

MEN AND WOMEN: PARTNERS, LOVERS, FRIENDS

Mary Kathleen Roberts

ABSTRACT

In order to provide formal and systematic access to facts and possible facts about men and women, a formulation of the concepts of "man" and "woman" as status concepts and a paradigm case formulation of man-woman relationships are presented. This conceptualization is then applied successfully in making some empirical predictions. Possibilities for more practical applications of the conceptualization are explored.

Psychological research on men and women has traditionally not been guided by an understanding of what is involved in principle in being a man or a woman. Rather, the traditional approach has been simply to point to those objects labeled "man" and "woman," and to test out a theory about the characteristics and processes found in those objects. However, to test out a theory about spatial abilities, ego libido, sex

Advances in Descriptive Psychology, Volume 2, pages 57-78
Copyright © 1982 JAI Press Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
ISBN: 0-89232-225-X

roles, and so on, as they occur in the objects labeled “man” or “woman,” is not to study men and women as such.

In order to study men and women as such, a radical shift in approach is made in the conceptualization and empirical study presented here. First, a shift is made away from the traditional semantic view of language to a pragmatic view. “Man” and “woman” are not seen primarily as labels for objects, but rather as concepts that people act on in a great variety of forms of behavior.

Secondly, a shift is made away from the narrowly truth-seeking view of scientific activity. No attempt is made here to state a theory, that is, a body of truths about men and women, or to test a theory empirically. Rather an attempt is made to formulate the conceptual system that includes the concepts of “man” and “woman,” and then to apply that conceptualization. Such a conceptual system is necessary to give us formal and systematic access to the facts and possible facts about men and women. It is only when we have formal access to the possibilities that we can determine empirically which of these possibilities is the case, and know what it is that we have found out empirically.

In the conceptualization that follows, the concepts of man and woman are presented as status concepts, and a paradigm case formulation of man-woman relationships is presented. (Readers unfamiliar with paradigm case formulations are referred to Ossorio, 1981.) Based on the conceptualization, the question of what is involved in principle in being a man or woman is answered.

Two hypotheses are generated using the conceptualization, and an empirical study designed to test these hypotheses is presented. Indicators and participants in the study are described, and the results of specific predictions reported. The results confirm the hypotheses, and thereby provide evidence of the predictive applicability of the conceptualization. The predictive applicability of the conceptualization having been established, possibilities for practical application of the formulation—in socialization, education, and psychotherapy—are explored.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

In order to present “man” and “woman” as status concepts, it is necessary first to clarify the notion of status. Because it is easier to clarify the notion of status in the context of a game, rather than in the lives of men and women, and because there is a well-established precedent in Descriptive Psychology of giving chess examples, I invite the reader to relax and enjoy a languid afternoon’s chess game.

Man and Woman as Status Concepts

Imagine two bums out in a park playing chess. One bum ponders to himself "What is it to be Black?" as he says to the other bum "Knight to Queen's Bishop 6."

The pondering bum looks around. There is nothing he can point to in order to answer his question. There is no chess board in sight and no physical pieces. When the two bums strolled over to the park, all the tables were taken, so they are playing in their heads.

Sobered, the bum considers: "Black is a concept within a whole system of concepts. The concept of Black depends on the presence of the other concepts in the system: White, pawns, rooks, castling, checking, etc. Hmm . . . Where do all these concepts have a place? In the game of chess, a social practice that calls for the use of this system of concepts."

His opponent announces "Pawn to Queen 4."

Our bum, as he responds absentmindedly "Pawn takes Pawn Queen 4," realizes that he can anchor his understanding of what it is to be Black in the social practice of chess. "Let's see then. A person plays the game of chess from one of two positions: Black or White. Eureka! Black is a status, a standing in the game of chess. With this status goes the behavior potential to play chess.

"I wonder if it makes any difference whether I'm Black or White. Well, if I'm Black, I can't move White's pieces. No . . . that's not right. It's not that I can't move White's pieces. I could. But if I'm Black and I move White's pieces, it counts as a violation of the rules of chess. So my behavior counts differently depending on my status.

"I wish it didn't count as a violation if I move White's pieces. But if certain things didn't count as violations, there wouldn't be the game of chess. I couldn't be Black anymore, and I wouldn't have the behavior potential to play chess."

About this time, the two chess players are joined by two other bums. Because at first glance the two chess players appear to be idle, one of the new bums takes out a bedraggled deck of cards and invites the chess players to make a foursome for bridge. The chess players decide to postpone their chess game.

As one of the new bums deals, our bum ponders again: "What is it to be North? I understand this now. North is a status, a standing in the game of bridge. The status carries with it the behavior potential to play bridge, and the status determines (logically determines) how my behavior counts in the game of bridge.

"Umm . . . But North is not just a standing in bridge. In particular, it's a standing in relation to South, and also a standing in relation to East and West. The status carries with it a set of relationships."

Our bum, a little excited by his insight, bids "4 Trumps" and returns quickly to his thoughts. "So to be North is to stand in a certain relation to South, and a certain relation to East and West. More specifically, to

be North is to have the relation of teammate to South, and the relation of competitor to both East and West. And to be Black is to stand in a certain relation to White, and to be *I* is to stand in a certain relation to *Thou*, and”

His partner nudges him: “Are you being North, or are you somewhere else today?”

Black in chess and North in bridge having been introduced as status concepts, man and woman will now be presented as status concepts. Man, like Black or North, is a concept within a whole system of concepts. The concept of man depends on the presence of the other concepts in the system: woman, child, adult, father, mother, and so on. This type of conceptual system has a place in all the known ways of life that people have created. Just as the game of chess calls for the use of the concepts of Black, White, pawn, etc., ways of life call for the use of the concepts of man, woman, child, etc.

An understanding of the concept of man can be anchored in ways of life. If different ways of life are seen as different games, then a person plays one of these “games of life” from one of two positions: man or woman. Man is thus a status, a standing in the game of life or a way of life. With this status goes the behavior potential to live life in one of the ways it is lived.

Depending on the particular way of life, a person with the status of man has certain behavior potential. For example, in a Tasmanian way of life, a person who has the status of man is eligible to participate in many social practices, but he is restricted from other social practices, including seal hunting. This is not a causal restriction on the man; for example, he could swim out to the seal rocks and club seals. Instead, it is a restriction on what the man is doing. He could not be participating in a full sense in a Tasmanian way of life and hunt seals. (Cf. Our bum could not be playing chess and move White’s pieces.)

If a person has the status of woman, however, in a Tasmanian way of life, then she is eligible to hunt seals. Thus, if a woman hunts seals it counts differently than if a man hunts seals. In the case of the woman, it counts as doing her part, actualizing herself, but in the case of the man, it counts as a violation of a social norm. The status of man or woman thus determines (logically, normatively) how a behavior counts, and therefore, *what* behavior it is within a given way of life.

The status of man or woman also determines how behaviors count in units of behavior smaller than ways of life. In addition to options within ways of life counting differently, options within intrinsic social practices also count differently, depending on a person’s status. For example, in our social practice of provocation-hostility, if a man chooses the option

of punching another person, it counts differently than if a woman punches somebody. Likewise, in our social practice of loss-lamentation, if a woman lets herself cry in public, it counts differently than if a man cries in public.

It is sometimes said that women cannot express anger and men cannot express sadness in our ways of life. This is obviously not the case: Both social practices are open to people in both statuses, but frequently men and women express themselves in different ways, that is, by choosing different options. For example, in the social practice of provocation-hostility, a woman may express her anger by choosing conventional options like yelling, sulking royally, or various options specific to the provoking situation. But if she wants to express that she is angry, and not enraged or beside herself, she is restricted from punching. The restriction is not causal: She could punch. But given existing norms, she would not then be expressing anger, but rather rage or fury. Were there not some norms and restrictions of this sort, she would not have the potential to express anger at all.

A person with a given status, in addition to having certain behavior potential and certain restrictions on behavior potential, also has a set of possible relationships to other people. A person with the status of man is potentially a member of the "team" of men. As a member of the "team" of men, he automatically has a potential relation to any member of the "team" of women, and a potential relation to the "team" of women as a whole.

So far the presentation of man and woman as status concepts has paralleled the reverie of our bum in the park. But our bum was interrupted before he could complete his formulation. He worked out a ground-level notion of status, but did not realize that the statuses of Black and North also carry with them the behavior potential for making particular moves in particular games. In fact, if particular people didn't make particular moves in particular games, there wouldn't be chess or bridge. Or, to use football as an example, if all football players were always on the bench, and a particular member of one team never tackled a particular member of an opposing team in an actual game, there wouldn't be football.

Correspondingly, if no man ever had a particular relationship to a particular woman, there wouldn't be men and women as we know them. Thus, the status of man also carries with it behavior potential to engage in particular behaviors that express a personal relationship to a particular woman.

This is not to say that every man has to have such a relationship. A person with the status of man is eligible to participate in such a relationship, but it is not always a practical possibility. In this case, the person with the status of man is like a person with the status of quar-

terback, who is eligible to throw a pass but has no one in position to receive the ball. It is not practically possible for the quarterback to pass the ball, but this does not affect his eligibility to do so. Likewise, even though a man does not participate in an actual relationship with a particular woman, this does not affect his eligibility to do so.

Our bum, in addition to not realizing that the statuses of Black and North carry with them the eligibility to make particular moves in particular games, also did not point out that Black and North are optional statuses, which a person only operates from for the duration of a game. By contrast, man and woman are preemptive statuses: A person is usually assigned the status of man or woman at birth, and then always operates from the assigned position.

The preemptive nature of the statuses of man and woman is underscored by the research of Money and Ehrhardt. Money and Ehrhardt (1972) found that in the case of hermaphroditic babies, where a sex reassignment, that is, a change in status, is necessary after the time of birth, the age ceiling for the sex reassignment is around eighteen months, before the onset of language acquisition. After this age, studies indicate that a child's status is best left unchanged, whether chromosomal, gonadal, or hormonal sex agree with the originally assigned status or not.

If the child is treated consistently in accord with his assigned status, the child eventually accepts this status as his own. By the age of six or seven, the child accepts for himself the place that others have given him all along. ("I couldn't be me and not be a boy" or "I couldn't be me and not be a girl.")

In rare cases, however, there may be a conflict between the place others give the child, and the place the child accepts for himself. For example, a child may feel out of place when others treat him as a boy, and feel inside that "I couldn't be me and be a boy." In this case, he may be a transsexual as an adult, and seek surgically and legally to change his status. There is no contradiction here with saying that man and woman are preemptive statuses: The transsexual seeks to live in accord with the status he has always taken to be his own.

Man and woman have now been presented as status concepts. For our purposes, the concept of status as behavior potential in a way of life is designated as "Level I status," and the concept of status as behavior potential in a personal relationship is designated as "Level II status." Level I status is a standing in a way of life; this standing carries with it behavior potential in a way of life and a set of potential relationships. Level II status is a standing in a personal relationship; this standing carries with it behavior potential to engage in behaviors that express a personal relationship to a particular person.

Some additional conceptual resources are needed, however. There is

a variety of man-woman relationships possible with Level II status, and access to this range of relationships needs to be provided. But before providing these additional conceptual resources, I will digress briefly to mention the difference between status and role.

For some statuses, there is a role that is complementary to the status. The role prescribes certain conventional behaviors, and these behaviors fall within the behavior potential of a person who has the corresponding status. For example, the role of mother prescribes conventional behaviors like feeding children, keeping them clean, and playing with them. These behaviors fall within the behavior potential of a person who has the status of mother, and the behaviors may be an authentic expression of that status.

However, a person may perform the behaviors prescribed by a role without operating from the corresponding status. For example, a nurse may perform the role of a mother with a child, but that does not make her the child's mother (we might call her the child's motherer). Or, a woman may perform the role of mother, but not really be a mother on the inside. The performance of the role is then inauthentic: It is not a personal expression of the woman's status as a mother, nor is it the expression of a normative personal relationship to her child.

For other statuses, there is no role that is complementary. For example, there is no role that prescribes behaviors that go with the status of friend. "Doing what a friend does" cannot be described in terms of a set of conventional behaviors. Nonetheless, in a given behavioral context we may distinguish between what a friend might be expected to do and what would be surprising for a friend to do. Accordingly, a person may merely do what a friend does and not really be a friend: The person may do friendly things without these being an expression of his or her status as a friend or of a personal relationship to another.

In ordinary language people sometimes confuse status and role, and use the terms interchangeably. For example, someone might comment, "I'm saying this in the role of your mother" and mean (a) I have the status of your mother, and I'm genuinely speaking from that position, (b) I have the status of your mother, but in saying this, I'm just performing the role, or (c) I don't have the status of your mother, that is, I don't have the eligibility to say this, but I'm going to perform the role anyway (Look out!).

The confusion between status and role in ordinary language is not problematical, since it is usually possible to tell from the situation what a person means and to respond accordingly. But this sort of confusion is problematical when it is carried over into social science and interferes with giving clear and adequate accounts of human behavior.

Nevertheless, social scientists have generally not commented on the

distinction between status and role. One exception is the anthropologist Ralph Linton. According to Linton (1936),

A status, as distinct from the individual who may occupy it, is simply a collection of rights and duties. . . . When the individual puts the rights and duties which constitute the status into effect, he is performing a role. Role and status are quite inseparable, and the distinction between them is of only academic interest. There are no roles without statuses or statuses without roles. (pp. 113-114)

Three comments on this passage: First, in limiting status to a collection of rights and duties, Linton misses the essence of many statuses. For example, the status of friend may carry with it certain rights and duties, but these are not what we take to constitute the status. When we describe friendship, we talk primarily in terms of enjoying each other's company, appreciating how things count for each other, being willing to do things for each other, and so on, rather than in terms of rights and duties.

Secondly, there are statuses without roles, as in the example of the status of friend mentioned above.

Finally, Linton misses the importance of the distinction between status and role to the way human lives are lived. People are frequently concerned about themselves or others performing roles for which they do not have the corresponding status. It is recognized that if a person performs a role without having the corresponding status, he may add to the suffering of others, as well as missing out on satisfactions for himself. For example, Don Juan enacted the role of "the Great Lover" many times with many women. But his performance of the role was never the expression of a personal relationship with a woman (Level II status). Because of this, he caused many women to suffer, and he himself never knew the satisfactions of a genuine love relationship.

Paradigm Case Formulation of Man-Woman Relationships

As noted above, a variety of man-woman relationships is possible with Level II status, and access to the range of possible relationships needs to be provided. For this purpose, a conceptual-notational device, the paradigm case formulation, will be used, since the range of possible cases of man-woman relationships lends itself most readily to a paradigm case formulation, rather than to a taxonomy or a parametric analysis.

In introducing Paradigm Case relationships, two guidelines will be followed. First, relationships which are taken to be archetypal man-woman relationships will be chosen. In addition, because it seems to be a conceptual truth that sexual intercourse is a paradigmatic expression of a man-woman relationship, relationships which have sexual inter-

course as a genuine behavioral expression will be included. (See Roberts, 1980, for a more complete statement of the rationale for using sexual intercourse as a guideline here.)

In accordance with these two guidelines, that is, of choosing cases which are archetypal and choosing cases which have sexual intercourse as a genuine behavioral expression, three Paradigm Cases of man-woman relationships will be introduced. The three Paradigm Cases are the relationships of (a) Contract-partnership, (b) Romantic love, and (c) Friendship.

In the first relationship, Contract-partnership, a man and a woman enter into a contract together and become life partners. Their partnership may arise from sheer necessity, from convenience, or from duty-obligation. In the Paradigm Case, a particular man and a particular woman enter into the spirit of their contract, and each genuinely fulfills his or her part in the partnership.

A partnership arising from sheer necessity is perhaps the oldest form of relationship between men and women. The contract in this case is based upon mutual teaming for survival, and the essence of the contract is that each person helps the other fulfill his or her basic needs. Since helping each other fulfill basic needs may include helping each other meet sexual needs, sexual intercourse is a way of fulfilling the contract and an expression of the relationship.

In a partnership arising from convenience, basic survival is not so much an issue, and the contract is more one of making life easier for the other person in important ways. The contract is for the mutual advantage of both people, and makes it possible for each of them to have important things. Since having a sexual partner near at hand and having a guaranteed sexual relationship may make life easier, sexual intercourse is a way of fulfilling the contract and an expression of the relationship.

In a partnership arising from duty-obligation, the contract is based on the social position of each person, and the contract makes it possible for each person to fulfill his or her social duties and obligations. For example, a man and a woman of royal lineage may enter into a contract together in order to fulfill the traditions and moral obligations of royalty. Since sexual intercourse is a way of providing progeny to perpetuate the royal lineage, sexual intercourse is a way of fulfilling the contract and an expression of the relationship.

A person's standing in a particular contract-partnership relationship (Level II status) will correspond to his standing in a particular way of life (Level I status). For example, a man who is living a way of life that involves struggling for basic necessities like food, clothing, or shelter, will most likely have a relationship with a woman that involves teaming

for survival. And a man who is living a regal way of life will most likely have a relationship with a woman that involves fulfilling obligations as a royal couple.

The second Paradigm Case, Romantic love, is also a very old form of relationship between men and women. While many of the accoutrements and traditions associated with romantic love were not introduced until the Troubadour movement in the late eleventh century, the phenomenon in its essence was known long before that. There are descriptions of romantic love in Homer, who wrote sometime between 1250 and 850 B.C.

The Paradigm Case is a relationship of mutual love between a particular man and a particular woman. The Paradigm Case has the following characteristics (Marshall, Note 1):

1. Asymmetrical eligibilities
2. Intimacy
3. Respect
4. Advocate-champion (actively promote the other's interests)
5. Willingness to give the utmost
6. Fascination
7. Exclusivity.

When a man and a woman have a love relationship, that is, when they actualize Level II status in a romantic love relationship, they each have a unique standing. In the two-person community of love, each person has a unique place with the other, a place which is not possible for an individual in a larger community. The special place the man and woman have with each other is a strong affirmation of the equal value of both. Along with having a unique place with each other, lovers may also evoke things in each other and appreciate things in each other that are not evoked or appreciated by others in the larger community.

One of the special eligibilities that goes with being lovers is the eligibility to make love, that is, to express love by engaging in sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse as an expression of love is not the same as sexual intercourse as a fulfillment of a contract, but in both cases, sexual intercourse is a genuine expression of a man-woman relationship.

The third Paradigm Case, Friendship, has traditionally been taken as a paradigmatic relationship between men, and most often came about when men were participating together in some important enterprise. In the last 200 years, however, friendship has gained some acceptance as a paradigm for man-woman relationships.

The friendship paradigm appears to be gaining acceptance because some people no longer see meaning or value in the romantic love rela-

tionship. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft, a leader in the women's rights movement at the end of the eighteenth century, wrote about friendship and love as follows:

Friendship is a serious affection; the most sublime of all affections. . . . The very reverse may be said of love. In a great degree, love and friendship cannot subsist in the same bosom. . . . The vain fears and fond jealousies, the winds which fan the flame of love, are both incompatible with the tender confidence and sincere respect of friendship. (1792/1967, p. 122)

Other critics of the romantic love paradigm point out that it is an unequal relationship, an idealistic one, a possessive one, and so forth. The friendship relationship has emerged as an alternative for men and women.

The Paradigm Case of friendship is a relationship of mutual friendship between a particular man and a particular woman. The Paradigm Case has the following characteristics (Marshall, Note 1):

1. Symmetrical eligibilities
2. Intimacy
3. Respect
4. Trust (act with the other's interests in mind)
5. Liking.

When a man and a woman have a friendship—when they actualize Level II status in a friendship—the status of friend determines that the same behaviors count alike for both people. This is expressed by the characteristic of symmetrical eligibilities: Within the limits of their friendship, men and women have the same eligibilities to participate in social practices, and the same behavior is regarded as appropriate for both the man and the woman.

There may be a strain on the friendship, however, unless the man and woman also have a corresponding way of life in which behaviors count the same for both of them. Otherwise, the symmetrical eligibilities that go with the status of friend (Level II status) may conflict with the asymmetrical eligibilities that have traditionally been embedded in ways of life for men and women (Level I status).

One of the eligibilities that goes with the status of friend is the eligibility to do enjoyable things together, and thus sexual intercourse appears to be an expression of friendship. However, sexual intercourse may not preserve the symmetry of the friendship. While the positions of the man and woman in sexual intercourse are interchangeable in the most concrete sense, for example, the woman may be “on top,” the behavior potential of men and women in sexual intercourse is not interchangeable.

Three Paradigm Cases of man-woman relationships have been intro-

duced; transformations of the Paradigm Cases could also be introduced. For example, it is possible to have a romantic love relationship in which intimacy is missing. Thus, one transformation for the Paradigm Case of Romantic love might be "Eliminate intimacy from the relationship." As a second example, it is possible to have romantic love within a contract-partnership relationship. In fact, love and marriage (a contract relation) are said to go together "like a horse and carriage." Thus, one transformation for the Paradigm Case of Contract-partnership might be "Add the relationship of romantic love." However, it does not appear that much would be gained by additional bookkeeping of this sort, and therefore such transformations will not be formally introduced.

In addition, other Paradigm Cases could be introduced. Although the discussion has been in terms of the three Paradigm Cases of contract-partnership, romantic love, and friendship, the conceptualization allows for other paradigms. However, since none appear to be sufficiently salient to be on a par with these three, no other Paradigm Cases will be introduced.

Having presented man and woman as status concepts, and having presented a paradigm case formulation for the concept of man-woman relationships, the task of providing formal and systematic access to the facts and possible facts about men and women is now completed. This is not to say that exhaustive access to the facts about men and women has been provided. As noted above, man and woman are concepts within a whole system of concepts, a system that includes other concepts like child, adult, mother, father, and so on. Only part of this conceptual system has been formulated here, the part that directly pertains to the concepts of man and woman.

Accordingly, it may be noted that access to the facts about men and women in relation to other statuses has not been provided. Man-woman relationships have been seen as two-person games, which is a little like seeing baseball as a "pitcher's duel." Just as a pitcher's duel only takes place within the larger game of baseball, which includes other statuses like catcher, short-stop, and so on, man-woman relationships only take place within the larger game of life, which includes many other statuses. In order to provide access to the facts about men and women in relation to these other statuses, more of the conceptual system that includes the concepts of man and woman would have to be formulated.

While the formulation does not provide exhaustive access to the facts about men and women, it does provide adequate access to the range of facts needed for understanding what it is to be a man or woman. Thus, it is now possible to return to the original question of what is involved in principle in being a man or woman. To be a man is to be eligible to stand in a certain relation to a particular woman, and to be a woman

is to be eligible to stand in a certain relation to a particular man. What that relation is depends on which paradigm a person accepts as the fundamental relationship between men and women.

EMPIRICAL STUDY

In the introduction, it was stated that an attempt would be made here to formulate the conceptual system that includes the concepts of man and woman, and then to apply that conceptualization. The hypotheses and empirical predictions presented below represent applications of the conceptualization.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses are based in part on the archetypal nature of the three Paradigm Case relationships introduced in the conceptualization. If the particular Paradigm Cases introduced in the conceptualization are cases that people actually use as archetypes, then, depending on which Paradigm Case relationship a person takes to be fundamental between men and women, the person will tend to perceive particular cases of man-woman relationships in light of that archetype. Moreover, since interactions between men and women are expressions of relationships, a person will also tend to perceive personal interactions between men and women in a way which reflects his or her guiding archetype.

By way of example, the paradigms of brotherhood and competition may be considered. If a person takes brotherhood as his archetype of man-woman relationships, when the person encounters a particular interaction between a man and a woman, he will tend to perceive the interaction as either an expression or violation of brotherhood. Likewise, if a person takes competition as his archetype of man-woman relationships, when the person encounters a particular interaction between a man and a woman, he will tend to perceive the interaction in a win, lose, draw format. If the particular interaction is a sexual one, the person with the brotherhood archetype will probably see it as a mutual affirmation, while the person with the competition archetype will probably see it as a skirmish in the "battle of the sexes."

The paradigms of contract-partnership, romantic love, and friendship may operate in the same way, so that a person who has romantic love as his archetype is likely to see a sexual interaction as an expression of love, while a person who has friendship as his archetype is likely to see it as an expression of friendship.

In addition to guiding perception in this way, an archetypal relationship may also provide a standard against which to judge actual relationships, and therefore provide a basis for satisfaction or disappointment in them.

As an example of the way in which an archetype provides a standard against which to judge actual relationships, a mother-son paradigm may be considered. If a man takes a mother-son paradigm as his archetype of man-woman relationships, the man's satisfaction with actual man-woman relationships will be determined by how closely those actual relationships resemble the mother-son archetype. Moreover, the man will tend to be unhappy to the extent that he does not have a mother-son relationship.

In the same way, depending on whether a person takes contract-partnership, romantic love, or friendship as his archetype, the person's satisfaction with actual man-woman relationships will be determined by how closely those actual relationships resemble his archetype. In addition, the person will tend to be unhappy to the extent that he does not have a relationship like his archetypal relationship.

This is not to say that people cannot enjoy the satisfactions of more than one kind of relationship. But the satisfactions of each of the paradigmatic relationships are different, and the person who really has a given archetype will tend to feel that he is missing something vital in his life if he only has the satisfactions that go with one of the other paradigms.

In accord with this discussion of the archetypal nature of the Paradigm Cases, the following hypotheses are made.

Hypothesis 1. Individuals who take a given paradigmatic relationship as archetypal for men and women, as compared to individuals who take a different relationship as archetypal, will show a stronger tendency to view sexual behavior as exemplifying that given archetype.

Hypothesis 2. Individuals who take a given paradigmatic relationship as archetypal for men and women, as compared to individuals who take a different relationship as archetypal, will be more disappointed at not having a relationship of that particular kind.

Indicators

Three forms were developed for use in testing these hypotheses: The Paradigm Form, the Sexual Significance Index, and the Disappointment Rating Form. Each of these indicators is described below.

Paradigm Form

In this form, participants were presented with descriptions of relationships exemplifying each of the Paradigm Cases introduced in the paradigm case formulation of man-woman relationships. (Although the three Paradigm Cases introduced in the formulation need not be exhaustive for man-woman relationships, for purposes of the present study

it was assumed that the three paradigms were sufficiently close to being exhaustive that the difference would not be decisive with respect to empirical findings.) The particular relationships on the Paradigm Form included four relationships exemplifying the contract-partnership paradigm, four relationships exemplifying the romantic love paradigm, and four relationships exemplifying the friendship paradigm. A sample description of a friendship included on the Paradigm Form is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Sample Description of a Friendship

Sharon Potter and John Webb first met in the heart of poverty-stricken Appalachia, where both were VISTA volunteers. They were drawn to one another by their common desire to help the poor, and by their common discouragement with the difficulties they faced. John was trying to establish a rural legal-aid service, but found that none of the city attorneys would help. Sharon was trying to establish a social service center, but she had met the same sort of resistance as John.

Once they met, life seemed hopeful again to both of them. On summer's evenings, John would drive over to the small town where Sharon lived, and they would join Sharon's neighbors for an evening of blue grass music. John and Sharon both were content then, relaxing together.

When autumn came, they enjoyed back-packing in the Smoky Mountains, experiencing the majesty of the Smokies and the beautiful colors of autumn. During the cold winter months, they loved to spend long evenings by the fire together. They would brainstorm for creative ways to solve the social and legal problems of the poor, or they'd relax and share popcorn and backgammon.

Participants were instructed to rate "How well does this relationship get at the essentials of a masculine-feminine relationship?" for each of the relationships on the form. The ratings were done on ten-point scales. In addition, participants were asked to indicate which relationship "best gets at the essentials."

On the basis of responses on the Paradigm Form, a participant was designated as having a given paradigm as his archetype if (a) on the average, the participant rated the relationships exemplifying that paradigm above the other relationships and (b) the participant indicated a relationship exemplifying that paradigm as best getting at the essentials.

Sexual Significance Index

In this indicator, participants were asked to imagine that a particular person had just engaged in sexual intercourse, and the person was thinking to himself or herself about it. In each case, the particular person to

*Table 1. Sample Items from the Subscales
of the Sexual Significance Index*

Romantic Thoughts:
“He is mine and I am his.”
“I feel a love too deep for words.”
“I can’t live without her.”
“Our love seems to deepen each time we’re together.”
Friendship Thoughts:
“We have so much to share.”
“How much we’ve both grown, being together.”
“How much I like him.”
“It’s so much fun to be with her.”

be imagined by the participants was a man or woman from one of the twelve relationships on the Paradigm Form. Participants were presented with a list of possible thoughts that the person might be having, and asked to rate how out of character it would be for the person to be having each thought on the list.

Two subscales were derived from the thoughts on the Sexual Significance Index. One subscale consisted of the romantic thoughts on the lists following a romantic relationship, and the other subscale consisted of the friendship thoughts on the lists following a friendship relationship. Sample items from each subscale are presented in Table 1.

The mean of a person’s ratings of the items on the romantic thoughts subscale was used as an index of the person’s tendency to view sexual behavior in light of the romantic love archetype, and the mean of a person’s ratings of the items on the friendship thoughts subscale was used as an index of the person’s tendency to view sexual behavior in light of the friendship archetype.

Disappointment Rating Form

This indicator also involved the use of the twelve relationships included on the Paradigm Form, but was administered prior to the Paradigm Form. Participants were instructed to rate “How disappointed would you be if this was the best relationship you ever had?” for each of the relationships on the form. The mean of a person’s ratings on the four relationships exemplifying a given paradigm was used as an index of the person’s tendency to be disappointed with a relationship of that kind.

Participants

Participants in the study included 166 students who were enrolled at the University of Colorado during the summer and fall of 1979. They ranged in age from 17 to 46, with the median age being 18.9. One hundred

fifty-four of the participants, approximately 93%, were single. There were 71 men and 95 women.

Each participant completed the set of forms described above at his or her own pace. Because each person completed the set individually, it would have been possible to use a large group administration procedure. However, a small group administration procedure was used, with two to six people per group, in order to increase cooperation by the participants.

When the participants' responses on the Paradigm Form were analyzed, 98 people were found who consistently took one of the three paradigms as the fundamental relationship between men and women. These people met both of the criteria for having an archetype, that is, (a) they rated the relationships exemplifying a given paradigm above the other relationships on the Paradigm Form, and (b) they chose a relationship exemplifying that paradigm as best getting at the essentials of a man-woman relationship.

The 98 people who met both of these criteria were classified according to archetype as follows:

Romantic love	57 participants
Friendship	36 participants
Contract-partnership	5 participants

Predictions and Results

In order to test Hypothesis 1, that is, that individuals tend to view sexual behavior as exemplifying the relationship that they take to be archetypal, the following two predictions were made.

Prediction 1(a). Participants who have romantic love as their archetype for man-woman relationships will tend to rate thoughts expressive of romantic love as less out of character following sexual intercourse than participants who have either friendship or contract-partnership as their archetype.

Prediction 1(b). Participants who have friendship as their archetype for man-woman relationships will tend to rate thoughts expressive of friendship as less out of character following sexual intercourse than participants who have contract-partnership as their archetype.

Ratings made on the Sexual Significance Index described above by the 98 participants who met both of the criteria for having an archetype were then analyzed using *t*-tests. Although the direction of the difference

Table 2. Comparison of Groups on the Sexual Significance Index

<i>Groups</i>	<i>n</i> ^a	<i>X</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Romantic Thoughts: How out of character?					
Romantic	51	1.03	.75		
Friendship	32	1.54	.86	2.88	.006
Romantic Thoughts: How out of character?					
Romantic	51	1.03	.75		
Contract	5	1.82	.56	2.30	.026
Friendship Thoughts: How out of character?					
Friendship	32	1.38	.93		
Contract	5	2.47	.43	2.54	.016

^a Some participants had missing data on the Sexual Significance Index.

between the means was predicted, two-tailed tests were used. A probability level of .05 or less was considered significant. As the results in Table 2 show, both predictions 1(a) and 1(b) were verified, thereby confirming Hypothesis 1.

In order to test Hypothesis 2, that is, that individuals will tend to be disappointed if they do not have a relationship of the kind they take to be archetypal, the following four predictions were made.

Prediction 2(a). Participants who have romantic love as their archetype will tend to be more disappointed if a friendship relationship is the best relationship they ever have than will participants who have friendship as their archetype.

Prediction 2(b). Participants who have friendship as their archetype will tend to be more disappointed if a romantic love relationship is the best relationship they ever have than will participants who have romantic love as their archetype.

Prediction 2(c). Participants who have romantic love as their archetype will tend to be more disappointed if a contract-partnership relationship is the best relationship they ever have than will participants who have contract-partnership as their archetype.

Prediction 2(d). Participants who have friendship as their archetype will tend to be more disappointed if a contract-partnership relationship is the best relationship they ever have than will participants who have contract-partnership as their archetype.

Ratings made on the Disappointment Rating Form by the 98 participants who had archetypes were then analyzed using *t*-tests. Two-tailed

Table 3. Comparison of Groups on Disappointment Rating Form

<i>Groups</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Disappointment with Friendship					
Romantic	57	3.72	1.15		
Friendship	36	3.04	1.19	2.71	.008
Disappointment with Romantic Love					
Romantic	57	2.96	1.38		
Friendship	36	4.65	1.51	5.53	.000
Disappointment with Contract					
Romantic	57	5.32	1.38		
Contract	5	4.80	1.63	.80	.430
Disappointment with Contract					
Friendship	36	5.50	1.48		
Contract	5	4.80	1.63	.99	.330

tests were used, and a probability level of .05 or less was again counted as significant. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 3.

As revealed in the table, the romantic and friendship groups differed from each other as expected; Predictions 2(a) and 2(b) were both verified. The contract group differed from the other groups in the predicted direction, but the differences between the means were not statistically significant.

It was possible that the differences did not reach significance because of the small size of the contract group. Therefore, in order to increase the size of the contract group, the requirement that the participants choose a relationship exemplifying their archetype as *best* getting at the essentials of a man-woman relationship was relaxed. Any participant who rated one set of relationships above the others was considered to have an archetype. Predictions 2(c) and 2(d) were then retested using the resulting larger samples. As evident in Table 4, the results came substantially closer to significance with a slightly larger sample of contract people.

Table 4. Comparison of Groups on Disappointment Rating Form Including People Who Did Not Meet Criterion (b)

<i>Groups</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Disappointment with Contract					
Romantic	109	5.39	1.28		
Contract	9	4.77	1.47	1.38	.170
Disappointment with Contract					
Friendship	39	5.51	1.43		
Contract	9	4.77	1.47	1.38	.174

Although Predictions 2(c) and 2(d) were not verified, the overall pattern of results gives strong support for Hypothesis 2. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Paradigm Cases do function as archetypes, both in guiding perception of sexual interactions, and in providing a standard against which to judge relationships.

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

The empirical study described above serves to establish the predictive applicability of the conceptualization. But application of the conceptualization in practical ways is what is of long-term interest, rather than merely predictive applicability. Among the areas where the conceptual system might be used to make a real world difference are socialization, education, and psychotherapy.

In the area of socialization, parents are faced with the task of teaching their children what options in social practices are appropriate in given situations. In times of social stability and uniformity, it is relatively easy for parents to know what options are appropriate, given the sex of their child. As long as there are customary ways for boys and girls to act, a parent can feel confident saying "That's not feminine," or "That's not the way a man acts," and so forth.

In times of social change or diversity, however, the task of socialization increases in difficulty. When traditional notions of masculinity and femininity are being questioned, rejected, and reversed regularly in the media, parents may find themselves reluctant to say "That's not masculine" or "That's not the way a woman behaves." Especially if parents understand only the customs, but not the principles underlying them, they may feel uncertain about what to teach their children.

The status formulation presented here could be used to help parents understand the principles underlying the notions of masculinity and femininity, and thereby put them in a position to be more clear about what they want to teach. One way of doing this will be sketched briefly.

The starting point would be to clarify what a person is doing when he or she says of a boy "He's masculine," or of a girl "She's feminine." There are two things that might be involved. First, a person might be giving a personal characteristic description, and saying in effect "He's a boy who has a set of personal characteristics such that it comes naturally (easily) to him to interact with other males and females in ways which are normative." From this, it would follow that certain ways of treating the child were appropriate.

Secondly, in saying "He's masculine," the person might be saying that the boy is "not unmasculine," that is, that the boy has not gone wrong in one of the ways he could go wrong in relation to other males and females. In this case, the person would be using a double negative

(“not unmasculine”), in order to say that no criticism of a certain sort was applicable.

It may be noted that the two uses are related. If a person has a set of personal characteristics such that interacting in normative ways comes naturally, this will normally explain why the person has not failed in one of the ways he might have failed.

After the distinction between the two usages had been made, the second usage could be elaborated on. Sometimes, instead of saying that no criticism is applicable, parents in fact want to let their children know that they have failed in some way. By saying “That’s unfeminine” or “That’s not masculine” at such times, parents are sensitizing their children to certain kinds of failures, and warning them against going wrong in those ways.

Such criticism tends to be most appropriate to relationships and interactions with the opposite sex. Thus, parents are sensitizing their sons to ways they might go wrong in relation to women, and their daughters to ways they might go wrong in relation to men. However, ways of going wrong differ, depending on what relationship is being expressed.

Therefore, the three Paradigm Cases could be introduced, and parents could clarify which paradigm they were using, and which they wanted to use, as their guide in socialization. For example, parents might be sensitizing a son to ways of going wrong in a partnership with a woman. Or parents might be sensitizing a son to ways of going wrong as a friend to women. Whichever paradigm parents decided to use, once they had this sort of clarity on what they were doing, their consistency as parents would probably be increased, as well as their confidence.

Parenthetically, it may be noted that the formulation has been used by the author as part of a unit on socialization in a child development course. The reception was favorable, although some students, especially those with children, were surprised to realize that if children were socialized to be friends to the opposite sex, and correspondingly, taught that boys and girls should have symmetrical eligibilities in relationships, these children might be less likely to participate one day in a romantic love relationship. Or, if they did participate, they might not fare too well, given their lack of socialization relevant to that kind of relationship.

A second area where the conceptual system might be useful is in education, in particular, in a sex education program. For young people beginning to look for life partners, it might be valuable to be aware of the possibility of mismatch between people with different archetypes. Possibly, they could then have their eyes open for someone who shared their archetype, and thereby avoid the betrayal a person experiences when, for example, her Pierre Abélard turns out to be a Pierre Curie, or his Beatrice turns out to be a Beatrice Webb.

The third area where the conceptual system might be useful is in

psychotherapy, most obviously with people who are going wrong in relation to the opposite sex. With the status formulation in mind, a therapist could quickly diagnose where the client stood in relation to the opposite sex, for example, "He treats women as though they were 'one of the guys,' " or "She stands as a competitor in relation to men." Once how the person was going wrong was diagnosed, a therapy program could be designed with the status formulation as part of its rationale. In the case of the man who treated women as one of the guys, it would be necessary to help the man appreciate what women are like, and to help him understand the ways in which a woman can be important to a man. Then, perhaps he could take his stand as a man in relation to a particular woman, rather than treating her as one of the guys.

All the possibilities sketched above represent places where the system might be used. Whether or not the use of the system would be effective in these places is a factual question. A range of empirical research could be done to find out about this.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper is an abridgement of a doctoral dissertation. The dissertation also included an investigation of inside and outside views of man-woman relationships, which will be reported on in another paper.

My deepest thanks go to Peter G. Ossorio for teaching and guiding me throughout the dissertation.

Address: Aurora Community Mental Health Center, 1020 S. Uvalda, Aurora, Colorado 80012.

REFERENCE NOTE

1. Marshall, K. M. *Male-female relationship paradigms*. Unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado, 1977.

REFERENCES

- Linton, R. *The study of man: An introduction*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936.
- Money, J., & Ehrhardt, A. *Man & woman, boy & girl: The differentiation and dimorphism of gender identity from conception to maturity*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.
- Ossorio, P. G. Conceptual-notational devices. In K. E. Davis (Ed.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology* (Vol. 1). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1981.
- Roberts, M. K. *Partners, lovers, friends: A status dynamic study of men and women* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Colorado, 1980).
- Wollstonecraft, M. *A vindication of the rights of woman*. New York: Norton, 1967. (Originally published, 1792.)