ADVANCES IN DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

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ADVANCES IN DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

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FOREWORD

The second volume of *Advances in Descriptive Psychology* marks the occasion of Thomas O. Mitchell joining with me as series editor and issue editor. Working with him has been a distinct pleasure. He brings to editorial work a broad knowledge of Descriptive Psychology, very high levels of competence in its linguistic and cognitive science applications, and a knack for seeing constructive reorganizations of papers. Volume 2 has benefitted very much from his touch.

Once again the editors and some members of the editorial board were privileged to be Mary McDermott Shideler's guests at High Havens. Her hospitality and the setting makes editorial work unusually rewarding. Joining Tom, Mary, and myself in these sessions were Jan Vanderburgh and Peter Ossorio. Every contributor to the volume has benefitted from the comments and suggestions of this group. In addition, feedback on individual papers was provided by other members of the editorial board.

With Volume 2, we had the problem of having more acceptable material

than we could accommodate. This forced us to defer some very interesting papers to Volume 3. For a new enterprise, having more than enough first quality material is a good sign.

Bringing out a volume is a matter of teamwork, and several other members of the team who have helped to make *Advances* possible deserve recognition. Cathie L. Hughes not only kept a timely and complex flow of correspondence with authors moving smoothly, she also mastered the intricacies of the computer indexing that we used for both Volumes 1 and 2. With Volume 2, she had the assistance of Mary Verner Schlaefer's meticulous preparation of chapter indices for two long chapters. Finally, it has been a pleasure to deal with Susan Oppenheim at JAI Press who has facilitated the entire process whenever we have called on her.

Keith E. Davis
Editor

PART I

PSYCHOLOGY AND ALTERNATIVE WORLDS: EMBODIMENT, RELATIONSHIPS, AND HYPNOSIS

INTRODUCTION

Thomas O. Mitchell and Keith E. Davis

The first section of this volume of *Advances in Descriptive Psychology* contains papers that address radically fundamental issues: the mind-body problem and the related issue of whether there can be nonhuman persons, the problem of the nature of love and friendship, and the issues of the fundamental nature of reality and of the apparent violation of reality constraints in hypnotism.

The six papers presented here can be grouped into three pairs. Each pair addresses aspects of the same general issue, but from somewhat different points of view and with somewhat different purposes. The effect is rather like that of a stereoscopic representation—each view is somewhat different from the other, but taken together the two views are complementary and richer than either taken alone. The papers are quite diverse in style and approach, and illustrate well the richness and flexibility of Descriptive Psychology.

EMBODIMENT AND RELATED ISSUES

The first two papers, "Embodiment," by Ossorio, and "The Problem of Other Possible Persons," by Schwartz, deal with questions of age-old

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fascination: What is the relation between mind and body? Are there beings which are persons but which do not have human bodies?

Tales of being that were part brute, part human, were found in the earliest mythologies we are aware of, and the concept of the thinking part of persons as somehow separable from their bodies, and thus destined to live on in some form after death, was pervasive in ancient religious thought. Early Greek philosophers, in their attempts to be systematic and scientific about these questions, came up with divergent points of view about how to account for the function of mind: witness the thoroughgoing materialism of the Atomists, on the one hand, and the Pythagoreans' doctrine of transmigrating souls, on the other.

In our time, it is fashionable among psychologists to dismiss the mind-body problem as unimportant, irrelevant, and unsolvable. The common posture is that psychology can progress quite satisfactorily without any concern whatsoever for this problem. Yet the problem refuses to go away and is far from dead among professional academics. The mind-body problem is central, although often unexplicated, in controversies over artificial intelligence (e.g., Dreyfus, 1972), and recent writings (Bunge, 1980; Fodor, 1981) illustrate both the continuing grip of this problem on the minds of serious thinkers and the striking differences in answers they give to it.

In the first part of his paper Ossorio explains how it can be that psychology can, indeed, make some progress without direct attention to the mind-body problem. As he points out, Descriptive Psychology made great strides for over fifteen years without an explicit formulation of the embodiment parameter. Yet, as he also shows, this does not mean that the problem is either dispensable or unsolvable.

His account of the mind-body problem is impressive in its directness and lucid simplicity. He shows that a part-whole formulation of the concept of persons enables one to deal systematically with all of the facts about persons, bodies, and minds without becoming entangled in logical contradictions and without being forced ultimately into either materialism or spiritualism. Since his formulation is an explication of the implications of the entire Descriptive Psychology framework, it has the power and virtue of being truly systematic, and cannot in any sense be said to be an *ad hoc* account of the problem.

Schwartz's paper comes at the same general problem area from a different angle. His concern is with that classic line of interest that might be traced from the person-animals of ancient mythology to the androids and thinking computers of present-day science fiction. His problem is, must a person be a homo sapiens? Or can other embodiments—other primates, aquatic mammals, computers—be persons, too?

Even those who are not science fiction buffs and those who are unaware of the controversies over whether chimpanzees can use language

will be fascinated by the problem as Schwartz lays it out. Furthermore, he makes clear the power of Descriptive Psychology to encompass, clarify, and integrate such diverse approaches as those of Freud and Wittgenstein as they bear on this issue.

Working within the framework of Descriptive Psychology, Schwartz argues that it is logically possible that there be persons who are not instances of *homo sapiens*. He makes clear the relation between technical concepts like intentional action and deliberate action, on the one hand, and the general issue of embodiment constraints, on the other hand. True to the pragmatic spirit of Descriptive Psychology, he concludes with a provocative rule of action regarding possible persons which do not have a *homo sapiens* embodiment: Treat any questionable entity as a person.

INTIMATE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The next pair of papers, "Men and Women: Partners, Lovers, Friends," by Roberts, and "Friendship and Love Relationships," by Davis and Todd, address a problem which is no less radically fundamental: the problem of love and friendship.

In her paper, Roberts lays a foundation for dealing with two fundamental questions: First, what is it to be a man or a woman? Second, what significance does heterosexual intercourse have in various types of man-woman relationships?

Behavioral scientists have conventionally avoided the first question by focusing on how, and whether, the behavior of men and women differs; see, for example, the classic study by Maccoby and Jacklin (1974). Those who take this approach treat questions about the appropriateness or the significance of gender-related behavior as issues of stereotypes rather than as issues of legitimate status distinctions.

Roberts, in contrast, develops a conceptualization that focuses on the legitimate status distinctions involved in gender-related behaviors, showing how these distinctions operate in quite different ways from the distinctions between behaviors.

She reminds us that the notion of status marks the distinction between what one is eligible to do and what one is not eligible to do—how one participates in the social practices of the community—and thus how one's behavior counts, is taken, or is interpreted. This concern with eligibility, and with the difference that eligibility makes in the significance of behavior, leads directly to her elegant and simple answer to the question of what it means to be a man or woman: "To be a woman is to be eligible to stand in a certain relation to a particular man," and vice versa for men (Roberts, 1982, p. 68–69).

She explores this "certain relation" by formulating three paradigm case treatments: partner, lover, and friend; and she delineates how en-

gaging in heterosexual intercourse can function as a paradigmatic expression of each type of relationship. These formulations provide an answer to the second question, the question about the significance of heterosexual intercourse.

As Roberts indicates, there are clear therapeutic implications to her work. For example, a person who does not appreciate the difference between partnership relationships and love relationships has less behavior potential for participation in man-woman relationships than an individual who does appreciate this difference. The acquisition of such an appreciation when it is lacking would certainly be therapeutic.

In their paper, "Friendship and Love Relationships," Davis and Todd address such problems as: What is love? What is friendship? How do love and friendship differ? How are they similar to each other? Is there a technology of assessment for identifying actual, specific relationships of one kind or the other?

They address these issues first by the articulation of paradigm case formulations of friendship relationships and of love relationships. In these formulations they identify characteristics, such as enjoyment, trust, and respect, which are involved in love, friendship, or both. They point out the similarities between the two kinds of relationships, as indicated by characteristics found in both formulations, and the differences, as indicated by those which are not shared.

Following their presentation of the conceptual analysis, Davis and Todd describe an assessment procedure, the Relationship Rating Form (RRF), based upon this analysis. The RRF contains items related to each of the characteristics identified in the paradigm case formulations; the respondents rate their relationships with specific persons with respect to each of the items.

They then report the results of three empirical studies concerning the construct and predictive validity of the RRF. These studies show that the RRF does, indeed, assess those characteristics which are articulated in the paradigm case formulations. Furthermore, the pattern of findings in the case of various actual relationships is in accord with the pattern to be expected on the basis of the conceptual analysis.

Beyond its use in the validity studies, the RRF has applicability to the assessment of specific relationships. For example, it can be used to identify cases of friendship that are not archetypal, such as those in which there is preoccupation bordering on fascination, in order to study the origins, development, stability, and typical problems of these special kinds of relationships.

Finally, Davis and Todd present a significant critical review of other formulations which have influenced recent research on love and friendship relationships. This review will help the reader to understand the

place of the Descriptive Psychology formulation in the scientific study of these relationships.

Both these papers, then, make substantial contributions to the study of conceptual and empirical aspects of intimate personal relationships. Perhaps the only question that might be raised about the complementary nature of the two papers concerns the paradigm case formulations integral to both papers. These formulations differ somewhat from each other. How, then, can they both be valid?

The answer is that there can be more than one valid and informative paradigm case formulation of any subject matter. As Ossorio (1981) points out in his original treatment of paradigm case methodology, paradigm case formulations can legitimately start with any of several different specific instances as exemplars, and can legitimately serve any of several different purposes.

In this instance, the Davis and Todd formulation is more elaborate than Roberts's formulation, and the difference is primarily explained by the differing purposes of the authors. For Roberts, the formulation needed to be only elaborate enough to draw a clear contrast among the three types of relationships, and to furnish clear standards against which to compare specific vignettes.

For Davis and Todd, the formulation had to be elaborate enough to provide a reasonably complete guide to the assessment of ways in which a relationship could go wrong. Davis and Todd therefore identified four more characteristics of the archetypal case than did Roberts. For example, in the case of friendship, they identified Mutual Assistance, Acceptance, Spontaneity (later modified to Authenticity) and Understanding. Clearly, there are pathologies of friendship typified by deficiencies in one or more of these aspects, and hence for Davis and Todd's purposes they need to be represented.

Despite these differences, however, there is no conflict between the formulation provided by Roberts and that developed by Davis and Todd. Roberts does not present her treatment as exhaustive (and neither do Davis and Todd); and Davis and Todd's formulations can be seen as supplementary and complementary to Roberts's.

CREATING WORLDS AND RECOGNIZING REALITY

The last pair of papers deals with aspects of what is probably the most fundamental question of all: What is real? Shideler's paper, "The Creator and the Discoverer," approaches this question through a consideration of different worlds. She contrasts the Secondary Worlds, presented in literature, with the Primary Worlds we all live in, and makes the point that both can be treated as created, rather than as discovered. She links

these two kinds of worlds to the Real World—the ultimate State of Affairs containing all States of Affairs—and shows how the reality concepts articulated in Descriptive Psychology, particularly as presented by Ossorio (1971/1978a, 1971/1978b), make sense of the relations between these different kinds of worlds.

Shideler's paper shows yet another side of the diversity and scope of Descriptive Psychology. Although she clearly presents a technical analysis, she focuses on an aspect of behavior all too neglected by professional psychologists—literary invention and production—and she demonstrates by the style of her presentation that one can, indeed, make psychological sense without sacrificing stylistic grace and elegance.

The relation of the individual to the real world is also central to Plotkin and Schwartz's paper, "A Conceptualization of Hypnosis." They articulate the concept of the Final Order Appraisal (FOA). The FOA is the appraisal of the place of an element in the real world, that is, of whether some element is real or not. It is by reference to an individual's capacity and disposition to make final-order appraisals, when appropriate, that they distinguish between Hypnotic states and behaviors, Hypnoid states and behaviors, and simulation of hypnotic behavior.

They argue that an individual can be in a psychological state which is characterized by that individual's lacking the capacity to make FOAs. In this state an individual will have experiences which those who have the usual capacity to make FOAs will appraise as nonreal, for example, the experience of a wooden rod as glowing hot iron. The individual in this state, however, will not make the FOA, and will therefore treat the experience in every way as real. It is this state which Plotkin and Schwartz term the "Hypnotic state."

In contrast, an individual can be in a state in which that person can truly have an experience, for example, the experience of the wooden rod as hot iron, but have the capacity to make, and actually make, the FOA of the experience as anomalous. In this case, an individual might say, "This rod feels just like hot iron—but I know that it's not *really* hot iron." It is this state which Plotkin and Schwartz designate the "Hypnoid state."

They further distinguish from both Hypnotic states and Hypnoid states the situation in which an individual consciously and deliberately pretends to behave as would a person who is truly in a Hypnotic or Hypnoid state. In this case, there is not question of any reduction in the capacity or disposition to make appropriate FOAs.

It is through the elaboration of these distinctions that Plotkin and Schwartz resolve the current controversy over whether hypnotic phenomena are to be explained by a special psychological state, or not. They point out that their conception of psychological states, differing with respect to the capacity to make FOAs, accounts for both the phe-

nomena cited in support in the state position, and those cited in support of the nonstate position.

In the course of working out this conceptualization, they present fairly extended discussions of some critical issues from the point of view of Descriptive Psychology. For example, they discuss the differences between conceptualization, on the one hand, and theories and hypotheses on the other; they treat the issue of whether there are psychological states and why such states are to be distinguished from underlying processes or antecedent events; they offer a detailed account of the role of the Developmental Schema (Ossorio, 1970/1981) in the explanation of circumstantial and situational factors in hypnotic and hypnoid behaviors.

In addition, they treat major theoretical positions regarding hypnosis, such as those of Shor, Hilgard, and Orne, in detail, explicating clearly how their position, developed from Descriptive Psychology, differs from these points of view, and arguing that the Descriptive Psychology conception is preferable.

Their discussion is very helpful in appreciating the scope of Descriptive Psychology's contribution to this subject matter. Although this paper is long and is rich in technical detail, a careful reading of it will prove stimulating and enlightening to both the specialist in hypnotism and the nonspecialist.

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PART I

PSYCHOLOGY AND ALTERNATIVE WORLDS: EMBODIMENT, RELATIONSHIPS, AND HYPNOSIS

EMBODIMENT

Peter G. Ossorio

ABSTRACT

Embodiment is introduced as a Person parameter. The possible values of the Embodiment parameter are seen to be paradigmatic body types, such as Homo sapiens; the possible values of individual characterizations, such as tall or short, are seen to be personal characteristics contingent on the value of the Embodiment parameter. The systematic resources for giving Embodiment descriptions, and for relating them to other Behavior and Person descriptions, are articulated by reference to the State of Affairs System. The classic mind-body problem is examined. A part-whole explication of the mind-body issue, using the resources of the systematic articulation of the Embodiment parameter, is shown to provide the resources needed to handle the facts of mind and body systematically and without paradox.

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THE PROBLEM OF OTHER POSSIBLE PERSONS:

DOLPHINS, PRIMATES, AND ALIENS

Wynn R. Schwartz

ABSTRACT

A content-free formulation of *Persons* is constructed that can be applied to nonhuman individuals. The focus is on the concept of "Person" and on the detection of persons. My approach is primarily conceptual rather than empirical and so I do not argue that there are, in fact, nonhuman persons, but what is said has bearing on whether, for example, dolphins, nonhuman primates, "aliens," or computers could be persons. The formulation and arguments elaborate on thoughts found in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Peter Ossorio. The basic topics examined include intentional and deliberate action, language, self-consciousness, and "real worlds." The categories of potential, nascent, primitive, defective, former, created, and super persons are also formulated.

The problem of other possible persons is a long-time favorite of science fiction writers. Related interests may have helped instigate Descriptive

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Psychology. Peter Ossorio once told me that some people at NASA asked, "If green gas on the moon speaks to one of our astronauts, how do we know whether or not it's a person?" The answer, of course, depends on what we mean by "persons," and in the following essay I will attempt to spell out that concept. Please notice that this essay first requires of its readers that they see that a specimen of Homo sapiens is only incidentally a person. I will not be grounding the concept of "person" on our species or on our biological form.

But what else could possibly be persons? Current thinking offers these candidates: dolphins, and especially John Lilly's favorite, *Tursiops truncatus,* the bottlenose dolphin (Lilly, 1975); certain nonhuman primates who have been given special training, notably chimpanzees, orangutans, and lowland gorillas (see, for example, Premack, 1976, and Rumbaugh, 1977); and science fiction's aliens or spacemen. My goals here, however, are primarily conceptual and I will not be arguing the empirical question of whether there are, in fact, nonhuman persons. I don't know. But I will keep an eye on empirical concerns as I develop concepts, and after constructing a conceptualization of persons, I will indicate some methods of person detection.

My interest in this essay is not with the concept and detection of mere intelligent or intentional activity, biological or otherwise. Rather, I will be concerned with those intelligences to which the term "person" can appropriately apply. I take it for granted that the world is full of instances of intentional actors other than ourselves.

For example, as I write this paragraph, I can see my cat stalking a bird through last fall's unraked leaves. She leaps but the bird flies in time to escape her teeth and claws. My cat turns and looks at me through the window. She approaches and meows until I let her in. I have no doubt that I have just described the intentional activities of three actors, although I'm the only person present.

Whether there are persons other than ourselves is neither a trivial nor a purely academic question. We should remember that, from time to time, successful attempts have been made to strip the status of person from some of us. Where the line is drawn has real consequences. If, in reality, dolphins and other *Cetacea* are persons, then we are currently committing murder and genocide against them. If Koko, the gorilla, is a person, then there are legitimate questions about the state of her civil rights.

Special issues arise when we are dealing with persons, although these matters are often overlooked or denied by the sciences. Fortunately, the special status of persons is often recognized and explored within the humanities. Ethics, politics, law, religion, and esthetics sometimes subscribe to a more adequate view of persons than does conventional psychology with its physiological, biological-behavioral, or ecological bent.

In this essay, I will work with person concepts rather than with concepts that are more properly at home in a biological science. Person concepts are those that can be used to describe our special state of affairs, most notably our ethical and esthetic acts and responsibilities. Those concepts follow from our status as persons and not from our human biology; although, as will be seen below, biological facts have a significant place here, too.

It is an empirical question whether we are, in fact, persons, at least as I will describe them. We might not be, but in that case it would also be true that the elements of the fabric of our social order—contracts, laws, and the like—are without a proper subject. Our legal language, with its concerns with negligence and responsibility, makes sense only in recognition of the special status of persons. No mere biological language would be adequate as the vehicle of explanation in regard to "legal acts." Other examples of concepts inappropriate to biological discourse include "I-thou" relations and the notion of ethical and moral responsibility. "I-thou," "moral," and "just" are concepts whose very meaning precludes translation into electrical, mechanical, or magnetic forces or others "of equal dignity." The Helmholtz program (Bernfeld, 1944), still a dominant compulsion in science, will not do. Person concepts have not been shown to be reducible to physiology, and there is every reason (Ossorio, 1971/1978) to think such a program to be fundamentally misguided.

Besides their nonreducibility to physiology, my claim is that persons are nondeterministic, but this is not to say that person concepts cannot be used within a science. Person concepts have a place in rule following inquiry and explication. That they are out of place and negated in a deterministic universe is not to argue that as persons, we cannot act scientifically. As I will indicate later, *only* persons can behave scientifically.

CONCEPTUAL FORMALIZATION

Historically, "persons" has not had a single basic meaning in either philosphy or ordinary use. But this is not a major problem for us since the tack I am taking is basically conceptual rather than historical. There are, however, certain historical traditions that are in many ways compatible with the aspects of persons that I'm interested in here, that is, with what is unique to, or paradigmatic of, persons.

Four of the first five subheadings under "Persons" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edwards, 1967) offer good examples of what I wish to underscore as considerations should we encounter nonhuman persons.

1. *Persons and things.* Kant's (1787/1933) position is instructive. He said that, unlike other things, persons are of unconditional worth. Persons

are distinct from mere things in that respect is an attitude which has application only to persons.

2. *Persons are ends-in-themselves.* Persons, Kant said, are "ends-in-themselves and sources of value in their own right." Hence ethical considerations apply to persons that do not apply elsewhere. "Murder" versus "killing" is this sort of distinction, in that only persons can murder or be murdered. Persons can also kill and be killed; but when a person kills another person with premeditation (that is, deliberately), the act of killing is murder.

3. Accordingly, we have entry three, *legal persons.* Persons have responsibilities and are considered agents. This is a status that can be gained and lost. Consequently, some of us, sometimes, might not be legal persons.

There are two meanings of responsibility which need to be examined here. The first is simply an indication of mere agency as in "I felt that way" or even "last night I dreamt." By saying mere agency, I mean to exclude deliberate, premeditated, or other chosen activity. Emotion and free association are examples of activity that fall within the sphere of mere agency. Emotional behavior and dreams are ordinarily nondeliberate phenomena, although sometimes persons might hold themselves accountable for their expression or may be held so by others. A crime of passion, a shout of fear, or a perverse dream will customarily be considered beyond self-control. Even so, persons may be held accountable in the sense and to the extent that they are accountable for their personal characteristics and their expression (Aristotle, 334–323 BC/1941; Freud, 1925/1975; Schafer, 1975; Schwartz, Note 1). But as often as not, the person will not be held responsible, since the optional or chosen nature of these cases is extremely problematic. Moral responsibility, on the other hand, is usually identified with the domain of choice and deliberate behavior (although not invariably so).

The aspects of the second meaning of responsibility, moral attribution and the acts that follow from deliberation and choice, are the ground on which the question of responsibility *always* arises. Legal persons are considered to be those who can choose or refrain from a legally given range of behaviors, and do so knowlingly. They are agents able to exercise adequate self-control. The *moral* and the *legal* are not necessarily in a formal correspondence, but they are linked through the concepts of choice and responsibility. From these concerns follows the *Encylopedia's* next subheading.

4. *Self-consciousness.* Persons are morally responsible agents and can be so because they are at least sometimes self-consciously aware of their actions, options, and choices (see Natsoulas, 1978, and Plotkin, 1981).

In line with the above, the personalist philosopher Edar Brightman (Edwards, 1967) provides the definition that "a person is a complex unity of consciousness which identifies itself with its past self in memory, determines itself by its freedom, is purposive and value seeking, private yet communicating, and potentially rational."

P. F. Strawson's (1958) conceptualization of persons, involving M-predicates and P-predicates, is probably the best known of the modern formulations. The M-predicates concern the embodiment: the material body or object that happens to be the person in question. The P-predicates are those special concepts that apply only to persons. For an object to be a person there must be at lest one P-predicate as part of its description.

With the above in mind, let's turn to the conceptualization of "persons' found in Peter Ossorio's work (1971/1978; 1970/1981), on which I will elaborate.

OSSORIO'S "PERSONS"

As presented by Osssorio, "persons" is a concept that requires for its articulation an understanding of the kindred and interdependent concepts of "language," "reality," and "action." No one of these four concepts can be understood without full reference to the other three.

Ossorio provides a conceptualization of persons that rests on particular classes of action and eligibility. In Ossorio's work, two connected sets of concepts identify the actions and eligibilities that are paradigmatically those of persons. The first set of concepts is used in descriptions of paradigm cases of the acts of persons. By paradigm cases I refer to the use of the full, typical, complex, or archetypical elements descriptive of the entity in question. These must include attributes that would not be ascribed to entities that are not at issue. The paradigm case for persons would include the elements that Strawson appears to have in mind with his "P-predicates." The second set of concepts concerns the formal structures or standing conditions that are necessary for the actions in question to occur. For persons, the salient form of action is *deliberate* (Ossorio, 1969/1978) and the standing conditions involve the potential for self-regulation, including *linuistic self-regulation* (i.e., language). Deliberate action and linguistic self-regulation are interdependent concepts needed in the articulation of P-predicates. This is also to say that any notion or theory of humans-as-persons that is not capable of generating, describing or accounting for particular deliberate actions and verbal expressions is inadequate as a theory of "persons" or "personality." (For a paradigm case formulation of "persons" see Ossorio, 1982.)

In a formal presentation of "personality," Ossorio (1973; 1970/1981) indicates that three behavioral roles can be used in mapping out the behavior of persons. Persons are able to engage in intentional action, to observe and describe their actions, and to criticize, sometimes *deliberately,* their descriptions. Note that giving description and critique are just special cases of intentional (or goal-directed, purposive) action. Also note the distinction between deliberate action and intentional action. Deliberate action is intentional action in which the actor's behavior follows from an appraisal of behavioral options. Specifically, he considers the options corresponding to his descriptions. In the present context deliberation is a concern with one's own possible actions. In deliberate action, the agent does not merely distinguish actions but also chooses among alternative actions.

This format of an intentional actor who can *observe and describe,* and who can *observe and criticize,* makes up a negative feedback loop and is enhanced if linguistic behavior is one of the actor's possibilities. Description and critique are dependent on the scope of possible representations of behavior, and language provides the actor with the widest range.

Intentional action does not, per se, require any linguistic competence. Only if the actor is also eligible to describe and criticize behavior does language become useful. In this fashion, goal-directed and purposive nonhuman, animal behavior can be seen as intentional action but not as deliberate action. Persons, too, do not always act deliberately. But when the issues of option, choice, decision, and renunciation are taken into consideration, then deliberate behavior is automatically at issue. A person *sometimes* acts deliberately, but not always.

This conceptualization of persons is permissive in several ways. First, not all of the deliberate actions that the person performs need involve deliberation. Second, there are no specific demands made in regard to what particular deliberate acts must be performed. Further, since Ossorio's formulation is "body-neutral" and does not designate specific embodiments or individual differences, it is an ideal tool in considering the personhood of nonhuman beings.

DELIBERATE ACTION, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND REAL WORLDS

Ordinarily, when persons enage in deliberate action, they know what their motives in the real world are. Since deliberate action is action in which the actor chooses on the basis of the merits of alternative behaviors, deliberate action typically involves self-awareness in that the actor

is proceeding with consideration of *his or her own* reasons to behave. In deliberate action one does not merely act in relation to an intended goal. Deliberate actions involve deciding from among one's options an appropriate course of behavior. Accordingly, such behavior implies values, self-awareness, language or language-like representation, and a real world (Plotkin, 1981).

The real world is the context in which the behavior occurs. "The real world" refers to the full set of distinctions that the actor might in any way act upon (Wittgenstein, 1921/1971). The emphasis on "real" underscores the fact that persons have an intrinsic interest in the outcomes of their actions, and consequently, with the implications of their values and concepts. This is implicit in reality testing. Not just any action will do since the recognized context of behavior, the real world, involves both varied and individually different opportunities and constraints. Without the options and limitations that the real world carries, there would be no weight given to intention, deliberation, and the kindred concepts of rationality and responsibility. It is a person's pragmatic concern with the real and the true that characterizes the real world as an arena different from the domain of fantasy and dream. It is a person's actions in the real world that defines his or her words.

The real world is the primary context for the development of meaningful expression even though the worlds of fantasy and dream, like the worlds of poetry and art, allow for a wider range of possible representations, which include the impossible, the absurd, and the nonsensical. The real world is inherently a domain of both *formal* (logical) and *historical* (factual) constraint, and these shared and recognized limits must be encountered before, logically before, the worlds of dream and fantasy can have any meaning. Words and meanings are stable because they are shared and because the world of action has stability and structure. The intrapersonal worlds of dream and fantasy require the public and social world for their meaningful content and *not* the other way around. In another context, this is the reminder that there are no private languages (Wittgenstein, 1953).

Persons have contingent status as actors in a real world. It is therein that the outcome of deeds counts. Persons are enabled to negotiate with standards of rationality, effectiveness, and quality because they can share meanings, practices, and language. Effectiveness and rationality are public and can be appraised by competent judges able to use common concepts in their sharing of social practices. Without some weighing of quality or effect, people would have no grounds for evaluating either themselves or others and no practical locus from which to determine if their utterances are understood.

LANGUAGE

> Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing.)
>
> *Essence* is expressed by grammar. (Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953, pp. 44, 116)

Language instructs us and allows us to represent what is not present and has the capacity to identify and describe the elements of the world. In what can be seen as a formal unpacking of Wittgenstein's language-game, Ossorio (1970/1981) has given a formula for verbal behavior as involving concepts (C), locutions (L), and behaviors (B). To quote, "C is a concept, L is a locution which stands in a one-to-one relation to C, . . . and B is the class of behaviors which consist of acting on the concept C. Uttering L is thus a special case of B" (pp. 80–81). This pramatic view of language and verbal behavior reminds us that, as Gregory Bateson (1972) said, "information consists of differences that make a difference." Concepts, distinctions, and language have meaning only insofar as they can make a difference in behavior. Concepts, articulated or not, serve as our guides to action (Schwartz, 1979a).

Linguistic self-regulation should be distinguished from physiological feedbacks on the one hand and from mere communication on the other, (although language contains many instances of mere communication). The concepts that are represented in language are sometimes arbitrary and artificial ones which have combinatory possibilities that allow for novelty. Contrast this with the direct communication of a lion's growl. Language provides varied and irregular forms of expression and is not just an automatic self-regulation or response. Instead, it is self-regulation that can be refrained from or deliberately overridden. The structure of utterances is ordered not by automatic necessity, but by allowed possibility. There are different ways of talking and thinking about the same thing. A person can understand the rule-following and orderly flow of a shared language, even though the style of presentation is highly idiosyncratic. Getting the drift is central among the implications of linguistic competence.

Several defining principles can be extracted from this concept of language in regard to the traditional linguistic categories of syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.

1. The syntactic structure of a language must allow for novel expression and for varied expressions with equivalent meanings.
2. The semantic structure of a language *may* contain iconic, analogic,

or part-for-whole representations, but it *must* contain arbitrary symbols.

3. Meanings follow from use.

Both images and words can be semantic elements of linguistic structure. And images, like words, require a grammar when they are part of deliberate thought. (See, for example, Arnheim, 1969.) Simple pictorial representation, as Freud (1900/1925) indicated when he discussed dream imagery, is not enough. An image by itself does not tell how it is to be evaluated. But in one who is *already* competent with language, visual imagery can be part, or even the bulk, of a critical understanding.

SYMBOL, SELF, SOCIETY, AND SELF-REGULATION

Personal understanding and self-control go hand in hand with a competent recognition of the concepts one acts upon. Self-control involves, in part, conceptual mastery in being able to represent one's own actions to one's self. In this way, a person's self-control can be said to range within the conceptual scope given by that person's mastery of his or her native tongue.

Representations of the self and ways of recognizing the personal nature of action are linked in the phenomena of self-consciousness and deliberate action. It is self-consciously and deliberately that we make the judgments that mark us as persons, apart from the rest of nature. Representation of the self, whether in the form of icon, part-for-whole, or replica, or in words like "I," "me," and "mine," are basic possessions and achievements of the self-aware person. These symbols and their transformations are employed consciously and unconsciously in self-regulation and reality testing. Deliberate acts correspond to and are sometimes anticipated by deliberate self-conscious thought. The way we see ourselves in our thought and behavior provides a great deal of the motive and feedback that determines what we do. If we don't see ourselves as authors of our actions, then our behavior is not *self*-regulated. Instead it is regulated by our "nature" and our social life. Nature and social life are the great regulators of organizations as diverse as beehives and baboon colonies. In the social lives of persons, mass hysterias, crowds and mobs may be driven more by the social and the natural than by individual deliberations. What I am trying to emphasize in these remarks is that what typifies a person as a person is his or her individual self-conscious and deliberate acts, and not the acts that follow directly and solely from his or her natural and social context. If the person is an organism, he lives within the organism's natural constraints, but to say that the organism is a

person is to say that he or she may also act deliberately within those boundaries.

Despite my emphasis here on the person as individual, the individual person can only occur where there is also social life. Persons are language users and language requires social practice for word meanings (Wittgenstein, 1953). Social practice and discourse is the kettle that brews self-aware individuals. Selves require others. For the self to have meaning there must be recognition of the other. "I," "me," and "mine" are only meaningful expressions in a world of "you" and "yours."

Linguistic self-regulation and reality testing can only arise insofar as the individual is eligible for *social action, dialog,* and *negotiation.* Negotiation is the central concept. Social practice requires that actors starting with different initial positions are able to find a footing on which they can relate to each other. Negotiations are social practices that involve appeal to shared standards (i.e., shared grounds for action) through which different actors may resolve disagreements and find a common ground (Ossorio, 1969/1978). I am arguing, in summary, that the potential for negotiation enables a social group to produce persons. This corresponds to saying that the broader context of language in self-regulation is language in social regulation. The paradigm case of the regulatory use of language is dialog and negotiation. The self-regulating person's role as critic is calibrated by the verbal and nonverbal acts of other persons. Persons can deliberate with themselves and weigh their own options to an extent that corresponds to their eligibility to negotiate options with other persons. To deliberate with one's self, one must be eligible to negotiate with others, even if one refuses to do so. Social dialog and negotiations make up a paradigm case from which deliberation may be derived.

Four principles can be distilled from these remarks:

1. Reality testing requires shared access to phenomena.
2. Language requires shared access to the significance of actions and reality.
3. Negotiation and dialog require the recognition of the shared domain.
4. If "persons" is a concept dependent on "language," "reality," and "action," then persons can exist only in a social context where negotiation and dialog can also exist.

DOLPHINS, PRIMATES, AND LANGUAGE

Please tickle, hug hurry. (Washoe, in Gardner & Gardner, 1971)

I have no present interest in either claiming or denying that primates other than ourselves have actually spoken as proper language users.

Whether any but ourselves have been successfully taught language (as vocal utterance, handsign, or whatever) is an empirical matter. The current evidence seems indecisive as a demonstration of language in dolphins and nonhuman primates. (See, for example, Ristau & Robbins, 1979, and Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh & Boysen, 1980). It is unclear whether any of the attempts to teach human languages to chimpanzees, orangutans,or gorillas have effected a transformation from mere intentional animal behavior to deliberate action. It does seem to me that we have little reason to suspect that nonhuman primates already possess their own languages, or that they will use language if we don't teach them.

I am not concerning myself with whether language use requires an innate competence. Whether, as Chomsky (1972) claims, innate linguistic competence is needed for language is an empirical matter (Piattelli-Palmarini,1980). Similarly, it is an open empirical question whether we humans are the only entities with this possibly innate feature.

Humans are primates, and so it seems sensible for us to try out one of our basic attributes with others of our kind. We teach our children to use language; perhaps we can teach other primates as well. In this fashion it can be argued that we also teach our children to be persons.

A kindred interest has centered on teaching dolphins human language. In the case of these aquatic mammals however, the question is also sometimes asked whether they already speak and are accordingly persons whose language has not yet been recognized or translated. John Lilly (1975), for one, calls them the "humans of the sea."

It seems to me that under certain circumstances, and with a clear concept of person in mind, it should be possible to demonstrate that a nonhuman being uses language and is indeed a person. It is also the case, however, that even with an articulated notion of person and language we still might fail to recognize that the other is one of us. What is at stake is recognizing shared "forms of life" through successful social exchange. To have good reason to see the other as a person, we must see ourselves doing something with that person that one can do only with another.

Again, it should be understood that there are no formal grounds for limiting the possibility of an entity being a person to its also being a member of our species, even if we are the only people we know. Since demonstrating that another entity is a person rests on the demonstration of its facility with language, what I am arguing is that the problems involved in talking with other possible people are logically no different from the problems that generally attend translation and cross-cultural conversation. *N'est-ce pas?* Cross-species or cross-entity conversation is a problem of similar scope, in which the formal difficulty is in establishing common ground that would allow us to share social actions with

other species. I am arguing that when Wittgenstein (1953, p. 226e) claims that "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life," he has in mind intentional forms or classes of action rather than types of embodiment or biology. Types of action can be shared even if we don't share the same body parts.

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION

> We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language, we do not *understand* the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them.
>
> If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. (Ludwig Wittgenstein 1953, p. 223e)

Just what would we have to say to dolphins, primates, and aliens? Of course, if Wittgenstein is correct about lions the issue is moot, since reasonable understanding would be out of the question. But is it? Wittenstein (1953) also reminds us that "a child has much to learn before it can pretend" (p. 229e) and that "false moves can only exist as the exception" (p. 227e). In other words, lions must know the ordinary meaning of their expressions and sometimes mean what they say if the lions are to be *saying anything at all*. It should not be the case, on formal grounds, that humans cannot have dialog with talking lions (never mind the risk). To say that in principle we cannot speak with lions, whether it requires speaking a foreign language or talking in our native tongue, is to argue that we do not share with them in common activities or forms of life. Of course, there must be shared forms of activity for there to be shared social practices, since dialog and translation are contingent on the eligibility to share in social practice. Can we play games with lions? While scratching a lion's back where it can't reach, can we not imagine understanding the lion's request for us to scratch harder and to the left? Here biology does matter, and as I will argue later, our compatibility with lions is an empirical one based on our similar bodies. Lions are one of us animals and we have a host of animal issues that we can discuss with them. The same is true for dolphins and nonhuman primates. Aliens may be another matter. Unless we could identify a shared sense of, for example, danger, coercion, provocation, wrongdoing, or other notions which have nothing intrinsically to do with embodiment, we might truly fail to connect with them.

Partly what is at issue here is that if a lion or anything else uses language as language, it demonstrates competence as a person. As I have

been claiming, central to our recognizing that another individual is in fact a person is believing that the other is a language user. And the best test of language use is successful dialog. If it is true that the lion's talk is either untranslatable or totally unreliable, then we could not recognize it as talk and we would not treat the lion as a person.

BODIES

> Anatomy is destiny. (Sigmund Freud, 1924/1975, p. 178)

> . . . everyone is much more simply human than otherwise. Man—however undistinguished biologically—as long as he is entitled to the term, human personality, will be very much more like every other instance of human personality than he is like anything else in the world. (Harry Stack Sullivan, 1953, pp. 32–33)

Our bodies provide us with endless subject matter and are at times our major preoccupation. Certainly a vast array of our acts and deliberations follow from the facts of our bodies. Much of the scientific study of our behavior, our developmental psychologies, physical anthropologies, ethnologies, psychobiologies, some linguistics and a good deal of psychoanalysis, medicine, and psychiatry rest on embodiment foundations. So we're on familiar ground.

But it is in regard to our bodies that our deepest prejudices lie. For most if not all of us, our embodiment carries with it empathic limitations. All the individual differences and personal characteristics that we attribute to the persons we know are those of one single species. We may be empathically unable to relate to the personal characteristics that stem from an embodiment different from our own. We have enough trouble relating to ourselves. Many of our behaviors grow out of our body's pains, pleasures, and jeopardies, and we are ready-made to react with empathic sensitivity to those sorts of feelings. It may be very difficult for us to relate to an entity with different feelings or perhaps no feelings at all. A silicon-based alien would probably have its vulnerabilities, but we might be hard pressed to see them.

Persons have bodies and it is our object status in the real world that gives some of our effectiveness its experiential and causal force. We can affect and are affected by a world of other objects, processes, and events. This is part of Quine's (1960) reminder when he tells us that Dr. Johnson demonstrated the reality of a stone by kicking it.

So what sort of object are we? Phylogenetically we are human, then primate, then mammal, then vertebrate, and so on, and our empathic capacity seems reactive to just that sort of ordering. We are likely to attribute P-predicates, or better said, anthropomorphize, following a sliding scale of phylogeny. The more ways a thing can be said to look and

act like us, the more likely are we to speak of it, correctly or not, as a person. Dolphins are the exception here, but even so, until recently, most humans thought of them, if at all, as just another "fish."

Are there formal constraints on the type of object that could be a person? I don't think that there are, and so the following remarks are offered as good bets rather than exclusive formulations. I suspect I will be overly "bio-centric," because I believe that the best candidates for persons are objects developed in organic evolution. But this is my prejudice. I know of no formal grounds that exclude nonorganic forms from consideration. Consequently, some of the following is theory.

There are, however, two almost certain features of any embodiment potentially a person. The first is that it possess structures that allow or generate self-governed movement and the second is that it have a varied and integrated perceptual system. Both attributes are needed for reality testing and effective action. Persons are able to wonder, "What's happening?", can find empirical answers, and can act on what they sense to be the case. Knowledge of the real world is gained and enhanced by motion and complex perception.

Our being mammals in a walkabout world certainly contributes to our experience and potential as persons. Remember that the only other serious candidates presently on the scene are also mammals (unless you happen to know some spacemen). Could a rock or a plant be a person? Could green gas on the moon speak meaningfully to an astronaut? I don't think personal consciousness can develop without effective action as a co-occurrent. Rocks, liquids, and gases, and by these I mean either inflexibly stable or shapeless and nonrigid forms, seem to me unlikely candidates for personhood. Their potential for creating effects and their scale of variability and self-regulation seem lacking in sufficient complexity (although this, too, is a questionable assumption). But I suppose that given a time scale orders of magnitude different from our life span, perhaps. As individual humans, the limited amount of time in which we live governs much of our sense of what is active "doing." Geologists see time and effect in different spans. Contrast our short period of seventy or so years, our weak attentions and short memories, our living day to day, hour to hour, minute to minute, with the eons of a mineral's sojourn from igneous to metamorphic, finally ground down and sedimentary.

VARIOUS PERSONS

Within the one species, Homo sapiens, people vary greatly in body, consciousness, knowledge, competence, and motive. As a thought experiment, contrast this within-species variation with the possibilities if another species also produced persons. Then contrast this between-species variation, a variation of biological forms, with the possible differ-

ences between biological and other sorts of structures. I find that the further my thought experiment drifts beyond the organisms I'm acqainted with the more my imagination fails. Fortunately, we have science fiction.

Let me offer a somewhat sketchy and overly simplified view of the structure of person variability. Our best example of persons, advanced and mature Homo sapiens, provides the paradigm case. We have self-mobile and information-gathering bodies, are social, language using, deliberate, and self-conscious of ourselves as individuals. Among humans, these aspects vary, but only more or less. Ignoring for the moment the specifics of consciousness, the dimensions of formal variability appear to be as follows: Persons are objects and may vary the way that objects vary. Persons are deliberate and may vary in the way that a natural language allows. Deliberate action and the range of natural language are interdependent.

Before we proceed to a classification of persons, recall classes of motive particular to both persons and other intentional individuals. Here I am thinking that whereas we human persons share common motivations with other members of the animal kingdom, we also have some motives that do not naturally follow from our animal membership. Specifically, our primate embodiment provides us with particular hedonic and prudential motives and perspectives, whereas our status as responsible deliberators provides us with additional esthetic and ethical concerns. (And maybe additional hedonic and prudent ones, as well.) Esthetics and ethics are conceptually different from hedonics and prudence. Our bodies are a ground for the latter, whereas the fact that we are persons generates the potential for the former. Human persons and other animals may be motivated by pleasure, pain, adaptation, and self-protection, but only persons are in a position to act self-consciously with a sense of ethics and esthetics. Justice, fairness, beauty, simplicity, truth, rigor, objectivity, and elegance are a list of some of the ethical and esthetic standards that are at issue only in the world of persons. As matters of judgment, they require that the judge be able to deliberate. One could describe a person who lacked an ethical or esthetic perspective but that person would be a deficit case or a caricature, or would suffer a pathology. Again, whereas pain, pleasure, and fear, as psychological states, make sense in the general and animal world of intentional actions, only where there is *also* deliberate action will there be clear cases of esthetic and ethical motivation.

CLASSES OF PERSONS

Nonpersons

Nondeliberate individuals, processes, events, and states of affairs are nonpersons.

Potential Persons

These are the classes of nondeliberate intentional individuals that could become deliberate if given special training or circumstances. This possibility would apply to the gorilla, Koko, if she has indeed been taught to use language and to deliberate. In general, cases of potential persons would involve the attempts of paradigm case persons to teach complex intentional individuals language and self-representation. For persons like ourselves, primate persons, the most obvious candidates for potential persons would be our near biological and evolutionary kin, the other primates, and any other behaviorally complicated organism capable of socially exchanging varied and comples communications, for example, the *Cetacea*.

My emphasis on biological family and class is deliberate. Here I am underscoring that persons arise within a class or group of communicating individuals. That is, they occur where shared social practice can occur. Isolates, singularities, and anomalies are not good possibilities for potential persons. I suspect that at a minimum, persons arise *as* and *within* a dyad. Persons occur where there are already other persons. If there are not already others then their genesis is dyadic. Two arise together. There is no Adam-person before Eve.

Nascent Persons

This category contains the infants and to some extent the children of persons. Infants are not yet deliberate and children's deliberations range within their immaturity. Since these deficits limit the domain of appropriate responsibility, they are significant considerations in the designation of legal persons as is seen in the specification of tort and criminality (Prosser, 1971).

Nascent persons are different from potential persons. As a rule, potential persons do not become persons and they *never* become persons without having encountered special circumstances. Nascent persons under the usual expected circumstances do become persons. Nascent persons are the progeny of those who are already persons; potential persons are not.

This category is not a formal claim that all persons have a childhood. We Homo sapiens do; that fact is Weston La Barre's (1954) starting point in his discussion of how members of our particular species became persons. Neoteny and our long-term dependency on the presence of nurturing and protecting adults give our species both the necessity for a complex social context and the sufficient time to learn our language and ways. We come into the world with a fairly generalized and nonspecific behavior potential and we pick up many of our particulars as we go along. This helps us establish a flexible set of behavioral options,

unlike what is apparently the case in organisms that reach their maturity far faster than we do.

In the animal kingdom it is generally found that the more extended the period before the organism's maturity, the smarter the adults of that species appear. Similarly, large brain/body ratios correlate positively with the duration of the species gestation and childhood as does the apparent scope and flexibility of the adult's behavior. Dolphins and primates show the pattern of fairly long gestations and childhoods. By and large, animals whose behavior is rigidly stereotyped grow up quickly.

I. S. Shklovskii and Carl Sagan (Sagan, 1979; Shklovskii & Sagan, 1966) have agrued that given the sort of universe that we inhabit, biological forms are inevitable. There is, of course, cogent counterargument (see, for example, Pollard, 1979). But if biologies are a rule rather than an exception, and should we someday encounter extraterrestrial life and search for persons among its forms, we might use the concept of an extended dependent period as part of our search strategy.

Primitive Persons

Primitive persons only show a relatively narrow range of language and deliberation. This is a hypothetical case that to my knowledge has no extant representatives. Primitive persons are to be contrasted to groups of persons who possess more extensive perspective. The more extensive the perspective, the wider the range of possible appraisal and action. Ossorio (1970/1981, p. 62) has referred to hedonics, prudence, ethics, and esthetics in identifying fundamental perspectives and as classes of reasons or motives. Persons more advanced than ourselves might find this set incomplete. To them we might seem primitive. But I have nothing to say about persons more advanced than ourselves, and my delineation of primitiveness is accordingly accomplished within the above four classes of motive and perspective. As I mentioned earlier, there is a qualitative gulf separating the logics of hedonics and prudence from ethics and esthetics. This suggest a possible evolutionary path insofar as organic beings are considered: As organisms our ancestors had bodies and dilemmas with pain, pleasure, and safety long before they evolved members that achieved the status of person. My theory is that primitive persons might be motivated prudently and hedonically and not yet ethically and esthetically. The same, I suspect, holds for nascent persons.

These lines of reasoning suggest the following evolutionary strand. As primitive persons act in their own self-interest they eventually come into conflict with others on whom they depend. Hedonic and prudential self-interest clashes with concurrent hedonic and predential relations with mutually dependent others. Ethics and esthetics may have been generated, in part, as a way of resolving the resulting dilemmas. But once

there are ethical and esthetic rules and systems, new concerns arise and the old relationships are transformed. For instance, what was once simply mutual dependence may give rise to love.

Of course, ethics and esthetics deal with more than the resolution of pain and pleasure. I am only suggesting that some of the uses of ethical and esthetic perspectives is in the resolution of affective conflict. But once there are systems of ethics and esthetics they take on a life of their own and generate their own dilemmas. The heart of my miniature theory is that organic beings like ourselves experience pain and pleasure as unlearned affects. Affects serve as basic reasons for hedonically and prudentially motivated actions.

I want to restate the principle that being able to make ethical and esthetic appraisals leads to actions whose significance is different from the possibly identical performances of those without ethical or esthetic motives. For example, refraining from doing something because the act makes one *feel* guilty or anxious is action in regard to its hedonic or prudential consequences. It is possible for the same constrained performance to occur in response to the recognition that the act would be unjust or wrong, even without a feared experience of pain or anxiety to back it up. Both may look to an outside observer like the same behavior, even though they are done (or not done) for different reasons. They differ in significance.

Defective Persons

Defective persons show defects in linguistic self-regulation that result in deficits in their participation in social practices and in the span and quality of their deliberate actions. No mere defect in body status counts unless the defect also inhibits, diminishes, or distorts linguistic self-regulation. A great deal of psychopathology is the study of defective person status in the way a great deal of coventional medical science is not. Merely having a broken leg or an ulcer does not create a defective person. But being unable to deliberate or reality-test does. Like primitive persons, defective persons might lack certain motivational perspectives. They may be inadequately hedonic, prudential, ethical, or esthetic. The contrast between defective and primitive is that defective persons lack a status that their peers are expected to achieve, whereas primitive persons are on a par with their peers.

Former Persons

Three possibilities usually fall into the category of former persons. They are: dead person, ghosts, and those who were at one time able to linguistically self-regulate and deliberate but who have permanently lost that status. This last case also falls within the category of defective

persons. Person treat members of these categories differently from other entities, in part because of their former status as persons.

Created Persons

If we build or program objects such that they become capable of deliberate action, we have created persons. Since, except through accident, these creations would be restricted by the limitations of their creators' concepts, we would expect them to reflect their creators. Odds are, relative to their creators, that they would be primitive persons, even if they had super capacities and abilities.

Super Persons

We could, however, imagine created persons who filled out all of our personal characteristics and perspectives but who could operate faster, longer, and so forth. They would be super persons.

PROOF AND COMPETENT JUDGMENT

> If you do know that *here is one hand*, we'll grant you all the rest. . . .
> From it *seeming* to me—or to everyone—to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so.
> What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it.
> If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 2e)

> A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason to think otherwise. (Peter Ossorio, 1970/1981, p. 80)

Formally, I can no more prove that an alien is a person than that there is one hand before me. I cannot *prove* anything that concerns the empirical world. What I can do is remove or create doubt. But where I don't doubt that I now hold my pen in hand, I have many reasons to doubt whether there are, in reality, persons other than ourselves. Still, I do not discount the possibility.

I want to stress that none of these issues are matters of proof. This has been a primarily conceptual inquiry and concepts are not suitable for claims of proof. Concepts cannot be true or false. Instead, they are well formed or they are vague or confused. If well formed, they are useful or they are not. If useful, then they are appropriately employed or they are used awkwardly or inappropriately. The concept of persons is not an item for which the question, Is it true? is sensibly asked. Instead the appropriate questions are: Is the presentation coherent and can the concepts be used in descriptions of ourselves and others?

The asking of these last questions changes the focus of inquiry from conceptual to theoretical and empirical. Concepts only indicate possi-

bilities; they are guides to possible actions, and hence, to possible facts. Concepts may lead to facts but are not facts, except in the trivial sense of "It is a *fact* that I use concept 'X'." A purely conceptual inquiry is a study of the range of possibilities, specifically, possibilities for action. Theories, on the other hand, attempt to make sense of why only *particular* sets of possibilities are historically the case.

Both conceptual and theoretical study are subject to esthetic standards, such as rigor, objectivity, and elegance, and require an esthetic perspective. Basically, concepts and theories are subject to the esthetic standards of coherence and fit. Consequently, scientific behavior is a possibility for persons which follows from and corresponds to their potential for esthetic judgment. Since esthetic standards, such as coherence and fit, identify basic aspects of the person concept, they can only be of concern to persons, and as a further restriction, only to those persons who are competent judges.

After asking whether or not the concept of person is applicable to ourselves and others, the empirical and methodological questions center on whether particular judges are competent in their use of the concepts. Essentially, the question is a pragmatic one. Can the judge successfully treat the other as a person? If he can successfully treat the other as a person, he will have little or no reason to doubt that the other is a person. Of course, another person might disagree with that judgment, and the disagreeing judge might appeal to observations and reminders that have been overlooked or might misunderstand or reject the usefulness of the concepts.

As persons are conceptualized in this essay, it appears that we have some grounds for doubting that we have actually encountered real cases of other persons. All current claims that dolphins and nonhuman primates are persons, insofar as these claims have been linked to strong demonstrations of language use, are in doubt.

Since we have our doubts and since proof is not the question, how might we look closer? Remember, there are real ethical issues before us, since we do have commerce with other primates and with dolphins. Someday we may be in contact with something "out there."

My proposed methodology includes this: In spite of doubts, if I have *any* reason to treat the other as a person, I then respond to the other "person to person," until I fail in my resulting actions. Ideally, I respond as I to thou. If there appears to be any place for the application of a P-predicate in the description of another, I treat the other as a person and continue to do so until I acquire sufficient grounds to believe that my action is misguided. Different judges will consider different grounds sufficient.

My methodological stance is a simple one. *Treat the questionable*

entity as a person. Take the risk of false positives. Persons seem to have hazardous and in other ways unfortunate responses to begin treated as nonpersons, and since being taken as "one of us" is a powerful facilitator of mutual interaction (Schwartz, 1979b), initially treating the questionable other as a person rather than as a nonperson is a good policy. Dealing with the questionable other as a person is more likely to produce further grounds that he is indeed a person than if he is initially treated as a nonperson.

INSTANCES AND EVIDENCE

How do we go about encountering instances and gathering evidence that something other than ourselves is a person? The various ways involve the recognition of acts or artifacts that require, or seem to require, deliberation. Artifacts that appear to be machines would be good evidence. Symbols and other instances and evidence of language would be strong findings. But the epitome of instances that confirm the status of persons on the participants is negotiation. Negotiation, in turn, requires the recognition and affirmation of shared appraisals and common social practices. Recall that we might not recognize that another is a person if we cannot find a common ground for behavior, and that we need shared social practice to translate the other's linguistic expressions. There is not much empathy without a shared sense of option and experience.

Instances and Evidence of Language

Central in any search for nonhuman persons is finding instances and evidence of verbal behavior or other linguistic expression. Dialog is the best instance. The appearance of symbolic or pictorial representations of unfolding action sequences would be a strong sign.

Weak evidence that would bear further study involves just the sort of behavior and anatomy we see in dolphins and their kin. The complex range of signals and the high potential for information transfer descriptive of the dolphin's ability to generate and receive sound (Bateson, 1972; Lilly, 1975) is the sort of evidence that begs us to look closer. If we assume that dolphins might be language-using persons and accordingly treat them as persons, we might find evidence that they indeed use language even if we cannot yet translate their utterances.

Because the *Cetacea* lack hands it is unlikely that they work out their possible deliberations in a material technology. But their utterances are possibly complex enough to allow the expression of epic history and song (Sagan, 1979). They have more than enough signal capacity to communicate the subtleties of relationships and social interaction (Bate-

son, 1972). We don't know what they may be communicating but it is urgent that we find out whether or not it is language. If they are language users, then their extinction by our hands, as horrible as that is in itself, is also murder and genocide. Their slaughter is already happening and for some species of *Cetacea* it is already too late. Some of the Great Whales are gone forever and some Cetacean populations have been thinned to the point that they are no longer genetically viable. There are not enough blue whales left for the few remaining survivors to find each other in the vastness of ocean, mate, and teach their "songs" anew. It is our fault.

Manifestations of Deliberate Action

The instances and the evidence of deliberate action are structured linguistically in the form of games, utterances, or nonverbal behavioral productions. The following interrelated categories are what I have in mind: (a) symbolic representation of performances chosen; (b) representation of renounced behavioral alternatives; and (c) evidence of instances of deliberate objects or processes.

The first category is the same discussed above in the section on evidences and instances of language, although what I am emphasizing in this present category is the act of language being chosen. The fact that something is chosen, whether the choice be words, objects, or acts, is represented most clearly by the symbolic representation of that which is *not* chosen. Renunciation and negation are wedded with choice and deliberation. The point of this second category, the representation of behavior not undergone, is that if an entity were able to show us *in any way* what it did not do (or refrained from doing), then that observation would serve as strong grounds for us to treat the other as a person.

The last category involves evidence and instances of objects, processes, events, and other states of affairs produced by deliberate acts. Contrivances of any form would be evidence to consider. Nonbiological organization that appears "counter-entropic" would earmark such contrivance. An unfortunate evidence of persons would be signs of deliberation gone wrong. In the world of choice there are few guarantees. We take our chances. Mistakes as extreme as destroyed worlds would disclose the darker implications of personal responsibility. we are able to do ourselves in ways more tragic and horrible than the merely intentional or natural. Because as persons we can self-reflect we may see no point in continuing our lives and choose suicide. Or, behaving with a sense of love or honor, we might self-consciously sacrifice ourselves to serve or protect another. Unlike the lemming's blind march to the sea, we are enabled to choose death over life. A nonperson cannot do so.

Suicide and altruistic self-sacrifice should not be confused with certain

stereotypic behaviors commonly seen in social animals who expose themselves to increased risk in their signaling to their kin that danger is near. Such social warnings are common in animal groups, and are readily understood in terms of the genetic value of group survival over individual survival. Groups that produce members who loudly proclaim the existence of danger (and expose themselves to it) may frequently lose their sentinels, but more members of the group thereby live and reproduce. The sentinel in such a group is not choosing death or danger. There is nothing ethical at work here. Natural selection is in response to genetic interest, not self-interest.

As developed earlier in this essay, being a person provides the possibility of motivations unlike those found in the lives of nonpersons. Accordingly, evidence of either ethical or esthetic perspectives in the action of another would be strong reason to see the other as able to deliberate. Also, as stated earlier, esthetic and ethical behavior is less tied to particular embodiments than are hedonics and prudence. Whereas hedonics and prudence, like ethics and esthetics, are grounds for choice, only ethics and esthetics follow from the fact of choice. Ethical and esthetic acts require somewhere in their construction the option that it could be otherwise. Ethics involve the concept of justice (Pitkin, 1972) and esthetics the various types of fittingness (Ossorio, 1970/1981, p. 62). As universals, ethics and esthetics may be more suitable to bridge the dilemma of disparate embodiments than are our local concerns with pleasure, pain, and vulnerability. Should a nonhuman entity show an apparent concern with fittingness or justice, we would have reason to attempt a negotiation. Persons do not *have* to be concerned with justice and esthetics, but such an interest is within our most defining possibilities. We are most clearly identified as persons by our poetry, our science, and our laws. When we wonder whether something is fair, well formed, or correct we are quintessentially acting as persons.

SUMMARY

The problem of other possible persons is one that cannot be addressed if our sense of persons is limited to members of our own species. Moreover, we are never in a position to *prove* that a being is a person. Rather than these problems being solved through proofs, we can resolve them, in part, through adoption of a policy; namely, if we have *any* grounds for seeing the other as a person, we then should treat him as a person until we have reason enough to feel that our attempts are misguided.

To see and treat a nonhuman as a person requires a conceptualization of persons that is "body-neutral." Such a formulation has been provided by Peter Ossorio (1982) when he defined a person as "an individual

whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of deliberate action" (p. 14). The deliberate acts of persons require the potential for self-regulation, including linguistic self-regulation. Accordingly, evidence that an individual acts deliberately or uses language is the principal ground for suspecting that he is a person, regardless of his embodiment. When the judgment is made that an entity is or might be a person, special esthetic and ethical considerations then apply.

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MEN AND WOMEN:
PARTNERS, LOVERS, FRIENDS

Mary Kathleen Roberts

ABSTRACT

In order to provide formal and systematic access to facts and possible facts about men and women, a formulation of the concepts of "man" and "woman" as status concepts and a paradigm case formulation of man-woman relationships are presented. This conceptualization is then applied successfully in making some empirical predictions. Possibilities for more practical applications of the conceptualization are explored.

Psychological research on men and women has traditionally not been guided by an understanding of what is involved in principle in being a man or a woman. Rather, the traditional approach has been simply to point to those objects labeled "man" and "woman," and to test out a theory about the characteristics and processes found in those objects. However, to test out a theory about spatial abilities, ego libido, sex

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roles, and so on, as they occur in the objects labeled "man" or "woman," is not to study men and women as such.

In order to study men and women as such, a radical shift in approach is made in the conceptualization and empirical study presented here. First, a shift is made away from the traditional semantic view of language to a pragmatic view. "Man" and "woman" are not seen primarily as labels for objects, but rather as concepts that people act on in a great variety of forms of behavior.

Secondly, a shift is made away from the narrowly truth-seeking view of scientific activity. No attempt is made here to state a theory, that is, a body of truths about men and women, or to test a theory empirically. Rather an attempt is made to formulate the conceptual system that includes the concepts of "man" and "woman," and then to apply that conceptualization. Such a conceptual system is necessary to give us formal and systematic access to the facts and possible facts about men and women. It is only when we have formal access to the possibilities that we can determine empirically which of these possibilities is the case, and know what it is that we have found out empirically.

In the conceptualization that follows, the concepts of man and woman are presented as status concepts, and a paradigm case formulation of man-woman relationships is presented. (Readers unfamiliar with paradigm case formulations are referred to Ossorio, 1981.) Based on the conceptualization, the question of what is involved in principle in being a man or woman is answered.

Two hypotheses are generated using the conceptualization, and an empirical study designed to test these hypotheses is presented. Indicators and participants in the study are described, and the results of specific predictions reported. The results confirm the hypotheses, and thereby provide evidence of the predictive applicability of the conceptualization. The predictive applicability of the conceptualization having been established, possibilities for practical application of the formulation—in socialization, education, and psychotherapy—are explored.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

In order to present "man" and "woman" as status concepts, it is necessary first to clarify the notion of status. Because it is easier to clarify the notion of status in the context of a game, rather than in the lives of men and women, and because there is a well-established precedent in Descriptive Psychology of giving chess examples, I invite the reader to relax and enjoy a languid afternoon's chess game.

Man and Woman as Status Concepts

Imagine two bums out in a park playing chess. One bum ponders to himself "What is it to be Black?" as he says to the other bum "Knight to Queen's Bishop 6."

The pondering bum looks around. There is nothing he can point to in order to answer his question. There is no chess board in sight and no physical pieces. When the two bums strolled over to the park, all the tables were taken, so they are playing in their heads.

Sobered, the bum considers: "Black is a concept within a whole system of concepts. The concept of Black depends on the presence of the other concepts in the system: White, pawns, rooks, castling, checking, etc. Hmm . . . Where do all these concepts have a place? In the game of chess, a social practice that calls for the use of this system of concepts."

His opponent announces "Pawn to Queen 4."

Our bum, as he responds absentmindedly "Pawn takes Pawn Queen 4," realizes that he can anchor his understanding of what it is to be Black in the social practice of chess. "Let's see then. A person plays the game of chess from one of two positions: Black or White. Eureka! Black is a status, a standing in the game of chess. With this status goes the behavior potential to play chess.

"I wonder if it makes any difference whether I'm Black or White. Well, if I'm Black, I can't move White's pieces. No . . . that's not right. It's not that I can't move White's pieces. I could. But if I'm Black and I move White's pieces, it counts as a violation of the rules of chess. So my behavior counts differently depending on my status.

"I wish it didn't count as a violation if I move White's pieces. But if certain things didn't count as violations, there wouldn't be the game of chess. I couldn't be Black anymore, and I wouldn't have the behavior potential to play chess."

About this time, the two chess players are joined by two other bums. Because at first glance the two chess players appear to be idle, one of the new bums takes out a bedraggled deck of cards and invites the chess players to make a foursome for bridge. The chess players decide to postpone their chess game.

As one of the new bums deals, our bum ponders again: "What is it to be North? I understand this now. North is a status, a standing in the game of bridge. The status carries with it the behavior potential to play bridge, and the status determines (logically determines) how my behavior counts in the game of bridge.

"Umm . . . But North is not just a standing in bridge. In particular, it's a standing in relation to South, and also a standing in relation to East and West. The status carries with it a set of relationships."

Our bum, a little excited by his insight, bids "4 Trumps" and returns quickly to his thoughts. "So to be North is to stand in a certain relation to South, and a certain relation to East and West. More specifically, to

> be North is to have the relation of teammate to South, and the relation of competitor to both East and West. And to be Black is to stand in a certain relation to White, and to be *I* is to stand in a certain relation to *Thou,* and . . . ."
>
> His partner nudges him: "Are you being North, or are you somewhere else today?"

Black in chess and North in bridge having been introduced as status concepts, man and woman will now be presented as status concepts. Man, like Black or North, is a concept within a whole system of concepts. The concept of man depends on the presence of the other concepts in the system: woman, child, adult, father, mother, and so on. This type of conceptual system has a place in all the known ways of life that people have created. Just as the game of chess calls for the use of the concepts of Black, White, pawn, etc., ways of life call for the use of the concepts of man, woman, child, etc.

An understanding of the concept of man can be anchored in ways of life. If different ways of life are seen as different games, then a person plays one of these "games of life" from one of two positions: man or woman. Man is thus a status, a standing in the game of life or a way of life. With this status goes the behavior potential to live life in one of the ways it is lived.

Depending on the particular way of life, a person with the status of man has certain behavior potential. For example, in a Tasmanian way of life, a person who has the status of man is eligible to participate in many social practices, but he is restricted from other social practices, including seal hunting. This is not a causal restriction on the man; for example, he could swim out to the seal rocks and club seals. Instead, it is a restriction on what the man is doing. He could not be participating in a full sense in a Tasmanian way of life and hunt seals. (Cf. Our bum could not be playing chess and move White's pieces.)

If a person has the status of woman, however, in a Tasmanian way of life, then she is eligible to hunt seals. Thus, if a woman hunts seals it counts differently than if a man hunts seals. In the case of the woman, it counts as doing her part, actualizing herself, but in the case of the man, it counts as a violation of a social norm. The status of man or woman thus determines (logically, normatively) how a behavior counts, and therefore, *what* behavior it is within a given way of life.

The status of man or woman also determines how behaviors count in units of behavior smaller than ways of life. In addition to options within ways of life counting differently, options within intrinsic social practices also count differently, depending on a person's status. For example, in our social practice of provocation-hostility, if a man chooses the option

of punching another person, it counts differently than if a woman punches somebody. Likewise, in our social practice of loss-lamentation, if a woman lets herself cry in public, it counts differently than if a man cries in public.

It is sometimes said that women cannot express anger and men cannot express sadness in our ways of life. This is obviously not the case: Both social practices are open to people in both statuses, but frequently men and women express themselves in different ways, that is, by choosing different options. For example, in the social practice of provocation-hostility, a woman may express her anger by choosing conventional options like yelling, sulking royally, or various options specific to the provoking situation. But if she wants to express that she is angry, and not enraged or beside herself, she is restricted from punching. The restriction is not causal: She could punch. But given existing norms, she would not then be expressing anger, but rather rage or fury. Were there not some norms and restrictions of this sort, she would not have the potential to express anger at all.

A person with a given status, in addition to having certain behavior potential and certain restrictions on behavior potential, also has a set of possible relationships to other people. A person with the status of man is potentially a member of the "team" of men. As a member of the "team" of men, he automatically has a potential relation to any member of the "team" of women, and a potential relation to the "team" of women as a whole.

So far the presentation of man and woman as status concepts has paralleled the reverie of our bum in the park. But our bum was interrupted before he could complete his formulation. He worked out a ground-level notion of status, but did not realize that the statuses of Black and North also carry with them the behavior potential for making particular moves in particular games. In fact, if particular people didn't make particular moves in particular games, there wouldn't be chess or bridge. Or, to use football as an example, if all football players were always on the bench, and a particular member of one team never tackled a particular member of an opposing team in an actual game, there wouldn't be football.

Correspondingly, if no man ever had a particular relationship to a particular woman, there wouldn't be men and women as we know them. Thus, the status of man also carries with it behavior potential to engage in particular behaviors that express a personal relationship to a particular woman.

This is not to say that every man has to have such a relationship. A person with the status of man is eligible to participate in such a relationship, but it is not always a practical possibility. In this case, the person with the status of quar-

terback, who is eligible to throw a pass but has no one in position to receive the ball. It is not practically possible for the quarterback to pass the ball, but this does not affect his eligibility to do so. Likewise, even though a man does not participate in an actual relationship with a particular woman, this does not affect his eligibility to do so.

Our bum, in addition to not realizing that the statuses of Black and North carry with them the eligibility to make particular moves in particular games, also did not point out that Black and North are optional statuses, which a person only operates from for the duration of a game. By contrast, man and woman are preemptive statuses: A person is usually assigned the status of man or woman at birth, and then always operates from the assigned position.

The preemptive nature of the statuses of man and woman is underscored by the research of Money and Ehrhardt. Money and Ehrhardt (1972) found that in the case of hermaphroditic babies, where a sex reassignment, that is, a change in status, is necessary after the time of birth, the age ceiling for the sex reassignment is around eighteen months, before the onset of language acquisition. After this age, studies indicate that a child's status is best left unchanged, whether chromosomal, gonadal, or hormonal sex agree with the originally assigned status or not.

If the child is treated consistently in accord with his assigned status, the child eventually accepts this status as his own. By the age of six or seven, the child accepts for himself the place that others have given him all along. ("I couldn't be me and not be a boy" or "I couldn't be me and not be a girl.")

In rare cases, however, there may be a conflict between the place others give the child, and the place the child accepts for himself. For example, a child may feel out of place when others treat him as a boy, and feel inside that "I couldn't be me and be a boy." In this case, he may be a transsexual as an adult, and seek surgically and legally to change his status. There is no contradiction here with saying that man and woman are preemptive statuses: The transsexual seeks to live in accord with the status he has always taken to be his own.

Man and woman have now been presented as status concepts. For our purposes, the concept of status as behavior potential in a way of life is designated as "Level I status," and the concept of status as behavior potential in a personal relationship is designated as "Level II status." Level I status is a standing in a way of life; this standing carries with it behavior potential in a way of life and a set of potential relationships. Level II status is a standing in a personal relationship; this standing carries with it behavior potential to engage in behaviors that express a personal relationship to a particular person.

Some additional conceptual resources are needed, however. There is

a variety of man-woman relationships possible with Level II status, and access to this range of relationships needs to be provided. But before providing these additional conceptual resources, I will digress briefly to mention the difference between status and role.

For some statuses, there is a role that is complementary to the status. The role prescribes certain conventional behaviors, and these behaviors fall within the behavior potential of a person who has the corresponding status. For example, the role of mother prescribes conventional behaviors like feeding children, keeping them clean, and playing with them. These behaviors fall within the behavior potential of a person who has the status of mother, and the behaviors may be an authentic expression of that status.

However, a person may perform the behaviors prescribed by a role without operating from the corresponding status. For example, a nurse may perform the role of a mother with a child, but that does not make her the child's mother (we might call her the child's motherer). Or, a woman may perform the role of mother, but not really be a mother on the inside. The performance of the role is then inauthentic: It is not a personal expression of the woman's status as a mother, nor is it the expression of a normative personal relationship to her child.

For other statuses, there is no role that is complementary. For example, there is no role that prescribes behaviors that go with the status of friend. "Doing what a friend does" cannot be described in terms of a set of conventional behaviors. Nonetheless, in a given behavioral context we may distinguish between what a friend might be expected to do and what would be surprising for a friend to do. Accordingly, a person may merely do what a friend does and not really be a friend: The person may do friendly things without these being an expression of his or her status as a friend or of a personal relationship to another.

In ordinary language people sometimes confuse status and role, and use the terms interchangeably. For example, someone might comment, "I'm saying this in the role of your mother" and mean (a) I have the status of your mother, and I'm genuinely speaking from that position, (b) I have the status of your mother, but in saying this, I'm just performing the role, or (c) I don't have the status of your mother, that is, I don't have the eligibility to say this, but I'm going to perform the role anyway (Look out!).

The confusion between status and role in ordinary language is not problematical, since it is usually possible to tell from the situation what a person means and to respond accordingly. But this sort of confusion is problematical when it is carried over into social science and interferes with giving clear and adequate accounts of human behavior.

Nevertheless, social scientists have generally not commented on the

distinction between status and role. One exception is the anthropologist Ralph Linton. According to Linton (1936),

> A status, as distinct from the individual who may occupy it, is simply a collection of rights and duties. . . . When the individual puts the rights and duties which constitute the status into effect, he is performing a role. Role and status are quite inseparable, and the distinction between them is of only academic interest. There are no roles without statuses or statuses without roles. (pp. 113–114)

Three comments on this passage: First, in limiting status to a collection of rights and duties, Linton misses the essence of many statuses. For example, the status of friend may carry with it certain rights and duties, but these are not what we take to constitute the status. When we describe friendship, we talk primarily in terms of enjoying each other's company, appreciating how things count for each other, being willing to do things for each other, and so on, rather than in terms of rights and duties.

Secondly, there are statuses without roles, as in the example of the status of friend mentioned above.

Finally, Linton misses the importance of the distinction between status and role to the way human lives are lived. People are frequently concerned about themselves or others performing roles for which they do not have the corresponding status. It is recognized that if a person performs a role without having the corresponding status, he may add to the suffering of others, as well as missing out on satisfactions for himself. For example, Don Juan enacted the role of "the Great Lover" many times with many women. But his performance of the role was never the expression of a personal relationship with a woman (Level II status). Because of this, he caused many women to suffer, and he himself never knew the satisfactions of a genuine love relationship.

Paradigm Case Formulation of Man-Woman Relationships

As noted above, a variety of man-woman relationships is possible with Level II status, and access to the range of possible relationships needs to be provided. For this purpose, a conceptual-notational device, the paradigm case formulation, will be used, since the range of possible cases of man-woman relationships lends itself most readily to a paradigm case formulation, rather than to a taxonomy or a parametric analysis.

In introducing Paradigm Case relationships, two guidelines will be followed. First, relationships which are taken to be archetypal man-woman relationships will be chosen. In addition, because it seems to be a conceptual truth that sexual intercourse is a paradigmatic expression of a man-woman relationship, relationships which have sexual inter-

course as a genuine behavioral expression will be included. (See Roberts, 1980, for a more complete statement of the rationale for using sexual intercourse as a guideline here.)

In accordance with these two guidelines, that is, of choosing cases which are archetypal and choosing cases which have sexual intercourse as a genuine behavioral expression, three Paradigm Cases of man-woman relationships will be introduced. The three Paradigm Cases are the relationships of (a) Contract-partnership, (b) Romantic love, and (c) Friendship.

In the first relationship, Contract-partnership, a man and a woman enter into a contract together and become life partners. Their partnership may arise from sheer necessity, from convenience, or from duty-obligation. In the Paradigm Case, a particular man and a particular woman enter into the spirit of their contract, and each genuinely fulfills his or her part in the partnership.

A partnership arising from sheer necessity is perhaps the oldest form of relationship between men and women. The contract in this case is based upon mutual teaming for survival, and the essence of the contract is that each person helps the other fulfill his or her basic needs. Since helping each other fulfill basic needs may include helping each other meet sexual needs, sexual intercourse is a way of fulfilling the contract and an expression of the relationship.

In a partnership arising from convenience, basic survival is not so much an issue, and the contract is more one of making life easier for the other person in important ways. The contract is for the mutual advantage of both people, and makes it possible for each of them to have important things. Since having a sexual partner near at hand and having a guaranteed sexual relationship may make life easier, sexual intercourse is a way of fulfilling the contract and an expression of the relationship.

In a partnership arising from duty-obligation, the contract is based on the social position of each person, and the contract makes it possible for each person to fulfill his or her social duties and obligations. For example, a man and a woman of royal lineage may enter into a contract together in order to fulfill the traditions and moral obligations of royalty. Since sexual intercourse is a way of providing progeny to perpetuate the royal lineage, sexual intercourse is a way of fulfilling the contract and an expression of the relationship.

A person's standing in a particular contract-partnership relationship (Level II status) will correspond to his standing in a particular way of life (Level I status). For example, a man who is living a way of life that involves struggling for basic necessities like food, clothing, or shelter, will most likely have a relationship with a woman that involves teaming

for survival. And a man who is living a regal way of life will most likely have a relationship with a women that involves fulfilling obligations as a royal couple.

The second Paradigm Case, Romantic love, is also a very old form of relationship between men and women. While many of the accoutrements and traditions associated with romantic love were not introduced until the Troubador movement in the late eleventh century, the phenomenon in its essence was known long before that. There are descriptions of romantic love in Homer, who wrote sometime between 1250 and 850 B.C.

The Paradigm Case is a relationship of mutual love between a particular man and a particular woman. The Paradigm Case has the following characteristics (Marshall, Note 1):

1. Asymmetrical eligibilities
2. Intimacy
3. Respect
4. Advocate-champion (actively promote the other's interests)
5. Willingness to give the utmost
6. Fascination
7. Exclusivity.

When a man and a woman have a love relationship, that is, when they actualize Level II status in a romantic love relationship, they each have a unique standing. In the two-person community of love, each person has a unique place with the other, a place which is not possible for an individual in a larger community. The special place the man and woman have with each other is a strong affirmation of the equal value of both. Along with having a unique place with each other, lovers may also evoke things in each other and appreciate things in each other that are not evoked or appreciated by others in the larger community.

One of the special eligibilities that goes with being lovers is the eligibility to make love, that is, to express love by engaging in sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse as an expression of love is not the same as sexual intercourse as a fulfillment of a contract, but in both cases, sexual intercourse is a genuine expression of a man-woman relationship.

The third Paradigm Case, Friendship, has traditionally been taken as a paradigmatic relationship between men, and most often came about when men were participating together in some important enterprise. In the last 200 years, however, friendship has gained some acceptance as a paradigm for man-woman relationships.

The friendship paradigm appears to be gaining acceptance because some people no longer see meaning or value in the romantic love rela-

tionship. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft, a leader in the women's rights movement at the end of the eighteenth century, wrote about friendship and love as follows:

> Friendship is a serious affection; the most sublime of all affections. . . . The very reverse may be said of love. In a great degree, love and friendship cannot subsist in the same bosom. . . . The vain fears and fond jealousies, the winds which fan the flame of love, are both incompatible with the tender confidence and sincere respect of friendship. (1792/1967, p. 122)

Other critics of the romantic love paradigm point out that it is an unequal relationship, an idealistic one, a possessive one, and so forth. The friendship relationship has emerged as an alternative for men and women.

The Paradigm Case of friendship is a relationship of mutual friendship between a particular man and a particular woman. The Paradigm Case has the following characteristics (Marshall, Note 1):

1. Symmetrical eligibilities
2. Intimacy
3. Respect
4. Trust (act with the other's interests in mind)
5. Liking.

When a man and a woman have a friendship—when they actualize Level II status in a friendship—the status of friend determines that the same behaviors count alike for both people. This is expressed by the characteristic of symmetrical eligibilities: Within the limits of their friendship, men and women have the same eligibilities to participate in social practices, and the same behavior is regarded as appropriate for both the man and the woman.

There may be a strain on the friendship, however, unless the man and woman also have a corresponding way of life in which behaviors count the same for both of them. Otherwise, the symmetrical eligibilities that go with the status of friend (Level II status) may conflict with the asymmetrical eligibilities that have traditionally been embedded in ways of life for men and women (Level I status).

One of the eligibilities that goes with the status of friend is the eligibility to do enjoyable things together, and thus sexual intercourse appears to be an expression of friendship. However, sexual intercourse may not preserve the symmetry of the friendship. While the positions of the man and woman in sexual intercourse are interchangeable in the most concrete sense, for example, the woman may be "on top," the behavior potential of men and women in sexual intercourse is not interchangeable.

Three Paradigm Cases of man-woman relationships have been intro-

duced; transformations of the Paradigm Cases could also be introduced. For example, it is possible to have a romantic love relationship in which intimacy is missing. Thus, one transformation for the Paradigm Case of Romantic love might be "Eliminate intimacy from the relationship." As a second example, it is possible to have romantic love within a contract-partnership relationship. In fact, love and marriage (a contract relation) are said to go together "like a horse and carriage." Thus, one transformation for the Paradigm Case of Contract-partnership might be "Add the relationship of romantic love." However, it does not appear that much would be gained by additional bookkeeping of this sort, and therefore such transformations will not be formally introduced.

In addition, other Paradigm Cases could be introduced. Although the discussion has been in terms of the three Paradigm Cases of contract-partnership, romantic love, and friendship, the conceptualization allows for other paradigms. However, since none appear to be sufficiently salient to be on a par with these three, no other Paradigm Cases will be introduced.

Having presented man and woman as status concepts, and having presented a paradigm case formulation for the concept of man-woman relationships, the task of providing formal and systematic access to the facts and possible facts about men and women is now completed. This is not to say that exhaustive access to the facts about men and women has been provided. As noted above, man and woman are concepts within a whole system of concepts, a system that includes other concepts like child, adult, mother, father, and so on. Only part of this conceptual system has been formulated here, the part that directly pertains to the concepts of man and woman.

Accordingly, it may be noted that access to the facts about men and women in relation to other statuses has not been provided. Man-woman relationships have been seen as two-person games, which is a little like seeing baseball as a "pitcher's duel." Just as a pitcher's duel only takes place within the larger game of baseball, which includes other statuses like catcher, short-stop, and so on, man-woman relationships only take place within the larger game of life, which includes many other statuses. In order to provide access to the facts about men and women in relation to these other statuses, more of the conceptual system that includes the concepts of man and woman would have to be formulated.

While the formulation does not provide exhaustive access to the facts about men and women, it does provide adequate access to the range of facts needed for understanding what it is to be a man or woman. Thus, it is now possible to return to the original question of what is involved in principle in being a man or woman. To be a man is to be eligible to stand in a certain relation to a particular woman, and to be a woman

is to be eligible to stand in a certain relation to a particular man. What that relation is depends on which paradigm a person accepts as the fundamental relationship between men and women.

EMPIRICAL STUDY

In the introduction, it was stated that an attempt would be made here to formulate the conceptual system that includes the concepts of man and woman, and then to apply that conceptualization. The hypotheses and empirical predictions presented below represent applications of the conceptualization.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses are based in part on the archetypal nature of the three Paradigm Case relationships introduced in the conceptualization. If the particular Paradigm Cases introduced in the conceptualization are cases that people actually use as archetypes, then, depending on which Paradigm Case relationship a person takes to be fundamental between men and women, the person will tend to perceive particular cases of man-woman relationships in light of that archetype. Moreover, since interactions between men and women are expressions of relationships, a person will also tend to perceive personal interactions between men and women in a way which reflects his or her guiding archetype.

By way of example, the paradigms of brotherhood and competition may be considered. If a person takes brotherhood as his archetype of man-woman relationships, when the person encounters a particular interaction between a man and a woman, he will tend to perceive the interaction as either an expression or violation of brotherhood. Likewise, if a person takes competition as his archetype of man-woman relationships, when the person encounters a particular interaction between a man and a woman, he will tend to perceive the interaction in a win, lose, draw format. If the particular interaction is a sexual one, the person with the brotherhood archetype will probably see it as a mutual affirmation, while the person with the competition archetype will probably see it as a skirmish in the "battle of the sexes."

The paradigms of contract-partnership, romantic love, and friendship may operate in the same way, so that a person who has romantic love as his archetype is likely to see a sexual interaction as an expression of love, while a person who has friendship as his archetype is likely to see it as an expression of friendship.

In addition to guiding perception in this way, an archetypal relationship may also provide a standard against which to judge actual relationships, and therefore provide a basis for satisfaction or disappointment in them.

As an example of the way in which an archetype provides a standard against which to judge actual relationships, a mother-son paradigm may be considered. If a man takes a mother-son paradigm as his archetype of man-woman relationships, the man's satisfaction with actual man-woman relationships will be determined by how closely those actual relationships resemble the mother-son archetype. Moreover, the man will tend to be unhappy to the extent that he does not have a mother-son relationship.

In the same way, depending on whether a person takes contract-partnership, romantic love, or friendship as his archetype, the person's satisfaction with actual man-woman relationships will be determined by how closely those actual relationships resemble his archetype. In addition, the person will tend to be unhappy to the extent that he does not have a relationship like his archetypal relationship.

This is not to say that people cannot enjoy the satisfactions of more than one kind of relationship. But the satisfactions of each of the paradigmatic relationships are different, and the person who really has a given archetype will tend to feel that he is missing something vital in his life if he only has the satisfactions that go with one of the other paradigms.

In accord with this discussion of the archetypal nature of the Paradigm Cases, the following hypotheses are made.

Hypothesis 1. Individuals who take a given paradigmatic relationship as archetypal for men and women, as compared to individuals who take a different relationship as archetypal, will show a stronger tendency to view sexual behavior as exemplifying that given archetype.

Hypothesis 2. Individuals who take a given paradigmatic relationship as archetypal for men and women, as compared to individuals who take a different relationship as archetypal, will be more disappointed at not having a relationship of that particular kind.

Indicators

Three forms were developed for use in testing these hypotheses: The Paradigm Form, the Sexual Significance Index, and the Disappointment Rating Form. Each of these indicators is described below.

Paradigm Form

In this form, participants were presented with descriptions of relationships exemplifying each of the Paradigm Cases introduced in the paradigm case formulation of man-woman relationships. (Although the three Paradigm Cases introduced in the formulation need not be exhaustive for man-woman relationships, for purposes of the present study

it was assumed that the three paradigms were sufficiently close to being exhaustive that the difference would not be decisive with respect to empirical findings.) The particular relationships on the Paradigm Form included four relationships exemplifying the contract-partnership paradigm, four relationships exemplifying the romantic love paradigm, and four relationships exemplifying the friendship paradigm. A sample description of a friendship included on the Paradigm Form is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Sample Description of a Friendship

Sharon Potter and John Webb first met in the heart of poverty-stricken Appalachia, where both were VISTA volunteers. They were drawn to one another by their common desire to help the poor, and by their common discouragement with the difficulties they faced. John was trying to establish a rural legal-aid service, but found that none of the city attorneys would help. Sharon was trying to establish a social service center, but she had met the same sort of resistance as John.

Once they met, life seemed hopeful again to both of them. On summer's evenings, John would drive over to the small town where Sharon lived, and they would join Sharon's neighbors for an evening of blue grass music. John and Sharon both were content then, relaxing together.

When autumn came, they enjoyed back-packing in the Smoky Mountains, experiencing the majesty of the Smokies and the beautiful colors of autumn. During the cold winter months, they loved to spend long evenings by the fire together. They would brainstorm for creative ways to solve the social and legal problems of the poor, or they'd relax and share popcorn and backgammon.

Participants were instructed to rate "How well does this relationship get at the essentials of a masculine-feminine relationship?" for each of the relationships on the form. The ratings were done on ten-point scales. In addition, participants were asked to indicate which relationship "best gets at the essentials."

On the basis of responses on the Paradigm Form, a participant was designated as having a given paradigm as his archetype if (a) on the average, the participant rated the relationships exemplifying that paradigm above the other relationships and (b) the participant indicated a relationship exemplifying that paradigm as best getting at the essentials.

Sexual Significance Index

In this indicator, participants were asked to imagine that a particular person had just engaged in sexual intercourse, and the person was thinking to himself or herself about it. In each case, the particular person to

Table 1. Sample Items from the Subscales of the Sexual Significance Index

Romantic Thoughts:
"He is mine and I am his."
"I feel a love too deep for words."
"I can't live without her."
"Our love seems to deepen each time we're together."
Friendship Thoughts:
"We have so much to share."
"How much we've both grown, being together."
"How much I like him."
"It's so much fun to be with her."

be imagined by the participants was a man or woman from one of the twelve relationships on the Paradigm Form. Participants were presented with a list of possible thoughts that the person might be having, and asked to rate how out of character it would be for the person to be having each thought on the list.

Two subscales were derived from the thoughts on the Sexual Significance Index. One subscale consisted of the romantic thoughts on the lists following a romantic relationship, and the other subscale consisted of the friendship thoughts on the lists following a friendship relationship. Sample items from each subscale are presented in Table 1.

The mean of a person's ratings of the items on the romantic thoughts subscale was used as an index of the person's tendency to view sexual behavior in light of the romantic love archetype, and the mean of a person's ratings of the items on the friendship thoughts subscale was used as an index of the person's tendency to view sexual behavior in light of the friendship archetype.

Disappointment Rating Form

This indicator also involved the use of the twelve relationships included on the Paradigm Form, but was administered prior to the Paradigm Form. Participants were instructed to rate "How disappointed would you be if this was the best relationship you ever had?" for each of the relationships on the form. The mean of a person's ratings on the four relationships exemplifying a given paradigm was used as an index of the person's tendency to be disappointed with a relationship of that kind.

Participants

Participants in the study included 166 students who were enrolled at the University of Colorado during the summer and fall of 1979. They ranged in age from 17 to 46, with the median age being 18.9. One hundred

fifty-four of the participants, approximately 93%, were single. There were 71 men and 95 women.

Each participant completed the set of forms described above at his or her own pace. Because each person completed the set individually, it would have been possible to use a large group administration procedure. However, a small group administration procedure was used, with two to six people per group, in order to increase cooperation by the participants.

When the participants' responses on the Paradigm Form were analyzed, 98 people were found who consistently took one of the three paradigms as the fundamental relationship between men and women. These people met both of the criteria for having an archetype, that is, (a) they rated the relationships exemplifying a given paradigm above the other relationships on the Paradigm Form, and (b) they chose a relationship exemplifying that paradigm as best getting at the essentials of a man-woman relationship.

The 98 people who met both of these criteria were classified according to archetype as follows:

Romantic love	57 participants
Friendship	36 participants
Contract-partnership	5 participants

Predictions and Results

In order to test Hypothesis 1, that is, that individuals tend to view sexual behavior as exemplifying the relationship that they take to be archetypal, the following two predictions were made.

Prediction 1(a). Participants who have romantic love as their archetype for man-woman relationships will tend to rate thoughts expressive of romantic love as less out of character following sexual intercourse than participants who have either friendship or contract-partnership as their archetype.

Prediction 1(b). Participants who have friendship as their archetype for man-woman relationships will tend to rate thoughts expressive of friendship as less out of character following sexual intercourse than participants who have contract-partnership as their archetype.

Ratings made on the Sexual Significance Index described above by the 98 participants who met both of the criteria for having an archetype were then analyzed using *t*-tests. Although the direction of the difference

Table 2. Comparison of Groups on the Sexual Significance Index

Groups	*n*[a]	*X*	*SD*	*t*	*p*
Romantic Thoughts: How out of character?					
Romantic	51	1.03	.75		
Friendship	32	1.54	.86	2.88	.006
Romantic Thoughts: How out of character?					
Romantic	51	1.03	.75		
Contract	5	1.82	.56	2.30	.026
Friendship Thoughts: How out of character?					
Friendship	32	1.38	.93		
Contract	5	2.47	.43	2.54	.016

[a] Some participants had missing data on the Sexual Significance Index.

between the means was predicted, two-tailed tests were used. A probability level of .05 or less was considered significant. As the results in Table 2 show, both predictions 1(a) and 1(b) were verified, thereby confirming Hypothesis 1.

In order to test Hypothesis 2, that is, that individuals will tend to be disappointed if they do not have a relationship of the kind they take to be archetypal, the following four predictions were made.

Prediction 2(a). Participants who have romantic love as their archetype will tend to be more disappointed if a friendship relationship is the best relationship they ever have than will participants who have friendship as their archetype.

Prediction 2(b). Participants who have friendship as their archetype will tend to be more disappointed if a romantic love relationship is the best relationship they ever have than will participants who have romantic love as their archetype.

Prediction 2(c). Participants who have romantic love as their archetype will tend to be more disappointed if a contract-partnership relationship is the best relationship they ever have than will participants who have contract-partnership as their archetype.

Prediction 2(d). Participants who have friendship as their archetype will tend to be more disappointed if a contract-partnership relationship is the best relationship they ever have than will participants who have contract-partnership as their archetype.

Ratings made on the Disappointment Rating Form by the 98 participants who had archetypes were then analyzed using *t*-tests. Two-tailed

Table 3. Comparison of Groups on Disappointment Rating Form

Groups	*n*	*X*	*SD*	*t*	*p*
Disappointment with Friendship					
Romantic	57	3.72	1.15		
Friendship	36	3.04	1.19	2.71	.008
Disappointment with Romantic Love					
Romantic	57	2.96	1.38		
Friendship	36	4.65	1.51	5.53	.000
Disappointment with Contract					
Romantic	57	5.32	1.38		
Contract	5	4.80	1.63	.80	.430
Disappointment with Contract					
Friendship	36	5.50	1.48		
Contract	5	4.80	1.63	.99	.330

tests were used, and a probability level of .05 or less was again counted as significant. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 3.

As revealed in the table, the romantic and friendship groups differed from each other as expected; Predictions 2(a) and 2(b) were both verified. The contract group differed from the other groups in the predicted direction, but the differences between the means were not statistically significant.

It was possible that the differences did not reach significance because of the small size of the contract group. Therefore, in order to increase the size of the contract group, the requirement that the participants choose a relationship exemplifying their archetype as *best* getting at the essentials of a man-woman relationship was relaxed. Any participant who rated one set of relationships above the others was considered to have an archetype. Predictions 2(c) and 2(d) were then retested using the resulting larger samples. As evident in Table 4, the results came substantially closer to significance with a slightly larger sample of contract people.

Table 4. Comparison of Groups on Disappointment Rating Form Including People Who Did Not Meet Criterion (b)

Groups	*n*	*X*	*SD*	*t*	*p*
Disappointment with Contract					
Romantic	109	5.39	1.28		
Contract	9	4.77	1.47	1.38	.170
Disappointment with Contract					
Friendship	39	5.51	1.43		
Contract	9	4.77	1.47	1.38	.174

Although Predictions 2(c) and 2(d) were not verified, the overall pattern of results gives strong support for Hypothesis 2. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Paradigm Cases do function as archetypes, both in guiding perception of sexual interactions, and in providing a standard against which to judge relationships.

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

The empirical study described above serves to establish the predictive applicability of the conceptualization. But application of the conceptualization in practical ways is what is of long-term interest, rather than merely predictive applicability. Among the areas where the conceptual system might be used to make a real world difference are socialization, education, and psychotherapy.

In the area of socialization, parents are faced with the task of teaching their children what options in social practices are appropriate in given situations. In times of social stability and uniformity, it is relatively easy for parents to know what options are appropriate, given the sex of their child. As long as there are customary ways for boys and girls to act, a parent can feel confident saying "That's not feminine," or "That's not the way a man acts," and so forth.

In times of social change or diversity, however, the task of socialization increases in difficulty. When traditional notions of masculinity and femininity are being questioned, rejected, and reversed regularly in the media, parents may find themselves reluctant to say "That's not masculine" or "That's not the way a woman behaves." Especially if parents understand only the customs, but not the principles underlying them, they may feel uncertain about what to teach their children.

The status formulation presented here could be used to help parents understand the principles underlying the notions of masculinity and femininity, and thereby put them in a position to be more clear about what they want to teach. One way of doing this will be sketched briefly.

The starting point would be to clarify what a person is doing when he or she says of a boy "He's masculine," or of a girl "She's feminine." There are two things that might be involved. First, a person might be giving a personal characteristic description, and saying in effect "He's a boy who has a set of personal characteristics such that it comes naturally (easily) to him to interact with other males and females in ways which are normative." From this, it would follow that certain ways of treating the child were appropriate.

Secondly, in saying "He's masculine," the person might be saying that the boy is "not unmasculine," that is, that the boy has not gone wrong in one of the ways he could go wrong in relation to other males and females. In this case, the person would be using a double negative

("not unmasculine"), in order to say that no criticism of a certain sort was applicable.

It may be noted that the two uses are related. If a person has a set of personal characteristics such that interacting in normative ways comes naturally, this will normally explain why the person has not failed in one of the ways he might have failed.

After the distinction between the two usages had been made, the second usage could be elaborated on. Sometimes, instead of saying that no criticism is applicable, parents in fact want to let their children know that they have failed in some way. By saying "That's unfeminine" or "That's not masculine" at such times, parents are sensitizing their children to certain kinds of failures, and warning them against going wrong in those ways.

Such criticism tends to be most appropriate to relationships and interactions with the opposite sex. Thus, parents are sensitizing their sons to ways they might go wrong in relation to women, and their daughters to ways they might go wrong in relation to men. However, ways of going wrong differ, depending on what relationship is being expressed.

Therefore, the three Paradigm Cases could be introduced, and parents could clarify which paradigm they were using, and which they wanted to use, as their guide in socialization. For example, parents might be sensitizing a son to ways of going wrong in a partnership with a woman. Or parents might be sensitizing a son to ways of going wrong as a friend to women. Whichever paradigm parents decided to use, once they had this sort of clarity on what they were doing, their consistency as parents would probably be increased, as well as their confidence.

Parenthetically, it may be noted that the formulation has been used by the author as part of a unit on socialization in a child development course. The reception was favorable, although some students, especially those with children, were surprised to realize that if children were socialized to be friends to the opposite sex, and correspondingly, taught that boys and girls should have symmetrical eligibilities in relationships, these children might be less likely to participate one day in a romantic love relationship. Or, if they did participate, they might not fare too well, given their lack of socialization relevant to that kind of relationship.

A second area where the conceptual system might be useful is in education, in particular, in a sex education program. For young people beginning to look for life partners, it might be valuable to be aware of the possibility of mismatch between people with different archetypes. Possibly, they could then have their eyes open for someone who shared their archetype, and thereby avoid the betrayal a person experiences when, for example, her Pierre Abélard turns out to be a Pierre Curie, or his Beatrice turns out to be a Beatrice Webb.

The third area where the conceptual system might be useful is in

psychotherapy, most obviously with people who are going wrong in relation to the opposite sex. With the status formulation in mind, a therapist could quickly diagnose where the client stood in relation to the opposite sex, for example, "He treats women as though they were 'one of the guys,' " or "She stands as a competitor in relation to men." Once how the person was going wrong was diagnosed, a therapy program could be designed with the status formulation as part of its rationale. In the case of the man who treated women as one of the guys, it would be necessary to help the man appreciate what women are like, and to help him understand the ways in which a woman can be important to a man. Then, perhaps he could take his stand as a man in relation to a particular woman, rather than treating her as one of the guys.

All the possibilities sketched above represent places where the system might be used. Whether or not the use of the system would be effective in these places is a factual question. A range of empirical research could be done to find out about this.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper is an abridgement of a doctoral dissertation. The dissertation also included an investigation of inside and outside views of man-woman relationships, which will be reported on in another paper.

My deepest thanks go to Peter G. Ossorio for teaching and guiding me throughout the dissertation.

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FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE RELATIONSHIPS

Keith E. Davis and Michael J. Todd

ABSTRACT

A paradigm case formulation of friendship and love relationships is presented. Nine subrelations are taken to be essential features of the archetypical concept of friendship and eleven of the archetypical concept of romantic love. The major conceptual contrast between friendship and love relationships is taken to lie in the contrast between the passionate aspects of love—particularly fascination, exclusiveness, and sexual desire—and the milder passions of friendship, on the one hand, and the qualities of support distinctive to the two relationships. Both relationships involve very significant support in the category of being able to count on each other in both practical and emotional ways, but in romantic love, the quality of support is most appropriately characterized by "giving the utmost" and "being a champion or advocate" of the loved one, whereas in friendship such support marks only best or closest friendships from one's more ordinary friendships. Three studies were conducted in which several aspects of the construct and predictive validity of a new set of relationship assessment scales were tested. These studies provided very encouraging support for the validity of these scales. The findings and conceptualization are compared to results obtained by other researchers dealing with personal relationships.

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In this essay our aim is to contribute to the scientific understanding of personal relationships by taking two fundamental personal relationships—friendship and love—as central instances and by developing a conceptualization of each, and assessment procedures for research on each. The conceptual resources that we will bring to bear are those available within Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1966, 1969/1978, 1972/1978, 1981a, 1981c, 1981d) and his associates (Davis, 1981). In particular, we shall make use of the relationship formula, the notion of status dynamics, paradigm case formulations, and other conceptual devices to clarify the concepts of love and friendship as personal relationships. Our work builds on previous work, both published and unpublished, in Descriptive Psychology, including the unpublished work by Davis (Note 1) and by Marshall (Note 2), the published studies by Kelling (1972, 1979), and Roberts (1981).

The study of personal relationship has a long tradition in the social sciences, and we will deal briefly with some of the major alternative points of view. But, because our primary objective is the presentation of an original system and its associated research procedure, we do not pretend to make a comprehensive survey of the approaches to the study of relationships. Such a survey is in preparation by Davis (Note 3).

DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Friendship

An approach to the study of personal relationship grounded in Descriptive Psychology begins in the following way. We start with a paradigm case formulation (PCF) which is a genuine case of friendship (Ossorio, 1981d). While it is possible to have a friendship that does not involve mutual or reciprocal respect between the two persons involved, we have selected as our paradigm case one in which the subrelationships listed in Table 1 are mutual. Thus, the first person is taken to respect his or her friend who returns the respect. The reason for this selection of the paradigm is that mutual or reciprocal friendships are clearly genuine cases and ones which, furthermore, are archetypal. That is, they constitute the full case by virtue of which other cases are recognized as instances of that king of thing. If no friendships involved reciprocal trust, respect, or confiding, then our concept of such personal relationships would be quite different from what they are. Following Ossorio's (1981d) rule of thumb that, in picking one's paradigm case, one wants not only a genuine case but a complex one, we have in Table 1 gone in the direction of picking a very elaborate case. Such elaboration allows us

Table 1. Relationships for the Paradigm Cases of Friendship and Love

Friendship	*Romantic Love*
Equal Eligibilities	Asymmetric Eligibilities
Enjoy	Enjoyment
Trust	Advocate/Champion
Mutual Assistance	Give the Utmost
Acceptance	Acceptance
Respect	Respect
Spontaneity	Spontaneity
Understanding	Understanding
Intimacy	Intimacy
	Fascination
	Exclusiveness

to represent simpler cases by deletion or removing restrictions on individual cases.

It is useful to note some variety among cases that count as paradigm cases. In the first instance, any genuine case may be used as the paradigm case. But, it is often heuristic to have the paradigm case also be a fundamental or archetypal case. Cases with such a status are those which more readily exemplify the essence of the case. Thus, in the case of the concept of family, a wife, who has been widowed and who has two of her children living at home, clearly counts as a family; however, such a case would not count as one's fundamental case because the father was not present. Fundamental or archetypal cases need not be statistically frequent cases. The case of husband, wife, and children living at home constituted only 18.5% of American families in 1976. But it counts as an archetypal case. A third type of paradigm case is that of the original case—the first discovered instance or the precedent-setting case (as in a legal context). We think of the paradigm cases of friendship and love presented in Table 1 as archetypal paradigm cases, but, we shall use "archetypal" and "paradigm" as alternative locutions to refer to the PCF provided in Table 1.

As both Littmann (1983) and Roberts (1982) illustrate in this volume, paradigm case procedures can be used to generate the variety of instances, say, of humor or of personal relationships between men and women. The critical step in this procedure is that of selecting features of the paradigm case that are to be changed by some transformation. The most common transformations are deletion (i.e., removing a restriction of a particular sort) and a reflexive inclusion of some feature of the original PCF within itself. To see how deletion works, let us start with our paradigm case of friendship. It is one in which the relationship is

reciprocal or mutual. But, one can easily remove this restriction and, thus generate cases, which obviously occur in the real world, in which the friendship is not mutual. Not only are there cases of unrequited friendship, but, even where the two persons may be said properly to be friends, one person may not respect a friend's judgment in financial matters or in the selection of partners of the opposite sex and yet they may still be friends. The lack of mutual respect marks it as a certain type of friendship, but, it certainly qualifies as a friendship.

A PCF provides a way of representing the structure of the subrelationships that are taken to be fundamental to clarifying how the relevant personal relationships operate. The subrelationships have been selected because they constitute, in our judgment, the kinds of considerations that are relevant to explaining the ways in which the particular relationships exemplify the general category and the ways in which such relationships can be said to go wrong or to be defective. That one is intimate with another person in the sense of sharing personal goals, aspirations, and fears is a state of affairs that marks the development of a particular type of friendship—a close, personal one. The failure to share anything other than what can be gained from first-hand observation marks a different kind of friendship—a more reserved or formal one. The kind of claim that we make with respect to the items in Table 1 is not that they provide a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of friendship to specific cases, but rather that they constitute a set of reminders of considerations relevant to cases counting as genuine instances. Or, alternatively, they constitute a set of categories in terms of which the case may be said to be genuine, but one which varies from the archetypal case in one or more selected ways. ("Mike and Joe are friends, but Joe always has to be top-dog." Such a case marks the fact that Joe's personal characteristics place a limit on his being as good a friend of Mike's as he might if he did not have to be top-dog.)

The paradigm case presented in Table 1 is an *unconstrained* case—that is, the realization of the friendship or love relationship is not limited by the reality of individual differences nor by those of social position. The introduction of these constraints automatically places limits on the realization of any specific personal relationship, and thus one encounters the variety of real world cases of friendship none of which are exactly like the archetypal paradigm case.

Because the explicit use of paradigm case procedures is novel, there are doubtless questions about the procedures that cannot be answered in this context. Perhaps the most useful reminders about the procedure are: (a) That a PCF is not a definition, that is, it is not a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a label; (b) that a PCF

presupposes a person who is using it and who has the ordinary competences involved in recognizing instances and in reasoning about them; and (d) that alternative PCFs of the same concept are possible because of legitimate differences in purposes and focus. Indeed the PCFs offered by Roberts 1982) and us are not identical, although they share a common core of subrelationships. The issue of how PCFs of the same concept could differ and yet be acceptable for scientific work will be dealt with in the introduction to Part I of this volume. (See also Ossorio [1981d] and Bambrough [1961].)

The following are features of the paradigm case formulation for friendship which is taken to be a relationship in which the two persons, who are friends:

1. Participate as equals in the sense that those things that one person is eligible to do the other is also eligible to do. (Equal Eligibilities)
2. Enjoy each other's company. Such enjoyment needs to be understood as a dispositional characteristic of the relationship. It is not, therefore, incompatible with states of mutual annoyance, anger, or disappointment. But, if enjoyment were not the norm, it would make the explanation of continued association difficult. (Enjoyment)
3. Have a relationship of mutual trust in the sense that each takes it that the other person will act in light of his friend's best interest. (Trust)
4. Are inclined to provide each other with assistance and support (Telford, 1971) and, specifically, assume that they can count on each other in times of need, trouble, or personal distress. (Mutual Assistance)
5. Accept each other as they are, without being inclined to change or make the other over into a new, different person. (Acceptance)
6. Respect each other in the sense of taking it that each exercises good judgment in his or her life choices. (Respect)
7. Feel free to be themselves in their relationship, rather than feeling required to play a role, wear a mask, or inhibit expressions of their personal characteristics. (Spontaneity)
8. Have come to understand each other, not merely in the sense of knowing facts about each other, but in the more fundamental sense of understanding the rationale of the other's behavior. In such cases, one person is not routinely puzzled or mystified by his or her friend's behavior. (Understanding)
9. Are intimate in the sense of sharing experiences by virtue of doing things together and, in many cases, by virtue of confiding in each other. The intimacy may extend to physical intimacy, but it need not take such forms to count as intimacy. (Intimacy)

The archetypal paradigm case of friendship makes it clear immediately why such a personal relationship would be valued, indeed exalted in life and literature. To be in such a relationship not only increases one's behavior potential, because one has a completely loyal ally, but also provides a context in which to realize one's own personal growth. To be responsive to the bonds of friendship is, genuinely, to grow as a person, or in a more old-fashioned phrase, to develop one's character. The importance of having and being a friend is widley recognized in the literature on social development, psychopathology, and adult development, but it is not clear that any of these literatures have an explicit formulation of what the relationship is and, hence, of why friendship ought to be a valued state of affairs for a person. We believe that this formulation does just such a job—making us appreciate why the ideal of friendship has the status that it does in all cultures. But, as we all know, real world friendships seldom achieve the exalted status of those idealized friendships celebrated in poetry and hortatory literature. Why not?

In Descriptive Psychology, we have a general principle that provides the fundamental recourse for understanding the variation between the archetypal paradigm case and everyday cases. The archetypal case is in unconstrained or unlimited personal relationship, and, in this sense, it is an idealized relationship. There are, logically, two major types of constraints on personal relationships; there are the personal characteristics or individual differences of the persons involved and the social standing or status that they have in the community. It is important to understand that the *constraints* introduced on personal relationships both by the characteristics of the participants and by virtue of their position in the system *will necessarily limit the degree to which any specific relationship involves,* to the fullest extent possible, *the features of the archetypal case.*

A couple of illustrations may be helpful here. In the case of personal characteristics, there is a long history of developmental theorizing and research which makes it quite obvious that, say, suspiciousness or a paranoid streak constitutes a personal characteristic that will fundamentally limit the degree to which a person having that characteristic can become a friend with someone else. And that particular personal characteristic has its effect on the relationship through limiting the degree to which a person trusts anyone with whom he or she deals. Nothing that the other person does can "prove" that the other person is trustworthy to the fundamentally and completely suspicious person. For the option is always present that whatever the other person does, that person is merely trying to prove that he or she is trustworthy when in fact, the real goal is some form of exploitation. Thus, while a truly suspicious

person may call some small number of others friends, his or her manner of treating those others and the kind of choices made in relating to them would certainly mark a relationship that differed significantly from the archetypal case of friendship.

One can see the same phenomena—friendships being limited by personal characteristics—in innumerable cases: alcoholism, drug addiction, competitiveness, moodiness, and so on. In each of these cases, when one thinks of the implication of the personal characteristic and how it might relate to the person's capacity to enter into and maintain a friendship one can see that there are indeed limits to such a person's ability to be a friend.

The same kind of thing holds with respect to positions in the community. Anyone who is promoted in an organization and thus has to exercise authority over former peers, some of whom may have been friends, becomes aware of limits on his or her ability to maintain these friendships. To the extent that someone in the organization is a close friend, a superior is automatically liable to the judgment that any action taken with respect to that person is biased by the friendship. Since any position of authority is governed by the norm of impartiality or fairness in the treatment of all subordinates, the full exercise of one's inclinations as a friend places one at risk of conflict with the requirements of the office. We certainly do not mean to say that friendships between people who are at different levels within a hierarchy are impossible. Quite the contrary; we expect to find many instances of such friendships. That point is that the constraints of their social positions will necessarily and properly place some limits on the ability of these individuals to implement fully a friendship. In the case of the example just given, the person holding the position of authority must, of necessity, either place some limits on assisting a friend within the organization, or run the risk of being seen as indulging in cronyism or favoritism. The latter will certainly affect organization morale and perhaps this person's tenure in authority. When faced with these kinds of potential conflicts, individuals will make choices, expressive of their own personal characteristics. A person valuing loyalty over appearance may favor friends and punish enemies within the organization. A person valuing fairness and impartiality above all may be evenhanded to the point of coldness in dealing with friends within the organization. Thus, it is a fundamental conceptual point in Descriptive Psychology that personal relationships are constrained in their realization by the personal characteristics of the participants and by the statuses that they hold within the community. Because the individuals involved in personal relationships are persons and have freedom of choice, the exact ways in which these general constraints will be expressed in specific relationships is an empirical matter.

A major implication of the principles discussed above is that, in the variety of real world relationships that count as friendships, one will find relationships which, to varying degrees, will be deficient with respect to the qualities listed in the paradigm case of friendship. In some instances, the friendships will be one-sided. For example, one member of the friendship may treat the other person as a genuine and perhaps close friend, but, the second person may treat the first person more like a social acquaintance. This different understanding of the relationship can be detected by assessment procedures that will be described later in the paper.

Another major type of variation in relationships that will still legitimately count as friendships are in the degree to which one or both of the partners may, for example, respect each other. Some ground floor, some minimal level, or threshold value of respect seems essential to call the relationship a friendship at all—in contrast to, say, a mutually exploitive relationship or a relationship of convenience. But friendships do clearly exist in which the other person cannot be counted on to exercise good judgment. For example, we may think that, while our friend Joe is a great guy, he is a fool in his choice of women. If he is indeed a friend, one does not walk away from him because he has bad judgment in his choice of women, although one might arrange not to spend time with him when he is in the company of his poor choices. The friendship one would have with Joe is constrained by his poor judgment in that area and, in this example, the effect of that is to provide Joe's friend with a reason not to associate with him when he is out with women. Likewise, specific friendships may be deficit in any of the nine subrelationships identified in Table 1, but still remain genuine friendships. But, this state of affairs raises the question of to what degree can one treat a relationship as a friendship when it is deficient to a significant degree in several subrelationships?

Two reminders are important in this context. The first one follows from the famous philosophical dialogue on whether a specific game counts as an instance of chess. In that dialogue, the presupposition of the example is that the Queens have been removed and that no pieces are allowed to make the moves permissible to the Queen. The question then is "Is it a game of chess or not?" And the outcome of the dialogue is that one has good reasons for treating it as a game of chess and also good reasons for *not* so treating it. Whatever one calls the specific game would be misleading unless qualifications were stated. The same state of affairs holds for social relationships that are "friendship-like." For some of these cases, we have existing descriptive phrases that embody the qualifications: "They are drinking buddies" (but not really friends); "They are business friends" (but not intimate or personal friends); or

"They are untied by their common hatred of a third person" (but whether they will be friends when he is gone is entirely open to doubt.) The implicit but usually unspoken qualification is in parentheses. For others, we have to make the qualification explicit if we do not wish to mislead our hearers.

The second reminder is that, in the strict sense, the list of relationships that characterize the paradigm case of friendship are not to be understood as components, aspects, or building blocks out of which one can create the fundamental relationship. The relationship is itself primary and the subrelationships listed in Table 1 are a language for describing and clarifying ways in which instances of friendship may go wrong or be deficient with respect to the paradigm case of friendship. A PCF starts with a genuine instance—not with components.

In what sense is the PCF of friendship multidimensional?

Because the paradigm case formulation of friendship (and of love) presented in Table 1 consists of a list of subrelationships, it is easy to think that the model being proposed is a multidimensional model. While it is conceptually multidimensional, it would be misleading to assimilate this to the standard statistical sense of multidimensionality in which the dimensionality is derived from multidimensional scaling or factor analytic procedures. The multidimensionality at issue in our formulation is conceptual, and no presupposition is made that each of these dimensions will be statistically independent of the others. Indeed, one would expect that there would be a strongly positive intercorrelation among all of the dimensions associated with friendship in our Table 1. Then what is the force of saying that this is a multidimensional model?

The subrelationships identified in Table 1 are to be understood in the following sense. They constitute a language that is available to members of the community for making distinctions within and between relationships and particularly for noting in what respect and in what way a particular relationship has gone wrong and in what way a desirable state of affairs has been achieved. In this respect, friendship and love are similar to the concept of health—health being a notion which is difficult to identify by positive features but quite easily identified by deficits. The relationship language (e.g., trust, respect), that we are applying in the paradigm case formulations serve, in many cases, as disguised double negatives. For example, to say that Tom and Mary are friends but that their relationship is characterized by a lack of trust in the area of the opposite sex, is to say that their relationship lacks something that, in the paradigm case, it would have. And as we have commented earlier, if the deficit of the subrelationship is severe enough, it may call into question whether or not we should treat the relationship as a friendship

or love relationship at all. Clarification is a different task from analysis, particularly if analysis is understood to involve the breaking of a larger whole down into its component units; Trust, Respect and the other items listed in Table 1 are not components or elements. Despite the fact that we can independently identify trust in relationships and respect in relationships outside of the context of a friendship, in the context of the social reality of friendship, these dimensions are our means of categorizing how the normal, "healthy" relationship can succeed or fail.

Romantic Love Relationships

In the last decade, the study of romantic love and other intimate heterosexual relationships has come into its own within social psychology. A number of social psychologists and other behavioral scientists have made serious and sustained attempts to conceptualize the general domain of personal relationships or specific domains such as love or friendship. Among the more notable general conceptualizations have been those by Hinde (1979), Kelley (1979), and Levinger (1974, 1979). Among those who have devoted substantial attention to romantic love are Hatfield, Utne, and Traupmann (1979), Lee (1973, 1977), Murstein (1976, 1980), Rubin (1970, 1973), Schwartz and Merten (1980), and Walster and Walster (1978). In the area of friendship, the major theoretical formulations and associated research efforts have been made by Kurth (1970), La Gaipa (1977b, 1979) and Wright (1969, 1973). The growing work in this area has also been reviewed and systematized by Cook and Wilson (1979), Dickens and Perlman (1981), and Huston and Levinger (1978).

The paradigm case of romantic love embodied in Table 1 differs from friendship relationship in a number of important respects and yet shares some very important similarities. To highlight the areas of difference, we might begin with the first item of the Table, which is the notion of asymmetric eligibility or asymmetric status. Because a paradigm case of romantic love is a case involving members of the opposite sex, the individuals involved typically have different eligibilities. That is, one type of behavior on the part of a man will count differently than that same behavior would on the part of a woman. One of the most fundamental eligibility differences is associated with the structure of the male and female sexual anatomy. Wolgast (1980) argues that a range of predictable but not universal differences in how specific behaviors are counted in most societies follow from this anatomically rooted behavioral difference.

Just as the eligibilities of men and women lead us to count or interpret the same behaviors differently even in romantic relationships, there are,

likewise, similarities in eligibility. To be loved by the one who loves you counts as an affirmation of one's masculinity or femininity. (See Roberts, this volume, & Wolgast, [1980] for an extended treatment of "man" and "woman" as status concepts.)

Not every behavior of an individual in a romantic relationship is affected by sex-role eligibilities, but many are. It appears that no human society has failed to have some kind of double standard for men and women. Gender differences have been one of the community's fundamental status distinctions, but exactly which behaviors are treated as being appropriate to men or to women have varied enormously from society to society (e.g., Mead, 1935). To deal adequately with the question of change in the content gender identities would take us too far afield in this apper, but see the paper by Bernard (1981) on the topic. The "double standard" at the heart of sex-role differences provides some of the most apt illustrations of this point.

Some of the other important differences between romantic love and friendship may be seen in the contrast between Trust and Advocacy. The notion of Advocacy involves furthering or Championing another's interest. To champion another person marks that person as a special friend.

The notion of Giving One's Utmost to the lover when he or she is in need is deeply rooted in Western romantic folk tales. Both men and women lovers are eligible to do this—witness Heloise in the tale of Abelard and Heloise. A friend, however, is not expected to make such sacrifices, unless, perhaps, he or she is a *best* friend.

Of course, the most obvious difference between a romantic love relationship and a friendship lies in a cluster of subrelationships which collectively might be identified as the Passion cluster—Fascination, Exclusiveness and Enjoyment. Fascination can be seen as central to romantic love and deserves particular elaboration.

To be fascinated with another person is to be inclined to pay attention to that person even when one should be engaged in other activities. Fascination is thus a state that carries with it strong expectations about behavior, but it also involves appraisal or evaluation of the other person. The things or persons that fascinate one are those which one treats as worthy of attention, and while one may be fascinated with evil or with a perfectly horrible person, the positive fascination of love is equivalent to the appraisal of the person as worthy of one's attention to the exclusion of almost any other concern. Logically, fascinations are part of a sequence of states ranging in intensity from interest, to fascinations, to preoccupations, to obsessions (Ossorio, Note 4; White, 1964). When one is fascinated by another person, that person typically occupies one's thoughts; one wants to be with that person, wants to see him or her,

touch him or her, wants to be close to him or her, and one would be upset and disturbed if one were forced to be separated from him or her. A frustration of this fascination, which can occur because the fascination is not reciprocated by the other person or because the other person is unaware of the interest with which he or she is viewed, can intensify the state of fascination. In this respect fascination shares the logic of other emotional behaviors. If one cannot act on the impulse generated by the relevant appraisal, that is a causal condition for "feeling" the emotional state (Ossorio, 1966, pp. 52–53). To see a state of affairs as dangerous and yet not be able to avoid the danger is to be liable to feelings of fear (anxiety, panic, etc.). To see another as worthy of devotion and yet not to be allowed to express that devotion is to be liable to extreme despair; indeed one is likely to be lovesick.

Of course, the fascination may go wrong, as novels such as John Fowles's *The Collector* (1963) show us. One of the important social inventions for taming the emotional force of love was the provision for expressions of devotion in song, contest, and heroic deeds without having these expressions necessarily disturb the marital partnerships of the participants. Such inventions socialize the unruly beast of passion and incorporate the expressions of fascination into a stable social order.

Fascination provides the conceptual resource for understanding phenomena such as the tendency noted by Rubin (1970) for lovers to spend more time gazing directly into each other's eyes than do nonlovers. It also provides the conceptual foundation for understanding the findings of Tesser and Paulhus (1976) that the number of thoughts and the amount of time spent thinking aobut the other in a dating relationship are predictive of the development of a love relationship.

Fascination is also a conceptual resource for understanding how one can be miserable and dejected in love yet quite unwilling to give up the object of love. It works something like this: Because fascination involves placing a value on the other person, nonreciprocation is, of course, frustrating; one may be extremely unhappy and miserable because of the unrequited love, but also reluctant to give up the object of one's love. The relevant general principle is that people do not choose less behavior potential over more behavior potential (Ossorio, Note 5). Having a love relationship involves a greater behavior potential than not having one. Hence, one does not give up easily, even when one's love is initially rejected or unreciprocated. Conceptually, fascination appears to be akin to what Rubin (1970) has identified as "absorption" in his analysis of romantic love.

Another major subrelation that is essential to understanding romantic love is that of Exclusivity. The notion that romantic lovers from a special two-person community has been well explored by Roberts (1982) and

by Slater (1963). The fundamental notion in this case is that each lover would be upset, indeed feel betrayed, if his or her loved one had the same relationship to someone else that he or she has to him or her. When the relationship is going well exclusivity provides the reality basis for the subjective experience of having a special relationship to the loved one, for the sense of almost limitless power that lovers feel—the sense that they can accomplish anything and overcome any adversity just because they are true lovers.

When it goes wrong in the sense of becoming excessive, exclusivity provides part of the basis for possessiveness, jealousy, and excessive dependency on the other. When one becomes preoccupied with the possibility of loosing the loved one—either to death or to a rival, one then has the condition for the emotional behavior of jealousy and for exhibiting either possessiveness or overdependency. Thus, exclusivity has both its bright side and its dark side (symbolized by images such as "the spider's web" or "blind mazes").

The statement of the Exclusivity subrelationship has to be made with care or it can be made too strong. That romantic love, in its archetype, is a two-person exclusive relationship does not at all prevent individuals from (a) being uncertain about whether they love Tom more than Harry or vice versa, or (b) from wishing that it were possible to love both equally well and to live together in harmony. Indeed, one of the themes of the unconventional world in life and in fiction is the possibility of nonpossessive love. Rimmer (1966, 1968) has used fiction as a vehicle for presenting notions of nonpossessive sexual freedom. And, the literature of alternative life styles and communes make it clear that many have tried some sort of experiment in multiple-partner emotional and physical intimacy. John Irving's *The 158-Pound Marriage* (1974), shows some of the psychological difficulties of such relationships, as does his *The World According to Garp* (1978). If one can truly free oneself from the passion of exclusivity, then the type of love relationship appears to be transformed into something akin to brotherly love or friendship, it is not merely romantic love minus possessiveness.

Enjoyment of each other's company is the third element of the cluster of subrelationships that marks the passions of romantic love. It is also, however, a conceptual property of friendships. In both relationships, enjoyment of the other's company functions logically as a way of designating the relationship as an intrinsic one, that is, as one needing no further explanation for questions such as, "Why do they spend time together?" than "They are friends, or they are lovers." In either case, the answer could be elaborated for someone who needed an elaboration by, "Well that means, among other things, that they enjoy each other's company." Such enjoyment, however, must be construed as dispositional

rather than as occurrent; for it is not incompatible with being very angry or upset with each other on a specific occasion.

The use of enjoyment as an explanation-stopper is relevant to the distinction that Clark and Mills (1979) have made between communal and exchange relationships. Both love and friendship would count as communal relationships; for, in them, one does not participate in the relationship for what one can get out of it. If the members of the relationship participate in it because they need emotional support, economic assistance, an athletic partner, and so on, then one has, respectively, mutual support dyads, partnerships, or teammates—but not friends or lovers. Indeed, it is a fundamental violation of either of these relationships to exploit one's friends or one's lover for other ends.

Two conceptual points need to be made. What are the implications for a relationship when one or more members no longer finds any joy in it? And, it is possible to have love relationships that are not characterized by enjoyment of each other's company—at least initially? The first question may be dealt with by an attributional analysis or, as is designated within Descriptive Psychology, by an examination of possible status assignments available to the describer. In effect, the question for a participant in a relationship which he or she no longer enjoys is "Why not?" One explanation is that the person raising the question has changed. Either (a) he or she is in a temporary state that prevents his enjoyment, or (b) he or she no longer finds the kinds of things that they have done with the other interesting or enjoyable. This latter case is the general case of growing or maturing beyond the other person. When the explanation for the change is attributed to the other person there are also two general possibilities. Either (a) he or she has undergone some externally induced change in his personal characteristics—such as an accident, a mental breakdown, or a severe disappointment in life—that makes them no longer good, enjoyable company; or (b) one has just discovered what the other person is really like, and hence discovered that he or she never really was the kind of person that one would have for a friend or for a lover. The latter attribution follows the logic of status degradation ceremonies.

As an empirical matter, one would expect that relationships in which the members no longer find each other's company enjoyable would be vulnerable to dissolution, but if the person makes either a self status-assignment to his own temporary emotional states or a status-assignment to factors beyond the other person's control, then the relationship could very well survive such joylessness.

The theme of love without initial enjoyment of each other's company has attracted many talented writers of fiction. Among relevant cases are Robert Graves' classic "The Shout" (1929), Maugham's *Of Human Bondage* (1915), V. S. Pritchett's "Blind Love" and his "Noisy" sequence

in *Selected Stories* (1979), and Isaac Bashevis Singer's "The Witch" in *Passions* (1976). Conceptually, we would treat these cases as transformations of the archetypal paradigm case in which the Enjoyment subrelationship has been deleted. With Fascination and Exclusivity still operative, one generates all the passion one needs to deal with these fictional, and other real, cases of initially joyless love.

Relationships and Behavior

A relationship is a particular state of affairs—one which conveys information about how two or more persons or objects are connected. As such it is *not* merely a summary of prior behaviors among the participants, for relationships guide our expectations about what kinds of behavior the persons will engage in, and, given an appraisal of what their relationship is, that appraisal provides the context within which some behaviors are seen as violative, others as natural expressions of the relationship, and still others as neutral. Ossorio has codified the implications of this general point in his Relationship and Relationship Change Formulas, originally formulated in Ossorio (1967/1981) and generalized in Ossorio (1970/1981). The formulas give us the resources for explaining social behavior, and for formulating accounts both of why the expected behaviors fail to occur and of why a particular relationship changes in the direction that it does.

Construct Validation

The approach taken in the empirical studies to be described next is generally that of demonstrating that individuals who are asked to describe various types of existing personal relationships will describe them in ways that follow directly from the conceptual distinctions that we hve presented in Table 1. Thus, our assessment procedures which consist of relationship-descriptive statements, are being subjected to a test of the adequacy of the items and scales to reflect the conceptualization. If the scales are adequate to the general task of describing friendship and love relationships, then certain patterns of results should occur. Rather than tediously repeating the implications of our conceptualization here, we shall build our statement of expectations into the results section and return to the issues of the adequacy of our conceptualization and our assessment procedures in the discussion section.

METHOD

Three separate studies were conducted, varying in sample composition, procedures, and explicit purpose. The first two studies used the same assessment procedure—the 74-item Relationship Rating Form (RRF) and

involved the same task—rating up to six individuals with whom the respondent had one of six possible relationships. In Study 3, a short, modified version of the RRF was used, and the participants rated individuals with whom they had only one of two relationships.

Studies One and Two

Participants

One hundred and fifty persons, 95 women and 55 men, participated in these studies. Approximately two thirds were students who received course credit for their participation, and the others were members of the community recruited through social networks. More than one third were over 25 yers old. They volunteered for a study of social relationships which they knew would deal with their "friends, acquaintances, and romantic partners." Each participant was asked to produce a list of close friends defined as "people you can count on to reciprocate your feeling." Each person was also asked to list some people with whom he was on friendly terms, but who were not friends; to list former friends, and to list his spouse, lover, or steady dating partner. Thus, participants identified real people with whom they had relationships that could fall into one of six categories: spouse/lover; best friend; close friends: same sex; close friends: opposite sex; former friends; and acquaintance (with whom they had friendly relations). Not all subjects had relationships falling into all six categories, but the typical participant had at least three or four of the six relationships. One hundred and fifty close friends of the same sex were rated: 119 best friends; 123 acquaintances; 75 close friends of the opposite sex; 73 spouse/lovers, and 110 former friends. Sixteen best friends were found also to be either spouses or lovers and were transferred to that condition for all subsequent analyses. Preliminary data analyses indicated that the minor procedure variations in these two studies did not lead to differences in the results; consequently participants are combined into one group for all analyses reported in this paper.

Relationship Rating Form

Each participant was asked to describe each relationship on a 74-item rating form, with items derived largely from Kelling's (1972, 1979) study. Sixty-seven of the 74 items were grouped conceptually into 16 scales relevant to the subrelationships identified in the paradigm case formulation of friendship and love. Because of the length of the task, some subrelationships were not studied in these two samples. Sexual intimacy was not assessed, nor was status equality.

As can be seen in Table 2, Cronbach's alphas ranged from .57 to .96,

Table 2. Scale and Global Scale Alphas and Stabilities for the Relationship Rating Form in Studies One and Two

Scale	*Items*	*Alpha*[a]	*Global*	*Alphas*[a]	*Stability*[b]
Acceptance	4	.80			
Respect	2	.70	Viability	.91	.59
Trust	5	.83			
Enjoyment	2	.88			
Exclusiveness	7	.82	Passion	.94	.67
Fascination	3	.89			
Mutual Assistance:					
Given	9	.96			
Receive	9	.96	Support	.98	.73
Mutual Advocacy	2	.94			
Give the Utmost	4	.94			
Understanding	5	.84			
Confiding	5	.89	Intimate	.79	.82
Spontaneity	3	.57	(not in		.70
Mutual Love	2	.96	global		.59
Stability	2	.69	scales)		.42
Success	3	.94			.54

[a]Standardized item *alphas*.
[b]Guttman split half coefficient.

all of which indicate an acceptable degree of interitem correlation. A Gutmann split-half coefficient was used to estimate test-retest stabilities. These were based on one relationship (either a Close Friend or Spouse/ Lover) which 27 of the participants rated again three weeks later. These ranged from .42 to .82 (Table 2). Data from other studies using the RRF suggest that the stabilities of these scales are somewhat underestimated by allowing the participants to select one relationship for rerating. It seems that the participants tend to pick (a) the person they like the most and (b) the person who is most on their minds. Such a selection tends to reduce substantially the variance of the ratings, and hence to underestimate the stability of the ratings.

In Study Two, the relationship assessment device also included questions concerning common activities engaed in with the person rated, experience with violations or betrayal of the relationship, and items related to Wright's (1969) model of friendship. For love relationships, corresponding information was obtained on the duration of the relationship, commitment to marrige, Rubin's (1970) love and Liking scales and self-reported behaviors that are potentially destructive to the relationship. Only some of these data will be reported here.

Global Scales

Studies One and Two

As a data reduction measure, these 16 scales were combined into 4 global scales on the basis of conceptual similarity and interitem correlations. Acceptance, Trust, and Respect were combined into a single Viability Scale; Enjoyment, Exclusivity, and Fascination into a Passion Scale; Understanding and Confiding into a single Intimacy Scale; and Mutual Assistance given or received, Advocacy, and Willingness to Give the Utmost, were collapsed into a single Support Global Scale. As can be seen from Table 2, standardized item alphas ranged from .79 to .98. The Spontaneity, Mutual Love, Success, and Stability Scales were retained in their original form.

Study Three

Participants were 93 students (56 women and 37 men) in an undergraduate course on the Psychology of Marriage who agreed to describe their relationships with one friend and one lover (either a spouse or a steaday date, either current or past). The relationship scales were typically reduced from three to four items to two, and several new items and scales were introduced. The major changes were the addition of two-item scales for Alter Ego, Good Influence, a three-item Sexual Intimacy Scale, a modified version of the Mutual Assistance and Mutual Advocacy/Give the Utmost Scales. Items were also added to the Understanding Scale and to the Exclusiveness Scale, and scales dealing with Conflict, Ambivalence, and Maintenance of the relationship were derived from work by Braiker and Kelley (1979, pp. 152–153). The alphas for these scales are presented in Table 3.

For data reduction purposes, the same procedure of combining scales into global scales based on conceptual similarity and interscale correlations employed in Studies One and Two, was also used here, reducing the number of dependent measure from 19 to 10. Fascination, Exclusiveness, Enjoyment, and Sexual Intimacy were combined into a single Passion Scale. Acceptance, Trust, Respect, and Good Influence were collapsed into a Viability Scale. Alter Ego was added to Confiding and Understanding to form an Intimacy Scale. Revised Mutual Advocacy and Give the Utmost Scales were collapsed along with the general Mutual Assistance scales into a Support Scale. However, the Stability, Spontaneity, Ambivalence, Conflict, Maintenance, and Success Scales were left unchanged for data analysis purposes. Standardized item alphas for the agregate scales, ranging from .66 to .91, are given in Table 3.

Table 3. Scale and Global Scale Alphas for the RRF in Study Three

Scale	*Items*	*Alphas*[a]	*Global*	*Alphas*[a]
Acceptance	2	.68		
Good Influence	2	.87	Viability	.66
Respect	2	.59		
Trust	2	.64		
Enjoyment	3	.81		
Exclusiveness	3	.74	Passion	.91
Fascination	1	—		
Sexual Intimacy	3	.96		
Understanding	4	.72		
Confides	2	.73	Intimacy	.79
Alter Ego	2	.84		
Mutual Assistance	4	.73		
Mutual Advocacy-Give			Support	.84
Utmost	3	.91		
Spontaneity	2	.59	(Not in Global	
Stability	2	.66	Scales)	
Success	2	.74		
Conflict	2	.51		
Ambivalence	4	.63		
Maintenance	3	.71		

[a]Standardized item *alphas*.

RESULTS

Comparisons of the Relationship Types

Expectations

The conceptualization provides strong grounds for expecting love relationships and friendships to differ primarily in the Passion cluster; that is, in terms of Fascination, Exclusiveness, Enjoyment, and Mutual Love. In terms of the Global Scales, the differences would be expected to appear in the Passion and Mutual Love Scales. Depth of devotion, as measured by the Global Support Scale, also should distinguish lovers from friends, but because degree of Support is probably a defining criteria for best friendships, Support should distinguish best friends from other friends. In addition to differing in degree of Support, best friends and close friends ought to differ in Intimacy (which consists of Confiding and Understanding items). All of the scales, however, except the Passion Scales, might be expected to distinguish among friendship levels or types.

Analysis Plan

The overall analysis was carried out in two steps. First, each relationship comparison was treated as a 2(relationship type) X 2(gender of subjects) repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance. There were eight dependent measures: six relationship scales, and two judgment scales (Success and Stability).

If the multivariate F was significant by Wilk's criterion, then an overall discriminant score was computed. Because the discriminant function weights are not robust, we used them only to weigh the scale means before summing them into the discriminant score. The scales having the largest weights contribute the most to the discriminant score, and would, therefore, also have the largest correlations with it. Thus, to obtain a robust measure of the discriminating power of these scales, each one was correlated with the discriminant score. Those having the highest correlations were the ones distinguishing the two relationships the most. First data are presented from Studies One and Two (in Tables 4–6) and then data from Study Three (Table 7).

Spouse/Lover vs. Friendship Types: Best Friend vs. Spouse/Lover

Forty-nine persons (18 men and 31 women) rated both of these relationships. The overall $F(8,39) = 28.95$, $p < .0001$. Neither the gender nor interaction effect were significant.

In Table 4, the means and correlations with the discriminant score for each scale are presented. With the experiment wise Alpha set at .006 (.05/8), the Passion, Support, Stability and Mutual Love Scales had sig-

Table 4 Means and Correlations with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales for Studies One and Two: Best Friend vs. Spouse/Lover Relationship

Relationship Scales	*Correlation with Discriminant Score*	*Relationship*	
		Best Friend	*Spouse/Lover*
Passion	.89*	7.02	8.17
Mutual Love	.41*	4.85	6.88
Stability	−.33*	8.01	6.86
Support	.27*	8.00	8.25
Viability	−.25	7.77	7.49
Spontaneity	−.24	8.13	7.84
Success	−.21	7.89	7.42
Intimacy	−.14	7.55	7.25

Notes: The higher the mean, the more of the attribute that relationship has. $n = 49$ per relationship.
* − $p < .05$.

nificant correlations with the discriminant score. Spouses and lovers had higher ratings on all these scales except Stability. Best friendships, then, were seen as significantly more stable than love relationships, but, as expected, were also less passionate, as well as lacking the degree of devotion found in love relationships. These findings are not surprising.

Close Friends of the Same Sex vs. Spouse/Lover

In general the results reported in Table 5 confirmed our expectations. There was a large overal effect for relationship type: $F(8,55) = 50.13$, $p < .0001$, for the 64 people (24 men and 40 women) who rated both relationships. Again, neither the gender nor the interaction effects were significant.

Consistent with our expectations, the Passion, Support, Intimacy, and Mutual Love Scales had significant correlations with the discriminant score. Spouses and lovers received higher ratings on all of these scales.

It seems safe to conclude that, among our subjects, close friendships between members of the same sex were distinguished from love relationships not only by romantic intensity, but also by degree of intimacy and sharing and by depth of caring and supportiveness of the other person. Both relationships, however, shared a strong foundation of trust, respect, acceptance, spontaneity, and stability.

Spouse/Lover vs. Close Friends of the Opposite Sex

Thirty-seven participants (15 men and 22 women) rated both of these relationships. Once again there was a strong effect for relationship type:

Table 5. Means and Correlation with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales for Studies One and Two: Close Friends of Same Sex vs. Spouse/Lover Relationships

Relationship Scale	*Correlation with Discriminant Score*	*Relationship*	
		Spouse/Lover	*Close Same-Sex*
Passion	.95*	6.98	4.14
Mutual Love	.69*	8.22	5.44
Support	.51*	8.18	6.99
Intimacy	.44*	7.23	5.74
Success	.24*	7.57	7.04
Stability	−.17	6.82	7.10
Viability	.05	7.55	7.31
Spontaneity	−.05	7.81	7.58

Notes: The higher the mean, the more of the attribute that relationship has. n 64 per relationship.
* = $p < .05$.

$F(8,27) = 22.12$, $p < .001$. Neither the gender nor interaction effects were significant.

The pattern of significant correlations here is quite similar to that found between close friends of the same sex and lovers; except that opposite-sex friendships did not differ from love relationships in the judged degree of Success. These means and correlations are given in Table 6.

Friendship vs. Love: Summary

The common thread running through the contasts between love relationships and friendship types is that participants consistently express more Fascination, Exclusiveness, Mutual Love, and Enjoyment of each other's company for their spouses and lovers than for their friends. In addition, love relationships are marked by more Confiding and Understanding, as well as a greater tendency to provide practical and emotional Support. Consistent with our expectations, differences in willingness to Support the other in various ways are less marked between spouses or lovers and best friends than between spouses or lovers and the other friendship types.

Only in the Spouse/Lover vs. Close Same-Sex Friendship contrast did Success distinguish the two relationships, with the love relationships being seen as clearly more successful. This may be due to a relative lack of Intimacy in the close same-sex friendships.

Neither judgments regarding the Viability of the relationship nor the Spontaneity scale distinguished friends from lovers in any comparison. These findings largely deal with descriptive contrasts between relationship types as well as construct validity. All scales performed in a manner

Table 6. Means and Correlations with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales in Studies One and Two: Close Friends of the Opposite Sex vs. Spouse/Lover Relationships.

Relationship Scale	*Correlation with Discriminant Score*	*Relationship*	
		Spouse/Lover	*Close Friends Opposite Sex*
Passion	.85*	6.93	4.22
Mutual Love	.60*	7.89	5.09
Support	.53*	8.02	6.47
Intimacy	.48*	6.94	5.19
Spontaneity	.19	7.75	7.27
Viability	.14	7.33	6.93
Success	.06	7.22	6.68
Stability	−.13	6.60	6.77

Notes: The higher the mean, the more of the attribute that relationship has. n = 37 per relationship.
* = $p < .05$.

consistent with our expectations. However, some parameters important to friendship and love relationships were not assessed in Studies One and Two. The third study provided an opportunity to deal with this problem and to introduce other important refinements in the procedure.

Friends vs. Spouse/Lovers: Study Three

The revised scale wordings and introduction of new scales in this sample (See Table 3) gave an opportunity for an independent check of the patterns thus far observed and also provided information about the usefulness of new relationship scales. Specifically, we expected the Global Passion Scale containing the sexual intimacy items to differentiate friends from spouses or lovers. We also hoped that the considerably shortened Mutual Assistance, Advocacy, and Give the Utmost Scales (when combined into a Global Support Scale) would continue to distinguish between friends and lovers. However, the addition of the Good Influence Scale to Viability Scale would not be expected to contribute to a differentiation between friends and lovers. The single scales— Ambivalence, Conflict, and Maintenance—were expected to yield significantly higher scores for spouses ansd lovers than for friends. The rationale was that love relationships, demanding greater commitment than friendships, provide much more opportunity for both conflict and doubt about the relationship to arise. Therefore, if the relationship is to continue, the partners would have to engage in a good deal more relationship maintenance activity than would be necessary for the friendship.

Of the 93 persons who participated in this study, 79 provided complete data consisting of rating for both a friend and a lover. Thus, only 79 participants could be included in the repeated measures 2(relationship type) $\times$ 2(gender) multivariate analysis of variance. As in similar comparisons in Studies One and Two, the overall multivariate F for relationship type was highly significant $F(10,66) = 49.43$, $p < .0001$, while the gender and interaction effects again failed to reach significance at the .05 level.

Table 7 presents the means and correlations with the discriminant score for Study Three. As predicted, the Passion Scale, including the sexual intimacy items, differentiated markedly between the two relationship types, having by far the largest correlations with the discriminant score: .92. At a more moderate, but still significant, level of correlation were Ambivalence, Maintenance, and Conflict. As predicted, spouses and lovers had higher means on these three scales. Unexpectedly, however, the Global Intimacy Scale, including Alter Ego, had a significant correlation with friends receiving a higher mean rating. This is surprising, considering that in two out of three friend/lover comparisons in Studies

Table 7. Means and Correlations with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales in Study Three: Friends vs. Spouse/Lover Relationships

Relationship Scale	*Correlation with Discriminant Score*	*Relationship*	
		Spouse/Lover	*Friends*
Passion	.92*	7.89	4.21
Stability	−.48*	6.39	7.72
Ambivalence	.47*	2.91	1.60
Conflict	.36*	5.32	4.10
Maintenance	.26*	6.41	5.38
Intimacy	.26*	6.95	7.29
Spontaneity	−.20	7.50	7.75
Viability	.15	7.40	7.48
Success	.11	7.18	7.25
Support	.10	7.73	7.71

Notes: The higher the scale mean the more of the attribute that relationship has. $n = 79$ per relationship.
* = $p < .05$.

One and Two, spouses and lovers relationships had higher Intimacy scores. It may be the case that the effect was reversed in Study Three due to the addition of the Alter Ego items. This scale may be more prevalent in, and more appropriate to, friendships than love relationships, especially if the advice sought concerns how to deal with one's romantic partner. Finally, the finding of Study One and Two that best friendships are seen as more stable than love relationships was supported by similar findings in Study Three. Stability correlated significantly with the discriminant score and friends received higher mean ratings.

No other scales had a significant correlation. In the case of the Support Scale, the failure to correlate strongly with lover rather than friendship was not expected. It may be that our drastic surgery on this scale reduced its sensitivity.

Thus, with the exception of the weak finding for the Support Scale, and the reversal of the Intimacy effect, the major findings of the first two studies have been replicated in this study. The overall evidence for the construct validity of the assessment procedures is encouraging.

Comparisons within Friendship Types:
Best Friends vs. Close Friends of the Same Sex

If the research procedures adequately represent the conceptualization, the ratings of best and close friends of the same sex ought to differ most in two areas: Intimacy, as measured by the combined Confiding and Understanding Scales, as well as Support, since the ability to count on

the other, no matter what, is for many people the definition of a best friendship. However, all of the parameters, except those concerning romantic love, could be expected to distinguish the two relationships to some extent.

Ninety-five persons (35 men and 62 women) rated both a best friend and close friend of the same sex. The overall multivariate F was highly significant: $F(8,85) = 10.61$, $p < .0001$. Once again, neither the gender effect nor the gender by relationship interaction achieved significance.

As can be seen from Table 8, our expectations were confirmed. Support and Intimacy had the highest correlations with the discriminant score. All of the nonromantic scales discriminated the relationships, but so did Passion and Mutual Love. It may be that Exclusiveness and Enjoyment items in the Passion Scale are relevant to distinguishing Best from Close Friendships. When these two subscales from the Passion Global are examined separately, they, and only they, yield significant univariate Fs. (Data are not tabled.)

Close Friends of the Same Sex vs. Close Friends of the Opposite Sex

Nothing in the concept of friendship requires us to expect differences in this comparison. It may be, however, that the realities of gender identity and status make friendship across gender lines more difficult, less enduring, and more likely to be disrupted by romantic involvements than friendships between members of the same sex. These possibilities make it important to take an empirical look at this contrast.

Sixty-three persons (33 men and 30 women) rated both a close friend of the same sex and one of the opposite sex. Unlike any other contrast,

Table 8. Means and Correlations with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales in Studies One and Two: Best Friends vs. Close Friends of the Same Sex Relationships.

Relationship Scale	*Correlations with Discriminant Score*	*Relationship*	
		Best Friends	*Close Friends*
Support	.82*	7.84	7.06
Intimacy	.80*	7.41	6.09
Stability	.66*	8.03	7.26
Passion	.61*	4.90	4.28
Success	.59*	7.70	7.07
Viability	.51*	7.72	7.24
Spontaneity	.36*	8.09	7.56
Mutual Love	.34*	6.62	5.61

Notes: The higher the mean, the more of the attribute that relationship has. $n = 95$ per relationship. * = $p < .05$.

this time the multivariate *F* was non-significant and none of the univariate *Fs* were significant. An examination of the means of the subscales indicates that, while no large differences exist, there was a consistent tendency for the same-sex friend to be rated more favorably than was the opposite-sex friend. Again, neither the gender nor interaction effect was significant. This clearly suggests that gender of the other does not make a dramatic difference in the quality of a friendship once one has been established.

Opposite-sex close friendships appear to be less frequent in this sample than same-sex close friendships; only 56% of men who had a close male friend also had a female friend, and only 44% of the women reported having both close male and female friends.

Overall Summary

When asked to describe and evaluate existing personal relationships, the participants in these three studies described their Spouse/Lover relationships as involving more Passion, Mutual Love, and practical and emotional Support than they saw in even their best friendships. But such friendships were taken to be more Stable. Love relationships, when compared to Close Friendships (where the persons involved were not best friends) were seen as involving not only more Passion and Support, but also more Intimacy (Confiding and Understanding) and more Acceptance, Respect, and Trust. Same-sex friendships and opposite-sex friendships were remarkably similar to each other on all relationship scales and in the pattern of contrast with both lover and best friendship relationships. Thus, the general findings are robust across both same-sex and opposite-sex relationships and across types of friendships.

The modifications of the assessment procedures introduced in Study Three demonstrated that even fairly brief scales could make the same kinds of distinctions among relationship types, with the exception of the Support Scales, where the radical surgery involved in cutting from 24 to 7 items and the rewording of some items seems to have been detrimental to that scale. The addition of scales derived from Braiker and Kelley's research (1979) added considerably to the specification of the contrast between Love and Friendship relationships by showing the importance of conflict, ambivalence, and relationship-maintenance behaviors.

DISCUSSION

Three issues deserve some attention now. In light of these data, and of other existing data: (a) How adequate are the proposed conceptualizations of friendship and romantic love? (b) How promising is the assessment strategy for dealing with aspects of personal relationships of interest

both to practitioners and researchers? and, finally, (c) In what respect is our approach, rooted in Descriptive Psychology, genuinely different from previous formulations.?

Conceptual Adequacy

The fact that a conceptualization is preempirical or nonfalsifiable on the basis of empirical evidence does not, of course, free one from the fundamental question of adequacy. In this regard, the questions may be put as follows: Does the concept of romantic love proposed reflect the phenomena historically recognized under the label "romantic love," and likewise for "friendship?" Is the statement of the archetypal concept clear, and are sufficient guidelines provided to distinguish among borderline cases?

We want to acknowledge a difficulty with our preliminary conceptualization. As we see it now, we gave too little emphasis to Authenticity and, perhaps, too much to Spontaneity. To be spontaneous is to do what one feels like doing, but to be authentic is to be genuine in one's relationship to the other and to treat the other as a unique person rather than as the holder of a position or the performer of certain roles. One can engage in spontaneous behavior deliberately, but authenticity is a relationship that cannot be achieved by deciding to be authentic. Either one is or one is not authentic in one's behavior. La Gaipa's items (Note 7) seems to be an excellent approximation of the relationship state of Authenticity. And, in our view, Authenticity is a subrelationship that is central to personal relationships, such as love and friendship, in contrast to impersonal relationship. Without Authenticity, the opportunity afforded by intimacy is not an opportunity to get to know another person. It is a sham, and what is learned will only incidentally and as a matter of luck be genuine knowledge. Suttles (1970) made a similar point very well in his treatment of friendship, and both Wright (Note 8) and La Gaipa (1977b) have recognized the merit of this position. La Gaipa currently uses four items in his assessment of Authenticity:

> "Does not try to take advantage of me or 'use' me."
> "I can drop all defenses and be myself with him/her."
> "More interested in me as a person than in what I can do for him/her."
> "We can express differences of opinion without it coming between us."

We are currently using these items in our research.

La Gaipa's empirical work has shown that, while Authenticity is not of much concern to 9-year-olds when describing their friends, that it is of growing importance to 13- and 16-year-olds (1979), and, that among college students, decreases in attributed authenticity was a major cor-

relate of the termination of friendship (1977b, p. 254). The Authenticity scale was the second most discriminating scale in a contrast between friends and nonfriends (1977b, p. 256). All in all, the work of La Gaipa and his associates makes a very strong case for the psychological importance of Authenticity in personal relationships.

In the context of assessing the conceptual adequacy of this formulation, it is quite natural to ask, "Well, how many dimensions or subrelations are there really?" In our view, there is not likely to be any universally valid answer to this question for two reasons. First, because no limit can be placed on human inventiveness, it is entirely likely that the next generation will make relationship distinctions that we do not now make. Second, the number of conceptual distinctions that one finds it necessary to make in dealing with friendship and love relationships will depend upon the type of purposes that one has. For the purpose of predicting progress in courtships, one may do just as well with a single summative measure of love as with a multidimensional scale making the number of distinctions that we make here. Indeed, as both Murstein (1980) and Rubin (1970) appear to argue, that has been the case in their research contexts. On the other hand Smith (Note 9) has data, derived from Davis's Colorado Courtship Study, that shows greater predictive power (to some criteria of relationship progress) if Passion, Viability, and Degree of Intimacy are taken into account. And certainly in clinical and community contexts, where the clarification of difficulties is often at issue, one may need to use any or all of the eleven distinctions used by us in Table 1. Indeed, one may want to make distinctions that we have left unmade. For example, where is our loyalty scale? Surely loyalty is relevant to these personal relationships. While we do not argue that the conceptual content of a distinction between loyalty and support is already built into our assessement procedures, we do think our items dealing with the person's ability to "count on" the other in various contexts—which is included in the Support scales—captures much of the force of loyalty. But, and this is critical, the issue of how many distinctions need to be made for various purposes is an empirical matter. One has to show—with data—that the distinctions are of no particular use in one context or that insufficient distinctions have been made in another context.

Our own work with factor analytic reduction of the Relationship Scales is quite preliminary, but we are in a position to share some general impressions. We find that, if one combines observations from all the relationship types (i.e., across spouse/lover and the various types of friendship), one gets a very large first factor, accounting for as much as 85% of the common variance. If, however, one conducts the analysis within relationship types, then one gets four to six interpretable factors.

In this case, the first factor seldom accounts for more than 40% of the common variance. La Gaipa (1977b, p. 252) reports considerable variation in the number and content of factors derived from his friendship ratings. We anticipate that the factor structure of relationship scales will vary considerably with the same kinds of conditions that have been demonstrated to affect the magnitude of the correlation coefficient. Among these will be the precise population of relationship types included in the analysis, the number and type of relationship deficiencies in these relationships, as well as several technical variations among factor analytic procedures. It should be clear, however, that the multidimensionality of friendship and romantic love as personal relationships does not stand or fall on the results of factor analytic studies.

Empirical Adequacy of the Assessment Devices

Certainly the data from the three studies are encouraging on this general point. The major findings that should have been obtained, were obtained. Spouses/lovers were consistently rated as more Fascinating, Exclusive, Enjoyable than friends—even best or close friends—and this finding held both in same-sex and opposite-sex friendship. But, it would be disingenuous not to note the important limitations of our test of the instruments. First, the range of participants—while going beyond college sophomores—is not broad yet. Second, the ability of relatively uneducated persons to use these rating scales remains to be demonstrated. Third, more evidence is needed on the stability of the scale scores over time periods when relationships are unlikely to be changing. All of these points are being dealt with in work currently underway, some of which is already available in draft form (Davis & Todd, Notes 6 & 10).

Also, it would be desirable to have evidence that variations in the relationship scales that one would ordinarily interpret as reflecting variations in the quality of the relationship, are significantly related to other psychological variables such as overall life satisfaction or one's ability to withstand or handle stressful life events. Also, clinical interventions that are successful by other criteria ought to make predictable differences in relationships and thus in relation scale scores. Work currently underway by Davis and Cafferty (Note 11) addresses the former points but not the latter.

Relationship of This Formulation to Other Formulations

Any such review will have to be quite selective, for the relevant research literature has grown enormously in the last five years. We shall restrict ourselves to examining two major formulations in the case of

friendship and three in the case of romantic love which have inspired some data collection.

Theories of Friendship

Other than the excellent conceptual paper by Suttles (1970), the major positions that attempt to deal with friendship are those of La Gaipa (1977a, 1977b, 1979) and Wright (1969, Note 8). La Gaipa (1977b) identified his conceptual dimensions through open-ended interviews conducted with 150 participants from all walks of life. The 1,800 statements about the meaning of friendship that were obtained from these interviews were content analyzed and reduced to 152 themes. These themes were, in turn, rated by a panel of thirty judges according to whether or not each theme was "Definitely Essential" to "Definitely Not Essential" to four categories of friendship.

> Ratings, then were obtained from different groups of subjects responding to the four [categories] of friendship. Separate factor analyses were conducted (La Gaipa, 1969) using the principal component technique with rotation to simple structure. A total of 11 factors was identified from the responses to the four levels of friendship. The eight major factors were: *Self Disclosure* ("feeling free to express and reveal personal and intimate information"); *Authenticity* ("openness and honesty in the relationship; being real, genuine and spontaneous"); *Helping Behavior* ("expressing concern for one's well being; giving help readily without being asked; providing psychological support"); *Acceptance* ("acknowledging one's identity integrity and individuality; not taking advantage of another"); *Positive Regard* ("providing ego reinforcement; enhancing one's feeling of self-worth; treating one as deserving of respect and as an important, worthwhile person"); *Strength of Character* ("striving to achieve and conform to the objective value system of the society"); *Similarity* ("possessing similar points of view; expressing agreement on controversial issues; possessing similar attitudes and interests"); *Empathic Understanding* ("interpreting accurately the feelings of another person; understanding how one really feels; really listening to what one has to say") and *Ritualistic Social Exchange*. (La Gaipa, 1977b, pp. 251–252)

Clearly there is a high degree of similarity between the relationship factors in our conceptualization and those discovered by La Gaipa and his associates. Our work was entirely independent of his during the first two studies, and so the similarity is a case of independent invention. Earlier in this paper we have acknowledged the need to reformulate our variable Spontaneity and bring it closer to his Authenticity. Now we want to raise questions about two of his factors that seem to us to involve conceptual difficulties of the sort that will lead to unclear empirical findings. The two factors in question are Strength of Character and Similarity.

The procedure that La Gaipa (1977b) used of having judges rate how essential an item is does not necessarily require the judge to make a

distinction between conceptual necessity and strong empirical correlation. It appears to us that, in both of these cases, the factors in question combine two or more conceptually distinct relationship qualities and that they include mixtures of some things that are clearly part of the concept of friendship and others which are not. The two factors which require theoretical clarification, in our view, are Strength of Character and Similarity. Let us examine the content of the four items currently used to assess Similarity.

"We share similar views about things that really matter in life."
"We have many common interests."
"Our personalities are compatible."
"I enjoy the time spent with him/her doing things together."

The first two items are clearly similarity items, but neither compatibility of personalities nor enjoyment of activities together are solely matters of similarity. So in our view, this factor mixes conceptually distinct relationship qualities—similarity of values, interests, and so on and the enjoyment of each other's company. Since the latter may well follow from important differences in values, attitudes or interests, it seems a conceptual error to combine these items. Why? Because data from ratings on these items leaves the degree to which judged similarity of interests and values is indeed a major correlate of friendships or of changes in friendship status and entirely open question. Because one would have difficulty engaging in mutual social practices without some similarity, it does seem to be implicit in archetypal friendships. But there is clearly a question about how to assess the role of similarity for studies which demonstrate that actual similarity in values, and attitudes has very little predictive power to criteria such as heterosexual relationship progress (Levinger, Senn, & Jorgensn, 1970; Rubin, 1974), or level or degree of friendship (La Gaipa, 1977b; Wright, Note 8). The appraisal of a relationship as involving significant similarities, in the manner of La Gaipa's first two items above, shows much more promise as an empirical predictor of relationship status or progress (La Gaipa, 1977b).

The difficulty that exists in the Strength of Character Scale, is a confusion between admiration items and respect items. The conceptual issue is this: Respect, in the sense of respecting the other's judgment, seems to be part of the concept of friendship, but admiration, because it is an attitude that involves inequality and social distance, does not. And, indeed it is interesting to note that this ambiguity may explain some of the failures of the Strength of Character Sale. Mean scores on it did not differentiate among best, close, and good friends, and they only marginally distinguished these three from social acquaintances (La Gaipa,

1977b, pp. 254–256). The "Strength of Character dimension showed less differences between most and least preferred friend than any of the other scales" (1977b, p. 260). Our conceptual point may be put this way: if two persons are friends, and they do not respect each other (to a significant degree or in most respects), that requires explanation. But, if they are friends and do not admire each other, that does not.

It should be clear, however, that in most respects we find La Gaipa's conceptualization to be quite compatible with ours, and to find the wealth of data that he has collected over the last thirteen years to be, in all probability, the richest body of empirical information on friendship that exists anywhere in this world at this time. We have touched only on some very limited aspects of his work in this paper.

Wright's Model

Paul Wright, like La Gaipa, has devoted a significant portion of his scholarly career to the understanding of friendship, primarily same sex friendship. His model has undergone two major revisions. In its original form (Wright, 1969), his criterion of friendship was the degree of voluntary interdependence, and friendships were taken to be established because of the degree of benefit in three general areas:

> [1] Stimulation value refers to the degree to which one person (the subject) sees another as interesting and imaginative, capable of introducing the subject to new ideas and activities, and capable of leading him into an expansion and elaboration of his present knowledge and outlook. [2] Utility value refers to the degree to which the subject sees another person as cooperative, helpful, and in general, willing to use his time and resources to help the subject meet his own personal goals and needs. [3] Ego support value refers to the degree to which the subject sees another person as encouraging, supportive, nonthreatening, and, in general, capable of helping the subject feel more comfortable and maintain an impression of himself as a competent, worthwhile person. These values may be thought of as the direct rewards in a friendship. . . . (Wright, 1969:299)

An interesting conceptual feature of his early model was the maintenance-difficulty dimension. This dimension takes into account the fact that with some persons, one has to work hard at maintaining a relationship. Such relationships require more tack, acceptance, and patience than an easy relationship. The strength of the other friendship variables was typically found to be independent of the maintenance difficulty dimension (Wright, 1978). In our view, this is one way of systematically introducing a procedure to direct assessment of the constraints of personal characteristics on the realization of a friendship.

In his subsequent revision, two major steps have been involved. First, stimulated by the work of Kurth (1970) and Suttles (1970), he made a systematic distinction between friendship and friendly relations, and he

introduced a second criterion of friendship—personalistic interest in the friend (Wright, 1978). The second step involved the placement of his model of friendship in the context of a theory of the behaving person and of self-referent motivation (Wright, Note 12, 1978). From some very general principles of self-referent motivation, he derived an "investment" model of personal relationships. "The investment involves an expenditure of time, personal resources, and personalized concern. An investment also implies some sort of expected return or dividend. . . . The dividends from an investment of self in friendship include one or more of the following: an enhanced sense of individuality, facilitated self-affirmation, facilitated self-evaluation, and facilitated self-growth" (Wright, Note 12). These tend to be experienced as the direct rewards or benefits of friendship originally identified by Wright. In his final model, there are four benefits or values with self-affirmation being an added benefit. During the 1970's, Wright has continued to refine his assessment devices and to collect data on topics such as the differences between men and women friendships. While the investment model of friendship is an advance over an exchange model in that it takes explicit cognizance of the long-term character of the relationship, it still appears to us to have the limitations of any analogy in contrast to a representation of the reality of friendships in terms of the phenomenon itself. An intended virtue of a PCF is that one can, by reference to its characteristics, directly give an account of what is special, deviant, or unusual about real cases and also account for the termination or dissolution of friendships.

Let us contrast a means-ends model and an intrinsic participation model to help see the limitations of Wright's analogy. Investment is clearly something that one does in order to get certain returns—that's the point of the activity. In contrast, one may, for example, play golf because a variety of extrinsic considerations such as wanting to meet new clients for one's business, wanting to be one up on other players, etc., or one may play because one enjoys the game or finds it interesting and challenging. Enjoyment is not something extrinsic to the game that one gets by virtue of doing it, but rather enjoyment is the way we have of designating that one's participation is intrinsic—done without ulterior motivation. Our paradigm cases of intrinsic motivation are games, expressions of emotions, consumatory activities, and play. Thus to formulate one's account of why people become friends in terms of the rewards (benefits, dividends) that they get out of a relationship runs the risk of denying that they enter into the relationship in a genuine or authentic way. For if they act friendly merely in order to get friendly actions in return, regardless of their feelings or the other, then they are being inauthentic—not relating to the other as a unique individual but as a means to getting good feelings, intellectual stimulation, etc. In this regard,

Wright's model is self-contradictory. Empirically, Wright assesses the person-qua-person variable. Conceptually, it is not yet clear that he sees the pernicious quality of means-ends models.

With respect to the termination of friendships, his new model with explicit reference to self-conception does appear to make it possible for him to deal with the case in which a person remains a loyal friend despite the fact that he no longer finds that relationship stimulating or supportive. Such a person may well do this purely out of his concern for the kind of person he would be if he were to drop a friend merely because of his difficulty or the lapse in the quality of the relationship. His reasons for sticking by his friend then are self-referent in Wright's terms.

Thus, while Wright's assessment procedures get at aspects of friendship that are very important and while his model has been revised to incorporate more of what is fundamental to friendships, the tendency to present the model in investment terms and the lack of a clear criterion for distinguishing friendship and love leave his model short of the mark.

Love Relationships

Three quite different theorist's work will be examined briefly in this section: Lee (1976, 1977); Rubin (1970, 1973, 1974); Hatfield et al. (1979); Walster and Walster (1978); and Berschild and Walster (1974). Lee (1977) makes use of constructive ideal types for a "typology of styles of loving." We find his typology to be very interesting and to find some of the work that it has stimulated (Hatkoff and Lasswell, 1979) of intrinsic interest. But, in our view, what he presents is a typology of man-woman relationships—more elaborate than Robert's (1982) but of the same general sort. Lee's *Storage* seems very much like a person whose primary model or archetype for heterosexual relationships is friendship, and his *Pragma* seems very much like Robert's (1982) partnership model.

Lee's work is extremely provocative, for he gets at types of relationships that are both important and clearly recognizable as typical of man and woman relationships. Following the distinction that Littmann (1982) makes in her work on humor, Lee appears to present a mixture of conceptualization of various prototypes of man-woman relationships and an empirically testable theory about the kinds of persons who will choose whichever types without clearly separating the two. For example, in our view, nothing in the concept of romantic love or passion requires that the lover have an image of ideal physical type and be ready to fall in love with such a person at first sight. (In fact, it is interesting how variable the physical types can be to which the very same person is attracted at different times.) But, such an image appears to be very common among Lee's *Eros* type of lover.

Lee's *Ludus* appears to involve playing at love, and the lover's being

"high" on the experience of having another fall in love with him or her without the lover also becoming deeply involved. This is obviously not a mutual or reciprocal relationship. One can generate such patterns, formally, by deleting one or more terms in our paradigm case of romantic love. *Ludus* involves the deletion of exclusiveness and of authenticity. *Mania* involves the deletion of trust or advocacy (resulting in insecurity in the relationship) combined with an intensification of the state of fascination because the normal ways of expressing devotion are neither possible nor successful. This particular combination is a very destructive one, for it combines intense desire to possess the other with very great fear that one will not or cannot hold the other. Finally, one need only note in passing that *Agape* in its ideal type is not a personal relationship at all. For in it, one is merely granting to one's "lover" the kind of acceptance or Christian charity that one would grant to anyone.

We hope that it is possible to see how, without additional examples, one can generate all of Lee's conceptual types and yet keep clear about the difference between a conceptualization of types of man-woman relationships and a theory of what kinds of persons prefer which types of relationships.

Rubin's (1970, 1973, 1974) formulation is, strictly speaking, a formulation of the attitude of romantic love. "Love is an *attitude* held by a person toward a particular other person, involving predispositions to think, feel, and behave in certain ways toward that other person" (1970, p. 265). Ossorio (Note 5) shows how the concept of attitude as it is traditionally used by social psychologists is a logical counterpart (on the subjective side) of being in a certain relationship (either with a person or with some other state of affairs). Thus, one would expect considerable similarity between an attitudinal analysis of love and a relationship analysis. (Indeed, the assessment technology of this study is equivalent in form to an attitude assessment.) But to start with the reality of being in a personal relationship draws attention to matters that one might not notice from the standpoint of subjective feelings. A critical omission, in our view, is Respect, which Rubin allocates to his Liking Scale. While one can have feelings of love (in the sense of feeling both passionate toward the other and wanting to support the other) one has, at best, a defective love relationship if there is no mutual respect between partners. (Of course, we all know that there are some number of cases in which one partner lives with or marries someone that they do not really respect. Thus, we are not legislating what can happen, but raising the question of what to call such cases when one finds them.) In our system, the answer is clear cut: it is a nonarchetypal case of love without Respect, but a case nonetheless.

In Rubin's system, one can have cases of high Love scores and rel-

atively low Liking scores. But the Liking Scale is a very imperfect instrument for dealing with such questions because it is not systematically made up of items dealing with, say, respect, admiration, and the enjoyment of each other's company. A similar difficulty, which may have only limited practical significance, exists for the Love Scale. Rubin (1970) alternatively describes love as consisting of three aspects: needing, caring, and intimacy; or of "predispositions to help, affiliative and dependency needs, and exclusiveness and absorption." But, because the criterion of item retention in the development of his scale was a purely statistical one—once the pool of items had been created according to the judgment of a blue ribbon panel as reflecting aspects of romantic love—one is not in a position to say how much each of these aspects contributes to the prediction of any specific criterion. Our conceptual model, and associated assessment techniques, allow one to discover just what else is going on in relationships, say, that are high in passion but low in respect and to determine just how frequent such relationships are found in various ecologies. As they are now used, Rubin's scales do not permit such refinements. It may well be that the difficulties in predictive validity that Dion and Dion (1979) have noted, particularly the better predictiveness for high-love women, is related to this issue.

Lest our views of Rubin's work are taken to be entirely negative, it is important to note that his work brought the phenomenon of romantic love into a central focus within social psychology, and his resistance to formulations of love in purely reward/cost or exchange terms shows an important grasp of a central point that has escaped the third and final theorist under review.

Hatfield is a very talented experimentalist and an engaging popularizer (see Walster & Walster, 1978) who has a penchant for reductionistic theorizing. On the one hand, she proposes that passionate love is a condition that occurs when (a) a person experiences any kind of physiological arousal and (b) attributes the arousal to his or her passionate attraction to another person. This particular formulation goes far beyond what the data cited in its support shows, and involves an entirely unnecessary confusion of the concept of emotion and the concept of physiological arousal. Let us deal with the second question first. In Ossorio (1981b, 1981c, and 1976), the logic of emotional concepts is presented as a special case of the relationship formula. Using paradigm case procedures, it is possible to show that uses of emotional concepts such as fear, anger, guilt, and joy in (a) the explanation of actions, (b) in the attribution of current or temporary states, and (c) in various types of dispositional attributions all are derivable from the resources of the intentional action paradigm and the personal characteristics paradigm. None of these uses presupposes that P's recognition of his emotions

involve first recognizing that his physiological states have changed and then figuring out what emotion he has. The differentiation of emotions is accomplished by the distinctive appraisals of the world that go along with each emotion, that is, danger with fear, provocation with anger, wrong-doing with guilt. Whether or not physiological arousal is in fact a necessary causal condition for the attribution of an emotion remains to be established.

With respect to the case of love, the data collected so far is not clearly relevant—at most, it deals with initial attraction or sexual arousal, not with love—but if the studies were redone with some attention to assessing feelings of Fascination and other Passion items, then one might well find that, having any emotion aroused at the time that a person met someone who was attractive, would make it more likely that the person would describe him or herself as having passionate feelings toward that person. What is at issue, however, is whether findings about temporary heightening of self-attributed passionate feelings have any significance for the development of love relationships. That remains to be demonstrated.

A second kind of reductionistic error is found in Hatfield's formulation of the role of equity in personal relationship such as love relationships (Hatfield, Utne, & Traupmann, 1979). In this paper, she takes it as a starting point (see pp. 100–101) that people maximize outcomes (which is quite different from taking it that persons have reasons for what they do), treats hedonic (pleasure-seeking) and prudential (pain-avoidance) standards as the fundamental standards, and thus has to explain how one could possibly have either aesthetic or ethical standards—equity is, after all, an ethical concept. She treats it as a theoretical question whether or not considerations of equity are relevant to impersonal and personal relationship (104–106). But the question of fairness, or whether one is getting what one deserves out of a relationship, can obviously be raised in any relationship. The theoretical issue is rather whether or not personal relationships involve the kind of mental bookkeeping that Hatfield attributes to everyone in all relationships.

One way to see what is wrong with Hatfield's model of equity, as it applies to intimate relationships, is to imagine that one is in a relationship where one does consciously what she claims we really do unconsciously—namely, keeps a very careful record of our contributions to a relationship, in comparison to the other's contributions, and compares both of these to each person's rewards from the relationship. Anyone who really tries to do such careful bookkeeping will find that the activity of "keeping score" will undermine trust, the kind of taken-for-granted concern of the other's welfare, that is at the heart of such relationships.

Again, one has to be careful in how this point is put; it is not that such record keeping may not be useful for couples who have lost trust

in each other and need to reduce their concerns about exploitation by keeping track, nor that such bookkeeping may not be useful, for a while, when couples find themselves feeling exploited or unfairly treated by each other. Even in these cases, however, our experience suggests that it is not the act of keeping score, but rather the discussion of how things count to each other and the subsequent gain in understanding of each other's values and preferences, that is therapeutic. But this is an empirical point, awaiting research.

To make the conceptual point in another way: Anyone who has to keep track of inputs and outputs reveals himself not to know what a personal relationship such as friendship and love is all about and hence not to be a promising candidate for a genuine personal relationship.

Hatfield tends to treat the issue raised in this context as an empirically resolvable dispute. "Let's collect data on perceived inequities and see whether or not people who feel an inequity of either type—under-benefitted of over-benefitted—in fact try to restore the actual or psychological equity in the relationship." But Rubin and many other theorists who, like us, take the spontaneous willingness to make sacrifices for one's lover to be central to the archetype of romantic love, see this as conceptual issue. It concerns what one is willing to count as an instance of a love relationship.

Hatfield seems to take it that anyone holding this position is deceiving themselves because they think that they or anyone else can act unselfishly (Walster & Walster, 1978, pp. 134–135). But no one who holds the position (that being in love involves the disposition to give one's utmost when the other person needs it) is asserting that lovers do not have personal motivation. Rather the argument concerns the content of that motivation. In one case, to provide assistance and support because one loves the other is the motivation. That is different from providing assistance and support because the other person is going to repay you in some way. The latter is an exchange relationship, and one expects the contract to be met. The former is an intrinsic relationship governed by different norms. Both Clark and Mills (1979) and Schwartz and Merten (1980) have made similar conceptual points, the former illustrating the point with experimental data and the latter with an ethnographic study of one young woman's love relationship.

The relevant standard is that of fittingness or appropriateness. Thus, in a mutual love relationship, one expects the other to provide assistance without getting a *quid pro quo* just as one is willing to do the same thing. The fact that couples in such relationships are often concerned about whether they are being treated fairly by their partners or have problems in the give-and-get areas is not evidence that love relationships are really just cases of exchange relationships. Rather it is evident that in love

relationships, one can quite properly be concerned about whether the other person is reciprocating or whether the relationship is indeed a mutual love relationship. The socialization of both men and women includes cautionary tales about being taken advantage of by members of the opposite sex under the guise of being loved, so it does not require the convolutions of exchange models (with their characteristic defect of ruling out on *a priori* grounds ethical or esthetic motivation) to make concerns about equity in relationships intelligible.

The fact that, in a well-functioning love relationship one gets more when one also contributes more, is fully intelligible within Descriptive Psychology. The enhancement of one's behavior potential (or status) implied by genuinely being in a relationship with another who is a champion of one's interest, who is inclined to give the utmost on one's behalf, who treats one as worthy of devotion, and soon, shows why one would want to have such a relationship and be reluctant to give up even a defective case without a better opportunity. That many real world relationships have problems with respect to the equity or reciprocity of the contributions to the relationship should not blind us to the fact that such problems would not exist unless the participants held a concept of what ought to be, which made inequality of contribution a problem. One need only think of the different expectations that one has for parent-child relationships or teacher-student relationships to see that what relationship one has with the other person is part of the "defining context" of what determines one's judgment of fairness.

Summary of Discussion

In this section we have presented information relevant to the adequacy of this conceptualization to deal with the kinds of facts about friendships and love relationships that are well established. We have also presented information about the adequacy of the assessment techniques as measures of the conceptual distinctions that are relevant to the study of friendship and love. Finally we have compared and contrasted this formulation rooted in Descriptive Psychology with several formulations based on other presuppositions. In the case of general formulations of close personal relationships, the major difficulty is that of having a criterion for distinguishing different types of close personal relationships from each other; for surely love and friendship would qualify as close relationships and yet a conceptual separation of the two has not been clearly presented in the existing literature.

With respect to the models of friendship, two were reviewed. Those of La Gaipa (1977a, 1977b) and Wright (1969). La Gaipa's model appears to have one significant advantage—his conceptualization of Authenticity

and its associated assessment scale—and two potential defects in relationships to our model. The defects concern lack of clarity about two of his conceptual variables—Similarity and Strength of Character. In Wright's case, the defects of the model seemed more fundamental. His model has no criterion for distinguishing friendship from love, nor does it represent several critical phenomena of friendship, such as its being an intrinsic relationship rather than an exchange relationship.

With respect to models of love relationships, three were reviewed briefly—Lee's (1976, 1977), Rubin's (1970, 1974), and Hatfield's (Walster & Walster, 1978; and Hatfield, Utne, & Traupmann, 1979). Each model is seen as having significant defects that could be remedied by making use of the tools of the paradigm case methods and the distinctions involved in this model.

SUMMARY

A paradigm case formulation of friendship and love relationships has been presented. Nine subrelations (Table 1) were taken to be essential features of the archetypical concept of friendship and eleven of the archetypical concept of romantic love. The major conceptual contrast between friendship and love relationships was taken to lie in the contrast between the passionate aspects of love—particularly Fascination, Exclusiveness, and sexual desire—and the milder passions of friendship, on one hand, and the qualities of Support distinctive to the two relationships. Both relationships involve very significant Support of the sort shown by being able to count on each other in both practical and emotional ways, but in romantic love, the quality of Support is most appropriately characterized by "giving the utmost" and "being a champion or advocate" of the loved one, whereas in friendship such support marks only best or closest friendships from one's more ordinary friendships.

Three studies provided very encouraging support for the validity of the scales. The findings were examined in light of results obtained by other researchers, and the conceptualization was compared and contrasted to other views of friendship and love.

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THE CREATOR AND THE DISCOVERER

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ABSTRACT

Using the conceptual resources and methodology of Descriptive Psychology, I compare the activity of creating Secondary Worlds, such as Tolkien's Middle-earth, with the normal and universal human activity of creating the Primary Worlds we live in, and inquire into how these Primary Worlds are related to the Real World. Further, I investigate how the activities of creation and discovery are related. My purpose is to clarify such practical problems as how we can live satisfactorily with persons who in some sense live in worlds other than ours.

For at least twenty years, I have been exercised by the question whether we discover or create the worlds we live in. I started from the fact that we do seem to live in different worlds, and this is so common an experience that we have stock phrases for speaking of it: "You're not living in the same world I am," "This is a whole new world to me," "It's out of this world," "He's living in a world of his own"; and there are dozens of others.

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Obviously, writers of fiction, and most conspicuously writers of fantasy and science fiction like J. R. R. Tolkien, are creating imaginary worlds. Presumably scientists are discovering "what really is out there." But how about our own, ordinary worlds? Are we responsible for them as Tolkien is for Middle-earth? Or are we explorers and discoverers with no responsibility for what we find except for our seeking in one direction rather than another?

Four immediately practical, and indeed urgent, problems call for an analysis of world-making. First, how are we to treat persons who live in worlds markedly different from our own—to take an extreme example, a paranoid schizophrenic, or a less extreme but more frequent case, a close associate of another religious or political persuasion, or cultural background? Second, how does the change occur from living in one world to living in another? Third, what is our responsibility in either creating or discovering our worlds? And fourth, what distinguishes those achievements which we call "creative" from those which we consider to be not creative?

I am not attempting to answer all these questions in this one chapter, but to illustrate a way by which we can answer them. Specifically, I shall be exhibiting how Descriptive Psychology provides formal access to the activity of world-making.

I

No achievement of the human imagination is more impressive than the construction of what J. R. R. Tolkien (1947) calls "Secondary Worlds," such as his own Middle-earth, Austin Tappan Wright's Islandia (1942), and uncounted other fantasy realms, each with its own kind of creatures, social organizations, customs, history, language, neighbors, and problems. Some of them, like Middle-earth, display the extramundane quality of faërie. Others, like Islandia, are "of the earth, earthy." Some are so vivid and consistent as to capture our imaginations. We report that while we are reading those books, we are "living in those worlds." Others fail to stir us or probably anyone except their creators. But so universal—historically, geographically, and culturally—is the invention of Secondary Worlds that we can well begin our exploration of what is meant by "world-makers" with Tolkien's statement, "Fantasy is a natural human activity" (1947, p. 2), and with a similar statement by a psychologist, Peter G. Ossorio, "The starting point is that human beings intrinsically have the capacity to create and to reconstruct worlds, and it's that kind of achievement that you're talking about with this kind of language of imagination, creativity, and so on. You simply start with that kind of achievement as the norm, and worry about deficiencies, etc., later" (Ossorio, Note 1).

First, although it may sound so obvious as to be trivial, Secondary Worlds are created by persons. Middle-earth and Islandia, for example, are the products of individual genius. In contrast, untold numbers of persons have contributed to creating the world of King Arthur and his knights as we now have it. This does not mean, however, that the persons responsible for constructing or reconstructing those worlds made them up out of thin air as arbitrary or irrational formulations. Instead, as Tolkien describes the process in his admirable essay, "On fairy-stories":

> The human mind, endowed with the powers of generalization and abstraction, sees not only *green-grass*, discriminating it from other things . . . but sees that it is *green* as well as being *grass*. But how powerful, how stimulating to the very faculty that produced it, was the invention of the adjective: no spell or incantation in Faërie is more potent. . . . the mind that thought of *light, heavy, grey, yellow, still, swift,* also conceived of magic that would make heavy things light and able to fly, turn grey lead into yellow gold, and the still rock into swift water. If it could do the one, it could do the other; it inevitably did both. (1947, p. 50)

The builder of the most exotic world works with ingredients which are in principle available to everyone and which initially he (or she or they, this is to be understood throughout) learned from other people. Even more important than the ability to recombine elements, however, is the ability to generate new patterns, and since formally the range of possible patterns is infinite, there is no *a priori* limit to what the world-maker can originate: worlds like Middle-earth and Islandia, creatures such as hobbits and Ents, customs such as the Islandian tanrydoon.

Every Secondary World is somebody's world, and is therefore in principle accessible to other persons, just as any person's knowledge about anything is in principle accessible to any observer. Potentially if not actually, Secondary Worlds are in the public domain just as much as chess or the history of the American Revolution or Bach's B-Minor Mass. Anyone who chooses, and has the necessary capacity and opportunity, can learn to play chess, become a historian or musician or musicologist, or participate imaginatively in Frodo's or John Lang's adventures, even though only as a spectator whose presence has no effect on the outcome. In practice, of course, these worlds or domains may not be accessible to some people for historical, educational, or other reasons, and some people may choose not to take advantage of their opportunity to become acquainted with chess, Islandia, or whatever, for lack of time or interest. In principle however, these worlds are public worlds, not because we are aware of or actualize the same possibilities, but because the range of possible facts is the same for us all.

Second, as chess-players form a community, and historians and musicians other communities, so do the great numbers of people who have been enchanted by Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings* (1954), and by

Wright's *Islandia* (1942) which I consider to be equally a masterpiece. These persons are joined in community not merely by shared enthusiasms, but more importantly, by shared competence in the use of concepts which designate elements in that domain, and the relationships for which those elements are eligible. We are initiated into such communities by becoming competent in the use of the concepts designating those elements and their relationships, and by the time we are adult, most of us are members of many such groups. We not only immerse ourselves upon occasion in Middle-earth or Islandia, but are also chess players, more or less at home in the worlds of cooking, business, politics, education, and so on down the line. Some worlds are mutually exclusive, like Middle-earth and Islandia, or opposing political parties, or football and chess. For example, there is no place in football for the concept "checkmate," or in solid-state physics for the concept "person." Other worlds, like those of art and fashion and typography, overlap because they share such basic concepts as beauty and proportion.

What connects these worlds, no matter how disparate—and in some instances the only thing that connects them—is that they all have a place in the Real World, the world in which we persons live and move and have our being, wherein persons create Secondary Worlds like Islandia, and become at home in domains like chess, and generate communities like families and political parties and schools of philosophers. It is the world in which we are not only spectators, but actors whose behaviors, observations, and appraisals affect the outcome of whatever is going on. More formally, the Real World is "the state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs" (Ossorio, 1971/1978b, p. 29), that is, the world in which each of those other worlds, from Middle-earth to football, has a place. The Real World, then, can be understood as a place-holder.

II

Having differentiated the Real World from Secondary Worlds, we should take a moment to consider what is meant by "world" as such. Still following Ossorio, we can take the concept of "world" to be the concept of a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is "a totality of related objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs" (Ossorio, 1971/1978b, p. 7), in which the relationships may be economic or historical or emotional or kinetic or geometric, or whatever else may be appropriate to the objects which have a place in that world (cf. Ossorio, 1971/1978a, p. 30). So. for example, the world of chess is a totality of objects—a board, pieces, players—related in ways which are specified by the rules of chess; the actual playing of a game is a process; to have played a game is an event; and that there is such a game is a state of affairs. The

world of Islandia is a totality comprising such states of affairs as its having the geography and past history it does, as well as objects such as persons, animals, buildings, and so on, and a great number of events which are related as belonging to the continuing history—the chronology—of that country. The Real World, as contrasted with "worlds," is that totality of related objects, processes, events, and/or states of affairs which includes all other totalities, that is, all Secondary Worlds and, as we shall see, all Primary Worlds as well.

It is obvious that some worlds are more complex and more comprehensive than others. The domain of chess is simple and tightly circumscribed in comparison with, let us say, the daomin of science or of art, or even of Middle-earth, yet it is just as much a world as they are, as a tiny circle is as much a circle as a huge one, or in G. K. Chesterton's illustration, "A bullet is quite as round as the world, but it is not the world. There is such a thing as a narrow universality; there is such a thing as a small and cramped eternity; you may see it in many modern religions" (1908, p. 20).

For example, the world of Middle-earth is larger than the world of Islandia, in an important way. The novel *Islandia* is the tale of a young American, John Lang, in the early years of the twentieth century, who is the first of his countrymen to be allowed into the nation called Islandia, which is located somewhere in the Subantarctic. Islandia had previously been as closed to outsiders as Japan before the coming of Commodore Perry, and the central problem is whether Islandia shall continue closed to the rest of the world, and so retain its distinctive culture, or whether it should interact with other cultures at the risk of compromising its fundamental values. As presented in the book, the issues are cultural and personal—which are important enough, God knows. In contrast, the issue which is implicit in *The Lord of the Rings* (Tolkien, 1954), and explicit in *The Silmarillion* (Tolkien, 1977), is not the fate of a culture but the fate of a whole world, the survival not of a particular way of living but of ultimate good over ultimate evil. In Islandia, the destiny of something lovely and dear hangs in the balance. In Frodo's quest, something infinitely valuable is at stake. The conflict is not simply cultural, but cosmic.

To mark this difference between Islandia and Middle-earth, we might call the one "mundane" and the other "transcendental," because it is concerned with meanings and significances that transcend the merely earthly, the merely practical, and even the merely historical, in the direction of ultimate values and totalities. All manner of worlds can be so contrasted and compared. Some, like chess and economics and fashion, have no reference to what is ultimately significant for everything that is; in others, such ultimates have the highest priority; in still others,

ultimates have a peripheral place. Conceivably, for a finalist engaged in an international chess tournament, winning may be the equivalent of ultimate salvation and losing of ultimate damnation for him personally, but this has to do with the place of the domain of chess within that particular player's world, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the domain of chess per se. So far as the game of chess is concerned, victory is nothing but victory and defeat is nothing but defeat. Neither has any significance beyond that simple fact, and if players choose to bestow upon those outcomes a more extensive meaning—for example, national honor or personal pride—that has nothing to do with the world of chess. The players are then using the game as a means of accomplishing something other than what is of ultimate significance *in chess,* which is checkmate. The ultimate for a person is whatever it is, but if it be nothing more or other than checkmate, his is indeed "a small and cramped eternity."

A world or domain, conceived as a state of affairs, is a construct, and as such can be described, portrayed, mapped, analyzed, and understood. And it can be compared and contrasted with other worlds, all without reference to its status—its place—in the Real World. There is, however, a legitimate and important sense in which, for example, the domain of chess, the realm of Islandia, and the world of art have comparable places. The game is a game, the story is a story, the world of art is a world. They simply are what they are. We could indeed ask another order of questions, such as, "Is there really such a game as chess?" and "Is it true that the game we are now playing is chess?", or "Is it true that there is a place called Middle-earth?" and "Is there an actual story about Middle-earth?" To answer these, however, we must go beyond description to appraisals of reality and truth, but we must go further with simple description before we can discuss appraisals.

III

Now for a change of pace. Let us suppose that a friend invites me to join her in a ball game. There are many games played with a ball, so before I commit myself, I ask her, "Which game?" She answers, "Jacks," which I enjoy, so we sit down and play. Since that is the game we are playing, we do not delimit a playing field, or set up goalposts or bases, or round up other players in order to have teams. We do not tackle or hit home runs or commit foot faults. Both of us are sufficiently familiar with other games to understand what is going on in them, and to appreciate the enthusiasm of those who are passionate about them. But the game *we* are playing is jacks. For the moment, we are committed to doing *that.*

In choosing which game to play, we take into account hedonic considerations—which ones we like and don't like—and practical considerations like having on hand the necessary equipment and number of players. Ethical considerations may be relevant. Ought we to be doing something less frivolous, like writing letters or washing dishes? And is there not something inappropriate, unseemly, about two intelligent, decorous, but unmistakably ancient ladies sitting on the ground and playing a children's game which we learned when we were children?

And now, let us suppose that we also learned, when we were children, that the world we are living in has certain rules (as games do), sometimes called physical or moral laws, that our living in it calls for our making certain distinctions and developing certain skills (as playing games does), and that this is *our* world, the one we are committed to living in by virtue of belonging within this society. As we grew older, we learned that in other cultures, people have lived by other rules and have partitioned the world in other ways, that is, made other distinctions, and acquired other skills. But just as we played our game, although we learned about others as well, so at least through our childhood, most of us were committed to the one world of our growing-up, although we knew something about various others.

All this while, however, both in playing games and living in the world, we were not only mastering the constructs which made them *these* games and worlds, but we were also reconstructing them. We reconstructed the games primarily by introducing our individual styles of playing, since most of them are governed by meticulously specified rules which all the players have agreed upon. We reconstructed our worlds by what we took to be important, intelligible, within our capacity, interesting, or satisfying in what we observed and experienced, and as well by what we disliked, could not comprehend, found dull or unfulfilling. Moreover, we could not do a great many things that we wanted to do unless we acquired new concepts, skills, and information, and these acquisitions resulted in further reconstructions, some of which have been so sudden and radical as to call forth the exclamation, "I'm living in a whole new world!" Throughout all this reconstruction, we were creating new forms just as Tolkien did in creating Middle-earth and Wright in creating Islandia, except that ours were not Secondary but Primary Worlds, in which what we did and observed and evaluated made a difference in what was going on. The process was the same and the achievement was the same: the creation of a world, a totality—whether transcendental or mundane—of related objects, processes, events, and/or states of affairs, which has a place within the state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs, the Real World—which, again, can be thought of as simply a place-holder.

We learn about the Real World by observing which of its possibilities are actual, are in fact the case; for example, whether here and now a game of chess is in progress, or whether a story portrays actual, historical persons and events rather than imaginary ones. All our observations are selected from Real World possibilities, and "the capacity to entertain these possibilities is primarily shown not in these fantastic creations, but in simple empirical observation" (Ossorio, Note 2).

As every observation constitutes a selection from the infinite range of Real World possibilities, so every behavior constitutes a selection from the range of behaviors which is possible for us, given our personal characteristics and circumstances. And in the course of inventing our behaviors, we create our Primary Worlds. As Ossorio has said, "Since . . . every behavior consists of treating the world as something or other, you create the behavior of treating it as that thing, and whatever you are treating it as is what it is for you. That's the sense in which in creating behaviors, you create the world" (Ossorio, Note 3). Later he goes on to say,

> It's basically a negative thing, reflecting the fact that there's no necessity holding between something and our seeing it that way. That's demonstrable. What you see one way, I don't have to see that way, and its being that way in no way forces me to see it that way, and in no way makes inevitable that I see it that way. Therefore it follows that if I do see it that way, something beyond inevitability has happened, and that's what we're getting at in saying "create." There was something that was non-necessary that got accomplished. (Ossorio, Note 4)

This understanding of creativity is a far cry from common notions of creation as being "out of the whole cloth," or strikingly original, or a mysterious process, or a special capacity which we can bring to fruition or extinguish more or less at will. In the place of these notions, we can conceptualize creativity as a natural human function which all of us exercise constantly. Even a casual conversation—passing the time of day—exemplifies selecting among possibilities (Do I greet you warmly or coldly? Do I take myself to be your friend or a mere acquaintance?), and inventing new behaviors (no two conversations are exactly alike). So to describe creativity in no way diminishes the achievements of Tolkien, Wright, and others of their stature. What it does is to show that we are engaged in the same exciting and important enterprise with them, and at an even more significant level. The creation of Secondary Worlds is a special case of creating worlds, and our first creations are of Primary Worlds.

In thinking about the relation of Primary Worlds to the Real World, it may be of value to keep in mind the rules of chess, which at once limit what the players can do and still be playing chess, and provide the

opportunity to play that game. Without the rules, there would be no game of chess at all. The rules, however, do not prescribe what move a player shall make in any situation; they prescribe only what the possibilities are, and he selects from among those possibilities, play by play. Likewise, the Real World provides us with limits (e.g., boundary conditions) and opportunities, but it does not compel us to see or treat it as this rather than that. Nor is it, more passively, a given which we have only to receive. Still less is it an arbitrary construct of our whimsical minds, because it does limit—restrain—us. I can look through a window but not through a wall, write letters using a typewriter but not using a mop. More elaborately, I have on my desk an object which I can treat as a paperweight, an ashtray, a template for drawing a circle, or a missile, but I cannot get away with treating it as fuel for my fireplace because it will not burn at fireplace temperatures. Nor can I successfully use it as a microphone, a telephone, or a chair; these represent boundary conditions on my possible behavior in relation to it. And since I cannot successfully treat it as, for example, a chair, neither can I successfully treat what I *do* do with it as "successfully treating it as a chair."

"Ah," you say, looking over my shoulder, "what it *really* is, is a small, round, metal box." And so it is, but the description "small, round, metal box" is no more definitive than "ashtray," "paperweight," "template," or "missile." Because I use it as an ashtray, it *is* an ashtray. Because I throw it at a marauding cat, it *is* a missile. Because I put things in it, it *is* a box. But size, shape, and composition do not have to be a primary or favored description of it any more than ashtray or missile or box has to be. When we define or describe it as any of these, we are simply formulating a set of opportunities for possible behaviors relative to it, as well as a set of constraints. The characteristics of that object which make it possible to treat it successfully as an ashtray are not incompatible with, and may overlap, those that make it possible to treat it successfully as a missile and as a box, but none of these behaviors or descriptions in itself takes precedence over any of the others.

Given that what we see when we look around us provides limits and opportunities rather than coercions, the fact that different people see and treat things differently does not represent a deviation from an ideal of unanimity on what it *really* is, but is itself the norm of knowledge and behavior. All knowledge is somebody's knowledge and all behavior is somebody's behavior, and in neither case is there a necessary connection between any given state of affairs and how we see or treat it, any more than there is a necessary connection between what we are taught and what we learn. Grading examination papers is a salutary exercise in seeing how differently individuals respond to the same textbooks, lectures, and discussions. The student is an active participant in

what he learns, not merely a passive recipient, and this is not an exceptional but a universal situation. Because "the world provides us with opportunities but not unlimited ones" (Ossorio, Note 5), we *choose* how we shall treat what we see when we look around us. We *choose* how we shall behave. We *choose* among the Real World possibilities, and by so choosing we create our own behavioral, Primary Worlds, worlds that are non-necessary and new, and in principle are public.

The most complete and complex instances of world-creations are to be found in communities of persons who are committed to talking and acting in well-established, agreed-upon ways—for example, as if the world were simply and transcendentally "out there" waiting to be "discovered," or as forcibly imposing its categories upon us. As this community sees it, the alternative to its being simply and transcendentally "out there" is its being "in here," merely in our minds, inviolably private. (My apologies for so brutally oversimplifying this.) All of us who are inheritors of Western culture have been initiated into that community, where we remain full-fledged members as long as we are willing to ring the illimitable changes on those themes. Some, indeed, have opted out in favor of talking and acting in Eastern ways, and some for assimilating one to the other or for amalgamating them—which in certain cases looks like the effort to amalgamate chess and jacks. Then there are those who recognize that neither the concept of the world as being transcendentally "out there" nor that of its being "all in our minds" is relevant to our behavior as persons—except within the domain of philosophy, just as the specification of how the king, in chess, can move is irrelevant to the behavior of actual, historical kings.

To take a short detour—just as firmly embedded in our culture is the truism that we cannot think without assuming something (which is itself an assumption). Of course we can think without assuming anything, and we frequently do. Distinguishing colors, articulating the concept "color" into its aspects of hue, saturation, and brilliance, associating phenomena into groups, reaching for a pencil—none of these requires that we assume anything whatsoever. All that is required is that we make distinctions and act on them. When I reach for the pencil, I do not need to assume that it is a "real" pencil and that it "really is" where it appears to be. I observe it, and being competent in the use of the concept "pencil," I take it to be a pencil. Wanting to use it and being competent to move in the appropriate ways, I reach for it and succeed in taking it into my hand. For everyday (and most other) behavior, we need observation and competence; assumptions are entirely extraneous. They are not even the cherry on top, except that once we deny the special place of assumptions as basic to thinking, our place in the academic world may be jeopardized.

In answer to those who would insist that all I have been saying is

flagrantly based on assumptions, "making assumptions" is one way to describe what I am doing, and there is a philosophical point in talking that way. But what I am doing can also be described in a very different way, and I am proposing that there is a behavioral point in talking this other way, that is, without assuming that we cannot think without assuming something, because behaviorally, that assumption is not only superfluous but encumbering.

IV

So far, I have taken great pains to avoid references to "reality" and "truth." Both are words which are loaded with so heavy a freight of theories, explanations, connotations, and confusions that I would abandon them if I could. Unhappily, I do not see how I can. The danger is too immediate that questions will arise—have already arisen—concerning truth and reality which, if not dealt with, would derail my entire presentation. Almost invariably, in the course of discussing this conceptual formulation, I am asked, "Which of these worlds is the *real* world, yours or mine?" The answer is quite simple: the world which has a place for both of them. Conceptually, the Real World is the state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs, including all possibilities, and our having the different Primary Worlds that we do represents a selection from among those possibilities. Observationally, the Real World is what we see when we look around us, and since each of us sees it with his own eyes, and from his own viewing point, of course we see it differently. And seeing it differently is not merely one of the Real World possibilities; it is one of the Real World necessities.

If, for example, my world has no place for how you see a chair and you see it differently from the way I do, then my world *cannot* be the Real World, because the Real World, as a place-holder, *does* have a place for both the way you see it and the way I see it, as well as a place for both of us having mastered the concept "chair" so that we both see it to be a chair. Moreover, the Real World has a place for persons who, seeing that object, do not see it to be a chair because that concept is not part of their repertoire of knowledge—an infant, perhaps, or a nomad. So we come back to the concept of the Real World as the state of affairs that includes all other states of affairs, the world that includes your Primary World, and mine, and theirs.

An obdurate questioner will go on to ask, "But what is the 'it' which we see differently? What is it in itself, independent of our different views of it?" In reply, I should like first to consider what is the point of postulating an "independent it"—a *ding an sich*—at all. Could it be that we suppose that unless there is a transcendental "it," we are condemned

to a relativity which gives us no firm ground on which to stand, much less walk or dance? As Ossorio points out, however,

> The relativity problem [can be approached] as a variation on a disageement problem. As soon as you have the problem, you know that you have a framework which enables you to formulate that as a problem. And in that framework, these things are not incoherent. That framework has to include in it the possibility of just such disagreement. So disagreement is not somewhere you can begin from; behind it is something more fundamental, i.e., what is shared, and what is shared will turn out to be concepts, including the concept of just such a disagreement. So the solution is inherent in the problem. You couldn't have the problem were there not such a solution. (Ossorio, 1977, p. 184)

We do not need to ground ourselves on elaborate speculations about some transcendental realm that undergirds our varying Primary Worlds. We can start instead from the indubitable fact that we *do* stand and walk and occasionally dance. We are persons not only being-in-the-world, as the Existentialists have frequently reminded us, but also, as they have said less frequently, behaving-in-the-world. Our Primary, that is, behavioral, Worlds are those we *can* behave in. The behavioral world needs no such speculative undergirding, even though there is a place in it for the behavior of speculating about such ideas, just as the behavioral world has a place for playing chess and running experiments in physics and doing theology and cooking dinner. For behaving in the world, all we need is to make distinctions and act on them. If we want to *know* what we are doing, or to know *what* we are doing, then we shall need to exploit the fact that we have language, but we do not need to *be* anything other than persons in the world in order to be what we unquestionably are—unquestionably, because only a person behaving in a world could deny that he was a person behaving in a world, so that in the very act of denying it, he would be exemplifying what he denied.

The truth question arises in a particularly acute and obstinate form with respect to religions, because it seems all too obvious that if one religion is true, then the others must be false, unless we take up some form of relativism which predicates that all are true or all are false, so that any choice among them is arbitrary if not capricious. This framing of the situation, however, reflects a disabling conceptual confusion, because religions are not just bodies of doctrine consisting of statements that are eligible for verification or falsification, proof or disproof. They are worlds, domains of ultimate significance, and thus as much more than our doctrinal descriptions as a game of chess is more than the book containing the rules. As worlds, religions simply are what they are, and we can live in one of those worlds or none of them, just as we can play jacks or chess or neither. Far more will be at stake in the commitment

to a religious world than in the choice among games: in the one case, a way of life, in the other a specific activity or domain within a way of life. But the principle is the same, that worlds of whatever size—a game, an imaginary world, a religion—are not eligible to be either true or false, so that to say that a religion is true is to utter nonsense. It would be like saying that a table is true or false. Our religious doctrines are statements that do or do not represent accurately ("tell the truth about") the nature of that world, but worlds are appraised on other bases. Skipping over several steps, in the end our religion is a manifestation of who we are.

Here also it is important to keep in mind that anything which can be described in one way can also be described in another—remember the paperweight-ashtray-missile-box—and that there is no primary or favored description of that object as it might be independently of someone's knowing it. There and here, our first question must be not whether one description is true and the others false, but what is the point in describing it in one way rather than another? For that matter, what is the point of giving descriptions, whether of a single object or of a world, at all? We give descriptions when we are engaged in forms of behavior which call for them, and when we have a way of treating something as this rather than that—for example, when somebody asks us, "What's that thing on your desk?" Or when we ask ourselves, "What kind of a world am I living in?" Or when we say, "This is the world I am committed to. This is *my* way of life—subject to reconstruction, of course."

What is the point of our claiming that the statements we make in describing the world are "true?" Much the same as the point of postulating a world which is simply "out there"—it provides a transcendental guard against relativism—and, be it noted, against responsibility. But even if there were a guaranteed way to achieve truth—and there is not, any more than there is a guaranteed way to write a literary masterpiece—what could we do with such irrefragible truths? Truths can only be known and articulated by persons; each person would view them from his own viewpoint and articulate them in his own language; and so behaviorally, our last state would be neither worse nor better than, but exactly the same as, our first.

We need the concept of truth as an anchor, so that our statements will be statements and not merely sentences, and so that our statements will be about things—that is, because we have forms of behavior which call for distinguishing truth from error. Even so, there is an alternative to Aristotle's dictum that to speak the truth is to say of what is, *that* it is. That alternative is, in Stanley Cavell's words, "saying of what is *what* it is" (1959, p. 32), which is to say, describing it.

There is a nonabsolute sense in which there is a point in claiming that the statements we make in describing the world are true. Tolkien ex-

pressed this in his comment that the successful story maker creates a Secondary World within which "what he relates is 'true': it accords with the laws of that world" (1947, p. 60), that is, there is a domain within which those statements *are* true. Thus within the domain of Euclidean geometry, it is true that parallel lines never meet. Within the domain of my activities, it is true that this object on my desk is a paperweight, but within other domains—for example, chess, biology, ballistics—it would not be true that it is a paperweight, because in those domains there is no place for paperweights. There is no domain, however, in which *anything* goes in the way of description, because a domain is a totality of *related* objects and/or processes, and so forth, and those relationships limit what can be true within that domain.

"But," I can well believe somebody is objecting, "obviously you have been enunciating throughout what you take to be true." No. I have presented a set of distinctions; explicated a concept, "world"; described three major kinds of world, the Real World, Primary Worlds, and Secondary Worlds; all this because it seems to me unmistakable that there is a point in talking this way and in seeing what that point is. I have repeatedly directed attention to the fact that whatever can be described in one way can also be described in other ways, and that there is no primary or favored description, not even the behavioral one I am presenting here, although the fact that we can give behavioral descriptions makes all the difference. A world in which behavioral descriptions were not possible and relevant would be very different from the actual world that we are familiar with.

It may be worth adding that there is a point in talking in technical ways only within technical domains, such as chess or mathematics, or within very limited realms such as Islandia or Middle-earth, but, whereas all human activities and knowledge and creations are subsumed under persons-behaving-in-the-world, talking behaviorally will have a point at some stage in considering whatever persons do or are involved in. "Questions about the truth of any statement presuppose the Person Concept or some equivalent thereof, since it is only within such a framework that any such question can be formulated, understood, reacted to, or acted upon" (Ossorio, 1971/1978b, p. xiii).

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From Middle-earth and Islandia to the concepts of truth and reality may seem like a long and circuitous road, so now at the end, let me try to map out where we have been. Beginning with the recognition that the creation of those Secondary Worlds is an astonishing imaginative achievement, we explored the possibility that for those with eyes to see,

our creation of Primary Worlds is an achievement of essentially the same kind, the creation of a world, and an even more impressive one because we actually live in our Primary Worlds, but not even Tolkien has actually ever set foot in Middle-earth. A "world" was conceived as a totality of related objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs, and Primary and Secondary Worlds were compared with each other, and with the Real World which is the state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs, including our Primary Worlds. Because we are not compelled to take any aspect of the world—any object, process, event, or state of affairs—in one way rather than another, how we *do* take it eventuates in our creation of our Primary Worlds and our responsibility for our creation. Finally, to forestall, if possible, certain common misunderstandings of this portrayal of world-making, I examined what point there might be in describing any of these worlds as "real" or "true," and proposed that as those words are commonly used, they have only limited meaning when applied to worlds.

My conclusion, then, is that we need to speak in terms of both discovery and creation to describe adequately what in fact we do: we discover the boundary conditions and other limits on our possible behaviors, and we create our actual behaviors. Our achievements may be Primary or Secondary Worlds, may be coherent masterpieces like Aristotle's and Tolkien's, or incoherent, small, and cramped like some that we all have known. The essential difference between them is that in our Primary Worlds, we participate as actors, observers, and appraisers, but we are only spectators of Secondary Worlds.

If by inventing our behaviors, we create our worlds, it follows that we can recreate them by inventing other behaviors, and this not as an exceptional process requiring exceptional abilities, but in the natural course of living. And because we choose the behaviors by which we create our worlds, we are responsible for whether those creations are increasingly or decreasingly coherent, inclusive, and elegant, whether we are moving toward or away from integrity, community, and joy.

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A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF HYPNOSIS:

EXPLORING THE PLACE OF APPRAISAL AND ANOMALY IN BEHAVIOR AND EXPERIENCE

William B. Plotkin and Wynn R. Schwartz

ABSTRACT

This article introduces a new approach to the elucidation of hypnotic phenomena. Rather than contributing to the ongoing debate as to whether or not hypnosis involves a special psychological state, we develop a "conceptual map" of the subject matter of hypnosis that encompasses both the presently defined "state" and "nonstate" positions without reducing one to the other. We begin by explicitly and systematically articulating, in ordinary observational "action" language, concepts of "psychological state," "trance state," and "hypnotic state." Then, we introduce a concept of "hypnoid behavior" which is distinguished from both hypnotic phenomena and the simulation of hypnosis. The concepts of selected "state" theorists (Ronald Shor, Martin Orne, and Ernest Hilgard) and "nonstate" theorists (Theodore Barber and Theodore Sarbin) are located on the present conceptual map, which demonstrates

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that these two theoretical positions are not so much in disagreement as they are concerned with different ranges of phenomena. The general logic of "state" concepts in behavioral science is discussed, with emphasis on the use of a "hypnotic state" concept in the explanation of hypnotic phenomena. Finally, the concepts of "suggestibility," "hypnotizability," and other relevant individual-difference concepts are compared and contrasted.

Despite 200 years of research on hypnotic phenomena, the most fundamental issue in the field is no closer to resolution now than it was in 1784 when Benjamin Franklin (representing a scientific commission appointed by the King of France) confidently announced that Franz Anton Mesmer's alleged "animal magnetism" did not exist, and that the effects attributed to this chimerical force were simply the result of imagination and imitation. Of course, the notion of animal magnetism has long since passed into history, but the essential issue, concerning the fundamental nature of hypnosis, remains. In its contemporary form, this issue has found its way to the center of the so-called state-nonstate debate, which focuses on the following question: Does hypnosis involve the induction of a special state of consciousness—a trance state—or can hypnotic phenomena be adequately and fully explained in terms of such familiar psychological processes as imagination, suggestion, and role-playing? In recent years, the debate over this issue has at times become rather heated, with some very articulate and persuasive proponents on both sides (e.g., Barber, 1972; Bowers, 1973, 1976; Chaves, 1968; Coe, 1973; Hilgard, 1969, 1973; Orne, 1959, 1972; Sarbin & Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1970; Spanos & Barber, 1974; Spanos & Chaves, 1970; Tellegen, 1970). However, despite some encouraging recent trends toward empirical and theoretical convergence in hypnosis research (Spanos & Barber, 1974), the state-nonstate debate remains quite unresolved, with vigorous and vocal defenders on both sides apparently prepared to defend their positions until Science's Day of Judgment, when the Divine Debate-Dissolving Datum will presumably be unveiled.

This essay (see also Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 1, Note 2), has been written for those who do not believe in such a day or such a datum, for those who do, but cannot wait that long, and, above all, for those like ourselves (e.g., Bowers, 1976; Gordon, 1969; Orne, 1977; Shor, 1970; Weitzenhoffer, 1962) who have concluded that perhaps the problem is not a lack of data but rather one of confusion stemming from the characteristically ambiguous and equivocal manner in which the issue has been formulated and in which answers have been propounded. We have found that with a clear articulation, the dispute loses its substance—the debate simply dissolves. To be sure, there remains a significant number of empirical issues requiring empirical resolution, but, as will be seen,

these are fundamentally different issues from those currently defined within the state-nonstate dispute.

In short, where there currently appears to be the greatest amount of disagreement among hypnosis researchers, we find the two sides to be in fact speaking past one another and not disagreeing at all. Moreover, this dispute appears to be merely symptomatic of a more pervasive underlying problem. *We see the puzzle as primarily a conceptual one, and only partly and secondarily as a reflection of methodological inadequacy.* In particular, we find that it is entirely possible for a bona fide and respectable concept of "hypnotic state" to exist side-by-side, with such other contemporary conceptions as "believed-in imaginings" (Sarbin & Coe, 1972), "absorption" (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), "suggestion-related imaginings" (Spanos & Barber, 1974), "dissociation" (Hilgard, 1974, 1977), and "role-taking involvement" (Sarbin & Coe, 1972), and to do so without the state and nonstate concepts competing with one another, substituting for one another, or getting in each other's way. However, it will take much more than a mere assertion that all these concepts can coexist peacefully. What we propose is a single conceptual system, or conceptualization, which can encompass and sort out both positions within the framework of an integrated set of explicitly articulated concepts. The superstructure of such a system is in fact already in existence, and indeed has been so for over fifteen years, under the title of Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1966, 1969/1978, 1973, 1971/1978). In this paper, we present a small portion of Descriptive Psychology, which is elaborated and adapted where necessary, to provide a framework sufficiently rich and differentiated to allow explicit and systematic conceptual access to the *full* range of facts subsumed under the term "hypnosis."

We will argue that although the theoretical languages and positions of the state and nonstate positions are manifestly contentious, their underlying distinctions are not. However, we will *not* be claiming that the same phenomena can be spoken of in either "hypnotic state" or "imagination" terms as if it were merely a matter of linguistic preference; these are not merely semantic issues, but conceptual ones. Indeed, we hope to demonstrate that there are at least three conceptually distinct—albeit empirically overlapping—sorts of phenomena encompassed under the single label of "hypnosis." A need then arises for a single conceptual system in which these different phenomena can be simultaneously located and differentiated. Correspondingly, there is also an absence of distinct methodologies for *empirically* separating these phenomena. Of course, this is no coincidence. If the distinctions are not clearly articulated, we would expect them to be empirically demonstrable only by accident. The difficulty appears to stem largely from the fact that under the same

conditions (e.g., those of hypnosis experiments), two different types of hypnotic phenomena may occur—one more appropriately spoken of in "special state" language, the other more accurately described in the terms of imagination and role-playing. Proponents of the state and non-state positions tend to see or generate only what their respective theoretical orientations allow or highlight. For the sake of both convenience and heuristics, we will employ the convention of calling the former phenomena by the term "Hypnotic states" or "Trance states," and the latter phenomena by the term "Hypnoid behaviors." Both will be differentiated from sham behavior or playacting, the mere simulation of hypnotic performances. The employment of capital letters is deliberate, and it is crucial that their significance is not misunderstood. They are intended to remind the reader throughout this article that any of our sentences in declarative or propositional form concerning Hypnotic or Hypnoid phenomena is not an empirical assertion or statement about anything, including hypnosis. Rather, they are either articulations (e.g., definitions) of what we *mean* by these words, or they are logical implications or derivations of these concepts. Naturally, before any such implications are articulated, our concepts of "Hypnotic state" and "Hypnoid" will first be very explicitly presented. Subsequently, when we say, for example, that a Hypnotized person (one who is, by definition, in a Hypnotic state) would do such and such in circumstance C, we are not to be taken as hypothesizing or claiming anything or to be "making up facts." Rather, we will simply be saying, "Notice that in these circumstances it is only these sorts of behaviors that *logically* would *be* characteristic of a Hypnotized person, as defined here." Such a presentation is not an assertion of fact, but an illustration of the use of our concepts in the organization, differentiation, and integration of the subject matter of hypnosis. Furthermore, when we employ words such as "hypnosis" or "hypnotic" with lower-case letters, this is also to be taken as deliberate and as indicating that we are referring to either the empirical findings or the historically distinguished and largely undefined subject matter of hypnosis. The significance and intention of our capital letters is solely and precisely to distinguish our concepts of Hypnotic and Hypnoid from any historically or experimentally derived connotations of these terms, although, naturally, our concepts would have no heuristic value if there were not some substantial substantive overlap.

We see our task as similar to the one undertaken by Shor (1970) in a paper concerned with a similar goal:

> Semantic differences aside, it is the writer's belief that present theories of hypnosis seem so divergent because they are touching different sides of the proverbial elephant. . . . In the writer's judgment there are useful distinctions and important insights embedded in most contemporary and even antiquated theories. So the task,

> in metaphor, is not to choose sides, one against another, but to separate the wheat from the chaff. The argument here is not for a superficial eclecticism but rather for a harmonious synthesis. (p. 90)

We are attempting to provide here a common and theoretically neutral language that bridges the apparent gap between the state and nonstate positions, and that includes both.

THE NATURE OF CONCEPTUALIZATION

Since this idea of a theoretically neutral conceptualization will undoubtedly seem unfamiliar, if not specious, to many of our readers, we will clarify this matter before continuing. This is necessary since what we are presenting here is fundamentally different from a theory[1] or a model, and any attempt to treat it as one of the latter will inevitably lead to some critical misunderstandings as to the nature of our formulation.

The most fundamental difference between a conceptualization and what are commonly called theories, hypotheses, and predictions is that, unlike the latter three, a conceptualization does not claim, assert, or deny anything, and nothing is predicted. Rather, its intent is the explicit and systematic delineation of a subject matter—a range of *possible* facts (including established as well as merely possible facts). It articulates a set of concepts that can be used to make distinctions between the sorts of phenomena that make up the subject matter in question—in this case, hypnosis. It is a "map" of possibilities, a conceptual "bookkeeping device." As with the chemist's periodic table, it is a means of locating and sorting possible observations within a given conceptual domain. In essence, the conceptualization from which we are borrowing (Ossorio, 1966, 1969/1978, 1971/1978) is what Walter Mischel (1973) has termed a "grammar of behavior." It is not a preemptive bid at the truth. Rather, our foremost purpose is to provide a set of tools for explicitly and systematically describing, ordering, and categorizing both past and future empirical findings about hypnosis so that, as hypnosis researchers, we can be clearer—in our own minds and in our communications—as to what it is we have empirically discovered and as to precisely how and where we agree or disagree concerning hypnosis.

Conceptualizations are here distinguished from those formulations—be they theories, assumptions, postulates, hypotheses, or predictions—that assert some particular facts and thereby deny other merely possible facts. Theories, hypotheses, and so forth are supposed to be confirmable and hence falsifiable, and must therefore be supported by systematic observations to be acceptable. In contrast, a conceptualization must be *non*falsifiable if it is to serve its purpose of articulating and ordering a full range of possible facts without any bias toward some particular facts,

and without leaving out any possible facts. Thus, it is a misunderstanding to consider testability to be a standard of evaluation of a conceptualization, if one means by "testability" an assessment of truth value. Conceptualizations have no possible truth values. Rather, the criteria for appraising conceptualizations are explicitness, cogency, coherency, comprehensiveness (in giving systematic access to a full range of facts), faithfulness to the traditionally recognized subject matter (not merely to the theories), and, most generally, usefulness in the description and explanation of those facts that make up the subject matter. The major empirical question about conceptualizations concerns the extent of their applicability by different persons. Range of application is not to be confused with truth.

It is imperative, then, that the reader understand that we will not be asserting or proposing anything about hypnosis. (See also Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 1, Note 2.) We will not, for example, claim that hypnotic induction procedures must lead to what we will articulate as "Hypnotic states," or that they usually do, or even that they ever do or have. Rather, we will attempt to explicitly identify the different sorts of outcomes that hypnotic induction procedures logically *could* lead to, including Hypnotic states, Hypnoid behaviors, simulation, and various sorts of nonresponsiveness.

One additional feature of conceptualizations needs to be pointed out here. This is a feature that differentiates conceptualizations from most models as well as most theories. This is the requirement that, in order to accomplish their goal, conceptualizations must be articulated in a terminology that already has an established usage—namely, ordinary observational language. There are three reasons for this. First, this is the only way to have theoretical neutrality. Second, since the adequacy of a conceptualization depends upon its intelligibility and its usefulness in the observation of the relevant phenomena, it must be articulated in terms that require neither further definition nor translation in order to use them observationally.[2] Our best, if not only candidate is ordinary language, as many others have recognized (Bromley, 1977; T. Mischel, 1969; W. Mischel, 1968; Ossorio, 1971/1978). Moreover, ordinary language is no less capable of conceptual precision and rigor than specially contrived technical language (Harré & Secord, 1973; Wittgenstein, 1953).

A third advantage of using ordinary language is that there is no need or place for the familiar sort of operational procedures in the empirical employment of the resulting conceptualization. Indeed, the whole notion of "operational definition" deserves a closer look, since whatever else they might be, operational "definitions" are most certainly *not* definitions (Lieberman, 1977). This is to say that they do not directly explicate the *meaning* of a concept; rather, they only attempt to illustrate or instantiate

the concept's use. For example, operational "definitions" of "hypnotic state" (e.g., what*ever* follows an hypnotic indirection procedure; or what*ever* state a person is in while he responds above a certain arbitrary score on a "hypnotic susceptibility scale") tell us nothing about what we mean by "hypnotic state." What they do tell us is where to look to find—or what to do to generate—an instance of the concept in question (e.g., hypnotic state). However, without an explicit conceptualization, an operationalization fails to accomplish adequately even these latter goals. For we should have to ask ourselves how we would ever know if our operational procedure in fact generated an instance of the concept in question—and not an instance of something entirely unrelated or of something merely related—if we were not already prepared to articulate independently what would *count* as an instance of that concept. Does our operational procedure lead to a hypnotic state just because we say so? How would we know if it didn't? Do we just take this on faith? In short, it should be clear that our capacity to adequately answer empirical questions such as "Do hypnotic induction procedures always, sometimes, or ever lead to a trance state, and, if so, under which circumstances?" requires a prior ability to articulate adequate answers to such *conceptual* (not merely methodological) questions as "What do we *mean* by 'trance state'?" With such a conceptualization in hand, we can then meaningfully design (a) procedures whose goal is to *instantiate*—not (operationally) define—trance states, and (b) procedures by which we can empirically assess whether, in fact, we have succeeded in doing do. The present conceptualization is offered as precisely the sort of formulation that can allow us to appraise the adequacy or success of an instantiation of the hypnotic state. Indeed, it places us in the considerably more powerful position of being able to generate an unlimited set of systematically related instantiations, as illustrated in Plotkin and Schwartz (Note 2).

The distinctiveness of the present approach may best be seen in the shift in the form and nature of the questions that are asked. In the traditional approach there is a quasi-empirical historical question, "What are the historically recognized hypnotic phenomena and means of producing them?" followed by major empirical questions such as "Is there really such a thing as a hypnotic state?" (e.g., Orne, 1972) or "Does hypnosis involve a psychological state distinct from the normal waking state?" (e.g., Barber, 1972). Our major critique of the above approach has been that the fundamental conceptual questions, What do we *mean* by "hypnotic state" and by "psychological state"? are unasked and unanswered, and, therefore, the above empirical questions are indeterminate and unanswerable.

In contrast, in the present approach we begin with these fundamental

conceptual questions, which allows us to develop subsequently both historically faithful and conceptually warranted procedures for assessing, for example, the presence of a Hypnotic state. With these procedures we can then meaningfully answer such empirical questions as (a) "Is person P, at time T, in a Hypnotic state?", (b) "Which procedures are most effective in facilitating the induction of a Hypnotic state with person P?" (c) "Which sorts of interests, abilities, and other personal characteristics of P facilitates his Hypnotizability?" (d) "Which sorts of non-ordinary skills, if any, facilitate the hypnotist's successful employment of induction procedure X?" (e) How frequently, if ever, do standard hypnotic induction procedures result in Hypnotic states in particular populations?" and (f) "In what ways can the induction of a Hypnotic state be of benefit for person P?"

OVERVIEW

In light of these considerations, we will proceed in a manner that is quite distinct from the standard approach to hypnosis and that will not generate the familiar sorts of procedural difficulties. We will begin by articulating the general concept of "psychological state" in the ordinary observational vocabulary of action language (e.g., T. Mischel, 1969; Wittgenstein, 1953). On the face of it, this concept of psychological state encompasses all instances of such states, and articulates the basic rules underlying our attributions of any particular psychological state to an individual.

Second, we will articulate concepts of "Trance" and "Hypnotic state" which are manifestly and unequivocally special cases of the concept of psychological state, so that at this point there will be no possibility for coherently raising a doubt as to whether or not the Hypnotic state is a distinct psychological state.

Third, we will introduce the notion of "Hypnoid behaviors," which will be carefully distinguished from—and compared to—both Hypnotic phenomena and hypnotic simulation. Following this, we will explore some related issues such as (a) the logical place of state concepts in the explanation of hypnotic phenomena, and (b) several different sorts of individual difference concepts relevant to understanding hypnosis.

In a second paper (Plotkin & Schwartz, Reference Note 1) we will illustrate the use of the concepts developed in this essay by employing them to construct descriptions, categorizations, and explanations of (a) hypnotic inductions procedures, and (b) a sample of representative manifestations of the Hypnotic state. The ease with which the concepts presented here can be employed to construct coherent explanations of both historically recognized and contemporary hypnotic phenomena

forms the basis for our identification of the present formulation as indeed a heuristic conceptualization of the subject matter of hypnosis.

Finally, in a third essay (Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 2), we shall present (a) general guidelines for the assessment of the presence and depth of the Hypnotic state, and (b) an explicit instance of such a procedure recently developed and successfully employed in one of our laboratories.

PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES

Curiously enough, in all the contributions to the dispute as to whether or not hypnosis involves a distinct psychological state, there has been virtually no coherent discussion of the logically presupposed issue of just what is *meant* by "psychological state" in the first place. Such an articulation is the task of this first section.

To begin with, by "psychological state" we mean a state of a *person* (Abelson, 1977; Harré & Secord, 1972; Ossorio, 1966, 1973, 1971/1978; Strawson, 1959), not of any merely physiological, mechanical, or information-processing structure. This is not to say that it cannot turn out that certain sorts of, for example, distinctive physiological events occur during psychological states of human beings. But whether or not this is the case is an empirical issue, and has no bearing on the conceptual question of what is meant by "psychological state." In general, we must be careful not to misconstrue psychological states as mental or physical entities or processes. In acting in accordance with this caution, we will of course be following the lead of many others before us (e.g., Ossorio, 1966; Ryle, 1949; Sarbin & Coe, 1972; Wittgenstein, 1953).

The initial move is to see that psychological-state concepts (e.g., angry, afraid, elated, interested, bored, confused, depressed, calm, agitated, relaxed, absorbed, entranced, hypnotized) constitute one set of a larger class of descriptive concepts we have for characterizing persons. This superordinate class we will call "personal characteristics" (PC) concepts. Psychological state concepts are a special subset in that they distinguish a person's characteristics at one time from that *same* person's characteristics at other times, whereas all other PC concepts are used to contrast or compare one person with another person, a group of persons, or a social norm.

The wide variety of PC concepts that distinguish between persons can be encompassed under the two categories of personal powers and dispositions. Briefly, the notion of powers involves what a person is *able* to do, and includes the special cases of abilities (the achievements a person is able to accomplish nonaccidentally), knowledge (the range of concepts and facts he or she is able to act upon), and values (the set

of motivational priorities upon which the person is able to act). The category of dispositions, on the other hand, concerns what a person generally *prefers* or is willing to do, and encompasses such groups of concepts as traits, attitudes, interests, and styles (all of which can be further articulated; e.g., Ossorio, 1969/1978).

Although a particular person can be generally characterized and distinguished from others by reference to his or her normal (baseline) powers and dispositions, there can, of course, be psychological variations within a person. When there is a systematic, meaningful, and identifiable variation of this sort, we speak of psychological states.

Thus, to say that a person is in a particular psychological state is to identify a systematic and significant difference of a particular kind in his or her powers and/or dispositions from what they are when he is not in that state (Ossorio, 1969/1978).

For example, to say that a person is in a state of anger (at X) is to say that he or she is more disposed to act in a hostile fashion toward X than normally. Likewise, to say that a person is in a confused state is to say that the person is less able to understand or recognize his or her circumstances or context, and is less able to act appropriately than at other times.

It is important to emphasize here that the domain of psychological states, which corresponds to the language of powers and dispositions, is logically distinct from the domains of behavior, physiology, or experience. It would be as inappropriate to *define* a psychological state such as trance in terms of particular behaviors or experiences as it would be to define it in terms of particular physiological events. Moreover, as instances of PCs, psychological states are not events or processes that happen over and above behavioral events and processes; neither are they hidden forces that "underlie" or efficiently cause behaviors. Rather, PC concepts are the terms that observer-describers use to characterize persons (not mere bodies or minds) by categorizing the different sorts of patterns of behavior that are characteristic of particular individuals (e.g., Block, 1971, 1977; Bowers, 1977), or of particular persons at particular times (i.e., psychological states). Since, as attributes or standing conditions, they are categorically and logically distinct from occurrences (processes and events), they are conceptually ineligible to serve as antecedent variables. As we will elaborate below (in the section on "The Place of the Hypnotic State Concept"), and as Bowers (1973a, 1976) has pointed out, the hypnotic state is not—logically could not be—something that precedes and efficiently causes hypnotic behavior, as Barber (1964, 1969, 1972), for example, has said (correctly in some cases, incorrectly in others) the state theorists hold. Hypnotic states do not efficiently

cause hypnotic behavior; rather hypnotic behaviors are expressions or manifestations of a particular sort of alteration in the person—in his powers and/or dispositions.

The next step is to explicitly identify the particular sort of alteration in powers and/or dispositions that characterize what we will call Trance states, of which our concept of "Hypnotic state" is a special case.[3]

THE TRANCE STATE

We take it to be self-evident that there are at least the following two criteria of adequacy for a conceptualization of trance: (a) It must be a conceptualization of a *state* and not of an object, process, event, structure, behavior, experience, or (as with operational definitions) a procedure that may merely lead to such a state or that may merely provide the opportunity for the manifestation or assessment of such a state, and (b) it must be a conceptualization of a *psychological* state as opposed to, for example, a physiological, cybernetic, or magnetic state. Our conceptualization is as follows:

A *Trance state* is a psychological state characterized by a significant reduction in the person's power and/or disposition to generate final-order appraisals.

The elements of this definition that will require explication are (a) the concept of final-order appraisal, (b) the notion of significant reduction, and (c) the distinction between accepting and generating appraisals.

Final Order Appraisals

The concept of "appraisal" is central to the understanding of the behavior of persons, and is by no means a special construct tailored only for the explication of Trance states. (Indeed, appraisal is in many ways comparable to attribution, which has been widely adopted and employed in contemporary social psychology; see Harvey, Ickes, & Kidd, 1976, 1978; Jones, Karouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1972; Kelley, 1967.) This feature is not incidental, since any formulation of trance that was developed from overly specialized constructs would be unable to effectively integrate the domain of hypnosis with the more general domain of behavior and persons (Gordon, 1969).

To appraise an Element[4] is to assign a value, place, or status to it. An appraisal is an observation or description which carries with it an intrinsic motivational significance, since by assigning a place or status to an Element, it provides one or more reasons for behaving in a particular manner toward that Element. For example, if John appraises a particular hypnotist as someone who can be trusted, this gives John

reason to feel, for instance, that he can speak confidently to the hypnotist and that he need not watch the hypnotic procedures in too much detail. On the other hand, if John appraises the hypnotic situation to be a danger or threat to himself, this observation will give him reason to try to avoid or resist a trance induction. Note that although an appraisal has intrinsic motivational significance, a person may not in fact act on a given appraisal if he has a stronger reason to do otherwise, stemming from other relevant appraisals. In addition, it is important to recognize that the generation of an appraisal is not necessarily a *conscious* process (Langer, 1978) or indeed any kind of process at all (Malcolm, 1971). The making of an appraisal may typically be a nonconscious achievement or event.

Appraisals and Context

As many before us have recognized, to describe or appraise an Element is to assign it a place in a larger domain, to place it within a particular frame or context (Bartlett, 1932; Bertalanfy, 1968; Jenkins, 1974; Kelly, 1955; Mandler, 1975; Neisser, 1967, 1976; Piaget, 1952; Sarbin, 1977; Wittgenstein, 1953). All of an Element's identity, meaning, and significance is contingent upon its place in one or more contexts; all Elements are perceived in terms of their physical, psychological, social, cognitive, and/or linguistic context and not as things-in-themselves. For example, it is now well-recognized that an adequate understanding of any particular behavior ultimately depends upon being able to place it in its social and cultural context—in the social practice, interactional pattern, social group, or form of life in which it has its place or meaning (e.g., Goffman, 1974; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967; Wilson, 1973; Winch, 1965; Wittgenstein, 1953).

The contexts within which an Element is located may, of course, vary widely in logical type and extensiveness, as do, for example, such contexts as a biological cell, a room, a manuscript, a human relationship, a social episode or social institution, or the "worlds" of biology, mountaineering, business, art, mathematics, or education. However, there is one context in which *all* Elements, by definition, have a place; this is the most inclusive or extensive context—the domain which we will identify here as the "real world." That is, the real world is a limiting case or totality in the sense that it is the final context at which we arrive when we locate an Element's place in more and more extensive contexts. Real world, then, is the category term for the totality that encompasses all Elements and all other contexts. As such, it includes the contexts that we call fiction, hallucinations, fantasy, dreams, and imagination, as well as the contents of these contexts, such as fictional characters, hallucinated objects, and dream images. However, it must be remembered that

the place in the real world of a character of fiction, for example, is *as* a character of fiction, not as a real person. The character of fiction is only a person within the context of the fiction. Thus, all Elements, including imaginary ones, have *some* place in the real world; to identify that place is to identify in *what way* (i.e., under what description) they are real.

The content and organization of the real world may vary from culture to culture, and on a smaller scale, from person to person, within a given culture (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Watzlavick, 1976), but for each person, the real world is this sort of totality. There are two reasons why we speak of the "real world" rather than simply the "world:" first, in order to contrast what is *actual* for an individual from what is impossible or merely possible for him (which of course must be assessed by means of appraisals), and second, in order to contrast the totality with constituent sub-worlds such as the business world or the world of fiction.

When an individual appraises the place of an Element within this ultimate or logically final context of his real world, he is making the sort of appraisal that we will identify as a *final-order appraisal* (FOA). To appraise an Element to be an X relative to the context of the real world is to appraise it to be a *real* X. A nonreal X is an Element that is appraised to be an X only within a special context, but not in direct relation to the larger context of the real world; implicit or explicit reference to the smaller context must be made to understand this Element's correct real-world description. For example, a piece of cut glass may be a diamond within the context of a theatrical play, but it is not a diamond within the context of the real world—it is not a *real* diamond; rather, in its real-world context, it is a piece of costume jewelry. Thus, to make a FOA of an Element is to decide under what description that Element is real or nonreal. Every identifiable Element has some place in the real world, and thus there is always at least one description under which an Element is a real X, even though this description may be significantly different from the original one (e.g., in the case of illusions or hallucinations). To make a FOA of an Element corresponds either to saying what place the element has in the real world (these we shall call positive FOAs) or to saying what place it does not have (negative FOAs).

We have chosen to identify these appraisals of veridicality as final-order appraisals since the final or conclusive significance of any Element depends upon the place of that Element in the real world. Or put another way, whenever we have a question or doubt about the nature or significance of an Element, we will ask certain questions and, as answers, make certain appraisals of that Element. In the class of such appraisals, the conclusive or final appraisal is whether or not the Element is a real

X: that appraisal makes an ultimate difference in how we *treat* that Element.

Appraisals of Realness and Truth

To be able to appraise that an Element is a real or a nonreal X requires that one know what are the most fundamental relationships that an X has with certain other Elements of the real world—those relationships which most centrally identify it as the sort of Element that it is. It is these sorts of relationships which together define its real-world place; our knowledge of them corresponds to our knowledge of what facts are possible or impossible, likely or unlikely, about an X.

The appraisal of an Element as being real or nonreal corresponds to the appraisal of the *description* of that Element as an X as being true or false. Therefore, appraisals of realness and appraisals of truth are both final-order appraisals.

The behavioral significance of knowing that an Element is a real X is that we then know how to treat it, what to expect from it, and how to act in accordance with it. When there is a question of doubt, the way in which we determine whether or not an Element is a real X is to determine if we can successfully treat it as an X (assuming that we are then in a position to do so). If we can successfully treat it as an X, and if we have no further reason for supposing that it is something other than an X, then the Element is appraised as a real X. (See Brickman, 1978, for a recent related discussion of reality attributions.) Notice that, for person P, what counts as evidence as to whether or not a particular Element can be treated as an X depends upon *P's* concept of X, not the observer's concept. However, persons in the same or similar societies will share the same or similar languages and social practices, and hence, similar concepts and appraisals. We have to be especially careful in appraising another person as "unrealistic" or "in poor contact with reality" (e.g., "schizophrenic") when we have significantly different real-world concepts. Then the pragmatic issue of whether or not a person is realistic boils down to whether or not that person can effectively treat Elements in accordance with his or her *own* concepts and appraisals: Do his or her appraisals "work" for that person? (See also Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980.) This is to point out that acting realistically does not require all persons to view circumstances in the same fashion. Rather, whatever concepts a person employs, the test of his or her real-world contact is whether the person is effective or not. Not all sincere descriptions/observations, even our own, can be effectively acted upon, yet we can tell the difference between those that can and those that cannot unless we are psychotic, in Trance, or in some other way unable to generate effective FOAs.

Since a person who is in a Trance state, as defined here, is one who is relatively nondisposed and/or unable to generate FOAs, he or she will be correspondingly unlikely to distinguish imaginary Xs from real Xs—he or she will be unlikely to notice that an Element described as an X cannot be effectively treated as an X; or, if the person does notice this, he or she will not take that as a basis for seeing that Element as something other than an X.

Self-appraisals

There is a second domain which is, for persons, also a totality or ultimate context. This is the context of the self-concept. Persons' self-concepts are their summary formulation of their own powers and dispositions—of their respective status "or place" in the real world. Simply put, it corresponds to how persons see themselves; it defines or limits what persons feel to be possible facts about themselves. Answers to questions such as "Am I eligible to do that?" or "Could I have done that?" or "What sort of person am I?" are formed in accordance with the self-concept. Since the self-concept is the ultimate context in relation to which we appraise descriptions or possible facts about ourselves, then self-appraisals are also final-order appraisals. As FOAs, self-appraisals establish the reality of ourselves. Although we cannot take the space to expand on this here, it should at least be pointed out that the contexts of the real world and of the self are interdependent—they reflect each other. What a person sees as real, or as possible for him or her to encounter, is limited by his self-concept. Likewise, one's understanding of one's self is constrained by one's understanding of the domain (the real world) in which one has a place. To *be* a person—to have the ability to be aware of one's self—corresponds to being a final-order appraiser, to having a concept of "real," and to knowing oneself as a being-in-the-world (Boss, 1963). However, when a person is in a Trance state, that person is not fully acting upon his or her normal person-status since he or she may be relatively nondisposed or unable to distinguish himself or herself as a *particular* self. At these times, the person's self-concept is relatively inactive, and he or she can entertain facts about him- or herself that he or she may not have been willing to consider otherwise.

FOAs and Episodic Memory

Up to this point, we have identified the real world as simply the most inclusive context. A further way to see what sets off the real world as the one in relation to which appraisals of realness and truth are made is that it is the one that includes the individual and all his or her personal or autobiographical history. This is a logical necessity since, whatever else the real world is, it must include the individual whose real world

it is. The ability to distinguish the real world from other worlds, therefore, requires the ability to identify the historical facts that correspond to one's personal experiences: For any given observer, the real world is "my world." Furthermore, the ability to distinguish one's personal experiences from other, merely possible, experiences is an achievement that requires a special memorial competence, which Tulving (1972) has called "episodic memory":

> Episodic memory receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events. A perceptual event can be stored in the episodic system solely in terms of its perceptible properties or attributes, and it is always stored in terms of its autobiographical reference to the already existing contents of the episodic memory store. (p. 385)

Thus, the ability to make FOAs depends upon the ability (or abilities) identified as episodic memory, since the making of a FOA requires the identification of one's real-world context which is codified in episodic memory. Therefore, a person in a Trance state, who is relatively nondisposed to appraise Elements relative to the context of the real world, may be expected to show certain deficits in his episodic memory, at least on those tasks in which episodic and semantic memory are most distinct.

The Place of FOAs in Behavior and Experience

It is important to note that simply treating an Element as an X does not require that a positive FOA of X has been made. To the contrary, it is relatively rare that we make FOAs since fundamental issues of veridicality seldom arise and, logically, could not be the rule. As discussed below, it is necessarily the case that most appraisals are not final-order appraisals. FOAs are made only when an Element or description is recognized as *anomalous*. By anomalous we do not mean that the Element is irregular, counterexpectative, or ambiguous, although this may often be the case for anomalies. Rather, when we speak of an Element as being anomalous, we are saying that, under its initial description or observation as an X, it appears to be violating one or more of the fundamental relationships that hold between Xs and other Elements. Anomalous, then, is a different concept from counterexpectative, since under some circumstances an anomalous Element will actually be expected (e.g., a mirage or optical illusion), and an unexpected Element is, of course, not necessarily anomalous. Likewise, an irregularity (e.g., a missing object or an object in the wrong position) is not anomalous if no fundamental relationships are violated by that irregularity. Nor is an ambiguous element anomalous if we have not questioned its realness. An Element is an anomalous X if and only if, *as* an X, it is violating the formal laws that govern the existence of Xs. Thus, the place (use) of

FOAs is in the management of Elements that are recognized to be *out* of place. The rule for normal behavior and observation is that an Element is simply identified as an X, it is treated as a case of an X, and no FOA is made. It is only when we cannot successfully treat an apparent X *as* an X, or when we have reason to believe that such an action will be unsuccessful, that we may generate a FOA.

The reason, then, that FOAs are not generally made is that we do not frequently encounter anomalous Elements. This would logically have to be the general rule since an Element is learned to be an X, in the first place, by virtue of the fact that we *have* been able to successfully treat it as an X in a variety of circumstances and ways. We would not have learned that it was an X otherwise. Thus, from the very fact that we acquired the particular concept of an X that we did, it follows that it is unusual to encounter anomalous Xs. If at a later time we were to frequently encounter anomalous Xs, our concept of X and ways of treating Xs would change to accommodate this state of affairs (cf. Piaget, 1955). Of course, there are individual differences here. Some of us encounter anomalies more often than others. This will reflect our changing circumstances, our learning histories in acquiring particular concepts, and our proneness to certain emotional, pathological, or altered states of consciousness.

However, it is not only that persons differ in their liability for encountering anomalies or in their disposition to appraise Elements as anomalies. It is also the case that some classes of Elements, by their very nature, are more likely to have anomalous instances, or to evoke appraisals of anomaly, across observers. These will be the sorts of Elements that are of relatively great conceptual complexity and which we have less established or dependable means for appraising. The major class of such Elements appear to be those that are uniquely associated with persons.

FOAs in Everyday Life

In particular, it is the *self-presentations* and *interpersonal relationships* of persons that appear to be the most frequent objects of FOAs. For the most part, persons may be pretty much as they present themselves to be. However, as Goffman (1959, 1969) has thoroughly explored, persons are also quite capable of dissimulation, fraud, and deception (even self-deception; see Fingarette, 1969), something of which nonpersons are categorically incapable. That is, it is only persons who can purposely mislead each other as to what is real or true, just as it is only persons who can wonder "Is it real?" or "Is it true?" or "Is it me?" (Arnold, 1969).

If we think about our recent occasions for generating FOAs, most of

us will find them to concern questions about the authenticity or accuracy of another's statements or status claims, or of the nature of a personal relationship. For example, consider those daily experiences of doubt as to whether or not person P really is feeling what he is expressing, whether P is "putting us on" or "presenting a false front," whether P really has the status he is claiming, whether he really has the ability or disposition he is implying, whether he and I really have the relationship he is suggesting, and so forth. These all involve FOA-generation. As Goffman (1969) points out, the generation of FOAs in social contexts can become quite complex, reflexive, and contagious:

> Surely every adult who has had a friend or spouse has had occasion to doubt expression of relationship and then to doubt the doubt even while giving the other reasons to suspect that something is being doubted. (Goffman, 1969, p. 81)

Although social interaction is undoubtedly the most common context in which FOAs are generated (and also the one in which there are the greatest individual differences in power and disposition to generate FOAs), anomalies are also encountered and appraised in other domains. Graham Reed (1972), in *The Psychology of Anomalous Experience*, nicely categorizes, analyzes, and documents numerous sorts of anomalies that occur both within and outside the context of person-perception. Although Reed employs the term anomaly in a way that is somewhat broader than our use (he includes occurrences that are merely "irregular, disordered, or unusual"), his book nevertheless explores numerous examples of what we are here calling anomalies, that is, occurrences that appear to violate fundamental real-world relationships. For instance, FOAs are commonly evoked, either during or after the fact (and either successfully or unsuccessfully), by such phenomena as perceptual illusions (e.g., the classical optical illusions; desert mirages; illusions associated with monotonous sensory conditions such as aviation, watchkeeping, solitary imprisonment, deep-sea diving, polar exploration, and experimental sensory-deprivation; expectancy-related illusions and misidentifications; and pareidolia), hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery, dreams, hallucinations (both positive and negative, pseudo and functional), doppelgänger (a hallucination of one's "double"), *l'illusion des sosies* (the correct recognition of all the *attributes* of another person without being able to recognize the person as such; that is, the illusion of someone's being an impostor or double), déjà vu and its converse, jamais vu, experiences associated with the blurring of "ego boundaries," depersonalization (those instances in which one "remains aware of his personal identity, but appreciates that his sense of change and unreality is subjective and does not represent any *real* change" (Reed, 1972, p. 127), as in some experiences associated with psychedelic drugs, psychosis, intense emo-

tional reactions, and social stress situations), similar experiences of derealization, and the appraisals of others' delusions (demonstrably false beliefs). In the course of his presentation, Reed (1972) also discusses numerous occasions (Trances) in which the power and/or disposition to generate FOAs is significantly reduced.

The Generation of FOAs

To generate a FOA is to both initiate and make it. This distinction between "generating" and "making" is important since the person in Trance may make appraisals that are initiated or evoked by someone else.

The generation of a FOA can be formally represented as involving three steps or phases: anomaly recognition, evidence gathering, and decision. This is not meant to imply that when a person generates a FOA, it is necessarily the case that he or she sequentially, deliberately, or consciously performs these three steps, but rather that, paradigmatically, FOAs involve these three sorts of achievements. However, in some cases the middle step is left out, and the first and third steps become two perspectives on the same and single event. The first formal phase, the recognition of anomaly, corresponds to the initiation of the FOA. The second phase, evidence gathering, corresponds to the optional process of "reality-testing," the resolution of ambiguity, during which it is determined whether or not the Element in question can be treated as an X, whether in fact it violates the fundamental relationships between Xs and other Elements, and so forth (see Piaget, 1955). Finally, the FOA is made, which corresponds to the decision that "it really is an X, after all" or "it is not an X," or "it is actually a Y."

It is critical to understand that when we speak of a person as making the appraisal that an Element is an X, this is meant specifically to exclude the possibility that he or she is simply pretending that it is an X or merely acting *as if* it had been appraised as an X. To appraise an Element as an X is to genuinely *experience* it as an X. Moreover, a person who appraises an Element as an X will usually treat it accordingly, since appraisals carry with them intrinsic motivational significance. However, there are exceptions here. In some circumstances we will have a sufficiently strong reason to treat an Element as a not-X (and thus pretend) despite the fact that we appraise it to be an X. Therefore, how an Element is appraised and how it is treated are different issues, although they will normally coincide.

How Much is "Significantly"?

We are not being imprecise when we say that a reduction in power and/or disposition to generate FOAs amounts to a Trance state only if it is a *significant* reduction. This language simply embodies three re-

minders. First, the description of someone as being Entranced is an appraisal, not a measurement. There is no getting around the logical requirement that this appraisal must be made by *someone,* and that different observers will sometimes disagree. It is not meaningful to speak of somehow quantifying a conceptualization of a psychological phenomenon in the hope of rendering it more objective. As Harré and Secord (1973) have pointed out, precision in the social sciences does not correspond to accuracy of quantitative measurements (as it does in the natural sciences), but rather to the explicitness and refinement of descriptions and conceptual articulations. Moreover, as Bowers (1977) has recently noted, objectivity in psychology is not to be confused with descriptions of behavior in physical or topographical terms. (See the formulation of the concept of "behavior" by Ossorio, 1973, for what is perhaps the most exceptional instance of precision and objectivity in behavioral science.)

Second, being Entranced is not an all-or-none condition: a person can be more or less Entranced. The phrase "significant reduction" implies a continuum of Trance depth. The depth, or intensity, of a Trance state corresponds to the extent of the reduction in power and/or disposition to generate FOAs. The deeper the state, the more it is the case that the relinquished range of FOAs are fundamental to the individual's concept of self and real world.

Third, when appraising person P's state, the reduction in question is relative to *P's* normal powers and dispositions, not to a social norm or ideal. We can expect that people will differ on this PC dimension, so that strictly speaking we cannot make an adequate determination of the extent to which a person is Entranced unless we know something of that person's normal powers and dispositions (see the section below on individual differences).

None of the above is to be taken as implying that it is neither possible nor desirable to develop objective and precise procedures for increasing the confidence and reliability with which we can appraise the extent that a person is in a Trance state. Indeed, such procedures have already been developed and are to be described elsewhere (Schwartz & Plotkin, Note 2). Rather, the above reminders indicate that the conceptualization of a phenomenon is not the place to speak of specific instantiations of that phenomenon. The conceptualization of Trance must indicate what *all* instances of Trance have in common. It is precisely that feature which allows the conceptualization to be employed in the assessment of its instances in not one, but any, circumstances.

FOAs and Trance

We saw above that only a small minority of the very large number of appraisals we make every day could be final-order appraisals. However,

this is not to imply that the power to make FOAs is of anything less than central and primary importance in being a person and in maintaining a concept of self and real world. Although FOAs are not the rule, persons are normally disposed and able to generate them when they are called for. It is not the constant making of FOAs, but rather the *disposition and power* to generate them, that is the logical requirement for having, achieving, and maintaining a real world and a self-concept. A person who could not generate FOAs when called for would not be able to distinguish between a real world and an imaginary world, or between self and other, and thus would not *have* the concepts of the real world or of self.

Although persons are not always generating FOAs, it is an unusual and striking phenomenon when a person does not generate a FOA *under those circumstances in which he would be expected to,* that is, when an Element is encountered that he would normally appraise as anomalous. When, over a period of time, a person frequently fails to generate such FOAs, he or she is in a Trance state as defined here. The case of the Hypnotic state is one of the clearest exemplars of one of these conditions: The hypnotic situation is precisely one in which there *is* something anomalous about, for example, the hypnotist's descriptions of various Elements (i.e., those descriptions would normally be appraised as false). In fact, it is because many hypnotic subjects either do not generate—or do not appear to generate—the FOAs that they would be expected to, that the hypnotic situation holds the fascination, interest, and entertainment value that it does. However, we are here identifying Trance states (including the Hypnotic state—see below) only with those in which the person does not even *generate* many of the FOAs that we would expect him or her to. The other case (generating them but not acting upon them) is the one which we will speak of below as encompassing both Hypnoid behaviors and simulation, which will be further differentiated.

Individuals manifesting the state we are calling Trance should regularly be observed to handle the realness or truth of the Elements they encounter in an extraordinary fashion: for them, *there are no such issues.* Thus, what may seem astonishing to a nonEntranced observer may appear to be treated matter-of-factly by the person in Trance. What otherwise would be considered as anomalous is acted upon without awkwardness or suspicion. The Entranced individual is simply less likely to make distinctions between what is (for the observer) imagination, on the one hand, and reality, on the other, although the person in Trance can consciously act in relation to both domains. It is not the real world *contents* that are abandoned, but what finally organizes and interrelates them: the real world *context.* Thus, when a person is in Trance, there is a more fluid relationship between remembered, perceived, and imagined Elements—there is a greater range of possibilities that can be freely

considered and acted upon. Trance offers some degree of freedom from normal real-world constraints—a freedom that can enhance creative synthesis—at the cost of a temporary pragmatic ineffectiveness.

In any given instance of Trance, we would not necessarily expect that the total sense of self or of real-world context is abandoned, but rather that the range of FOAs given up will depend upon the depth of Trance, upon the circumstances involved in the induction (including any social relationships involved), and upon the person's other personal characteristics, including other nonTrance features of his or her present psychological state. With this qualification in mind, it appears that the present formulation of Trance encompasses the full range of psychological states historically identified as trance states: those associated with reverie, meditation, hypnosis, hypnagogia, spiritualism, divination, shamanism, fugue, depersonalization, derealization, dissociation, and some psychoses.

To summarize: a person in a Trance state—one who is relatively nondisposed and/or unable to generate FOAs—is a person who is correspondingly nondisposed and/or unable to:

1. recognize anomalies
2. question the realness of distinguished Elements
3. question the truth of distinguished statements
4. act on his self-concept
5. appraise the place of an Element in the contexts of self or real world
6. pay heed to the context that his real world provides for his actions.

SHOR'S "GENERALIZED REALITY ORIENTATION"

In reviewing the relevant literature, there is one previous conceptualization of trance that prominently stands out from the rest in terms of its richness and originality. This is Ronald Shor's (1959, 1961, 1970) work concerning the concept of the "generalized-reality orientation." In this section we will briefly review Shor's concept, and compare and contrast it with the present formulation of Trance. In a later section we will discuss how our concept of *Hypnotic state* (presented below) differs from Shor's (1961, 1970) concept of hypnosis, as well as those of Hilgard (1965) and Orne (1977).

Shor (1959) defines the generalized reality-orientation (GRO) as "a structured frame of reference in the background of attention which supports, interprets, and gives meaning to all experiences" (p. 236). For him, a trance state is "any state in which the generalized reality-orientation has faded to relatively nonfunctional unawareness" (p. 241). At

first glance, this fading of the GRO appears to correspond roughly to a reduction in power and/or disposition to generate FOAs. However, on closer inspection, it turns out that Shor's "GRO relinquishment" encompasses a much more pervasive and general power loss than what we have here articulated as a Trance state. Specifically, Shor's concept of trance corresponds to what we would identify, in our present terms, as a significant reduction in power and/or dispositions to generate *any* kind of appraisal (not simply *final-order* appraisals). That is, for Shor (1959), a trance involves "the loss of self and world *entirely*" (p. 236; our emphasis), not merely "the *merging* of self and world" (p. 236, author's emphasis). For Shor, the GRO is "the whole abstract superstructure of relationships which serves as the foundation for my viewing the world" (p. 237). Hence, the GRO appears to be as global a concept as Kelly's (1955) "personal construct system," Lewin's (1935) "life space," Roger's (1947) "phenomenal field," Piaget's (1955) "universe" or "system of schemata," or what we have here called the person's concept of the real world. Shor (1959) states that the GRO

> does not exist just to test reality. While reality-testing is certainly an important derivation, the conception goes beyond it. The reality-orientation *is* reality, at least in the sense that it is the inner surrogate for reality which the person must have in order to interpret anything (to "test" anything for that matter). All entities and events (self, time, space, purpose) exist for an individual only because they are predicated upon the mobilization of an adequate reality-orientation in which such secondary functions (such as reality-testing and differentiation of self from environment) can exist. (p. 240, author's emphasis)

In contrast, persons in what we have here conceptualized as a Trance state still have the power and disposition to make distinctions and to generate the full range of lower-order appraisals about their world, although since they are in Trance, they will not distinguish that world as their world or as a real (or nonreal) world—they will not distinguish between reality and imagination. The Entranced individual's world is one in which the distinctions "self" and "real" have no place, but it is nevertheless a world in which all other forms of appraisals can and do have a place. In other words, there is not a complete loss of consciousness or of critical awareness as in Shor's "trance."

We do not think that the loss of a cognitive framework as global as that represented by Shor's GRO is what most persons, professionals and laymen alike, have in mind when they think of trance. It is the distinction between final-order appraisals and appraisals in general that is absent in Shor's (1959) formulation, and one that we find to be necessary for the understanding of most states historically identified as trances, including the hypnotic state.

However, in his more recent publications, Shor (1961, 1970) writes of

the GRO in a way that is somewhat different from his initial formulation. For example, in his 1970 paper, he states that

> this wide frame of reference or orientation to generalized reality can fade into the very distant background of our minds so that ongoing experiences are *isolated from their usual context*. When that happens the *distinction between imagination and reality no longer exists for us*. (p. 91, our emphasis)

Contrary to his earlier formulation, Shor here implies that the GRO is not necessary for the making of distinctions, but only for the distinctions between real and not-real. This is more in line with our concept of Trance, but in the very next paragraph of Shor's (1970) paper we find an important distinction nonetheless:

> Trance depth is defined as the extent to which at any given moment in time the true state of affairs is unrepresented in the subject's conscious, phenomenal self-awareness. (p. 91)

Here, then, it appears that Shor is restricting trance experiences to those of *imaginary* states of affairs. In contrast, our concept of Trance does not exclude the *representation* of the "true state of affairs." It is possible (although not necessary) for a person in Trance to be perfectly aware of his or her normal real world; it is just that to the extent the person is aware of the real world he or she is not aware of it *as* real. For example, the person does not distinguish between images and observations of actual objects in terms of their realness; he or she is categorically unconcerned with issues of realness or self so that every distinction is equally real or nonreal. Thus, we are identifying Trance not with a condition in which the person is "completely oblivious to the true reality about him" (Shor, 1970, p. 92), but rather with a condition in which there is an obliviousness to the *issues* of realness, self, or truth. We find this distinction to be crucial since we want to be able to include under the label of Trance behavior those that involve conscious transactions with everyday real-world Elements, including real persons such as hypnotists.

Before going on, we will briefly mention what we find to be some additional differences between the two formulations. First is the fact that our conceptualization in terms of powers and dispositions directly expresses Trance state in the language of psychological states, whereas reality-orientation language is somewhat more abstract and susceptible to equivocation and reification. Second, by speaking in terms of appraisals rather than of orientations we can directly relate Trance to its manifestations in particular Trance behaviors, whereas extra moves are required to connect an orientation change to a particular behavior change.

(Recall that appraisals are on the same level of analysis as behaviors—they are descriptions or observations that connect directly to reasons for actions.) This feature greatly facilitates the explication of particular Trance phenomena (Schwartz & Plotkin, Note 1). Third, by speaking on the more differentiated level of appraisals (in contrast to the relatively global level of orientation), we can easily speak of a loss of specific ranges of FOAs (e.g., those associated with what Wittgenstein, 1953, has termed "forms of life") as opposed to a global loss of FOAs (or reality-orientation). This is important since there will be cases of Trance with which we will want to be able to deal that involve a loss of power to generate only a restricted range of FOAs. Finally, and most importantly, our formulation in terms of appraisals allows us access, on the same integrated conceptual map, to both the sorts of facts involved in Trance (including Hypnotic) behaviors and those involved in Hypnoid and simulation behavior. Thus a rapprochement between the "state" and "nonstate" positions becomes a formal possibility.

THE HYPNOTIC STATE

In order to articulate systematically the range of possible facts that correspond to "Hypnotic state," we will offer a paradigm case formulation of this concept. A paradigm case formulation consists of two components: a paradigm case and a set of permissible transformations. The paradigm case is typically the most general, complex, and/or indubitable instance of the concept in question, while the transformations are permissible ways in which the paradigm case can be altered with the result still being an instance of the concept. Thus paradigm case formulations are a highly effective means of delineating a subject matter consisting of a family of related phenomena that do not have any single set of characteristics in common.

Paradigm case. A Hypnotic state is a Trance state characterized by there being another person (the hypnotist) who (a) facilitates the induction of the state, (b) facilitates the maintenance of the state, (c) becomes highly effective at evoking appraisals for the subject.

Transformations. (1) Eliminate (a) and/or (b) and/or (c), but not all three. (2) Increase the number of hypnotists. (3) Allow the hypnotist and subject to be the same person in different roles or at different times (in which case, it is an auto-Hypnotic state).

Here are a few points about the above formulation that deserve special and immediate emphasis. The first concerns part (c) of the paradigm

case, which corresponds to the traditional notions of suggestion and suggestibility: a successful suggestion is the evocation of a (typically anomalous) appraisal (usually not a *final-order* appraisal; see below). When we speak of a subject as having *accepted* a suggestion, we will mean that the subject has made the corresponding appraisal (not simply acted *as if* he or she has). In the paradigm case of the Hypnotic state, the hypnotist becomes highly effective at evoking appraisals for the Hypnotized subject since (a) during the induction procedure (see Schwartz & Plotkin, Note 1), the hypnotist may have led the subject to believe that the hypnotist has the power to affect the subject's behavior and experience, (b) the subject has partially relinquished his or her self-concept, and has thereby lost some of the reasons that he or she would normally have had to resist the hypnotist's suggestions (reasons for or against certain behavior stem from the person's self-concept), and (c) since paradgimatically, the Hypnotized person is unlikely to generate FOAs of the hypnotist's suggestions, he or she is correspondingly unlikely to question whether the suggested phenomena are possible; that is, the subject is relatively unlikely to question the veridicality of the hypnotist's descriptions of the world, including the hypnotist's description of the subject's behavior. Thus, it is likely that a Hypnotized subject would be able to accept the hypnotist's appraisals and to act in accordance with them, provided that he or she has the relevant competence to perform the particular actions that are suggested.

None of these statements concerning part (c) of the paradigm case is to be taken to imply that the hypnotist acquires "special powers" over the subject. To the contrary, we may more appropriately speak of the subject's exercise of his or her own special power to experience his or her own world in unusual ways. (We shall discuss elsewhere the issue of compulsion and ability to resist hypnotic suggestions; see Plotkin and Schwartz, Note 1.)

Second, note that suggestibility is not a necessary feature of the Hypnotic state (nor is the Hypnotic state necessary for suggestibility; see below). It is possible for a person to give up his or her power or disposition to generate only those FOAs that concern issues of "real-non-real" and "self-not-self" without giving up those that concern issues of "true-untrue," which are the set of FOAs applied to other persons' statements, including the hypnotist's suggestions. Thus, a Hypnotized person may be nondisposed to question the realness of what he or she observes without accepting the descriptions (suggestions) of other persons.

Third, when one or more of the transformations are applied, we still have a case of a Hypnotic state, but not one as representative as the paradigm case.

Fourth, note that as a psychological state, the Hypnotic state is articulated in the language of powers and dispositions and not in terms of (a) any particular behaviors or experiences, (b) the occurrence of any particular type of induction procedure, or even *any* induction procedure, (c) the occurrence of any particular type or class of verbalization by the subject, (d) the detection or occurrence of any type of physiological event or process, or (e) any *particular* sort of relationship with the hypnotist. Rather, the Hypnotic state is here defined in terms of a particular sort of change in power and/or disposition, regardless of how this change comes about, and regardless of the specific behavior and experiences by which it is expressed.

Fifth, note that the issue of which particular behaviors and experiences occur during the Hypnotic state depends upon (a) the subject's personal dispositions and powers, including the subject's abilities, values, and knowledge (or beliefs) about hypnosis, whether acquired extra-experimentally or by means of explicit or implicit suggestion during the hypnotic procedures, and (b) the circumstances of the hypnotic context, including the interpersonal relationships and the hypnotist's suggestions (if any). Finally, note that a person need not know at the time he or she is Hypnotized that he or she is in that state, nor need it be the case that any of the Hypnotic experiences appears to be unusual to the person at the time of their occurrence.

OTHER FORMULATIONS OF THE HYPNOTIC STATE

In this section, we will compare our conceptualization with the formulations of three of the major "hypnotic state" theorists—Ronald Shor, Martin Orne, and Ernest Hilgard. Our goal is to point out some major differences between these approaches and our own and to clarify further our conceptualization in the process.

Shor's Formulation

Ronald Shor (1961, 1970) in his "three-factor theory of hypnosis," does not actually offer a direct conceptualization of the hypnotic state. Instead, he speaks in terms of the related concept of "hypnotic depth," which he defines as a "complex of depth along three conceptually separate dimensions" (Shor, 1961, p. 252): trance, nonconscious involvement, and archaic involvement. Shor's concept of trance depth has already been discussed in an earlier section.

> Depth of nonconscious involvement is defined as the extent to which at any given moment in time the hypnotic experiences and behaviors are executed by the subject

> without conscious intention—i.e., without consciously directed motivation, even seemingly in defiance of it.
>
> . . . Depth of archaic involvement is defined as the extent to which at any given moment in time the subject is expressing attitudes, yearnings, and modes of relating to the hypnotist as if a child toward his parents. (Shor, 1970, pp. 91–92)

Shor's formulation differs from ours in several respects. First, since for Shor "it would be quite misleading . . . to speak of an *overall* depth of hypnosis" (1970, p. 91; our emphasis), then it also becomes quite misleading to speak of a unitary concept of hypnotic state. Indeed, he never does. Hence, this is one clear difference between our formulations. Ours allows us to assess the presence of both a Hypnotic state and Hypnotic depth without losing the capacity to make any of the distinctions encompassed by Shor's formulation. Second, as we have already seen above, his concept of trance depth gets at a somewhat different range of facts than does our concept of Trance; specifically, it excludes the conscious distinguishing of real world Elements.

Third, there is no one-to-one correspondence between Shor's second dimension (nonconscious involvement) and any single feature of our present formulation. There is a complexity in making a comparison here since it appears that this dimension of Shor's formulation encompasses two somewhat different sets of phenomena, both of which have further subdivisions. Table 1 is an outline of our analysis of nonconscious involvement. An in-depth treatment of this feature of Shor's formulation is called for here, since it concerns some of the most central and intractable problems in the exploration of hypnotic phenomena.

The first sense in which Shor employs the notion of nonconscious involvement is represented in the above quote, in which he speaks of experiences and behaviors being executed without conscious intention. This, itself, requires partition into two phenomena for analysis: the nonconscious "execution" of (a) behavior and (b) experiences. First, what does it mean to "nonconsciously execute a behavior"? If it is to perform intentionally an action without being *conscious* of our intention to do

Table 1. Analysis of Shor's "Nonconscious Involvement"

I. Behaviors and experiences executed without conscious intention.
   A. Behaviors
      1. Behaviors appraised by the subject (while they are occurring) as spontaneous or automatic.
      2. Behaviors executed completely out of awareness.
   B. Experiences
      1. The cognitive construction of experiences.
      2. Experiences facilitated by nonconscious goal-directed fantasy.

II. Nonconscious general strivings to be a good hypnotic subject.

so, then Shor's nonconscious involvement encompasses too much. It should be clear to all of us that, relative to the number of behaviors we execute every day, we are very rarely *ever* consciously aware of our intentions to do what we do (indeed, a person who is frequently conscious of his intentions to execute behavior is typically considered to lack spontaneity or to be overly "self-conscious"). On the contrary, it is not our *intentions to behave* that are the typical contents of consciousness, but rather it is the Elements in relation to which we are behaving. (See Plotkin, [1981] for further details.) Hence, we do not think that Shor wants to say that a behavior is hypnotic by his second dimension simply because it is executed without conscious intention to do so. Rather, we believe he has in mind one or both of the following two sorts of unusual (indeed, anomalous) behaviors. First are those intentional behaviors of which we become consciously aware while we execute them but which we consciously appraise to be unintended (this is item IA1 in Table 1). A typical example from the historical domain of hypnosis would be the subject who consciously appraises his arm to be spontaneously or automatically rising— that is, rising without the intention to raise it. This, indeed, is an anomalous experience, but it is important that the reader carefully notice what is anomalous about it. It is not anomalous simply because it is being executed without conscious intention. Rather, what is odd is the combination of two states of affairs: (a) The subject is consciously attending to his behavior of raising his arm (this, itself, is unusual; note how infrequently we are consciously aware of our behavior itself *while* we are executing it.), and (b) from the subject's point of view, this behavior does not appear to be a *behavior* at all—that is, it does not appear to be an intentional action (Ossorio, 1973)—it appears to be a mere movement or occurrence. In short, what is odd is that the subject is consciously appraising as unintended, a behavior that an observer consciously appraises to be an intentional action. Note that this would not happen unless the subject were specifically conscious of his or her action itself. Such a behavior is not necessarily Hypnotic by our present formulation—it may only be what we will formally discuss below as a Hypnoid behavior. (Whether it is one or the other will also be discussed below.) Moreover, and in any case, such behaviors are only a very special instance of what is encompassed by "behaviors executed without conscious intention," since this latter category includes the majority of behaviors both in and out of hypnosis. Thus, we do not think that Shor's formulation is sufficiently precise here.

A second type of behavior which is a special instance of behaviors executed without conscious intention, and which Shor might also have in mind, are those which are executed without any conscious awareness whatsoever—no conscious awareness of the behavior *qua* behavior, of

the intention, or of the Elements in relation to which the behavior is directed (item IA2 in Table 1). Examples from hypnosis are automatic writing (e.g., Hilgard, 1977), and posthypnotic behaviors such as unconsciously touching one's ankle upon a prearranged cue. However, again, what is unusual about these behaviors in hypnosis is not simply that they are completely unconscious, since every day we execute certain behaviors completely unconsciously—behaviors like scratching an itch, twirling a strand of hair, adjusting our posture, smoking a cigarette, tying a shoelace, or sometimes even more complex behaviors such as driving an automobile while only being conscious of, say, a conversation or of a pressing problem. The reader will recognize, of course, that these behaviors are the exercise of "overlearned" skills, or of habits that no longer require any sort of conscious attention for their execution. The odd thing, then, about hypnotic automatic writing or posthypnotic behavior is not simply that they are executed nonconsciously, but that they are either (a) executed in response to a cue explicitly arranged by the hypnotist, or (b) neither "overlearned" nor habitual—they normally *are* executed with conscious attention (not *in*tention) to the task, the objects of the action. (For our exploration of these phenomena see Schwartz & Plotkin, Note 1).

To summarize so far: we find that Shor's formulation of behaviors executed without conscious intention, although including many hypnotic behaviors, nevertheless encompasses far too many others to be a heuristic identification of any dimension of hypnosis. Moreover, it also excludes many behaviors that are commonly considered hypnotic. For example, consider the following hypnotic behavior which is executed with conscious intention (unlike most everyday behaviors). Suppose the hypnotist places a room-temperature wooden rod in the subject's hand and says that it is a heating element which he or she is turning on and making hotter and hotter. Suppose the subject appraises (actually experiences) the rod to be getting increasingly hot, and eventually drops it. The dropping of the rod would be considered to be hypnotic by most persons, but it is fully intentional, and consciously so. The subject is conscious both of what he or she is doing and of why he or she is doing it. As far as the subject is concerned the "heating element" was beginning to burn his or her hand. The reason that the subject is conscious of his or her behavior and intention stems from the fact that the hypnotist has specifically focused the subject's attention there. In any case, the interesting (hypnotic) aspect of this behavior is not whether or not it was executed with conscious intention, but rather the fact that apparently the subject was "fooled" or "deluded" (Orne, 1977; Sutcliffe, 1961) into experiencing (appraising) the rod as hot. Hypnotic behavior of this sort includes those stemming from positive and negative hallucinations (e.g..

brushing away a hallucinated fly, or an hypnotic anaesthesia) and "challenge items", in which the subject is conscious of an intentional and unsuccessful attempt to, for example, bend a hypnotically stiffened arm or open hypnotically stuck or paralyzed eyes. Hence, behaviors of the above sort are not hypnotic by Shor's criteria of "executed without conscious intention."

However, Shor's formulation could be taken to imply that in the case of the challenge items, the behaviors that are nonconsciously executed are not the attempts to perform the challenged behaviors (such as bending the stiffened arm), but rather the simultaneous behavior of, for example, stiffening the arm so that it *is* difficult to bend. Indeed, if the subject *is* keeping his or her arm stiff and is not conscious of this, and if this is the reason the subject cannot bend his or her arm when he or she tries, then this behavior is hypnotic by Shor's definition (although not necessarily by ours—see below). However, this will not help with the positive and negative hallucinations. For example, what behaviors are being nonconsciously executed in the case of the dropped "heating element"?

At this point, Shor might argue that the dropping of the rod was a case of nonconscious involvement not because the *behavior* was executed without conscious intention, but because the *experience* (of heat) was. Now we are on to part IB (Table 1) of our analysis of nonconscious involvement, and we must begin by asking: In what sense is an experience (a distinction or appraisal) ever "executed," whether consciously or otherwise? We will consider two possibilities.

First is the "constructionist" idea that all experiences are "constructed" out of elements of our "cognitive construct systems" (Kelly, 1955; Neisser, 1976; Sarbin, 1977). According to this view, perception and imagination are always the result of active, but usually nonconscious, cognitive processes. In this sense, *all* experiences are executed and usually nonconsciously. If this was what Shor meant by "execution," then we would have to conclude that all of us are hypnotized most of the time. As appealing as this idea may be to some, it clearly encompasses a much larger domain under "hypnosis" than any contemporary student of hypnosis, including Shor and ourselves, would find desirable.

A second (and not mutually exclusive) interpretation of "execution" would correspond to the carrying out of a specific set of sequence of behaviors for the purpose of bringing about a particular experience. Perhaps most experiences can be seen as the achievement of whatever behaviors immediately preceded them, but how often would we say that we engaged in those behaviors specifically for the purpose of having a certain experience at their termination? Certainly there are common instances of such practices, but they are clearly not the rule for everyday

behaviors. In this sense of the word, then, experiences are rarely executed. Nevertheless, there is in fact an instance of this sort of phenomenon that is associated with hypnosis: namely what has recently been termed "goal-directed fantasy" (e.g., Spanos, 1971; Spanos & Barber, 1972), about which we will have much to say below in connection with Hypnoid behaviors. When a person engages in goal-directed fantasy (GDF), he or she imagines those things which, if they were actually to occur, would bring about the desired experience. This may correspond to the sort of thing Shor had in mind when speaking of the "execution of an experience." If so, then Shor would say that it was a case of nonconscious involvement when a person engaged in GDF, or something like it, *without being conscious of doing so,* or at least without being conscious of doing so for the purpose of executing the experience in question (e.g., of the rod being hot). We won't say that such nonconscious GDF is impossible, but it should be pointed out that, given that nonconscious GDF is, by definition, both private and nonconscious, it is problematic to assert that it occurs routinely during hypnosis, especially since there is an alternative way of making sense of such hallucinatory phenomena (e.g., the hallucinated heat). As defined here, the Hypnotized subject (unlike the Hypnoid subject, as we shall see below) need not actively strive to experience the rod as hot (consciously or otherwise) any more than the normally awake person actively strives to experience it as being at room temperature. What needs to be accounted for in the above example is not a nonconscious execution, but rather the fact that the subject is unaware that the rod is not *really* hot. However, this feature is already built into our definition of the Hypnotic state: to be aware that the rod is not actually hot would be to generate a FOA of the hypnotist's statement that the rod *was* hot, and, by definition, it is FOAs that the Hypnotized subject is relatively unable or nondisposed to generate, including FOAs of the hypnotist's appraisals (feature (c) of our definition of the Hypnotic state). Hence, if there is an unresolved question here, it is not "Why does the Hypnotized person experience the rod as hot?" but rather "How in the world does a person get in an Hypnotic state, in the first place?" (see Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 1.)

A second possible meaning of "nonconscious involvement" (Part II of Table 1) which is somewhat different from that discussed above is the following: "The person's set of strivings to be a good hypnotic subject has sunk below the level of conscious awareness and is now functioning nonconsciously" (Shor, 1970, p. 91). Here Shor is not speaking of specific intentions to perform specific behaviors, but rather of the person's overall reasons ("strivings") for participating in the hypnotic interaction. On this point, our concepts overlap. The Hypnotized person,

as a logical corollary of our definition, loses awareness of the fact that he is in a hypnotic context since awareness of that sort of fact is a *final-order* awareness: The hypnotic context (as opposed to its Elements) is the subject's real world context, and as we developed above (p. xx), the person in a Trance is "indisposed and/or unable to . . . pay heed to the context that his real world provides for his actions." Since the subject will not be aware of this context (unless it is pointed out), neither will he or she be aware of the reasons which stem from the context (i.e., "strivings to be a good hypnotic subject"). Thus, to the extent that a Hypnotized subject has reasons for enacting the role of a hypnotized person, it is not those reasons that he will be consciously acting upon when in the Hypnotic state.[5] As Shor (1970) points out in this vein, "hypnosis is not just a consciously deliberate decision to cooperate, not just conscious compliance, but is something more profound" (p. 91).

As for Shor's third dimension, "the depth of archaic involvement," we find this to be more restrictive than is desirable for a general definition of hypnotic state, as well as out of keeping with contemporary understandings of hypnosis (see Sheehan and Perry's, 1976, discussion of "collaborative approaches" to hypnosis research). That is, this sort of parent-child relationship (i.e., regressive) between hypnotist and subject may in fact occur occasionally (or even often) and when it does it may facilitate the induction of a Hypnotic state, but we see no reason why one would want to say that this sort of relationship is necessary for or especially characteristic of a Hypnotic state by incorporating it into one's definition. For this reason, in our formulation we have not specified the hypnotist-subject relationship to be of any particular type. This allows for the possibility of archaic involvement, but does not require it.

Orne's Formulation

Martin Orne (1959, 1972, 1977) is commonly considered to be one of the foremost of the hypnotic state theorists, and, indeed, he has been one of the most articulate proponents and defenders of the notion that hypnosis can involve more than simulation and "mere" imagination. Moreover, he has stated many times that he considers hypnosis to be best explained in terms of psychological states and that the "essence" of hypnosis lies in the "subjective experiences" of the susceptible subject. However, a careful reading of Orne's works on hypnosis shows that he has not offered a formal conceptualization of hypnosis or hypnotic state until very recently (Orne, 1977). In this latest paper, he notes:

> What characterizes the hypnotizable subject is *not* the tendency to comply with any and all requests but rather the *specific tendency or ability to respond to suggestions designed to elicit hypnotic phenomena.* In other words, what strikes the observer

> is the profound change that can apparently be brought about in the *experience* of the hypnotized subject, which suggests that hypnosis must involve some basic and profound alterations. (p. 16, author's emphasis)
>
> In summary, I have tried to define hypnosis as that state or condition in which subjects are able to respond to appropriate suggestions with distortions of perception or memory. (p. 19)

As can be seen here, there are some major differences between Orne's formulation and ours. First, Orne defines the hypnotic state in terms of suggestibility (although not mere compliance), while it has been seen that suggestibility is neither a necessary nor sufficient manifestation of what we are calling the Hypnotic state. Second, Orne's definition does not distinguish between Hypnotic behavior and that which we will articulate below as Hypnoid behavior, both of which may involve distortions of perception or memory and profound changes in experience in the course of (genuinely) responding to suggestions. It is this Hypnotic/Hypnoid distinction that we find to be most crucial for the sorting out of hypnotic phenomena, and the resolution of the state-nonstate dispute. Third, we find Orne's identification of "appropriate suggestions" to be inappropriate for the task of conceptualization. In his article, Orne (1977) identifies the "suggestions designed to elicit hypnotic phenomena" as those found in the "standardized scales of hypnotic susceptibility." In saying this, Orne produces an impure mixture of conceptual and ostensive definition; while we need to know precisely and conceptually what it is about those suggestions that make them hypnotic, Orne only tells us where to find them. In the next section of this paper, we will articulate a concept of hypnotic suggestion in terms of anomaly.

Before this recent paper, Orne's approach had been mostly an atheoretical one, in which he has sought to delineate empirically consequences of hypnotic induction procedures in hypnotically susceptible subjects that cannot be accounted for simply in terms of the subjects' sensitivity to the demand characteristics of the experimental context (Orne, 1959, 1972). The outcome of his intriguing work employing what he calls the "simulating-subject quasi-control group" has been the isolation of several candidates for characterisitc *attributes* or *features* of the hypnotic state. However, Orne would be the first to point out that (a) any differences between simulators and real susceptibles does not necessarily mean that an attribute of hypnosis per se has been isolated (the differences may only be a reflection of personality differences between the two groups, or due to differences in preexperimental instructions; see Sheehan and Perry, 1976); and (b) the identification of such features does not, in any case, constitute an articulation of a *concept* of hypnotic state. This second point concerns the distinction between the behavioral manifes-

tations of a state (i.e., its features) and the state itself (the alteration in powers and/or dispositions). Among the possible "essence" manifestations of hypnosis that Orne and his associates have isolated are "trance logic," source amnesia, high role involvement, responsiveness to post-hypnotic suggestions outside of the experimental context, and randomized order of recall following suggested amnesia. (For a discussion of these phenomena see Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 1.)

Hilgard's Formulation

Ernest Hilgard, in his early work, was also a strong advocate of hypnosis as involving a special state of consciousness—a hypnotic or trance state. However, Hilgard has never offered a formal conceptualization of the hypnotic state per se. He acknowledges a "difficulty of defining hypnosis and of specifying exactly how it differs from other states" (Hilgard, 1965, p. 21). Instead, in his major treatise concerning hypnosis as a special state, Hilgard (1965) lists seven "characteristics of the hypnotic state" by which he hopes to "delineate the state sufficiently to invite its further examination as a field of potentially important psychological inquiry" (p. 21). These seven features are

> subsidence of the planning function, redistribution of attention, availability of memories and heightened ability for fantasy production, reduction of reality testing and tolerance for reality distortion, increased suggestibility, role behavior, and posthypnotic amnesia. (Hilgard, 1965, p. 21)

It is probably clear to the reader already that most of these features, even without elaboration, can be conceptually connected to our definition of Hypnotic state. (See Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 1.) This demonstrates (a) that it is possible to offer an explicit and concise formulation of hypnotic state which systematically integrates a diverse and wide range of facts, and (b) that our present concept of Hypnotic state is heuristically effective at formally accessing at least a major portion of the traditionally recognized subject matter of hypnosis.

In any case, the primary point we wish to make in comparing our present work with that of Hilgard's is that our concept of Hypnotic state cannot be seen as an alternative to his concept of hypnotic state, simply because he has never formally articulated such a concept. This reflects a major difference in our understandings of the role of conceptualization in science, as discussed in our introduction to this article. From Hilgard's, as well as Orne's, point of view, the essential nature of hypnosis (not merely its behavioral manifestations) must be determined empirically; hence, they are understandably reluctant to offer a preempirical conceptual articulation—indeed, this apparently would make no sense to

them. In contrast, we see the task of providing a framework for the location of empirically discoverable facts to be necessarily a nonempirical one, and preferably a preempirical one (Ossorio, 1971/1978). Since an adequate conceptualization is one that provides a framework for all *possible* facts within a given subject matter, there is no need to worry that such a formulation results in an a priori denial or assertion of any particular facts. Moreover, without such a conceptual framework, there is no way to know in what ways, if any, the various empirically discovered facts about hypnosis hold together. Are they manifestations of one or several or *any* unusual psychological states? We trust that the reader sees that there is no hope in answering such questions unless we can preempirically articulate what would *count* as a finding about, for example, the hypnotic state. Moreover, this cannot be adequately accomplished with an ostensive or operational definition or by taxonomically identifying a set of representative hypnotic phenomena, as Hilgard (1973) has offered, since we would still have no identification of what *conceptually* holds all these phenomena together as a single domain. As we will elaborate in a subsequent section, our concept of Hypnotic state, unlike Hilgard's (1973) merely classificatory use of "hypnotic state", can be employed as a component of *explanations* of hypnotic phenomena as well as a formal systematization of the subject matter. (See Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 1, for a discussion of Hilgard's (1977) more recent work on "neodissociation theory.")

HYPNOID BEHAVIORS

Of the several fundamental distinctions within the domain of hypnosis that have not been clearly articulated, perhaps the one whose neglect has resulted in the greatest degree of controversy over matters of both theory and fact is the distinction which we will here identify as that between the Hypnotic state and Hypnoid behavior. Hypnoid behaviors are a special class of behaviors that in one important respect resemble one sort of Hypnotic behavior, but which are, logically, noncharacteristic of Hypnotic states. They are also conceptually distinct from simulation or mere compliance. We propose that the Hypnotic/Hypnoid/simulation distinction prescribes some fundamental changes in the manner in which empirical investigations of hypnosis are carried out. These changes will be delineated below and elsewhere (Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 2).

Before offering a formal definition, let's consider some examples of Hypnoid behaviors, which, to our understanding, are very much more common than Hypnotic behavior during the administration of "hypnotic susceptibility scales" to unselected populations (although the actual frequencies must, of course, be empirically ascertained). Consider the individual who is asked to vividly think of his arm as becoming stiff, rigid,

and unbendable, and in so doing finds that to some degree—from mildly to vividly—he or she is able to *experience* his or her arm as rigid; furthermore, when subsequently asked to bend it, this person genuinely finds it to be somewhat difficult to bend—from just distinguishably more difficult than normal to completely unbendable. Moreover, imagine that during this experience of rigidity and genuine difficulty in bending his or her arm, this individual coincidently appraises either or both that (a) it is odd (anomalous) that the arm should become stiff in this manner, or that (b) his or her arm is not really stiff or difficult to bend, but that he or she is simply *experiencing* it that way for one reason or another. For the purpose of our example, it does not matter whether this individual is delighted and fascinated by this anomalous experience, or whether he or she is frightened, puzzled, or bored by it, or any combination of the above. The important point is that the individual recognizes that this experience *is* anomalous. All other examples of Hypnoid behaviors would take essentially the same form as above, but instead of involving the appraisal of a stiff arm, they might involve the appraisal of an abnormally heavy arm or eyelids, or of fused fingers, paralyzed limbs or vocal cords, or of a "force" between one's hands, or of an arm insensitive to pain, a nose insensitive to smell, vision insensitive to certain objects, or of a "fly" buzzing around one's head. What distinguishes these appraisals and their associated behaviors as Hypnoid rather than Hypnotic is articulated below.

Hypnoid behaviors are here defined as behaviors in which a suggested anomalous appraisal (appraisal number 1) of an Element is made and acted upon with the coincident appraisal (appraisal number 2) by the subject, that either (a) appraisal number 1, (b) the Element, and/or (c) his or her ongoing behavior *is* anomalous.[6]

There are several features of this definition that require discussion. The first concerns appraisal number 2. This is a "meta-appraisal" or second-order appraisal relative to appraisal number 1, but more explicitly and to the point, it is a *final-order* appraisal of appraisal number 1, the Element, and/or the ongoing behavior. It is final-order by definition because appraisal number 2 is an appraisal of an anomaly, and, as we saw above, to see an Element (including an appraisal or behavior) as anomalous is a final-order activity. Appraisal number 1 (e.g., that my arm is stiff, insensitive, spontaneously floating) is not a final-order appraisal, and therefore these sorts of anomalous appraisals can also be characteristic of *Hypnotic* behaviors. (Indeed, their characteristic occurrence in Hypnotic states is precisely what is codified by feature (c) of our above paradigm case formulation of Hypnotic state.) What makes Hypnoid behavior nonHypnotic is the second appraisal, which, being final-order, is by definition not characteristic of an Hypnotic state.

Second, it is crucial that the reader does not misunderstand what we

mean by an "anomalous appraisal" (appraisal number 1). It does not mean "an appraisal of an anomaly," which would be a FOA. Rather, it is an appraisal that is, itself, anomalous. The term "anomalous" here is used precisely in the same way as in the earlier discussion of anomalies. Specifically, an anomalous appraisal made by person P is one that is out of keeping with P's concept of the real world or self (e.g., appraisals that conflict with the fact that my arms are the sort of Elements that are normally bendable, self-controllable, sensitive, and subject to the laws of gravity). When an observer of P (including, possibly, P himself) says that P is engaging in a Hypnoid behavior, he or she is saying not only that P is making an anomalous appraisal, but also that either (a) P recognizes that that appraisal (or the appraised Element) is anomalous, and/or (b) P recognizes that P's ongoing behavior (that which constitutes the acting upon the anomalous appraisal) is anomalous. Notice that in clauses (a) and (b) above we use the word "recognizes" rather than "appraises" since, if it is Hypnoid behavior, then by definition P must be correct (i.e., agree with the observer) that it is an anomalous appraisal.[7]

Third, note that Hypnoid phenomena are, by definition, suggested—either explicitly or implicitly (directly or indirectly). The anomalous appraisal may be evoked either by another person (e.g., a hypnotist, therapist, or group leader) or by the subjects themselves (autosuggestion).

Fourth, note that appraisals or descriptions that are appraised as counterfactual (incorrect) or as counterexpectative (surprising) are not precisely the same set as those that are appraised as anomalous. Sometimes a person will not be in a position to make a correct or expected appraisal (due to a lack of knowledge, lack of skill, or inadequacy of observational position). For example, in the case of the standard optical illusions, incorrect appraisals are often appraised as neither surprising nor anomalous—and, in any case, not Hypnoid since they do not require suggestion. Likewise, note that the anomalous appraisals associated with Hypnoid behavior are not necessarily surprising (given a goal-directed fantasy, for example) nor incorrect (e.g., I may in fact *not* be able to bend my arm). They are anomalous in that they are out of keeping with the person's concept of real world or self.

Fifth, since the making of the Hypnoid anomalous appraisal is out of keeping with the subject's concept of real world or self, its occurrence calls for a special explanation (see the following section). However, the occurrence of the second appraisal involved in Hypnoid behaviors—namely, the FOA of the anomalous appraisal—does not require an explanation because the rule (discussed above) is that persons *are* normally disposed and able to generate FOAs of anomalies; hence, it is not at all surprising that persons would recognize as such their own anomalous appraisals or behaviors. Indeed, it is not the occurrence but the absence of that FOA (e.g., in Hypnotic states) that would call for an explanation.

Sixth, it is important to keep in mind that when we say that a person appraises an Element as an X, we do not merely nor necessarily mean that he or she simply says that it is an X or simply treats it as an X. Rather, it is to be understood as meaning that the person genuinely *experiences* it as an X. Moreover, a person who appraises an Element as an X will also treat it accordingly unless he or she has a stronger reason to do otherwise (stemming from other appraisals). To merely pretend that an Element is an X is to appraise it as a not-X while there is a stronger reason to treat is as an X. In this connection, we should briefly consider the notion of "*as-if* behavior" as it has been applied to the understanding of hypnosis (Sarbin, 1950; Sarbin & Coe, 1972). The phrase "*as-if* behavior" is somewhat ambiguous since it can be taken in two significantly different ways. In both cases, the subject *treats* as a not-X an Element that the observer appraises to be an X. However, in one case, the subject himself does not appraise or experience the Element as a not-X (e.g., as an unbendable arm), rather, he or she appraises it as an X (a bendable arm), but deliberately *acts as if* he or she had appraised it as a not-X, because the subject has something to gain from deception or compliance. In this sense, *as-if* behavior corresponds to simulation, pretense, or sham behavior—mere play-acting. There are no present-day investigators of hypnosis who fail to recognize that simulation can and sometimes does occur during hypnotic procedures. However, they differ widely as to its perceived prevalence (see Sutcliffe's, 1960, discussion of the "credulous" and "skeptical" views of hypnotic phenomena).

On the other hand, when Sarbin speaks of *as-if* behavior, he is not speaking of simulation. Rather, he has in mind the case of a subject who appraises an Element as a not-X and is acting accordingly, while an observer appraises that the Element *is* an X. Once again, the subject is said to be treating an X *as if* it were a not-X, but in this case it is because the subject genuinely *experiences* it as a not-X even though he or she may know (another appraisal) that it must in fact be an X. Coe and Sarbin (1977) have made it abundantly clear that it is in this latter sense that they have spoken of *as-if* behavior as a useful concept for explaining hypnotic phenomena, and thus it is a mistake to take their role-playing position as asserting that hypnotic behavior is a case of faking, dissimulation, deception, or fraud. To the contrary, Sarbin's *as-if* behavior encompasses what we are here identifying as both Hypnoid and Hypnotic suggestibility. The problem with the as-if formulation is that it does not make the distinction between these two forms of suggestibility, which depends upon an additional consideration: When the subject makes a suggested anomalous appraisal which he or she sees *as* anomalous, it is a case of Hypnoid suggestibility. However, in the case of an Hypnotic state, the subject, by definition, is relatively indisposed or unable to

generate FOAs, and therefore is correspondingly unlikely to recognize the anomalous nature of any anomalous appraisals he or she may make.[8] Notice that the *conceptual* distinction between Hypnoid and Hypnotic suggestibility has nothing to do with the presence or absence of a hypnotic induction procedure.

Also, it is important that the reader understand that the manifestations of the Hypnotic state are by no means limited to the making of anomalous appraisals without the awareness of their anomalousness. The act of accepting, making, and acting upon anomalous appraisals (i.e., responding to suggestions) is only one possible manifestation of the Hypnotic state. As many other students of hypnosis have pointed out, the hypnotic state is not simply a matter of hypersuggestibility (Bowers, 1976; Gill, 1972; Hilgard, 1965; Shor, 1961, 1970).

One of the distinguishing characteristics of a Hypnoid behavior is that the person does not immediately act upon his FOA of his behavior, the Element, or of his or her anomalous appraisal. That is, the person acts upon the lower-order anomalous appraisal while suppressing the immediate manifestation of the FOA. It takes a special willingness and skill to refrain from acting on one's FOAs since, being final-order, they normally have motivational priority. In contrast, in the case of the Hypnotized person there *is* no FOA to suppress. He or she not only experiences the non-X Element as an X and treats it accordingly, but there is also no thought at the time that the Element might be something other than an X. This is why it should be possible to have greater suggestibility in the Hypnotic state compared to Hypnoid behaviors. Unlike the Hypnoid individual, the Hypnotized person need not suppress the manifestation of a conflicting FOA. It is this conflicting FOA that can weaken the effectiveness and/or likelihood of the Hypnoid anomalous appraisal.

The reader may wonder how it is possible, in the case of Hypnoid behavior, for a person to be simultaneously appraising an Element to be both an X and a not-X. However, this is not at all paradoxical if we remember that the two appraisals are on different "levels." The first is lower-order while the second is final-order—the person experiences the Element *as if* it were an X, while at the same time recognizing that, in the context of his or her real world, it is not in truth, an X. Thus, the Element in question can be authentically treated as an X, but not as a *real* X. This sort of dual appraisal should not seem unusual since it is the same sort of appraisal often involved in daydreams, fantasy, play, imagination, and the perceptual illusions (except that in these cases the appraisals are usually not suggested and often not anomalous).

In summary, the person engaging in Hypnoid behaviors may be observed to treat certain Elements in unusual or puzzling ways, but he or she is not Hypnotized, since there is not a significant reduction in his

or her power or disposition to generate FOAs. The person's intact power and disposition to generate FOAs is manifested in the recognition that his or her behavior *is* anomalous, that he or she is treating the arm, for example, in an anomalous manner (e.g., as unbendable), and/or that some Element, say an image of a person, is not an *actual* person, even though, in some of its perceptual qualities, it looks like one.

The Evocation of Hypnoid Behaviors

How a person comes to engage in Hypnoid behaviors (i.e., how he comes to make anomalous appraisals without being Hypnotized) is, of course, an empirical question and calls for an explanation. In an excellent review article, Spanos and Barber (1974) have discussed the factors that several groups of investigators have found to "determine responsiveness to suggestions," which includes what we have here identified as Hypnoid behaviors. Spanos and Barber found that

> major theoreticians in the area of hypnosis, regardless of paradigm affiliation, are converging on the conclusion that responding to suggestions involves at least two interrelated factors. The first can be conceptualized as a willingness on the part of the subject to cooperate with the experimenter in fulfilling the aims of the suggestions. The second can be described as a shift in cognitive orientation from an objective or pragmatic perspective to one of involvement in suggestion—related imaginings. The construct *involvement in suggestion—related imaginings* encompasses at least two simultaneously occurring cognitive processes: (a) sustaining and elaborating imaginings that are consistent with the aims of the suggestions and (b) disregarding information that is inconsistent with the aims of the suggestions. (pp. 500–501)

This is a particularly interesting quotation since it encompasses the *possibilities* of both Hypnotic and Hypnoid suggestibility, although this important distinction is not made here or elsewhere in Spanos and Barber's article. Although the "shift in cognitive orientation" to which they refer could be interpreted as a significant reduction in power and/or disposition to generate FOAs (and hence as what we are here identifying as a Hypnotic state), we very much doubt that this is what they had in mind, since as "nonstate" theorists, they are committed to explaining hypnotic behavior in a manner that would not evoke such a radical alteration in a person's fundamental capacities. (If the reader has any doubt as to whether or not FOAs represent a fundamental human capacity, he or she is referred back to our earlier discussion of FOAs.) In any case, consider the possibilities: On the one hand, if they do say that their "shift in cognitive orientation" corresponds to what we have here identified as the Hypnotic state, then we have no difference between the state and nonstate positions, and hence no more dispute. On the other

hand, in the more likely case that this is not what they mean, we then need a more explicit articulation of what they do have in mind (in which case the dispute can equally well be resolved—this time by seeing that the two sides were in fact speaking of different phenomena). In the interests of such a resolution, we offer a nonHypnotic, that is, a Hypnoid—interpretation of their "shift in cognitive orientation." Consider that this shift may only entail what we would call an *enhancement* in disposition to generate *anomalous* appraisals (which is, indeed, a type of shift away from "an objective or pragmatic perspective"). Such an enhancement does not require a Hypnotic state; it only requires a willingness to not immediately *act* upon one's FOAs—a shift away from one's normal policy of giving motivational priority to final-order appraisals. We should not be surprised to find that people differ as to their willingness and ability to accomplish this sort of shift. In any case, it should be clear that it is precisely this sort of shift that would facilitate the occurrence of Hypnoid behaviors. The research reviewed by Spanos and Barber demonstrates just this.

It is also clear why their first factor, willingness to cooperate, would be important in the evocation of Hypnoid behaviors. Consider the typical subject undergoing a test of responsiveness to suggestions. He is asked to think of an X as a non-X, and he immediately generates a FOA: an X is not a non-X. Normally, such a FOA takes motivational precedence over any conflicting lower-order appraisal. Indeed, this FOA gives him a reason not even to try to think of the X as a non-X ("It's non-adaptive! Why *should* I?"). Therefore, the subject who is going to engage in Hypnoid behaviors must have, in addition to the requisite skills, an appropriate reason for reversing what is his normal motivational policy ("If it is not a real X, it is not to be treated as *any* kind of X"). This reason may stem, for instance, from a desire to cooperate with the experimenter, to learn more about hypnosis, to have an interesting experience, and so forth.

Spanos and Barber's second factor, "involvement in suggestion-related imaginings," has appeared in many other forms throughout the history of hypnosis research, including Braid's (1847) "mono-ideism," White's (1941) "monomotivation," Arnold's (1946) "ideomotor behavior," Sarbin's (1950) "*as-if* behavior," Shor's (1959) "temporary orientation to a small range of preoccupations," Sutcliffe's (1965) "vividness of imagery and proneness to fantasy," J. R. Hilgard's (1970) "imaginative involvement," Sarbin and Coe's (1972) "believed-in imaginings," Barber, Spanos, and Chave's (1974) "thinking and imagining with the suggestions," and Spanos' (1971) "goal-directed fantasy." The essential idea behind all these formulations is that anomalous appraisals can be evoked when the subject concentrates upon, intensifies, and/or elaborates his imagi-

native processes in a way that is in accordance with the suggestions of the hypnotist. It is important to recognize that such cognitive processes as "goal-directed fantasy" and "thinking along with suggestions"are not the anomalous appraisals themselves. Rather, they constitute a process of *generating* these appraisals.

An example of such a cognitive process leading to a Hypnoid behavior is as follows: If I repeatedly say to myself that my arm is insensitive, if I "picture" it as separated from the rest of my body, and if I vividly imagine that it is dull, numb, a piece of rubber, an inanimate object without sensations, then I may succeed in actually experiencing (appraising) my arm in that way and treating it accordingly—so that, for example, I may not feel any pain from my arm when it is subsequently dipped into ice-cold water. Being able to succeed at these sorts of exercises appears to be facilitated by certain attention-related (Davidson & Coleman, 1977; Van Nuys, 1973) and imagination-related (J. R. Hilgard, 1970; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) skills that are normally distributed in the population. However, as we have emphasized above, a subject need not be in the least bit Hypnotized to successfully generate anomalous appraisals. The individual engaging in Hypnoid behavior is not significantly less able or disposed than normal to recognize anomalies; he or she has not lost contact with his normal contextual sense of self and real world.

In this connection, Spanos and Barber (1974) point out that non-state theorists find it to be "unnecessary and misleading to posit a special or qualitatively different state in order to explain the experiences of good hypnotic subjects" (p. 508). On the one hand, we entirely agree that persons need not be in what we are calling a Hypnotic state in order to generate the anomalous appraisals (and have the unusual experiences) associated with Hypnoid behavior (i.e., "responsivness to suggestions"). However, this leaves entirely untouched the question as to whether or not qualitatively different states do occur during *some* hypnotic procedures. Even when it comes to suggestibility, Hypnoid and Hypnotic phenomena are qualitatively different. In his recent book, Bowers (1976) succinctly points out some of the major differences in manifestation and induction between what we would here identify as Hypnotic versus Hypnoid suggestibility:

> Hypnotic subjects are not actively trying, in any ordinary sense, to behave purposefully in accordance with role requirements (Sarbin, 1950), demand characteristics, or hypnotic suggestions. Instead, suggested events are experienced as *happening to him* in ways that would require active effort to resist. . . . Weitzenhoffer and Sjoberg (1961) are especially clear about this issue. They point out that subjects seen under conditions of waking suggestibility [Hypnoid] tend to experience *themselves* as working to produce the suggested effects. They do so by actively con-

> centrating on the suggestions, repeating them over and over, and so on. However, when these same subjects were hypnotized, they experienced the *hypnotist* as doing all the work while they themselves did nothing. (p. 108)

Bowers concludes that "somehow, an altered state of consciousness helps to create this effortless involvement in the suggested state of affairs" (p. 108). We offer our present formulation of "Hypnotic state" as an answer—as an explication of why it is that the Hypnotized person need not become *actively* involved (on any level) with the suggestions in order to experience in accordance with them.

On a second point we completely agree with Spanos and Barber when they claim that state theorists have been rather vague about what they mean by "hypnotic state", so that it is uncertain what if anything they are saying differently from the nonstate theorists' "involvement in suggestion-related imaginings." It is precisely this sort of ambiguity that we are attempting to clear up with the present conceptualization. We are confident that nonstate theorists such as Barber and Sarbin will agree that what we have here specified as the Hypnotic state is a condition that is significantly different from both sleep and the normal waking state. The question now becomes, "How often, if ever, does it occur?" In another publication (Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 2) we introduce an objective methodology for assessing the presence of Hypnotic states independent of suggestibility, but it should be pointed out here that it is clear to us, both from our recent experience with this methodology and from certain experiential reports from several decades of hypnosis research (reviewed in Bowers, 1976), that it is unquestionable that Hypnotic states can and do occur during hypnotic procedures, although they are less frequent than Hypnoid behavior.

In summary, we believe the above section has demonstrated how anomalous appraisals can be generated and acted upon outside of the Hypnotic state. In essence, Hypnoid behaviors were seen to follow the same logic as any other behavior—we normally treat things in accordance with how we appraise them. The empirical lesson from Hypnoid behaviors is that an Element can evidently be appraised and genuinely treated in very unusual or anomalous ways if, for example, we think along with certain suggestions and imagine vividly enough. (However, see Zamansky, 1977, for an intriguing complication.)

HYPNOID STATES

Observers of hypnotic phenomena may on occasion have reason to speak of Hypnoid *states* as well as behaviors. A Hypnoid state is here defined as a nonTrance state characterized by a significant enhancement of dis-

position and/or power to make anomalous appraisals. Whether we speak of a Hypnoid state or a Hypnoid behavior on any given occasion will depend upon whether we are making a general characterization of the person during a certain time period, in which case we speak of a state, or whether we are referring specifically to a given behavior.

The Induction of Hypnoid States

As with Hypnoid behaviors, it is an empirical question as to how Hypnoid states are brought about. In general, everything that was said above concerning Hypnoid behavior will apply here. However, there is one formulation that is particularly well suited to explaining how an enhanced disposition and/or power to generate anomalous appraisals may come about. This is Sarbin and Coe's (1972) formulation of "role enactment." These authors suggest that the individual in a successful hypnosis experiment enacts what he takes to be the requested or implicitly invited role of hypnotic subject (usually conceived as something on the order of an automaton) and, to the extent that he is willing and able to do this, he finds it permissible to engage in the actions appropriate to this role, such as becoming involved in—and believing in—his imaginings, and to thereby succeed in making certain anomalous appraisals. These authors point out that the extent to which an individual can become involved in enacting the role of a hypnotic subject depends on such factors as (a) the subject's ability to recognize the specific nature of the role assigned by the hypnotist, (b) the degree to which the individual sees the role as one which is a desirable one, (c) the degree to which the individual possesses the skills required to enact the role of a hypnotic subject, and (d) the extent to which the individual is reinforced (especially by the hypnotist) for his or her initial and ongoing role enactments.

We find that Sarbin and Coe's formulation of a person enacting the role of a hypnotic subject, and becoming involved in believed-in imaginings, is a cogent explanation of one way in which Hypnoid states may be induced. Moreover, there is some indirect empirical support for the claim that such hypnotic role enactments may in fact take place (Coe & Sarbin, 1966; Sarbin & Lim, 1963). However, it is also possible that hypnotic role enactment, as defined by Sarbin and Coe, would sometimes lead to *Hypnotic* states. How this would happen is, of course, not explicated by Sarbin and Coe since they eschew a concept of trance. They also do not explicitly make the distinction we are here identifying as that between Hypnoid and Hypnotic, although something like this distinction may be implicit in their continuum of role-taking involvement. (See Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 1 for a discussion of how "hypnotic role enactment" can serve as an Hypnotic induction.)

THE PLACE OF THE HYPNOTIC-STATE CONCEPT IN THE EXPLANATION OF HYPNOTIC PHENOMENA

We have seen that there are at least three distinct types of behaviors associated with hypnosis that require explanation: Hypnotic behavior, Hypnoid behavior, and simulation. We have already reviewed the theories and empirical findings relevant to the explantion of Hypnoid behaviors.

As for the explanation of Hypnotic behaviors, what we have developed so far in this chapter is a concept of Hypnotic state. This concept by itself is not an explanation of anything, rather, it is a tool whose *use* is in the construction of explanations of Hypnotic phenomena. Sometimes we need to remember that concepts do not explain; persons who use them do. In order to construct an empirically warranted explanation of a Hypnotic phenomenon employing the Hypnotic state concept, an observer must have an empirical basis for asserting that the subject is Hypnotized. To say that it must be an empirical basis is simply to say that it must be based on observation. However, given what we have seen to be the possible confusion between Hypnotic, Hypnoid, and simulation phenomena, we will require our observations to rule out any reasonable doubts that the apparent Hypnotic phenomenon is actually a case of one of the latter two. In Plotkin & Schwartz (Note 2), we perform this nonempirical task of constructing a set of procedures for the empirical assessment of the presence of Hypnotic states based upon the conceptualization introduced here.

However, given the *logical* possibility of an Hypnotic state, there are still at least three related *conceptual* issues that first need to be explored: (a) What are the different sorts of ways in which a person might become Hypnotized? How is it that the traditionally recognized hypnotic induction procedures would lead to Hypnotic states, if they would at all? (b) What are the different sorts of ways that a Hypnotic state might be manifested in particular circumstances? How is it that the traditionally recognized hypnotic phenomena would be manifestations of a Hypnotic state, if they would be at all? and (c) What does it mean to be Hypnotizable? What are the other related personal characteristics from which we must be careful to distinguish Hypnotizability?

This last issue we will consider at the close of this essay. Our discussion of the first two issues makes up a second essay (Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 1) which lays the foundation for our third essay (Plotkin & Schwartz, Note 2), a presentation of guidelines for inducing and empirically assessing the presence of the Hypnotic state.

What we will do in the present section is to outline how all of the above questions fit together and to focus on the generic place of a "Hypnotic state" concept in the explanation of hypnotic phenomena.

The primary reminder concerns the status of state concepts. They are not to be thought of as antecedent variables, as some nonstate theorists (e.g., Barber, 1964, 1969) as well as some state theorists (e.g., Hilgard, 1969, 1973) have supposed. As is the case with all personal characteristic (PC) concepts, psychological states are not events or processes, even "internal" ones—they are not occurrences of any sort. Rather, they are conditions, attributes, features, or characteristics of individuals. The relationship between a psychological state and a behavior is of a logically different type than that between an antecedent event and a behavior. In the Descriptive Psychology framework, the logical relations between antecedent events, personal characteristics, and behavior are spelled out explicitly and systematically in the Developmental Schema (Ossorio, 1981, see especially p. 63). One of the reminders embedded in this schema is that the full explanation of any behavior requires that one make reference to both the situation, or circumstances, within which the behavior takes place (which is part of what is usually meant by "antecedent variables"; the other part consists of *prior* circumstances, or history; see below) and the actor's PCs. Knowledge of the circumstances of the behavior allows us to say or explain why that behavior happened *when* it did—it allows us to specify the events, processes, objects, and states of affairs that make up the context within which the behavior is chosen and enacted. Our knowledge of the actor's PCs (including traits, attitudes, interests, values, and psychological state), on the other hand, allow us to say why it was *that* behavior rather than some other—it allows us to explain why the specific circumstances led to the particular behavior that it did (in general, "given *this* kind of person in *those* circumstances, and, yes, *that's* what he *would* do"; Ossorio, 1981, p. 63). Together, a person's PCs and present circumstances give him or her a set of reasons for and/or against engaging in a variety of different actions. The intentional actor chooses that behavior in which he or she has the strongest reason(s) to engage.

It is relevant to note here that it is somewhat misleading to speak of even circumstances (or antecedent variables) as direct *causes* of behavior in the sense of mechanistic cause and effect. Circumstances do not directly cause behavior, but, along with PCs, they provide the reasons for a behavioral choice. Moreover, it is important to note that circumstances and PCs, being of conceptually distinct classes, can logically neither compete with nor substitute for one another in the explanation of behavior. Thus, in the explanation of Hypnotic phenomena, references to antecedent variables can never logically compete with references to PC concepts such as Hypnotic state.

The relationship between PCs and behavior is one of expression, potentiation, or constraint. A person's behavior *expresses* his or her characteristics; his or her characteristics render particular behaviors likely,

possible, or impossible. For example, a person who is Hypnotized (i.e., relatively nondisposed and/or unable to generate FOAs) is thereby one who is likely to respond in accordance with the hypnotist's appraisals, or to be able, when the hypnotist requests, to recall a traumatic memory that was previously inaccessible. In these examples, the Hypnotic state is a PC, and the hypnotist's appraisals and requests are features of the present circumstances. Both states of affairs contribute to the explanation of why the particular behaviors occurred. A change in the nature of either may result in a change in behavior.

This issue is critical since the attempt to categorize and treat the "hypnotic state" as a putative antecedent variable has led to a gross distortion of the possible role of a hypnotic state concept in the explanation of hypnotic phenomena. As Bowers (1976) has noted, "the distinction between trance as a cause of suggestibility and trance as a concomitant is very important to maintain" (p. 96). Bowers (1973a, 1973b, 1976) has critiqued Barber's (1964, 1969) objections to the trance concept as follows:

> The essential inadequacy of Barber's attack on trance flows from his preferred methodology. For Barber, "the main task of science is to specify quantitatively how variations in one or a combination of antecedent variables affect the dependent variables—the behaviors that are to be explained" (Barber, 1969, p. 14). This ultrabehavioristic, input-output view of science can only attribute observed differences in outcome to observed differences in inputs. Since a trance state is a condition of the [person] . . . it is not an . . . input; therefore, it cannot, according to Barber's model, explain outputs. In other words, an input-output model in which behavioral outcomes can be explained only by stimulus antecedents is simply blind to ASCs (Bowers, 1973b). . . . In sum, for Barber to deny the existence of trance on the basis of this input-output model of science is a little like denying the existence of four-inch fish after fishing with a net having five-inch holes. (Bowers, 1976, p. 97)

In this connection, it need be emphasized that the role of PC concepts, such as "Hypnotizable" (see below) or "Hypnotized" is not limited to merely descriptive or classificatory uses, as Hilgard (1973) has argued. Personal characteristics are at least as important in the *explanation* of behaviors as are features of the present circumstances. For example, to point out that a given "behaviorist" chose to write an article eschewing PC concepts because he has the (a) mistaken *belief* that they are mysterious "inner" invisible causes and (b) an *interest* in employing only "observable" causes in his scientific accounts *is* an explanation of that behaviorist's behavior, and one that is in terms of PC concepts. And it is a different explanation than saying he did so because he lacks the *competence* (a PC) to do otherwise, or because he has very high regard (a PC) for his mentor who asked him to write it (that request being a feature of the behaviorist's circumstances). (In a recent exploration of

the relation between science and the real world, Ossorio, 1978, demonstrates more elaborately and elegantly than we can here how the myopic preoccupation with mechanistic cause and effect as the only acceptable explanatory principle has significantly retarded the development of behavioral science.) The major caution concerning the employment of PC concepts such as hypnotic state in the explanation of behaviors is that to *be* explanatory and not merely descriptive, we must explicitly understand and articulate what we mean by these terms: As unspecified and empty "place-holders" they cannot, of course, be explanatory.

One type of behavior that present-day investigators of hypnosis seek to explain is responsiveness to test-suggestions. As is the case with all behaviors, reference to both PCs and present circumstances contribute to the explanation of this phenomenon. Since PCs and present circumstances are of logically distinct types, the present paper, which offers a conceptualization of a PC—the Hypnotic state—does not, and logically could not, contradict (or confirm) the empirical findings of other contemporary investigators to the extent that they have attempted to delineate possible relationships between circumstances (antecedent variables) and the response to test-suggestions (see Spanos & Barber, 1974). However, there is a more important role than confirmation or disconfirmation that the present conceptualization is intended to play vis-à-vis these empirical findings: it can help organize them and put them in perspective. For example, as we have seen, there are at least three significantly different sorts of possible explanations for why a person might respond to test-suggestions (i.e., it is a case of Hypnotic behavior, Hypnoid behavior, or simulation). *Which* of the existing antecedent variables are relevant to the explanation of any particular instance of responsiveness to test-suggestions, then, will to some extent depend upon which one of these three (or more) phenomena is occurring. However, even more important, the explanation of *how* or *why* a particular set of antecedent variables would lead to responsiveness to test-suggestions can only be given in terms of the person's PCs. Although this has not been formally recognized as such, even the explanations of behavioristically oriented researchers such as T. X. Barber reflect this logical necessity. For example, Barber (1972) now evokes such explanatory "mediating variables" as the subjects' "willingness to cooperate." This is a PC concept relevant to the explanation of both Hypnoid and Hypnotic behaviors. However, Barber has not recognized that such states of affairs as willingness are not "mediating events" but characteristics of the responsive person no less than is the Hypnotic state, when present.

Another way in which the present formulation places the empirical findings in perspective is that it allows us to see how any particular

feature of an individual's circumstances can play a very different role in the responsiveness to test-suggestions depending upon whether the responsiveness is a case of Hypnotic, Hypnoid, or simulation behavior. (For example, see Bower's, 1973b, discussion of the different possible roles of demand characteristics.)

In summary, PC concepts are indispensable for explanations of behavior since they allow us to understand (a) *which* features of present circumstances are relevant *when* and (b) *why* and *how* they are relevant when they are. It is now widely recognized that a full explanation of any behavior always involves the identification of three different categories of facts: (a) the person's present PCs, (b) his or her present circumstances, and (c) the behavior itself, including the reasons for its choice (Bowers, 1973a; Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Ossorio, 1969).

If we require, in addition, an explanation of how a person *acquired* his or her present PCs (such as how the person became Hypnotized or willing to cooperate), this explanation, regardless of its particular content, must, logically, make reference to his or her *prior* PCs (e.g., skills and interests) and an appropriate intervening history (e.g., an induction procedure or "task-motivating instructions"). This is the second reminder embedded in the Development Schema (Ossorio, 1981).

When applied to the case of Hypnotic and Hypnoid behavior, the above reminders can be developed into the schematic diagram shown as Table 2, which is a specific instance of the Developmental Schema applied to hypnosis, and which organizes into five categories the different sorts of facts that are potentially involved in the description/explanation of Hypnotic and Hypnoid behavior. We have located on the schema a representative sample of the terms that contemporary investigators employ to identify facts of the different sorts involved in the explanation of these phenomena.

There are actually two parts to this schema. The first, encompassing categories 1, 2, and 3, is employed for constructing explanations of how present PCs relevant to hypnosis (category 3) are acquired, namely, by having the prior capacity (category 1) and the appropriate intervening history (category 2). The second part of the schema, encompassing categories 3, 4, and 5 (all of which involve facts that are contemporaneous with the behavior), is employed for constructing explanations of the Hypnoid or Hypnotic behavior (category 5) by reference to present PCs (category 3) and relevant features of the present circumstances (category 4); namely, "this kind of person acts this way in this kind of situation." Different hypnosis theorists have been concerned with different instances of these five categories, but all of the facts with which they have worked can be located on this schema, which shows the logical relations between them, both inter- and intratheoretically as well as both inter- and intracategorically.

Table 2. Representative Sorts of Facts Involved in the Explanation of Hypnotic and Hypnoid Behaviors

(1) *Prior PCs*
- Hypnotic capacities and abilities (E. Hilgard, 1965)
- Imaginative skills and abilities (J. Hilgard, 1970, 1974; Barber, Spanos, & Chaves, 1974)
- Positive attitudes and expectancies concerning hypnosis (Barber, 1972)
- Dissociative skills (E. Hilgard, 1977; Bowers, 1976)
- Openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974)
- Role skills (Sarbin & Coe, 1972)
- Role expectations (Sarbin & Coe, 1972)

(2) *Appropriate Intervening History*
- Rapport establishment (e.g., Gill & Brenman, 1959)
- Securing cooperation; removing fears & misconceptions (Barber, 1972)
- Hypnotic induction procedure
- Task-motivating instructions (Barber, 1972)
- Demand characteristics (Orne, 1959)
- Role demands (Sarbin & Coe, 1972)
- Imagination Instructions

(3) *Present PCs*
- In addition to prior PCs:
- HYPNOTIC STATE (Hilgard, 1965; Erickson, Rossi, & Rossi, 1976; Gill & Brenman, 1959; Shor, 1959, 1962; Orne, 1977)
- HYPNOID STATE
- Role-involvement (Sarbin & Coe, 1972)
- Imaginative involvement (e.g. J. Hilgard, 1970)
- Absorbed state
- Relaxed state
- Trusting state
- Dissociated state (E. Hilgard, 1977)
- Willing to cooperate (Barber, 1972)

(4) *Present Circumstances*
- Hypnotist suggestions
- Demand characteristics (Orne, 1962)
- Hypnotist-subject relationship
- Role demands (Sarbin & Coe, 1972)

(5) *Behavior*
- Cognition: imagining and thinking along with suggestions (Barber 1972)
- Motivation:
  - to experience effects
  - to cooperate
- Competencies: various skills depending on behavior
- Performance and Achievement depending on behavior ("consequent variables": Barber, 1969)

The first four categories of the schema have been divided into two rows in order to emphasize that the sorts of facts on the top are non-process states of affairs or conditions (PCs), while those below correspond to occurrences (e.g., antecedent variables). Note that the sorts of facts constitutive of a full description of the behavior itself include specifications of the relevant cognitions (distinctions: both facts and concepts that are acted upon), motivations (states of affairs that are wanted), competence (e.g., skills that are exercised), performance (e.g., movements or posture), and achievement (i.e., result, outcome). The concept of behavior employed here, then, is a concept of *intentional action* (Anscombe, 1966; T. Mischel, 1969; Ossorio, 1973, 1981), something much more complex than the simple notions of "overt behavior," performance, response, or operant. Intentional actors are individuals who make choices that reflect their reasons for action—reasons that are provided by their circumstances and personal characteristics.

The Hypnotic State Concept and Circularity

It has been argued by some theorists that the concepts of hypnotic state and trance have been employed in a trivially circular manner (Barber, 1964, 1969; Sarbin & Coe, 1972). This is done when it is said that you know that a person is hypnotized because he responds to suggestions, and that the reason be responds to suggestions is that he is hypnotized. This is trivially circular if all one means by "hypnotized" is "responding to suggestions." This sort of circularity has, in fact, been a problem in the past since theorists have often used the terms "hypnotic state" and "trance" as empty (content-free) categories, so that it was very vague as to what, if anything, was accomplished with these "special mental state" terms (Spanos & Barber, 1974). However, with an explicitly articulated concept of Hypnotic state, there is no trivial circularity. Then, when we observe someone engaging in unusual behavior and explain this by saying that he is Hypnotized, the explanation is not merely a restatement of the observation nor a reference to suggestibility at all. Rather, it evokes an explicit concept that allows us to integrate and organize our observation with other prior *and* future observations of the person's behavior including, but not limited to, responsiveness to suggestions. If our description of the person as being Hypnotized is empirically warranted, then we would expect to observe additional expressions of his relative indisposition or inability to generate FOAs. If we do, our explanation of the person's behavior in terms of the Hypnotic state concept is supported. (However, notice that it is the explanation of that particular person's behavior that is confirmed or disconfirmed, not the Hypnotic state concept.)

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SUGGESTIBILITY AND HYPNOTIZABILITY

Research in hypnosis has clearly demonstrated that there are very large and enduring differences between persons in suggestibility (Hilgard, 1975), and that suggestibility is only slightly higher following a standard hypnotic induction procedure than following "waking imagination instructions" (Connors & Sheehan, 1978; Hilgard & Tart, 1966). The research may be summarized by saying that it appears that it is more the case that suggestible persons have special abilities to make and act upon anomalous appraisals than it is that hypnotists have special powers to enhance suggestibility, although recent research suggests that it may be possible to enhance a person's suggestibility (e.g., Diamond, 1977; Wickramasekera, 1977). In addition, much research has been carried out attempting to relate individual differences in suggestibility to numerous other personal characteristics, with only modest and recent success (Bowers, 1976; E. Hilgard, 1965, 1975; J. Hilgard, 1970; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).

However, whatever has been empirically ascertained concerning individual differences in suggestibility has no necessary reflection upon Hypnotizability, which is a different concept. To our knowledge, the present formulation is the first to explicitly articulate the *conceptual* difference between Hypnotizability and suggestibility. (Many others have said *that* there is a difference, but have not formally stated precisely what that difference is.) Suggestibility is the power to make and act upon suggested anomalous appraisals, while Hypnotizability is the power to relinquish one's power and/or disposition to generate FOAs. There can be different sorts of Hypnotizability corresponding to the different ways in which that power may be relinquished (see our categorization of different sorts of induction procedures in our second paper). Hypnotizability must also be distinguished from one's *disposition* to relinquish one's power to generate FOAs ("Hypnotophobia-Hypnotophilia"?), which may vary independently of Hypnotizability. "Hypnotic *Susceptibility*" is yet a different concept, concerning the inverse of one's power to resist being Hypnotized, which evidently is generally quite high among Hypnotizable persons (Austin, Perry, Sutcliffe, & Yeomans, 1963).

The matter gets even more complex since people may differ as to the strength of their normal (baseline) power and disposition to generate FOAs, a trait we shall refer to as Rationality. There is a very important difference between a person who has the power to relinquish his normally strong final-order perspective (i.e., a highly Hypnotizable person) and one who has a weak power to generate FOAs in the first place (a person of low Rationality—one who is characteristically unable to distinguish

fantasy from reality). However, when the former person is Hypnotized he may be as unlikely to generate a FOA as the latter person in his normal state. As an example, we would expect young children and persons in certain pathological conditions to be low on the Rationality trait (relative to normal adults), and therefore low on Hypnotizability as well (you can't give up what you don't have). A concept of Hypnotic state is not relevant to explaining differences in Rationality between persons, nor is it required to explain differences in suggestibility. State attributions must always be reserved for alterations relative to the individual's own baseline powers and dispositions. With few exceptions, existing studies of individual differences in suggestibility and "hypnotic susceptibility" have not distinguished between the traits of suggestibility, Rationality, and Hypnotizability. We suspect that much of the difficulty and complexity that have been encountered in relating suggestibility to other individual differences centers around this problem.

If we now consider just the trait of Hypnotizability (the capacity to relinquish one's final-order perspective), we can recognize immediately that people would be expected to vary widely on that dimension and that there should be all sorts of other skills and dispositions that have empirically ascertainable relationships to it. For example, people should differ not only in their desire and abilities to temporarily give up their final-order perspective, but also in their capacity for being shown *how* to do so by a variety of different means. We would expect that there are many persons for whom it is a delight to give up their disposition to generate FOAs. Much like play, the experiences that occur can be seen as intrinsically satisfying. An Hypnotic experience of floating through clouds may be reason enough to actively seek out such a state. For others, "relief" may be an appropriate reason: relief from the burden that their real world incurs. Yet for others, the giving up of their final-order perspective may be threatening, difficult, or simply not in accordance with their self-concept. Some persons more than others are preoccupied with reality checks and issues of self-control.

We would also expect that some of the skills and dispositions that have been found to be associated with "hypnotic susceptibility" would also be relevant to Hypnotizability, depending on the form of induction procedure employed. These relevant personal characteristics would include imaginative and dissociative skills and others listed in Table 2. As an example, Coe (1964) has found in several studies that drama students score higher on suggestibility scales than do engineers. J. Hilgard (1970) reports a similar difference between humanities majors and social science students. We would expect these differences to hold up for Hypnotizability. Since many drama students are experienced in what Sarbin and Coe (1972) term "engrossed acting," which may involve the relinquishment of the final-order perspective, it would not be surprising if they

sometimes made good Hypnotic subjects. On the other hand, engineers and social science students may be more concerned with reality checks, and may be reluctant to give them up. The world for many engineers is of a certain sort, and the final-order appraisal of whether and how an Element has a place in that world is his stock in trade.

SUMMARY

An attempt has been made here to clarify hypnotic phenomena by focusing on the "state" and "nonstate" positions that various theorists have attacked, claimed, and defended. Our position in regard to this debate is to argue that the central problem is conceptual rather than empirical. We demonstrate that because various theorist-researchers see their task as primarily empirical demonstration rather than conceptual clarification, they have been talking past each other and about different subject matters.

Rather than contributing to the ongoing debate as to whether or not hypnosis involves a special psychological state, we proceed by developing a conceptual map of the subject matter of hypnosis that encompasses both of the historically defined state and nonstate positions without reducing one to the other. The conceptualization we offer rests centrally on our systematically and explicitly articulating the status of appraisal and anomaly in behavior and experience. Three possibilities are presented that correspond to the possible ways a person could encounter an anomaly and/or behave anomalously. These possible ways of acting are described through the use of the concepts of *Trance state* or *Hypnotic state*, *simulation*, and *Hypnoid behaviors* or *Hypnoid state*.

The concepts of selected state theorists (Ronald Shor, Martin Orne, and Ernest Hilgard) and nonstate theorists (Theodore Barber, and Theodore Sarbin) are located on the present conceptual map, demonstrating how these two theoretical positions are not so much in disagreement as they are concerned with different ranges of phenomena.

Following from and supporting our conceptualization, the general logic of state concepts in psychology is reviewed with a focus upon the use of the Trance state concept in the explanation of hypnotic phenomena. Finally, the concepts of suggestibility, hypnotizability, and other pertinent individual-difference concepts are discussed.

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NOTES

1. The term "theory" has, of course, been employed by scientists and philosophers in numerous ways with varying degrees of overlap in meaning. Some of these uses of "theory" are closer to what we are here referring to as "conceptualization" than others. However, there is no need for dispute on this point. What is important is that the reader understands what we mean by "conceptualization" and how it contrasts with the particular use of "theory" we are here discussing. If the reader's understanding of our concept of "conceptualization" corresponds to his understanding of "theory." so much the better. As in the rest of this article, our concern here is with the conceptual, not the semantic, issues.

2. An example from the hypnosis literature of a formulation in nonobservational language that requires further definition and translation is the psychoanalytic definition of hypnotic state as "a regression in the service of the ego" (Gill & Brenman, 1959). Before such a concept can be observationally employed, we require an ordinary language translation of "regression" and "ego."

3. Trance states are a member of a special class of psychological states commonly termed "altered states of awareness" or "special states of consciousness." We cannot take the space here to offer an explication of these latter concepts, but the interested reader is referred to Plotkin and Schwartz (Note 3) where this task is accomplished.

4. Please note that "Element" is a general term that we will use to encompass the four more specific possibilities of objects, such as a house; processes, such as the construction of a house; events, such as the completion of a house; and states of affairs, such as the fact that I built the house or that it is an A-frame.

5. Although we do not have the space to elaborate upon this here, it should at least be pointed out that, in contrast to Shor, we do not see it as necessary that the Hypnotized subject is acting even *non*consciously on these reasons for enacting a hypnotic role. Indeed, our concept of Hypnotic state does not require that the Hypnotized person even *have* these reasons for enacting a role (as opposed to having them and not acting upon them). Although they are most likely very atypical cases, Erickson (1959) illustrates how that which we are here calling Hypnotic states can be, with the appropriate techniques, induced in persons who at no level desire to be good hypnotic subjects (in fact, they may be actively striving to resist becoming hypnotized). However, once they are Hypnotized, these strivings, too, become both nonconscious and, for the most part, nonfunctioning.

6. We take our present formulation of Hypnoid behavior to correspond to the domain of facts commonly referred to as "waking suggestibility" (e.g., Evans, 1967; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961).

7. If an observer other than P does not see it as an anomalous appraisal while P does, then the observer would not call it a Hypnoid behavior; rather, he would call it a perceptual illusion if most persons in their normal state see it the same way as P, or else some sort of psychotic episode (e.g., derealization or depersonalization) since in this latter instance it would be a case where, from the observer's perspective, P does not recognize some normal feature of himself or his world (i.e., P appraises as anomalous what he normally appraises as ordinary and familiar). Of course, if P himself is the observer, then there is no difference between "recognize" and "appraise" in the above clauses. Also, it is important to remember that the observation by someone other than P that P is correct or not correct concerning the anomalousness of his own appraisals is itself an appraisal on the observer's part, and that appraisal is also open to criticism. This is especially important to remember when the observer in question is a mental health professional, whose appraisals have the greatest significance concerning P's future (Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980).

8. These considerations reveal an interesting resemblance between our formulation of the Hypnotic state (and its distinction from Hypnoid) and Jaynes's (1976) recent discussion of hypnotic behavior as the " 'as if' with a suppression of the 'it isn't,' " that is, an anomalous appraisal of X without a (negative) FOA of X.

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PART II

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: DESCRIPTIVE-PRAGMATIC APPROACHES

INTRODUCTION

Raymond M. Bergner

> Charlie Brown: I'd really like to go over there and have lunch with that little red-haired girl, but (sigh!) I can't, because she's a something and I'm a nothing. You know, if I was a nothing and she was a nothing, I could go over there. Or if I was a something and she was a something, I could go over there. Or if I was a something and she was a nothing, I could go over there. But (sigh!) I'm a nothing and she's a something, so I can't go over there and have lunch with her.

Charlie Brown's lament provides us with a peculiarly apt statement about psychopathology as viewed from the standpoint of Descriptive Psychology. In introducing the three papers comprising the Clinical Topics Section of this volume, I will first of all present a very brief, relatively nontechnical overview of this standpoint. I will then discuss the three papers, showing how each represents an elaborated treatment of certain more restricted topics falling within this broader scheme and highlighting the features of each that qualify it as a true advance in Descriptive Psychology.

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From the standpoint of Descriptive Psychology, *psychopathology* has to do essentially with restrictions in the ability of persons to participate in life in ways which are meaningful, absorbing, and fulfilling to them. For the great majority of persons coming to psychotherapy, the most important modes of participation are interpersonal relationships and, to a lesser extent, work (cf. Freud's classical definition of mental health as "the ability to love and to work"). Their distress, like Charlie Brown's, is due to such problems in living as failures to establish meaningful relationships, disruptions in existing relationships, and inabilities to find or to maintain meaningful work.

Ossorio has said that "if a situation calls for something a person cannot do, he will do something he can do" (1969/1981: 31). This statement, originally formulated for a different purpose, provides us with an excellent entrée into the understanding of *psychopathological behaviors* (e.g., hysterical influence attempts, paranoid reformulations of reality, and the abuse of alcohol). Psychopathological behaviors are overly costly, insufficient, or otherwise problematic attempts at human participation in situations where other modes of participation would serve far better. Charlie Brown, unable to act as he would like to, becomes instead buried in contemplation of his predicament ("obsessively ruminative").

A person's "behavior potential" is the range of intentional actions that he or she is able to engage in. Behavior potential is a function of a number of factors. Within Descriptive Psychology, the one factor most strongly emphasized is the individual's "status," which is the totality of this individual's relationships with all of the elements of the world. Status designates an individual's position in the scheme of things, which position is divisible into any number of subrelationships. For example, the terms "father," "judge," "perpetrator," and "free agent" all designate such subrelationships. To occupy certain positions in relation to other persons, objects, states of affairs, or even oneself enhances one's freedom and ability to act; to occupy others constricts such freedom and ability.

Second, what a person takes to be the case about the world, his structure of knowledge and beliefs, importantly influences his behavior potential. For example, his self-concept, which represents his beliefs about his own status, exercises a powerful effect on his behavior potential. When Charlie Brown tells us that "I'm a nothing and she's a something, so I can't go over and have lunch with her," it is abundantly clear that his beliefs about his own status make a great deal of difference in what he actually does.

Third, and finally, an individual's existing skills and capabilities are important determinants of his behavior potential, a point that is much stressed by behavioral practitioners. Obviously, a person can reliably do only what he or she knows how to do.

An individual *"grows,"* that is, becomes able to do things he could not do before, when his status, his beliefs, and/or his capabilities change in such fashion that his behavior potential is expanded (for example, Charlie Brown may revise his appraisal of his own status and come to see and treat himself as a "something"). To enhance an individual's participation in the world, and in the bargain reduce his distress and his reliance on psychopathological behaviors, is the basic mission of psychotherapy as conceived from a Descriptive Psychological standpoint. In order to accomplish this end, the psychotherapist provides conditions in which an individual can alter his beliefs about self and world, alter his repertoire of skills and capabilities, and/or alter his status in such a manner that the individual's behavior potential is expanded.

THE PAPERS

If we take what has been said thus far as a crude map of the clinical landscape, we can see how each of the three papers included in this section of the book represents an "up close" depiction of some smaller territory within this broader domain. Let us now turn our attention to these papers, to their place in this broader scheme of things, and most importantly, to the features that qualify each of them as an important advance in Descriptive Psychology.

Baker, in his paper, "Therapeutic Social Practices," takes a close look at psychotherapeutic processes from the viewpoint of Descriptive Psychology. Working from a more technically precise definition of psychopathology than the one proferred above, namely that psychopathology entails significant restrictions in the ability of persons to participate in the existing social practices of a culture, Baker explicates the concept of a "social practice" and uses this concept to elucidate both the processes and the goals of psychotherapy. He examines a variety of important contemporary therapies and shows how each of them (1) itself entails participation in "therapeutic" social practices and (2) is concerned with enabling persons to expand their appreciation of and participation in social practices. The differences between these therapies when viewed from this new vantage point are not radical ones. Rather, they have to do with the facts that some therapies attempt to foster enhanced participation explicitly and didactically, while others do so inexplicitly and evocatively; and that some therapies focus upon reflexive social practices, while others focus upon ordinary, nonreflexive ones.

There are a number of important and novel features of this paper. First, Baker provides for the first time a Descriptive Psychologically-based rationale for an eclectic approach to psychotherapy. This rationale, which unifies these diverse approaches, may actually render the term "eclectic" itself somewhat questionable, since this term is ordinarily

used to designate a selection from incompatible, divergent viewpoints. Perhaps it is more accurate to say, then, that what Baker has accomplished is the provision of a conceptual framework within which all of these supposedly divergent techniques are shown to be both conceptually coherent and compatible in practice.

Second, the notion of a "reflexive social practice" represents a novel contribution. It provides, I believe, a clearer and more precise way of talking about relations with self than is currently afforded by most other theories. It also provides exceptionally lucid conceptual linkages to processes of human socialization in ordinary (i.e., nonreflexive) social practices. Third, Baker provides some rather intriguing and ingenious explications of hypnotic phenomena from the standpoint of social practices.

In his paper on "Attempted Suicide and Restrictions in the Ability to Negotiate Personal Characteristics," Kirsch, like Baker, is concerned with persons suffering from restrictions in their ability to participate in social practices. While Baker focuses upon psychotherapeutic processes, however, Kirsch is more concerned with psychopathology and psychopathological behavior. Utilizing Descriptive Psychological concepts, Kirsch offers us a precise and clinically useful explication of the traditional general idea that suicide attempts may best be understood as tactics in human relationships.

Kirsch's proposal is that suicidal persons are persons who have come to a certain impasse in their interpersonal relationships. Specifically, their eligibility to engage in the social practice of negotiation with respect to their own personal characteristics has been significantly restricted in these relationships. The suicidal act represents a negotiation move, a desperate one to be sure, either to prevent further degradation of their position within the relationship or to reinstate themselves to a position from which they have already been degraded. In the last part of this paper, Kirsch presents empirical research which is supportive of this position.

Kirsch's paper represents the first attempt to utilize Descriptive Psychology concepts—especially those of Social Practice, psychopathology as inability to participate in social practices, negotiation, and status—to understand suicidal behavior. He clearly demonstrates the utility of such concepts for rendering such behavior more intelligible in a way that is very useful for the clinician.

A very interesting possibility raised by this study is that our usual tendency to regard suicidal gestures and serious suicide attempts as totally different acts may be overstated. Kirsch suggests here that both may be regarded, despite obvious differences in lethality, as attempts to prevent a degradation or to reinstate oneself after an already accomplished degradation. If one thinks of the one-time Japanese custom of

restoring one's honor after a personal disgrace by killing oneself, the notion of dying as restorative of personal status in a community of living persons may not seem so farfetched.

Finally, Kirsch's paper provides a partial but excellent beginning to a Descriptive Psychologically-based approach to the understanding of family systems phenomena. The negotiation of personal characteristics and, more broadly, the assignment and negotiation of status within relationships, can be seen in this paper to provide precise and useful accounts as to how certain transactional patterns can result in the serious dysfunction of the participants.

In the third paper in this section, "Hysterical Action, Impersonation, and Caretaking Roles," Bergner, like Kirsch, is concerned with using Descriptive Psychological concepts to shed light on certain kinds of psychopathology and psychopathological behavior. Drawing on the notions of psychopathology as inability to participate in social practices, psychopathological behavior as what persons do when they can't do something better, and status, Bergner provides an account of the intelligibility of hysterical phenomena, for example, conversion reactions, amnesias, and presentations of self by persons as not in charge of their own actions.

The basic position taken in this paper is that hysterical phenomena may best be understood as actions (as opposed to happenings). Specifically, they represent impersonative status claims engaged in by persons who have good reason to present themselves to the world as sick persons, forgetful persons, stupid persons, and, in extreme cases, nonpersons (i.e., nonagents). These good reasons often have to do with these persons having personal histories in which they were prematurely and coercively charged with adult, caretaker roles, and exploited and depleted in these roles. Having been excessively socialized in social practices entailing caring for and being cared for, when these persons seek ultimately to escape exploitation, what comes naturally to them is to make a bid (status claim) for the reciprocal role in these social practices. And since one cannot become, for example, a sick person or a stupid person by an act of will, the only option available is to *simulate* such defect. Based on this conceptualization, Bergner concludes his paper with a number of therapeutic recommendations. Most importantly, he suggests ways of responding in a status-enhancing way to the impersonative status claims made by hysterical clients to their psychotherapists.

In a manner similar to Kirsch, Bergner uses Descriptive Psychological concepts to extend and refine notions that already have some currency in the clinical marketplace. The concepts of "status" and "status claims" represent refinements of Szasz's excellent work on the notion of hysteria as impersonation (Szasz, 1973), and tie this notion into a whole network

of other Descriptive Psychological concepts. Bergner extends Szasz's predominant concern with feigned physical illness and shows how many more features of hysterical persons may also be regarded as impersonative status claims. Finally in contrast with Szasz, Bergner takes the position that in hysteria we are confronted with a person who has many factual competencies but who is feigning incompetence, not with a factually empty and seriously deficient person. The implications of this for the psychotherapist working with such persons are obvious and vast.

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THERAPEUTIC SOCIAL PRACTICES

Eugene M. Baker

ABSTRACT

The conceptual framework called Descriptive Psychology provides a perspective from which several therapeutic approaches are seen to be related. A conceptual analysis of social practices along with a selective review of psychotherapy literature helps reveal the meaning and implications of the analogy: Behavioral Family Therapy is to Structural and Strategic Family Therapy as Cognitive Behavior Modification is to Generative Personality Approaches (Gestalt Therapy, Redecision Therapy, and Ericksonian Hypnosis). Thorough understanding of the concepts of social practice and reflexive social practice within the context of the Descriptive Psychology perspective can provide the practitioner with great procedural flexibility while maintaining conceptual coherence.

The field of psychotherapy is characterized by a multiplicity of approaches, techniques, and theories. Each approach carries with it an ideology, technical jargon, and usually an enthusiastic following. Unfortunately, this situation leaves many practicing clinicians unable (or worse yet, unwilling) to communicate with others of different orienta-

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tions. Often there are heated polemics about which approach is generally superior or more "scientific." Behavior modifiers cast aspersions on "cognitive" behavior modifiers (Ledwidge, 1978). Family therapists tend to see individual psychotherapy as incomplete. Stylistic differences and preferences becomes epistemological or metaphysical propositions. Practitioners often seek certification as Gestalt Therapists, Transactional Analysts, Official Hypnotists, or even Neurolinguistic Programmers. Clients even seek particular brands of psychotherapy. And somehow, in the clamor arising from this Tower of Babel, the simple notion that as therapists we deal with persons engaging in social practices has been overlooked.

This essay does not offer yet another set of techniques for psychotherapy or even another theory. Rather, an effort is made to articulate a perspective deriving from competence in the use of social practices. From this perspective therapists may gain access to alternative therapeutic approaches and use different techniques with greater flexibility. However, this is not to suggest the popular eclecticism of taking something from one approach, something from others, and *hoping* that they will all make sense. Making sense of psychotherapy must precede using a particular method. Finally and most importantly, an attempt is made herein to build some bridges between therapists who practice within one or even several approaches and the conceptual system which is Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1971/1978, 1970/1981).

This chapter is divided into two major sections: a review and extension of some concepts within Descriptive Psychology, and a selective review of some therapeutc approaches. No attempt has been made to be exhaustive in choosing therapies to examine. The intent is rather to provide examples and give substance to the notion that as therapists we are all engaged in similar activities, regardless of orientation. Perhaps as the formal relations between such diverse approaches as Gestalt Therapy and Behavioral Family Therapy are spelled out, a different understanding of each therapy will develop.

DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Descriptive Psychology is a coherent conceptual framework for understanding persons and behavior. Descriptive Psychology is not another psychological theory; rather, it provides a kind of bookkeeping system for organizing facts about behavior. The major feature which distinguishes Descriptive Psychology from existing approaches in psychology is the stress placed upon preempirical conceptual analysis. A wide variety of ordinary language concepts have been used to provide a perspective

on persons, bchavior, language, and reality. In particular, the concept of social practice is explored here as a unifying concept for the psychotherapies.

Social Practices

Ossorio (1970/1981) states, "Social practice descriptions are used to represent unitary sequences of behaviors by a single individual or patterns of behavior involving multiple participants" (p. 4). Among the daily social practices in which one might engage are dining, negotiating a disagreement, solving a problem, or playing a game. The activities are recognizable, repeatable, and learnable. Therapeutic activities such as doing systematic desensitization, inducing a trance, identifying and altering internal dialogues, and modeling a parenting strategy are also examples of social practices.

A social practice is a special case of the concept of process. Ossorio (1971/1978) has developed a format for describing processes which is called the Basic Process Unit. The parameters of a process, or ways in which processes can differ from one another, include: Name, Stages, Options, Versions, Contingencies, Elements, Individuals, and Eligibilities.

Playing a game of chess provides a clear example of the sequential aspects of a social practice. The moves of the game are the Stages of the process, and for each move the player considers various Options. The rules for the movement of the pieces and the conduct of the game are called the Contingencies. Each different game of chess represents a particular Version of the process.

The parameters of Elements, Individuals, and Eligibilities are most simply understood in a play. The Elements are the characters or roles, while the Individuals are the particular actors. The Eligibilities provide a casting list, so that each actor is assigned as a character in the play. Any social practice can be fully described by providing values for each of the parameters.

A person's behavior is often described by reference to his or her participation in a particular social practice. When a person "moves pawn to queen 4," he or she is making a move in a game of chess. Within Descriptive Psychology, to describe a person's behavior in terms of participation in a relevant social practice is one way of indicating the Significance of the behavior. In this case, Significance has a particular technical meaning as one of the parameters of behavior. The concept of behavior, also called intentional action, has been anaylzed by Ossorio (1973) to have the following parameters: Identity, Want, Know, Know How, Performance, Achievement, Personal Characteristics, and Significance.

When a person chooses among behaviors, he or she is said to be

engaging in deliberate action. In deliberate action the values of the Know and Want parameters are given by specifying some behaviors. Deliberate action descriptions are the paradigm for the behavior of persons. In a social practice each Stage has behavioral options, and consequently a participant in a social practice is choosing among behaviors. The behavioral sequence in a social practice is thus a sequence of deliberate actions. Sometimes persons may become locked into one version of a particular social practice and describe themselves as having "no choice" with respect to that particular social practice. Recognizing that social practices are inherently sequences of deliberate action provides at least formal access to the possibilities of choice and decision.

There are various classes of social practices. To name only a few, there are rhetorical (having a debate), instructional (teaching a child arithmetic), regulatory (disciplining a child for misbehavior), recreational (playing tennis), occupational (programming a computer to solve a problem), and evocative or dramatic (reciting a poem). Within each class there are many separate social practices.

Social Practices in Psychotherapy

Negotiation, problem solving, and status assignment are examples of social practices that are important in psychotherapy. The Stages in the social practice of negotiation include: (a) stating positions, (b) criticising the other's position and supporting one's own position, (c) adjusting positions, and (d) agreeing or agreeing to disagree. People can go through the first three Stages as often as needed to reach the final Stage. Couples who come for therapy often have gone wrong in one or more of the many ways that they could go wrong in this social practice. For example, they might have failed to state positions clearly, perhaps simply assuming that each knew the other's position. Failure to recognize that agreeing to disagree is one acceptable stopping-place can lead to interminable negotiating, or more frequently repetitive fighting.

Problem solving has many formats, spelled out by various writers, though they are all generally similar. The diversity results from being able to decompose any Stage of a process into constituent processes. Bourne, Dominowski, and Loftus (1979) identify three general stages: (a) preparation (understanding the problem), (b) production (generating solutions), and (c) judgment (evaluating the solutions generated). Spivack, Platt, and Shure (1976) have found that many clinical problems can be seen as deriving from faulty interpersonal problem solving. Failures may occur because a person doesn't recognize a problem, doesn't understand consequentiality or causality, is deficient in means-end thinking, or is deficient in generating alternatives. Their therapeutic approach involves specifically teaching the person the practice of interpersonal

problem solving with attention to the ways in which a person can go wrong.

Status assignment, as a social practice, is demonstrated in a variety of contexts such as a marriage ceremony, college graduation ceremony, judicial proceeding, or assignment of a psychiatric diagnosis. Generally any accreditation or degradation ceremony involves the social practice of status assignment (Schwartz, 1979). The concept of status is central in the clinical applications of Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1976).

The concept of status designates the totality of a person's relationships with elements of the real world. Status indicates the person's place in the world, though not in a merely hierarchical sense. One way of describing a relationship is to indicate the social practices which are appropriate to that relationship. For instance, the social practices appropriate to the friendship relationship are different from those appropriate to the doctor-patient relationship. Speaking of the repertoire of social practices that a person has acquired and is eligible to participate in is another way of indicating his or her status. What a person is capable of doing and/or eligible to do is called behavior potential. Status is a summary statement of a person's behavior potential.

When a person's status changes, his or her relationships, behavior potential, and repertoire of social practices change. Perhaps the clearest example of a social practice which leads to status change is the "degradation ceremony" (Garfinkel, 1956). The perpetrator of an act which clearly violates the values of the community is degraded when a denouncer successfully claims that the act demonstrates that the perpetrator is not a member in good standing in the community. Ossorio (1971/1978) has used the Basic Process Unit to elaborate the structure of this social practice. In the degradation ceremony the Elements are perpetrator, denouncer, witnesses, group, and act. The Stages are (a) description of the act, (b) redescription of the act as reprehensible, and (c) characterization of the perpetrator by the act. A person who has been subjected to a successful degradation ceremony will have lost behavior potential and will no longer be able to engage in the social practices for which he or she was eligible prior to the degradation ceremony.

In status assignment, "treating a person as an X," where X can be any particular status, becomes quite important. To the extent that I treat a person as a friend, for example, I will be encouraging that person to behave in ways which are compatible with this status assignment, and also interpreting his or her behavior as an expression of status. In family therapy, the positive connotation technique (see Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 1978) is a social practice of status assignment which gives the therapist access to important observations about the system's functioning. The therapist makes a positive appraisal of both the symptomatic behavior of the patient and the symptomatic behaviors of the

others. One way to do this is to indicate that their actions serve the common goal of preserving the system's functioning. This kind of status assignment also puts all members of the family on the same level.

Reflexive Social Practices

Social practices generally are thought of as public sequences of behavior involving two or more persons. Once someone has grasped the concept of social practice and understands the structure of a social practice, that person is able to recognize that in some instances the potential for similar behavior or activities exists for that person whether alone or with others. A social practice is reflexive when a single individual acts as both the Individuals and Elements parameters of the social practice. In this case the Eligibility parameter indicates that the person is eligible to be each of the Elements. Persons can be both the critic and the subject of their own criticism; a person may be judge, jury, prosecutor, and defendant. Several schools of therapy employ the metaphor of "parts of the person." Gestalt Therapy (Perls, 1969) has the topdog and underdog; Redecision Therapy (Goulding & Goulding, 1979) has the Parent, Adult, and Child ego states. Of course, these are not really substantive parts because the concept of Elements is basically methodological, not substantive.

Because reflexive social practices are special cases of social practices, it is logically difficult, if not impossible, to engage in a reflexive social practice for which there is not a social practice specifiable. To play a game of chess with oneself, one has to first understand what it is to play chess. Generally, reflexive social practices appear developmentally after social practices. Children, however, may develop mastery in some social practices through practice in the homologous reflexive social practice.

Clinically important reflexive social practices include persuading oneself to do something, denouncing oneself for an act, and coaching oneself to better performance. Just as one can assign status to others, one can assign status to oneself. Depression is a particularly interesting case of self-status assignment. One formulation of depression (Ossorio, 1976) involves the reflexive use of the degradation ceremony; the individual becomes the perpetrator, denouncer, and witness in this instance. Following a loss of status, such as the loss of a relationship, potential activity, or eligibility for certain social practices, the person overtly recognizes his or her lowered status; this amounts to engaging in a degradation ceremony with oneself. Ossorio (1976) says:

> So if what you're recognizing is the loss of status or a lower behavior potential, and if you're overtly engaged in a degradation ceremony that is the recognition of that, then indeed, on both counts you will have less to think about and less to do, because both your thoughts and your performances have to do with your behavior.

> The less behavior potential you have, the less there is to think about, the less choices to be made, the less performances to engage in. (p. 56)

Not only does this formulation provide for the relative inactivity of the depressed person, but it also accounts for the self-condemnation so typical in depression. In the self-condemnation, the person is playing both denouncer and perpetrator.

In Gestalt Therapy, Redecision Therapy, or Neurolinguistic Programming (Bandler & Grinder, 1979), the person is instructed to "talk" to a particular part of himself, to carry on a dialogue, change positions, and choose new options within a particular reflexive social practice. In the presence of a good therapist, this monodramatic activity often results in behavior change, for reasons which will soon be noted.

In the self-instructional approach (Meichenbaum, 1977), the person is encouraged to overtly, and then covertly, coach and instruct himself as to what actions are appropriate and necessry. The person thus engages in reflexive social practices modeled after the social practices of instruction or coaching. Again, behavior frequently changes as the person gains mastery of this new set of reflexive social practices, which were formerly not in use.

A final, more subtle use of the concept of reflexive social practice can be found in what is traditionally called dissociation. Under hypnosis the person may show anaesthesia while a "hidden observer" is aware of the pain (Hilgard, 1977). In dissociation the person doesn't recognize his or her *eligibility* for participation as a given Element in the reflexive social practice; it is as though one were to watch a play and be able to see and hear only one actor, instead of the whole cast. More about this later.

One can recognize reflexive social practices in cases where an action has reference to the self, or when the person acknowledges engaging in a reflexive social practice, such as having a conversation with himself or herself. Experience with people can also provide a guide for recognizing implicit reflexive social practices.

Imagining Social Practices

It is important to distinguish engaging in a reflexive social practice from imagining a social practice. While both involve only one person doing the acting, there is considerable difference. To understand the difference, it is useful to consider how imagining a social practice is different from engaging in the social practice. Following Neisser's (1976) approach, I will suggest that imagining something amounts to anticipating, being prepared to act upon, something. To imagine a social practice is to be prepared to act upon it. Essentially, imagining a social practice is a way of specifying the value of the Know parameter of behavior.

Often it is helpful actually to engage in a social practice before trying to imagine versions of it; indeed, one must have the schema of social practices to be able to imagine a variety of social practices. It is not necessary, or even desirable, however, to engage in every social practice that one can imagine. Being able to imagine a social practice can have considerable effect on behavior, since the person can then make choices among more Options, or more adequately evaluate Options within a given social practice.

How is engaging in a reflexive social practice different from just imagining a reflexive social practice? Further, is the difference between imagining and engaging in a social practice the same as the difference between imagining and engaging in a *reflexive* social practice? In a reflexive social practice, one person is eligible for all Elements of the social practice. This reflexive social practice may be acted out visibly, or a person may imagine that he or she is engaging in the reflexive social practice. The difference here is between acting out a monodrama and imagining the action of a monodrama. It is a matter of the degree of involvement, just as reciting Hamlet's soliloquy is different from imagining the recitation of the soliloquy. If someone tells you that he or she was imagining a dialogue with himself or herself, that person indicates anticipations and gives you a promise that he or she would be able, in appropriate circumstances, to act out the dialogue.

Talking to oneself, at least among adults, is usually carried out imaginatively, rather than overtly. No doubt, however, our internal dialogues and debates and monodramas can significantly affect our behavior and decisions. It is unlikely that we would be able adequately to imagine reflexive social practices without having some practice and experience in actually engaging in them. Children, it should be noted, can often be heard instructing themselves, debating with themselves, and so on. As we develop and become members of our society, we learn to imagine reflexive social practices, rather than to engage overtly in them. In fact, when a Gestalt therapist requests that a person talk to a part of himself, there is often a feeling of silliness, self-consciousness, and peculiarity, almost as though the therapist had requested that the person act again as a child does, and implicitly then to be "one-down" in the presence of an adult.

Both imagining social practices and engaging in reflexive social practices affects behavior by giving the person new choices and new grounds for evaluating a behavior. To watch a play, listen to a story, or hear a trance induction gives room for persons to place themselves imaginatively as one or more of the Elements in the series of social practices. When a person recognizes new Versions of a social practice, or new Options within a social practice or reflexive social practice, he or she can engage in new Versions, if he or she has sufficient reasons.

Therapeutic Practices and Procedures

According to Ossorio (1976), pathology involves a significant restriction on a person's participation in some social practices. Conversely, a social practice is therapeutic to the extent that it removes inappropriate restrictions on a person's participation in, eligibility or capability to participate in, or motivation to participate in relevant social practices. A person may not be able to participate in some relevant social practice because he or she is not eligible, lacks appropriate skills, or has reasons not to participate in the social practice. A person may also fail to participate in a particular social practice because he or she has no opportunity to do so; in this case, the therapist's task involves constructing a situation so that the person has such an opportunity and recognizes it.

While adhering to the therapeutic policies of treating the client as a person, legitimizing, and being on the client's side (Ossorio, 1976), the therapist can follow four principles to achieve therapeutic ends.

1. Assess the social practices the person uses or can use, as well as those the client desires but can't or doesn't use.
2. Treat the person as a collaborator (a corollary of being on the client's side, which is particularly useful if there is more than one client).
3. Show the person social practices that are new in at least some parameters, such as Options, Versions, or Contingencies, by using demonstration, injunction, description, or metaphor.
4. Give the person the opportunity to practice new social practices, and names for the new social practices, so that the person's action can be clearly seen by him or her to be deliberate action.

Principle 1, assessing the existing and desired social practices, alerts us to the process nature of what we observe between persons and in a person's relations with himself. Rather than nominalize or hypostatize, the therapist can remain closer to what he or she observes actually happening. The therapist may examine the repertoire of social practices which the client displays or recounts. Of interest may be the extent and depth of this repertoire, the person's predilections, and the person's skill at a given social practice. In family therapy, the therapist can observe the regulatory, instructional, evocative, and recreational social practices used by and available to the family members. The family therapist generally looks for patterns with the same kind of theme (see Haley, 1976). In individual therapy, constellations of misconceptions may be seen as attributes of implicit participation in some reflexive social practices, and the therapist may ask the client to make this participation explicit.

Principle 2, treating the client as a collaborator, serves as a reminder about the status of the client. When one observes expert therapists like Erickson, Satir, or even Socrates, one notices that the range of social practices employed are generally consistent with those used by collaborators. When a family system is the client, being a collaborator with each member of the family to achieve a desired change is a most effective way of joining each member. In approaches using the metaphor of parts, treating each part as a collaborator helps insure that each aspect of the person is legitimized and validated (something the client is probably not doing).

Principle 3, showing the person new social practices, arrives at the crux of the therapists' activities. A social practice is new or different if any of the values of the parameters changes. The therapist may model or demonstrate desired social practices, roles, or Versions, as is commonly done in role-playing, so that the client sees, hears, and feels how to go about doing something different. The therapist, particularly a strategic therapist, may give the client a specific injunction, so that the client discovers new options in the social practice. For example, a therapist may instruct a client to decline an invitation to an argument by simply acknowledging that the other person said something, without making any commitment to the content of what was said. The client is told to respond nonchalantly with words such as OK, wow, gee, and so forth. By responding in this way, the client can avoid the social practice of continuing an argument without ignoring the person. A therapist may also utilize stories, metaphors, or examples (see Gordon, 1978) to show the person new versions of particular social practices. Even so-called nondirective therapists show new versions of social practices as they interact with their clients, and thus allow the person to take on alternate status assignments. By modeling the social practice of recognizing, accepting, and exploring an experience, the therapist shows the client how to adopt a new relationship to an experience.

Principle 4, giving the person the opportunity to practice new social practices, highlights the importance of practice and experience in learning (see Maxims 6 and 7 in Ossorio, 1970/1981). Practice may occur by observation, participation, imagination, or any combination of these modes of practice. In this way the therapist can also guide the client through the various stages of learning and help the client become even more effective. In the second section of this paper, each of these principles will be exemplified in the context of particular therapeutic approaches.

STANDARD THERAPIES FROM A DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY PERSPECTIVE

In this section, I review a variety of therapies in light of the concepts and perspectives developed in the previous section. These therapies include Behavioral Family Therapy, Structural and Strategic Family Therapy, several of the approaches generically referred to as Cognitive Behavior Modification, and several of the approaches which use the metaphors and concepts of the Generative Personality (Gilligan, Note 1), specifically, Gestalt Therapy, Redecision Therapy, and Ericksonian Hypnosis.

The general progress of this section is from interpersonal to intrapersonal modes of therapy. The following analogy also provides structure to this section: Behavioral Family Therapy is to Structural and Strategic Family Therapy as Cognitive Behavior Modification is to the Generative Personality Therapies. The first system of each term is usually explicit, direct, and instructional, while the second system of each term is usually more implicit, indirect, and dramatic/evocative. The first half of the analogy appeals to social practices and engaging in them, while the second part appeals to reflexive social practices and imagining social practices.

Behavioral Family Therapy

Behavioral Family Therapy (e.g., Blechman & Olson, 1976; Patterson, 1968, 1976; Patterson, Cobb, & Ray, 1973; Stuart, 1969, 1971, 1976) can be seen from the Descriptive Psychology perspective to instruct persons in the social practices of negotiation, problem solving, and regulation of behavior. Specific instruction and practice often result in enhanced participation in the relevant social practices; for example, more effective child discipline or more satisfying marital interactions.

Stuart's (1969, 1971, 1976) approach, which is based on behavioral exchange and the establishment of equity in marital and parent-child relationships, focuses primarily on teaching family members how to go about contracting for behavioral change. In the establishment of such contracts, family members learn to specify desired behaviors clearly (state positions), negotiate mutually agreeable Contingencies (supporting and criticizing positions and adjusting positions), and agree to initiate the Contingencies (come to agreement). This process then is practice in negotiation, with the aid of a therapist to insure that it does not go wrong in one of the ways in which it can go wrong. Blechman and Olson's (1976) Family Contract Game specifically instructs the members on interpersonal problem solving. Players have the experience of learning on a board game the Stages, Options, Versions, and Contingencies in interpersonal problem solving.

Regulatory social practices such as discipline are frequently the concern of parents and often the target of behavioral interventions. The work of Gerald Patterson (1968, 1976) is paradigmatic of these kinds of behavioral programs. Parents are taught the general principles of Social Learning Theory with particular emphasis on the effect of various consequences on behavior. Parents learn through observation and instruction how to structure Contingencies so that a child is less likely to engage in a particular action, that is, has fewer reasons to do so. Parents learn to specify behaviors and to give more adequate social practice descriptions. For example, a parent might learn to be quite specific about what counts as compliance with a directive such as "clean up your room." Because the parents learn to provide different Contingencies for actions, they soon find themselves involved in new social practices. Instead of "coercion-aggression," they find themselves involved in "command-compliance." However, this is not always the case, which serves to highlight the nonautomaticity of consequences on behavior.

To provide a new consequence for a behavior is to give the person a new reason for action. Action still depends on the person's choices, and he or she may have stronger reasons for continuing the undesired behavior. Indeed, sometimes parents will fail to utilize the new techniques, because they have failed to understand them, or mistakenly believed that they are applying them, or have stronger reasons not to use them. When these behavioral approaches are successful, it is often found that family members feel differently about themselves and others (Patterson, 1976). That is to say, through participation in new social practices or new Versions of social practices, the family members have changed one another's status assignments. A parent might come to see a child more positively as child and parent engage in successful command-compliance interactions.

A procedural outline for Behavioral Family Therapy includes at least three major segments: (a) teaching the people to observe and describe behavior and social practices (antecedents and consequences, as well as a particular action), (b) providing explicit instruction in changing the Contingencies and thereby generating new Versions of a social practice or new social practices altogether, (c) encouraging observation and/or practice of new social practices.

Structural and Strategic Family Therapy

Structural Family Therapy (Minuchin, 1974) seeks to alter relationships among members of the family, the structure of the family system. The Descriptive Psychology concept of status, the totality of a person's relationships, provides access to such related notions in the family therapy

literature as boundaries, fusion, enmeshment, disengagement, coalitions, and alliances. To talk about boundaries is a way of talking about relationships; a rigid boundary means that there is little opportunity for interaction, while a diffuse boundary suggests little room for independent functioning within the relationship.

Structural Family Therapists seek to redefine members' positions within the family; that is, to change their status assignments and thereby make them eligible, or sometimes ineligible, for participation in new types of social practices. When the therapist instructs the parents to sit next to one another, excuses a parental child from the room so that parents may interact, or gives homework assignments that will bring father and son closer together, the therapist is using tactics of status assignment.

The therapist may use reframing or relabeling to put a behavior from one social practice into another and thus change its Significance. One way of achieving this is to make Move 2s (see Ossorio, 1976). Move 1 and Move 2 indicate the first two Stages of a social practice. To make Move 1 is to initiate a certain social practice and thus invite someone to make Move 2; for example, to ask a question is to invite an answer. A person may make a Move 2 in a certain social practice without the other's having intended to make or having made Move 1. Making Move 2 puts pressure on the other person either to construe one of his actions as Move 1 or to indicate explicitly that Move 2 was inappropriate and unwarranted. For example, when a therapist says "thank you" and praises a family member for disruptive behavior, he is relabeling the disruptive behavior as compliance with a request, even though no request appeared to have been made. Role-playing and exchanging roles are other ways that the therapist may explicitly change the position of each member and consequently the realm of social practices which occur between them.

Because most status changes require recognition of, opportunity for, motivation for, and participation in a new status, it usually takes some time to accomplish a change. Structural Family Therapists use transitional structures, with transitional relationships, to get from one structure—that is configuration of statuses—to another structure. The general pattern of therapy involves joining the family and restructuring the family. Joining the family occurs when the therapist successfully occupies a place within the family, usually a status which no other member has or could have. This pattern of joining and restructuring occurs repeatedly throughout the course of therapy, and is formally identical to the pattern of "pacing and leading" which Bandler and Grinder (1975) identify in hypnosis.

Strategic approaches to family therapy (Haley, 1963, 1976; Palazzoli,

Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 1978; and Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974) require the therapist to observe sequences of interaction closely. The sequences of social practices engaged in by the various family members tend to be repeated and thus begin to define the hierarchy—in Descriptive Psychology terms, the set of status assignments—for the family. The Contingencies within and among these social practices are the rules the family lives by. From a Descriptive Psychology perspective, the interventions which are characteristic of this approach can be seen to aim at providing new Versions of relevant social practices and thus generating more appropriate status assignments. For example, a "helpful" wife can learn to be less helpful to her depressed husband, and thereby open for him the options of being more independent and less depressed.

Strategic Family Therapists often use paradoxical maneuvers in therapy. Generally, this type of therapy involves accepting the current set of social practices and status assignments as the best that the family can do at the present in an attempt to maintain homeostasis. The therapist acknowledges this for the family and thus is allied with the survival tendencies of the system. When intervening, the therapist uses injunctive rather than interpretive language in order literally to change some aspect of the social practice and thus to alter the sequence of interactions which is problematic. For instance, an injunction to cease efforts to solve a problem is based on the insight that the attempted solutions perpetuate the problem. Injunctions may appear paradoxical to some participants, but not necessarily to the therapist. When the therapist encourages a person to *try* to do what he or she is already doing unsuccessfully, this seems paradoxical to the person. After all, the therapist is supposed to help the person change, not make things worse or keep them the same. The therapist recongizes that this move redefines the person's activities as a success—namely, complying with the therapists' directive. Alternately, the person may succeed in what he or she was attempting to do and also succeed. Either way the therapist can legitimately treat the person as successful—that is, give him or her a new status.

Generally, social practices may be described in more than one way, since each behavior may be redescribed in terms of Significance. "Reframing" a behavior is possible because a given behavior may belong to several distinct social practices. Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch (1974) consider this practice in terms of the theory of logical types; but the language of social practices and redescription makes the same kind of sense.

Family Therapies and Social Practices

The Descriptive Psychology concept of social practice provides access to the diversity of concepts and procedures in the field of family therapy.

From the perspective of the Descriptive Psychology framework developed above, one can see that, despite differences in style and emphasis, both Behavioral Family Therapy and Structural and Strategic Family Therapy essentially seek to alter repetitive patterns of interaction. Behavioral Family Therapy focuses on explicitly and directly instructing family members in new Versions and Contingencies for social practices. Structural and Strategic Family Therapy focus on altering statuses, or eligibilities, and relationships, which are determined by engaging in a particular set of social practices.

In family therapy approaches, the focus is on social practices rather than reflexive social practices. In the next sections individual therapies which treat the person as a family of sorts are explored.

Cognitive Behavior Modification

Cognitive Behavior Modification is a generic term which refers to a variety of therapies and procedures. The work of Beck (1976), Ellis (1962), Mahoney (1974), Meichenbaum (1977), among others (see for instance the recent collection by Kendall & Hollon, 1979), exemplifies this approach. Therapists usually focus on cognitive distortions (Beck, 1976), misconceptions (Raimy, 1975), or irrational thinking (Ellis, 1962). Central to these approaches are the notions of "self-talk" and imagery. Self-talk is usually covert. Therapists seek to make the self-talk overt and then teach the client to change this. My thesis is that Cognitive Behavior Modifiers seek to identify and systematically change a person's reflexive social practices, such as self-rhetoric, self-instruction, self-regulation, or self-status assignment. The Cognitive Behavior Modifier also seeks to change the client's imaginings of social practices and reflexive social practices.

Cognitive distortions or misconceptions can be seen to arise from practice, or in some cases nonpractice, in particular reflexive social practices or imaginary social practices. Perhaps the clearest example of this involves the thinking errors that Beck (1976) identifies as central to depression. The cognitive triad of negative evaluations of self, world, and future can be seen as arising naturally from participation in the reflexive social practice of a degradation ceremony carried out on oneself. The tendency to attend selectively and to overgeneralize is part of playing out the roles of denouncer and witness. The expressions of hopelessness reflect the loss of status accorded to the perpetrator. "Castastrophizing" can be understood as the person's imagining that he or she will be unable to cope adequately with events at each stage. Cognitions, as specifications of the Know parameter of behavior, are inherent elements of social practices, and social practices are often values of the Know parameter.

A special case of great concern to the Cognitive Behavior Modification approaches is self-control. Self-instructional training (Meichenbaum, 1977) is used, for instance, to teach children how to be reflective rather than impulsive. The therapist actually coaches the child in how to behave. The child also watches the therapist engage in a reflexive social practice in which the therapist instructs himself in problem-solving procedures. The child is then encouraged to do the same. Finally, the child is encouraged to do the self-coaching silently, in imagination. Ultimately the child achieves greater self-control in the sense that he or she is less impulsive. Vygotsky (1978) explains the general principles as follows:

> The greatest change in children's capacity to use language as a problem-solving tool takes place somewhat later in their development, when socialized speech (which has previously been used to address an adult) *is turned inward*. Instead of appealing to the adult, children appeal to themselves; language thus takes on an *intrapersonal* function in addition to its interpersonal use. When children develop a method of behavior for guiding themselves that had previously been used in relation to another person, when they organize their own activities according to a social form of behavior, they succeed in applying a social attitude to themselves. The history of the process of the *internalization of social speech* is also the history of the socialization of children's practical intellect. (p. 27, emphases in original)

There are several conceptual issues in self-control which can be clarified by Descriptive Psychology. Self-control is not ordinarily a matter of using imaginary reflexive social practices, but derives from a status achieved through practice in imaginary reflexive social practices and social practices. Self-control training involves achieving a new status in which the person does not have the same set of dispositions. Ordinarily we take it that a person has control of his or her behavior in the course of a daily routine. It is only when the person has certain dispositions, such as eating to alleviate stress, that the question of self-control even arises. The sequence of (a) making explicit what is implicit (reflexive social practices), (b) having the client observe and practice new reflexive social practices, and (c) encouraging imaginary engagement in reflexive social practices, seems to be a common sequence within this therapeutic approach. Imaginary involvement in a reflexive social practice can provide anticipations which make possible new choices, in the same way that imagining a social practice can make possible new choices. The advantage of the reflexive social practice format is that the person, the client, is eligible for each of the roles, that is Elements, within the instructional social practice, rather than imagining someone else in the instructional or regulatory role.

Coping skills training (Meichenbaum, 1977) anticipates that in learning any new response, there will be times when the new response does not work and thus the client must be prepared to cope with this eventuality.

Accordingly, coping skills training uses imagining a sequence of events, that is, social practice, and having the person develop new responses to each challenge. In dealing with stress, anger, and even alcohol abuse, the person is taught a series of new responses, and given the opportunity to practice imaginatively or overtly these new Versions of old social practices in the face of challenges.

Beck's (1976; also Hollon & Beck, 1979) cognitive therapy of depression provides some good exemplifications of the therapeutic principles mentioned in the first section of the paper. Beck's style is generally one of Socratic dialogue with the client, treating him as a collaborator. In therapy the client is urged to become an unbiased, or less biased observer of himself and his situations. This is accomplished by having clients engage in a variety of tasks which will help them discover whether their expectations about themselves and situations are right or in need of revision. In so doing clients begin to participate in the new social practice of conducting an experiment and give up self-derogatory practices. The clients are taught new ways of thinking, self-talk, and imagery, and practice these as well. Because the clients are also keeping a log of activities, they are encouraged to begin participating in more pleasurable social practices, and to recognize participation in some which they may have overlooked. These are all practices in keeping with a new status assignment which is self-attributed.

Generative Personality Approaches

Generative Personality Approaches include Gestalt Therapy (Perls, 1969; Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1951), Redecision Therapy (Goulding & Goulding, 1979), Neurolinguistic Programming (Bandler & Grinder, 1979), and Ericksonian Hypnosis (Bandler & Grinder, 1975; Erickson & Rossi, 1979; and Gilligan, Note 1). The role of reflexive social practices becomes particularly evident when these therapies are examined from the framework of Descriptive Psychology. In these approaches clients are encouraged to establish communication with parts of themselves, which they usually "disown," in the attempt to achieve integration and change. It is quite important to remember that these parts have only methodological status and are not entities.

The most important aspect of reflexive social practices in these approaches is the Eligibility parameter. In doing Gestalt Therapy or Redecision Therapy, one can notice that the person has often failed to recognize eligibility for all of the roles within a monodramatic sequence; hence, the discomfort with playing disowned parts. In Gestalt Therapy theory (Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1951) the terms "introjection," "retroflection," "projection," and "confluence" can be understood to refer to various restrictions on the Eligibilities parameters of relevant

reflexive social practices. (These four terms are used within Gestalt Therapy theory to refer to mistaken boundaries between self and others.) A variety of hypnotic phenomena depend upon the person's agreement to be ineligible for participation as a particular Element, namely, the unconscious.

Despite the variety of procedures used within Generative Personality Approaches, a procedural outline can be discerned. First, using primarily monodramatic and evocative reflexive social practices, the therapist's task is to observe the implicit or explicit reflexive social practices and to encourage the person to make explicit any implicit reflexive social practices. Second, the person is encouraged to act as if he or she were all of the parts; this is to redefine the Eligibility parameter. Third, the therapist helps the person develop new Versions of the reflexive social practices by suggesting new Options or having the person create new Options. Fundamentally, reflexive social practices are changed from futile attempts at negotiation or problem solving, such as blaming, to more successful Versions of these social practices. Going from old to new Versions of reflexive social practices involves using transitional Versions so that the change is not so abrupt as to be rejected. Finally, the person is encouraged to practice these new reflexive social practices and to experience the cognitive and affective changes that go along with these.

This outline is compatible with that offered by Bandler and Grinder (1979) for the process they call "reframing." In Gestalt Therapy or Redecision Therapy, the impasse is resolved as the person learns to "listen" to the disowned parts of self, change harangue into dialogue, and to make new decisions—in Descriptive Psychology terms, to choose new Options within these reflexive social practices. Again, as in Cognitive Behavior Modification, we notice the sequence of taking what was implicit, making it explicit, changing it, and allowing it to be implicit again.

Hypnosis

Hypnosis is a particularly interesting case of utilizing reflexive social practices embedded within social practices, and deserves special attention for the ways in which it sheds light upon the integration of the preceding concepts. Ericksonian Hypnosis (Erickson & Rossi, 1979; Gilligan, Note 1) can be understood as an interpersonal relationship based on mutual acceptance. Characteristically, the hypnotist tends to accept whatever the behavior of the subject is, which makes it easier for the subject to accept the behavior of the hypnotist, that is, making suggestions.

The pattern of pacing and leading (see Bandler and Grinder, 1975) is an important one to understand. A person paces another when he or she mirrors and acknowledges the behavior of the other. A hypnotist can pace such aspects of behavior as the subject's rate of breathing, level

of activity, affective style, imaginations, and physiological responses. Pacing can be either verbal or nonverbal. After some pacing, it is possible to lead, suggest a response, and pace whatever happens after that. Repeating this pattern of pacing and leading is one excellent way of inducing a trance. The hypnotist is very careful to define any behavior which the person offers as acceptable, and as much as possible to define it as a hypnotic response. This can also be accomplished by using general language and covering all possibilities of response in a description; for example, "to experience an unusual sensation," rather than saying what particular sensation the person will have.

Coe and Sarbin (1977) adopt a dramaturgical model for hypnosis. They speak of the hypnotist's inviting the subject to participate in a minidrama and giving role assignments, through using counterfactual and counter-expectational speech. Indeed the social practices used within hypnosis are primarily dramatic or evocative. The term evocative is used to highlight the similarity of hypnotic language to poetic language, which evokes the unconscious. The subject may accept or reject such an invitation. Once the subject has accepted it, he or she has already begun to respond with acceptance to the suggestions of the hypnotist. The hypnotist strives to make any option which is chosen count as one which indicates acceptance; this is where the phrasing of suggestions and the hypnotist's response to the subject's response becomes so important. The hypnotist may succeed in these endeavors by giving permission for the person to do what he or she is already doing. One must observe very closely the behavior of the subject to do this effectively. In many ways, then, the hypnotist and subject maneuver one another (see Haley, 1963, for more detail), as each person's actions set limits on the options for the other's actions in order that they can develop a very special relationship.

A most important device of the hypnotist is the use of language implying reflexive social practices, particularly reflexive social practices in which the Elements are the "conscious mind" and the "unconscious mind." For example, the hypnotist may tell the subject to "allow yourself to . . ." or tell the subject that he or she doesn't have to listen, but the unconscious mind can hear. The Elements of conscious mind and unconscious mind in this context have significant implications for the attribution of agency, motivation, perception, or performance. The person is eligible to be both conscious and unconscious, but the conscious is not eligible to participate as the unconscious. Thus, hypnotic phenomena are experienced as occurring autonomously, even though by one description— the observer's—the person is clearly performing the action. The unconscious as an Element in any reflexive social practice has particularly interesting attributes, for example, whatever is experienced as alien to the person can be counted as action by the unconscious. Results

can be achieved without the experience of effort. The term unconscious is sufficiently vague to defy precise status assignment and thus can be successfully assigned a wide variety of attributes.

Most importantly, in the Descriptive Psychology formulation one need not be concerned with questions of the existence of the unconscious, because it is an Element within reflexive social practices just as white is an Element in the social practice of chess. Because the person is eligible to play both the conscious and the unconscious, he or she may under appropriate circumstances be able to report on the action of both elements in the social practice, just as Hilgard's (1977) "hidden observer" can report on the experience of pain and the efforts to distract attention from the pain.

So far we have seen that induction of a hypnotic trance involves two people engaging in a set of social practices such as pacing and leading and permission giving, as well as one, the hypnotist, invoking the possibilities of reflexive social practices involving the conscious and unconscious. The therapeutic utilization of hypnosis involves successive efforts to define the kinds of behaviors for which the unconscious is eligible, and giving the subject practice in a new set of reflexive social practices involving the conscious and the unconscious.

The variety of hypnotic phenomena indicates the range of behaviors for which the unconscious is eligible, for example, anesthesia, analgesia, amnesia, or hypermnesia. Generally, in hypnosis the unconscious is given eligibility for beneficent actions such as healing, protecting, helping, or learning. This is somewaht in contrast to the subject's conscious understanding of the unconscious actions. They may often be seen as problematic, bothersome, unpleasant, or senseless. The hypnotist successfully redefines the person's view of the unconscious as the hypnotist elicits beneficent unconscious behavior.

The hypnotist can then give the person the opportunity to practice a new set of reflexive social practices involving the conscious and the unconscious. As the person accepts the hypnotist's suggestions of giving permission to the unconscious, he establishes a cooperative rather than conflictual or controlling relationship. The permission giving is acceptable because of the way in which the unconscious behavior potential was defined as benevolent. The unconscious can act helpfully and not hostilely because the relationsip is one of permission giving rather than coercion. In sum, the person is given the opportunity to practice and experience new therapeutic reflexive social practices involving the Elements conscious and unconscious. The therapist has modeled this new relationship through a relationship with the subject characterized by mutual acceptance and collaboration. The hypnotist operates on the premise that persons can be uniquely helpful to themselves. Or as Er-

ickson said, "All the therapy occurs within the patient, not between the therapist and the patient" (Erickson & Rossi, 1979, p. 160).

Given practice in this new set of social practices and reflexive social practices, the subject can use "cues" to access this whole relationship. Indeed, as the subject gathers practice and experience in these new kinds of social practices, he or she becomes more proficient and develops a new relationship between conscious and unconscious.

The preceding brief description of hypnosis suggests that hypnosis is not so much a matter of inducing a particular state and making suggestions, but of modeling in the social practices between hypnotist and subject, and evoking a relationship of subject to hypnotist and ultimately of subject to self. As the person begins to redefine his or her eligibility to play both conscious and unconscious Elements and to experience cooperation rather than conflict, the person's behavior can and usually does change, as the person gains access to more of his or her own creative and therapeutic powers.

Intrapersonal Therapies and Social Practices

The Descriptive Psychology perspective on Cognitive Behavior Modification and Generative Personality Approaches involves the concepts of engaging in reflexive social practices and imagining social practices. As in the family therapies, the differences between Cognitive Behavior Modification and Generative Personality Approaches are differences of emphasis and style. Both approaches seek to alter the repetitive patterns of behavior which individuals display with reference to themselves. Cognitive Behavior Modification generally relies upon explicit and direct instruction in alternative reflexive social practices. Generative Personality Approaches are generally more evocative and dramatic than Cognitive Behavior Modification. In Generative Personality Approaches, the emphasis is on changing relationships among various parts of the person through having the person engage in new reflexive social practices.

SUMMARY

In this paper I have attempted to show how the conceptual framework called Descriptive Psychology provides a perspective from which several psychotherapeutic approaches can be seen as related despite their diverse origins, emphases, procedures, styles, and theoretical explanations. Particular attention has been paid to the concept of social practice and the special cases of reflexive social practices and imagined social practices. The social practices of negotiation, problem solving, and status assignment have been seen to be important in psychotherapy. Four principles were articulated in order to assist the practitioner in applying the knowl-

edge about social practices. The therapist should assess the existing and desired social practices, treat the client as a collaborator, show the client new social practices, and provide the opportunity for practice.

A selective review of therapies was provided to highlight the many ways in which the Descriptive Psychology concepts developed in the first part of the paper provide access to concepts and practices of superficially divergent therapeutic approaches. A guiding analogy was articulated: Behavioral Family Therapy is to Structural and Strategic Family Therapy as Cognitive Behavior Modification is to Generative Personality Approaches. The first pair of approaches focuses on social practices within a family context, while the second pair of approaches focuses on intrapersonal patterns of behavior, that is, reflexive social practices. While Behavior Family Therapy and Cognitive Behavior Modification are usually explicit and direct in providing instruction in alternative Versions, Options, and Contingencies of relevant social practices, Structural and Strategic Family Therapy and the Generative Personality Approaches are somewhat more indirect and implicit in encouraging changes in eligibility or status, through practice in new or sometimes unusual social practices.

The concept of social practice is invaluable in helping us to recognize the patterns of interpersonal and intrapersonal behavior. The concept itself is content-free, but provides a template for a number of content areas. When one understands the concept of social practice and its applications, one can take a flexible approach to therapeutic problems. By having systematic access to a wide variety of therapeutic approaches, the therapist's range of choices is expanded. The effective therapist will exercise skill and judgment in his or her selection of therapeutic practices. Competence in operating from the Descriptive Psychology perspective articulated in this paper means that the practitioner can act with great flexibility while maintaining conceptual coherence.

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HYSTERICAL ACTION, IMPERSONATION, AND CARETAKING ROLES:

A DESCRIPTIVE AND PRACTICAL STUDY

Raymond M. Bergner

ABSTRACT

The present study comprises three parts. In part one, a case is made, expanding upon Szasz's (1974) earlier analysis, that hysterical action represents the impersonation of a disabled person, or even of a nonperson, in which the individual does not realize that he or she is impersonating. In part two, a common constellation of reasons why persons resort to such impersonation is described. In part three, a number of therapeutic recommendations are made.

The purpose of this study is to provide a constructive and useful picture of hysterical action and hysterical persons. I will attempt to accomplish

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this purpose in a threefold manner. First, the concept of "hysterical action" will be defined. Second, one frequently encountered constellation of reasons why individuals resort to such action will be described. Third and finally, some therapeutic strategies that I have found to be especially effective with these persons will be delineated.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

The clinical descriptions and therapeutic recommendations put forth in this paper are often status dynamic in nature. That is to say, I will be concerned with the hysterical individual's statuses as crucial determinants of the range of actions in which he or she is able to participate (Ossorio, 1976). Defined in a manner consistent with its Latin etymology (approximately, "where one stands"), an individual's statuses are his or her various "positions-in-relation-to." To stand in certain places, to occupy certain positions in relation to other persons, objects, states of affairs, or even oneself, enhances one's freedom and ability to act; to occupy others constricts such freedom and ability. For example, an individual in the military might occupy the position of private or of general. The mere occupation of the latter position by an individual, quite apart from his or her social skills, belief systems, or other personal characteristics, carries with it a greatly expanded power and range of possible behaviors in the military community, in comparison with the former. In like manner, statuses such as "person," "perpetrator," or "therapist" convey different powers and eligibilities than do other statuses, for example, "organism," "victim," or "patient."

From a status dynamic point of view, the task of psychotherapy is status enhancement; that is, helping clients to occupy positions of enhanced power from which they may better participate in life. Typically, this entails helping clients to realize statuses which they have had all along (e.g., free agent or perpetrator) but which, for whatever reason, they have failed to realize and to exploit. At other times, it entails helping individuals to occupy new, more viable statuses.

In using the designation "hysterical person" throughout this paper, I refer to persons who engage excessively in hysterical actions on an enduring basis. This term should be regarded as a *behavioral summary term*. It is *not* used here to designate any underlying pathological entity, either physical or psychological in nature.

It is widely acknowledged (e.g., Blinder, 1966; Halleck, 1967) that the majority of persons who engage excessively in hysterical self-presentation are female. Further, almost all such individuals whom I have personally treated have been women. For this reason, and also because it is very awkward stylistically to repeatedly refer to "he or she," "him

or her," and so on. I will use feminine pronouns throughout this paper to designate hysterical persons.

THE PHENOMENA

What are the behavioral phenomena in question? Here I will merely recall those phenomena which classically have been designated "hysterical" and which encompass both what has been termed "hysterical neurosis" and "hysterical personality style."

Under the rubric "hysterical neurosis" we have those more or less circumscribed reactions of persons which fall into two general classes. The first of these is, of course, the conversion reactions—those paralyses, blindnesses, anesthesias, and so forth with no discernible organic basis which constituted the original interest of Breuer and Freud in 1895. Secondly, we have those states termed "dissociative" in nature, especially here amnesia, fugue, and multiple personality.

The rubric "hysterical personality" has been used to designate, not such circumscribed reactions, but a relatively enduring and pervasive style of interpersonal functioning which encompasses the following:

1. Extensive presentation of self as a victim in life with no control over, or responsibility for, certain of one's actions.
2. Extensive presentation of self as helpless, especially (but not exclusively) in the sense that one is swept away by emotion in difficult circumstances at the expense of logical problem-solving and coping behavior. These ostensible logical defects often take the form of displays of very poorly concentrated, impressionistic, nonfactually oriented intellectual activity (Shapiro, 1965) which is ill-suited to the solution of problems in living.
3. Extensive presentation of self as hyperdependent, that is, as in need of a stable, competent, logical individual who will function as a strong protective leader. The relationship between this factor and the previous one should be obvious.
4. Presentation of self as physically ill in the absence of any demonstrable physical pathology.
5. Presentation of self as considerably younger and less mature than one is in fact.
6. Hyperdramatic self-presentation.
7. "Labile and extreme, but shallow" emotional display (Chodoff & Lyons, 1958).

The question has been raised by Chodoff (1974) whether or not all of these phenomena, seemingly so disparate, deserve to be lumped together

under a common rubric. The position taken in this paper is that, while perhaps the term "hysteria" itself (etymology: "wandering uterus") is almost totally uninformative, these behavioral phenomena do share a basic intelligibility which justifies their inclusion under a common label. This intelligibility will be articulated in the following sections of this paper.

INTELLIGIBILITY OF HYSTERICAL ACTION

Fundamentally, hysterical phenomena represent impersonative status claims. We may best understand the hysterical individual, ostensibly beset with illness, forgetfulness, helplessness, and so forth, much as we would an entertainer doing mime. She is acting out in a bodily, iconic language of physical representation a mimicry of these things. She is masquerading as one who is ill, forgetful, or helpless, and thus making a bid to be regarded and treated as such.

The content of this simulation is most importantly of two related sorts. First, a great deal of hysterical simulation is taken up with the imitation, in one form or another, of a defective, damaged person. Historically, authors have stressed only two versions of this, namely the impersonations of physically ill persons and of insane persons (Chodoff, 1965; Sullivan, 1947; Szasz, 1974). However, if one goes down the list of hysterical phenomena presented above, it is easy to see that a broader spectrum of personal deficiencies are being impersonated. These include: (a) radical memory impairment (e.g., forgetfulness of past events or even, in extreme cases, of one's identity), (b) helplessness, (c) intellectual incompetence, and (d) personal and physical immaturity (e.g., a woman of twenty-eight may look and act like a girl of eighteen).

The second major form of impersonation that is of interest here represents an extreme version of the above. Here the person at times impersonates, not merely a damaged or deficient person, but in effect a nonperson. The simulation here is of a nonagent, of an organism whose behavior is purely the result of internal and external forces acting upon it, and one which does not engage in intentional or deliberate action and is not responsible for its behavior. This impersonation is typically conveyed in locutions such as, "I *found myself* in situation X," "I don't know what *made me* do it," or "My anger just *took over.*" The simulation, one is tempted to say, is of a puppet or of a robot.

Two of the classical attributes of hysterical individuals are that they have a dramatic or histrionic personal style, and that they exhibit "labile and extreme but shallow affectivity" (Chodoff & Lyons, 1958). It is easy to see that, insofar as an individual is engaging in extensive impersonation, she is being not only stylistically but literally dramatic; in the

extreme, her life becomes largely a drama in which she is enacting impersonative roles. Secondly, it is not surprising that much of the emotional expression which goes with such extensive role-playing should, like emotion in a stage drama, be quickly changeable, exaggerated in nature, and not deeply felt. Thus, both of these general attributions are exactly what we would expect from a person whose self-presentation is often, literally, a dramatic presentation.

Thus far my analysis would suggest an identity between the concepts "hysterical action" and "malingering." There is, however, a crucial difference between the two. In an hysterical act, unlike an act of malingering, the individual engaging in it genuinely *does not know what she is doing;* that is, she genuinely does not know *that she is acting, that she is impersonating.* The person who resorts to an act of hysterical impersonation is, like the person malingering, one who has reason enough to engage in deception. Unlike the latter, however, she also has strong reasons not to know that what she is doing constitutes a deception and, further, strong reasons not to know that she does not know, lest the entire structure of ignorance be subverted (see Ossorio, 1966, pp. 40–44). The substance of certain of these reasons will be described in the following section of this paper. (This is not to say that hysterical persons, i.e., persons who engage excessively in hysterical acts, never consciously or deliberately lie or deceive. In fact, as Szasz has noted, in addition to what we might term their "unconscious deception," they seem more given to such conscious deception than the ordinary person.)

Not to know that one is impersonating is, obviously, to be taken in by one's own act. Thus, the hysterical individual comes to believe her own impersonative status claims. She comes to believe that she is a sick, illogical, crazy individual and/or that she is (at least in regard to certain actions) a nonagent. Breuer and Freud (1895/1965) asserted that an individual beset with an hysterical symptom was, with respect to this symptom, in a "hypnoid state." Paraphrasing this, I would say that the conviction with which some persons believe their own impersonations assumes hypnotic proportions. In terms of Schwartz's (1980, Note 1) definition of the trance state, these persons seem literally unable or not at all disposed in their own case to perceive the anomalous as anomalous. Thus, they may be genuinely convinced, for example, that an arm is really paralyzed, that they are weak and helpless, or that they are in no sense the authors of their own actions.

Such beliefs about oneself are obviously of the utmost significance. The individual who sincerely believes that she is sick, helpless, stupid, immature, and not in charge of her own actions is obviously going to conduct her life far differently than a person who does not entertain such beliefs. Her self-concept, her summary formulation of her status and

thus of her relationships to the rest of the world, verges in extreme cases on that of a puppet (i.e., a thing whose movements are determined by forces external to it) or of a lunatic (i.e., a person, but one whose actions are now, temporarily or permanently, under the control of some mysterious disease process, not under the control of self). Puppets and lunatics, although they are entitled to make special claims on others for help and care, enjoy far fewer powers and eligibilities than ordinary persons. The constraints inherent in such a self-assigned status, especially one which over the course of time has almost always been heavily authenticated by others, are enormous.

There are two traditional issues which the present analysis, I believe, handles better than previous analyses. First, as mentioned earlier, Chodoff (1974) has questioned the accuracy and the utility of employing one concept, hysteria, to designate both neurotic phenomena, such as conversions and dissociative states, and characterological phenomena. The analysis outlined above, which states that *both* sorts of phenomena constitute the impersonation of disability or deficit in which the individual does not know what she is doing, provides a justification for continuing to link them under one rubric. I agree with Chodoff, however, that some other designation (he suggests "histrionic") might prove more apt and more informative.

Secondly, there is here, as elsewhere, much historical controversy among therapists about differential diagnois. What should we designate "hysterical neurosis," what "hysterical personality," what "hysterical features" in other personality types? I suggest that the more important diagnostic questions, where hysterical actions are concerned, are questions such as the following: To what degree does this person resort to hysterical impersonative tactics? How central or how peripheral a role do these assume in her problems in living? To what extent, and for what reasons, is this person committed to the use of such tactics? What is it that this person cannot do which, if she could do, would eliminate the need to resort to hysterical impersonation? It is the answer to these questions, not those concerning in what nosological pigeonhole this person belongs, which provide the psycotherapist with truly useful information.

RATIONALE: WHY WOULD A PERSON ENGAGE EXTENSIVELY IN SUCH IMPERSONATION?

In this section I will present a constellation of reasons, beliefs, and life experiences which I have observed with considerable frequency in hysterical persons. In describing these, I am not making the claim that these constitute the only reasons why people engage in hysterical actions. They do not. I do claim, however, that the picture presented below is

very common, is very important to the understanding of much hysterical impersonation, and provides the psychotherapist with more leverage to bring about useful change than do most previous accounts.

Much of the hysterical behavior which I have observed seems to have been engaged in most importantly for two related reasons: (a) to be exempted from caretaking roles and (b) to get other individuals to assume such caretaking roles in relation to the hysterical individual. Hysterical impersonative acts thus represent dramatic, extortive bids to avoid the caretaker role and to assume instead the role of recipient of care. For example, if one engages in highly dramatic portrayals of an individual in great pain or in the throes of a seizure, this places powerful ethical constraints on others to avoid demanding that this individual be a caretaker. Further, others are also ethically constrained to provide help and support for her.

What kind of person would typically adopt this sort of measure in order to secure these ends? In my experience, such a person usually possesses two features which, taken together, make it clear why she would resort to this sort of strategic impersonation.

First, in contrast with previous accounts, which assert that beneath her impersonative dramatics the hysterical individual is factually quite simple, incompetent, and inadequate (Sullivan, 1947; Szasz, 1973), I have observed that typically the hysterical individual possesses many factual competencies. In particular, the hysteric is typically in many respects a competent caretaker, but one who is given to the assumption of excessive responsibilities when she is functioning in helping roles. This is a person whom some family systems theorists would describe, not as inadequate, but as *overadequate* when they are fulfilling such role responsibilities (Bergner, 1977; Bowen, 1966). This is the boss who can't delegate. This is the parent given to overprotection and untoward servility.

Secondly, as one might anticipate from the above, the hysteric is typically a person who has never established a workable definition of what constitutes reasonable limits to her own responsibilities. Characteristically, she has become tremendously oversold on the ethical demands imposed by needy others and, further, developed what amounts in practice to a rather grandiose conception of her own powers; that is, she implicitly believes that she can control the conduct and the happiness of others. When fulfilling caretaker roles, then, she has very strong senses of moral compunction and of exaggerated personal power and responsibility which lead her to give more and more, and to place virtually no limits on how much she should and will give. In doing so, she renders herself highly vulnerable to becoming exploited and depleted, and in fact often becomes so.

There is undoubtedly no one way in which a person acquires the disposition to overfunction in caretaker roles and the beliefs which accompany this disposition. However, there is one pattern which is sufficiently common to warrant mention. Many of the hysterical individuals whom I have known have had a personal history in which one of their parents, most often the same-sex parent, became seriously dysfunctional, for example, with alcoholism or physical invalidism. These individuals, in response to this state of affairs, were prematurely and coercively charged with the adoption of adult, caretaker roles and ultimately spent a good many of their developing years in the excessive discharge of these role responsibilities. Further, in contrast with some families in which the children who fulfill such roles are lavishly rewarded, in the hysteric's family, the rewards were very meager; on balance her experience was one of distasteful submission and exploitation. In effect, in the adoption of such roles, this person became a parent to her own same-sex parent and her siblings, and a spouse to her opposite-sex parent. In the latter regard, furthermore, when a young girl takes on her own mother's caretaking responsibilities as her mother abdicates them, she simultaneously functions in the role of generational equal, or spouse, to her own father. It is highly likely that the Oedipal feelings and the maternal deprivation so often documented by psychoanalytic authors often arise out of such familial role-taking patterns.

A child who is prematurely and excessively charged with parental roles, and who acquiesces to such role expectations, frequently develops a very powerful sense of moral obligation about caretaking roles (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Spark 1974). She becomes so used to a life of service to others, and so sold on the vital necessity of her rendering such service, that she becomes almost a slave to her own sense of responsibility in this area. Further, such a child has usually been given a status assignment (the "child who is competent enough to be a parent") which represents an unrealistic, exaggerated appraisal of her powers by others in the family. Little wonder, then, that she grows into adulthood with such a misappraisal of her own powers.

Finally, the literature on observational learning (Bandura, 1969) tells us that a child learns, through observation, a great deal which he or she may not immediately exhibit. This learning becomes part of a behavioral repertoire which can be manifested should circumstances warrant such display. The parental child, as she engages in extensive caretaking behaviors, simultaneously observes the complementary role behaviors manifested by those in her care. She thus learns, for future reference as it were, the roles of "helped" and even "helpless."

It should by now be clear why the impersonation of disability represents a sensible solution for the sort of person I have been describing.

Here we have an individual who has been excessively socialized in the "game," one might say, of "helper-helped" and, within the role possibilities afforded by this game, has remained primarily in the helper role. This person has severe difficulties setting limits on how much caretaking she is willing to give—she is being exploited and depleted by others but cannot in good conscience take the overt, straightforward stance, "No, I won't give any more." A solution which makes sense, then, is for this person to make a position shift within the game she knows best and *herself became disabled and in need of help*. Now, since we cannot for the most part simply will ourselves to be sick when we are not, or stupid when we are not, and so forth, the solution must be to *impersonate these things*. It now becomes important, however, given this person's moral abhorrence of deceitfully opting out of caretaking responsibilities and extorting others into taking them on, that she *not know* that she is impersonating disability. She must see herself as genuinely disabled and genuinely in need of the care of others. Finally, she must not know that she does not know she is impersonating, since any subversion of the structure of ignorance would seriously impair her ability to pursue the impersonative act.

In my experience, the hysterical individual's bid to be taken care of is often not total; that is, she does not abdicate all caregiver responsibilities. Rather, this bid represents an attempt to balance out what is simultaneously going on in other current relationships. For example, a highly successful teacher/administrator whom I once treated exhibited the following pattern. During the day she functioned as a very competent professional, but one given to the excessive assumption of the responsibilities of those under her. Upon entering her front door at night, however, she routinely shifted to a tremendously helpless, illogical, hyperemotional role with her husband (the additional element of impersonating disability so as not to threaten one's spouse with one's success and competence may be noted here). By way of further example, an overly involved and overly responsible psychotherapist with a large, lucrative private practice would lapse into the appearance of being a totally insecure nervous wreck in the presence of her own psychotherapist.

Such individuals will often convey an implicit or explict world-view with the following general outline: "The neediness of a sick or helpless person represents the ultimate moral imperative. In the face of such neediness on the part of others, I must therefore give, and give even to the point of personal depletion. Then, however, I myself am entitled to go, present my own neediness to another, and be 'refueled' without limitation by this other." In this world-view, it should be underscored, there is little notion that one can help oneself; help must always come from without.

The foregoing descriptions and explanations may be utilized as a paradigm case. That is, the clinician may be able to delete certain features of the complete, paradigmatic picture outlined above, and still generate adequate explanatory accounts of some hysterical phenomena. For example, an hysterical blindness at the battlefront may be taken as the impersonation of physical disability by a person who does not know what he is doing, who wishes to be exempted from responsibility, and who cannot take the overt personal stand that "I won't do this." However, in this case, the further elements delineated in the analysis presented above need not be present to account adequately for his behavior.

THERAPEUTIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Therapeutic Goals

In my experience, therapy with hysterical individuals requires that the therapist take a good deal of initiative in determining the crucial issues and goals to be discussed. The therapist who fails to do so, whether through the adoption of a passive, laissez-faire stance or through personal uncertainty as to just what are the core issues, invites this individual to lead him or her down numerous blind alleys. The predictable outcome is a therapy with no direction and no progress. It is incumbent on the therapist, therefore, to focus discussion on the important issues. This may entail asking the client to temporarily shelve some others. Or, perhaps somewhat better, the therapist might adopt a policy of going along with whatever content the client introduces, but consistently relate this content back to the core issues.

With this in mind I suggest the following goals as those which are most important and profitable to pursue:

1. The hysterical individual would ideally alter her belief that she is a defective, sick, virtual nonagent and realize her actual status as that of a person (i.e., an agent capable of intentional and deliberate action) and one who, through the impersonation of deficit, has believed her own act and thus greatly misappraised her own powers and eligibilities.
2. The hysterical individual would ideally become able to question and to alter her belief that the giving of care to others represents some sort of absolute moral imperative in the face of which she must give until totally depleted. Further, resolving this, she would become more able honestly and straightforwardly to set and enforce personal limits on how much care she is willing to give so that she does not have to resort to impersonation and extortion to escape the demands of others.

3. The hysterical individual would ideally become able, in the reciprocal, care-getting role, to *ask* honestly and straightforwardly for care from others, again without resorting to impersonation and extortion to secure these ends. If this can be accomplished, the individual no longer has to win by losing, that is, secure care by presenting herself to the world as an irrational, helpless, sick, virtual nonperson.
4. The hysterical individual would ideally become more able to engage in social practices with few or no caretaking elements. Lacking socialization in practices other than those involving the coercive giving and getting of care, she would make good this developmental lack and expand her forms of relating.
5. The hysterical individual would ideally become more able to help herself.

Therapeutic Attitude

It is a truism that the psychotherapist's optimum attitude toward the hysterical (or any other) client ought to be an accepting one. Notwithstanding its status as a truism, this attitude is so frequently lacking toward hysterical clients that something needs to be said here. Therapists are very often angry at their hysterical clients. They believe that they are being lied to and manipulated—which is often true—but they sometimes lack a perspective on such behavior which would help them to maintain a more therapeutic attitude.

A therapist who adopts the conception of hysteria I have presented here should encounter less difficulty in maintaining an accepting therapeutic attitude toward clients who are hysterics. For example, this conception makes it clear that, in the case of true hysterical action, the individual is not deliberately lying or impersonating, but is substantially convinced by her own act. An attitude toward the client which says, "I believe that you believe what you're saying; however, it's probably not true," will generate less therapist anger than one that says "You're deliberately conning me."

By way of further example, it is helpful to keep in mind that even when she may be deliberately lying, the hysterical individual is not, as a rule, doing so out of simple malice, but because she genuinely believes, within her world-view, that she has good reason to do so. A helpful, if imperfect, analogy here comes from the novel *Roots* (Haley, 1977) in which the character Chicken George impersonates illiteracy because he believes (correctly) that not to do so would invite oppression from his master. The hysteric has her own good reasons to do as she is doing, and an optimum therapeutic attitude acknowledges this fact without condoning these acts, excusing them, or being victimized by them, all of which would be countertherapeutic.

Some Therapeutic Stances and Tactics

The essential business of psychotherapy with the individual I have been describing in these pages is to accomplish the goals set forth above. Obviously, there is no one way to do so and no particular techniques that would guarantee success in this attempt. There are, however, a number of strategies and stances which I have found particularly helpful in working with hysterical clients.

Responding to Impersonative Status Claims

One of the therapist's most fundamental and most difficult tasks with hysterical individuals is to see to it that they are successful in their relationship with the therapist (Ossorio, 1976). This is often rendered especially difficult by the fact that much of the behavior of the hysterical individual in this relationship consists in making impersonative status claims which place the therapist in a difficult predicament. If he or she straightforwardly accepts these claims, this represents the authentication or confirmation of the hysterical individual in her problematic, impersonative roles. The therapeutic relationship, then, merely replicates other unsuccessful relationships. On the other hand, if the basic therapeutic response toward these status claims is simply to reject them, the result is a disconfirmation of the person in this relationship and, again, relationship failure.

Let us suppose that an individual's self-presentation has roughly the following content: "I'm in terrible, terrible (psychic) pain. My life is a living hell, and I'm totally unable to figure out what is causing my pain. You've got to figure this out for me." The therapist has two obvious choices in how he or she will respond to this, and both of them spell trouble. First, the therapist's response may be essentially, "Yes, I believe that you are in terrible pain, that you can't figure it out, and that you can't help yourself. I will figure it out for you." While no therapist but the most naive beginner would ever *say* such a thing, I have observed many therapists who implicitly *treat* hysterical clients in this fashion. They make this assertion not in words, but in actions. Such a response confirms the individual's impersonative claim to pain and helplessness, and amounts to joining the hysterical person in one more relationship where she can win by losing.

Secondly, the therapist's response may be essentially this: "I don't believe you. I don't believe you're in that much pain and I don't believe that you are so dumb that you can't figure anything out at all." I know a therapist once who took this stance and exhibited an admirable terseness. He simply kept saying "bullshit" to his hysterical clients. I believe that this response is preferable to the other. When this is the basic stance

of the therapist, however, the relationship then becomes one in which the client is rejected and disconfirmed.

The difficult task then becomes to *accept* the impersonative relationship bids of the hysterical individual, but *not at face value* and *not in a way which authenticates this individual in a problematic role.* This takes considerable ingenuity (more ingenuity, I must confess, than I am often able to muster on the spot). Let me illustrate a few examples of such therapeutic responses for the individual mentioned above who is claiming "terrible, terrible" pain and a total inability to discern what the source of this pain is. Let us further assume that the therapist has ample reason to conclude that indeed there is some pain here, but not "terrible, terrible" pain, and that this person does possess the wherewithal to determine the reasons for this pain. Consider the following responses (all of which are severely condensed for illustrative purposes):

1. "You know, I was just remembering how you often help your friends with their problems. I'd like to ask you to try something. Would you move over here into my chair and pretend that a good friend has told you that she is in the sort of pain and the sort of circumstances you have been describing. What would you tell her was probably the matter?" This reply is responsive to the client's relationship bid without accepting it *prima facie* or rejecting it. The therapist does comply with the request for help, but in a way which accredits the client as herself a competent problem-solver and which calls upon her to help herself. This sort of tactic, employed repeatedly, can be extremely effective with the more competent and more cooperative hysteric. The individual who is determined to pursue the game of helplessness with a vengeance, however, will often summarily reject this sort of therapeutic request.

2. "You know, what you're doing right now is extremely powerful. I feel almost backed against the wall. Do you suppose you could turn down the power a bit?" The therapist here accepts the impersonative bid, again not at face value (i.e., as a claim to the status of "helpless victim") but as a power tactic and a very good one. If the therapist is not sarcastic or otherwise abusive in the way this is said, he or she accredits the person as a very powerful individual, so powerful indeed that she needs to temper her exercise of her power.

3. "Whew, you must have really been hopping for your family this week. It looks like you're really rejecting that old helper role with a vengeance this morning." The therapist here responds empathically to what he or she guesses might be at the root of a given dramatic, helpless bid. Further, he or she reframes it status dynamically, not as an instance of genuine helplessness, but as the understandable rejection of a role the person is competent to play.

"Talk" to the Client in Iconic Language

As related earlier, the hysteric is an individual who is given to communicating with others in a language of iconic signs. Like an actress in a silent film, she communicates her messages to others with dramatic gestures and postures. Her motto, one might say, is that "one picture is worth 10,000 words." An obvious implication for the psychotherapist is that he or she should, when possible, "speak" back to the hysterical individual in her own language. For example, several years ago I was talking with a client who was presenting herself to an extreme degree as if she were merely a pawn of forces external to herself. To hear her talk, she was a totally passive creature whose emotions and behaviors were nothing but the products of external forces operating upon her. As she was speaking, I got up out of my seat, walked over to her, and started to wave my hands over her head much in the manner that a magician might who was demonstrating that there were no wires suspending a levitated body. "What the hell are you doing?" she asked me. "I'm looking for the strings," I replied. "You are talking to me almost totally as if you were a puppet and somebody else was pulling your strings, and I'm just looking for the strings. I can't find any." This message, communicated first in iconic signs, had a considerable impact. In fact, this client mentioned it at least a month later and told me it had started her thinking about how much she underestimated her control over her own conduct.

Be Somebody

If there is one sort of person who drives hysterical individuals crazy, it is the passive, ambiguous person who will never define where he or she stands on things (Bergner, 1977). In contrast, what the hysteric can best use is an individual who, without attempting to control her, will maintain a kind but *firm* adherence to his or her own limits. The therapist will almost inevitably have to define and enforce such limits during the course of therapy, typically in regard to such matters as after-hours phone calls, seductive bids, or other demands which the therapist does not want to, and should not, meet. Furthermore, from an observational learning standpoint, the hysterical individual genuinely needs to observe another person who is not controlling and not controlled, but rather is in charge of and comfortable with taking stands on what he or she is willing to give.

SUMMARY

The present study expands upon the seminal notion, proposed by Szasz (1974) and others, that hysterical phenomena represent the mimicry of

physical illness and/or insanity. The major theses advanced include the following:

1. Hysterical phenomena represent impersonative status claims in which persons present themselves to others as either defective persons or nonpersons, and thus make a bid to be regarded and treated as such. The actual forms which such bids assume include status claims other than those of sick person and insane person.
2. What distinguishes hysterical action from simple malingering is that in the former individuals do not realize that they are impersonating. Not realizing this, they are in effect taken in by their own impersonative status claims.
3. The consequences entailed in believing such self-assigned statuses as sick person, insane person, irrational person, and nonperson are enormous. While they do convey entitlement to care from others, in other ways they drastically restrict an individual's powers and eligibilities to participate in social practices.
4. Hysterical action is frequently engaged in in order to be exempted from caretaking roles and responsibilities, and to get others to assume such roles in relation to the hysterical individual. Developmental experiences in which this individual was prematurely and excessively charged with caretaker responsibilities are common, and provide a multiplicity of reasons why the hysteric resorts to such drastic and self-damaging measures to achieve these ends.
5. In doing psychotherapy with hysterical clients, it is important (a) to take a good deal of initiative in determining the crucial issues and goals to be pursued; (b) to maintain a charitable attitude toward the deceits and manipulations of hysterical clients, yet one which stops short of excusing, condoning, or being vicitmized by these actions; (c) to set limits in a kind yet firm way regarding what one is willing and not willing to do in this relationship; and (d) to accept the impersonative relationship bids of hysterical individuals, but not at face value and not in a way that authenticates these persons in problematic roles.

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ATTEMPTED SUICIDE AND RESTRICTIONS IN THE ELIGIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Ned L. Kirsch

ABSTRACT

A conceptualization of suicide attempts is offered in which the interpersonal significance of the suicidal act is stressed. Suicide attempters are seen as finding themselves in relationships in which their eligibility to negotiate their personal characteristics has been significantly restricted. Given such relationships, the suicidal act has the significance of a negotiation move within the problematic relationship. This negotiation move represents the efforts of the attempters either to (a) prevent a degradation of their position within the relationship or (b) reinstate themselves to a position from which they have already been degraded. A study was designed to test the prediction that in situations that call for the negotiation of personal characteristics (i.e., situations of potential degradation), suicidal individuals will offer significantly fewer negotiation moves than nonsuicidal individuals. This pre-

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diction was supported. A number of issues related to the conceptualization and study are also discussed, including: (a) the relationship between depth of depression and the eligibility to negotiate personal characteristics; (b) the paradoxical nature of suicide attempts, and (c) the relationship of the present conceptualization to others which have recently been presented in the literature.

Based on the detailed examination of suicidal behaviors and the circumstances surrounding them, a number of hypotheses have been offered in the literature to account for differences between suicide attempters and committers. It has been suggested that individuals who engage unsuccessfully in suicidal behaviors may either (a) have no intention of terminating their lives, or (b) what intention they do have may be accompanied by competing intentions which, in effect, generate behaviors of distinct significance (Dorpat & Boswell, 1963; Farberow & Shneidman, 1961; Henderson, Hatigar, Davidson, Lance, Duncan-Jones, Kohler, Retchie, McAuley, Williams & Slazhius, 1977; Shneidman, 1969; Stengel, 1960a; Weiss, Nunez & Schaie, 1961).

This plausible hypothesis raises two important questions: (a) If suicidal attempters are not intending to terminate their lives, what are they doing by engaging in life-threatening behaviors? (b) If suicidal acts represent an unusual method by which a goal can be achieved, what can be said about the suicidal individual's world where such unusual acts are used?

A number of respectable efforts have been made in the literature to answer these questions which are, of course, not new. Of varying theoretical orientations, these answers have typically attributed the suicidal act to problematic changes within a person's world. The suicidal act itself is then viewed as representing an attempt to rectify these changes (see, as a recent example, Baechler, 1980). Theorists differ more on the details which they stress (e.g., the nature of problematic relationship or situational changes) than they do on these two basic propositions.

Stengel (1960a, 1960b, 1964, 1968; Stengel & Cook, 1958), for example, has emphasized the communication aspects of suicidal behaviors. He views suicidal individuals as in control of at least a limited range of behavioral options. For Stengel (1964) the suicide attempt represents a direct communication of a specific kind which has significance within a relationship and which may elicit specific changes within that relationship. Stengel (1964) indicates, in fact, that the relatively high "recidivism" rate for suicide attempters may be attributable to the failure of the attempt to initiate or accomplish sought-for changes. In such cases, second and third attempts may be viewed as efforts to rectify earlier failures.

From a somewhat different point of view, the interpersonal nature of suicidal acts has also been recognized in psychoanalytic theory. The

suicidal act has been variously described in this literature as: (a) the symptomatic expression of aggressive impulses directed toward hated aspects of a significant other (technically, an "object"), which the depressed individual has come to regard as expressions of his own character (i.e., aggression directed toward an ambivalently regarded introject) (Menninger, 1938); (b) a self-imposed penance to appease a loved one who has been wronged, or the reaffirmation through death of a capacity (e.g., to love or be nurturant) which had been questioned by either the attempter or the person to whom the attempt is directed (Hendin, 1964); or (c) the response to repeated loss by a person who has been rejected while seeking assistance (Meerloo, 1964). In all cases, however, the act itself is meaningful only insofar as it expresses how attempters view themselves vis-à-vis some significant other, regardless of the various symbolic motives which have been attributed to the act.

A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ATTEMPTED SUICIDE

The conceptualization that I will offer is not directly critical of any of these positions, insofar as they represent efforts to describe suicidal acts as expressions of problematic relationships. The historical details of these relationships will, of course, vary greatly, as will the details of those relationships upon which theorists focus. My effort will be, instead, to propose a conceptual framework which isolates a common element of these positions and provides for the systematic observation and description of suicidal behavior. Within such a framework, any number of different relationships can be problematic enough from the attempter's point of view. The observer, however, need not be restrictive about which relationship characteristics will count, so long as the problematic qualities of the relationship can be shown to be "problematic enough" from the actor's perspective.

Specifically this paper develops the following conceptualization:

1. Suicide attempters find themselves in a problematic relationship or set of relationships.
2. Within such problematic relationships, suicide attempters find, specifically, that the range of behaviors available to them has been significantly restricted in characteristic ways.
3. Most saliently, suicide attempters find that their eligibility to negotiate their personal characteristics has been significantly restricted.
4. When a situation within the problematic relationship calls compellingly for negotiation, sucide attempters will choose a negotiation move from among those still available to them. (The suicidal act is one such behavior, which has the significance of a negotiation move within the problematic relationship.)

5. This negotiation move represents the efforts of attempters either to prevent a degradation of their position within the relationship (i.e., prevent being treated as a person with some newly ascribed personal characteristic) or to reinstate themselves to a position from which they have already been degraded.

Since I am suggesting that the suicidal act serves as a negotiation move, I will first develop, at some length, the concept of negotiation introduced by Ossorio (1970/1981). After presenting this background material, I will discuss the negotiation of personal characteristics, developing the relationship between restrictions in the eligibility to negotiate personal characteristics and suicide attempts. Finally, an empirical investigation will be presented in which a method for studying the negotiation of personal characteristics will be introduced. This empirical investigation will examine one hypothesis generated by the conceptual model discussed in this paper.

The Concept of Negotiation

For most daily life circumstances, one can expect a certain degree of similarity in the ways different individuals behave with regard to some state of affairs. For any state of affairs and for any two observers, however, there is no *guarantee* that the way the world is observed, described, and treated will be the same; circumstances in which observers find themselves differing are far from uncommon.

This is not difficult to comprehend. Different observers of some state of affairs may, for example, have different histories and varying degrees and kinds of capacities or competence (i.e., they may not have acquired the competence to engage in the same social practices). Similarly, they may be members of different interpersonal worlds or have different purposes. All of these factors will find expression in what they are prepared to see and describe.

When two observers call one another's descriptions into question, however, the achievement of some sort of resolution requires an interpersonal "method" which will establish the respective descriptions of the state of affairs each observer is prepared to offer. Descriptions are members of a logical category of statements, and like the observations upon which they are based are ineligible for "proof" (Kirsch, 1979). Therefore, an alternative conceptualization is necessary to account for what does proceed between observers whose descriptions differ. Ossorio (1970/1981) has offered the social practice of negotiation as the "paradigm for the resolution of disagreement among critics of a given description." In practice, negotiation serves as the "method" by which individuals may establish (a) the kind of state of affairs a given state of affairs is

to be treated as, or (b) the significance of that state of affairs when descriptions of it have been called into question.

For every negotiation there will be some guarantee of resolution for each participant, though not necessarily the same resolution. Furthermore, each participant's resolution will meet one of two conditions: (a) It will provide for each person's understanding of his fellow negotiator's resolution as compatible with their relationship. If not, (b) the relationship will change, so that each person's understanding of the other person's resolution will be compatible with their relationship.

As negotiations proceed, each resolution "leaves no challenges to be raised or met by the participants" within the context of a particular description whose adequacy has been called into question, although each negotiation may raise "further questions to be pursued and disagreements thereon subject to negotiation" (Ossorio, 1970/1981, p. 7). Within any particular negotiation or series of negotiations, many options for the resolution of disagreement are available to the participants. A number of factors besides the adequacy of the descriptions may also influence the outcome of the negotiation. For no negotiation, however, is it necessary that the resolution achieved be one of consensus. Other options might include, for example, an agreement to disagree, in which each participant recognizes the legitimacy, if not the personal acceptability of differing descriptions, or a compromise, in which a new position having elements from each of the original two is agreed and acted upon.

It is also important to note briefly that negotiation, as it is being used in this discussion, is distinguishable from bargaining. In establishing how some state of affairs will be treated, negotiators come to a resolution about how the world is to be treated. In this sense, negotiators establish what will count for them as "reality" and, given a resolution of that sort, will proceed accordingly. Bargainers, however, address themselves to "what can be lived with" rather than to "what is." In bargaining, solutions are sought which do not change the face of things but simply establish the compromises and trade-offs that bargainers are willing to entertain.

An example may be helpful in clarifying the social practice of negotiation as it is used in this paper. Take the case of a man who is driving 55 miles per hour in a 25-mile per hour speed zone. He is stopped by a state policeman who proceeds to write him a ticket for speeding. The driver, who is barely willing to stop his car, frantically points to a bleeding child lying in the seat beside him. The officer, seeing the urgency of the situation, quickly escorts the driver to the hospital at breakneck speed where, after seeing to the child's safety, he proceeds to finish writing the ticket he had started earlier. As the relieved driver (who is once again beginning to attend to the world around him) sees this development,

he asks the officer what he's doing and suggests that the circumstances of his case warrant an exception.

The point at which the driver challenges the officer is the point at which he calls into question the officer's description (as yet implicit) of the state of affairs for which the officer would contend his actions are appropriate. "You were speeding," the officer says. "There're no excuses."

"The boy's life was in danger, couldn't you see that?" the driver replies. "Did you want me to let him die?"

"No," says the officer, a bit angered at this point, "my eyes are fine. But you should have called for help so others wouldn't be injured too."

"But I had no time," the driver counters, implying that he's only restating the obvious. "He was bleeding too much to take that chance."

One need not take this scenario to its conclusion to see the major points. Whatever we, as observers of this negotiation, might think of the persons or the decisions which they made, both the decisions and the circumstances upon which the decisions are based are all understandable to us. And yet, the descriptions which these two persons offer are significantly at variance. For the speeder, the life and death of a child was at stake, a commonly understood defense and a supervening issue which for him "converted" his act of exceeding the speed limit into an act of acceptable personal and societal responsibility. For the officer, saving the child's life required special action but not at the expense of social order. For him, speeding, whatever the reason offered, is still speeding and no reason will sway him from what he sees to be his duty and his devotion to the law.

Given these differences, a number of options are available to the negotiators, some of which have been mentioned above, and I would like to give additional examples of how some "moves" might appear within the context of the "speeder" example.

Initially, both officer and speeder might simply appeal to the facts to demonstrate the respective adequacy of their different descriptions. For example

Officer: You were going 55.

Driver: Yes, but the street was clear.

Officer: Clear or not, it's a 25 zone.

Driver: I know, but I was sounding my horn to warn people I was coming.

In this simple example, the negotiators struggle to resolve the importance of facts because the "weights" assigned to facts may alter the significance of the state of affairs being considered. Additionally, a negotiator may choose to ignore the facts (e.g., going 55 miles per hour), the description (e.g., speeding) and the significance of the state of affairs (e.g., com-

mitting a misdemeanor) and challenge instead the eligibility of the describer to (a) treat the state of affairs as being of a certain kind or (b) offer a certain kind of description. These challenges may include such examples as challenging the describer's status (e.g., "Who do you think you are anyway?"), noting a personal incapacity (e.g., "How could you see how fast I was going? You weren't even wearing your glasses."), or appealing to the relationship between the negotiators which renders one of them ineligible to offer the description being challenged (e.g., "You can put that ticket book away, rookie, I'm a sergeant myself.")

All of these examples are, of course, speculative for any given negotiation and may be used at the discretion of the negotiators in any order or combination which they see fit. As noted above, each negotiation may raise further issues for negotiation and within each successive negotiation, any of the same or different negotiation moves may be employed. For example, a negotiation about the relevant facts may be quickly settled and subsequently yield a negotiation about the significance of those facts. This process of successive negotiations will continue until such time as each party achieves some resolution for each negotiation, although, as previously stated, consensus is not required.

The Negotiation of Personal Characteristics

In the discussion above I have suggested that observers will negotiate the adequacy of descriptions, if for some reason a description of a state of affairs has been called into question. There is, however, one category of descriptions which is of special importance to the conceptualization of suicide attempts, namely, descriptions of persons, which can formally be treated in the same way as the descriptions of other objects or states of affairs. Most notably, ascriptions of personal characteristics (which are, in effect, descriptions of persons) are, like other descriptions, subject to criticism and can be negotiated when called into question.

The negotiation of personal characteristics, however, is not a trivial matter. Individuals frequently have good reasons for entering into negotiations of this kind, since the way they are seen by others will correspond to the way they are treated, which will in turn correspond to the range of behavioral options available to them within their social worlds. (For example, it would be difficult for me to work for a boss who refused to hire me because he saw me as undependable.) To the degree that the limitations or ineligibilities which accompany a particular way of being seen are of some importance, the individual whose behavioral options would be altered by the restricting description may call it into question.

For example, as changes occur in the description of a person (P) upon which an observer (O) is prepared to act, the behaviors in which P is

eligible to engage within the relationship with O will correspondingly change. (Another way of saying this is that their relationship changes.) If O's redescription has not been successfully challenged by P any subsequent effort by P to challenge O's description may be seen by O as the behavior of a person with the new set of personal characteristics, and therefore as "just the kind of thing a person like that would do." (This development will be recognized as a variation of Garfinkle's [1956] discussion of degradation ceremonies.)

Any time prior to O's successful redescription of P, however (and perhaps after as well, although with much more difficulty for P), P may enter into negotiation with O about O's and P's respective descriptions of P's personal characteristics. P himself has a number of reasons for entering into such a negotiation, any and all of which may be sufficient reasons for him. Most notably, P will enter into a negotiation with O about his own personal characteristics if a successful redescription of P's personal characteristics would significantly alter his standing within that relationship and correspondingly restrict his behavioral eligibilities. These restrictions may be significant for any of a number of reasons, including: (a) the relationship itself is important enough in its own right to be preserved as it stands; (b) the relationship is important because of other relationships which O has which are, in turn, important to P; and (c) the relationship is important to P because of other relationships which he has, to some significant degree as a function of his relationship with O.

The Ineligibility to Negotiate Ascribed Personal Characteristics

In daily life the negotiation of personal characteristics may range anywhere from relatively mundane instances (such as, for example, establishing that one is "not really undependable" by offering acceptable reasons for being late) to more complex examples (such as progressively renegotiating where one stands within an intimate relationship by repeatedly discussing, among other things, how one sees oneself, the other person, and oneself in regard to the other person). The ineligibility to negotiate a particular set of characteristics is not, however, an unusual circumstance and is certainly not always insidious. In fact, within *any* relationship a person will be eligible to negotiate certain personal characteristics and not eligible to negotiate others. This is the case because every relationship has a history that is, in part, a history of previous negotiations through which personal characteristics have been established. Since every relationship is, to some important degree, an expression of the history which its members share, the personal characteristics that these members take one another to have will not change unless the relationship (and possibly, the significance of the history they share)

changes as well. Until the relationship does change or is called into question, each member will be treated by other members as ineligible to claim any of a number of specific personal characteristics which are either pragmatically or logically incompatible with the personal characteristics that have already been established.

There is, of course, great significance to having successfully or unsuccessfully negotiated a particular personal characteristic, since the range of behaviors available to a person in a relationship will correspond to the sort of person he is taken to be. While some personal characteristics typically correspond to relatively minor behavioral restrictions (e.g., being tall), others may dramatically change a person's social world (e.g., being seen as fundamentally "unloving," "unreliable," or "dangerous"). For example, it may not be uncommon for individuals who have been successfully redescribed in this way to report corresponding changes in their self-esteem or general mood. At least in principle, however, no specific redescription of a person's characteristics will divest him of his broader status as a negotiator. While certain personal characteristics limit a person's specific eligibilities a negotiator may still question previously negotiated characteristics or challenge other new ascriptions. As Schwartz (1979) has noted, a primary goal of psychotherapy is to establish that clients who view themselves as degraded still retain the status of negotiators, whatever other personal characteristics they may ascribe to themselves.

Apart from these examples of ineligibilities, however, (i.e., ineligibilities for specific sets of personal characteristics) individuals may find themselves in relationships in which their eligibility to be a negotiator has been significantly restricted. A restriction in the eligibility to be a negotiator (and, correspondingly, to enter into negotiations about one's place in a relationship) is an insidiously disconfirming restriction. If it is sufficiently inclusive, it may even restrict the degraded person's eligibility to enter into negotiations about the eligibility to negotiate. A successful degradation of this sort will therefore have a significant impact on the place which a person takes himself to have in the world at large. A person who cannot (i.e., is ineligible to) negotiate personal characteristics may experience himself or herself as worthless. He or she will have difficulty entering into new relationships which, in turn, require new negotiations; will be susceptible to the successful ascription of competing personal characteristics across a range of relationships; and, taken to an extreme, may even be significantly restricted in the eligibility to assess and negotiate states of affairs in the world at large.

Ineligibilities and Suicide Attempts

At this point in the conceptual development, the relationship of suicide attempts to restrictions in the eligibility to negotiate personal character-

istics becomes clearer. In effect, as a person's eligibility to negotiate becomes increasingly restricted, the corresponding range of available behaviors that count as negotiations will also be restricted. In such circumstances, a person can be expected to engage in whatever behaviors are available which *will* count as negotiation moves. I am proposing that suicidal individuals find themselves in relationships in which suicide attempts represent the only negotiation moves they take to be still available to them which will either (a) prevent significant restrictions in the range of behaviors available to them, or (b) reinstate significant restrictions that have already been rescinded. In other words, suicidal individuals are faced with an actual or threatened degradation that constitutes an untenable position within a relationship. Suicide attempters will therefore exercise whatever behavioral options are available to them within that relationship which potentially retain sufficient "force" to establish or reestablish their status as negotiators.

In the remainder of this paper a study will be presented which was conducted as part of a larger investigation (Kirsch, 1979) designed to explore some of the ramifications of the conceptualization presented above. This study will assess the following hypothesis: that suicide attempters will be less likely than others to negotiate their personal characteristics when those characteristics are called into question within the context of some relationship. Specifically, the responses given by suicide attempters to accusations of wrongdoing will be compared to the responses given by nonsuicidal individuals to the same set of accusations. If the conceptualization presented above is a fair representation of suicidal acts, then one would expect suicidal individuals to offer fewer responses to these accusations that can be scored as negotiation moves.

It should be noted that the specific hypothesis explored in this paper represents only one element of the broader conceptual framework. Many other empirical questions could be asked about suicidal individuals and their relationships, based on the above model. The question being addressed in this paper is, however, central. If suicidal individuals are not less likely to offer negotiations when their personal characteristics are called into question, then no further empirical efforts to explicate the conceptual model need be attempted. If, however, that hypothesis is supported, a number of avenues for potentially significant research are opened. Variations upon the paradigm case example might, for example, investigate other questions such as: differences in the likelihood of negotiation as a function of the potential lethality of the suicidal act; differences in the range and types of problematic relationships reported by the attempters; the impact of seemingly nonrelational changes (e.g., medical illness) upon individuals, insofar as these changes are associated

with or generate problematic relationships; and special cases such as those in which the intent of the suicidal act appears to be a refusal to negotiate (e.g., "If that's the only game in town then I'd rather play no game at all!"). As previously stated, however, all of these would require that validity be established for the assertion that suicide attempters see themselves as restricted in a characteristic way. This study will therefore be limited to that demonstration.

METHOD

General Design

A sample of 60 patient participants was employed, consisting of four groups of 15 patients each (Note 1). These groups were: (a) high magnitude-of-intent suicide attempters; (b) low magnitude-of-intent suicide attempters; (c) suicidal ideators without a history of suicide attempts and (d) a comparison group of nonsuicidal psychiatric patients from the same hospital. All patients had no evidence of psychotic functioning in their histories. Data were collected from all patients within 24 hours of their admission to a large state psychiatric hospital in which approximately 300 beds are reserved for adult psychiatric admissions. At the time of data collection patients were informed of their rights and consent was obtained in accordance with HEW regulations. Data collected consisted of: (a) the Beck Depression Inventory; (b) the Beck Suicidal Intent Scale; (c) a Negotiation Inventory described below; and (d) a structured interview in which a clinical history and the subject's own report of the major reasons for the attempt were obtained. In all analyses, group membership served as the independent variable. Beck Depression Inventory and Negotiation Inventory scores served alternately as dependent variables or covariates in a series of analyses of variance or regression designs.

Patient Participants

The design of the present study called for four groups of 15 patients each: two groups of patients who had made a suicide attempt, one group of patients who only reported suicidal ideation, and a control group of patients who reported no current suicidal ideation or prior suicidal activity. Participants for each of these four cells were obtained in the following manner.

1. *Suicide Attempters (High and Low Magnitude-of-Intent Groups).* Based on the histories and diagnostic impressions obtained during two phases of an admission procedure (a preadmission psychiatric screening and an extensive diagnostic interview conducted by members of a treatment

team) to a large state hospital over a nine-month period, every patient admitted between the ages of 18 and 65 with no evidence of past or present psychotic functioning who had made an overt suicide attempt was interviewed by the author within 24 hours of admission. This procedure was adopted to minimize the effects of a postattempt catharsis reaction. During this interview each patient was administered the Beck Depression Inventory, the Beck Suicidal Intent Scale, and a Negotiation Inventory developed for this study. Based on a set of criteria for inclusion in the study (e.g., ability to read and write English, consent to participate and the above mentioned criteria) a group of 38 suicide attempters was interviewed, of whom 30 satisfied all the criteria for inclusion and participated in the study. A median split was performed on the scores received by these 30 participants on the Suicide Intent Scale, and two groups of 15 participants each were identified: a high magnitude-of-intent group of 15 participants and a low magnitude-of-intent group of 15 participants.

2. *Suicidal Ideators and Nonsuicidal Controls.* A similar procedure was followed both for all nonpsychotic patients admitted to the hospital during the same time period who reported suicidal ideation to either the admitting physician or admission team and for all nonpsychotic patients without suicidal history or present suicidal ideation. A total of 22 patients with suicidal ideation were interviewed, of whom 15 met selection criteria and were utilized in the study. A total of 20 nonsuicidal patients were interviewed, of whom 15 met selection criteria and were utilized in this study.

Instruments

1. *Beck Suicidal Intent Scale.* Magnitude of suicidal intent was assessed with the Beck Suicidal Intent Scale (Beck, Schuyler & Herman, 1972). This instrument consists of 15 scorable items designed to assess the attempter's magnitude of intent by examining (a) the circumstances of the actual suicide attempt and (b) the attempter's own reported conceptions and expectations of the probable lethality of the attempt. Data on the reliability and validity of this scale can be obtained in Beck, et al. (1972).

2. *Beck Depression Inventory.* The depth of depression for each subject was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961). This instrument consists of 22 items, each assessing a major behavioral or vegetative sign of depression commonly identified in the descriptive psychiatric literature (see, for example, Campbell, 1953; Friedman, Cowitz, Cohen & Granick, 1963;

Grinker, Miller, Sabshin, Nunn & Nunnally, 1961). The scale is self-administered. Subjects are requested to choose the one of four to six statements for each of the 22 symptoms which most accurately describes them (only one item of the scale directly queries the respondent about suicidal ideation). Each statement is assigned a weighted score; scale scores consist of the sum of weighted item scores. Data on the reliability and validity of this scale can be found in Beck (1967).

3. *Negotiation Inventory.* In order to assess the likelihood that a patient participant would offer negotiation responses when personal characteristics were called into question, a Negotiation Inventory was designed in which twenty brief scenarios were presented to each respondent. These scenarios are all characterized by an interaction in which a person is accused of either some act of wrongdoing or of having some negative personal characteristic. Respondents are requested to write what they would say in such situations for each of the twenty scenarios (see Forward, Cantor & Kirsch, 1976; Harre & Secord, 1973, and Mixon, 1972, for discussions of the modified role-enactment technique). The following are sample items from this scale:

1. You arrive two hours late for a dinner appointment and your friend accuses you of being irresponsible. What would you say?
2. You don't return a borrowed car at the time you promised and your friend accuses you of being untrustworthy. What would you say?
3. You don't get a job finished by the deadline and your boss accuses you of being lazy. What would you say?
4. You have been speeding coming home from a party. A state trooper stops you and arrests you for drunken driving. What would you say?

The method of scoring the responses of participants in this study was based upon a description of the social practice of making an accusation and offering a plea in response to accusation (i.e., the social practice of Accusations and Pleas). This social practice consists of four stages: (a) a violation (i.e., breaking a promise or failing to comply with a norm that is appealed to in identifying a behavior as an offense); (b) an accusation; (c) a plea; and (d) a negotiated resolution between the participants in the episode.

Within this social practice, an accusation (stage b) represents one possible move along a dimension of discipline strategies that a person can choose when confronted by some behavioral violation of a norm. These are: warning, accusation, and condemnation. Similarly, several options are available to the alleged perpetrator, including: (a) mere acceptance or rejection of the accusation (i.e., nonnegotiation); (b) apology;

(c) excuse or justification (i.e., an account; see Scott & Lyman, 1968); (d) challenges; and (e) contingency statements. Within the social practice, each accusation can be treated as an attempt to degrade the alleged perpetrator (Garfinkel, 1956) and each plea offered in response to accusation represents a different manner in which the perpetrator can attempt to forestall the degrading consequences of the accusation (Sykes & Matza, 1957). A discussion of the principal forms of pleas and the types of moves they represent follows below:

1. Mere Acceptance or Mere Rejection of the Accusation: Nonnegotiation. In merely accepting the accusation, the perpetrator assumes the degraded position and, in effect, informs the accuser that he is now prepared to be treated as a person of that sort. The mere acceptance in this way of an ascribed negative characteristic constitutes the successful degradation of the individual who is now prepared to act upon and be treated as eligible only for those behaviors that correspond to being a person of the "new kind."

This condition most closely resembles Garfinkel's (1956) description of a successful degradation ceremony, in which the social identity of those who overstep normative behavioral boundaries is modified and controlled. As described by Garfinkel (1956), communities establish the criteria for membership in good standing as a set of suprapersonal standards that are used to assess an individual's behavior. These standards are presented in a way which establishes membership in good standing as tautologically related to behaving in accordance with these social constraints and stipulations (i.e., engaging in some behavior *constitutes* being a member of the community in good standing).

When an individual behaves in a way which can be identified as a transgression, another individual who acts as a representative of the community fills the role of denouncer. If it is effective, the denunciation redefines the total identity of the transgressing individual in the eyes of witnesses who both represent the community's standards and serve to make the proceedings and the effect of the degradation public. The denouncer is faced with a number of tasks: (a) he must make a reasonable case for the perpetrator's having committed the transgression he is accused of; (b) he must present his denunciation to the witnesses in such a way as to preclude the possibility of their both disagreeing with the denunciation and remaining members of the community in good standing; (c) he must not concentrate on the perpetrator's specific behavior but on that behavior as one member of a class of behaviors that are morally repugnant; and (d) he must redescribe the perpetrator as being, and having always been, a member of the class of persons who commit such acts.

As Garfinkel notes, there are a number of strategies that the perpetrator

may use to counter this attempted degradation. In the present example (i.e., nonnegotiation), the perpetrator offers no resistance to the ascription implied in the accusation, does not negotiate his standing and, in effect, accedes to those characterisitcs which have been credited to him.

In offering a mere rejection of the accusation, the perpetrator does little better. Rather than offer reasons which support his being treated as a person of the "old kind" (i.e., one in good standing), the perpetrator merely insists, without demonstration, that he is a person of the "old kind." A denial of this sort is barely more of a negotiation than mere acceptance, since the accusation (which is based upon reasons for viewing the perpetrator as a person of the "new kind") requires that other reasons be offered which in some way call the accuser's reasons into question. A mere denial can, in effect, be treated as no reason at all, and the denier will be treated as a person of the "new kind" unless the accuser has other reasons for not following through on the accusation.

2. *Apology.* With an apology, the perpetrator attempts to recover status after having been accused of an act which both the accuser and the perpetrator recognize as a transgression. An apology suggests that there are no reasons the perpetrator can offer which will (a) absolve him of responsibility for the act, or (b) serve as an adequate redescription of appropriate action on the basis of some other set of standards. Unlike a mere acceptance or denial, however, an apology is a recognition that the described violation was committed and requests a status reinstatement (i.e., a pardon), even though no other account can be offered for the violation. The apologizer, in effect, assures the accuser that the offense will not occur again and, at worst, is assigned the status of a penitent. It might be expected that successive violations would be more difficult to forgive.

3. *Accounts: Justifications and Excuses.* With a justification the perpetrator reaffirms his status by claiming that the accuser's description of the behavior in question was incorrect. While it may have appeared that the perpetrator was committing a transgression within the context of the accuser's social practice description, the perpetrator claims that he was really acting on some other description which took precedence over the one presupposed by the accusation (note the example of the officer and speeder discussed above). A justification makes the claim that the transgression was not committed, by challenging the accuser's behavioral description.

A justification therefore presents the accuser with a behavioral redescription that challenges the applicability of the norm (or appeals to another of greater significance). A number of options of this sort are open to the perpetrator who wishes to make such a case: (a) claiming to not

be part of the relevant community to which that norm applies; (b) claiming that what the accuser took to be a norm is no longer or never was a norm of that sort; or (c) claiming that some other state of affairs such as personal obligation, responsibility, or relationship took precedence over that norm which would otherwise have been operative.

With an excuse, the perpetrator attempts to maintain status by demonstrating to the accuser that the violation was not deliberate, although it is clear to both that a "violation-like" behavior could not be denied. Unlike a justification, an excuse does not challenge the accuser's description of the behavior as a violation. Instead, the excuser challenges the accuser's ascription that the violation was performed deliberately. Rather than offer another description of the behavior which renders it appropriate, the excuser claims that the particular behavior was a function of extenuating circumstances (i.e., circumstances not under the perpetrator's control) and therefore the behavior is claimed not to have been a true expression of the behaver's character (Austin, 1961; Scott & Lyman, 1968).

4. *Challenges.* A perpetrator who offers a challenge addresses himself to the eligibility of the accuser to offer an accusation of that sort. The challenge can be addressed to the accuser (e.g., "Who are you to accuse me of that?") or to the relationship between them (e.g., "Some friend you turned out to be!"). In both of these cases the perpetrator does not directly address either the behavior which has been called into question or the accuser's description of that behavior, but offers a response which is addressed instead to the accuser's eligibility to give accusations of that sort. In some respects, a successful challenge leaves the description of the behavior and the personal characteristics associated with it as yet unnegotiated; repeated challenges by both members of a relationship may lead to a characteristic form of relationship stress (see, for example, Bergner, 1981).

5. *Contingency Statements.* Contingency statements are any variation upon pleas such as "why," "how come," or "I should consider that, let me give it some thought." Like challenges, contingency statements leave the violation and the perpetrator's personal characteristics unnegotiated; unlike challenges, they directly address the accusation by suggesting that the perpetrator is prepared to consider the accusation if a "reasonable" case can be made for its validity. In effect, the contingency statement preserves the perpetrator's standing in the relationship and precludes the degradation, regardless of the outcome of any subsequent negotiation. The successful contingency establishes the perpetrator as the member of the relationship whose endorsement is required for an accusation even to be considered. If some accusation successfully iden-

tifies a violation, the perpetrator can claim that this is so only because the accusation has been addressed to someone who is "reasonable enough to recognize my mistakes." All future accusations would therefore be subject to the same scrutiny, at which time the accusee might conceivably refuse to endorse the accusation, appealing instead to an established capacity for judicious self-examination as reason for the accusation's rejection. In many respects, contingency statements of this kind represent the most powerful negotiation moves in the face of accusation and are most likely to preserve or enhance the perpetrator's position in the relationship.

Based on these five response categories, a coding manual was developed to assist in the training of raters. This manual and the scaling procedures used in the development of the instrument can be found in Kirsch (1979). Prior to the use of the Negotiation Inventory in the present study, a small pilot study was conducted to investigate the power of the scale and coding scheme to differentiate suicidal and nonsuicidal persons. Ten suicidal patients were obtained in the same manner as described above and were administered the Negotiation Inventory. Responses to the Negotiation Inventory items were also obtained from an additional sample of 10 university students with no reported psychiatric or suicidal history. The protocols of these 20 individuals were randomized and blindly scored by the investigator. t tests were performed employing each of the five response categories as dependent variables. A significant difference was obtained between suicidal and nonsuicidal individuals for the nonnegotiation category, (t [19] = 2.21, $p < .05$). Differences between suicidal and nonsuicidal participants on all other coding categories were nonsignificant.

For the present study, all responses obtained from participants were scored by two trained independent raters. Raters were trained using the coding manual cited above, in which sample responses for each category and methods for coding some atypical responses were provided. In the present investigation, raters achieved an initial interrater agreement of 82% per participant protocol. All differences were subsequently resolved through negotiation and consensus was required for every item.

RESULTS

Relationship Between Suicidal/Nonsuicidal Group Membership and Nonnegotiation Scores

A one-way analysis of variance was performed using nonnegotiation scores as a dependent variable in order to assess differences in the degree to which suicidal and nonsuicidal participants offer nonnegotiation re-

sponses on the Negotiation Inventory. A summary of the analysis of variance is presented in Table 1. As predicted, suicidal participants offered significantly more nonnegotiation responses than their nonsuicidal counterparts (F [3,56] = 3.23, $p < .03$). A Tukey B test for homogeneous subgroups indicated that this significant F was attributable to differences between the means of the high magnitude-of-intent attempters and the nonsuicidal comparison group.

Relationship Between Suicidal/Nonsuicidal Group Membership and Negotiation Scores

In addition to a nonnegotiation score, each participant also received scores for the number of apologies, accounts, challenges, and contingency responses they offered on the Negotiation Inventory. These four scores conjointly represent the number and type of negotiation moves offered by each participant. Although no specific predictions were offered about differences among the four subject groups on each of these four negotiation subscores, a series of four one-way analyses of variance were conducted to assess any differences in the patterns of negotiations offered by suicidal and nonsuicidal participants.

Of the four analyses of variance conducted only the analysis using contingency-type responses as the dependent variable approached significance (F [3,56] = 2.63, $p < .059$), suggesting that participants in the nonsuicidal and ideator groups offer more contingency-type negotiations than their suicidal counterparts. The four analyses as a group, however, must be treated as indicating that while suicidal and nonsuicidal subjects

Table 1. "Nonnegotiation" Responses by Suicidal/Nonsuicidal Group Membership

Suicidal/Nonsuicidal group membership	$\bar{X}$	*SD*	*N*
Group 1 (HiMag)	7.47	3.29	15
Group 2 (LoMag)	6.60	3.09	15
Group 3 (Ideators)	7.33	3.83	15
Group 4 (Nonsuicidal)	4.20	2.76	15

ANOVA Summary

Source	*df*	*SS*	*MS*	*F*
Between Groups	3	103.33	34.44	3.23*
Within Groups	56	597.07	10.66	
Total	59	700.40		

Note: *$p < .03$.

are distinguishable in the degree to which they employ nonnegotiation responses they are not distinguishable on the basis of the patterns of negotiations they employ.

Two possible interpretations can be offered for this finding. Conceptually, these findings may indicate that the four types of negotiation moves may be pragmatically equivalent as status-reaffirming moves for these subjects. The choice to employ any particular negotiation may be attributable to the nature of the violations and the content of the accusation in question, rather than to any programmatic effort or characteristic style to offer one type of negotiation rather than another. It is also possible, however, that no differences were found in these analyses because the five negotiation/nonnegotiation scores are linearly dependent. The significant differences between subgroups which were found for nonnegotiation scores may have restricted the potential variance between groups on the remaining four subscores and increased the likelihood of finding nonsignificant differences with these dependent variables.

Because nonsignificant differences were obtained on the four negotiation subscales, the following analysis is restricted to nonnegotiation scores.

Relationship Between Suicidal/Nonsuicidal Group Membership, Depression and Nonnegotiation Scores

The correlation between suicidality and depression was established by performing a simple regression analysis with depression scores as the dependent variable. The categorical variable of suicidal/nonsuicidal group membership was used as a predictor by converting it into three dummy-coded variables. The analysis reveals that suicidal/nonsuicidal group membership accounts for 34% of the variance in depression scores (F [3,56] = 9.42, $p < .001$) and, as expected, indicates a significant direct relationship between participants' depth of depression and their degree of suicidal intent.

Because of the relatively strong direct correlation between group membership and depression, a series of furthur regression analyses were conducted to clarify the relationship between suicidality and depth of depression with respect to nonnegotiation scores. Using nonnegotiation scores as the dependent variable, depression and suicidal/nonsuicidal group membership were alternately used as the first and second predictors in two forced regression designs. The results indicate that when group membership alone is used as a predictor, it accounts for 13.95% of the unadjusted variance in nonnegotiation scores (F [3,56] = 3.03, $p < .04$). Adding depression as a second predictor increases the variance

accounted for to 16.55% (F [4,55] = 2.73, $p < .04$) although the amount of increased variance attributable to the addition of depression is not significant.

Conversely, depression as the sole predictor accounts for only 10.99% of the unadjusted variance in nonnegotiation scores (F [1,58] = 7.16, $p < .02$) and the amount of increased variance attributable to the addition of suicidal/nonsuicidal group membership is not significant.

While no causal inferences can be made on the basis of these correlational analyses, they do indicate that the relationship between suicidality and depression is complex, that both contribute to the prediction of nonnegotiation scores and that both may correspond to changes in a person's behavioral eligibilities. These two variables do, however, share considerable covariance and the additional variance accounted for by adding one or the other to a regression equation may not be sufficient to warrant using both as predictors. If initial variance accounted for by one predictor (i.e., the raw correlation) is therefore used as a criterion for predictor selection, the results indicate that suicidal/nonsuicidal group membership offers the greater predictive power.

DISCUSSION

The central finding of the present study is that in response to accusations of wrongdoing, suicidal subjects are significantly less likely to negotiate their own personal characteristics than are nonsuicidal people. The present study does, of course, have a number of methodological limitations which must be considered when interpreting this finding. For example:

1. Subjects were recruited in a large state psychiatric hospital which serves a distinct segment of the general population. Patients are primarily from indigent families, without jobs or medical insurance, and often without permanent residence. At present, the relationship between histories of this kind and the eligibility to negotiate is unclear. It may be the case, for example, that psychiatric histories of the kind which are common in state hospitals are themselves sufficient to generate characteristic ineligibilities. This possibility is attenuated somewhat by the fact that comparison group subjects, who offered significantly more negotiation moves than their suicidal counterparts, are also members of the population served by the state hospital. Nevertheless, a systematic effect of "state hospital histories" must be considered in interpreting the present findings.

Similarly, it has been noted that admission to a state hospital itself, for whatever reason, is a powerful degradation (Goffman, 1967). The effects of this degradation on the present study are unclear, but must be considered as one possible source of systematic variance. For ex-

ample, while all subject groups used in this study shared the status of state hospital admission, the preadmission course of their difficulties may have varied systematically. Many of the nonattempters found themselves in the state hospital because, in effect, they were considered to be public nuisances. These patients, who often recognized the reasons for their admission, typically felt that they had been unjustly certified. Others viewed their hospitalization as an opportunity to divest themselves temporarily of financial problems; a few were merely awaiting transfer to another facility which was better suited to their needs. Suicide attempters, however, appeared to be a much more homogeneous group, all of whom reported recent periods of extreme personal distress and many of whom recognized the importance of hospitalization. Given these differences, suicide attempters may assume the degraded status of patient more readily than nonattempters. The finding that nonattempters offer more negotiations may correspondingly reflect a more acute desire to be discharged and to demonstrate that they are not in need of psychiatric care.

2. All suicidal subjects were interviewed within 24 hours of their admission to the hospital. This relatively short period of time between admission and interview was insisted upon to minimize the opportunity for subjects to (a) spontaneously recover from their suicidal ideation; (b) visit family or friends who might exacerbate or alleviate their continuing suicidal thoughts; or (c) receive psychiatric care. This precaution could not be totally efficient, since a suicidal act may sometimes have an immediate cathartic effect. A number of suicide attempters may, as well, be accompanied to the hospital by family members who are responsible for saving them. The reported differences between suicidal and nonsuicidal groups indicate that the technique of near-immediate data collection did prevent the attenuation of significant differences. Nevertheless, it is unclear in what ways and to what degree the data are confounded by any of a number of possible postattempt phenomena such as, for example, seeing the world from the eyes of a newly degraded unsuccessful suicide attempter). Statements about the subjects of the study as suicide attempters must therefore be treated with the cautions that are reserved for any *post hoc* description.

Implications of the Present Study and Directions for Future Research

1. *Depression, Suicide, and Hopelessness.* Apart from the reservations expressed above, however, the findings of this study are broadly consistent with other observations of suicidal individuals. There is a good deal of evidence in the literature to suggest that suicide attempters do find themselves in situations which have been described as "untenable"

or "hopeless" (Bedrosian & Beck, 1979; Farber, 1968; Hattem, 1964; Kobler & Stotland, 1964; Kovacs, Beck & Weissman, 1975; Minkoff, Bergman, Beck & Beck, 1973; Rubenstein, Moses & Lidz, 1958). Kobler and Stotland (1964), for example, have presented a case history of a small psychiatric in-patient facility that experienced an epidemic of suicides within a brief crisis period. They suggest that the major determinant of suicidal behaviors is the observations of attempters that those around them believe that there is no way to prevent them from carrying through their lethal plan. Minkoff, et al. (1973), have similarly noted that many suicide attempters report having experienced feelings of hopelessness and describe a suicide attempter as one who "believes that nothing will turn out right for him, nothing he does will succeed . . . and his worst problem will never be solved" (p. 455).

Nevertheless, some important questions remain about what factors might distinguish a person who is merely depressed from one who is depressed and suicidal. Bedrosian and Beck (1979) have suggested that the concept of hopelessness which has been discussed above may be worth exploring in this regard. They have suggested that suicidal individuals not only face problematic changes in their world (which might be characteristic of any mood disorder) but, additionally, that they see no opportunity for implementing changes. Suicidal acts therefore become reasonable alternatives.

The conceptualization offered in the present paper is in many ways consistent with the formulation proposed by Bedrosian and Beck (1979). In fact, the data presented above suggest that the types of negotiations offered by suicidal individuals may, like scores on the Hopelessness Scale (Kovacs, et al., 1975), offer a methodological link between depression and the potential lethality of the suicidal act. This similarity is not surprising, since a suicidal individual who finds that he has been divested of his status as a negotiator may, in fact, be hopeless and may experience limitations in the behavioral options available to him. Typically, these restrictions will encompass behaviors which enable some persons to alter real-world states of affairs. Restrictions of the sort discussed in this conceptualization are "what hopelessness is all about."

The negotiation model, however, provides for the ascription of meaning to the suicidal act. It suggests that the suicidal individual is one who still retains some status and therefore "still has something to lose." Within this context, the suicidal act may be viewed as a self-affirmation and not simply an act of resignation to unmitigatable circumstances. While an immediate concern of a clinical or crisis intervention center may therefore be the alleviation of acute stress, a long-term therapeutic goal in working with suicidal individuals may be more profitably viewed

as the reinstatement of the attempter's status as a negotiator (Schwartz, 1979).

2. *The Negotiation Model and the Paradoxical Nature of Suicide Attempts.* Shneidman (1969), in discussing the notes of suicide committers, has stressed the paradoxical nature of the suicide note. He has noted that committers frequently leave instructions to be carried out after their death, express angry or loving feelings toward important people in their lives and discuss future events as if they will continue to have an impact on or be affected by them. Calling the expression of such thoughts "catalogic," Shneidman (1969) has remarked that suicide committers are unable to cognize their own deaths and treat the world as a place in which they will continue to have a part.

Paradoxes like these are not limited to suicide committers; a number of conceptual problems must be faced in discussing suicide attempters as well. For example, apart from duplicitous attempts in which the attempter is explicitly *not* intending to die, any attempt will be potentially lethal to some degree. Since a successful negotiation can benefit only individuals who are not successfully suicidal, it could be claimed that the value for the attempter of negotiating in this way is somewhat unclear. If the attempter dies, then any reaffirmation of status will be meaningless. Yet, it is also the case that many attempters do not deliberately insure the failure of their attempts; for them death is a genuine possibility.

Although a compelling solution to this paradox is not yet available, the present formulation does offer some indications of what a solution to the paradox might look like. Briefly, the description of suicide attempts as negotiation moves suggests that they represent efforts on the part of attempters to reaffirm their status within a network of relationships. To the degree that their status is successfully reaffirmed, attempters can also expect to preserve important behavioral eligibilities or, perhaps, broaden their opportunities in new ways. For many attempters, however, the benefits which correspond to reaffirmation may not be as important as the reaffirmation itself. For them a suicidal act, regardless of outcome, may be justified by its accrediting power alone.

3. *Suicide Attempters and Committers.* The initial impetus for the present conceptualization and study was the reported observation (Stengel, 1964) that suicide attempts are far more ambiguous in their significance than successful suicidal acts. The study reported in this paper did not directly address this issue. The conceptualization introduced above, however, does suggest that suicide attempters and committers may be more similar than their respective epidemiologies might indicate, since mem-

bers of both groups are struggling with significant disruptions of their interpersonal worlds. It may be valuable to treat suicide committers and attempters as differing from one another only in the degree to which their interpersonal world has been disrupted, with the additional expectation that the particular events which precipitate such disruptions may be different as well.

This redescription is in contrast to the observation that attempters and committers are epidemiologically distinct groups, a position which also suggests respective sets of conceptually independent reasons for the behaviors of these two groups. The negotiation model represents, instead, an insistence upon viewing suicidal acts as "cut from the same interpersonal cloth" such that differences between suicidal groups reflect variations in the type, range, and locus of their interpersonal difficulties. It is certainly the case that epidemiological differences between suicidal groups may help observers identify the likely areas of interpersonal disruption, but the present conceptualization raises the possibility that intervention techniques may be most successful if they are tailored to specific interpersonal disruptions and the attempter's degraded status.

In a recent major work, Baechler (1980) has suggested that suicidal individuals all face problematic situations and that suicidal acts can all be viewed as a problem-solving strategy. As Shneidman (1980) notes, Baechler dismisses "the three traditional approaches to the study of suicide: moral and philosophical analysis, the analysis of individual cases and the statistical" (1980, p. 175) in exchange for a position which emphasizes that "suicide denotes all behavior that seeks and finds the solution to an existential problem by making an attempt on the life of the subject" (Baechler, 1980, p. 74). In effect, the present conceptualization provides one method by which the impact of the problems faced by suicidal persons can be formulated. It is consistent with recommendations such as those of Baechler (1980) which stress the importance of a suicide attempt as, at the very least, an understandable response to a state of affairs which, for the attempter, is untenable. This conceptualization offers no suggestions about which states of affairs are most likely to be seen in this way or which persons are most likely to find some state of affairs untenable. It does, however, provide a basis for discussing such issues in a coherent way that is consistent with the attempter's own view of the world.

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thank Dr. Julius Laffal who graciously facilitated the collection of the data. The dissertation upon which this study is based was funded in part by National Institute of Mental Health Grant No. 5–34976. Address: Department of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, Box 33, University Hospital, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 48109.

NOTE

1. Data were collected as part of a larger study (Kirsch, 1979) in which additional hypotheses were tested. The partition of subjects reported in the present investigation reflects the requirements of the larger study.

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Peter G. Ossorio has been a member of the faculty of the Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, since 1961. He has been extremely active in the training and supervision both of clinical and non-clinical students. He is the founder of Descrptive Psychology as a systematic formulation, and the author of numerous monographs and technical reports. He is also the founder of the Linguistic Research Institute which has been engaged in research and consultation since the early 1960's. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Los Angeles in clinical psychology.

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