictions of the particular PCP's that were in greatest conflict, the conceptualization was supported.

Hypothesis 3

For the first generation immigrant, as PCP's change and some are given up, of those that remain there will be at least one Marker PCP (i.e., a Pilipino PCP that is rated higher than the rest of the PCP's) that will increase in importance in the first generation and will be transmitted to subsequent generations.

Prediction 3.1:
In the first generation, the Preferred PCP will be the PCP that refers to eating with one's hands (PCP5). This PCP will also be the Preferred PCP for the second generation.

The Pilipino P5 index was compared with each of the remaining 4 Pilipino Pn indices by utilizing a t-test. In all comparisons within the first generation group, the Pilipino P5 index was not significantly higher than any of the other 4 Pilipino Pn indices. Instead, the Pilipino P5 index was significantly lower than each of the other 4 indices. These findings not only fail to support the prediction, but are also in the opposite direction. Table 3.1a summarizes these findings.

Table 3.1a – Comparison of Preferred PCP with Remaining PCP's for the First Generation

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Pilipino P5	3.17	2.51	−8.13	<<.001
Pilipino P1	7.02	1.16		
Pilipino P5	3.17	2.51	−6.77	<<.001
Pilipino P2	6.59	1.73		
Pilipino P5	3.17	2.51	−6.96	<<.001
Pilipino P3	6.48	1.61		
Pilipino P5	3.17	2.51	−3.40	.002
Pilipino P4	4.89	1.66		

In all comparisons within the second generation, the Pilipino P5 index was significantly lower than each of the other 4 Pilipino Pn indices. These findings are

consistent with the findings in the first generation, and contradict the prediction. Table 3.1b summarizes these findings.

Table 3.1b – Comparison of Preferred PCP with Remaining PCP's for the Second Generation

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Pilipino P5	1.90	1.90	−7.72	<<.001
Pilipino P1	7.13	1.32		
Pilipino P5	1.90	1.90	−7.21	<<.001
Pilipino P2	6.90	1.43		
Pilipino P5	1.90	1.90	−4.63	<.001
Pilipino P3	5.80	2.11		
Pilipino P5	1.90	1.90	−2.85	.013
Pilipino P4	4.17	1.71		

Prediction 3.2:
The Marker PCP will be the same for both generations.

The Marker PCP for the first generation was PCP1 (use euphemisms to avoid the displeasure of an important person). The Pilipino P1 value was 7.02 (S.D.=1.16). The Marker PCP for the intermediate generation was PCP2 (use titles, sir, or madam when addressing people in authority). The Pilipino P2 value was 8.20 (S.D.=1.51). The Marker PCP for the second generation was PCP1. The Pilipino P1 value was 7.13 (S.D.=1.32). These results support the prediction. Tables 3.2a to 3.2c summarize these results.

Table 3.2a – First Generation Ranking of PCP's

Rank Order	Mean	S.D.
1. PCP1 – Use Euphemisms	7.02	1.16
2. PCP2 – Use Titles	6.59	1.73
3. PCP3 – Dress Up Whenever Going Out	6.48	1.61
4. PCP4 – Forgo Personal Needs	4.89	1.66
5. PCP5 – Eat With Your Hands	3.17	2.51

Table 3.2b – Intermediate Generation Ranking of PCP's

Rank Order	Mean	S.D.
1. PCP2 – Use Titles	8.20	1.51
2. PCP1 – Use Euphemisms	7.60	1.71
3. PCP3 – Dress Up Whenever Going Out	5.80	1.57
4. PCP4 – Forgo Personal Needs	4.70	1.15
5. PCP5 – Eat With Hands	4.10	2.22

Table 3.2c – Second Generation Ranking of PCP's

Rank Order	Mean	S.D.
1. PCP1 – Use Euphemisms	7.13	1.32
2. PCP2 – Use Titles	6.90	1.43
3. PCP3 – Dress Up Whenever Going Out	5.80	2.11
4. PCP4 – Forgo Personal Needs	4.17	1.71
5. PCP5 – Eat With Hands	1.90	1.90

Prediction 3.3:
There will be a Preferred PCP, and it will be the same for both generations.

T-tests were performed comparing the Marker PCP for each generation with each of the remaining four PCP's. For the first generation, the Marker PCP was PCP1 which was significantly higher than PCP4 (t=6.00, p<<.001) and PCP5 (t=8.13, p<<.001), but not significantly higher than PCP2 (t=1.21, p=.238) or PCP3 (t=1.74, p=.094). These findings do not show that PCP1 was a Preferred PCP, and therefore the prediction was not supported. See Table 3.3a for a summary.

Table 3.3a – First Generation Preferred PCP Comparisons

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Marker PCP1	7.02	1.16	1.21	.238
PCP2	6.59	1.73		
Marker PCP1	7.02	1.16	1.74	.094
PCP3	6.48	1.61		
Marker PCP1	7.02	1.16	6.00	<<.001
PCP4	4.89	1.66		
Marker PCP1	7.02	1.16	8.13	<<.001
PCP5	3.17	2.51		

For the intermediate generation, the Marker PCP was PCP2 (M=8.20, S.D.=1.15) which was significantly higher than PCP4 (M=4.70, S.D.=1.15, t=9.90, p=.001) and PCP5 (M=4.10, S.D.=2.22, t=3.62, p=.022), but not significantly higher than PCP1 (M=7.60, S.D.=1.71, t=0.88, p=.426) or PCP3 (M=5.80, S.D.=1.57, t=2.48, p=.068). These findings do not show that PCP2 was the Preferred PCP, and therefore the prediction was not supported. See table 3.3b for a summary.

Table 3.3b – Intermediate Generation Preferred PCP Comparisons

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Marker PCP2	8.20	1.15	.88	.426

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
PCP1	7.60	1.71		
Marker PCP2	8.20	1.15	2.48	.068
PCP3	5.80	1.57		
Marker PCP2	8.20	1.15	9.90	.001
PCP4	4.70	1.15		
Marker PCP2	8.20	1.15	3.62	.022
PCP5	4.10	2.22		

For the second generation, the Marker PCP was PCP1 (M=7.13, S.D.=1.90) which was significantly higher than PCP3 (M=5.80, S.D.=2.11, t=2.59, p=.022), PCP4 (M=4.17, S.D.=1.71, t=7.88, p<<.001), and PCP5 (M=1.90, S.D.⁻1.90, t=7.72, p<<.001), but not significantly higher than PCP2 (M=6.90, S.D.=1.43, t=0.68, p=.500). These findings do not show that PCP1 was a Preferred PCP, and therefore the prediction is not supported. See Table 3.3c for a summary.

Table 3.3c – Second Generation Preferred PCP Comparisons

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Marker PCP1	7.13	1.32	.68	.509
PCP2	6.90	1.43		
Marker PCP1	7.13	1.32	2.59	.022
PCP3	5.80	2.11		
Marker PCP1	7.13	1.32	7.88	<<.001
PCP4	4.17	1.71		
Marker PCP1	7.13	1.32	7.72	<<.001
PCP5	1.90	1.90		

Across both generations, there was no Preferred PCP, and therefore the third hypothesis was not supported. The first prediction specified PCP5 as the Preferred PCP for both generations. Not only did the data not support this prediction, the findings were in the opposite direction from the prediction. In both generations, the PCP5 index was significantly less than each of the other four PCP's. Furthermore, this prediction is mutually exclusive with prediction 2.1 above wherein PCP5 was determined by the experimenter to be one of the two PCP's that were most in conflict with the Anglo–American culture. Clearly, PCP5 cannot be simultaneously a .dysvalued high conflict PCP and a Preferred PCP. These mutually exclusive predictions were the result of an oversight by the experimenter in failing to provide an adequate conceptualization of the potential significance of this PCP to Pilipinos.

The practice of eating with one's hands can, in principle, be both a high conflict PCP and a Preferred PCP. This notion relies on the critical distinction between public and private social practices. As a public social practice in the U.S., eating with one's hands as one does in the Philippines is clearly censured. As such, one

would naturally expect that Pilipinos would poorly endorse the corresponding choice principle. However, as a private social practice that one engages in with fellow Pilipino–Americans who are family and friends, this practice can embody what it means to be "back home" and behave in familiar and "native" ways. Especially when eating native dishes during a cultural or religious celebration, this practice can, in principle, be highly valued and endorsed. This important distinction was not articulated in the conceptualization nor indicated at all in the instrument. Instead, the general descriptions of this practice and choice principle in the questionnaire conveyed it strictly as a public practice.

The second prediction was supported by the data, and therefore partially supported the hypothesis. For both the first and second generations, the Marker PCP was PCP1 (use euphemisms to avoid the displeasure of an important person). As the Marker PCP, the index for PCP1 was numerically highest for both generations. However, for the intermediate generation PCP1 was ranked second to PCP2 (use titles, sir, or madam when addressing people in authority). Since this group consisted of only five subjects, it is difficult to interpret these results with confidence. The consistency of PCP1 as the Marker PCP for both first and second generations suggests that at least this PCP was passed on from one generation to the next. Thus, the conceptualization regarding the retention of at least one PCP across generations was mildly confirmed.

The third prediction was not fully supported by the data. The Marker PCP for each generation was not significantly higher than each of the other four PCP's. In the first generation, PCP1 was significantly higher than only two of the four other PCP's. Whereas, in the second generation, PCP1 was significantly higher than only three of the four PCP's. These findings indicate that the conceptualization of a Preferred PCP was only partially supported. Although the Marker PCP was the same for both generations, this PCP did not qualify as a Preferred PCP. The absence of a Preferred PCP suggests that the Pilipino–Americans who were studied were not clearly hanging on to their native culture by endorsing a particular PCP significantly higher than the others, and then passing it on to the next generation. This lack of retention of a particular PCP suggested that the Pilipino peripheral choice principles were not grossly in conflict with the American culture. Therefore, the pressure to maintain native values did not seem to be great. These findings suggested that the attraction model may apply better than the conflict model in these circumstances.

Hypothesis 4

For those American choice principles where there are initial differences between the Anglo–American ratings and the Pilipino–American ratings, the Pilipino–American ratings of the American PCP's and ICP's will change across generations in the direction of endorsing the host culture. The PCP's and ICP's of

the second generation (first generation born in the host country) will be more similar to those of the host culture than those of the first generation immigrant.

Primarily, t-tests were performed comparing the Anglo–American and Pilipino–American ratings of the American choice principles to determine initial differences between their ratings. For all three levels of choice principles, there were no significant differences between the Anglo–American and Pilipino–American ratings. Therefore, this hypothesis could not be tested. Table 4 summarizes these findings.

Table 4 – Anglo–American and Pilipino–American Ratings of American Choice Principles

		Mean	S.D.	t	p
CCP's	Anglo Ratings	7.00	.95	−.80	.425
	Pilipino Ratings	7.16	.96		
ICP's	Anglo Ratings	6.57	1.14	−.95	.344
	Pilipino Ratings	6.80	1.10		
PCP's	Anglo Ratings	6.81	1.19	1.07	.289
	Pilipino Ratings	6.56	1.03		

The lack of initial differences suggests that the Pilipino–Americans may have been previously acculturated, at least to some significant degree, prior to immigrating to the U.S. If so, then the attraction model may apply better than the conflict model.

Hypothesis 5

The CCP's across generations are less likely to change and change less than ICP's and PCP's.

In order to test this hypothesis, the levels of endorsement of the Pilipino choice principles across generations will be determined by calculating the mean indices across first and second generations.

Prediction 5.1:

The mean of the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino C) and (Pilipino2)(Pilipino C) indices will be higher than the mean of the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) and (Pilipino2)(Pilipino I) indices.

T–tests were performed comparing the means of these two sets of indices. The analysis yielded positive significant results. The mean of the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino C) and (Pilipino2)(Pilipino C) indices was 7.28 (S.D.=1.07). The mean of the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino I) and (Pilipino2)(Pilipino I) indices was 6.99 (S.D.=.96). This significant difference was in the direction predicted (t=2.61, p=.013). See Table 5.1 for a summary of these findings.

Table 5.1 – Means of First and Second Generation Ratings of Pilipino CCP's and ICP's

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Pilipino CCP's	7.28	1.07	2.61	.013
Pilipino ICP's	6.99	.96		

Prediction 5.2: The mean of the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino C) and (Pilipino2)(Pilipino C) indices will be higher than the mean of the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) and (Pilipino2)(Pilipino P) indices.

T–tests were performed comparing the means of these two sets of indices. The analysis yielded positive significant results. The mean of the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino C) and (Pilipino2)(Pilipino C) indices was 7.28 (S.D.=1.07). The mean of the (Pilipino1)(Pilipino P) and (Pilipino2)(Pilipino P) indices was 5.47 (S.D.=1.00). This significant difference was in the direction predicted (t=10.90, p<<.001). See Table 5.2 below for a summary of these findings.

Table 5.2 – Means of First and Second Generation Ratings of Pilipino CCP's and PCP's

	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Pilipino CCP's	7.28	1.07	10.90	<<.001
Pilipino PCP's	5.47	1.00		

The data clearly supported the last hypothesis. The index for the CCP's was significantly higher than the index for the ICP's, and markedly higher than the index for the PCP's. The t–value of 10.90 and p–value of <.001 were quite notable. These results strongly confirmed the conceptualization that across generations CCP's were most resistant to change relative to ICP's and PCP's.

The Applicability of the Attraction Model Versus the Conflict Model

Overall, the data suggested that the attraction model was more applicable in this population than the conflict model. The several indicators are as follows. As indicated by the findings for hypothesis 3, the absence of a Preferred PCP suggested that the Pilipino–American immigrants were not hanging on to their native culture by endorsing a particular PCP much more than the others, and subsequently passing this on to the following generation. In the conflict model, the Preferred PCP is an important PCP since it carries the burden of embodying the native way of life. The absence of a Preferred PCP suggested that the prediction

that a native PCP would be strongly retained, despite the pressures from the host culture to change, was not supported.

Furthermore, as indicated by the entire set of analyses for hypothesis 4, there were no significant initial differences between the Pilipino–American ratings of the Pilipino and American CCP's and ICP's. This finding applied both across and within generations. This lack of initial differences suggested that the Pilipino–American immigrants may have been previously acculturated to the American way of life. Moreover, it is reasonable that one of their primary reasons for inmigrating to the U.S. was their attraction to the American way of life. Practically speaking, the status of an immigrant implies that the voluntary move to another country was primarily motivated by being drawn to the new host culture. In contrast, the status of a refugee means that the move was involuntary, and therefore the new host culture may not necessarily be more attractive than the native culture.

In addition, the characteristic Pilipino belief in the colonial mentality further supports this notion of being drawn to the new host culture. According to the notion of the colonial mentality, most if not all aspects of America and the American way of life is better than the native Pilipino ways. The findings for those Pilipino–Americans who have been residents of the U.S. for five years and less further corroborate these general notions.

Although this study examined the extent to which the conflict model accounts for the nature of the process of change in acculturation, the background facts that have been outlined above suggest that the attraction model is more applicable to this population. As mentioned earlier, the selection of the conflict model was based on the clinical interest in focusing on the difficulties in adjusting to a new culture. Although the difficulties in adjustment can also be studied within the attraction model, those difficulties are qualitatively different from those within the conflict model. The difficulties within the conflict model are of relatively greater clinical interest, since those difficulties more clearly impinge on a person's ability to engage in their native social practices and thereby satisfy basic human needs.

Limitations of the Study

The limitations of this study can be classified in the following categories: (a) specificity of the ethnic groups, (b) specificity of the model, (c) limitations in sampling, (d) limitations in the instrument, and (e) limitations in the procedures. Each of these aspects will be reviewed below.

Although the conceptualization can be applied to any two ethnic groups and cultures, this study strictly examined the Pilipino and Anglo–American cultures. The conceptualization of a hierarchy of choice principles may, in practice, apply differently in two other cultures. Although there is no apparent reason that this would be the case, the results of this study do not necessarily preclude the possibility that the process of acculmration proceeds differently in other ethnic

groups. In any case, these findings cannot be necessarily or logically generalized to other ethnic groups.

Moreover, the model that was tested in this study is only one of the possible models that can be derived from the conceptualization. The conflict and attraction models were the only two models that were explicitly described and developed. As an example of an alternative model, a learning model wherein a culturally displaced person acquires new choice principles through a process of learning is also plausible. This learning process could also proceed from the peripheral to the central level. Alternatively, some combination of any of the three possible models mentioned thus far may actually account for the phenomenon. In any case, the conclusions and assertions that can be made must be limited to those that can be directly derived from the conflict model and not any other model.

Within this specific model, there are further limitations concerning the particular population samples that were studied. The demographic characteristics of the Pilipino–American and Anglo–American populations were reasonably distinct. Almost half (46.8%) of the Pilipino–American group was recruited from a Catholic church, and as such their responses may be confounded with whatever choice principles are associated with practicing Catholics. Approximately two–thirds of the entire Pilipino–American sample were women. Within the second generation, eighty percent were women. Although no significant gender differences were found, the sample was not balanced in terms of gender. Regarding sample size, the first generation group was almost twice the size of the second generation group. Such a discrepancy limits the degree of confidence in making clear comparisons between the generations. Finally, the mean duration of residency in the U.S. for the first generation was 13.5 years. There were only eleven subjects who have been in the U.S. for five years or less. It is reasonable to speculate that the results may be different for a larger number of recent immigrants.

Regarding the demographic characteristics of the Anglo–American group, certain differences between the Anglo–American and the Pilipino–American sample characteristics may render these two populations limited in their comparability. For example, less than one–third of the Anglo–American sample was recruited from the same Catholic church, as compared to almost half in the Pilipino–American sample. Also, the Anglo–American sample was better balanced in terms of gender compared to the Pilipino–American sample. Finally, the Anglo–American sample consisted primarily of students (42.9%) compared to the more balanced distribution of occupations in the Pilipino–American sample. These sampling limitations in both populations limit the generalizability of these findings accordingly.

Certain limitations are inherent in drawing interpretations and conclusions from the findings of an instrument that has never been utilized. Primarily, the Perspectives Questionnaire sampled only certain choice principles that were derived from the cultural analyses of Pilipino and American cultures. Although

there is no clear indication that this particular sample was systematically biased in any way, it is plausible that this sample may not be the most sensitive in detecting differences between the cultures and changes in the process of acculturation. This limitation may be due to limitations in the cultural analyses and/or the manner in which these choice principles were described in the instrument. Despite these potential deficits and limitations, the sample that was utilized can be regarded as sound to the extent that the hypotheses were supported. A different sample of choice principles may or may not yield different findings.

Another aspect of the limitations of this new instrument concerns the face validity of the questionnaire. As questions that have been created and never tested, one can rely on face validity to assert with reasonable confidence that the items tap whatever they were designed to assess. However, one cannot definitively determine whatever additional constructs any given item taps as well. This uncertainty provides a clear and natural basis for improvement of the items. Additional refinements include undergoing reliability studies, as well as determining the extent to which items that are designed to measure the same choice principle correlate with each other, and then discarding and/or modifying those items that do not correlate.

Procedurally, there are clearly better ways than utilizing a questionnaire to establish and assess the degree of endorsement of choice principles. However, these methods are essentially unfeasible given the scope of this study. In principle, more direct ways of assessment could provide more accurate data. These methods may include, for example, extensive interviews, actual responses and choices in a set of specified conditions, and direct behavioral observation in naturalistic conditions. Nonetheless, there are no apparent indicators or reasons to believe that the questionnaire format was systematically biased.

In sum, the limitations described above specify the parameters within which one can and cannot make reasonable interpretations, conclusions, and statements about the phenomenon of acculturation as it has been conceptualized. Nevertheless, despite such parameters this study remains as a piece of pioneer research, since there have been no studies heretofore that have examined the acculturation of Pilipino–Americans.

Recommendations for Future Research

The recommendations for future research will be described in the following two areas. First, recommendations for improving the current study will be articulated. Second, recommendations for developing this area of research will be delineated.

Regarding the limitations in the samples studied, the primary recommendation is to increase the size of the second generation group. The sample size of fifteen subjects was considered to be the absolute minimum with which to draw some interesting conclusions from the findings. A larger number of subjects, and a number that was comparable with the size of the first generation, would increase

the generalizability of the findings. The second recommendation is to recruit from a greater variety of sources. A sample that is predominantly from one source, in this case a church, limits the interpretations and conclusions that can be drawn. The sample can also be improved by having a balanced mix of men and women. This recommendation is specifically applicable to the second generation sample. Another recommendation is to increase the number of subjects who have been residents of the U.S. for five years or less. Additionally, improving the distribution of years within this duration would be preferable. The combination of a limited total number of subjects with a narrow distribution of duration greatly limits the conclusions that can be drawn from this group. Lastly, greater confidence in the interpretations and conclusions can be attained by improving the overall comparability of the Anglo–American and Pilipino–American samples. Controlling and matching most demographic factors between these two groups would more clearly isolate the actual differences that are of prime interest in this study.

With regard to recommendations concerning the instrument, the primary area of improvement is based on the mutual exclusivity of two predictions. Refining the conceptualization and description of the choice principle regarding eating with one's hands is of critical importance. An articulation of the distinction between the public and private implementation of this choice principle would likely yield different results. The improvement would be in the conceptualization itself, the descriptions in the instrument, and the descriptions in the scale administered to the Anglo–American raters to determine the degree of incompatibility of the Pilipino PCP's with the American way of life.

A secondary recommendation regarding the instrument is to refine the descriptions of other ambiguous and otherwise inadequately clear items in the questionnaire that may have contributed to missing data and/or inaccurate responses. A small but significant number of items were left unanswered despite the availability of the experimenter during the administration and completion of the questionnaires. Furthermore, it is quite reasonable to assume that despite great efforts in creating clearly stated items, not all of the items were adequately clear to all of the subjects. Improving the descriptions of the items would likely reduce the error variance. Further improvements in the instrument could be done by performing reliability studies, as well as by testing the correlation between items that were designed to measure the same choice principles.

Refinements in the cultural analyses could yield a set of choice principles that may more effectively tap the differences between Anglo–American and Pilipino cultures. Although the cultural analyses that were performed focused on the areas of conflict between the two cultures, the set of choice principles that were selected may not accurately reflect those areas of conflict. Perhaps a different set of choice principles would show greater differences between the levels of endorsement by the Pilipino–American subjects.

With regard to procedural refinements, utilizing a method of assessment and data collection that is more direct and intensive may provide more accurate data. Methods such as extensive interviews and direct observations may present different results.

The second broad area of recommendations for future research involves those steps that may be taken in developing this particular area of research. A natural extension of this research would be to apply this conceptualization in studying the acculturation of other ethnic and cultural groups. These groups could be other culturally displaced persons in the U.S., or those in other countries. The conceptualization was designed to be generalizable to potentially any cultural group. Further studies could test this generalizability.

In this study, Pilipino–Americans in the Denver Metro area of Colorado were studied. The Pilipino–American community in Colorado is very small relative to the Pilipino–American population in other areas of the U.S. These areas include California, Hawaii, New York, and Washington where the Pilipino–American communities are of significant size, and degree of organization and cohesion. Studying the acculturation of Pilipino–Americans in communities that are better developed than that in Colorado may yield very different findings and conclusions.

Another area of future research may be to study the acculturation of other culturally displaced groups. Culturally displaced persons consists of refugees, sojourners, returning veterans, as well as immigrants. In principle, the conceptualization could apply in the acculturation of any of these culturally displaced groups. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that different models of change may apply depending on the circumstances of departure from the original culture and arrival in the new culture.

As a final area of future research, the examination of other models that can be derived from the broader conceptualization may further illuminate the phenomenon of acculturation. A potential initial step would be to examine how the attraction model differs from the conflict model. Once the differences were clarified, then the applicability of the attraction model per se could be studied. Otherwise, other models could be generated and tested. These models may or may not be contingent on the characteristics of the particular group being studied.

In closing, the increasing mobility of people on a worldwide scale combined with the ever changing international sociopolitical conditions render this particular area of research especially salient. The increasing number of culturally displaced persons on an international scale calls for improving our understanding of the phenomenon of adapting to new cultures.

APPENDIX A: CULTURAL PARAMETRIC DESCRIPTIONS

Pilipino Culture

Members

The members of Pilipino society are a very diverse group consisting of many distinct social, political, linguistic, religious, and cultural communities. This diversity is rooted in certain geographic and historical facts about the Philippines. Geographically, the country is composed of an archipelago of over 7,000 islands and islets, of which about 800 are inhabited. Historically, the Philippines has been occupied by various people across time including the original Malaysians and Indonesians, followed later by the Spaniards, Chinese, Indians, and Americans (Pido, 1985).

Due to over 300 years of Spanish colonization, more than 80% of the population are Christian, of which the vast majority are Roman Catholics and a very small proportion belonging to various Protestant sects. Muslims amount to about 4% of the population. Approximately 40% of the population live in lowland urban areas. Most of these people are educated and make their living through a money market system. Roughly 60% of Pilipinos live in mountainous rural areas and make their living by working the land. These people are generally much less educated, and some are still on the barter economy (Pido, 1985).

Since the study of acculturation is the purpose of this examination, the Pilipino–American immigrant community will be the focus. One of the primary reasons Pilipinos immigrate to the U.S. is to improve their economic opportunities. Secondary reasons include better educational opportunities, reuniting with family members already in the U.S., political discontentment, and simply the spirit of adventure (Pido, 1985). Since the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, many immigrants are professionals, such as dentists, doctors, accountants, lawyers, teachers, and engineers. Accordingly, the majority of them are middle class and well educated.

World

For review, this parameter refers to the context, structure, and principles of the world as it is understood. This includes (a) the place of the community in the world, (b) the history of the community, including its relations and interactions with other communities, and (c) the past, present, and (in principle) future history of the world.

The place of the community in the world

The current place of the Philippines and its people in the world is largely the outcome of the rise and fall of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. In the early 70's, he declared martial law, thereby suspending the Constitution and civil liberties. He continued to rule the country through Presidential Decrees until 1986 when the "People Power" revolution ousted him from power and placed Corazon Aquino as the newly elected president. She remained in power until the recent election of Fidel Ramos as the new president. As a result of the many years of Marcos rule, the Philippine economic resources have been all but completely depleted. Accordingly, the Philippines is currently attempting to rebuild itself after years of economic devastation.

The history of the community

The oldest known inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are people who are racially identical to the Pygmies of Africa (Pido, 1985). These people are called the "Negritos" (or little Negroes), which was a term originated by the Spaniards. After the Negritos, the Malays migrated from what is now Malaysia and Indonesia about 7,000 years ago. Following this large migration, small groups of people from China, Arabia, and India came to settle in the Philippines. Then in 1521, Magellan claimed the Philippines for Spain and named it after Prince Philip. The period of Spanish colonization began shortly thereafter and continued until 1898. During this colonization period, the Spaniards transformed much of the Pilipino culture in many ways including converting most of the Pilipinos to Catholicism. As part of the settlement of the Spanish–American War, the Philippines became a United States colony in 1898. The Philippines later became an independent republic in 1935. The next period of foreign occupation occurred during World War II when the Japanese occupied the Philippines from 1941 to 1946. From 1946 until the declaration of martial law by Marcos, the Philippines was a self-governing republic. Since the ousting of Marcos in 1986, the Philippines has resumed being a self-governing republic.

The history of the world

Most cultures have certain beliefs and/or mythologies about the origin of people and the different races. In the Philippines, most children are taught at a young age that story about how God (known as Bathala) created the first human being (Pido, 1985). This legend is told in the metaphor of pottery.

Bathala created the first human being in his image from clay and placed it in a kiln to be fired. He let the clay figure stay too long and the image was burnt black, and so the first black person was created. At the second attempt, God was too cautious and did not get the correct temperature and firing time. The image was "uncooked" and too pale, and so the first white person was created. On the third attempt, Bathala had the correct mixture of clay and just the proper kiln

temperature and firing time. The result was the creation of the first man who was truly in the image of God, the brown person.

Context, structures, principles, and beliefs

Pilipino culture has a personalistic view of the universe (Church, 1987; Marcelino, 1990). This perspective states that the universe is directly controlled by personal beings other than, and different from, oneself and others like oneself. This differs from a more Western mechanistic belief which states that the universe is governed by impersonal laws that humans can discover and manipulate.

Pilipinos also believe that good is limited. One individual or group of individuals cannot advance except at the expense of another, since there is only one source of good common to all. This belief is supposedly the basis of the common human failing of envy (Lynch, 1973).

Another belief is that success is undeserved by any person. If a person claims success as a personal achievement, or takes pride in it, or refuses to share it with others, then that person positively deserves failure. By sharing success and ascribing it to fate or luck, the envy of others who have been "deprived" by the successful person is averted. This behavior also assures that the good fortune will not be withdrawn since success is not attributed to personal effort or merit.

A frequently documented belief that characterize Pilipinos is the *colonial mentality* (Church, 1987; Enriquez, 1988; Marcelino, 1990). This mentality is characterized by the belief that the colonizer (in this case Spaniards and Americans) are superior in many, if not most ways, to the colonized. The social, economic, and political realities that provided the basis for this mentality was the experience of over four centuries of Anglo and mestizo rulers almost exclusively holding power, authority, prestige, and wealth. Accordingly, the colonized Pilipinos adopt many of the beliefs and values of the colonizer, and attempt to emulate the colonizer. In general, the colonial mentality leads many Pilipinos to believe that they are inferior and second-class to Americans and other Anglo groups. Many Pilipinos attempt to improve their status and increase their behavior potential by emulating Anglos in ways that they can. This colonial mentality is evidenced in many aspects of Pilipino culture. Most Pilipinos regard light complexion and European features to be more attractive than traditional Pilipino features. Goods that are made in the U.S. are generally regarded as superior to those made domestically. Behaviorally, when Pilipinos interact with Anglos many act in a manner characterized by conformity, obedience, obsequiousness, humility, and high sensitivity to the white person's needs and approval (Lynch, 1973).

Statuses

The concept of status can be formulated in terms of position, in terms of relationships, in terms of standards, in terms of reasons, and in terms of

perspective. The different formulations give us different views of the same concept, and the different idioms reflect different conceptual contexts or conceptual perspectives.

General order of statuses

Overall, the different statuses within Pilipino culture are vertically arranged wherein the superordinate status has higher standing in the community than any of the subordinate statuses. In those cases where there are no clear vertically oriented differences in status, preference and loyalty are given to those statuses that are more similar and more closely related; i.e., (in order of increasing distance) nuclear family over other kinsmen, close relatives over other kinsmen, kinsmen over non-kinsmen, neighbors over other townmates, townmates over outsiders, those with the same mother tongue over those with a different mother tongue, and finally those with the same religion over those with a different religion (Lynch, 1973).

Social class

In general, the society is divided into three broad classes. There is a very small ruling and wealthy elite. Many, if not most, of these people belong to long established wealthy families. The middle class is larger than the upper class and includes professionals, white collar workers, and blue collar workers who live and work in urban areas. More than half of the population belong to the rural lower class who generally live below the poverty level (Pido, 1985).

The notion of equivalence

As regarded from outside a given group of persons, each group member represents and is equivalent to the total membership. For instance, person A is equivalent to group A since a member stands for his group. Also, person A1 is equivalent to person A2 since one member stands for another. Finally, person A is equivalent to person B if they are spouses (Lynch, 1973).

The notion of solidarity

As viewed from inside a given group, fellow members are united against other groups of the same kind (e.g., families, villages, towns, and so on). Accordingly, any degradation of a group member is a degradation of the entire group (at whatever level); and so group retaliation is justified. Similarly, any member who disgraces himself disgraces the entire group, just as any member's success is a success of the group (Lynch, 1973).

Social stratification based on racial background

Another vestige from the days of Spanish colonialism is the social stratification system based on race (Enriquez, 1988; Pido, 1985). The original structure instituted by the Spaniards placed the Spaniards born in Spain on top; below them were the Spaniards born in the Philippines; followed by the mestizos who were half Pilipino and half Spanish; and below them were those with one quarter Spanish blood. This ranking continued down to a person who was pure Pilipino. A person's position in this complex stratification greatly determined that person's access to economic opportunities, education, and prestige.

Today much of this stratification system persists. One of the immediate ways that a person is evaluated is to what degree that person appears Spanish. Accordingly, those with lighter skin and more European features have higher status than those with darker skin and more native Pilipino features. This stratification system is clearly exemplified by persons in the entertainment industry, since they are predominantly mestizos.

Family structure and statuses

The extended family is the basic social, economic, political, and religious unit in society (Church, 1987; Enriquez, 1988; Marcelino, 1990; Pido, 1985). The paradigm case for the Pilipino extended family consists of three generations living in the same household; that is, grandparents, parents, and children. Usually, unmarried adult children do not set up their own households, but continue to live with their parents. Other relatives such as aunts, uncles, and cousins may occasionally be a part of the extended family household.

The extended family system is based on economic necessity as much as it is on cultural traditions. Pilipino society has been primarily rural and agrarian, and thus lacks the social service institutions usually present in urbanized and industrialized societies (e.g. unemployment compensation, medical insurance, welfare, social security, and so on). The extended family system provides, or at least attempts to provide, many of these services.

Membership in the extended family is not restricted to blood relatives, but also includes those who have become *compadres* (males) or *comadres* (females). These persons are non-blood related family members, and those who the family have come to consider to be informal family members. These statuses are roughly equivalent to the American notion of non-blood related "aunts" and "uncles." Ordinarily, a person acquires this status by acting as a sponsor at a marriage, baptismal, and/or confirmation ceremony.

The family statuses are hierarchically ordered. The father is generally considered to be the head of the family, followed by the mother. The children are ordered primarily according to age. Titles that denote a member's place and status in the family are used when addressing any member. For example, "kuya" refers to oldest

brother, "ate" refers to oldest sister, "ditse" refers to next younger sister, and "bunso" refers to youngest child.

The primarily role and responsibility of a parent is to raise children who will honor, respect, and practice the Pilipino values and way of life. Parents are considered to have done a good job if they raise children who are polite, considerate, well behaved, and respectful of their elders.

In general, the family treats children with great indulgence when they are young. As the child grows up, the child is raised to be always respectful to anyone of higher status, especially within the child's own family. Children also learn that they must help the family whenever they can. It is also important that the child do well in school and in social relationships in order to uphold the honor of the family. When children reach adulthood, their primary role is to begin to pay back the debt to their parents for bringing them into the world and raising them. One of the ways to do this is to always act with the family's and parents' interests in mind. Also, when parents reach old age, the children become responsible for their parents' well being until they die. It is generally unthinkable to send elderly parents to an institution such as a nursing home.

Compadrazco system (Ritual co-parenthood)

When the Spaniards converted the Pilipinos to Catholicism, among the rituals introduced was the requirement of godparents in baptisms and confirmations (Pido, 1985). The acquisition of godparents resulted in expanded kinship groups and alliances. The Pilipinos later expanded this ritual to require godparents or sponsors as part of any quasi-religious ceremony such as ordinations, weddings, house blessings, and so on. By expanding one's alliances and kinship group through this ritual, one's social status is elevated.

Neighbors

The status of being a neighbor includes the expectation that neighbors will help one another and share resources whenever necessary. Neighbors are also expected to share in household responsibilities and functions.

Age

In general, people must always pay respect to anyone significantly older than themselves (Church, 1987; Pido, 1985). Older persons must be respected for their wisdom and experience, especially the elderly. Even among siblings, the older child is entitled to the respect from all younger siblings. A person pays respect by addressing an older adult in a particular manner. For instance, in the Tagalog language, the word "po" (or less formal "ho") is used when one addresses any older adult. This practice is roughly equivalent to the use of sir or madam in English.

Regional and linguistic distinctions

Pilipinos generally identify themselves primarily by the ethnolinguistic group to which they belong (Pido, 1985). When Pilipinos meet, often times the first thing that they do is identify themselves by their regional or language affinities. (These different ethnolinguistic groups are described under "Language.")

Social Practices

This term refers to the repertoire of behavior patterns which in a given culture constitute what there is for the members to do. "Social practice" also refers to the various ways in which a given behavior pattern can be done. Some instances of social practices are having dinner, reading a newspaper, and attending an artistic performance. In general, social practices are components of organized sets or structures of social practices, the latter being referred to as institutions or organizations. Examples of the latter include raising a family, passing laws, educating children, engaging in commerce, and so on. Social practices are either intrinsic or non–intrinsic. An intrinsic social practice is one that can be understood as being engaged in without ulterior motives and without a further end in view. Non–intrinsic social practices are social practices which are not intrinsic. Most institutions generally operate like intrinsic social practices in that people do not generally need reasons to raise families, pass laws, educate their children, and so on; rather, that is simply what one does unless one has reasons not to.

A social practice that in many ways expresses the spirit of the Pilipino culture is the celebration of special occasions. Birthdays, anniversaries, baptisms, confirmations, Christmas, New Years, graduation, and departures and arrivals of guests and relatives are all considered special occasions that call for special celebrations (Pido, 1985). These celebrations are usually held in the home, and the hosts customarily spare no expense in setting a lavish spread of food and drink for their guests. A significance of this social practice is to create the opportunity to express one's hospitality and display one's material success. Ordinarily, an excessive amount of food is prepared, more than can be consumed by the guests. This is not regarded as extravagant, rather as a gesture of generosity. If one prepares only enough, or worse, insufficient amount of food and drink, then one risks being criticized for being *kuripot* (stingy). The excess food is customarily given to guests to take home with them. However, one must also be careful of being criticized for being *mayabang* (show-off).

Language

Every culture has at least one language spoken by its members. In the case of the Pilipinos, there are eight major ethnolinguistic groups, made up of 200 dialects (Pido, 1985). The eight major groups are Tagalog, Ilocano, Pampango, Pangasinan, and Bicolano in Luzon; and Warray Hiligaynor and Sugboanon in the Visayan

islands. Lastly, the Muslims on the island of Mindanao have their own language and culture.

The current national language is called "Pilipino" which uses primarily Tagalog grammatical construction and incorporates native and foreign terms and words. The fact that "Pilipino" is primarily based on Tagalog reflects the status that Tagalog has relative to the other languages.

Choice Principles

Policy statements
These are direct prescriptions for choosing behavior.

1. Maintain smooth interpersonal relationships (S.I.R.). In general, Pilipinos relate in ways that aim to continually reduce interpersonal stresses by deemphasizing differences and thereby avoiding direct face to face confrontations (Church, 1987; Enriquez, 1988; Lynch, 1973; Marcelino, 1990; Pido, 1985).

2. *Utang na loob*. This policy statement roughly translates to "debt of gratitude" or "debt of good will" (Church, 1987; Enriquez, 1988; Marcelino, 1990; Pido, 1985). This policy expresses the importance of appreciating and reciprocating acts of generosity, kindness, and love. These gestures can be received from various relationships ranging from close relationships (e.g., family and friends) to distant relationships (e.g., business acquaintances). When good will, a favor, or some service is received, whether solicited or not, it must be reciprocated. The nature and proportion of the reciprocation is primarily determined by the relative statuses of the parties involved. A person of comparatively high status is expected to reciprocate in ways that are commensurate with their status; and likewise with a person of low status. If a person does not reciprocate commensurately, that person is likely to be criticized for being *kuripot* or stingy. If a person who can return a favor does not, that person can be ostracized and that person will experience shame. If the person does not experience shame, the person is *walang hiya*, or shameless, which is a further degradation of that person's status.

3. *Pakikisama*. This policy expresses the importance of cooperation through joining a group for a common good (Church, 1987; Enriquez, 1988; Marcelino, 1990; Pido, 1985). For example, a person may join along in helping organize a birthday party, or a person agrees to going out for Chinese food on an evening out. A person who is not involved or shows indifference to the interests, welfare, and activities of the group can be regarded with suspicion and mistrust. A person is usually expected to agree, concede their personal desires, and go along with the group (or at least give that impression). If a person does not practice *pakikisama*, that person may be alienated from the group since that person may no longer be regarded as an eligible or genuine member of that group.

4. *Respeto* This policy emphasizes the acknowledgment and sensitivity to the rights, feelings, and individuality of others (Church, 1987; Enriquez, 1988; Pido,

1985). In practice respeto involves listening to the opinions of one's parents and children without judgement or blame, for example. It also involves being able to take the perspective of others, and thereby appreciating their individuality . Respeto can also involve the expectation of obedience by someone in authority.

4. Use of titles. In general, it is imperative to address people by their titles whenever possible (Church, 1987; Pido, 1985). Titles include "Doctor," "Captain," "Attorney," or even "Mr." or "Mrs.." The use of titles is a primary way of showing respect for age and authority.

Values

Although values are primarily used descriptively, they can also be used prescriptively.

1. Religiosity. The vast majority of Pilipinos are Roman Catholics. Some are devout Catholics who engage genuinely and completely in all of the tenets of the Catholic church. Others are cultural Catholics who have comparatively less understanding and appreciation of Catholic theology, and engage in the rituals and ceremonies socially, as opposed to religiously. For these people, church and religious events are primarily a socializing opportunity during which they can catch up on news "back home," eat Pilipino food, and generally enjoy the company of friends and relatives.

2. Competition. In general, Pilipinos are highly competitive (Santos, 1983). Usually, the object of the competition is not as important as winning per se, regardless of the prize. Winning and losing are not ordinarily regarded as an individual's victory or defeat, rather as a source of pride or disgrace for the entire family or group. The importance of winning often leads to high aspirations and great personal and familial sacrifices.

3. Modesty and humility. Persons who act in immodest and ostentatious ways call attention to themselves, and risk being criticized for being *mayabang* or being a show-off. Acting in these ways tends to set oneself apart from the group (Lynch, 1973).

4. Family and kinship. The extended family is the central and primary institution for Pilipinos (Lynch, 1973; Pido, 1985). The welfare of the family takes precedence over individual success. Accordingly, the individual works and makes sacrifices for his family. For example, a son or daughter may forgo marriage indefinitely if the interests of the family will be best served by remaining single. A professionally successful son or daughter may refuse a promotion if it requires relocating away from the extended family. However, the best interests of the family is not always served by remaining within the household. It is quite common for a husband to leave his family to work in another country as a means of removing his family from poverty.

In accordance with acting in the best interest of the family, those Pilipinos who have left some of their extended family behind in the Philippines will often maintain aiding, if not supporting, their families long distance. This support is

provided by sending money orders, cash inserted in letters, packages of clothing, household wares, and other necessary goods. Furthermore, homecoming trips or *balikbayan* are done regularly during which *pasalubong* (gifts one brings from a trip) are generously distributed.

5. Compassion. (*awa*) In general, any person who has suffered a grievous blow at the hand of Fate or human injustice, or who (even through their own fault) is in a helpless condition, deserves sympathy, pity, and mercy. If that person asks for assistance, that person is regarded as deserving it (Lynch, 1973).

6. Respect, deference, and obedience of authority and elders. (*galang*) As a strongly hierarchical and authoritarian society, status differences with regard to age, power, prestige, wealth, and authority are respected and honored (Church, 1987; Lynch, 1973; Pido, 1985). Gaining the approval and avoiding the displeasure of people in authority is a central value that guides behavior. Generally, Pilipinos do not talk back nor do they question authority. Authority figures are regarded as entitled to many privileges. In addition to respect and obedience, they receive adulation, and gifts in the form of money, material goods, and personal services. Aside from acknowledging the person's position of authority, these gifts and gestures are given to seek or return favors. By doing so, when a person is in need of assistance from an authority figure, that person can expect a favorable response. With regard to respect for elders, traditionally Pilipino children kiss the hands of their parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, *ninongs* and *ninangs* (godparents) when greeting them or bidding them goodbye.

7. Education. Generally, Pilipinos place great importance on the schooling of their children (Church, 1987; Pido, 1985). They regard education as the primary means to acquiring good jobs, economic security, social acceptance, and upward mobility not only for their children, but for the entire family. Getting a good quality education is so important that it is not unusual for parents to go into heavy debt and sell property to ensure that at least one of their children, usually the eldest, gets a college degree. In this instance, that child upon graduation and successful employment, is obligated to return the sacrifice by supporting the next youngest child through school. Conclusively, family welfare takes precedence over individual economic and social advancement.

8. Attaining a position of authority and importance. As a society that is very hierarchically oriented, acquiring a position of power and prestige is highly regarded (Pido, 1985). In general, most of the professional positions such as doctors, lawyers, and professors are regarded with great respect, deference, and reverence. What one accomplishes in that capacity is often secondary to having the title and position itself.

9. Well groomed appearance. In general, Pilipinos place great importance on presenting oneself as well groomed and properly dressed. Men and women usually wear fashionable, neat, and fancy attire, especially to special occasions. Santos

(1983, pg. 138) described that "it is a Pilipino tradition to dress properly when you go out."

Slogans and mottos

1. *Bayanihan*. This slogan roughly translates to describe the spirit of togetherness and gregariousness (Church, 1987; Pido, 1985).

2. Golden Rule. Based on the Roman Catholic teachings, this motto guides people to "do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

Maxims

Pragmatically, maxims have the general character of warnings or reminders.

1. *Hiya*. This term roughly translated means "shame" (Church, 1987; Enriquez, 1988; Marcelino, 1990; Pido, 1985; Santos, 1983). This maxim reminds individuals to avoid bringing shame to themselves and their families by acting with honor and dignity, and within the parameters of acceptable conduct. Hiya can be described as the uncomfortable feeling that accompanies the awareness of being in a socially unacceptable position, or performing a socially inappropriate action. In effect, hiya enforces compliance and conformity with the sanctioned social practices and choice principles. By doing so, a person is regarded as a legitimate member of the Pilipino community by the community as a whole, and the immediate person with whom one is relating.

2. *Amor Propio*. This term refers to being sensitive to personal affront (Church, 1987; Enriquez, 1988; Lynch, 1973; Pido, 1985). People act towards others in ways that preserve (or at least not threaten) another person's self esteem. Functionally, amor propio aids people in maintaining their status and social acceptance. Amor propio does not imply extreme sensitivity to personal insult such that every indignity, slighting remark, or offensive gesture is taken to heart. Rather, those degradations that threaten a person's central values and identity can warrant a retaliatory reaction.

Strategies

1. Use of third parties as go-betweens. In potentially awkward or conflictual situations, third parties are customarily used preventively or remedially (Lynch, 1973; Pido, 1985; Santos, 1983). These situations include making an embarrassing request, voicing a complaint, or communicating a difficult and controversial decision. By utilizing a third party, shame can be avoided.

2. Use of euphemisms (e.g *siguro na*). "Siguro na" roughly translates to "I guess so" or "could be" (Enriquez, 1988; Santos, 1983). By making ambiguous statements such as this, the risk of offending someone (and thereby no longer having a smooth interpersonal relationship) is minimized. By exercising subtlety and tact in relationships, a person expresses sensitivity and respect toward the other person. This strategy is particularly applicable when interacting with persons in authority.

Anglo American Culture

Members

The American society consists of people from many ethnic groups. Except for the native American Indians, all Americans or their ancestors came from foreign countries. In some cases, some Americans continue to strongly identify with their ethnic heritage. For instance, some Americans refer to themselves and others in terms such as "Swedes" or "Danes" or "Germans" (Kearny, Kearny, & Crandall, 1984). Despite the great ethnic diversity, what ties Americans together is their sense of national identity as Americans.

For the purposes of this investigation, the paradigm case American will be described with few qualifications. It is generally accepted and believed that the Anglo person is the paradigm case American. In general, most of the Anglo-Americans belong to the middle class. They generally have middle class values and live a middle class lifestyle.

World

The place of the community in the world

Americans generally regard America as the land of abundant material wealth. Most Americans are proud of their nation's ability to produce material wealth and maintain a high standard of living. Although the U.S. does not have the highest standard of living worldwide, many Americans have a nationalistic view that the U.S. is the superior nation in most respects among all other nations worldwide. Many Americans believe that the American way of life is by far the best in the world.

The history of the community

The original Anglo-Americans emigrated as colonists from Great Britain to what is now the U.S. to escape religious and political persecution. These pilgrims settled in the northeast section of the U.S. In 1776, these colonists declared their independence from Great Britain and formed the United States of America.

Statuses

Social class

In ideal terms, all people are believed to be equal, or at least have equal rights and opportunities for success and happiness. The lack of a formal class system was intended to provide equal opportunity for all members. This egalitarian society was created to prevent the socio-political oppression that caused most of the original emigrants to leave in the first place. Many of their native countries were aristocratic

in structure, and so for the most part socioeconomic opportunities were determined at birth.

In actuality, a class system exists consisting of upper, middle, and lower social classes. In general, members of the upper class are the wealthy minority. Usually, their wealth has been acquired through capitalistic means. Some of the wealthy elite do not work for a living, and many spend much of their time in leisure and recreation activities.

The vast majority of the American population belong to the middle class. Middle class persons generally work for a living and are not independently wealthy. Some members of the middle class are self employed. Unlike the upper class, most middle class people cannot afford to spend most of their time in leisure and recreation.

The lower class is smaller in number than the middle class, but the numbers are increasing. Generally, members of the lower class are unemployed, underemployed, or not in the work force for various reasons. They have the lowest standard of living especially in terms of meeting basic needs. Although the unemployed lower class commonly have much free time, this time is not usually spent on leisure or recreation.

Status as an individual

Usually, each person stands for himself or herself and is not necessarily regarded as a representative of any group. Unlike more group oriented cultures, being a member of a group is not regarded as being equivalent to the group. Each member is regarded as an independent individual who is responsible and accountable for only their own behaviors.

Family Structure and Statuses

Generally, American families are organized in a nuclear rather than an extended family system. In general, the primary function of the family is to advance the happiness and well being of the individual members. Accordingly, the needs of each individual takes priority in the life of the family.

The paradigm case nuclear family consists of a father, a mother, and at least one child. In principle, the family is not hierarchically organized wherein the parents (especially the father) are regarded as the "rulers" of the household. Instead, there is more social equality between parents and children than in many other cultures, including Pilipino culture. In a sense, the democratic system extends into the home. For instance, children are usually permitted to openly argue and disagree with their parents, within reason. Teenagers are also generally granted considerable independence, especially compared to Pilipino norms.

Children are usually regarded as young adults when they reach 18 years of age. Sometime between 18 and 21 years of age, children are ordinarily expected to

move out of their parents' home and live on their own, regardless of whether they go on to college or not. Before moving out of the home, it is usually highly valued and practiced that each child has their own room. Since American families are usually not organized around an extended family system, grandparents rarely live in the same home with their married sons and daughters; and uncles and aunts almost never do. When grandparents are no longer able to care for themselves, they generally move to a nursing home, or a home for the elderly. The elderly are not generally taken into the families of their children.

Parents

The primary role of a parent is generally to raise children who will be independent, productive, and successful adults (Kearny et al., 1984). The responsibility of raising children and being a parent usually diminishes greatly when the child is considered an adult at 18 to 21 years of age.

Children

The role of a child is primarily to learn how to be an independent, responsible, and hard working adult (Kearny et al., 1984). As children grow up, they are expected to become increasingly self reliant, self sufficient, and independent. They also are granted greater amounts of responsibility with their increasing independence. For instance, with the considerable independence that teenagers are ordinarily granted, they are also expected to earn some of their own money and manage their time accordingly.

Kinship system

Since American families are organized in terms of the nuclear family system, primary allegiance is to each person's immediate family (Kearny et al., 1984). The extended family is recognized as fellow kin, but family members generally do not have strong allegiance or identification with their extended family system.

Age and status

In general, American culture is very youth oriented. Members who are productive, active, and good consumers (usually young adults) are generally more highly regarded than members who are non-productive, sedentary, and poor consumers (in some cases the elderly). Much of the American economic system is oriented towards the affluent young. Goods and services, advertising, and many media images are particularly targeted towards these young adults.

Neighbors

Unlike more group oriented cultures, there is no cultural expectation that neighbors will help one another, as well as share resources and household responsibilities and functions (Kearny et al., 1984). Despite the absence of this

formal cultural expectation, neighbors who are helpful and share resources are appreciated and considered good neighbors.

Regional distinctions

Americans occasionally classify themselves and others in terms of geographical origin (Kearny et al., 1984). Some Americans identify themselves as being from the West Coast, the East Coast, the Midwest, the South, and so on. These geographic identifications usually imply a particular way of life which includes such characteristics as values, pace of life, and specific social practices.

Language

The national language of the U.S. is English. Different regions within the U.S. speak different dialects or have distinct accents. Spanish is the second most spoken language, and is particularly prevalent in the Southwest region.

Choice Principles

Policy statements

These are direct prescriptions for choosing behavior:

1. Every man for himself. This statement directs people to rely only on themselves for the quality of their life and how they live their life. In general, receiving support from others, including family, is accepted but not usually admired or respected.

2. Look out for number one. This statement directs people to generally put their own interest before those of others. Each person's individual interests are usually more important than those of another person, organization, government, or other institutions.

3. Hard work and self reliance is the means to material success. This statement directs people to be hard working, self reliant, and perseverant since material success is generally the inevitable and just reward.

4. Be direct and to the point. This statement directs people to be clear, explicit, honest, straightforward, and to not speak in euphemisms.

5. Say what is on your mind. This statement is very similar to the prior policy statement. People should be open and honest, and not be deceitful.

6. Act with integrity and sincerity. This statement directs people to behave in a genuine, upright and honest manner, and without pretense or deceit.

7. Fight your own battles. This statement directs people to rely on themselves and not others to resolve their own conflicts and disagreements. Americans generally consider those who turn to others for help in resolving conflicts as weak in character.

8. Individual interests come before family interests. This statement directs people to consider the interests of the family as generally secondary to the interests of the individual.

9. If at first you don't succeed, try, try, again. This statement directs people to not give up the first time they meet failure. Instead, they should continue until they have succeeded or have given their best effort.

10. When the going gets tough, the tough get going. This statement directs people to increase their efforts even more when they are confronted with obstacles in order to overcome challenges and meet their goals.

Values

Although values are primarily used descriptively, they can also be used prescriptively.

1. Individual freedom For most Americans, this is clearly the most fundamental value. This value refers to the desire and ability of all individuals to control their own destiny without outside interference from the government, a ruling class, the church, or any other institution or organized authority. This fundamental value can be traced back to the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.

2. Self reliance In general, Americans highly value a person's ability to take care of oneself, rely on oneself, and solve one's own problems. Americans generally believe that if people are not self reliant, they risk losing their freedom (Kearny et al., 1984). If people rely excessively on support from family, government, or any organization, then people may not be free to do what they want. Furthermore, if people are dependent and not self reliant, they risk losing the respect of their peers. People are allowed to receive support from charity and family, but they are not admired for doing so.

3. Equal opportunity Americans generally value the equal chance that all members have of succeeding, at least in principle. Since the U.S. does not have a hereditary aristocracy, social class per se does not determine one's status and opportunities in life.

4. The Protestant Work Ethic In general, Americans place great importance and value in hard work and self discipline as the virtuous way of living (Kearny et al., 1984). The work of all people, not just those of the church, is regarded as holy. The capacity for self discipline, defined as the willingness to save and invest one's hard earned money rather than spend it on immediate pleasures, is a holy characteristic blessed by God.

5. Self Improvement Another aspect of the Protestant heritage is the value of self improvement (Kearny et al., 1984). The importance of self improvement is rooted in the fundamental religious belief in the natural wickedness of human nature. This wickedness cannot be forgiven by a priest acting in God's name. Instead, people are left responsible to improve themselves or else suffer eternal punishment by God

for their wickedness. Accordingly, Protestantism encourages a solid and persistent desire for self improvement.

6. Pursuit of Happiness The Constitution of the United States ensures all citizens of the right, among others, to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Each citizen has the right to take advantage of the opportunities for enjoyment, entertainment, and fun.

7. Competition Most Americans value competition and regard it as the price to pay for equal opportunity. Much of life is regarded as a race for success through competition with others.

8. Upward mobility This term refers to the improvement of one's lifestyle by raising one's social standing (i.e., occupation, income, social class, and so on). In general, Americans value upward mobility as the reward for hard work. In principle, upward mobility is attainable for every citizen because of equal opportunity.

9. Material wealth Generally, Americans value acquiring and maintaining a large number of material possessions since material wealth is the most widely accepted measure of success. Also, material wealth is regarded as tangible evidence of one's abilities and accomplishments.

10. Hard work Being industrious and working diligently and vigorously in one's job is regarded as the means to success. Material wealth is believed to be the natural reward for hard work. Through hard work, anyone can achieve a high standard of living, at least in principle.

11. Inventiveness Americans generally value the ability to create solutions for new problems, and to create inventions and new ways of doing things. The pioneers of the Old West were the prime embodiment of this value.

12. Can–do spirit Many Americans value having a sense of optimism that every problem has a solution, and take pride in meeting challenges and overcoming difficult obstacles (Kearny et al., 1984). Generally speaking, a difficult problem can be solved immediately, while an impossible one may take a bit longer.

13. Consumption over conservation Generally, Americans highly regard the consumption of goods and services for the following reasons: (a) comfort (e.g., as seen in the way homes are furnished, cars are designed, and manner in which people travel), (b) cleanliness (e.g., as exemplified by the media propagation of deodorants, mouthwash, cleansers, and laundry detergents), (c) novelty (e.g., as seen in the popularity of the phrase "new and improved," and in the tendency to replace old possessions with new ones even though old ones are still functional), and (d) convenience (e.g., as exemplified by fast food restaurants, numerous types of labor saving devices, and convenience foods that are already prepared or precooked). For these reasons, conservation is secondary to consumption.

Slogans and mottos

1. Stand on your own two feet. This motto directs people to be self reliant and self sufficient.

2. Pull yourself up by your bootstraps. This motto directs people to rely on their own strength and bring themselves up when they are in a difficult situation.

3. Going from rags to riches. This slogan refers to the "American Dream" of material success. A person goes from being poor and wearing rags to having material wealth and economic success.

4. Keeping up with the Joneses. This motto urges people to buy possessions that are equal to or better than what others have.

5. God helps those who help themselves. This slogan states that God will only help those persons who attempt to meet their goals on their own.

6. Early to bed and early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise. This motto reflects the Protestant work ethic which states that hard work leads to material and personal success. A means to this success is by taking care of oneself by getting adequate rest, and by utilizing the full day.

7. Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow you may die. This motto reflects the importance of the present over the future in American culture. One should enjoy themselves fully today, since tomorrow is uncertain and death is inevitable.

8. Actions speak louder than words. This slogan states that a person's behaviors are more genuine than a person's statements.

9. Life is what you make it. This slogan states that each person is responsible for and in control of making their life the way they want it to be.

10. Cleanliness is next to Godliness. This slogan reflects the belief of most Americans that it is important and holy to keep their bodies clean by washing themselves and wearing clean clothes daily. Indeed, many Americans are offended by anyone who does not follow their accepted standards of cleanliness.

11. Time is money. This slogan reflects the importance and value of time in the pursuit of economic wealth and success.

12. May the best person win. This slogan reflects the importance of fair competition. In competition, the person who is most capable inevitably wins.

13. To the winner belongs the spoils. This slogan reflects the value that American culture places on competition. The winner of a competition deserves the prize, while the loser gains nothing.

14. It's a dog–cat–dog world. This slogan reflects the values of self reliance and competition. The world is a fiercely competitive place where a person can only rely on themselves and their own resources for success.

15. It's not whether you win or lose, it's how you play the game. This slogan reflects the value of fair play and personal effort. The manner in which one attempts to reach a goal is more important than the results of those efforts.

Maxims
Pragmatically, maxims have the general character of warnings or reminders.

1. Look before you leap. This maxim reminds people to examine the situation carefully and thoroughly before taking action.

2. Never look a gift horse in the mouth. This maxim reminds people not to scrutinize a gift that is generously given.

3. Save something for a rainy day. This maxim urges people to save resources for possible difficult times in the future.

4. Idle hands are the devil's workshop. This maxim warns people that those who do not work hard are susceptible to evil.

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Kids *Interest Discovery Studies* (KIDS KITS):

A Descriptive Psychology Perspective

Catherine M. Felknor

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews some of the concerns that have been raised about the educational system during the past several decades. Many of these concerns focus on the need for students, especially at-risk students, to take greater responsibility for and to be more actively involved in their education. An educational program which promotes self-directed learning and student responsibility, as well as skill development, is presented. Using a Descriptive Psychology perspective not only illuminates the elements, processes and outcomes of this program, but helps to understand why the program is successful when done well and, also, how it can go wrong.

In recent decades, there have been many debates about the quality, success and failure of our educational system. These debates often reveal different definitions of what constitutes quality education, and also reflect a lack of any clear conceptualization of either the educational process or its outcomes. Frequently, the educational system is viewed in very simplistic terms without recognition of the

complex interrelationships that exist among its various elements, processes, and outcomes. This paper first considers a conceptualization of education posed by Howard Gardner (1991) which is much more complex than most and incorporates findings from cognitive research that indicate important variations across students. A brief review is given of selected issues raised in several books and articles written during the past 30 years which have identified problems and documented serious deficiencies that occur in many schools. The paper focuses on one educational program which is based on a complex conceptualization which parallels several of the ideas presented by Gardner, including the notion that different students learn and understand in different ways. Using a Descriptive Psychology perspective not only illuminates the elements, processes and outcomes of this program, but helps to understand why the program is successful when done well and, also, how it can go wrong.

Howard Gardner, in *The Unschooled Mind: How Children Think and How Schools Should Teach* (1991), describes three types of understanding: intuitive or natural understanding, rote or ritualistic understanding, and disciplinary or genuine understanding. The first allows for some degree of competency in dealing with the everyday world, but understandings may be immature, misleading, or actually misconceived. The second type reflects the conventional performances which most educators view as acceptable—students responding by repeating particular facts, concepts or solutions which have been taught. Such responses do not preclude genuine understanding, but fail to assure that genuine understanding has occurred. The third type of understanding is evidenced when students are able to take information and skills they have learned and apply them appropriately in new situations. There is little evidence that students achieve this type of understanding at least in part because schools are not promoting such understandings (Gardner, 1991).

Gardner and others working in the area of cognitive research conclude that students learn, remember, perform and understand in different ways. As Gardner points out, these differences challenge an educational system that assumes everyone can learn from the same materials in the same way with a single measure to assess student learning. The chances of acquiring genuine understanding are enhanced if multiple entry points are recognized and utilized. Genuine understanding is most likely to occur if the learner uses concepts and skills in several ways. An educational approach which integrates multiple entry points and allows a variety of formats for representing learning is not only beneficial for the learners, but also, "the way in which we conceptualize understanding is broadened." (Gardner, 1991, p. 13).

One purpose of Gardner's 1991 book is to suggest educational interventions which encourage more genuine understanding. While he reviews a number of possibilities, he notes most can be linked to two major themes: the **apprenticeship approach** and the **children's museum approach**. Both of these strategies involve

considerable hands-on activities with a variety of materials. In addition, the following features are typically present: (1) use of mentors; (2) the use of models or real objects to facilitate learning, and (3) the use of concepts and skills in carrying out real tasks. These types of learning situations usually involve interacting with others in the learning activity or in sharing what is learned.

Unfortunately, these approaches are rarely implemented in public schools. Research studies describing the climate and operation of schools have painted a somewhat dismal picture for several decades: *The Underachieving School* (John Holt, 1969); *Crisis in the Classroom* (Charles Silberman, 1970); *A Place Called School* (John Goodlad, 1984); *Schools of Thought* (Rexford Brown, 1991); as well as the book by Howard Gardner noted above. In one of the most extensive studies, John Goodlad collected in-depth information from over 1,000 classrooms at all levels of public school (elementary, junior high, and high school). According to the results of his seven year study, students ". . . rarely planned or initiated anything, read or wrote anything of some length, or created their own products. And they scarcely ever speculated on meanings, discussed alternative interpretations, or engaged in projects calling for collaborative effort." The topics in the curriculum, it appeared ". . . were something to be acquired, not something to be explored, reckoned with, and converted into personal meaning and development." (Goodlad, 1983, p. 468)

For more than a decade, much has been written about the desirability of getting students to take responsibility for their learning. The National Commission on Excellence in Education, *A Nation At Risk* (1983), advocated greater responsibility and increased involvement for all students. Brown (1991, page 249) states that "... students at all ages must take increasing responsibility for their learning. That is the only way to get them deeply engaged and committed to their education." A great deal of attention has been focused on the problems of low achievement by at-risk students as well as the challenge of keeping them in school. In some districts, however, there is an equal level of concern expressed about providing challenging instructional programs for the gifted and talented students.

There is an educational program which provides a possible remedy for many of the concerns raised by the authors noted above and uses the approaches recommended by Gardner. It integrates student responsibility and self direction as well as promoting increased learning. The program, Kids Interest Discovery Studies Kits (**KIDS KITS**), has been demonstrated to be effective with a wide range of students including at-risk, special needs, and academically gifted students (Petersen and Felknor, 1990; Felknor, 1992a; Felknor, 1992b).

The goal of the **KIDS KITS** program is to promote independent, self-directed learning, as well as research and study skills. These goals are accomplished through the development of thinking and questioning skills, awareness and use of numerous learning resources, application of the information gained, and increased enthusiasm for research activities. Kits are organized sets of multimedia materials designed to

elicit active student involvement in higher levels of thinking and independent learning. Kits include filmstrips, video tapes, audio tapes, real objects, models, games, puzzles, slides, diagrams, transparencies, charts, etc. as well as books and other types of print material. The high interest materials vary in terms of difficulty and learning modality so that all students can find resources suited to their ability level and learning style. Kit topics reflect areas of student interest and relate to regular curriculum especially for science and social studies.

Once the general topic has been established, student participation moves through four phases or stages (Petersen and Felknor, 1990): **exploration** (where students examine materials to stimulate interest and generate questions), **in–depth study** (where students identify/articulate specific questions and locate information to answer those questions), **application** (where students plan and prepare presentations or products which will demonstrate what they have learned), and **sharing** (presentations, displays, discussions, etc.).

The program can be used in the regular classroom, in the library or LMC (library media center), and in special program settings. Students may work individually, in pairs, in small groups or in moderate size groups. Grouping may be homogeneous or heterogeneous. The program can be used in any organizational structure (i.e., single grade classrooms or multigrade units; single teacher, teaching teams, or subject area departments; etc.). In addition to serving the needs of regular students, **KIDS KITS** is well suited to meet the needs of special populations, including gifted, Title I, at–risk, English as a second language, and those with learning disabilities or other special needs. It is possible to serve this wide variety of needs because, within the kit, students can find materials appropriate for their reading level and their learning style. In addition, students are able to demonstrate their learning in a format of their own choosing. Both of these conditions increase the probability of a challenging and successful learning experience. The program has been used successfully with all types of students in settings ranging from preschool through eighth grade and with special need populations at the high school level.

KIDS KITS has been nationally validated, and training has been conducted through the National Diffusion Network (NDN) for thousands of schools across the country and in US territories. In addition to the training, a manual and supplementary material help educators plan and implement the program at their site (Petersen and Felknor, 1990).

A DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY PERSPECTIVE

Descriptive Psychology provides a useful framework for understanding the structure and significance of the **KIDS KITS** program. The framework also can be used to systematically compare **KIDS KITS** and other more traditional approaches.

One of the maxims of Descriptive Psychology states that a person acquires concepts and skills through practice and experience in the social practices which involve the use of the concepts or the skills (Ossorio, 1981a; Shideler, 1988). This maxim provides the rationale for the **KIDS KITS** program since it is a social practice, with stages and options, that allows students to make use of concepts and skills which will enable them to become self-directed learners.

Within the education field this situation is frequently referred to as doing activities for real purposes (i.e., participating in a social practice). Examples are reading in order to find some information on a topic of interest or answer questions articulated by the student, and writing because the student has something to say on an issue/topic, rather than doing these tasks simply to fulfill an assignment given by the teacher. From the student's vantage point, participation in this social practice may be described as intrinsically motivated and offers both eligibility and opportunity to pursue his/her own interests through investigative study and discovery of information. This social practice is far different from the traditional approach of teacher assigned questions and students parroting back information dispensed by lecture or text book with perhaps occasional use of an encyclopedia.

In addition to the behavior maxim noted above, there are other elements from Descriptive Psychology that are useful in understanding the **KIDS KITS** program. Most notable is the Basic Process Unit along with Transition Rules 4 and 5 (Ossorio, 1981b; Shideler, 1988). Rule 4 states that "A process is a sequential change from one state of affairs to another," and Rule 5 clarifies that "A process is a state of affairs having other, related processes as immediate constituents" (Ossorio, 1981b, p. 116). A process takes place over time; it has duration. It can be decomposed into sub-processes which may be broken down even further. A process also can be viewed as part of a larger process.

The Basic Process Unit (BPU) includes a name (identifies the process) and a description that calls for specifying constituents (stages and options), relationships, elements, individuals, eligibilities, and contingencies (Ossorio, 1981b; Shideler, 1988). Elements are the logical roles or formal ingredients in the process. Individuals are assigned to or take on the various logical roles. The concept of eligibility is inseparable from the concepts of element and individual because it determines which individuals can take on certain roles or can participate in certain options. Contingencies specify the conditions under which an eligible individual actually carries out one or more of the elements of a process. During a process, relationships are continually changing, and, perhaps more accurately, could be described as a succession of different relationships (Shideler, 1988). Essential to the concept of BPU are the sub-processes which may represent stages or may be broken down into stages. For each stage, there may be more than one option regarding how it can take place. The eligibilities and contingencies determine which options are actually viable during an execution of the process. Different

patterns, that is, combinations of various alternative options for each of the stages, represent different versions of the process.

The **KIDS KITS** process involves four major stages: exploration, in–depth study, application, and sharing. During the first stage, students explore a variety of multimedia materials on a given topic. This exploration may be done by a single student, a pair of students, a small group, or a class size group. Which of these options actually occurs depends on the eligibilities of the individuals involved and the contingencies present in the situation. Within a given process, this stage serves to stimulate the student's curiosity and facilitates the articulation of questions which become the basis for subsequent stages of the process. With multiple repetitions of the social practice (i.e., engaging in the **KIDS KITS** process on several occasions over a period of time), students develop familiarity with a wide range of information resources.

In the second stage of the **KIDS KITS** process, students articulate specific questions and locate information to answer these questions. During this in–depth study, students must record in some fashion the information that is found and determine if their questions have been answered. Sometimes this in–depth study leads to new or modified questions and the information search may be expanded or change direction. With increased practice and experience (i.e., repeating the process on many occasions), the student develops the capacity to select appropriate resources—appropriate in terms of where the desired information is likely to be found, but also appropriate in terms the student's ability level and learning style. In addition, students become more adept at articulating questions and more competent in their recording (e.g., note taking, etc.) and understanding of relevant information.

During the third stage, the student applies or uses the new found knowledge. This stage involves both organization of the information and planning regarding a presentation or product which will exhibit the learning that has occurred. This stage frequently involves the use (and thus the development) of writing skills and media production skills (e.g., making transparencies, video tapes, slides, graphs, diagrams, collection displays, etc.). By engaging in different options for this stage of the process over time, each student should become skillful in using a variety of formats for presenting information.

In the final stage of the social practice, students realize further intrinsic satisfaction as well as public accreditation for the achievement by sharing the fruits of their work with others. There are several options for carrying out this stage of the process. Products may be placed on display; bound books may become part of the class/school library; students may lead a discussion with a small group or the whole class; articles may be written for a school newspaper or other publication; a sharing fair with displays and presentations might be held for other classes from the school or an evening fair involving the whole school might be held for parents. Sometimes a student product becomes part of the set of information available on

a given topic and can be used by other students in terms of their own interests and learning (within stages 1 and 2 of the process). Sometimes a student becomes an expert on a given topic and serves as an information resource for other students. A product might be used in other activities such as a science fair.

Participating in this complex social practice involves multiple behaviors. Many of the skills involved would require initial direct instruction with subsequent opportunity for guided practice, and independent practice with feedback to facilitate improvement. While many of these behaviors appear similar to those which may occur in a more traditional approach to education, there are two important differences. Rather than being dealt with as separate isolated skills (as frequently occurs within a more traditional approach), in **KIDS KITS** these skills and concepts are integrated into a complex multistage process. The second important difference, is the increased emphasis on the goal of self-directed learning within **KIDS KITS**. In a more traditional approach, even though similar performances may occur, they are likely to have a different significance because they are the result of teacher direction.

With regard to the second difference noted above, it is possible to view these two approaches to teaching and learning research skills as two versions of the same social practice or possibly as two different social practices: student-directed learning and teacher-directed learning (Felknor, 1991). These two social practices, each with its own set of stages and options, can be visualized as two adjacent matrices, i.e., making a three dimensional matrix: stages x options x teacher versus student directed. A given learning activity could operate totally within the teacher directed framework or totally within the student directed framework or, at certain choice points, it could move back and forth between these two parallel matrices. A fully implemented **KIDS KITS** program would operate primarily within the student directed matrix. A very traditional program would operate primarily within the teacher directed matrix. Certain circumstances (e.g., a teacher in transition toward allowing more student directed learning, requirements of district curriculum, limitations on variety of materials, etc.) could lead to a sequence of stages and options that moved back and forth between the two matrices in any of several patterns.

Figure 1 presents a diagram of how the research activity could progress along a variety of paths (different versions) moving back and forth between the two social practices as well as paths remaining within each practice. Moving along the right side of the diagram takes one through the stages in the self-directed social practice—the approach advocated by **KIDS KITS**. The stages along the left side of the diagram reflect the more common or traditional approach where few if any decisions are made by the student and participation is extrinsically controlled. Another layer of choices related to sharing activities could be added to the diagram. However, the sharing activities may be less variable (e.g., all students will share with the class), may be determined by external factors (e.g., a student may become

an expert but serving as a resource to other students depends on the needs/interests of other students), or may be separated in time from the research activity (e.g., an evening sharing fair that occurs toward the end of the school year). Thus, decisions about sharing do not fit as neatly into the diagram as do the choice points which have been depicted.

Figure 1

Teacher Directed and Student Directed Learning Activities

Four Possible choice/decision points:
‣ General Topic
‣ Specific Questions(s)
‣ Learning materials/resources used
‣ Application of information gained

Diagram by Catherine M. Felknor, *KIDS KITS Manual*, 1990. Reprinted with permission of the author.

Using the Framework of Descriptive Psychology To Understand KIDS KITS Outcomes

Looking at the **KIDS KITS** program from the perspective of Descriptive Psychology facilitates an understanding of how this program is different from the more common approach for involving students in research activities. This perspective also helps to clarify why some implementations are more successful than others. It is possible to describe the less effective situations as deficit cases or only approximations of what is intended in the **KIDS KITS** program. For example, in some schools, students rarely have access to the kits and, thus, there is not sufficient use of the skills and concepts for students to become proficient at the social practice of self–directed research/learning. In some schools, a marvelous set of kits may be used primarily by the teachers to facilitate and enrich teacher–directed learning activities—an important goal, but not the same as promoting self–directed learning carried out by the students.

In its intended mode of operation, **KIDS KITS** provides students the opportunity to learn concepts and skills relevant to the activity of inquiry/research. Students learn these concepts and skills by participating in a social practice— self–directed learning—which is basically similar to social practices in which they will need to participate in the future beyond the K–12 school setting (e.g., higher education, careers, caring for home and family, participating in civic matters, etc.). In many of these future activities, it will be more important to know how to access information and use it to answer questions than it will be to know how to memorize facts.

An essential element of the **Kids Interest Discovery Studies** program is the enhanced eligibilities rendered to students during their participation. When the class (or group) is engaged in the social practice of self–directed learning, students are treated as eligible to make multiple decisions about the course and nature of their learning activities. Many specific eligibilities are involved (described earlier in this paper). Further, time is provided to practice the skills and concepts within the context of participating in the social practice of self–directed learning. Prior learning is accredited and serves as a foundation for further or more advanced study. Growth in both knowledge and skills is recognized not only by the teacher but also by classmates and others beyond the classroom as products and presentations are shared with a variety of audiences. The class (or group) really becomes a community of learners with individuals sometimes in the actor role, sometimes in the observer role, and sometimes in the critic role as students move through the four stages of the **KIDS KITS** program, i.e., exploration, in–depth study, application and sharing. Students who are given the status of productive learner and contributor to the learning community generally accept this status and act in accord with this status. In fact, evidence from many schools has suggested

that students operating in this self-directed format accomplish much more than students in teacher-directed situations.

Evaluation Data from KIDS KITS Programs

A considerable amount of research has been conducted on the impact of this program on student learning and participation in library activities as well as on levels of thinking. In addition to two studies at the original school, data have been collected at 15 other sites across the country with different demographic characteristics. In one district, there was an opportunity to examine the effects of the two different approaches represented in Figure 1 above.

KIDS KITS was chosen for use in the Title I After-School Program in a large urban school district. The After-School Program was initiated to serve students who were on the waiting list for participating in the regular Title I program that was conducted during the school day. It was decided to serve third through fifth grade students, with the priority on fourth and fifth graders, since it was likely that they might not have the opportunity to receive any other Title I services before they moved on to middle school. The After-School Programs met twice a week for one hour and 15 minutes. Ten schools participated in the pilot program.

Observation and Description of Program Operation

Two schools were selected for the data collection activity. The After-School instructors agreed to allow periodic observation of their programs in order to provide documentation of how the programs evolved and the nature of the student participation. At both schools, programs began in January. Each of these two programs was observed on four occasions between early February and the end of May—approximately once every five weeks. The observer was present for the entire hour and 15 minutes, as well as some time before and after the session. Conversations with instructors and students occurred on each occasion.

Interviews with the instructors in early February revealed that the enrollment was six students at one site and seven at the other. Both instructors experienced some difficulty getting the students into the KIDS KITS mode of operation. In one case, it was reported that students took a long time to decide what they were interested in and wanted to investigate further. In the other case, it was indicated that students were not able to come up with questions and needed a great deal of structure and direction. Thus, both instructors indicated the identified students were not independent learners at the beginning of the program. At both schools, students were not competent in the areas of articulating questions, selecting learning materials, finding information to answer questions, planning products or presentations to show what they had learned, or conducting presentations to share their learning. None of the students had prior experience using audio-visual equipment in an independent fashion for finding information or for conducting presentations. In addition, both groups included students described as behavior

problems in the regular classroom and at both sites some of these problems were exhibited during the after-school sessions.

While students at the two sites were described as presenting similar challenges at the beginning of the program, the two instructors addressed these challenges in a very different manner. In one school, the instructor provided training related to the use of the various pieces of equipment, as well as time to practice using the equipment. She described the process students would go through (i.e., the four stages of exploration, in-depth study, application and sharing). She emphasized the importance of deciding on one or more questions that they would try to answer by their research. The kits were placed on a table where it was possible for students to have access to all materials. Students made the choice about working individually or with a partner.

In the other school, the instructor felt that any given kit topic was too large and that it was better to focus as a group on an identified sub-topic (e.g., sharks rather than ocean). The sub-topic was selected by the instructor, students did not select materials from the kit nor operate any media equipment. Rather, the instructor, selected materials (usually books) to be put on display on a table and the kit with the remaining materials was placed on top of a library shelf—students had no access to the kit or the remaining materials. Video tapes were the only media other than print that were used and these were selected by the instructor, who also set up and operated the VCR . The entire group always worked together with everyone doing the same activity.

At the first school, students worked individually or in self-selected groups of two or three. Students produced a wide variety of products, including a film strip, a slide-tape show, a large diorama with three sculptured dinosaurs, a board game, and a picture dictionary, as well as written reports. In addition to sharing with the after-school group, students at this school shared products and information with their regular classes during school day. Students were eager to talk about their products and enthusiastic about the information they were learning.

At the second school, students were observed doing worksheets or activity sheets, making paper airplanes, and entering the steps of an experiment into the computer by copying text from a book. In the latter project, for those students who completed the text entry (a difficult typing task for many of the students), the instructor made a transparency from the page of computer print out, but the transparencies were never discussed or shown to anyone else. None of the students did or even observed the experiments they were typing. For all activities, the instructor selected and assigned product format. There was little if any sharing among the students since everyone was engaged in the same learning and production activities.

The tables on the following page summarize the implementation and the outcome characteristics at the two sites. Implementation at School 1 was very compatible with recommendations presented in the **KIDS KITS** training and

materials. It was a good example of the social practice of self-directed learning. Operation of the program at School 2 deviated from **KIDS KITS** recommendations in several ways. At school 2 the implementation was aligned with the social practice of teacher–directed learning.

SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTATION CHARACTERISTICS

	School 1	*School 2*
Determination of general topic	Program	Program
(what kit is used)	determined *	determined *
Identify question or sub–topic	Student	Instructor
Choice of whom to work with	Student	Instructor
Selection of learning materials	Student	Instructor
Operation of media equipment	Student	Instructor
Use of worksheets or activity sheets	No	Yes
Selection of product or presentation	Student	Instructor
Sharing of products within group	Yes	No
Sharing of products outside of group	Yes	No

* Kits developed by the Title I office were rotated across schools. During the semester, all kits were scheduled into each of the participating schools—usually two at a time. Thus, all after–school programs had access to the same materials and information.

SUMMARY OF OUTCOME CHARACTERISTICS

	School 1	*School 2*
Students positive about learning activity	Moderate to high degree	Low to moderate degree
Evidence of students expanding thinking/questioning skills	Moderate to high degree	Low degree
Increased use of variety of materials	Moderate degree	Low degree
Evidence of student responsibility (e.g., getting started without direction to do so)	High degree	Low degree
Students positive/proud of products	High degree	Low degree
Variety of products across students	High degree	Low degree
Increased skill re working with others	High degree	Low degree
Evidence of behavior problems	Markedly reduced	Remained about the same, some increase

Data charts prepared by Catherine M. Felknor as part of a project report: *KIDS KITS as an after–school program for at–risk students*, 1992. Reprinted with permission of the author.

Summary

Data presented in this paper compares the implementation and outcomes for two programs which initially set out to accomplish the same goals. The two programs served a comparable number of challenging at-risk students who had limited prior success with school and learning. The major difference between these two sites was the way in which the instructor viewed these students, the status which was assigned to the students, and the eligibilities provided and acted upon. The program implementation at the two sites looked quite different and the outcomes or results for students were markedly different.

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A Therapeutic Approach to Destructive Self–Criticism

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ABSTRACT

Countless psychotherapy clients engage in highly destructive forms of self–criticism. The consequences of such practices for their self–esteem, emotional state, vulnerability to others' criticisms, ability to change problematic behaviors, and more, are both numerous and dire. In part one of this chapter, three empirically common patterns of such destructive self–criticism, as well as their typical consequences, are described. In part two, some therapeutic concepts and procedures for helping persons to alter debilitating self–critical practices are presented.

> "Criticism is for the benefit of the actor."
> —Peter G. Ossorio (1976)

In general, criticism is a social practice whose point is to benefit the person criticized. When the English teacher criticizes the student's essay, the parent appraises the child's action, or the coach evaluates the athlete's technique, it is widely understood that such criticism should be beneficial to those receiving it. It

might, for example, inform them that something is wrong, what precisely about it is wrong, and/or how it might be remedied in the future. When criticism fails this understood requirement, it is typically regarded as failing its task. We say that it was "unconstructive," "unhelpful," "failed to provide its recipient with any information about how to change," and the like.

When it comes to criticizing *themselves*, countless individuals fail repeatedly to do so in ways that are beneficial. Instead, they resort to self-critical practices that are not merely unhelpful, but actually quite injurious. In many cases, the extent of this injury is so great that the practices may be considered pathogenic; i.e., they engender very significant restrictions in the ability of these persons to participate in the social practices of their communities (Ossorio, 1985). To borrow a phrase from Freud, these practices severely damage the ability of individuals "to love and to work."

Such destructive, even pathogenic, self-criticism is the subject of this report. In it, I shall (a) describe the most commonly observed patterns of such criticism; (b) note their consequences; (c) provide a set of therapeutic concepts and strategies for helping persons to abandon debilitating self-critical patterns in favor of more effective and constructive ones; and (d) relate some helpful responses to common resistances and obstacles that clients present.

Destructive Self-critical Patterns

1. Private Self-degradation Ceremonies.

Shannon (like all names in this chapter, a pseudonym), a 20 year old college senior, reported at her intake session that she continued to suffer repercussions from an event that had occurred many years earlier. While in eighth grade at a parochial school, her class had held a graduation party at a state park. During this party, a boy to whom she was strongly attracted asked her to walk with him alone in the forest. In the course of this walk, the boy suddenly thrust his hand into her pants and touched her vaginal area. Shocked, confused, and in some measure not wanting to displease the boy, Shannon froze. Before she could recover and say or do anything (a period she estimated at perhaps 5 seconds), the boy removed his hand. Nothing further transpired between the two. As a result of this single, brief incident, Shannon branded herself a "slut." She continued to characterize herself with this label throughout her adolescence, despite the fact that she scrupulously avoided all further sexual contacts during this period. Finally, she believed that everyone else in her social circle knew of the incident, regarded her as a slut, and wished not to be associated with her. The result of all of this was an extremely lonely and painful adolescence.

In this example, Shannon criticizes herself in a manner that is shared by many others. In reaction to perceived transgressions, mistakes, and failures, these

individuals brand themselves with highly invidious, disqualifying labels such as "slut," "stupid," "selfish," "incapable of loving," "insignificant," "screwed up," and the like. Where others might level similar self-accusations in a moment of pique, but not really mean them, these individuals stand deeply and fully behind their indictments. The effects of such critic acts, particularly when persons stamp in the same destructive labels time after time and year after year, can be extremely devastating to individuals.

A helpful concept for articulating the precise nature and implications of such critic acts is one formulated many years ago by Harold Garfinkel (1957), that of a "degradation ceremony" (see also Ossorio, 1976; 1978). This concept is perhaps best explicated by the use of an interpersonal example. Consider the hypothetical case of a lieutenant in the military who has been found guilty of a grave breach of his military duties. One morning, his company is assembled on the parade grounds, and he is brought before them. The company commander steps forward, faces the lieutenant, and before everyone makes a formal announcement to the effect that the lieutenant has engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. Further, the commander proclaims, this conduct is deemed a reflection of the lieutenant's character and reveals him to have been all along unfit to be an officer. In light of these things, the commander strips the lieutenant of his rank and demotes him to the rank of private (from Ossorio, 1976).

The basic force of this ceremony is that the lieutenant is literally "de-graded." That is, he is removed from one grade or status in his community and relocated to another, diminished one. The essential difference that this relocation makes is that the new status conveys drastic reductions in his eligibilities to participate in his community. Where once he could give orders to most of the men and women on the base, reside in special quarters, and in general enjoy a wide range of officers' privileges, he now can do none of these. His community status, and with it his behavioral eligibilities, have been radically diminished.

In this paradigm case, one person formally degrades another before witnesses. In the derivative case known as a "private self-degradation ceremony" (Ossorio, 1976, 1978), one person informally enacts all three roles: he or she serves as denouncer, as denounced, and as witness. This individual privately declares himself or herself to be a certain sort of degraded person (a "slut," a "selfish, loveless narcissist," etc.). By virtue of assigning themselves such disqualifying labels, these persons are responding to things going wrong by declaring in effect that, not only were they deficient on this occasion, but they are kinds of persons who, by dint of their defective character, incompetence, or moral blemish, (a) merit diminished standing in the human community, and (b) are disqualified from doing any better (cf. Goffman, 1963, on stigmatizing labels).

Compounding the damage just recounted is the fact that degrading statuses or labels that persons assign to themselves tend to become impervious to being altered by contradictory empirical evidence (Ossorio, 1976, 1978). By way of analogy,

consider a politician who has been branded by the public as "motivated solely by political expediency." Once such a label is fixed, no action by this politician, regardless of how selfless or nobly motivated it might be, need disconfirm the label. Anything positive he does may be assimilated to the label: "There he goes again, trying to create a positive image with the electorate." In the same manner, once individuals brand themselves with degrading labels, they tend in the face of contradictory evidence not to alter the label, but to assimilate new facts to it (cf. Beck & Weishaar, 1995, on prejudicial self-schemas; Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978, on the "insidious attributional style"). Thus, these labels, as in Shannon's case, tend to be quite enduring and resistant to change.

2. Employing Perfection as a Standard, Not an Ideal

Jack, a rather articulate tax accountant in his early thirties, related the following self-critical scenario: "On those rare occasions when a finished return looks good to me, I focus on how it wasn't done on time. If it was done on time, I focus on how inefficient I was in preparing it and how I've wasted money for my client and for my firm. If all that is okay, I focus on how I should have found a better way to do it. I always find something wrong......The standard is perfection, and if I achieve it, I get a '10.' If I fail to achieve it, I get a '0.' There are no 9.8's here like there are in Olympic figure skating."

Many years ago, Reinhold Niebuhr the theologian raised the question of the intent of the biblical injunction, "Be ye perfect!" (Niebuhr, 1956). Was perfection intended, he inquired, to be something that people could actually achieve, and were expected to achieve? If so, the standard was quite impossible and therefore foolish. However, he suggested, perfection was being posed, not as a standard of adequacy, but as an *ideal*—as a destination or guide star persons should strive toward even while knowing that they could never reach it. Failures to achieve this ideal would be inevitable, and the proper reaction in the face of such failures would be, not self-laceration, but humility and a renewed commitment to strive toward the ideal.

The contrast between this perspective and the one contained in my client's quote is stark. For Jack, perfection is a standard of adequacy. Failure to achieve it is not occasion for humble acknowledgment and renewed efforts. It is occasion to "give oneself a zero" and declare oneself a failure. One *should* achieve perfection (the note of grandiosity is unmistakeable here), and failure to do so is grounds for recriminations against oneself (including, quite possibly, the sorts of self-degradations discussed above). In the author's clinical experience, it is not the pursuit of perfection per se, but its employment as a standard of adequacy (sometimes in every sphere of the person's life) that proves so destructive to individuals.

There are three other common clinical scenarios that may be seen as variations on the above theme. All of them entail employment of some standard of adequacy that, like perfection, dooms them to failure. All conform to the identical formula

that, "If I do not meet standard X, then I am a failure (defective, inadequate, unworthy, etc.)." The first of these is "being number one." Here, the critic's stance becomes: "If you are not the very best (the most achieving, the smartest, the most beautiful, etc.), you are nothing." The employment of this standard results in the clinically ubiquitous comparison scenario in which one person, in the presence of an impressive other, feels utterly inferior and miserable. The second variation is, in effect, being a deity; the critic declares, implicitly, that "If you have failed to be omnipotent and omniscient, you are a failure." No one, of course, ever states the standard in this form. What is observable are self-denunciations that are intelligible as denunciations only if the implicit standard upheld is omniscience or omnipotence. For example, an individual might condemn himself for making an error in a situation where, given the information available to him, such a mistake was unavoidable. The implicit claim in such a case is an omniscient one: "No matter that I could not have known; I should have known." The third variation on this theme of unattainable standard setting might be termed "carrot dangling." The critic's formula here is "Because you did not do it a little better, you have failed." Like the apocryphal carriage driver of yore who dangled an unattainable carrot always a bit ahead of his mule, the critic here always upholds a standard of adequacy beyond what he or she in fact achieved. The operating premise of this critic typically seems to be, "If I let myself be satisfied with anything I do, I will lapse into complacency; I must always dangle the standard of success higher to keep myself motivated."

"It's the measuring stick that destroys" (Ossorio, personal communication, 1993). All of these standard–setting critic patterns doom the individual employing them to failure and misery. Success is impossible, and so the person is forever "getting a zero." Demoralization and even behavioral paralysis set in when virtually nothing he or she does ever results in senses of pride, appreciation, or accomplishment. Finally, the individual by the nature of the scenario develops a negative focus. What draws his or her attention are deficits from the standard upheld, not any positive actions or accomplishments that might be appreciated and celebrated (cf. Bergner, 1981).

3. The "Hanging Judge"

Randy, a 22 year old journalism student, missed his highway turnoff one day. The mistake was not a costly one, since the next turnoff, an alternative route to his destination, was only a mile down the road and he was under no time pressures. However, upon recognizing his mistake, he had what he described as a "fit" in which he screamed a long stream of obscenities at himself. So extreme was his anger that he shook his steering wheel violently and pounded his fist repeatedly on his dashboard.

By way of one further example, Jack, the tax accountant mentioned above, disliked his work but remained in it since it provided him with a good living. All

external indications such as yearly evaluations, raises, and promotions indicated that, despite his disaffection, he did very good, conscientious work. In the context of an empty chair exercise during one session, Jack was asked to be his critic and verbalize his evaluations of himself. In the role of critic, he angrily and contemptuously offered the following appraisal of himself as a worker: "He has no ambition—never puts in the extra effort. He never studies or reads a damned thing to improve himself. He doesn't concentrate at work. There's nothing he's really good at. His work is never any good. He's not worth the effort to waste my contempt on. He's lazy—like a welfare cheat after a free handout. I have no interest in helping him until he shows me something."

The image of the "hanging judge" (Ossorio, 1976; Driscoll, 1981, 1989) is the image from the old Western frontier of the judge who, for any offense no matter how minor, would sentence the defendant to death by hanging. It is the image of someone bent, not on seeking justice and seeing to it that the punishment fits the crime, but on accomplishing the angry and vindictive destruction of the accused.

Thus, what distinguishes this form of self-criticism (which may occur empirically in isolation or in conjunction with other patterns) is its overly harsh, scathing, vindictive quality. What is observed here is not the quiet, sinking-sensation quality that may characterize some persons as, for example, they draw negative comparisons between themselves and others. Rather, what is evident are qualities of anger, hatred, and assaultiveness towards oneself, qualities which have led previous authors to describe these persons as "abusive" critics and even as "killer" critics (Stone & Stone, 1993). Further, these attacks on self seem to the dispassionate observer to be seriously out of proportion to the alleged offense: a highway turnoff is missed and the individual launches a hateful diatribe against himself. Finally, as Jack again so aptly relates, there is little interest in this scenario in helping oneself, only interest in punishing and reviling oneself.

In concluding this section on self-critical scenarios, it should be noted that the listing of the above three patterns is not intended to be exhaustive. Other, less frequently observed, patterns exist. Unfortunately, considerations of space do not permit their delination here (but see Bergner, 1995).

General Consequences of Destructive Self-criticism

In most cases, there are some benefits that derive from habitually treating oneself in the self-critical ways described above. For example, the sort of "reading oneself the riot act" entailed in the hanging judge scenario might for a time prove an effective goad to make oneself pursue an important goal. However, the self-critical patterns related are all *on balance* damaging to the individual's ability to function well. Their costs outweigh their benefits. Above, a few consequences unique to each self-critical scenario were noted. In this section, important and pervasive consequences which tend to result from all three destructive patterns will be related.

Damaged self-esteem. A person's self-esteem is that person's summary appraisal of his or her own worth or goodness. As such, it is clearly and directly a product of the individual's functioning as a critic of self. If persons repeatedly appraise themselves as "unlovable," "selfish," "screwed-up," and the like; repeatedly declare themselves failures for not living up to impossible standards; repeatedly attack themselves in hateful, abusive ways; and/or engage in other injurious self-critical practices, their self-esteem will be abysmal.

Personal ineligibility. When persons criticize themselves destructively, they are making evaluations that affect profoundly their sense of eligibility to behave in the world. For example, if they appraise themselves as "unlovable," this is just another way of saying that they are ineligible to be loved; if "stupid," that they are ineligible for the myriad things in life that call for intelligence; if "insignificant nothings," that they are ineligible to have relationships with the worthy "somethings" of the world. Appraising themselves so, they will find it enormously difficult to pursue desired relationships, jobs, and other life opportunities.

Negative emotional states. When individuals engage repeatedly in such actions as branding themselves with disqualifying labels, declaring themselves ineligible, and judging themselves failures vis-a-vis impossible standards, they are likely to be *depressed.* When they appraise themselves in such a way that the situations they must confront seem too much for them (e.g., they will surely meet with humiliating failure in their upcoming performance, or prove unable to converse in an interesting and comfortable manner on an important date), they will be *anxious.* When they judge themselves the bearers of highly stigmatizing, socially discrediting characteristics, they will experience *shame.* When they repeatedly evaluate themselves as morally deficient and blameworthy, they will feel *guilty* (see Ossorio, 1976; Bergner, 1983, on emotional formulas). In these and other ways, destructive self-criticism will culminate in negative emotional states.

Vulnerability to the criticisms of others. When, as critics of themselves, individuals believe the worst, they will be all too ready to concur with the negative criticisms of others. When others criticize them, they cannot defend themselves, and their experience will be that they are highly vulnerable to being devastated and defined by the other: "They must be right; if they find me lacking, I must *be* lacking." Further, since the bad opinion of others brings with it such helplessness and devastation, these individuals must live their lives saddled with an inordinate concern about what other people think. They will say with some frequency that they cannot be "self-contained," that they are too desperate for external validation from others, and that in the face of all of this they find it very hard to "be themselves."

Dismissal of positives. When persons are always prepared to pounce critically upon mistakes and faults, but never to recognize strengths, efforts, and accomplishments, they rob themselves of crucial knowledges and satisfactions in life. Such individuals might, for example, get a positive evaluation at work, be

pursued romantically by an attractive other, or complete a difficult project in a quality fashion. When unacknowledged or discounted by the person, however, such events will have little or no positive impact on their senses of personal competency, desirability, or moral decency. Further, they will result at best in meager feelings of joy, accomplishment, or satisfaction. Overall, in these self–critical scenarios, there is a great deal of punishment, but very little reward, in evidence.

For many destructive self–critics, a triumph or an accomplishment is at best a break–even affair: the avoidance of painful failure (cf. Ossorio, 1976, on the "poor no more" image). As such, it may bring relief but no real satisfaction. Perhaps the philosopher who once decreed that "pleasure is the absence of pain" was a self–critic such as this.

Inability to change. Finally, one hallmark of destructive self–criticism is that, even when it represents a response to truly problematic actions or characteristics, it contains little that the person rendering it might use to change his or her behavior in the future. If one examines the quotations above, denunciatory labels, impositions of impossible standards, and harsh prosecutorial attacks abound. But there is little in the way of useful problem diagnoses or of implementable prescriptions for change. The situation is entirely analogous to one where a teacher might respond to a student's mistake by saying, "You are so stupid," rather than by saying, "Terry, I think the absence of good topic sentences and headings is what's hurting the organization in your essays. Next time, why don't you..."

Psychotherapy to Alter Critic Function

The basic goal of psychotherapy for critic problems, as conceived here, is to enable persons to abandon destructive modes of self–criticism in favor of more constructive and humane ones. In this section, a large number of therapeutic procedures and ideas that have proven highly effective in bringing about these ends will be described. While these must of necessity be presented in a linear fashion, this should not obscure the fact that in any actual case several of these ideas might be implemented simultaneously, or that their ordering might be different.

Helping Individuals to Recognize Their Self–Directed Critic Acts

Many clients are substantially unable to observe themselves as critics. Their reports about themselves assume forms such as the following: "Sometimes, for reasons I can't put my finger on, I just get this horrible sinking feeling that I am so unimportant to others." "When I am around her, I don't know why, but I always come away feeling so inferior." "My father made what seemed like a minor critical remark, but somehow it just sent me spiralling down into depression." The general picture in these cases is that individuals are able to report the consequences of their self–critical acts, but not the acts themselves. The sense created in them is that their pain emanates from unknown sources, or that it "comes from out of nowhere."

Such individuals are in a very poor position from which to change. They have a serious problem but they are unacquainted with what might be termed its "business end." They know the effects, but not the cause of these effects. Are these causes medical? marital? something deep-seated from their childhoods? Unlike the cartoon character Pogo, who once stated that "We have met the enemy and he is us" (Kelly, 1984), they do not know their "enemies" and thus have no conception regarding where they might best "launch their counterattack." Thus the therapist must help them to recognize both the fact that they are the perpetrators of their own misery, and the precise details regarding the nature of their self-critical acts.

There are a number of factors to consider when attempting to help persons recognize their destructive self-critical practices. Let us look at each of them in turn.

Instantaneous appraisals.

Human beings are capable of instantaneous appraisals, and indeed make them constantly. For example, when uttering a statement, a person might appraise that it calls for the word "well," rather than the word "good." Typically, this person will just say "well" and be unaware of having made the discrimination, much less of any "self-statements" to the effect that "This sentence calls for an adverb, not an adjective." It is the same for countless human appraisals (e.g., for virtually every word in every spoken sentence; for most of our minute-to-minute decisions as automobile drivers to stop or shift or accelerate). They are made instantaneously, automatically, and with little or no awareness.

Very often, critic acts take the form of such instantaneous appraisals. Their authors quickly, automatically, and with negligible awareness make critical evaluations of themselves. Here, there will be no self-statements to be found along the lines of "My quietness at this party is clear evidence that I am a deficient interactant with nothing of interest to say to others." Rather, the only clues to be found that such a verdict has been rendered may be the feelings of depression, inferiority, and personal insufficiency experienced by the person during and after the party. Thus, when instantaneous destructive apraisals have been made, it will be very difficult for their authors to observe and recognize their precise nature and, consequently, to report this in psychotherapy. Aaron Beck and his associates (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck & Weishaar, 1995) have noted, in a similar vein, that many dysfunctional cognitions constitute what they term "automatic thoughts."

Where destructive critic acts consist of such instantaneous appraisals, the job of the therapist becomes one of logical reconstruction. Just as one might reason that, "From what you said, you must have judged that an adverb was called for"; so a therapist might reason that, "From the withdrawal, depression, and despair you are describing, it sounds like you judged that you were inferior to her and that there could be no possibility of her being interested in you." Such critical appraisals may be hypothesized and discussed with the client, and in this way their likely content

and nature may be discerned. The work here is analogous to that of a detective who must start with the facts of the accomplished crime and then work backwards to reconstruct what must have happened. When such collaborative work with clients bears fruit, they become aware of the nature of their self-critical acts, see how they are their perpetrators, and take an essential first step toward removing them from their instantaneous, "automatic pilot" mode of perpetration.

Deficient observer function.

Many persons are simply not good observers of themselves. They are not particularly able to take an observational stance in relation to their own thinking and to see clearly what they are doing. While this need not be a problem when things are going right in a person's life, it does become one when things go wrong. At such times, they are left with important questions they cannot answer: "Why do I sometimes get depressed when nothing bad seems to have happened?" "Why does criticism seem to devastate me so much?" For many persons, the answers would be there to be found were they able to do a better job of observing themselves as self-critics.

An excellent technique for helping persons to become better observers of themselves is one widely used by cognitive behavioral therapists, that of self-monitoring (Ciminero, Nelson, & Lipinski, 1977; Haaga & Beck, 1992). For example, it might be suggested to clients that they carry around a small index card. At those times when they realize that they are feeling emotionally upset, or perhaps that they are engaging in some problematic behavior (withdrawing, lashing out angrily, etc.), they are to try to track what they were thinking immediately preceding the troublesome emotion or behavior. If they can identify it, they are to make themselves a brief note on the index card regarding the nature of their thoughts. Such notes may serve three functions. First, persons who meet with some success in this activity become better observers of their own self-critical behaviors, and thus more cognizant and appreciative of the fact that their problems do not come from "out of the blue." Second, these notes should be brought to therapy for discussion with the therapist regarding their contents. Here, important themes regarding both the form and the content of self-criticism may be discerned. Third, at a point where clients have attained some competence at more constructive self-critical practices, they might be directed to "catch themselves in the act" of destructive self-criticism and attempt immediately to counteract this by implementing more beneficial means of criticizing themselves (Beck et al., 1979).

A second technique is helpful both in cases where persons are not good observers and in those where appraisals are so instantaneous as to be difficult to detect. The procedure entails asking the individual to adopt the role of self-critic, and to speak from this position during the therapy hour. For example, in a recent session, I made the following suggestion to a young woman: "When I ask you to tell me what you were thinking at those times when you became so upset, you are drawing a blank. You're saying, 'I just don't know what I'm thinking—I don't

seem to be thinking anything at all.' Well, let's see if we can come at this thing in a little different way. This may seem a little strange but let me ask you to give it a try, and if it's too uncomfortable we can stop. I'd like you to kind of split yourself in two. The two parts are basically Beth and Beth's critic. Now over in this chair, let's put one of you—okay, that's where Beth sits. Now over here you are Beth's critic. Okay, from this critic chair, I want to know what you think of Beth. And let's go back to the other night, when around eight o'clock or so Beth started watching television even though all of her chores weren't done. Right now, think of her sitting there watching TV. What do you think of her?"

The basic technique here to assess the individual's critic acts is not to try to reconstruct, remember, or monitor anything. It is to request that the person speak from the critic role or position and appraise himself or herself. The client is interviewed, not as himself or herself ("I felt depressed..."), but as his or her critic ("Beth infuriates me when she sits around watching TV when there are still important things to be done..."). Very often, the person's critic functioning can be ascertained in this way when other methods fail.

Getting the Person to "Own" the Critic

Frequently, individuals will get to a point where they recognize that self–criticism is at the root of their problems but, when conveying their understanding of this, they will use expressions such as "my critic" or "my critical parent part," as if the behavior in question issued from some dissociated entity within them, but not really from *them*. In the same vein, they may say things like, "She (the critic) has been quiet lately and given me a reprieve, but I'm always afraid she'll come back." Not only do such statements convey that the critic is "not me," but they convey a complete sense of lack of control—a sense that "This isn't my behavior that I can elect to do or not do; it issues from some part of me that I do not control."

Such persons must be helped to "own" their critic acts. That is, they must come to a full recognition that they are their authors or perpetrators. Individuals who perceive these criticisms as somehow inflicted upon them by agencies beyond their control remain in low power positions from which change is very difficult. Those who appreciate fully that they are active, responsible perpetrators of critic acts occupy positions of far greater control from which change is more possible. Essentially, from the latter position, desisting from destructive criticism and initiating some other, more constructive sort becomes an active possibility.

The task of therapy, then, is that of establishing very clearly for the client: "This is exactly what you are doing to yourself as a critic. Your pain, your low esteem, your extreme vulnerability to criticism, and your other problems do not just happen to you. They are caused by actions that you, and not some dissociated entity within you, initiate." The following two strategies are both very helpful in achieving this end, as well as a number of other very vital ones.

Establishing What the Client is Trying to Accomplish

When clients are reluctant to own their critical actions, they have important reasons not to recognize fully that it is they who are behaving this way. These reasons or resistances generally have to do with not wanting to recognize modes of behavior that would seem to them hostile, destructive, foolish and/or irrational. The most helpful therapeutic attitude to counter this resistance is one that says, "I assume that you must have some very good reasons for behaving as you do. You wouldn't do the things you are doing to yourself unless you thought that it would accomplish some important purposes." The self-critical behavior is reframed as a good faith attempt to accomplish worthwhile ends (cf. Driscoll, 1981, 1989; McKay & Fanning, 1992), and the therapist may proceed to inquire about these ends. Once clients appreciate their positive reasons, they are generally far readier to recognize that they are the authors of their self-critical behaviors. Among the more common reasons that clients engage in problematic self-criticism are the following.

Self-improvement

Many clients believe that their favored modes of self-criticism will result in self-improvement, and failure to implement them will result in complacency and stagnation. If they do not hold themselves to the highest standards, or denounce themselves roundly for failures, or bring home to themselves the "truth" about what degraded creatures they are, they believe they will never become any better (Driscoll, 1981, 1989; Ossorio, 1976).

To avoid egotism

Many persons believe that it is wrong to think well of themselves. To do so amounts to an unacceptable egotism, boastfulness, or self-aggrandizement. Thus, to maintain the virtue of humility, they are required to think ill of themselves.

To protect themselves from dangers

Often, clients sense that there are certain dangers that would ensue should they think more positively of themselves (Driscoll, 1981, 1989; McKay & Fanning, 1992). Some persons believe that, if they raise themselves up, they run the risk of being "shot down" and humiliated; on the other hand, if they deprecate themselves to others, they run no such risk. Other clients believe that, if they think well of themselves, they are raising their expectations and may expose themselves to the pain of disappointment; far better to think little of oneself, expect little, and thus both avoid the pain of disappointment and even create the possibility of pleasant surprises. Still other individuals believe that a good opinion of themselves would create the danger that they would embark upon some dangerous course of action—if they believed themselves desirable, they might pursue a relationship and be painfully rejected; if they believed themselves competent, they might be tempted to leave the safety of their disliked yet secure jobs.

To atone for past sins

Some persons criticize themselves unconstructively to make amends for past wrongdoings (Driscoll, 1981, 1989; Bergner, 1995). They continually resurrect past misdeeds, criticize themselves anew for them, and experience again the guilt, shame, humiliation, or other painful emotions that have accompanied these recollections in the past. In effect, these persons become eternal penitents who continually seek atonement for their past sins.

To achieve subtle satisfactions

When one examines the self–critical acts of some clients, one discovers that these clients are achieving subtle satisfactions by criticizing themselves as they do. For example, there are satisfactions inherent in making grandiose claims about oneself, and many self–criticisms may be found upon inspection to contain such implicit claims. Consider the apocryphal story of an ordinary citizen who, upon hearing that war has broken out in the Middle East, castigates himself in the following way: "I'm so mad at myself. If I had called the secretary of state today, this wouldn't have happened" (Ossorio, 1976). On the surface, we see a man very angry and critical of himself; upon closer inspection, we recognize the grandiosity of the claim this man is making to us. It is often the same with our clients. By way of a second example, there are satisfactions inherent in being a critic whose standards are so exalted and refined that all is found wanting (Ossorio, 1976). The art critic sniffs and says, "Well, perhaps you found the play satisfactory; for myself I found it rather flawed." This delicious one–up move has its subtle parallels in the way some persons uphold their perfectionistic standards. Superior standards are after all the mark of superior persons, and to abjure such standards would render one commonplace, like everyone else. In this connection, countless clients will exhibit a clear double standard: "When others do X, it's okay; but when I do it, it's not okay." To cite a third and final example in this regard, many persons achieve satisfactions simply from the act of self–criticism itself (Ossorio, 1976; Roberts, personal communication, 1995). Just as it can be highly satisfying to criticize other persons (e.g., to "really tell them off" or to vent our accumulated displeasure), so, somewhat more subtly, it can be satisfying for persons to criticize themselves.

To achieve interpersonal ends

Self–criticism may be employed as a tactic to secure various ends in relationships (Ossorio, 1976; Driscoll, 1981, 1989) Some persons may use it to secure reassurance and sympathy; they find that when they criticize themselves, others (at least for a while) tend to pay attention, to console them, and to say positive things about them. Other persons, perhaps limited in their ability to do so more directly, may use self–criticism to express hostility. Driscoll (1981) cites the example of a woman who, upon being criticized by her husband for her cooking, attacked herself overtly and severely about what a bad wife she was. In doing so, she was implicitly saying to her husband, "Look how upset you've made me with

myself," but in a way that was likely to disarm him and thus avoid a feared counterattack. Finally, yet other persons may criticize themselves because they fear that others will hold them responsible or expect too much of them. If they run themselves down, this may cause others not to expect too much from them, or to be too harsh on them should they fail.

Further benefits of recognizing purposes

In addition to helping clients to own their self-critical actions, knowing what they are trying to accomplish by them creates several additional therapeutic benefits. First, clients realize that they are not crazy or arbitrarily malicious for behaving as they do; rather they see that their behavior constitutes an effort to secure understandable and sometimes even laudable human ends. Second, being clear about their purposes, clients are now in a better position to evaluate their operating premise that "criticizing myself this way will get me these benefits." Were they correct, or is it the case that treating themselves this way has not been very successful in getting them what they sought? Third, the therapist may utilize clients' existing motivations (e.g., for self-improvement) in the service of positive change by showing them how alternative critic behaviors might do a more effective, less costly, and less painful job of getting them what they have been seeking all along. As Buckminster Fuller (1985) once advocated, "Use existing forces, don't oppose them."

Prescribe the Problematic Critical Behaviors

The following therapeutic procedure, also directed at creating a sense of full control and ownership, is one of the most powerful mentioned in this report. When the groundwork procedures discussed above have been executed carefully and thoroughly, it often achieves sudden and radical changes that extend far beyond this one goal. The procedure entails *recommending to clients that they engage consciously and deliberately in their maladaptive self–critical behaviors.* An example of such a prescription might serve best to convey the nature of this strategy. "Right now," it might be suggested to a client, "you have told me that you have always imposed very perfectionistic standards upon yourself, and you have detailed exactly how you do this. Despite all of the pain, frustration, and constant sense of failure that this has produced, you have felt that you must treat yourself this way for fear that, if you did not, you would wind up a complacent mediocrity, despised and disrespected by others. To date, you have done all of this almost reflexively; you have become so good at it that you can carry it out on automatic pilot largely outside of your own awareness. In the coming week, I would like to suggest something that may surprise you: that you continue to do precisely what you have been doing—that you continue to impose those perfectionistic standards exactly as you have been—but that you take this behavior off of automatic pilot and engage in it consciously and deliberately."

This recommendation that clients perpetuate their destructive self–critical actions, since it will seem to most of them ill–advised, should be supported with some discussion of its rationales. The best policy here, rather than engage in the deception advocated in many symptom–prescription approaches, is simply to share with the client the actual therapeutic rationales for the directive. For the author, these are the following: (a) "Engaging in your problematic critic behaviors consciously and deliberately is a way to take control of them." The client is informed that removing them from their reflex, automatic mode of perpetration, which has resulted in the client having insufficient awareness and control over them, will greatly enhance his or her control. (b) "It will help you to gather vital information." Clients may be informed that enacting old critic behaviors deliberately provides an opportunity to monitor carefully a number of matters that will later be essential for making a full and considered decision to continue or discontinue them. What are the ends being sought by the behavior? Is the behavior in fact securing these desired ends? Does the client detect any dangers that might attend stopping the behavior? What negative consequences does the client notice? (c) "Never trust overnight changes." It is generally not possible or desirable to make radical overnight changes. Doing so usually amounts to an insufficiently considered, impulsive act. In contrast, the conservative approach of continuing to enact the old critic behaviors deliberately, while giving careful consideration to the sorts of matters mentioned above, is a way to proceed slowly and responsibly towards a decision about their continuance that will rest on a much firmer foundation.

Responding to noncompliance

When the groundwork for the directive to continue the enactment of destructive self–critical behaviors has been done carefully, and when the directive itself has been effectively delivered, clients will typically react to it in one of two ways. The first (and less therapeutically desirable) response is that they will decline to implement it. Since this response usually entails a cessation of their problematic self–critical behaviors, the client will typically report feeling much better. However, this response may also entail a fearful avoidance of the behaviors, and so less of a sense of ultimate ownership and control. For this reason, the suggested therapeutic response to such refusal is to attempt one additional time to secure compliance with the directive. In the author's experience, even when the client again does not comply, this additional refusal seems to solidify the therapeutic gain.

Responding to compliance

The second response to this directive is that clients implement it. In response to such compliance, recommended follow–up moves include (a) discussing the details of their efforts, (b) exploring the results of their self–monitoring efforts (e.g., "Did it seem like treating yourself this way last week led to self–improvement, or not?"),

(c) underscoring any new sense of control over the critic behaviors that was experienced, (d) expressing appreciation of clients' efforts, and (e) recommending that they repeat the directive for one additional week.

The results of successful compliance with this directive are typically greater senses of ownership and control over the critic behaviors, and thus an enhanced sense of choice in the matter of whether or not to abandon them. Most clients who attempt to comply, and meet with reasonable success in their attempts to take control of destructive critic behaviors, abandon these actions in a period ranging from several days to several weeks. The modal report is that they cannot continue to perpetrate such behaviors consciously and deliberately once they have appreciated fully the exact nature of what they have been doing to themselves (see Bergner, 1993, for a general and more detailed treatment of this sort of directive, as well as the differences between it and standard symptom prescription techniques).

Presenting Positive Concepts and Modes of Self-criticism

Where self-criticism is concerned, doing it right is first a matter of not doing it wrong. When clients simply cease engaging in their old, self-devastating critical acts, they report enormous changes in how they feel and behave.

Criticism, however, is a vital and necessary human function. It is at the heart of self-regulation. We cannot function as human beings if we cannot perform the job of the critic—if we cannot (a) recognize and appreciate when things are going right, and leave them alone, and (b) recognize when they are going wrong, and generate useful diagnoses and prescriptions for change (Ossorio, 1976; Shideler, 1988; Bergner, 1995). (Compare: a furnace cannot operate without a thermostat.) Thus, it is vastly in our interests, not merely to desist from destructive self-criticism, but to become the most competent, constructive critics that we can be.

An essential part of the present psychotherapy thus becomes that of helping clients to acquire concepts and skills pertaining to more effective and humane forms of self-criticism. In this section, many of those that the author has found most useful will be delineated. In presenting all of these to clients, it has proven helpful to heed the advice of Milton Erickson that in psychotherapy one should always utilize and build upon what is already there (O'Hanlon, 1987). In presenting these ideas to clients then, the more that we can build upon their existing understandings, competencies, values, world views, and other strengths, the better they will be able to hear, understand, and use what is said.

Employ social role images

The therapist may convey virtually anything pertinent to competent critic function by resort to social role images such as those of "parent" or "teacher." The primary reason for employment of such images is that most clients with critic problems lack a concept of constructive self-criticism, but do possess an

understanding of how one person operating in such roles would constructively criticize another. The most useful of such images for the author have been those of "parent," "teacher," "coach," "boss/supervisor," and "dance instructor."

A specific image is selected for use with a given client based on three criteria. First, the client should exhibit a good understanding of the role captured by the image. Second, he or she should value that role and its competent execution. Third, thinking in terms of the image about his or her own problems should be at least interesting, if not intriguing or captivating, for the person. Thus, for example, the image of a "parent" would *not* be selected for use with a client who lacked an adequate understanding of that role and/or exhibited a bitter and cynical attitude toward it.

By way of illustration, a therapist might be interested in conveying the perspective contained in the earlier quote, "Criticism is for the benefit of the actor." This aphorism, originally stated by Ossorio (1976), captures one highly beneficial perspective on self-criticism—that its reason for being should be to enhance the quality of the behavior, and thus the quality of life, of the person criticized. While very few clients will exhibit a command of this perspective in the case of self-criticism, almost all will understand it in the case of one person criticizing another. Thus, the latter becomes an excellent vehicle to communicate the perspective. For example, almost all clients easily recognize that if a dance instructor criticizes by degrading ("You clumsy oaf; you'll never get it right"), this is bad criticism because it disqualifies the dancer and renders him or her less able, not more able, to dance. In contrast, they recognize that a dance instructor who appreciates it when things go right ("Yes! That's it. Well done!") and who corrects with constructive, implementable prescriptions when things go wrong ("Not that way, Terry. Now watch me. Turn your foot this way.") is doing a good job as a critic precisely because such criticism is likely to benefit the performance of the dancer.

Image: "parent."   Perhaps the most generally useful social role image is that of "parent." The concept of parent is a complex one, but may be thought of for our present purposes as comprising two basic elements. The first of these is a commitment to the best interests of one's child—an enduring commitment to doing those things that will help this child develop into a competent, moral, participating adult capable of leading a meaningful life. The second element is related to the first as means to end: that of competently undertaking certain "jobs" vis-a-vis one's child such as discipline, nurturance, guidance, protection, acceptance, appreciation and support (Hardison, 1991). It may be noted that parents who fail significantly with respect to either of these elements (e.g., fail in general to have a commitment to the child's best interests, or fail more specifically to guide, discipline, or protect the child) are almost universally regarded in this culture as failing in these respects *as parents.*

Employing this image of a parent with destructively self-critical persons who possess it, numerous therapeutic options are possible. Such individuals might be asked if, as a parent, they would criticize their children as they do themselves? Would they always focus on negatives and never appreciate positives? crucify their children for anything less than perfection? brand them with disqualifying labels? never let them succeed in the parent's eyes? What would they do if their children were attacked by hostile critics—would they join the chorus of the critics as they do in their own case? Should their children do something problematic, what sorts of parental criticisms would benefit them in terms of helping them to change the behavior?

The above lines of questioning and discussion are largely concerned with extending parental *competencies* into the domain of self–criticism. As noted earlier, however, the parental role also implies a *commitment* to act in the best interests of one's child, a commitment that transcends and informs the behavioral execution of all of these various skills. Not only specific behaviors, but also this entire relational commitment can be proposed to clients as an alternative to their current, self–abusive ones. Their current agendas (e.g., "My job is to rub your nose in the ugly truth about yourself"; "My job is never to give you any approval until you shape up") can be articulated and contrasted with the parental one. Finally, the merits of making a personal commitment to oneself along the lines of the parental one, and of abandoning one's previous commitment, can be discussed.

In these and other ways, the image of the parent who is acting in the best interests of a child, which the client already possesses, becomes the model for something he or she does not possess: the concept of a competent, constructive self-critic. Since the role of parent is a broader and more complex one than that of self–critic (indeed, the role of critic is but one part of the parental role), there is in principle nothing that a person needs to be a competent and constructive self–critic that has no parallels in the parental role. This role can therefore provide an avenue to everything that the client might need to alter his or her approach to self.

Encouraging active practice

Clients should be urged to practice actively the new, more constructive and competent modes of self-criticism that are discussed in therapy. When clinical judgment indicates that the individual is able to do something new, and when he or she exhibits a willingness to do so, various assignments may be made for the client to carry out both inside and outside the therapy hour. For example, during a session, a client might report that she made what she considers to be a serious error the previous week, and that she has been attacking herself viciously for it. If the image of "parent" has been introduced, and the client has exhibited some appreciation and value for behaving that way, the therapist might suggest: "I'd like you to come over here to this chair and try to picture if you can that it's your teen-age daughter, not you, who has made that mistake and is sitting in that chair. Now, you believe it really is a mistake and you want to help her to correct it. Why

don't you speak to her as a mother. What would you say to her to deal with this matter?" If the therapist has been correct in his or her initial assessment that the client knew how to function as a good parental critic, the client will typically correct the child without resorting to degradation, viciousness, or the imposition of impossible standards. Corrective feedback and suggestions may be supplied if the client struggles with this task. This mode of critical reaction then can be discussed as a possible approach to herself, any reservations or resistances can be addressed, and the client might be instructed to respond to two or three mistakes in the following week in this more constructive manner. Such homework should always be reviewed in the following session in order to assess its effectiveness, provide feedback, and acknowledge and appreciate the client's efforts.

Employing other social role images

Although they are more limited roles, the logic and tactics of employing the images of "teacher," "coach," "boss," "supervisor," "pastor," or "dance instructor" are substantially identical to the above, and will not be discussed separately.

Some Common Resistances and Other Obstacles

"It's too weak to be effective"

When the constructive approaches to self–criticism described above are related to some clients, their reaction is that they find them weak, insufficient responses to their own mistakes and failings. If they are to change their shortcomings, they believe, they must bring serious negative consequences to bear upon themselves, and the present approaches seem to them mere "slaps on the wrist" that will not get the job done.

A recommended first therapeutic response to this objection (and, while it will not be repeated, to all of the subsequent ones) is to reflect it and to demonstrate an understanding of its intuitive, common sense logic. The individual's objection is heard and appreciated as a sensible, indeed quite plausible one.

Subsequent to this, various approaches are possible. One of these is to note how this objection embodies precisely the logic behind clients' current approaches to themselves—that they must be extremely harsh and punitive with themselves to get results. They may be asked if this approach has worked to date. If it has not, should it be abandoned? Or, might it perhaps be that they need to become even more harsh and punitive to see if this could work if practiced more assiduously (Driscoll, 1984)? A homework assignment along these lines might then be devised, and clients urged to perform an "experiment" on their "hypothesis."

Another approach is to pose counterarguments with the client. One of the most useful and compelling of these is a thought experiment that once again draws upon the client's understanding of two–person systems: "Think of two people who want you to correct a mistake that you've made. The first of them is someone who in general treats you well, is supportive of you, and appreciates your good points and

your achievements; when you make a mistake, he points it out to you clearly, makes no bones about the fact that it was a mistake, relates the reasons why, and urges a change. The second person is someone who in general treats you poorly, never supports you, never seems to notice anything positive about you, and reads you the riot act whenever you make a mistake (details here should be custom tailored to the client's self-critical modus operandi). With which of these two critics are you going to be more inclined to cooperate?" The link between self-criticism and change indeed seems to follow the logic of this example: treating oneself well (which does not preclude strong criticism at times) increases the likelihood that constructive action for change will follow upon self-criticism (Ossorio, 1976). Treating oneself in excessively harsh, unjust, coercive ways decreases the likelihood of change, while increasing the likelihood of rebellion, depressive inertia, and feelings of helplessness.

"That's okay for others, but not for me"

It is the rule, rather than the exception, that clients employ double standards as critics. That is, while they believe that it is important to treat others such as their children and friends in constructive ways, they do not believe that they should treat themselves in such ways. Or, while they find some behavior or personal characteristic acceptable in others, they find it abhorrent in themselves. Such double standards, it goes without saying, present a therapeutic obstacle when one is trying to employ the sorts of social role images just cited. "Oh, yes," many clients will relate, "I would never think of regarding or treating my child in such a fashion, but in my case it's different."

One therapeutic approach in such cases involves making explicit something that is generally implicit in the dual standard. This approach may be used in cases where (a) the therapist has achieved a good therapeutic relationship with the client, and (b) it is clear that the client places a value on human equality (vs. bigotry or self-aggrandizement). Such clients may be informed tactfully that there is an element of grandiosity and even bigotry inherent in their double standards. That is, what they are declaring in effect is that "ordinary standards may suffice for ordinary people, but they are not good enough for me." (Compare: "Those standards are good enough for those outgroup members—you can't expect too much from the likes of them—but they are not good enough for us ingroup members.") If presented carefully to clients who are assured that the therapist is fundamentally on their side, such a move is an effective "well-poisoning" one (Ossorio, 1976; Driscoll, 1984). That is, clients' actions are redescribed or reframed for them in such a way that their incompatibility with existing personal values is made clear, thus providing them with reason to desist from the behavior in the future.

"But it's the truth!"

Repeatedly, clients lock themselves into destructive self-critical scenarios by mistakenly regarding the whole matter as a truth issue. They do not see themselves as active critics with choices in such matters as what standards to uphold or how to respond to personal failings. Rather, they see themselves as victims—as persons compelled by the evidence to recognize factually grounded, inescapable truths about themselves. This viewpoint is epitomized by one client who, when more charitable treatment of himself was suggested, responded that, "You don't seem to understand; the bedrock truth about me is that deep down I am a complete and utter—hole."

While the facts may *constrain* what appraisals a person can make realistically, they do not *dictate* specific appraisals. For example, consider an object far simpler than a person: a rock. While the facts about a rock might constrain what appraisals we can make realistically (e.g., we cannot carry off behaviorally an assertion that it is a pocket calculator), it is open to us to regard and to treat it as a paper weight, a weapon, a container of a geologic record, an object which obeys the law of gravity, and much more. Further, the facts about the rock could not constrain us, should we care to, from passing what amount to personal "laws" about rocks—for example, that we will connt them "good rocks" if and only if they possess certain characteristics or meet certain standards of perfection of our choosing. Persons are quintessentially status assigners—beings who can and routinely do pass personal laws, set personal standards, *assign* things to various places or positions in their worlds, and thus give those things more or less value. When they are appraising rocks and when they are appraising persons, including themselves, the facts do not lock them into any one uniquely correct appraisal or any one uniquely correct mode of response.

Thus, even in those cases where there are admittedly negative facts about themselves for clients to contend with, they are not stuck with any one way to look at them or any one way to treat themselves in response to them. The facts do not dictate that they be cruel to themselves (cf., the fact that a man is unattractive does not compel us to tell him repeatedly that he is "ugly"). The facts do not dictate that they systematically choose the least charitable characterization possible (cf., the fact that a woman is very concerned about her appearance does not dictate that we regard her as "vain" rather than "insecure about her attractiveness"). The facts do not dictate that they systematically choose the least functional or adaptive appraisal possible (cf., the fact that a child is performing beneath his ability in school does not compel us to regard him as a "lazy bum" rather than as "resisting what he sees as parental coercion"). The facts do not dictate that we select any given quality (e.g., beauty, brilliance, achievement, or popularity) and declare it an absolute requirement for personal worth. The facts do not dictate that one should never forgive oneself.

"Objection: It's morally wrong"

Morality is an important matter for many persons who are destructive critics of themselves. Indeed, as mentioned above, one of the reasons some persist in their self-lacerating ways is because they believe it is virtuous to do so, and immorally egotistical to appraise themselves in more positive ways. These beliefs may be called into question profitably with many persons. The following moral questions are beneficial ones to raise with clients. (a) Is it any more virtuous to abuse oneself psychologically than it is to do so physically with alcohol, tobacco, or other substances? (b) Since destructive self-criticism is so damaging to our ability to function, do we have a moral obligation to others such as our children, spouses, and parents not to destroy our ability to care for and relate to them? (c) Do not such practices as self-degradation fail a critical moral test insofar as they damage our ability to change responsibly our behavior? (d) Is it morally acceptable to treat any human being the way the person is treating himself or herself? By exploring such questions, it is often possible to shift the client's existing motive to be moral into the service of treating himself or herself more humanely.

Objection: *"I'm afraid I'll get a big head"*

This is one of the more common reservations that clients have about refraining from their accustomed self-critical practices and adopting new, more humane ones. They fear that they will become unacceptably arrogant and egotistical. Further, they anticipate that others will detect this, will "shoot them down" in a humiliating way, and ultimately will reject them.

Several avenues of response are often helpful here. The first of these is a clarification of what is being advocated in the present approach. Some who fear that they will become arrogant mishear what is being said and believe that the therapist is promoting a completely non–self-critical, "everything–about–me–is–wonderful," approach that would lead to an inflated self-evaluation. Such a misinterpretation should be corrected by the therapist, and the client reminded that what is being advocated is a constructive self-critical approach in which part of the person's job is to identify faults and mistakes, and to correct these.

A second basis for clients' fears of egotism lies in the fact that one of the jobs of the critic consists in recognizing, acknowledging, and affirming one's own successes, competencies, and other positive attributes. Individuals are frightened that this will prove a route to arrogance. Several lines of response are often helpful in dispelling such fears. (a) Clients might be reminded of the notion of an "objective self-assessment" wherein a person concludes something on the following general order: "Well, I believe that my strengths lie in X, Y, and Z; my weaknesses in A, B, and C; and my 'not great but good enough' areas in D, E, and F." Such an example is helpful to pose to clients since in it they can see a person who is acknowledging positives, but who does not strike most observers as egotistical. (b) The notion of "self-efficacy beliefs" as developed by Bandura (1982, 1992) is a helpful one to share with clients in the present context. These are

beliefs that individuals have that, in specific areas of life such as athletics or academics, they have the ability to be successful if they exert the necessary efforts. Clients may be informed that research has shown that such beliefs are virtually indispensable if persons are to feel the personal confidence they need to undertake important things in life, and to persist in them in the face of obstacles (Bandura, 1992). Thus, such beliefs are more like "basic human needs" than they are instances of "unacceptable egotism." (d) Finally, clients may be asked to consider the opposite state of affairs where all positive criticism is withheld. Again, the use of two–person images is extremely helpful for making this point in a perspicuous way. For example, a client who is a dedicated teacher might be asked: "What would happen if you witheld all acknowledgments of your students' successes, strengths, and competencies from them? What would you be doing to them? Is it really any different in your own case?"

Obstacle: other critics

Many persons with critic problems report that they are devastated by the negative appraisals of others, and find themselves helplessly defined by these appraisals. One young woman expressed this problem very aptly in the following way: "When my father criticizes me, I am absolutely crushed; to me it's like God is speaking, and I just can't bring myself to believe anything other than what he is telling me." An important obstacle to these individuals regarding and treating themselves in more constructive ways, then, becomes the fact that others are criticizing them, and they find themselves unable to do anything but concur with these criticisms.

Eleanor Roosevelt once stated that "No one can make you feel inferior without your consent" (Bright, 1988, p. 159). The author has found it useful to share this quote with clients, and to discuss at length its basic contention: that criticism can devastate and control a person *only* when that person provides his or her own "consent." When individuals listen to the criticisms of others and conclude, often reflexively and unthinkingly, that the other must be right, and when they further concur that the matter is indeed the "federal case" that the other alleges it is, then they are most deeply affected. When, on the other hand, they refuse to provide such reflexive consent, they are far less vulnerable to others' criticisms. Thus, if clients can find ways to cease their reflex concurrence with the criticisms of others, and can instead assume control of their own final order appraisals, they can mute considerably the power of these criticisms to devastate and control them.

A helpful prescription in such cases is to recommend to clients, at a point when they have made some progress in becoming more constructive critics of themselves, that they "insert their own critic between themselves and others." If others offer a criticism, they are to employ the following procedure in the handling of such criticism. First, as a matter of the strictest policy, they are to suspend judgment regarding its merits. Rather than maintaining their customary, reflexive response, "Oh my gosh, they are absolutely right about me," they are to say to

themselves, "That person may be right, partially right, or wrong: I will consent to nothing until I have personally considered the matter; I will be the final judge." Second, they are to give the criticism the consideration due it and come to an independent, personal decision regarding its worth. Do *they* believe, based on their own best reflection, that the criticism has some merit or no merit at all? Third, if they make the personal judgment that the criticism has merit, they are to handle the matter of what does or does not need to be done in their own way. For the external critic, the matter may be a "hanging offense," but this should in no way bind the individual from handling it in the more constructive and humane ways that he or she has been acquiring.

The central function of this prescription is the absolutely essential one of restoring persons to being their own ultimate critics and self-status assigners. When they are successful, they retain an openness to the opinions of others, but are no longer at their mercy. Although the prescription may be described fairly simply and straightforwardly, its implementation is for most clients quite difficult. Further, it usually requires a great deal of supportive discussion about such matters as the supposed superiority or infallibility of their detractors and the eligibility of clients to criticize themselves competently and authoritatively.

Summary

This report has detailed a comprehensive approach to the treatment of destructive self-criticism. In it, I have described several empirically common patterns of such self-criticism and their consequences, and delineated a coherent set of therapeutic procedures for helping persons to abandon destructive practices and acquire far more constructive and humane ones. Therapeutic procedures advocated have included (a) showing clients precisely how they are behaving as self-critics, (b) helping them to understand their investment in such an approach to themselves, (c) getting them to take control and make a personal choice regarding continuance of their destructive self-critical behaviors, (d) helping them to acquire alternative methods and concepts pertaining to constructive self-criticism, and (e) aiding them in overcoming resistances and obstacles to doing so.

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PART III

A DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ATHLETIC COACHING

INTRODUCTION

Raymond M. Bergner

> "An organization is a human community...that exists for the accomplishment of its mission."
>
> —Anthony O. Putman

All head coaches, regardless of the sport they are coaching, and regardless of the age or gender of their players, face a common set of critical tasks. These tasks are of such importance that team success or failure will usually rest on how well they succeed at them. Certainly, the very best coaches, the ones who year in and year out develop teams of skillful, highly motivated, cohesive overachievers, are those who do the best job of implementing these tasks.

Coaches face, first of all, a *leadership* task. Like the head of any other organization, whether it be a business, a school, or a volunteer organization, the head coach must find an answer to this question: "What must I do, and how must I be as a person, if I am to maximize the likelihood that those under me will follow my lead in the pursuit of a shared mission?"

Second, coaches face a *motivational* task. The great majority of athletes do not enter their teams with ideal levels or kinds of motivation. Left to their own inclinations, few of these athletes would give their utmost to make themselves the best individual and team players that they could be. Coaches must therefore find ways to motivate their players to become the most skillful, intelligent, unselfish, and hardworking team members that they are capable of being.

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Third, coaches have a *teaching* task. They have the task of helping players to learn—of helping them to develop the superb technical skills and decision–making abilities that are necessary for success in their sport. Thus, coaches must acquire learning principles and methods that enable them to teach their game as well and as efficiently as possible.

All of the above are extremely vital tasks for coaches. Failure at them will, depending on the specific nature of the failure, result in such things as refusals to follow the coach's leadership, poor effort on the part of players, inadequate skill development, disciplinary problems, low team morale, and losing. Success at them produces such exciting results as team unity and commitment in the pursuit of a common mission, maximum personal effort, high levels of skill development, overachievement, and winning.

Despite this, a review of the coaching literature reveals that very little has been written about these tasks. The overwhelming majority of the hundreds of coaching books on the market pertain to some specific sport—e.g., to baseball, soccer, basketball, or football. In them, the same formula is repeated with remarkable regularity. This formula comprises a recounting of the rules, the necessary equipment, the basic skills, the positional responsibilities, some plays or general patterns of play, and some instructional drills. Many of these books are very well done and quite helpful to coaches. However, as a group, they leave a gigantic gap in the coach's knowledge: they say at best very little, and at worst nothing at all, about the vital coaching tasks mentioned above.

The three chapters that comprise this section will, to the author's knowledge, be the first to thoroughly and systematically address these critical coaching tasks. In them, the nature of the leadership, motivation, and teaching tasks will be discussed in depth, and their necessity for overall team success made clear. Further, numerous practical ideas and procedures will be presented that enable coaches to lead, motivate, and teach their teams in highly effective ways.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE PRESENT WORK

The following chapters, despite their modest size, have been thirteen years in the making. During this time, the author, a professor of psychology at a large state university, has been a youth soccer coach. Frustrated by my early attempts to obtain certain information from the countless athletic instructional books and videotapes that I consulted, I began to seek answers from other sources. This search has gone on now for many years and has proven far more fruitful.

First and foremost among these more helpful sources has been the conceptual resources of Descriptive Psychology. Especially helpful here has been Putman's (1990) seminal work on organizations, which resulted in my core conception of an athletic team being that of a "human community...that exists for the accomplishment of its mission" (Putman, 1990, p. 31). Further, numerous conceptual formulations of Peter Ossorio have proven tremendously useful for

illuminating and organizing the present subject matter. For example, his therapeutic policy, "Appeal to what matters" (Ossorio, 1976), proved the central unifying idea for the chapter on motivation. Other helpful formulations employed in these chapters include the Relationship Formula, the Relationship Change Formula, Degradation, Accreditation, and the nonempirical character of status assignments (Ossorio, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1982).

A second major source of ideas for the present analyses is the vast literature on leadership, motivation, and learning within the disciplines of psychology, business management, and political science. This literature consists both of empirical research on the factors involved in effective leading, motivating, and teaching; and of more practically oriented writings by respected experts in these areas such as Peter Drucker, A. Edwards Deming, John Gardner, James MacGregor Burns, Warren Bennis, and Steven Covey.

A third source of useful ideas for these chapters has been my study of the biographies, autobiographies, and recorded observations of many highly successful coaches. These include John Wooden, Vince Lombardi, Joe Paterno, Bobby Knight, Bear Bryant, Pat Riley, Lou Holtz, Doc Counsilman, Woody Hayes, and a little-known but very thoughtful Georgia high school coach named William Warren.

The fourth and final source of valuable ideas has been the work of great teachers in areas other than athletics. These have included, for example, a conversation with a very successful Denver piano teacher, Elaine Paulos, about her teaching methods; an examination of an established text on the teaching of ballet; and a study of the methods of a nationally renowned Chicago school teacher, Marva Collins.

In the end, then, the ideas contained in these chapters have been gathered from many sources. Subsequently, all of these ideas have been subjected to a great deal of critical thought and personal experimentation in my work as a coach. In the course of this experimentation, some ideas and methods have been discarded since they did not prove successful. Others have been retained, since they have proved over time to be extremely helpful. It is these last ideas, all subjected to what might be termed "the long struggle of the survival of the fittest," that I shall present in the following three chapters.

RELEVANCE TO OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERS

An athletic team is a particular kind of human organization, its coach a particular kind of organizational leader, and its athletes particular kinds of organizational members. The tasks confronting head coaches, those of leading, motivating, and training, are not unique to them, but are shared by virtually every other kind of organizational leader. For these reasons, many of the principles and practices presented in this section apply, not only to coaching, but to the management of other types of organizations such as companies, schools, agencies, or public interest groups.

It has already been noted that many of the ideas presented in these chapters originally came to the author's attention through his reading of such organizational experts as Putman, Drucker, Deming, and Bennis. They only "made their way to coaching," one might say, through a circuitous route in which the author saw these ideas exemplified in the work of the great coaches, and then applied them in his own coaching work and saw that they worked.

Thus, while athletic teams will be the focus of these chapters, there is much in them that should prove of considerable value to persons who are involved in the management of other types of organizations. In recent years, there has been a tendency for organizational leaders to look to the athletic arena, and to coaching practices in particular, for ideas that they might adapt to their own organizations. The present work, which attempts to capture the essence of what it is to be a good coach, will hopefully prove of considerable use to such individuals.

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LEADERSHIP IN ATHLETIC COACHING

Raymond M. Bergner

ABSTRACT

This chapter addresses the question: "What must coaches do, and how must they be, if they are to maximize the probability that their players and assistants will follow them with commitment and dedication?" A comprehensive answer to this question is provided in terms of (a) the creation, communication, and renewal of a meaningful mission; (b) the possession of certain critical personal characteristics by the coach; and (c) the ongoing engagement by the coach in certain actions that create and maintain relationships consistent with followership.

> "The chief object of leadership is the creation of a human community held together by the work bond for a common purpose."
> —Peter Drucker

The central question of leadership for the athletic coach is this: "What must I do, and how must I be as a person, if I am to maximize the likelihood that those under me will commit themselves to following my lead in the pursuit of a shared

mission?" The purpose of this chapter is to propose a comprehensive answer to this question.

Consider the following situation. One person, a player on an athletic team, makes an appraisal of a second person, the head coach of that team, and comes to the following conclusion: "If I follow the lead of this coach to the best of my ability, I have an excellent chance to achieve some things that are very important and valuable to me; if I elect not to do so, it seems doubtful that I can achieve these things." We may call this the "desired conclusion." It is the precise conclusion that every serious coach would like his or her players to draw: that they have a valuable opportunity to realize very desirable personal objectives if they dedicate themselves to following the lead of the coach. This chapter is about how coaches must *be* and how they must *behave* if they are to maximize the probability that the members of their teams will draw this conclusion and subsequently act upon it by following them with commitment and enthusiasm.

There are three general requirements that, in the ideal case, athletic coaches would fulfill in order to promote dedicated followership. Few, if any, coaches will be successful at all of them. However, the closer they can come to meeting these requirements, and can avoid going seriously wrong with respect to any of them, the more effective their leadership will be. These three general requirements are the following:

1. To establish an effective *mission* for the team; i.e., one that fully engages the hearts and minds of team members in the pursuit of a common purpose.
2. To possess *personal characteristics* that establish the coach's credibility as a person who is capable of leading the team to the accomplishment of this mission, and that do not create ethical or practical barriers to followership on the part of players and assistants.
3. To engage in *actions* that establish and maintain relationships with followers that are conducive to cooperation and followership; to avoid actions that establish relationships that are conducive to rebellion, refusal, and other oppositional reactions.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to providing a detailed and practical picture of what coaches would ideally achieve in these three regards if they are to elicit the strongest possible commitment from their players and assistants.

Requirement #1: to Establish an Effective Mission

> "Most importantly, they [leaders] can conceive and articulate goals
> that lift people out of their petty preoccupations, carry them above
> the conflicts that tear a society apart, and unite them in pursuit of
> objectives worthy of their best efforts."
>   —John Gardner

> "No man is good enough to govern another man without the other
> man's consent."
>
> —Abraham Lincoln

Peter Drucker has stated that "The first task of leadership is to define the mission" (Bennis, 1989, p. 192; cf. Putman, 1990). Consistent with his designation of this as the first task, our central concern in this section will be with the establishment and the communication of the team mission by the athletic coach.

Vision of Some "Better World"

The first requirement for head coaches, as for all other leaders, is that they possess a *vision* of some "better world." For the political or the organizational leader, this vision may be one of developing a great country, creating a thriving organization, or accomplishing a worthy social cause (Conger, 1988). For the athletic coach, this vision will be one of building a great athletic team. It is the realization of this vision—its translation from a dream into a reality—that then becomes the *mission* of the team.

The following is an example of such a vision and such a mission. It is presented here in the form of an extended excerpt from a mission statement delivered by the author to his adolescent girls' soccer team at the initial team meeting. While it is custom-tailored to this audience of young women, it is similar in its basic themes to the visions of three coaches who have most influenced the author, John Wooden, Joe Paterno, and William Warren. It is different from the visions of others such as Vince Lombardi and Bear Bryant, though not as different as the public reputations of those coaches might suggest:

"Good evening and welcome...The first thing that I would like to talk about tonight is the goals for this team. Right now, these goals are *my* goals. They are things that I believe would be very good for us to accomplish together. I hope that, when you hear them, you will think so too. I hope that you'll get the feeling that 'Yeah, that's something that I would really like too.'

"There are three of these goals. The first of them is individual development. That's just a fancy way of saying that our goal is for each of you to become the best soccer player that you are capable of becoming—the best dribbler, the best passer, the best defender, the best shooter, the best decision maker in the heat of battle. It's my experience over the past eleven years that most players don't know how good they can be. Whether they are good players to begin with, or whether they are not so good, they tend to underestimate how good they *can* be. I have seen players who, when they were young, were some of the clumsiest players on the team. Through hard work on their basic skills, they developed into highly skilled players who amazed their parents and their teammates by becoming so good that they made their high school teams and, in one case that I know of, earned a college scholarship to play soccer. I believe that most of you would be surprised to see how

good you can become if you work hard on your fundamental soccer skills. We will spend more time on these skills than probably any other team in the league. I'd love to see all of you amaze your parents, your teammates, and even yourselves by how good you become.

"Our second goal is that we become the best *team* that we have the ability to become. There are eleven positions in soccer. Every single one of them is extremely important. Being the best team that we can be means that we don't have a situation where a few stars make all the contributions and get all the glory, but that every player at every position makes an important contribution. Being the best team that we can be also means that we play unselfishly: if we have the shot, we take it; if we don't, we look for an open teammate to pass to. More than anything else, however, and this may surprise you, being the best team that we can be means that we root for each other and that we treat each other with respect. Each and every one of you has feelings. Suppose you went to school and someone said that they thought you were a "geek," or that your clothes were "dorky," or that you were "too fat" or "too skinny" or "ugly" or "dumb;" or this person ridiculed you for your religion or the color of your skin; or this person walked right past you in the hall as if you didn't even exist. All of these things, if you're a normal person with normal feelings, would hurt you. They might also make you very angry and maybe even cause you to feel hate toward that person. We don't want people hurt on this team and we don't want people hating each other. We can't really be a team if there are those kinds of feelings going around. So our goal, if we are to be the best team that we can be, must be for each of us to treat our teammates with respect. Each of you has a right to come to practices and games and not be hurt. And each of you has a duty to not hurt anybody else by name-calling, excluding them, or any other sort of abuse. Each of you, when you do something good, would like others to notice it and maybe say "nice pass," or "nice shot," or "nice save," or to give you a high five. If we're to be the best team we can be, each of you should think about doing the same for your teammates.

"Our third goal is to have fun. We will work hard, but I can guarantee you that you will have more fun than you've had on any team where you just went out and they let you screw around and scrimmage the whole time and didn't take it very seriously. It will be more fun in part because we will beat the great majority of those teams. We will work hard, but one of the things you'll learn, if you don't already know it, is that the right kind of hard work can be a lot of fun. Just think of playing the game of soccer: it's hard, it's demanding, it takes a lot out of you—but it's fun!

"I haven't said much about winning. That's because our number one concern here is with you doing your best to meet the three goals I just mentioned. And you have my word that, if you do your best at working hard on your skills and treating your teammates right, and we lose every single game, you will never hear a harsh word from me. In fact I will be extremely proud of you and happy with you.

However, going back to winning, in my experience here is what will happen if each of you works hard on the goals I just stated. We will almost always defeat the teams that have worse talent than we do. We will usually defeat the teams that have equal talent. And we'll probably pull off an upset or two over teams that have more talent than we do. If it turns out *we* have the best talent, or close to the best, we'll be awfully hard to beat.

"Here's the feeling that I'd like each and every one of you to have by the end of the season: 'I'm an important part of a very good soccer team. I've worked very hard on my skills and I've become a good soccer player who makes a very important contribution to my team. I know it, my coaches know it, my parents know it, and my teammates know it. I feel good about my teammates and they feel good about me. We've all worked hard to accomplish something together--we've all pulled together to be the best team that we could be'."

The above is just one possible version of the sort of "better world" that a coach might envision. Though custom-tailored for a specific age group and gender and sport, it incorporates a vision of what the expression "great team" means that draws upon the ideals of John Wooden, Joe Paterno, William Warren, and others. Its content aside, the central point in presenting this extended excerpt is to convey how a mission statement, whatever its content, represents an effort to pull such a vision together into one coherent statement and to communicate this to team members. In the remainder of this section, our focus will be on how such team missions can be made truly effective and unifying ones for the team.

Vision Must be Meaningful to Potential Followers

Upon hearing Vince Lombardi's initial mission statement to the Green Bay Packers, future Hall of Fame quarterback Bart Starr stated that his first reaction to Lombardi was, "Where have you been all my life?" Lombardi's speech, with its exhortations to hard work and sacrifice in the service of perfect execution and winning, spoke to Starr's own deepest hopes and aspirations as a football player.

If others are to follow any leader, that leader's vision must fulfill an absolutely essential requirement: It must be meaningful and desirable to followers. It must, as Lombardi's did for Starr, tap into their values, hopes, aspirations, and dreams. It must be of something of such value to them that they will see it as worthy of their commitment and best efforts (Burns, 1978; Conger, 1988; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Putman, 1990). If the leader's vision leaves them cold, there is little reason to follow.

James MacGregor Burns, in his classic 1978 book on leadership in American politics, states the following: "The leader's fundamental act is to induce people to be aware or conscious of what *they* feel—to feel *their* true needs so strongly, to define *their* values so meaningfully, that they can be moved to purposeful action" (p. 152). They must hear the vision and the mission and, like Bart Starr, greet it with the fundamental reaction that "This is what *I* deeply want; this speaks to me

and my deepest desires and aspirations and hopes." If the vision is merely what the leader wants—if it cannot be owned and pledged to by both leader and followers—then these vital personal interests that conduce to the best sort of commitment are lacking. Followers may go on and do what is called for in order to be a member of the team, or to get to play a game they love, or even just because they have nothing better to do. But their deepest motivations and commitments have not been engaged.

Thus, coaches who would lead, and not seek to influence through intimidation, appeasement, manipulation, or other means, must understand human beings and their deepest longings, and must comprehend the particular values and aspirations of those whom they would lead. While this is the matter for another chapter in this volume, some of the more universal and important of such desires, most of which are invoked in the mission statement quoted earlier, are desires for the following:

- The achievement of personal excellence as a player.
- The opportunity to display this acquired excellence before others—to shine, to excel, before an admiring audience.
- The chance to be an important, contributing member of a team—to have a vital role in the success of that team.
- The opportunity to be a member of a great team, and to take pride in that association.
- The chance to belong—to be a personally included, valued, liked, respected member of a team community regardless of one's race, religion, athletic ability, physical attractiveness, or possession of the currently voguish social characteristics.
- The opportunity to have in one's life a highly meaningful cause to which one can dedicate oneself.
- The opportunity to strive together with others in the pursuit of this highly meaningful cause—to have it be a common cause.
- The opportunity to become a better person—to acquire highly valued personal characteristics such as unselfishness, supportiveness toward others, cooperativeness, respect, racial and religious tolerance, and the ability to work long and hard in the pursuit of personally cherished goals.

Thus, coaches who would be leaders are well-advised to hold out to their teams a mission that embodies such human values and desires. The majority of athletes, and virtually all of those who will prove to be the cooperative, hard-working, unselfish, mutually supportive ones so dear to the hearts of coaches, will listen to a mission statement that holds out such possibilities and find it worthy of their best efforts and commitments. For in it is not just the obvious value of winning, but many deeper values and needs of human beings that may engage them at deeper levels of their being. Such missions also illustrate the possibility that athletics does not have to be "just a game." At a higher level of significance, it is one of the

possible ways that human beings can do one of the most meaningful things that they can do: come together in mutual support, respect, and effort, and form a community where they immerse themselves in striving to accomplish a commonly valued purpose.

Leader Must Communicate the Mission Effectively

It is not enough for a head coach, or any other leader, to possess a meaningful and desirable mission. He or she must be able to express this mission in such a way that potential followers can see clearly its value and meaningfulness for them personally (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Phillips, 1992; Putman, 1990). The initial, and therefore critical, articulation of this typically occurs in the sorts of mission statements exemplified above. If such statements are to be successful, if they are to enlist strong personal commitments from players and assistants right from the start, it is vital that they be delivered in the most effective form possible. It is therefore strongly in coaches' best interests to ensure that all of the key elements of the mission are present in the mission statement, and to craft all of its constituent messages in such a way that they are likely to enlist the existing motivations of players in the team cause. Time spent by coaches in preparing and rehearsing this statement to be as effective as possible is time well spent.

Leader Must Continually Renew the Mission

Organizational expert Anthony Putman (1990) has said that "Mission renewal is, I believe, the most critical factor in ensuring the long term success and continuity of an organization" (p. 43). A team mission is not the sort of thing that can be stated once and then forgotten. It must be kept alive (Phillips, 1992). Coaches must continually restate and reaffirm the mission if it is to remain a clear, present, and motivating guide star for team members. They must come back to it again and again in various ways such as reminding the team of the mission, punishing behavior contrary to it, and strongly and publicly rewarding actions consistent with it. Most importantly, they must themselves act in pursuit of the mission with the utmost consistency, and thereby demonstrate their own deep commitment to it.

Requirement # 2: Essential Characteristics for Leaders

"What you are speaks so loudly that I cannot hear what you say."
—Ralph Waldo Emerson

"One ambitious young lawyer asked how one went about winning trust, and the senior partner said dryly, 'Try being trustworthy'."
—John Gardner

The focus in this section is on what are often referred to as "leadership qualities." These are essentially personal characteristics that, if possessed by a leader and recognized by a follower, would give the latter reason to follow the former. These personal characteristics are not a willy–nilly collection with no organizing principle. Rather, they are all essential precisely because they relate to two central issues. The first of these is the *credibility* of the leader—especially, his or her credibility as someone who can and likely will bring about the accomplishment of the mission. If individuals are to follow, they must believe, not only that the leader possesses a meaningful mission, but also that he or she has what it takes to lead them to its achievement.

The second issue regarding leadership qualities has to do with the *personal acceptability* of the leader to followers. A potential follower might be exposed to a potential leader, and come away from the experience with the following reaction: "Yes, I believe that she has a very worthy mission, and I believe that she has the ability to achieve it, *but I could never follow that sort of person.*" The basis for rejecting the leader in such cases is usually that he or she is judged to be an unethical person and/or one who is potentially injurious to the follower. For example, an athlete might evaluate a prospective coach and make the following summary appraisal: "I have seen him develop excellent teams time and again; I'm pretty sure he will do so again and I would like to be a part of that; but I also know that he is an extremely callous, insensitive, and degrading person who rules with fear and abuse, and I know that he cheats in order to win, and I don't want to be involved with that sort of person."

All of the personal characteristics advanced in the literature as associated with effective leadership meet these twin requirements of conveying credibility and personal acceptability for most persons. All of them may be, and often are, faked or impersonated by persons desirous of leadership power such as politicians, chief executive officers, movement leaders—and head coaches. Here, however, we will discuss the ideal case where the coach is seen as being, and in fact is, the possessor of the following seven personal characteristics: (1) personal integrity, (2) faith that the mission can be accomplished, (3) competence, (4) self–confidence, (5) tenacity, (6) emotional stability, and (7) the ability to maintain command. In this section, each of these personal characteristics will be defined, and the reasons why its possession would constitute grounds for others to follow will be clarified.

1. Personal Integrity

It is very difficult to follow others with strong and enduring commitment if one cannot be sure that they are who they present themselves to be. The political office seeker presents himself as a family man with strong religious beliefs, but there are persistent reports of his engagement in sexual harassment of his office staff members. The religious leader presents herself as a selfless servant of the Lord, but has amassed a huge fortune from the contributions of her flock. In the wake of such

revelations, most followers will inevitably have serious questions about whether they can trust the self-presentations of the leader. Even when the questionable activities do not bear directly on the leader's conduct of his or her leadership role, the logical question for followers becomes: "If he (or she) has deceived me in this way, might he not also deceive me when he says he stands for certain things as a leader?"

Therefore, coaches, like other leaders, need to be, and to be seen as being, persons of honesty and integrity whose deeds match their words (Covey, 1991; Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Phillips, 1992). If they say they stand for some principle, their actions must be consistent with that principle. If they make a promise or commitment, they must follow through. They must be seen as "straight shooters" and "genuine articles," and not as slippery, manipulative, deceitful, falsely promising, or in other ways lacking integrity.

Such personal integrity is an essential *general* characteristic in a leader–coach. However, there is one particular area where such integrity is especially important. The leader is, in Putman's phrase, the "keeper of the mission" (1990, p. 20). As such, he or she must have, and must be seen as having, a true personal commitment to its accomplishment, and the coincidence between words and deeds becomes especially critical in this regard. For example, supposing that a coach proclaims, as many coaches do, that "our goal is to prepare you to be the best possible persons after your athletic careers are over." However, he then teaches players how to cheat, exploits them, and discards them when they have outlived their usefulness. Such a coach's mission statement emerges as a cynical lie, and one likely to promote hatred against him on the part of players. His ability to engage players in the pursuit of this "mission" is severely undermined.

The mission statement is, among other things, a *promise* from the head coach. It is a promise to the effect that he or she is, and will continue to be, personally dedicated and committed to its fulfillment. The players, if they are to follow with full commitment, must observe that this promise is being kept—that the mission is as much the leader's selfless guide star as it is everyone else's on the team. When this is the case, the players' perception will be that a shared commitment or covenant exists between the coach and themselves to accomplish the mission.

2. Faith That the Mission Can Be Accomplished

Players must believe that the coach believes (Conger, 1988). They must believe that the coach truly believes that the mission can be accomplished. If they perceive that their leader lacks such faith, they have reason to lose faith themselves and to cease following. After all, why would one work hard and long to achieve a mission when one's leader as well as oneself no longer believe that it can be achieved? Thus, the coach must set high but realizable goals for the team and communicate that he or she fully believes in the true possibility that, with the player's best

efforts, they can be achieved. Above all, the coach should never communicate despair.

3. Competence

To be effective leaders, coaches must be, and must be seen as being, competent (Hogan, Cnrphy, & Hogan, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). It is critical that players believe their coaches have a strong knowledge of the game, a command of its reqnisite skills and strategies, and the ability to teach what they know effectively to players. Few team members will follow a coach, no matter how appealing the mission, if they do not believe that he or she has the knowledge and skills required to lead them to its achievement.

4. Self–confidence

To be a leader, coaches must have, and be seen as having, self–confidence (Conger, 1988; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). They must believe in their own capabilities, methods, judgments, and decisions, and in the worth of what they are trying to accomplish. Coaches who communicate a great deal of self–doubt ("Well, I'm not sure this is the right decision." ... "Gee, I'm not sure I really understand this") are unlikely to engender strong belief in their players and assistants. It's hard to believe in leaders who don't believe in themselves. Furthermore, the possession of self–confidence helps coaches to act decisively and well, which in turn inspires confidence in their subordinates.

5. Tenacity

To be leaders, coaches must be, and must be seen as being, doggedly tenacious in the pursuit of the mission. Team members must believe that they will persist in the face of inevitable hardships, obstacles, opposition, criticism, and failures, in their steadfast pursuit of the mission. Few are willing to follow a leader whom they believe might abandon them when the going gets rough.

6. Emotional Stability

To be a leader, a coach must be, and must be seen as being, someone who can engage in sound, rational decision making both in ordinary circumstances and in the face of crises (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). If subordinates believe that their coach will become highly anxious, panicked, enraged, confused, or otherwise problematically disturbed; and that he or she will thereby be rendered unable to make sound, rational decisions at critical times, they will have less reason to follow the lead of this coach.

7. *Ability to Maintain Command*

To be a leader, a coach must be, and be seen as being, a person who has the ability and the will to set reasonable rules and limits for followers, and to enforce them consistently. As Joe Paterno, the highly successful Penn State football coach, observed, "If I backed off (from enforcing an important rule with significant consequences), the message was clear as a bell: I'm afraid of you guys. Ignore this rule. Ignore any rule that itches as much as this one does" (1988, p. 115). Such a failure, he argued, was an open invitation to repeated rule violations, a loss of team discipline, and a loss of control on the part of the coach over his or her team. The ultimate form that such limit-setting takes is expulsion of a member from the team, and it is vitally important that a coach be willing to take this drastic step when a player has been given a fair chance to mend his or her ways and has proven unable or unwilling to do so.

Ability to maintain command also means that the leader-coach will not permit others such as assistant coaches or players to make decisions or otherwise take control of the team in ways that are the head coach's responsibility (cf. Phillips, 1992) In this connection, Abraham Lincoln once advocated that "Some single mind must be master, else there will be no agreement in anything." While it is important for coaches to delegate certain responsibilities to others, and to be receptive to the input of others regarding alternative ways of doing things, it is critical that they not tolerate usurpations of power or anything else that would serve to undermine the unity of the team.

Once again here, the rationale for the necessity of this personal characteristic comes back to the credibility of the coach as someone who can accomplish the mission. If it becomes clear that the coach cannot control his or her followers, then *ipso facto* it becomes doubtful that he or she can direct them to the accomplishment of the team mission.

A Final Comment on Leadership Characteristics

Like any human being, a leader's ability to choose his or her personal characteristics is limited. It would make little sense, for example, to say to a coach, "When a critical situation occurs in a game, stop being so emotional; just set your feelings aside and think clearly;" or "Stop doubting yourself; have perfect confidence in yourself." One does not just decide to shed one's self-doubts or one's debilitating emotions in critical situations as one might decide to flip off a light switch.

Virtually every head coach will have personal weaknesses with respect to one or more of the leadership qualities outlined above. While an in-depth discussion of how to overcome such weaknesses is beyond the scope of this chapter, several brief suggestions may be offered. All of them require the preliminary step of the coach determining precisely what his or her weaknesses are. Once they are

determined, coaches are in a position to do three constructive things. First, knowing what their personal weaknesses are, they may target some personal efforts toward overcoming them, whether this be through personal thought, advice seeking, new behavior, or even personal counseling. Second, and more immediately implementable, coaches may devise ways to compensate for their weaknesses. For example, a coach might have a tendency to become so emotionally caught up in a game that adequate observation, and therefore effective decision making, are impaired. Such a coach might secure the aid of a highly trusted and more emotionally detached assistant coach to watch games, provide important observations, and make suggestions for adjustments based on these observations. Third, coaches might at times need to heed the old suggestion to "fake it 'til you make it" in selected ways. For example, they might express a greater self-confidence or a greater faith in some positive outcome than they in fact feel, in the interests of helping their teams.

ACTIONS TOWARD FOLLOWERS

> "If you would win a man to your cause, first convince him that you are his sincere friend. Therein is a drop of honey that catches his heart which, say what he will, is the great high road to his reason, and which when once gained, you will find but little trouble in convincing his judgment of the justice of your cause, if indeed that cause really be a just one. On the contrary, assume to dictate to his judgment, or to command his action, or to mark him as one to be shunned and despised, and he will retreat within himself, close all the avenues to his head and his heart, and though your cause be naked truth itself... you shall no more be able to (reach) him, than to penetrate the hard shell of a tortoise with a rye straw...Such is man, and so must he be understood by those who would lead him, even to his own best interest."
>
> —Abraham Lincoln

If they are to be effective leaders, how should coaches *behave* in relation to those under their authority? Again our answer here shall not be an ad hoc list, but one that has a rational, unifying principle behind it. Let us first develop the logic of this principle.

Every action of a coach toward a player is an act in a relationship. In the beginning, the coach's actions will be instrumental in establishing the nature of that relationship. Later, these actions will tend to maintain or deepen the relationship that currently exists, or they will tend to change it in the direction of a new relationship. For example, if a new player comes onto a team and the coach is warmly welcoming and takes pains to hook the player up with his new teammates, the coach's behaviors will tend to establish an amicable relationship with the

player. Later, if the coach supports this player in a time of personal need, this action will tend to maintain or to deepen the initial relationship. On the other hand, if the coach engages in favoritism that disadvantages the player, such behavior will tend to change the relationship in the direction of a different, less amicable one (cf. Ossorio, 1982/1998).

From a related but slightly different perspective, every action of a coach toward a player is also a case of treating that player as someone of greater or of lesser worth and value. If the coach tells a player to sit out and not risk injuring herself permanently, this is a case of treating her as someone whose physical well-being counts for more than winning a game. On the other hand, telling her to play under such circumstances is a case of treating her as someone whose physical well-being is less important than winning that game. For the most part, players are sensitive to what sort of place and value they have in the coach's eyes, which may range all the way from an athletic resource to be used and discarded when no longer useful, to a valued person whose best interests are placed before all other considerations.

The unifying principle for leadership actions becomes this: Leaders should act in such a way that the relationships they establish with their players through their actions, and the places of value they assign through these same actions, are ones that are conducive to cooperation and followership. Their behaviors should be expressive of relationships that are consistent with cooperation, and should be cases of treating a subordinate as an individual of high worth and value. A head coach may have an extremely desirable mission, and possess the utmost credibility as someone who can accomplish it, but can negate both of these if he or she engages in actions that turn followers against him or her, and thereby against the accomplishment of the mission. As Lao Tzu warned many centuries ago, "Fail to honor people, they fail to honor you."

In this section, eight behavioral policies of coaches towards their team members, all of which are consistent with the general principles just advanced, will be discussed. These policies are the following: (1) act in team members' best interests; (2) assign meaningful roles; (3) provide access to influence; (4) keep followers informed; (5) acknowledge contributions; (6) correct without degrading; (7) avoid unnecessary provocation; and (8) avoid unnecessary coercion.

1. Act in Player's Best Interests

The poet Robert Bly has said that "The old male initiators—King Arthur would be one—were interested in the soul of the young man. That's what the young men are missing today; there aren't any older men who are interested in their souls." Interest in their "souls"—interest in players becoming good people before all else— is the most critical thing that is implied by the notion of acting in players' best interests. Disciplining them even when this involves a loss of their talents to the team, not sacrificing their physical well being to win, and being there for them in times of personal need independently of what they can contribute to the team are

all ways that coaches can, and great coaches do, treat their players. Letting the infraction slide so that they can play, risking their physical well-being to win, and ignoring their human needs in times of trouble are all ways of saying, "I place winning before your soul—before your deepest personal interest." The former actions say to the player, "In relation to me, you are a valued person." The latter actions say, "In relation to me, you are only a means to my ends."

Why should coaches do this? Aside from the fact that it is first and foremost the moral way to treat human beings, it is in the long run one of the most effective things that a coach can do to enhance his or her ability to lead. To whom are players more likely to give their full devotion: someone who seems genuinely caring and interested in them as human beings; or someone who seems to value them only insofar as they can function athletically, and cares nothing for them as persons? In the short term, the former coach may lose some games. In the long term, he or she wins the dedication of players who, in the words of William Warren, are willing to "run through walls" for him or her.

Whatever their failings, it is a common theme in the biographies of great coaches like Lombardi, Bryant, Knight, and Paterno that they were there for their players as persons, and they remained there for them even when these players were no longer of any use to them as team members. And it is the highest tribute and testimony to their dedication when players say in the end, as Bart Starr did about Lombardi, that "More than anything else, he wanted us to be great men after we left football."

2. Assign Meaningful Roles

Other things being equal, who are players more likely to follow? A coach who gives them an insignificant role on the team? Or a coach who has taken the trouble to find out what their talents and interests are, and based on these has assigned them a vital, meaningful role in the accomplishment of the team mission? The former coach's message is, in effect, "You are nobody here, and I can't see any contribution you can make." The latter coach's message is: "You are somebody here; somebody worthy of being entrusted with a vital, meaningful role in the accomplishment of our mission; somebody whom I see as capable of making an important contribution to our team" (cf. Putman, 1990)

Goethe once said: "Treat a man as he is, and he will remain as he is. Treat a man as he can and should be, and he will become as he can and should be." Much empirical work confirms Goethe's surmisal that higher expectations often result in higher performance, and lower expectations in lower performance (see, for example, Rosenthal's classical 1974 work on the effects of teacher expectations on student performance). When judiciously entrusting a player (or an assistant) with a meaningful role, the coach is simultaneously conveying such an expectation. He or she is saying in effect: "This is a role vital to our team mission, and I see you as someone who can handle it." In so doing, the coach is conveying high expectations

and a vote of confidence, and thus enhancing the probability of eliciting the best performance from that player. (As always in human affairs, there are exceptions to the general rule, and judgment is required. For example, in the face of being so entrusted, some especially unconfident players might be so convinced of their lack of ability as to panic at the coach's assignment of responsibility. In such circumstances, other approaches to this player may be called for.)

Max DePree, in his excellent 1989 work on leadership in organizations has said that, "To make a commitment, any employee should be able to answer 'yes' to the following question: Is this a place where they will let me do my best? How can leaders expect a commitment from the people they lead, if those people feel thwarted and hindered?" (p. 42). One of the enduring lessons of America's quality debacle of the 1980's was that the old idea of asking a competent adult to screw in the same bolt all day was a recipe for disaster. Human beings need more. They need opportunities to employ fully their intellectual and physical skills—and ideally to be creative, innovative, and self-expressive in the bargain—in the accomplishment of meaningful tasks. Under conditions where this occurs, they can give themselves to their work. Under conditions where their roles seem trivial and meaningless, there is simply very little there to which they may give themselves.

3. Provide Access to Influence

Joe Paterno has said that "People usually don't mind not getting their way, but they always resent not getting their say" (1988, p. 72). Players and assistants need the opportunity to have their "say," i.e., to provide input to the coach knowing that it will always be given genuine consideration even if the coach does not in the end always act on it (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994). If this opportunity is denied, players have been cut off from having their voices heard in their organization. The basic message to them is that their desires, ideas, and grievances do not count. They have been encouraged to make this their team and to embrace its mission, but then informed that what they think and feel and want doesn't really matter to the leadership. Such players may come to feel that it is not *really* their team and their mission, and will have strong reason to resent the leader. Resentment, it goes without saying, is not an emotion conducive to following. It sets the follower against the leader.

Thus, it becomes important for coaches to let subordinates know that their input is welcome and that it will always be given due consideration. If players or assistant coaches have dissatisfactions, ideas, problems, or any other important matter that they need to discuss with the coach, they should be encouraged to do so. Further, when they do communicate such matters, care should be taken to see that it is a positive experience for them—that the coach listens carefully and patiently to them, attempts to understand precisely what they are saying, thanks them sincerely for their input, and demonstrates genuine consideration of their position. Finally, if the coach acts on a player's input, he or she should publicly

credit that player's contribution; if the coach decides not to act on the input, he or she should explain the reasons for this decision to the player.

Aside from the benefits already mentioned, actively soliciting and carefully considering the input of team members will be helpful to the coach in a further way. As keeper of the mission, he or she must stay in touch with the needs, desires, and dissatisfactions of followers. If subordinates should become less committed to the mission, it is only by virtue of being in touch with them that appropriate changes and adjustments can be made. For example, if a coaching decision is perceived as unfair, this may cause resentment against the coach and resistance to his or her agendas—i.e., to the mission. In such a situation, it is absolutely essential that the coach become aware of these barriers to mission fulfillment so that he or she has the opportunity to address the problem and to restore full dedication to the mission.

4. Keep Followers Informed

Leaders need to keep their followers as informed as possible about what key decisions will be made and, once they have been made, why they have taken the form that they have. They also need to keep them informed about important developments affecting the team and its mission. Again, it is the players' and assistants' team and mission, and they are being asked to make a substantial personal commitment. Therefore, they have a right to know. Furthermore, being highly secretive tends to elicit paranoia. Keeping followers uninformed about such matters provides a fertile ground for mistrust, suspicion, and the attribution of all sorts of unsavory motivations to the head coach. Obviously, the existence of such conditions is not conducive to following that coach.

5. Acknowledge Contributions

To lead effectively, it is important for coaches to acknowledge team members' contributions to the organizational mission—their cooperation, their achievements, and their efforts. These should be acknowledged with recognition, praise, advancement, appreciation, and in any other way that is in keeping with the character of the specific team (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). Both the reception of appreciation and recognition, as well as the fact that such acknowledgments are "news" that what one is doing is successful, give followers stronger reason to continue. In the vernacular of the behaviorists, these can be powerful "reinforcements" with important motivational and informational implications. In fact, it is a general finding of research on leadership that leaders who are highly rewarding get better results and higher satisfaction on the part of followers (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994).

How does this relate to our central concern in this chapter, which is with articulating the conditions under which leaders are maximally likely to receive

committed followership? The simple answer to this is given by the question, "Whom will most people follow? The coach who takes their hard work, achievements, and contributions for granted, and barely seems to notice them? Or the coach who notices and praises their efforts and achievements, who broadcasts their wonderful contributions far and wide, and who in the end says 'thank you'?"

6. *Correct Without Degrading*

John Wooden, the coach who led UCLA to an unprecedented 11 national championships in college basketball, once stated that a coach should never "cause a player to lose his dignity before his fellows." As a teacher of a game and as a maintainer of team discipline, it is frequently necessary for coaches to correct. Wooden's admonition is to be extremely careful about how one goes about doing this. Two rules of thumb are apropos. The first of these is to correct mistakes and misbehaviors without degrading persons. One coach might say after a mistake: "You clumsy oaf, Jones, have you got two left feet or something?" Another, confronted with the same mistake, might say, "Hold on, Pat—look, here's what you're doing—now watch me—try it this way." The former coach has degraded the player, and in the bargain has run the risk of destroying the player's confidence. The danger here is precisely that the player will believe the coach's appraisal that he (the player) is in fact an incompetent "clumsy oaf" and its obvious implication that he will never be able to succeed. The latter coach has corrected without degrading and without incurring such damaging consequences. The second rule of thumb is that any significant corrections or disciplinary actions should not be conducted publicly in front of other team members, but privately and in such a way that the player's dignity is preserved.

Aside from the counterproductive quality of public, degrading criticism, it gives the player strong reason to resent and, depending on the particular circumstances, even to hate the coach. These are reactions, as Abraham Lincoln pointed out in the quote at the beginning of this section, that often cause people to "retreat within themselves" and to become "unreachable." On the other hand, most players will appreciate constructive criticism that seems offered in a spirit of benefitting them, and will appreciate that any potentially embarrassing disciplinary actions have been handled privately. Such players have reason to feel positively toward the coach, and to cooperate with him or her.

7. *Avoid Unnecessary Provocation*

Provocation elicits hostility (Ossorio, 1976). Hostility on the part of players toward their head coach is a motivation that sets them against that coach (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994). While some degree of anger or animosity will inevitably occur between players and coaches at times, the engendering of such hostility is something that should be avoided to the degree possible. Unfortunate coaching

behaviors that often prove provocative include tyrannical abusiveness, favoritism, exploitation, neglect, manipulation, deceit, and excessive resort to harsh threats.

8. Avoid Unnecessary Coercion

Coercion elicits resistance (Ossorio, 1976). Resistance of followers to leaders is obviously the diametric opposite of committed cooperation with that leader in pursuit of the team mission, and is therefore to be avoided to the degree possible (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994). By the term "coercion" here is meant resort to forms of pressure that are perceived by players as excessively punitive, unfair, or illegitimate. Examples of such coerciveness include unwarranted resort to severe threats to control players, the excessive use of fear as a motivator, and the degrading barking of orders to followers when respectful directions and requests would do the job.

Max Depree (1989) has offered a helpful suggestion in this regard. He contends that leaders are well-advised to regard and to treat their followers as *volunteers*. The notion here is that leaders minimize their utilization of all of the "big sticks" that they possess (e.g., the power to bench, dismiss, or otherwise punish a player) to the degree possible. Instead, they would treat their followers as what, from a different vantage point, they are: persons who are there voluntarily—persons who have freely made a commitment to the team and its mission, and who could revoke that commitment at any time. The recommended attitude toward followers is: "This person has volunteered to go with me; I'd better hold up my end of the covenant as a leader in such a way as to maintain or enhance that free pledge of theirs." Realistically, there will be times when coaches must resort to the threat and the use of the "big sticks" alluded to above. The recommended policy here is to minimize such resort to the degree possible.

Leader "Possessions"

Before concluding this chapter, there is one final category of leader attributes that must be considered. It seems not to fall neatly under the categories that have been discussed thus far, those of mission, personal characteristics, or leader actions. The most apt label that I can think of to characterize this final category is "leader possessions," for these are things leaders ideally would have or possess in order to maximize belief and commitment on the part of followers. There are two of these possessions, those of (a) a credible plan for accomplishing the mission and (b) access to resources vital to this accomplishment.

1. Credible Plan for Accomplishing the Mission

In athletics, unless one is a coach whose reputation for success is firmly established, it is important to convey in the initial address to the team that one possesses an excellent plan for accomplishing the team mission (Kirkpatrick &

Locke, 1991). While it would not be feasible to communicate the entire plan, enough needs to be said about it that subordinates get a glimpse of its existence and its soundness. The particulars of the coach's plans and methods then emerge day by day and week by week. It is critical that, as they unfold, these plans and methods be demonstrably good ones and that their relationship to team success be made crystal clear to all subordinates. Players need to look at what is being done and draw the conclusion: "Yes, I see how following these methods and this overall plan will give us an excellent chance to succeed."

2. *Access to Vital Resources*

In general, leaders who are perceived as having access to vital resources relevant to the accomplishment of the mission become thereby more credible. They have the best minds at their disposal, or access to powerful political allies, or vast monetary resources. The extreme case of this is where the leader is perceived to be receiving some manner of divine assistance. In fact, this is the original meaning of the term "charisma" in the traditional notion of "charismatic leadership" (Conger, 1988).

Where coaching is concerned, therefore, it can be highly beneficial for coaches to possess access to such vital resources, and for team members to observe that this is the case. Such resources might include having (a) highly reputable fellow coaches available to speak to the team, to help with special practices, or to consult with the coach; (b) access to the fruits of scientific research in sports psychology; and (c) excellent training facilities and equipment, especially ones that might convey an advantage over other teams. All such resources, in addition to being helpful in their own right, enable the coach to gain further credibility as someone who can lead committed followers to the accomplishment of the team mission.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, the question has been raised: "What must coaches do, and how must they be, if they are to maximize the probability that their players and assistants will follow them with commitment and dedication?" The position that has been taken, based on the author's experience and his review of a vast literature on this question, is the following. First, coaches must possess a mission that taps into the deepest values and desires of their team members, must communicate this mission to them in the most effective ways possible, and must continually renew this mission. Second, they must have, and must be seen as having, certain personal characteristics that give them both high credibility and personal acceptability in the eyes of team members. These personal characteristics include personal integrity, faith in the achievability of the mission, competence, self-confidence, tenacity, emotional stability, and the ability to maintain command. Third, they must engage

in certain actions towards team members that create and maintain relationships consistent with followership. Such actions include putting players' best interests as persons first, assigning meaningful roles, providing access to influence, keeping followers informed, acknowledging contributions, correcting without degrading, and avoiding actions that would prove unnecessarily provocative or coercive. Fourth and finally, coaches are well-advised to possess, and to be seen as possessing, powerful plans and vital resources for accomplishing the mission.

As noted at the outset, the present analysis might be considered a portrait of an ideal state of affairs. No coach will succeed all of the time and in all of these respects. Hopefully, it provides a useful target for coaches to strive for, and a useful "check list" that they might use to ascertain areas where they are strong and areas where they need to work on themselves. To the degree that they can be excellent in these regards, or at a minimum avoid going seriously wrong with respect to any of them, to that degree coaches can immerse themselves in a highly meaningful, covenantal relationship with their players and assistants in the dedicated pursuit of the team mission.

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Coaching and Motivating

Raymond M. Bergner

ABSTRACT

This chapter addresses a critical question confronting all coaches: "What can I do to maximize the likelihood that my players will acquire a personal commitment to excellence?" Rejecting the notion that one could somehow "put" a motive into a player that was not already there, the chapter adopts a position arising out of Peter Ossorio's therapeutic policies: To motivate players, one must appeal to what already matters to them. Thus, the general recommendation advanced is that coaches strive to create team communities where the satisfaction of many preexisting, vital human motivations is available to team members who commit themselves to becoming the most excellent individual and team players that they are capable of becoming. Motivations discussed include those for recognition, for belongingness, for love, for personal excellence, for the opportunity to display this excellence before admiring others, and for the chance to make a meaningful contribution to a cause.

"Coaches who can outline plays on a blackboard are a dime a dozen. The ones who win get inside their players and motivate them."
—Vince Lombardi

In one of my psychotherapy lectures, I inform my students that I am about to impart a profound principle of motivation to them. I instruct them to get their pens ready to record a dictum that I solemnly refer to as "Bergner's First Motivational Principle." Then, after pausing for the proper dramatic effect, I tell them the principle: "Everybody wants something." The effect is usually laughter. I have made a self-evident, seemingly stupid point. Behind the joke, however, lies something that, while simple, is profound in its implications.

Where motivation is concerned, what do coaches want? They want players who are personally dedicated, without need of being continually pushed and prodded, to becoming the best individual and team players that they are capable of being. They want players who are themselves committed to acquiring excellent skills, playing intelligently and unselfishly, and giving their maximum effort.

The fact, however, is that relatively few athletes enter teams with such exemplary motivation. As a consequence, their coaches are repeatedly confronted with an extremely important question: What can I do to maximize the likelihood that my players will acquire a personal commitment to excellence? What can I do, in Lombardi's words, to "get inside (my) players and motivate them?"

The answer to this question lies in the simple motivational truism stated above: "Everybody wants something." All players, when they come to a team for the first time, come with a host of pre-existing motives. The key to developing highly motivated athletes does not lie in trying to put some new motive into them that is not already there. Indeed, contrary to the popular belief that "motivating" someone is more or less analogous to "injecting" something new into them, it is essentially impossible to motivate anyone in this sense. The key, rather, lies in *appealing to what already matters to them—to what already motivates them* (Ossorio, 1976).

Within psychology, this motivational principle of appealing to what already matters to people is a critical ingredient in many prominent contemporary psychotherapeutic approaches. These include Descriptive Psychology (Bergner, 1993; Driscoll, 1984; Ossorio, 1976), Brief Family Therapy (Fisch, Weakland, & Segal, 1982; Segal, 1991), Ericksonian therapies (O'Hanlon, 1987), and Operant Conditioning–based therapies (Spiegler & Guevremont, 1993). In these approaches, clients are motivated to engage in new and more beneficial behavior by making it clear to them that such behavior will enable them to acquire or achieve things that they have wanted all along.

From this perspective, *the coach's fundamental motivational task is to determine what players already want, and to create a team community where they can get these desired things in abundance by striving to become the best individual and team players that they can become.* If coaches can succeed at this task, they create what is sometimes referred to as a "win–win" situation (Covey, 1989). Players win because they become involved in a team community where a tremendous number of their motivations are satisfied, providing a highly involving, rewarding and beneficial experience for them. Coaches win because, in creating this sort of team

community, they are creating a situation where players are highly motivated to give their utmost to achieve individual excellence and team goals.

An excellent example of this approach to motivating others comes, not from athletics, but from education. The nationally noted elementary school teacher, Marva Collins, is famous for taking children who feared and hated school, and had no value for learning, and helping them become children who loved learning and were extraordinarily good at it (Collins & Tamarkin, 1982). Her essential method for achieving such drastic motivational shifts was simply to immerse children in an educational community where their participation and ever-increasing competence led to the satisfaction of many pre-existing needs and wants such as those for love, belongingness, competence, and recognition. In learning for these other reasons, they came to love learning itself (cf. Allport, 1961, on the "functional autonomy" of motives). In many ways, Marva Collins' way is an excellent recipe for coaches.

From the foregoing, then, it should be clear that knowing a great deal about what motives players already possess is a crucial resource for coaches. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and to discuss the most important of these motives. Obviously, not all players are alike and there will be some individual differences in what motivates them. However, as I believe the remainder of this chapter will clearly demonstrate, such differences are small compared to the large number of things that almost all athletes (and for that matter, all people) want. These more universal motives include ones related to relationships with others, to individual achievement, to team discipline, and to a variety of other objectives.

Relationship Motives

Motive: Recognition

A friend of mine has a cartoon on his door at work. It shows a dejected Charlie Brown sitting on a curb and saying to Snoopie: "Doing a good job around here is like wetting your pants in a dark suit. It gives you a warm feeling but nobody notices." Athletes, like people in general, have strong desires for recognition, and find it demoralizing not to receive it (DePree, 1989; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Warren, 1983). When they work hard, or master a new skill, or play unselfishly, and nobody seems to notice or care, it takes something away. They want their coaches to notice them, and to recognize, acknowledge, and appreciate their efforts and achievements.

Recognition at its most basic level has to do with simply knowing players. It has to do with such things as addressing them by their names, and not referring to them as "you" or "number 21." It has to do with seeing to it that no player gets lost, in the sense of remaining largely unknown to the coach. It has to do with making personal contact with individual players about various matters—taking this one aside to

suggest something to work on or joking with that one about how he'd better perform a skill correctly because his girlfriend is watching from the sidelines. Overall, it is about having some at least minimal relationship with each individual player.

Recognition means further that the coach notices and explicitly acknowledges players' efforts, achievements, and contributions (DePree, 1989; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Warren, 1983). This can be accomplished in a wide variety of ways, many of them rather simple and straightforward, but nonetheless crucial. For example, coaches can say things like "good hustle, Terry" after an especially intense effort. They can emphatically exclaim "Yes!" when a player executes a skill very skillfully, or say "Ah, that's much better," when a player shows improvement. They can ask a player who has mastered a skill to a very high degree to demonstrate it for the rest of the team. They can publicly recognize the usually unsung contributions of a player in front of the whole team, something that John Wooden did as a matter of policy at UCLA (Wooden, 1972). Most players will work quite hard when they know that a respected coach will notice their efforts and will explicitly acknowledge and appreciate them.

When coaches recognize players and their efforts and achievements, they are doing much more than merely motivating these players for their teams. They are doing something for them as people. They are saying to them: "You as a person, your hard work, and your achievements are all noticed and valued." For some players, who think well of themselves and who receive abundant measures of such affirmation elsewhere in their lives, the coach's recognition may be desirable but not critical. For other players, who may think poorly of themselves and get little of such affirmation elsewhere, the coach's recognition may provide a very vital source of self-esteem in their lives.

Motive: Belongingness

Most people, and perhaps especially young people, want to belong (Warren, 1983). They want to be included, accepted, and respected members of groups of persons whom they personally value. They want to avoid such painful situations as being an outcast or a devalued member of their group—a "nerd," a "weirdo," a "behavior problem," or a racially or religiously devalued person (Goffman, 1963). In relation to an athletic team, most players desire, often even crave, being seen by their teammates as socially and athletically valuable members of the team.

The motivational point here is not that coaches should dangle belongingness in the group as a reward that players receive if they work hard and learn well. The point, rather, is that players who experience acceptance from the group have reasons to behave differently than players who do not experience such acceptance (see Ossorio, 1981, on the "Relationship Formula"). In everyday life, people are more apt to work harder for others who like and include them than for others who reject and degrade them (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994). William Warren, an

experienced high school coach and author of a fine book on motivation in athletics, makes the following relevant observation about one of his teams. To win a "coach of the year" award, he states, ."...all I had to do was surround myself with girls who would have literally run themselves to death before they'd let down their teammates or me" (Warren, 1983, p. 139). Where there is belongingness, where the team is a community of people who include and like and respect each other, its members are given strong reason to work hard, to learn well, and to play unselfishly—all so that they will not let down their teammates or coaches. In contrast, where players are excluded or devalued, these players lack such reasons to give their best to the team. In fact, they may have reasons to do just the opposite, and thus to harm the team.

It is thus strongly in the interests of coaches to promote belongingness and community on their teams. How can they do this? First of all, belongingess starts with coaches as the leaders of their team communities. They must in their own behavior see to it that they include everybody, that they do not place any player in either a privileged or a devalued position, and that they publicly spread the accolades around by citing the efforts and accomplishments of as many players as possible. Essentially, in all of the ways that they can think to do so, they must communicate the message that "I regard each of you as a valued, respected, included member of this team."

Secondly, coaches may structure team activities, whenever feasible, to promote the inclusion of everyone, and to discourage the formation of cliques. For example, when they select groups to drill together or to play together in practice games, they can keep changing the composition of these groups. In this way, players are continually involved with many other players, and the natural tendency to always link up with the same friend (or fellow social outcast) is discouraged. Further, coaches can personally select the sides for scrimmages, thus avoiding a situation where the same players are embarrassed every day by being chosen last. Finally, Warren (1983) relates a story of how he dealt with an initially very cliquish team of girls. He required them, regardless of how they felt about each other, to "high five" every other team member whenever and wherever they might see her—in the school lunch room, in the shopping mall, or anywhere else. This simple act of solidarity, though resisted at first, resulted in eliminating the cliques and bringing a very high degree of cohesiveness to the team.

Third, explicit rules should be instituted whose function is to promote belongingness and discourage any sort of divisive or excluding behavior on the part of players. Such rules should include: (a) no verbal abuse or harassment of one team member by another, and (b) no physical violence or intimidation toward a teammate. Players should be told that, while at times they may not like certain of their teammates, they must always treat them with respect.

Fourth and finally, behaviors that promote team solidarity and belongingness should be explicitly encouraged. Those involving players openly celebrating each

others' efforts and accomplishments are especially valuable here. These include behaviors such as players verbally praising each others' efforts ("nice pass," "nice shot" , "great save," etc.); pointing to each other to acknowledge an assist, a pick, or a block; and "high–fiving" a teammate after he or she has made a good play.

Motive: Love

It is surprising how often great coaches use the word "love" to describe an important ingredient of team life. Not only "nice guys" like Wooden (1972) and Paterno (1988), but "tough guys" like Lombardi (1973) and Bryant (Bryant & Underwood, 1974) talk about it. Love is important in sports. And, since our present concern is with motivation, it is to the point here to note explicitly what everybody knows: people, including athletic people, want to be loved.

What is love? Fr. Robert Boyle, S.J., a noted Joycean scholar, once defined this term in a way that captures two longstanding traditions, those of Thomistic philosophy and of the traditional notion of "agape" or selfless love (Reese, 1980, p. 316). According to Boyle, love may best be defined as "the unselfish willing of another's good" (personal communication, 1966). It is the willing, the choosing, of the good of another human being independently of what that human being can do for oneself. By this definition, the opposite of love is exploitation: the utilization of another person solely for what that individual can provide for oneself, without regard for the best interests of that person.

Love in this sense is expressed whenever a coach places the best interests of players first. A coach refuses to play an injured player when there is a danger of further injury to that player, placing the physical wellbeing of the player over winning. A coach benches a player to teach him or her a needed personal lesson, placing the need for the lesson over winning. A coach is willing to spend time dealing with the problems of a player even though these do not benefit the team directly. A coach visits a player who has broken an arm and will not be able to contribute further to the team. All of these actions say to players that the coach cares about them, and not just about what they can provide for the coach.

Why should coaches do this? First, of course, is the simple ethical reason: they should do so because it's the right thing to do. But there is a pragmatic dimension here also. Treating people right, as we have been finding out in business organizations over the last decade or so, is good for the organization (DePree, 1989). As in an earlier example, the idea here is not that the coach should dangle caring as a reward for performance. Obviously, to do so would mean it wasn't caring to begin with, but a case of giving to get. Rather, the idea is that, other things being equal, players are going to be much more motivated, more loyal, and more eager to do their best for a coach who cares about them as persons and does not exploit them (Roberts, 1987). In contrast, players will resent, perhaps even hate, coaches who exploit them. Resentment and hatred, it goes without saying, are not relationships that are conducive to players being motivated to give their all to

a coach. They are more conducive to actions like loafing, not cooperating, and even sabotaging the coach's best interests. The poet Auden puts this point very simply in his poem, "August, 1914": "Those to whom evil is done do evil in return."

Motive: To Strive with Others for a Meaningful Cause.

A friend once told me that her father had always looked upon the years of World War II as the best years of his life. During the war, he had been a partisan in the Italian underground fighting the Fascists. Before the war, and later after the war, he had had a very hard time taking hold anywhere in life. He had drifted from job to job, unable to find anything that was meaningful and satisfying to him, and in the end was rather dissatisfied with his life. What was different about the war years? What made them the best years of his life despite the fact of terrible hardship and the risk of death? The difference, this man had explained to his daughter, was that this was the only time in his life that he had found a cause that he considered truly worthy of his dedication, and the opportunity to join with comrades in contributing to this cause had given tremendous meaning and direction to his life.

Most people want something to which they can dedicate themselves. They do not like, and by and large do not thrive, when they are floating without meaningful goals, when there is nothing worthwhile that they are trying to accomplish (Frankl, 1969; Yalom, 1980). Worthy causes, however, can be hard to come by in everyday life, especially in peacetime in circumstances of abundance and security.

One of the most vital things that participation in athletics can provide is the opportunity to unite with others in the pursuit of meaningful causes (Warren, 1983). In sports, people discover goals and missions for which they are willing to sacrifice—even in some cases to dedicate the primary energies of their lives. They discover, further, that pursuing such causes in the context of a close, mutually supportive group, all of whose members share a fervent desire to achieve the mission and are pulling together to do so, can be extraordinarily meaningful.

Many of the causes that sports provides are built into the structure of the athletic system. Goals like having a winning season, having an undefeated one, winning a championship, or defeating one's archrival are possible simply by virtue of the way the athletic situation is often structured.

However, almost all teams operate within such a structure and yet not all have an equal sense of united dedication to a cause. Typically, it is the coach who makes the difference. Perhaps the most important thing that coaches who wish to mobilize this motive can do is to formulate a mission statement for their teams (Conger, 1988; Deming, 1986; Putman, 1990). Since such statements were discussed at length in the previous chapter of this volume, only a few brief points regarding them will be made here. Mission statements are statements that proclaim to the team, "This is what we are all about; this is what we are striving to accomplish as a team." To be effective, the mission that they set forth must fulfill an essential

condition: it must tap into deep, existing motivations of players. That is to say, it must tap into many of the motives that are discussed in this chapter. Having formulated such a mission, the coach must state it explicitly to the players, and then be utterly faithful to and consistent with it (Deming, 1986; Putman, 1990) throughout the entire season.

Coaches who are aware of the human desire to join with others in pursuing worthy causes can utilize this knowledge to generate motivation in other ways, many of which will be familiar to most sports fans. Coaches may, for example, urge players to dedicate a game or a season to an ill or a deceased team member (as in the famous Rockne exhortation to his team to "Win one for the Gipper"). Alternatively, they might exhort players to "teach a lesson" to another team that has publicly belittled them. Or, by way of final example, they might issue specific goals or challenges to individual players (e.g. to a goalie to hold the opposition under one goal per game) or to the entire team (e.g., to yield fewer points than any other team in the league).

Finally, one of the most important advantages of players having a strong sense of cause or mission is that they become more willing to endure the hardships that are necessary in order to succeed. As the existential psychologist Viktor Frankl learned from his Nazi prison camp experiences, few people are willing to endure prolonged pain and hardship when they believe that there is no point in doing so (Frankl, 1963). However, he also observed, they will endure such hardship when they have a strong and meaningful purpose for doing so. Consistent with Frankl's observations, players with a burning sense of mission, of really wanting to accomplish something very badly, will willingly assume more hard work, fatigue, and sacrifice than others who lack such purpose.

Motive: Social Status

Many people, and perhaps especially young people, want to be associated with things that will give them high social standing. They pay a lot of extra money to obtain the "right" clothing with the currently fashionable manufacturer's logo. They listen to music, attend events, read books, and go to eating establishments that are "in." They try to associate themselves with other persons of high status. In general, they go to a lot of effort, time, and expense to do and have things that will give them a favorable social standing.

Most often, coaches have this social status motive working for them in very powerful ways without even having to think about it. Generally, such things as making a sports team, being first string, winning a letter, being a member of a superior team, and being a star player all convey high social standing. Since they are simply built into most social systems, the coach taps these powerful motivations without having to do anything special. They are just there for the taking.

It is also the case, however, that coaches are in positions to tap the social status motive in further ways. An example may serve to illustrate this. On my youth

soccer team one year, it was important to me that the players acquire excellent ball handling skills. One day, I announced to the team that it was probably not a good thing that they were all practicing the same skills. Some of them, I explained, were very proficient at them and needed to move on to other skills, while some of them needed further improvement on these basic skills. With this in mind, I said, I would be watching them that week to see who was ready to go on to the "advanced skills group" the following week. Now, while I was sincere about my intention to adopt this plan, it was not lost on me that I was appealing to a motive that all of them shared—a motive to belong to the high status "advanced skills group." And indeed, it was quite clear that players worked extra hard that week in order to get into this group.

When coaches are aware of it, they can see many ways in which they can structure things so that players win by achieving social status, while the team is helped in the bargain. Players may be informed that what they are doing (e.g., when they work hard to acquire perfect skills) might help them to achieve high status positions in the future such as making teams at more advanced levels. Players might be given awards for outstanding accomplishments that are highly visible to fans, parents, and other team members (the "buckeye" decals on Ohio State football helmets are perhaps the most famous example of this). Finally, players might receive special distinctions within the team group for effort and performance (e.g., Bear Bryant's highly exclusive "100% Club," comprised of players whom he believed had given maximum effort).

Motives Related to Individual Achievement

Motive: To Achieve Individual Excellence

Indiana University basketball coach Bobby Knight once challenged a new recruit in the following way: "If all you're looking for is an easy four years of loafing on defense and grabbing all the glory on offense, you're better off somewhere else. But if you want to work harder than you've ever worked in your life, become a better basketball player than you've ever thought possible, and be in the thick of a championship race, then maybe Indiana is for you" (Warren, 1983, p. 44).

When he says, ."..become a better basketball player than you've ever thought possible," Coach Knight is appealing to something that he knows is in virtually every player already, the desire to achieve excellence. Virtually all athletes want to be excellent—even the best—at the sport(s) that they have chosen to pursue. They want superior skills and understandings that will enable them to prevail over their opponents.

Like Coach Knight in this example, coaches need to try to harness this pre-existing motive for excellence in the service of getting players to work very hard to achieve it. The most basic strategy of all in this regard is to see to it that their training programs are constructed in such a way that excellence can indeed be acquired by cooperating with them (see the following chapter in this volume for an in-depth discussion of how to construct such programs). Further, coaches must find ways to ensure that players know that this is the case. For them to be motivated to work hard within the program, they must strongly believe that doing so will bring them the excellence that they desire. While some coaches will have established a reputation for having great training programs, others who have not yet developed such a reputation might engage in such activities as sharing with players some of their more compelling training principles, relating how these have been used by established great players and coaches, and telling stories about former players who have developed tremendously in their programs. The most compelling move, however, is simply to conduct very sound, efficient practice sessions where it quickly becomes apparent to players that, by working hard in these sessions, they can become highly skillful.

Motive: To Display Excellence Before Admiring Others

Athletes desire, not only to achieve excellence, but to display what they have achieved before admiring others. Very few people wish to be excellent in a closet. They want to shine in front of their parents, their friends, their teammates, their fellow students, and the general public.

The motive to display excellence is one whose satisfaction, to a large degree, is simply built into the athletic situation. Obviously, games are played before audiences, and players know this. However, there are some coaches who seem to know how to draw on this motive to an added degree. Perhaps the all-time master of this was Vince Lombardi who, throughout his career, conveyed messages to his athletes that played heavily upon their desires to shine before others. For example, while still a high school coach, he would say things such as the following to his players before a game: "Your mother and father are out there. They're looking at *you*. Five thousand people will be looking at *you*. They'll be watching *you* block...and *you* run...etc" (O'Brien, 1987, p. 72). Later, with the Green Bay Packers, a standard pep talk that he would deliver to individual players was this: "Keep this in mind, that each time you go on the field, you say to yourself, 'I want these people when they leave to say to themselves that they saw the best cornerback (fullback, guard, etc.) they have ever seen'." "It worked," said one player, "it rang in players' ears" (p. 244). Thus, following Lombardi's lead, coaches may enlist players' desires to shine before others to motivate them better to contribute to the team.

Motive: To Be Pushed

In a television show on weight training, a world class lifter was discussing his search for a training partner. He had finally selected someone, and stated that he had chosen this individual with one criterion uppermost in his mind. This criterion was that the partner had to be someone who would push him beyond where he would go by himself. He reported with undisguised admiration how, when he wanted to quit, his new partner would make him do five more repetitions of a given lift.

Many players who desire excellence realize that, left to their own initiative, they will not push themselves hard enough to get there. Recognizing this, they want someone else to push them to their best effort. This motive is often obscured by the fact that athletes are ambivalent about it: they want to be pushed but they also do not want to be pushed. Part of them, one might say, wants to do those five extra repetitions or that extra drill when they are tired, hot, and thirsty; but another part of them wants to stop and be left alone. Thus, what the coach who pushes might see on a day–to–day basis is some resistance and grumbling. However, if he or she is careful to ensure that the pushing is clearly in the players' best interests, and is never physically dangerous or abusive, what the coach will usually see in the long run is gratitude on the part of players.

Motive: To Obtain Feedback About How They Are Doing

Further related to the motive to acquire excellence is a desire on the part of most athletes to know how they are doing. Are they doing well? Are they making progress? Are they doing poorly? If so, what do they need to do to improve? What they want here is simply honest and accurate feedback about their performance.

When discussing the desire for feedback, organizational experts Blanchard and Johnson (1981) use the analogy of an individual who is bowling under very strange conditions. In this analogy, someone has placed a sheet across the alley in front of the pins. The bowler's ball passes under the sheet, he hears the sound of the impact, but he has no way to determine how many pins he has knocked down. The lack of feedback here, depriving the bowler of essential information about how he is doing, creates a situation that both frustrates him and prevents him from improving his game.

Withholding honest information about *superior* performance ignores players' desires for feedback to the detriment of the player and the team. Players, particularly those who are prone to be self–critical, sometimes do not recognize that they are making progress or are doing something very well, and need such facts confirmed by the coach. Without it, they may feel needlessly discouraged or incompetent.

Withholding honest feedback about *inferior* effort and performance also ignores this motivation and has multiple negative consequences. Told nothing about their

subpar efforts, players may not realize that they need to improve (much less how to go about doing so). Told misleadingly that they are doing fine when they are not, players who believe the coach settle unknowingly for inferiority. Those who do not believe the coach's false reassurances may cease to trust and respect him or her ("He's afraid to tell me the truth; why does he seem to feel he has to appease me?"). Finally, such players may get the extremely unfortunate message that the coach is willing to settle for inferior skills and efforts, and that they can therefore relax and take it easy.

Motive: To Become a Better Person

Most people want to become better persons. They want to improve themselves—to be the best that they can be. They want to acquire personal characteristics that they view as correct and desirable ones, and that they believe will be valuable to them in leading their lives in the best way.

In order to engage this motive, it is helpful for coaches to continually bring to players' attention the many ways in which doing the right thing as a team member is linked to acquiring highly valuable personal qualities for life. Such "right things" include working very long and hard to acquire personal excellence, getting oneself back up after defeats, treating all of ones' teammates with respect, celebrating the efforts and achievements of others, playing unselfishly, and in general working together with others to accomplish the team mission. It is not too difficult to bring home to players that, when they do these kinds of things, they are acquiring valuable traits, attitudes, and personal strengths for life. In behaving these ways—indeed, in immersing themselves in ways of life where the point of being these ways is unusually clear—they are acquiring such invaluable qualities as a value for excellence, resiliency in the face of life's inevitable failures, unselfishness, supportiveness toward others, cooperativeness, respect, racial and religious tolerance, and the ability to work long and hard in the faith that one can achieve personally cherished goals.

Motives Regarding Team Discipline

Motive: To Have a Framework of Fair Rules

While supervising a beginning psychotherapist one day, I observed an interesting interchange. My supervisee was seeing a single mother who had brought her nine year old son in because he was having temper tantrums. The therapist suggested that the two of them show her a typical exchange that might occur at home between them. The mother selected a situation that occurred in late afternoon on many days. The child would ask for cookies and, when told that he could not have any, escalate his demands and his angry insistence upon them to the point

where he would have a temper tantrum. In a somewhat unorthodox maneuver, the student therapist suggested that the mother play her son, and the son play the mother. The following dialogue ensued:

Mother (playing son): "I want a cookie."
Son (playing mother): "I'm sorry. It's too close to dinner and you'll ruin your appetite."
Mother (louder and more demanding): "I want a cookie."
Son: "I told you I'm sorry, it's too close to dinner."
Mother (very loud, angry, and demanding): "I want a cookie! I want three cookies! I don't want to wait til dinner!"
Son (firmly and patiently): "I'm sorry, but I told you it's too close to dinner. (Breaks role here and goes on) Mommy, don't you know that's what you're supposed to tell me—that it's too close to dinner and I shouldn't have cookies because they'll ruin my appetite."

Here was a nine year old child telling his mother in the clearest possible way that he wanted limits—that he didn't really want her to cave in to him when he knew he was over the line, but wanted her to take firm stands with him about what he could and could not do. Indeed, his temper tantrums, seen from this vantage point, were escalations designed to find his mother's limits. In the ensuing weeks, further, as the mother got the message and set some firm, reasonable limits and stood by them, her son's tantrums disappeared.

What is true of this nine year old child is true of most young people. They want limits but they do not want limits. On the one hand, they want to do just as they please even when they know it is wrong or self-defeating, and rail against attempts to have limits imposed. On the other hand, not trusting in their own self-governing abilities to keep them on correct paths, they want others in positions of authority to impose boundaries beyond which they cannot go (Paterno, 1988; Warren, 1983). They want recognizably fair limits or rules, and want them consistently enforced. In this connection, Joe Paterno quotes a former Penn State halfback, Charlie Pittman, who once informed him which was the stronger side of this conflict: "Deep down," Pittman stated, "all athletes yearn for discipline" (Paterno, 1988, p.218).

Most players also want fair, strictly enforced rules because they realize that such rules bind not only themselves, but all members of the team. They recognize that without such guidelines binding everyone, there are no safeguards against other players doing things that hurt the team such as missing or being late for practices, loafing their way through them, using harmful substances, or mistreating their teammates. Without strictly enforced rules, such things almost certainly will occur and will damage the team's ability to achieve its mission.

Thus, coaches who wish to utilize this motivation must impose rules. Further, they must make it very clear that these rules are not the outgrowths of the coach's

arbitrary desire to exercise authority, but are fair, just rules that exist for the good of each player and the team as a whole. Rules which seem arbitrary, unfair, and pointless (e.g., ones about hair length) will not be regarded as good limits by most players.

Finally, and very importantly, coaches must be willing to enforce these rules with meaningful consequences even when the costs of doing so may be very high (Paterno, 1988; Warren, 1983). For example, the cost of benching a player for a rules infraction may be that it will be very difficult to win without him or her. But limits must be just what the name implies—boundaries beyond which players may not go. If they may be compromised by the intense pressure of players or the desire to win games, then they are not really limits. They are just things the coach would like from players, but which players know they don't really have to do, especially if they are gifted athletes.

Examples of such rules have already been mentioned in other contexts. Rules which prohibit any physical or psychological abuse of teammates are extremely important. Rules about attendance at practice, about compliance with coaches' directives, about giving silent attention when coaches are instructing, about not doing things outside of practice that hurt the individual's performance and thus the team (e.g., getting insufficient sleep, smoking, drinking, using drugs), and about giving maximum effort at practice are also very good rules. Most players will recognize the fair, constructive quality of such rules and their necessity for team success, and will regard them as within the coach's rights to impose. Rules about hair and the like may easily be seen as unfair infringements on the player's right to self-expression, and may set the coach up for dissension, non-compliance, and a less than cooperative relationship with his or her players.

Other Motives

Motive: To Compete and To Win

Most people enjoy participating in contests, and love to win them. For most school children, spelling is boring, but spelling bees are involving. Geography is boring, but geography bees are not. Students come alive, and become much more motivated to work on the same material, when the teacher announces, "We're going to play a game this hour." The teacher has effectively harnessed their existing motivations to compete and to win in the service of learning.

It is the same with coaching. While a certain amount of basic, repetitive drilling is unavoidable, many extremely valuable training activities can be designed as competitive games. In soccer, for example, there is a traditional basic drill where players lob the ball to the head of a partner, who then heads it back to them. This drill is not very interesting to most players. In contrast, a very simple game can be

utilized in which the two partners head the ball back and forth to each other without touching it with their hands; the winners are the pair who keep the ball in the air for the greatest consecutive number of headers. This game usually proves quite involving. In fact, players' response to stopping it is almost always, "Aw, c'mon, coach, just two more minutes."

What is true for this example is true in general. Players will tend to work longer, harder, more diligently, and with greater enjoyment when the training activity is some sort of game or competition.

Motive: To Be Active

During a soccer clinic several years ago, the two college coaches who led it were instructing my colleagues and me in some core skills. One of these coaches would demonstrate a skill, and then direct us to practice it. We would begin to do so, but within one minute, he would cut in and say something like, "Okay, let me point out a mistake a lot of you are making," and then spend ten minutes correcting us. We would begin to practice the skill again, but he would quickly interrupt again with further suggestions. This became the pattern: very short bursts of activity followed by long speeches and demonstrations. The result was extreme frustration for myself and for other learners at the clinic. In contrast, the second coach, while employing essentially the same teaching format, would simply let us practice the skill for far longer periods of time before offering further instruction, or would correct us while we continued to practice. The results were infinitely more satisfying, both from an emotional and from a learning standpoint.

Young people want *action.* When they come to practice, they are seeking activity and find it very frustrating not to get enough of it. They do not like, and do not profit greatly from, long periods of inactivity spent waiting in lines for their turn, listening to long lectures, or standing on the sidelines waiting to get into a game. We therefore would do well to harness this already existing motive for activity by channeling it into practice drills and exercises involving high levels of useful training activities.

If we fail to channel the activity motive into beneficial training exercises, players are likely to channel it into less beneficial ones. Depending on their age, players who are getting no action will often create their own. Some of their favorite pastimes in my experience include getting into all sorts of fights (from grass fights to play fights to real fights), engaging in distracting side conversations, and perpetrating an amazing array of nuisance activities on each other. Valuable practice time is wasted on unproductive or counterproductive behavior. Further, discipline problems are created where none might have occurred if the coach had chosen a more active, involving drill, and kept things moving.

Motive: To Play The Game

When players sign up for a team, they are saying in effect, "I want to play *this* game." Their signing on is testimony to the fact that at this time they choose to play baseball or basketball or football from among the available alternatives. If further testimony were needed, most coaches know exactly how their players would respond if asked how they would like to spend practice time. "Let's scrimmage!," they would say. Let's play the game itself.

This is one of those motivations that is so present before our very eyes that we scarcely notice it—or think to use it to our players' and team's benefit beyond the obvious. Many coaches will make the amount of an athlete's playing time dependent upon the satisfaction of requirements for effort, skill acquisition, and conformance with team rules. Implemented carefully and fairly, this is a very effective use of this motivation. However, other, less obvious applications are possible.

The general suggestion here is that, whenever conditions are appropriate, thought be given to making practice activities as close to game conditions as possible. For example, rather than running laps or wind sprints for conditioning, a practice which most players dislike, the soccer coach might employ a ball dribbling exercise which simulates game conditions and requires prolonged running. Or, a baseball coach might hit a large number of fly balls to the outfielders that require them to run fast just to get to the ball. Excellent conditioning can be acquired in such ways, but with the added bonuses that the player is enjoying himself or herself far more, and is gaining greater skills in the bargain.

Somewhat paradoxically, it is often a good idea for coaches to harness players' motivations to play the game by *not* playing it in its customary form. Baseball players love to play baseball. However, this does not mean that they love to stand in right field for half an hour with nothing to do; generally, they love to hit and catch and throw and run bases. Soccer players love to play soccer. However, this does not mean that they love to stand back on defense, never touching the ball, while their offense controls the ball in front of the opponents' goal. Rather, they love to dribble, to pass, and to shoot on goal. Utilizing their motive to play the game, therefore, would suggest that we find or devise condensed versions of the normal game for our practices which enable players to actually play the game much more than they might in a regular scrimmage or game. Three versus three soccer, a game promoted by the Canadian Olympic and World Cup coach Tony Waiters (1990), is an excellent example of such a condensed game. Because there are only three players to a side, each player gets to play soccer—to dribble, pass, shoot, etc.—about three or four times as much as he or she would in a regular 11 versus 11 game.

Motive: To Gain Extrinsic Rewards

Over the years, I have taken my own children numerous times to a local pizza parlor which has a game room in the back. In this room is a game called "Skil–ball" in which participants get eight wooden balls and can accumulate points by bowling them down an alley into holes with different point values. The more points they get, the more little tickets come out of the machine. These tickets are then redeemable for prizes, mostly little cups, pens, pencils, toys and bumper stickers of very little monetary value. While this game taps many of the motivations already discussed (e.g., activity, competition, winning), it adds something else—an extrinsic reward or prize for performing up to certain levels. What has always struck me is the fervor with which children, adolescents, and even adults strive to get a certain number of prize tickets even though most of the prizes have a monetary value less than the cost of even one game. These young people could go out, for example, and buy a better pencil for a quarter than the one they just spent two dollars to win!

Many people love extrinsic rewards and will work hard to achieve them. This fact may be employed for the betterment of our players and our teams. For example, players on my younger soccer teams over the years have liked little prizes like soccer–related key chains, sports bag name tags, and stickers. These prizes could be won by players for various achievements such as dribbling through slalom courses with no mistakes in the fastest time, hitting targets placed in the corners of the goal, or displaying the most perfect kicking or passing form. By way of further example, awards certificates (available in many sporting goods stores) may be given out at the end of the season to players who have achieved various things (e.g., 100% effort, leading scorer, most assists, or fewest runs allowed).

Some interesting psychological research suggests that coaches must be careful in how they employ extrinsic rewards, or the results could be detrimental (Berk, 1989, p. 268). Specifically, coaches should never reward players for the mere doing of something that they already love to do. The effect of such a practice can be to interfere with players' intrinsic interest in that activity. Thus, for example, it would be unwise to reward players for merely practicing their skills at home since the result might be a diminished enjoyment of those activities. In contrast, it will be more beneficial to offer prizes, not for merely doing something, but for the attainment of some standard or achievement (e.g., running a slalom course in a certain time or hitting a certain percentage of three point shots). The additional benefit of linking rewards with achievements is that the player who is practicing his or her skills is less likely to do so with an aim merely to get through a set number of repetitions, and more likely to be concerned with getting the skill right.

Motive: To Have Fun

Though obvious, no listing of motives would be complete without the motive simply to have fun (Warren, 1983). Undoubtedly one of the foremost reasons why

young people enter athletics is simply because athletic participation is enjoyable. And one of the foremost reasons why they quit athletics is because it does not turn out to be enjoyable, or ceases to be so. "It wasn't any fun" or "It just got so it wasn't any fun anymore" are frequent reasons that people report for terminating their participation.

The motive to have fun is an extremely important one for coaches to harness for their teams' betterment. The basic question coaches may repeatedly raise when planning practice sessions is this: "Is there any drill or practice game that I can find or create that will get me what I want—high involvement, high effort, conditioning, the necessity for good decision making, and/or the rewarding of perfect technique— that will be fun for them to engage in?" There is no necessary incompatibility between enjoyment and good, hard productive practice activities.

To a great extent, if coaches successfully create team and practice situations that address all of the motives that have been listed in this chapter, the motive for fun will automatically be satisfied. Consider, for example, a player who said the following: "On this team, I feel appreciated, included, and cared for by my coach and teammates. I feel it gives me something worthwhile to strive for, that I am being challenged to be the best that I can be, and that I am acquiring excellence. Practices are full of active, competitive drills and games where I get to play my chosen sport, and execute its various skills, to a very high degree." It is extremely unlikely that such a player would then go on to say, "But, I'm not having any fun."

Idiosyncratic Motives

In the lore of coaching, there is an old aphorism about the coach having to find out about how "this guy responds to a push and that guy to a pat on the back." Some coaches, such as Red Auerbach (1985), even go so far as to say that each player is motivated differently and that coaches must therefore study each individual team member and learn what matters to him or her. What Auerbach fails to recognize is that, in his coaching situation, many of the relatively universal motivators listed above were already in place and he did not even have to think about them. Players were all in the public eye, striving for championships, on a closely knit team, with enormous financial and public recognition incentives in place, doing the thing they most loved doing, and very much not wanting to lose their hard-won position as a player for the world champion Boston Celtics.

While it is certainly true that there are enormous commonalities between individuals with respect to what motivates them, it is also true that there are important individual differences. Therefore, coaches desiring to appeal to what matters to their players must be aware, not only of the more universal motives cited above, but also of the idiosyncratic motives of the individuals on their teams. There may be a few general guidelines here. For example, Warren (1983) suggests that

confident, aggressive players often respond better to being pushed, while their shyer, less confident counterparts respond better to being encouraged. For the most part, however, the determination of individual motivations is a matter of observation. Coaches must look and see what does seem to motivate a particular player and then test this out by appealing to it and seeing what happens. In this way, he or she finds out that some players want a more parental, hand-on-the-shoulder approach, others a more laid-back one, and yet others a continually challenging one.

Conclusion

The overall recommendation of this chapter has been that coaches strive to create team communities where the satisfaction of many vital human motivations is available to members. These include motivations for recognition, for belongingness, for love, for personal excellence, for the opportunity to display this excellence before admiring others, and for the chance to make a meaningful contribution to a cause that they find worthy. In these communities, the satisfaction of these motives is available especially to those who participate most fully—that is, to those who work very, very hard on behalf of the community by becoming the most excellent individual and team players they are capable of being. The overall goal of creating such team communities is an ideal, and will always be imperfectly realized. Like most unattainable ideals, however, it conveys the invaluable benefit of providing a direction for our efforts.

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Coaching and Teaching

Raymond M. Bergner

ABSTRACT

This chapter explores the crucial matter of how coaches may obtain the best quality of learning from their players. The chapter is organized around three critical questions, and is devoted to providing sound, comprehensive, and practical answers to each of them: (1) What is the *ultimate objective* of the learning process in athletics—the "target" toward which all of our teaching efforts should be directed? (2) What are the *necessary conditions* that coaches must create on their teams if they wish to promote optimum learning? (3) What *learning principles and policies* should coaches employ if they are to help players to acquire the best possible mastery of the skills and concepts of their sport?

> "They call it coaching, but it is really teaching."
> —Vince Lombardi

Coaching is quintessentially about *getting players to learn*. It is about helping them to acquire the greatest possible mastery of the skills and concepts necessary for success in their sport. This being the case, it is absolutely necessary for the athletic coach, like any other teacher, to know a great deal about how to achieve the highest

quality of learning in his or her "students." The achievement of such learning excellence will be the subject of this chapter.

In order to address these matters of teaching and learning in athletics adequately, it seems best to raise and to answer three distinct questions:

1. What is the *ultimate objective* of the learning process in athletics; what is the "target" toward which all of our teaching efforts should be directed?
2. What are the *necessary conditions* that coaches must create on their teams if they wish to promote optimum learning?
3. What *learning principles and policies* should coaches employ if they are to help players to acquire the best possible mastery of the skills and concepts of their sport?

This chapter will be organized around these three questions, and will be devoted to providing sound, comprehensive, and practical answers to each of them.

Objectives of the Learning Process

"Begin with the end in mind."
—Steven Covey

What are we, as athletic coaches, trying to accomplish when we implement drills, chalk talks, scrimmages, and other learning procedures? What is the target or goal of all of our efforts to get players to learn? As in so many human endeavors, it is best, as Covey suggests, to "begin with the end in mind" (1989, p. 95) If we know exactly where we are trying to go, this provides an invaluable focus for all of our efforts to get there.

In athletics, the ideal goal of the teaching process is the development of players who have acquired the best possible mastery of the skills, choice principles, and self–regulatory abilities called for by their sport. Let me elaborate briefly on each of these.

Skills.
The first goal of the teaching process is that players acquire the ability to execute the fundamental skills of their sport (dribbling, passing, shooting, hitting, etc.). The ultimate objective here is that they become able to execute these skills in game situations with great technical correctness and quickness, without having to think about it (Wooden, 1972). They instinctively do the right thing, do it extremely quickly, and do it with great technical proficiency.

Choice Principles.
The second goal of the teaching process is that players gain a very strong mastery of the choice principles (Ossorio, 1983; Putman, 1990) essential to their

sport and to team life in general. Choice principles, as the name implies, are general decision rules or behavioral policies. They contain sound guidelines regarding what actions it is usually best to take in various situations. They tell players, in essence: "As a general rule, do X, but if in unusual circumstances you can see strong reasons to do otherwise, do so." Thus, they state general guidelines about what it is usually best to do, while permitting flexibility and creativity in unusual circumstances.

Most choice principles provide guidelines regarding what to do in game situations in one's sport. Some familiar examples of these from various sports include the following: "On defense, stay between your man and the goal." "Work hard to create good shots, and take only good ones." "Work hard to get open when you don't have the ball (or puck)." As a forward (shortstop, setter, goalie, etc.), your role is to do X, Y, and Z, but not A, B, and C" (positional role responsibilities, which include roles on set plays).

The other major group of choice principles has to do with one's conduct as a member of a team. These tend to be quite similar from one sport to another, and to permit fewer exceptions. Perhaps the most important of these is a principle that might be considered the cardinal rule of team life: "Always act so as to make the greatest contribution to the mission of your team" (cf. Putman, 1990). Other examples would include: "Always treat your teammates with respect," and "Acknowledge the positive contributions of your fellow players."

Self-regulation.

The third goal of the teaching process is that players learn to self-regulate—i.e., to govern their own behavior independently of the coach. The objective here is first of all that they learn to observe what they are doing and to evaluate it competently. If they judge their actions satisfactory, they must learn to note what is working and to make further use of it in appropriate situations. If they judge their actions unsatisfactory, they must learn to (a) diagnose the problem in behavioral terms (e.g., "I'm letting my person get behind me when I'm on defense"); (b) prescribe behavioral adjustments (e.g., "I've got to stay back a little more, focus more on her and less on the ball, and prevent her from making runs behind me"); (c) implement the prescription; and finally, (d) observe the consequences of the adjustment made and proceed accordingly (Ossorio, 1976, 1981; Bergner, 1995).

Summary.

Overall, then, the ideal goal of the learning process is the development of a player (a) with great technical skills; who (b) makes good decisions based on sound choice principles both in game situations and in team life in general; and (c) who is capable, without constant direction from the coach, of monitoring his or her own behavior, staying with what is working, and making appropriate adjustments in what is not working. Such a player can be released by the coach to do his or her job in an autonomous fashion. Such a player, if he or she also possesses leadership

qualities, can become a positive team leader (in the sense implied by the traditional expression, "a coach on the field").

With this as our picture of the ideal outcome of the learning process, let us turn our attention to how best to achieve it.

Promote Conditions Necessary For Optimum Learning

Learning, whether it be in the classroom, in the business organization, or on the athletic field, always occurs in a context. This context, far from being irrelevant, can be the determining factor in whether learning occurs to a high degree, a low degree, or not at all. For example, there is a great deal of talk in contemporary America about the appalling conditions in many of our classrooms. Teachers report that their students are unmotivated to learn, that they engage in behavior that introduces chaos and even danger into the classroom, and that they force teachers out of their educational roles into oppositional, police–like ones a great deal of the time. Under such conditions, these educators relate, they can possess the best teaching skills in the world and it does not matter. They cannot teach, and learning cannot occur to any appreciable degree in their classrooms.

Thus, one of the vital matters that the athletic coach must attend to is promoting the contexts or conditions necessary for optimum learning to occur. In this section, four such conditions will be examined: (a) players' motivation, (b) players' sense of personal eligibility to acquire athletic excellence, (c) the relationship between player and coach, and (d) the presence of seriously disruptive behavior in the athletic learning situation.

Motivate Players to Learn

Learning in the fullest sense of the word means more than mere exposure to content (students sit through many lectures and pick up little of what is said) or mere acquisition (many students acquire content but retain it only long enough to pass next week's test). Rather, as Bandura (1986) has noted, it implies *acceptance* of the newly acquired behavior or idea. In the present context, this means that players truly assimilate and personally adopt the skill or choice principle into their personal repertoires. They truly "make it their own" in the sense that they are ready, able, and personally inclined to *use* what they have learned in their own behavior.

People tend to learn, in this fullest sense of "accept," what is relevant to the achievement of their purposes in their worlds. They tend to discard, or to have a hard time maintaining, what they find irrelevant to the achievement of such purposes. When all is said and done, the expression, "being motivated to learn X," comes down essentially to this: that one can see clearly how learning X can be helpful in the accomplishment of one's own personally valued goals.

The practical upshot of this point for the athletic coach is that he or she must make every effort to ensure that players are very clear about how the meeting of each specific learning target can help them to achieve their own desired objectives. An in-depth discussion of this point, and of numerous ways to align the accomplishment of team objectives with players' existing motivations, is contained in the previous chapter. For the present, two brief examples of such motivational activities by the coach will be mentioned.

First, at a general level, the most important thing a coach can do is to articulate and continually renew a team mission in which, if players do their best to learn and acquire excellence, they can satisfy a great number of motivations that virtually all of them share. As noted in previous chapters, such preexisting motives will almost always include the desires (a) to win games and championships; (b) to achieve personal excellence; (c) to display this personal excellence before admiring others; (d) to work in positive collaboration with others in pursuit of a highly valued common purpose; and (e) to be personally valued, included, and cared for by one's coaches and teammates.

A second, more narrowly focused example of a motivational activity is that coaches may, as Lombardi did so fastidiously, continually clarify how every little thing to be learned benefits the player and the team (O'Brien, 1987). Thus, when introducing a new skill or exhorting players to improve an existing one, the coach might say something like, "If you become able to execute this move very skillfully and very quickly, you'll be able to break down most defenders and create scoring opportunities."

Establish Player's Eligibility to Acquire Excellence

John Gardner (1990), in his widely acclaimed book on leadership, relates an incident that occurred one day when he was sitting with Martin Luther King during a talk at a conference on education. The speaker, who was relating her approach to teaching inner-city children, stated that we must "First get them to read." On hearing this, Dr. King leaned over to Gardner and whispered in his ear, "No, first get them to believe in themselves" (p. 195).

Coaches, like inner-city teachers, have to deal with many individuals who have declared themselves *ineligible* for athletic success. These players, perhaps with the "help" of messages from previous coaches, teammates, or even their own parents, have made self-appraisals that disqualify them in their own minds from ever becoming good players or making meaningful contributions to the team (cf. Ossorio, 1976, 1978; Bergner, 1987, 1995 on "private self-degradation"; Bandura, 1992, on low "self-efficacy"). In their view, they are too uncoordinated, or nonathletic, or slow, or possessed of other attributes that doom them to athletic mediocrity at best.

Such a sense of personal ineligibility is the enemy of all serious efforts to learn. If players firmly believe that they do not have what it takes to achieve quality

athletic skills, it is only logical that they would see little reason to exert long and strenuous efforts to acquire them (Bandura, 1992). Therefore, in cases where players have insufficient faith in their own abilities or potentials, coaches must find ways to enhance the beliefs of such players that they can acquire excellence, or in some cases that they already are a good deal better than they realize. The following are some general strategies for accomplishing this end.

Work to Establish Own Credibility.

If the coach is to be successful in getting players to drop their old, self-disqualifying beliefs, and to adopt new and more positive ones, it is important for him or her to be as credible as possible (cf. Bergner & Staggs, 1987). Thus, the first general direction for efforts is that the coach pay a lot of attention to establishing his or her credibility in the eyes of players. Such credibility derives from two primary sources. First, it derives from players perceiving that the coach possesses considerable expertise about the sport itself. Players must believe that the coach knows the game, knows how to teach it well, and, most importantly, knows a good or potentially good player when he or she sees one. Second, credibility derives from players seeing the coach as honest. They must believe that the coach will render honest judgments, for better or for worse, of what he or she observes. A coach who, perhaps in a misguided effort always to be positive, says that everything is wonderful will quickly lose credibility.

If the coach is new, or is unknown to players, a good place to begin to establish credibility is in the initial address to the team. For example, the author, in his last such address to a new team, designed the talk, among other things, to convey an aura of competence to players. The talk was carefully written and rehearsed, contained allusions to a number of soccer principles, and included some analysis of videotaped highlights from a game featuring the U.S. National Women's Team. Further, in the course of focusing on other matters, the author mentioned at various points that he was a university professor, that he was a professor of psychology with a professional interest in what made organizations thrive, that he had been a coach for many years, that his previous team had had an unbeaten string of 16 games, that he had coached higher level players in the past, and other facts designed to foster credibility. A conscious effort was made to report all of these things in a matter-of-fact way that was not boastful, since boastfulness tends to undercut credibility and to have other negative side effects. Finally, in the days and weeks following this team meeting, all chalk talks, demonstrations, drills, and exercises were highly planned so that practices would be, and would be *seen* to be, highly efficient and goal oriented. All of these measures, aside from their obvious objectives, had as their unspoken agenda the goal of getting players to believe in their coach and in his competence.

Use Credibility to Create Useful Doubts in Players.

Having established his or her credibility, the coach may use this credibility in all sorts of ways to undermine players' negative self-appraisals, and to get them to consider far more positive ones (cf. Ossorio, 1976; Bergner, 1987; Bergner & Staggs, 1987). One of these ways is to create doubt in players that they are the best judges of their own potential. For example, in the team address alluded to above, the author attempted to plant such a doubt by relating the following message to players: "It's my experience over many years of coaching that most players do not know how good they can be if they really push themselves." He then goes on to tell some true stories about players who vastly underestimated themselves and later, by hard work, accomplished things that surprised both themselves and others. The point of saying this to all players, but especially to those with little belief in themselves, was to plant a useful doubt in their minds about whether they were the best judges of their own potential. "Most players," this message suggests, "underestimate how good they can be if they really try, so don't be so sure of any limitations you may have placed on your own possibilities."

Use Credibility to Recognize Competence.

One of the most powerful countermessages to "I can't do it," is "You've already done it" (Farber, 1981). One of the messages that unconfident players find it hardest to dismiss occurs when a highly credible coach repeatedly recognizes their already completed and undeniable successes. "Very smart shot, Sara Beth, you placed it right where the goalie wasn't." "Great route, Doug, you completely lost that defender." "Super defensive job, Anna, she couldn't get free to create a good shot or pass." All of these messages, delivered by a knowledgeable coach who players know does not lie, not only acknowledge success, but carry a further implication: such accomplishments, especially if they occur repeatedly, imply skill and competence, and are not the sorts of things that a "lousy athlete" would be likely to achieve by luck or accident. Therefore, the coach should actively search for such undeniable successes and accomplishments, even if they are small ones, and take pains to recognize them very clearly and explicitly.

Use "Move Two's."

A "move two" is a psychotherapy tactic created by Peter Ossorio (1976). In the present context, it represents a further way to recognize competence. Again, its primary virtue is that it can be especially difficult for players to dismiss. What the coach does here is to issue a message that doesn't explicitly state that the player has achieved some competence; rather, it presupposes that this must be the case. Consider this sequence of statements: "Joel, I believe that you have surpassed Pete in your defensive skills" (call this "move 1"); therefore, you are getting the starting nod over him in Saturday's game" (this is "move 2"). Here, Joel, if he does not believe in himself, has in move 1 something obvious and explicit that he can reject ("Gee, I don't think I'm better than Pete."). In the "move two" strategy, however,

what the coach does is to leave the premise (move 1) unstated, thus rendering it more difficult to combat. Instead, he or she issues only the move 2 message: "Joel, you're starting this week." The positive implication is clear, but it is not so easily dismissed because it is never made explicit.

Other examples of move 2's include the following: "Liz, come out here and show everybody the move you were just doing; everybody, please pay careful attention to what Liz is doing here, and then you try it" (unstated implication: Liz is quite good at this move). "Tony, I'm moving you up to varsity" (unstated implication: "You're too good to stay at the junior varsity level"). "Andrea, we've got a very important job for you this week; we'd like you to shadow their star all game long, deny her the ball, and pressure her to give it up when she does get it" (implicit message: "You are an excellent defender").

Use Credibility to Combat Players' Difficulties in Accepting Positive Appraisals.
At times, self-doubting players will find it difficult or impossible to accept the new and more positive appraisals they are hearing from their coaches. In their own minds, they will discount such appraisals with thoughts like "I was lucky," "it was an accident," "coach is just trying to make me feel good," or "it's amazing how even a klutz like me can get it right once in a while, but it can't last" (see Ossorio, 1976, on how "status takes precedence over fact"). Often, the coach will not be aware of these private discounting activities. However, if the player does make them public, coaches are well-advised not to let such statements pass unchallenged. For example, during a soccer practice, one player who thought little of her own ability made a perfectly formed, hard, and accurate shot on goal. When the coach said, "Nice kick, Sarah," she retorted that it was an "accident." The coach, in a friendly, gently teasing way, responded "Okay, nice accident." Then, after several additional quality shots from Sarah, he kidded her further by saying, "Gee, you're sure having a lot of good accidents today." Thus, while never directly contradicting Sarah, the coach worked to gently undermine her dismissal of her own competence by making teasing comments that he did not regard her success as accidental.

Never Degrade a Player.
Coaches, especially if they have acquired credibility with their players, should be careful never to use labels or other characterizations that could serve to diminish players' beliefs in their own abilities, potentials, or personal worth. Such labels and characterizations frequently imply ingrained, permanent deficiencies. The danger when we use them is quite simply that players will believe us—will believe that they possess these unchangeable, disqualifying characteristics (Ossorio, 1976, 1978; Bergner, 1987, 1995). Thus, the coach not only fails to enhance players' belief in themselves; he or she undermines such belief and, in the bargain, damages the team's ability to achieve its mission. Some common clusters of such labels and characterizations center around themes of work ethic ("lazy," "loafer," "always taking the easy way out," etc.); team vs. self orientation ("selfish," "ball hog,"

"glory hog," etc.); decision making ability ("stupid," "head case," "screw-up," etc.); and athletic potential ("uncoordinated," "klutz," "nonathletic," etc.).

The issue here is not truth. The issue is how to address deficiencies honestly and effectively, yet in such a way that the confidence of players is not destroyed. Coaches do not have to say "glory hog" to a player who is behaving selfishly. They can say, "Johnny, you absolutely must look more for the open man and stop taking bad shots, or you're coming out of the game." Coaches don't have to call Susie a "lazy loafer." They can say, "Susie, I don't see you working very hard right now to get this skill right, I need to see a greater effort," and then bring a negative consequence to bear for continued noncompliance. Coaches don't have to call Terry an "idiot." They can say, "That was a mistake, Terry; do you know what decision you need to make if that situation comes up again?," and then discuss the matter. Criticisms that destroy player's belief in themselves, that contain no useful information about how they can modify their problematic behavior, and that hurt the team by turning players against the coach, are destructive both to players and to the team's ability to accomplish its mission.

Relationship Between Coach and Athlete

Teaching is a human transaction entailing two complementary roles, those of teacher and student. In this transaction, one person, the teacher, creates a situation (e.g., gives a lecture, provides a demonstration, or prescribes an exercise) that he or she hopes will result in learning on the part of a second person, the student. For this transaction to be successful, the student must *cooperate* with the teacher's agenda, and do what it takes on his or her part to acquire the content of the lesson (do the exercise with diligence, practice the skill, etc.).

Viewed from this transactional perspective, the question becomes: "What sorts of relationships between teacher and pupil will lend themselves to the student being receptive to the teacher's agendas, and cooperative in carrying out his or her role in the learning process? The teacher can only "make a bid" or "extend an invitation" to learn. He or she cannot force the student to learn. What sorts of relationships will give students reason to cooperate, and thereby maximize the likelihood that this invitation will be accepted? On the other hand, what sorts of relationships will give pupils reason to reject the invitation—to thwart, oppose, disregard, or otherwise refuse to cooperate with the teacher?

A teacher is a leader whose particular mission is to enable followers to learn. Thus, it will not be surprising that those relationships that are conducive to effective leadership, and the actions that establish these relationships, will also be conducive to effective teaching. Since these are discussed at length in the chapter on leadership, they will be reviewed here only briefly and insofar as they relate to learning.

Act in the Best Interest of Athletes.

Athletes will tend to cooperate with a coach who places their best interests as human beings first. This is a coach who cares about them, and who in his or her actions gives priority to doing what is best for them as human beings (e.g., not playing them if they are injured, if they are neglecting their classwork, or if they need important behavioral limits placed on them). With such coaches, most athletes will tend to cooperate in the effort to learn. They will do so because they will want to return the good treatment given them, to please the coach, and not to do anything that would let the coach down or destroy the good relationship that exists between them (Warren, 1983). On the other hand, if the coach cares little for them, exploits them, and shows no concern for their best interests as persons, players have less reason to cooperate in efforts to learn, and more reason to be oppositional to the coach's teaching agendas.

Encourage, Listen To, and Genuinely Consider Player Input.

A coaching attitude of "I welcome your input, I will listen carefully to it, and I will always give it due consideration," is conducive to cooperation. When players see that the coach is genuinely interested in knowing their ideas, complaints, and difficulties; is truly attempting to understand them; and is willing to act on their input when convinced of its value, they are generally more receptive to the coach's agendas, including those having to do with learning.

Maintain Control: Set Limits and Enforce Them.

Research by Diana Baumrind (1983) and others in developmental psychology has shown that, where parents are concerned, it is a combination of warmth and firm control that yields the best outcomes, including learning outcomes. The same holds for coaching. Players respond best not only to the sort of caring and responsiveness described above, but to a situation where this is combined with the setting and subsequent enforcement of clear standards and limits. If the coach is a "good guy" but a pushover, it doesn't work. The message to players in such circumstances is that they don't really have to work hard to acquire skills and choice principles because, if they don't, there won't be any negative consequences from the coach (Paterno, 1988).

Keep Players Informed.

Coaches need to keep their players as informed as possible about key decisions and other developments affecting the wellbeing of the team. Secretiveness about such matters often elicits mistrust, suspicion, and the attribution of all sorts of unsavory motivations to the coach. None of these, it goes without saying, is particularly conducive to players being receptive to the coach's agendas, including those bearing on the matter of working hard to learn.

Acknowledge Efforts and Achievements.

Coaches must explicitly acknowledge players' efforts and achievements with recognition, praise, appreciation, new assignments, and in any other meaningful way that they can devise. From a relational (vs. informational or confidence-building) standpoint, such acknowledgments serve to establish a relationship with players where they know that their efforts are both recognized and appreciated by the coach (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). In general, all of us are more inclined to cooperate with others who recognize and appreciate our efforts.

Avoid Unnecessary Provocation.

Provocation elicits hostility (Ossorio, 1976), a motivation that, directed towards a coach, is not conducive to being receptive to him or her. Therefore, actions by the coach such as verbal or physical abusiveness, favoritism, exploitation, deceit, manipulation, or failure to honor commitments should be avoided on this, as well as on moral, grounds.

Avoid Unnecessary Coercion.

Coercion elicits resistance (Ossorio, 1976). Directed toward a coach who is attempting to teach, this is the very antithesis of cooperation in efforts to learn. Therefore, unnecessary resort to the use of threats, the degrading barking of orders, or any other form of pressure that will be perceived as excessive and/or illegitimate should be avoided.

Promote Family–Like Relationships between Team Members.

Speaking about families, Ossorio (personal communication, 1993) has characterized them in the following way: "A family is paradigmatically an institution marked by mutual support, affection, respect, cooperation, and trust, where differences are respected. No one is privileged, and no one is barred from rights" (cf. Roberts, 1991). While an athletic team is not literally a family, Ossorio's description is an excellent recipe for the sorts of relationships that would ideally exist between the members of a team. Where such relationships exist, they provide countless reasons for players to strive to learn and acquire excellence. For example, players on such a team will wish to do their best for their teammates, will be very loathe to let them down, will not want to damage their existing good relationships with them, and will work harder in the knowledge that their efforts will be noticed and celebrated by their fellow players. In contrast, the opposite sorts of team relationships (lack of mutual support, dislike, disrespect, noncooperation, mistrust, cliquishness, etc.) do not provide reasons for team members to strive in such fashion, and may provide reasons contrary to such acquisition of excellence through learning.

Therefore, coaches are well-advised to do such things as the following: (a) Take the lead by personally treating all team members in these ways (i.e., respectful, supportive, no one is privileged, etc.). (b) Set strict rules about how players must treat each other (see next section). Finally, (c) continually encourage players to

treat each other well through verbal messages, team–building activities, and open acknowledgments of their efforts when they do so.

Minimize Distractions from the Learning Situation

The athletic teaching situation must be as free as possible from elements that compete with the athletic lesson for the players' attention. Such elements are also destructive since they divert the coach's efforts toward controlling the distracting conditions, and away from teaching the lesson. Typical distractions include players horsing around when they are supposed to be on task, engaging in side conversations when coaches are instructing, refusing to cooperate with directions, harassing one another, or getting into physical confrontations.

Coaches must take strong action to eliminate or minimize all such barriers to learning (Paterno, 1988; Warren, 1983). The primary antidote here is something that has already been mentioned in connection with the coach–player relationship. Here we shall discuss it in greater detail insofar as it relates to preventing and eliminating factors that damage team learning. It comprises the following steps: (a) Establish from the outset a small but sufficient set of extremely clear rules and penalties prohibiting these and other activities that hurt the team. (b) Clarify for all players exactly how the proscribed activities damage the team. (c) Put the rules in writing and hand them out to every player (and, for younger players, every players' parents). (d) Stress that there are no exceptions to these rules and penalties. Finally, (e) enforce these rules throughout the season with the greatest possible consistency and evenhandedness. Coaches are well–advised never to let infractions slide in the hope that the problem will just go away by itself. Such an action is basically a message to all that they may be able to get away with these disruptive activities. This can easily lead to practice sessions becoming chaotic, uncontrolled, and of limited or no learning value. It is an absolute must that a coach, like a classroom teacher, maintain sufficient order so that lessons can be taught.

Teaching Policies

This section presents a set of eleven teaching policies. To a greater degree than the materials that have been presented previously in these chapters, the content of this section may be familiar to many readers. This is so, I believe, for two primary reasons. First, these policies are extremely commonsensical and will seem intuitively obvious to many readers. Second, they have been "preached and practiced" by many highly successful and visible coaches both past (e.g., John Wooden and Vince Lombardi) and present (e.g., Bobby Knight). To some degree, these policies may be seen as "reminders" whose value lies in the fact that, while "everybody knows them," it is equally true that everybody frequently forgets to

observe them or even violates them. While there are exceptions to every principle, and careful judgment about one's particular situation remains always a necessity, the following teaching guidelines should serve the athletic coach well the great majority of the time.

1. Teach Fewer Things Better

A cornerstone of the methods of John Wooden (1972), Vince Lombardi (O'Brien, 1987), Bobby Knight (Mellen, 1988), Woody Hayes (Walton, 1992), and many other great coaches has been a policy of not trying to teach players more than they can learn well. Rather than teaching many things only adequately (or even poorly), the central thrust of this policy is to teach fewer things, but to teach them as close to perfection as possible. Let us review three different applications of this general guideline.

The first application has to do with the overall design of the entire team training program. It comprises the following parts. (a) Decide on a relatively small set of fundamental skills, choice principles, and plays that are necessary and sufficient for success in the sport in question. (b) Inform the players of exactly what these are, so that they are very, very clear regarding precisely what they must learn. (c) Finally, focus the entire training program on teaching these fundamentals as close to perfection as possible. Thus, rather than teaching fancy but rarely utilized skills, the coach who follows this policy would teach players to execute the basic skills of a sport more quickly and perfectly than anyone else, and to a point where they can do so in game situations without thinking (Wooden, 1972). Rather than teaching numerous complicated plays, this coach would teach players to execute fewer, simpler, and thus more learnable ones more perfectly than the opposition.

A second application of the policy of teaching fewer things better is to teach one thing at a time. The general idea here is to create conditions where players can focus their attention on one thing to be learned, and not to overload their capacity to process information by trying to teach them too many things at once. For example, when a new skill is being introduced, players should not be inundated with all of its complexities at once ("Okay, everybody, now in playing defense, you have to get back fast, know where your person is at all times, stay between her and the goal, avoid ball-watching, be ready to help out if a teammate gets beaten, take this stance if your person has the ball...etc."). By way of further example, when instructing players about strategy during a time out in a game, only one very clearly stated point should be made at a time, and very few points made overall. When the coach tries to make ten points, all jammed into a very short, tension-packed, period of time, players usually leave the huddle thinking "What did he (or she) say? What were those ten things that I'm supposed to do all at once?"

A third and final application of the policy to teach fewer things better is to refrain from trying to cram too many things into one practice session. After observing the unfortunate state of overall team skills at an opening practice, or after

a poor showing in a game, the coach may become alarmed and begin to think, "Gee, we just have to do a much better job at X...and at Y...and at Z...etc." He or she may then attempt to improve all of these areas in one single practice session, and wind up touching only superficially on all of them, resulting in negligible improvement. Learning is far better served by selecting fewer learning targets for each practice session, and making sure that sufficient time is spent on each of them to achieve meaningful progress.

2. *Take Learners Where They Are, Not Where You Wish They Were*

We human beings have an amazing capacity at times to violate self-evident principles. One of the ones that the author has most frequently seen violated in athletic practice sessions is this: "Never require a person to do what he or she cannot do." For example, the author once observed a soccer coach who led off his first practice session by running a drill calling for players to get in groups of three and pass the ball back and forth to each other in the air, not letting it hit the ground. When his players proved completely incapable of keeping the ball in the air for more than two touches, the coach made no adjustments to accommodate to their skill level. The result was that, during the entire drill, the ball was on the ground being retrieved approximately 90% of the time. Players were not learning anything retrieving missed balls, showed negligible improvement, and were clearly frustrated by the drill. Why? Because they were asked in the first place to do things they could not do, and no adjustments were made when they proved incapable of carrying out the drill.

Teaching policy #2 suggests that the coach observe carefully where players in fact *are* in their skill development and, based on this assessment, refrain from giving them training exercises that call upon them to possess skills or skill levels that they do not in fact possess. They will only fail, learn little, and possibly become disheartened and lose confidence. Instead, the policy suggests, the coach would do well to build on what players are currently able to do. He or she should give tasks that they can succeed at, gradually add ones that call for manageable stretches in their abilities, and build up their skill levels in this fashion.

This general principle of taking players where they are, and building on this, has numerous practical applications. For example, (a) when introducing new skills of a complex nature, the policy suggests that these be broken down into simpler, and thus more currently manageable, components. These simple components should each be taught separately; and then players would put the individual pieces together to form the complex skill. (b) When teaching new skills, the policy also suggests that the coach should utilize a progression where the skill is learned first in very low-pressure situations (no opposition, ample time, etc.) where it is easiest for players to take their time and get their technique correct. Once it is well-learned under these conditions, the player is called upon to practice the skill under increasingly greater pressure, culminating in high-pressure, game condition

situations. (c) Finally, when teaching choice principles and other ideas, the present policy suggests that we draw upon examples of things that players already understand well. For example, with a young former football player who was new to soccer, the offensive responsibilities of a center midfielder were explained this way: "This position is a lot like a quarterback in football. You don't try to score much yourself; your basic offensive job is more to set others up to score with your passing."

Taking learners where they are also implies that drills or other lessons should not be too easy. Players will not learn from tasks that call upon them to operate well below their capabilities. (This should not be taken to imply that the fundamental skills of a sport do not need to be practiced over and over again, even by the most expert of players. Ted Williams, one of the greatest hitters in baseball history, continued throughout his career to work strenuously on his hitting, always refining his technique and searching for ways to make it even better.)

3. Be as Simple, Precise, and Clear as Possible.

Wellington Mara, the owner of the New York Giants football team, once made the following comment about Vince Lombardi's teaching methods. Seeing how simple, repetitious, and utterly exact Lombardi's messages to players were, Mara commented that "It was as if he were teaching the bottom 10% of the class" (O'Brien, 1987, p. 119). With verbal messages to the team, such simplicity, precision, and clarity are essential for optimum learning to occur. To create this, it is important for coaches to use language that they are sure players understand. Further, if athletes do not understand a lesson when it is given one way, it is critical that the coach present the lesson another way. Finally, clarity and understanding are often well served by the coach using stories, metaphors, and analogies to make his or her points (e.g., the technique for trapping a soccer ball coming out of the air may be compared to that of catching an egg thrown to one—one must withdraw the receiving surface to soften the impact).

This need for extreme clarity and precision also extends to nonverbal messages. A great deal of information in athletics cannot be communicated very well verbally. It is virtually impossible to describe all the elements of a technically correct "fireman" in wrestling, forward pass in football, or backhand in tennis in such a way that these descriptions alone would be sufficient for learning. Players simply have to see certain things to understand them. Thus, it is incumbent on the coach to provide the clearest, most helpful visual demonstrations possible. In this connection, two helpful guidelines are the following. First, separate the verbal part of the demonstration from the visual part, so that the auditory and visual channels are not "jamming" each other. For example, if the coach is teaching essential footwork, she might start by saying, "Now watch how I turn my foot," *stop talking*, and only then turn her foot in the desired way. Second, it is frequently helpful to provide illustrations in slow motion. If, for example, the coach is demonstrating a

complex skill, demonstrating it at full speed will often result in the players seeing a rather uninformative blur. If executed in slow motion, however, they will be able to see each of the components of the skill and how they go together in its overall execution. The coach may even isolate each of these components for the players' attention ("Now look at the position of my feet...now look at how my body is turned...now look at how my racket is back...etc.").

4. Insist that Players Strive to Execute Skills Perfectly.

One of the most useful maxims in coaching (my daughter informs me that her ballet instructor also employed it heavily) is that "Practice doesn't make perfect; *perfect* practice makes perfect." If players execute a technique the wrong way a thousand times, they have only made themselves better at doing that technique incorrectly. In the bargain, they have also established muscular habits that will render changing the technique more difficult. Therefore, it is essential that coaches ceaselessly urge players to strive for perfect execution, that they catch and correct faults before these become bad habits, and that they promote a value for perfect practice on the part of players.

5. Provide Immediate Feedback

The motivational and confidence-building benefits of providing positive feedback for successful performances have been discussed previously in this book. Such feedback, it may now be noted, is also very important from a learning standpoint (Skinner, 1974; Bandura, 1986). Accurate, credible messages that one is making progress, or that one has just executed a skill or a play assignment with excellence, provide important confirmatory *information* that one is getting something right. When viewed from a learning perspective, further, one can see that the provision of false positive feedback in order to please or reassure players is a poor idea. Such feedback, if believed, provides players with misleading information about the correctness of what they are doing.

From a learning perspective, it is also very important to provide immediate corrective feedback when players make mistakes in their technique or decision making. Again, such feedback provides critical information to players that they are going wrong and how they are going wrong, and can thus prevent them from making their mistakes habitual.

The fundamental rule for corrective criticism is this: *Criticism must always be for the benefit of improving behavior* (cf. Ossorio, 1976, 1981). When feedback is degrading ("Smith, you'll never amount to anything") or otherwise lacking in usable information ("C'mon, quit screwing up and get your act together, we need a hit"), it serves no constructive learning function for the player. In contrast, when criticism contains diagnoses of what is wrong, and prescriptions for how to improve it, that are couched in language that informs players about how to modify

their performance, it is beneficial criticism from a learning standpoint. For example, the classical admonition, "You're not watching the ball, you've got to keep your eye on the ball" is a simple, everyday example of criticism that can serve to improve behavior. It contains a diagnosis ("not watching the ball") and a prescription ("keep your eye on the ball") that the player can *use* to improve his or her performance.

6. When Possible, Teach in Small Groups

Circumstances and coaching personnel permitting, the quality of learning can be enhanced by teaching players in small groups of from two to six players. Working with such groups enables coaches to observe each player better, to provide corrective feedback more adequately, and to maintain levels of behavioral control that are more conducive to optimum learning.

7. Design Practices to Achieve Maximum Learning Time

In the "best of all possible learning worlds," players would be enhancing their mastery of skills and choice principles 100% of the time during every practice. While such a state of affairs is an unachievable ideal, certain common coaching practices do result unnecessarily in large wastages of valuable learning time. For example, it is not uncommon for coaches to employ drills where players stand in long lines awaiting their turn to practice a skill, thus creating a situation where they are learning only a small percentage of the time. Other common time wastages occur when valuable stretches of practice time are spent on breaks, setting up equipment for drills, giving lengthy instructions, and/or selecting sides for scrimmage. Finally, when players are required to participate in large scale scrimmages or other game–type drills (e.g., 9 v. 9 baseball, 11 v. 11 soccer), significant periods of time may pass where they are out of the action and learning comparatively little.

An excellent general learning principle is therefore to design practices so as to achieve maximum learning time for every single player. To this end, practices should be planned completely beforehand (all drills selected, their order determined, scrimmage sides established, etc.) so that no valuable learning time need be spent during practice on these matters. Whenever possible, all equipment (cones, flags, nets, etc.) should be set up before practice so that no time is wasted on set–up and players can move swiftly and efficiently from one learning activity to another. Where skill development is the goal, drills should be selected in which every player is practicing the target skill as much time as possible (e.g., in baseball, if fielding ground balls is the target skill, pairing up and throwing each other hard grounders will be infinitely superior to an intrasquad game where some players may handle no grounders the entire time). Where playing the game itself is the focus, and thus having players use the full range of skills and choice principles

under game-condition pressure, small scale games will usually be preferable to full scale ones (e.g., in soccer, 3 v. 3 games will result in all players dribbling, passing, shooting, or defending virtually 100% of the time).

8. Employ Drills that are Competitive Games

Compared to drills that involve repetition only, ones that are also competitive games sustain motivation and effort more easily for the vast majority of players. In soccer, for example, most players find pairing up and passing balls back and forth a somewhat boring activity. In contrast, when they are told that there is a contest, and the winners are the twosome who can make the highest number of consecutive passes to each other standing in small target areas, they usually find this a much more involving activity. When employing such contests, it is a good idea to publicly acknowledge the winners at the end, and to do something celebratory such as having them briefly raise their hands in victory while the rest of the team claps. Concentration, effort, time on task, and thus *learning*, are all improved by such drills.

9. Prefer Drills that are Enjoyable.

The rationale for this principle is essentially identical to that of the previous one. Drills that are enjoyable sustain motivation, effort, concentration, and time on task more easily than drills that are tedious. Again, they facilitate a better quality of learning, and do so without the coach continually having to "ride herd" on players.

10. Prefer Drills that Reward Perfect Execution.

Drills that have built-in rewards for perfect execution, and built-in penalties for poor execution, are excellent vehicles for achieving high quality learning. In such drills, getting the technique just right usually works, and getting it wrong usually does not. Players get their own natural feedback—the curve ball breaks or doesn't break, the jump shot goes in or doesn't go in, the escape from the down position occurs or doesn't occur—and learn from it. The reinforcement, or lack thereof, is instantaneous. Further, such drills reduce the burden on the observational and corrective powers of the coach. He or she has less of a need to see everything, and provide corrective feedback for it.

11. Employ Economical Drills (Under Certain Conditions).

Economical drills are ones that accomplish multiple coaching objectives at the same time. For example, a good economical drill might enhance skills, teach choice principles, and promote high levels of conditioning all at once. Such drills should not be employed in the early stages of teaching a specific skill or concept; at this stage, it is usually best to teach one thing at a time, and not to have multiple

elements competing for players' attention. However, at later stages, where skills and choice principles have been learned, and what is called for is their exercise under game conditions, economical drills become highly useful and appropriate.

Summary

In this chapter, the crucial matter of learning in team athletics has been the focus. Taking our cue from Lombardi's assertion that "coaching is really teaching," three highly practical questions have been raised and subsequently addressed. The first of these concerned the ultimate goal of teaching in team athletics: "What must players learn?" The position taken was that the basic objective of the learning process in athletics is the development of players (a) with great technical skills; (b) who make good decisions based on sound choice principles both in game situations and in team life in general; and (c) who are capable, without constant direction from the coach, of monitoring their own behavior, staying with what is working, and making appropriate adjustments in what is not working.

The second question addressed in this chapter concerned what conditions coaches should seek to create in order to promote optimum learning. The response to this question centered around the promotion of four such conditions, (a) high player motivation, (b) players' possession of a sense of personal eligibility, (c) an optimum relationship between coach and athletes, and (d) freedom from distracting factors in the learning situation. Measures to create and maintain all of these conditions were discussed.

The third and final question addressed in this chapter concerned the process of teaching itself: "What teaching policies should coaches employ in order to facilitate the best possible acquisition of skills and concepts on the part of players?" In response to this question, eleven teaching principles were advanced and discussed.

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