

FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE RELATIONSHIPS

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ABSTRACT

A paradigm case formulation of friendship and love relationships is presented. Nine subrelations are taken to be essential features of the archetypical concept of friendship and eleven of the archetypical concept of romantic love. The major conceptual contrast between friendship and love relationships is taken to lie in the contrast between the passionate aspects of love—particularly fascination, exclusiveness, and sexual desire—and the milder passions of friendship, on the one hand, and the qualities of support distinctive to the two relationships. Both relationships involve very significant support in the category of being able to count on each other in both practical and emotional ways, but in romantic love, the quality of support is most appropriately characterized by “giving the utmost” and “being a champion or advocate” of the loved one, whereas in friendship such support marks only best or closest friendships from one's more ordinary friendships. Three studies were conducted in which several aspects of the construct and predictive validity of a new set of relationship assessment scales were tested. These studies provided very encouraging support for the validity of these scales. The findings and conceptualization are compared to results obtained by other researchers dealing with personal relationships.

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In this essay our aim is to contribute to the scientific understanding of personal relationships by taking two fundamental personal relationships—friendship and love—as central instances and by developing a conceptualization of each, and assessment procedures for research on each. The conceptual resources that we will bring to bear are those available within Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 1966, 1969/1978, 1972/1978, 1981a, 1981c, 1981d) and his associates (Davis, 1981). In particular, we shall make use of the relationship formula, the notion of status dynamics, paradigm case formulations, and other conceptual devices to clarify the concepts of love and friendship as personal relationships. Our work builds on previous work, both published and unpublished, in Descriptive Psychology, including the unpublished work by Davis (Note 1) and by Marshall (Note 2), the published studies by Kelling (1972, 1979), and Roberts (1981).

The study of personal relationship has a long tradition in the social sciences, and we will deal briefly with some of the major alternative points of view. But, because our primary objective is the presentation of an original system and its associated research procedure, we do not pretend to make a comprehensive survey of the approaches to the study of relationships. Such a survey is in preparation by Davis (Note 3).

DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Friendship

An approach to the study of personal relationship grounded in Descriptive Psychology begins in the following way. We start with a paradigm case formulation (PCF) which is a genuine case of friendship (Ossorio, 1981d). While it is possible to have a friendship that does not involve mutual or reciprocal respect between the two persons involved, we have selected as our paradigm case one in which the subrelationships listed in Table 1 are mutual. Thus, the first person is taken to respect his or her friend who returns the respect. The reason for this selection of the paradigm is that mutual or reciprocal friendships are clearly genuine cases and ones which, furthermore, are archetypal. That is, they constitute the full case by virtue of which other cases are recognized as instances of that kind of thing. If no friendships involved reciprocal trust, respect, or confiding, then our concept of such personal relationships would be quite different from what they are. Following Ossorio's (1981d) rule of thumb that, in picking one's paradigm case, one wants not only a genuine case but a complex one, we have in Table 1 gone in the direction of picking a very elaborate case. Such elaboration allows us

Table 1. Relationships for the Paradigm Cases of Friendship and Love

<i>Friendship</i>	<i>Romantic Love</i>
Equal Eligibilities	Asymmetric Eligibilities
Enjoy	Enjoyment
Trust	Advocate/Champion
Mutual Assistance	Give the Utmost
Acceptance	Acceptance
Respect	Respect
Spontaneity	Spontaneity
Understanding	Understanding
Intimacy	Intimacy
	Fascination
	Exclusiveness

to represent simpler cases by deletion or removing restrictions on individual cases.

It is useful to note some variety among cases that count as paradigm cases. In the first instance, any genuine case may be used as the paradigm case. But, it is often heuristic to have the paradigm case also be a fundamental or archetypal case. Cases with such a status are those which more readily exemplify the essence of the case. Thus, in the case of the concept of family, a wife, who has been widowed and who has two of her children living at home, clearly counts as a family; however, such a case would not count as one's fundamental case because the father was not present. Fundamental or archetypal cases need not be statistically frequent cases. The case of husband, wife, and children living at home constituted only 18.5% of American families in 1976. But it counts as an archetypal case. A third type of paradigm case is that of the original case—the first discovered instance or the precedent-setting case (as in a legal context). We think of the paradigm cases of friendship and love presented in Table 1 as archetypal paradigm cases, but, we shall use "archetypal" and "paradigm" as alternative locutions to refer to the PCF provided in Table 1.

As both Littmann (1983) and Roberts (1982) illustrate in this volume, paradigm case procedures can be used to generate the variety of instances, say, of humor or of personal relationships between men and women. The critical step in this procedure is that of selecting features of the paradigm case that are to be changed by some transformation. The most common transformations are deletion (i.e., removing a restriction of a particular sort) and a reflexive inclusion of some feature of the original PCF within itself. To see how deletion works, let us start with our paradigm case of friendship. It is one in which the relationship is

reciprocal or mutual. But, one can easily remove this restriction and, thus generate cases, which obviously occur in the real world, in which the friendship is not mutual. Not only are there cases of unrequited friendship, but, even where the two persons may be said properly to be friends, one person may not respect a friend's judgment in financial matters or in the selection of partners of the opposite sex and yet they may still be friends. The lack of mutual respect marks it as a certain type of friendship, but, it certainly qualifies as a friendship.

A PCF provides a way of representing the structure of the subrelationships that are taken to be fundamental to clarifying how the relevant personal relationships operate. The subrelationships have been selected because they constitute, in our judgment, the kinds of considerations that are relevant to explaining the ways in which the particular relationships exemplify the general category and the ways in which such relationships can be said to go wrong or to be defective. That one is intimate with another person in the sense of sharing personal goals, aspirations, and fears is a state of affairs that marks the development of a particular type of friendship—a close, personal one. The failure to share anything other than what can be gained from first-hand observation marks a different kind of friendship—a more reserved or formal one. The kind of claim that we make with respect to the items in Table 1 is not that they provide a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of friendship to specific cases, but rather that they constitute a set of reminders of considerations relevant to cases counting as genuine instances. Or, alternatively, they constitute a set of categories in terms of which the case may be said to be genuine, but one which varies from the archetypal case in one or more selected ways. ('Mike and Joe are friends, but Joe always has to be top-dog.' Such a case marks the fact that Joe's personal characteristics place a limit on his being as good a friend of Mike's as he might if he did not have to be top-dog.)

The paradigm case presented in Table 1 is an *unconstrained* case—that is, the realization of the friendship or love relationship is not limited by the reality of individual differences nor by those of social position. The introduction of these constraints automatically places limits on the realization of any specific personal relationship, and thus one encounters the variety of real world cases of friendship none of which are exactly like the archetypal paradigm case.

Because the explicit use of paradigm case procedures is novel, there are doubtless questions about the procedures that cannot be answered in this context. Perhaps the most useful reminders about the procedure are: (a) That a PCF is not a definition, that is, it is not a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a label; (b) that a PCF

presupposes a person who is using it and who has the ordinary competences involved in recognizing instances and in reasoning about them; and (d) that alternative PCFs of the same concept are possible because of legitimate differences in purposes and focus. Indeed the PCFs offered by Roberts 1982) and us are not identical, although they share a common core of subrelationships. The issue of how PCFs of the same concept could differ and yet be acceptable for scientific work will be dealt with in the introduction to Part I of this volume. (See also Ossorio [1981d] and Bambrough [1961].)

The following are features of the paradigm case formulation for friendship which is taken to be a relationship in which the two persons, who are friends:

1. Participate as equals in the sense that those things that one person is eligible to do the other is also eligible to do. (Equal Eligibilities)
2. Enjoy each other's company. Such enjoyment needs to be understood as a dispositional characteristic of the relationship. It is not, therefore, incompatible with states of mutual annoyance, anger, or disappointment. But, if enjoyment were not the norm, it would make the explanation of continued association difficult. (Enjoyment)
3. Have a relationship of mutual trust in the sense that each takes it that the other person will act in light of his friend's best interest. (Trust)
4. Are inclined to provide each other with assistance and support (Telford, 1971) and, specifically, assume that they can count on each other in times of need, trouble, or personal distress. (Mutual Assistance)
5. Accept each other as they are, without being inclined to change or make the other over into a new, different person. (Acceptance)
6. Respect each other in the sense of taking it that each exercises good judgment in his or her life choices. (Respect)
7. Feel free to be themselves in their relationship, rather than feeling required to play a role, wear a mask, or inhibit expressions of their personal characteristics. (Spontaneity)
8. Have come to understand each other, not merely in the sense of knowing facts about each other, but in the more fundamental sense of understanding the rationale of the other's behavior. In such cases, one person is not routinely puzzled or mystified by his or her friend's behavior. (Understanding)
9. Are intimate in the sense of sharing experiences by virtue of doing things together and, in many cases, by virtue of confiding in each other. The intimacy may extend to physical intimacy, but it need not take such forms to count as intimacy. (Intimacy)

The archetypal paradigm case of friendship makes it clear immediately why such a personal relationship would be valued, indeed exalted in life and literature. To be in such a relationship not only increases one's behavior potential, because one has a completely loyal ally, but also provides a context in which to realize one's own personal growth. To be responsive to the bonds of friendship is, genuinely, to grow as a person, or in a more old-fashioned phrase, to develop one's character. The importance of having and being a friend is widely recognized in the literature on social development, psychopathology, and adult development, but it is not clear that any of these literatures have an explicit formulation of what the relationship is and, hence, of why friendship ought to be a valued state of affairs for a person. We believe that this formulation does just such a job—making us appreciate why the ideal of friendship has the status that it does in all cultures. But, as we all know, real world friendships seldom achieve the exalted status of those idealized friendships celebrated in poetry and hortatory literature. Why not?

In Descriptive Psychology, we have a general principle that provides the fundamental recourse for understanding the variation between the archetypal paradigm case and everyday cases. The archetypal case is in unconstrained or unlimited personal relationship, and, in this sense, it is an idealized relationship. There are, logically, two major types of constraints on personal relationships; there are the personal characteristics or individual differences of the persons involved and the social standing or status that they have in the community. It is important to understand that the *constraints* introduced on personal relationships both by the characteristics of the participants and by virtue of their position in the system *will necessarily limit the degree to which any specific relationship involves*, to the fullest extent possible, *the features of the archetypal case*.

A couple of illustrations may be helpful here. In the case of personal characteristics, there is a long history of developmental theorizing and research which makes it quite obvious that, say, suspiciousness or a paranoid streak constitutes a personal characteristic that will fundamentally limit the degree to which a person having that characteristic can become a friend with someone else. And that particular personal characteristic has its effect on the relationship through limiting the degree to which a person trusts anyone with whom he or she deals. Nothing that the other person does can "prove" that the other person is trustworthy to the fundamentally and completely suspicious person. For the option is always present that whatever the other person does, that person is merely trying to prove that he or she is trustworthy when in fact, the real goal is some form of exploitation. Thus, while a truly suspicious

person may call some small number of others friends, his or her manner of treating those others and the kind of choices made in relating to them would certainly mark a relationship that differed significantly from the archetypal case of friendship.

One can see the same phenomena—friendships being limited by personal characteristics—in innumerable cases: alcoholism, drug addiction, competitiveness, moodiness, and so on. In each of these cases, when one thinks of the implication of the personal characteristic and how it might relate to the person's capacity to enter into and maintain a friendship one can see that there are indeed limits to such a person's ability to be a friend.

The same kind of thing holds with respect to positions in the community. Anyone who is promoted in an organization and thus has to exercise authority over former peers, some of whom may have been friends, becomes aware of limits on his or her ability to maintain these friendships. To the extent that someone in the organization is a close friend, a superior is automatically liable to the judgment that any action taken with respect to that person is biased by the friendship. Since any position of authority is governed by the norm of impartiality or fairness in the treatment of all subordinates, the full exercise of one's inclinations as a friend places one at risk of conflict with the requirements of the office. We certainly do not mean to say that friendships between people who are at different levels within a hierarchy are impossible. Quite the contrary; we expect to find many instances of such friendships. That point is that the constraints of their social positions will necessarily and properly place some limits on the ability of these individuals to implement fully a friendship. In the case of the example just given, the person holding the position of authority must, of necessity, either place some limits on assisting a friend within the organization, or run the risk of being seen as indulging in cronyism or favoritism. The latter will certainly affect organization morale and perhaps this person's tenure in authority. When faced with these kinds of potential conflicts, individuals will make choices, expressive of their own personal characteristics. A person valuing loyalty over appearance may favor friends and punish enemies within the organization. A person valuing fairness and impartiality above all may be evenhanded to the point of coldness in dealing with friends within the organization. Thus, it is a fundamental conceptual point in Descriptive Psychology that personal relationships are constrained in their realization by the personal characteristics of the participants and by the statuses that they hold within the community. Because the individuals involved in personal relationships are persons and have freedom of choice, the exact ways in which these general constraints will be expressed in specific relationships is an empirical matter.

A major implication of the principles discussed above is that, in the variety of real world relationships that count as friendships, one will find relationships which, to varying degrees, will be deficient with respect to the qualities listed in the paradigm case of friendship. In some instances, the friendships will be one-sided. For example, one member of the friendship may treat the other person as a genuine and perhaps close friend, but, the second person may treat the first person more like a social acquaintance. This different understanding of the relationship can be detected by assessment procedures that will be described later in the paper.

Another major type of variation in relationships that will still legitimately count as friendships are in the degree to which one or both of the partners may, for example, respect each other. Some ground floor, some minimal level, or threshold value of respect seems essential to call the relationship a friendship at all—in contrast to, say, a mutually exploitive relationship or a relationship of convenience. But friendships do clearly exist in which the other person cannot be counted on to exercise good judgment. For example, we may think that, while our friend Joe is a great guy, he is a fool in his choice of women. If he is indeed a friend, one does not walk away from him because he has bad judgment in his choice of women, although one might arrange not to spend time with him when he is in the company of his poor choices. The friendship one would have with Joe is constrained by his poor judgment in that area and, in this example, the effect of that is to provide Joe's friend with a reason not to associate with him when he is out with women. Likewise, specific friendships may be deficit in any of the nine subrelationships identified in Table 1, but still remain genuine friendships. But, this state of affairs raises the question of to what degree can one treat a relationship as a friendship when it is deficient to a significant degree in several subrelationships?

Two reminders are important in this context. The first one follows from the famous philosophical dialogue on whether a specific game counts as an instance of chess. In that dialogue, the presupposition of the example is that the Queens have been removed and that no pieces are allowed to make the moves permissible to the Queen. The question then is "Is it a game of chess or not?" And the outcome of the dialogue is that one has good reasons for treating it as a game of chess and also good reasons for *not* so treating it. Whatever one calls the specific game would be misleading unless qualifications were stated. The same state of affairs holds for social relationships that are "friendship-like." For some of these cases, we have existing descriptive phrases that embody the qualifications: "They are drinking buddies" (but not really friends); "They are business friends" (but not intimate or personal friends); or

“They are untied by their common hatred of a third person” (but whether they will be friends when he is gone is entirely open to doubt.) The implicit but usually unspoken qualification is in parentheses. For others, we have to make the qualification explicit if we do not wish to mislead our hearers.

The second reminder is that, in the strict sense, the list of relationships that characterize the paradigm case of friendship are not to be understood as components, aspects, or building blocks out of which one can create the fundamental relationship. The relationship is itself primary and the subrelationships listed in Table 1 are a language for describing and clarifying ways in which instances of friendship may go wrong or be deficient with respect to the paradigm case of friendship. A PCF starts with a genuine instance—not with components.

In what sense is the PCF of friendship multidimensional?

Because the paradigm case formulation of friendship (and of love) presented in Table 1 consists of a list of subrelationships, it is easy to think that the model being proposed is a multidimensional model. While it is conceptually multidimensional, it would be misleading to assimilate this to the standard statistical sense of multidimensionality in which the dimensionality is derived from multidimensional scaling or factor analytic procedures. The multidimensionality at issue in our formulation is conceptual, and no presupposition is made that each of these dimensions will be statistically independent of the others. Indeed, one would expect that there would be a strongly positive intercorrelation among all of the dimensions associated with friendship in our Table 1. Then what is the force of saying that this is a multidimensional model?

The subrelationships identified in Table 1 are to be understood in the following sense. They constitute a language that is available to members of the community for making distinctions within and between relationships and particularly for noting in what respect and in what way a particular relationship has gone wrong and in what way a desirable state of affairs has been achieved. In this respect, friendship and love are similar to the concept of health—health being a notion which is difficult to identify by positive features but quite easily identified by deficits. The relationship language (e.g., trust, respect), that we are applying in the paradigm case formulations serve, in many cases, as disguised double negatives. For example, to say that Tom and Mary are friends but that their relationship is characterized by a lack of trust in the area of the opposite sex, is to say that their relationship lacks something that, in the paradigm case, it would have. And as we have commented earlier, if the deficit of the subrelationship is severe enough, it may call into question whether or not we should treat the relationship as a friendship

or love relationship at all. Clarification is a different task from analysis, particularly if analysis is understood to involve the breaking of a larger whole down into its component units; Trust, Respect and the other items listed in Table 1 are not components or elements. Despite the fact that we can independently identify trust in relationships and respect in relationships outside of the context of a friendship, in the context of the social reality of friendship, these dimensions are our means of categorizing how the normal, "healthy" relationship can succeed or fail.

Romantic Love Relationships

In the last decade, the study of romantic love and other intimate heterosexual relationships has come into its own within social psychology. A number of social psychologists and other behavioral scientists have made serious and sustained attempts to conceptualize the general domain of personal relationships or specific domains such as love or friendship. Among the more notable general conceptualizations have been those by Hinde (1979), Kelley (1979), and Levinger (1974, 1979). Among those who have devoted substantial attention to romantic love are Hatfield, Utne, and Traupmann (1979), Lee (1973, 1977), Murstein (1976, 1980), Rubin (1970, 1973), Schwartz and Merten (1980), and Walster and Walster (1978). In the area of friendship, the major theoretical formulations and associated research efforts have been made by Kurth (1970), La Gaipa (1977b, 1979) and Wright (1969, 1973). The growing work in this area has also been reviewed and systematized by Cook and Wilson (1979), Dickens and Perlman (1981), and Huston and Levinger (1978).

The paradigm case of romantic love embodied in Table 1 differs from friendship relationship in a number of important respects and yet shares some very important similarities. To highlight the areas of difference, we might begin with the first item of the Table, which is the notion of asymmetric eligibility or asymmetric status. Because a paradigm case of romantic love is a case involving members of the opposite sex, the individuals involved typically have different eligibilities. That is, one type of behavior on the part of a man will count differently than that same behavior would on the part of a woman. One of the most fundamental eligibility differences is associated with the structure of the male and female sexual anatomy. Wolgast (1980) argues that a range of predictable but not universal differences in how specific behaviors are counted in most societies follow from this anatomically rooted behavioral difference.

Just as the eligibilities of men and women lead us to count or interpret the same behaviors differently even in romantic relationships, there are,

likewise, similarities in eligibility. To be loved by the one who loves you counts as an affirmation of one's masculinity or femininity. (See Roberts, this volume, & Wolgast, [1980] for an extended treatment of "man" and "woman" as status concepts.)

Not every behavior of an individual in a romantic relationship is affected by sex-role eligibilities, but many are. It appears that no human society has failed to have some kind of double standard for men and women. Gender differences have been one of the community's fundamental status distinctions, but exactly which behaviors are treated as being appropriate to men or to women have varied enormously from society to society (e.g., Mead, 1935). To deal adequately with the question of change in the content gender identities would take us too far afield in this paper, but see the paper by Bernard (1981) on the topic. The "double standard" at the heart of sex-role differences provides some of the most apt illustrations of this point.

Some of the other important differences between romantic love and friendship may be seen in the contrast between Trust and Advocacy. The notion of Advocacy involves furthering or Championing another's interest. To champion another person marks that person as a special friend.

The notion of Giving One's Utmost to the lover when he or she is in need is deeply rooted in Western romantic folk tales. Both men and women lovers are eligible to do this—witness Heloise in the tale of Abelard and Heloise. A friend, however, is not expected to make such sacrifices, unless, perhaps, he or she is a *best* friend.

Of course, the most obvious difference between a romantic love relationship and a friendship lies in a cluster of subrelationships which collectively might be identified as the Passion cluster—Fascination, Exclusiveness and Enjoyment. Fascination can be seen as central to romantic love and deserves particular elaboration.

To be fascinated with another person is to be inclined to pay attention to that person even when one should be engaged in other activities. Fascination is thus a state that carries with it strong expectations about behavior, but it also involves appraisal or evaluation of the other person. The things or persons that fascinate one are those which one treats as worthy of attention, and while one may be fascinated with evil or with a perfectly horrible person, the positive fascination of love is equivalent to the appraisal of the person as worthy of one's attention to the exclusion of almost any other concern. Logically, fascinations are part of a sequence of states ranging in intensity from interest, to fascinations, to preoccupations, to obsessions (Ossorio, Note 4; White, 1964). When one is fascinated by another person, that person typically occupies one's thoughts; one wants to be with that person, wants to see him or her,

touch him or her, wants to be close to him or her, and one would be upset and disturbed if one were forced to be separated from him or her. A frustration of this fascination, which can occur because the fascination is not reciprocated by the other person or because the other person is unaware of the interest with which he or she is viewed, can intensify the state of fascination. In this respect fascination shares the logic of other emotional behaviors. If one cannot act on the impulse generated by the relevant appraisal, that is a causal condition for "feeling" the emotional state (Ossorio, 1966, pp. 52-53). To see a state of affairs as dangerous and yet not be able to avoid the danger is to be liable to feelings of fear (anxiety, panic, etc.). To see another as worthy of devotion and yet not to be allowed to express that devotion is to be liable to extreme despair; indeed one is likely to be lovesick.

Of course, the fascination may go wrong, as novels such as John Fowles's *The Collector* (1963) show us. One of the important social inventions for taming the emotional force of love was the provision for expressions of devotion in song, contest, and heroic deeds without having these expressions necessarily disturb the marital partnerships of the participants. Such inventions socialize the unruly beast of passion and incorporate the expressions of fascination into a stable social order.

Fascination provides the conceptual resource for understanding phenomena such as the tendency noted by Rubin (1970) for lovers to spend more time gazing directly into each other's eyes than do nonlovers. It also provides the conceptual foundation for understanding the findings of Tesser and Paulhus (1976) that the number of thoughts and the amount of time spent thinking about the other in a dating relationship are predictive of the development of a love relationship.

Fascination is also a conceptual resource for understanding how one can be miserable and dejected in love yet quite unwilling to give up the object of love. It works something like this: Because fascination involves placing a value on the other person, nonreciprocation is, of course, frustrating; one may be extremely unhappy and miserable because of the unrequited love, but also reluctant to give up the object of one's love. The relevant general principle is that people do not choose less behavior potential over more behavior potential (Ossorio, Note 5). Having a love relationship involves a greater behavior potential than not having one. Hence, one does not give up easily, even when one's love is initially rejected or unreciprocated. Conceptually, fascination appears to be akin to what Rubin (1970) has identified as "absorption" in his analysis of romantic love.

Another major subrelation that is essential to understanding romantic love is that of Exclusivity. The notion that romantic lovers form a special two-person community has been well explored by Roberts (1982) and

by Slater (1963). The fundamental notion in this case is that each lover would be upset, indeed feel betrayed, if his or her loved one had the same relationship to someone else that he or she has to him or her. When the relationship is going well exclusivity provides the reality basis for the subjective experience of having a special relationship to the loved one, for the sense of almost limitless power that lovers feel—the sense that they can accomplish anything and overcome any adversity just because they are true lovers.

When it goes wrong in the sense of becoming excessive, exclusivity provides part of the basis for possessiveness, jealousy, and excessive dependency on the other. When one becomes preoccupied with the possibility of losing the loved one—either to death or to a rival, one then has the condition for the emotional behavior of jealousy and for exhibiting either possessiveness or overdependency. Thus, exclusivity has both its bright side and its dark side (symbolized by images such as “the spider’s web” or “blind mazes”).

The statement of the Exclusivity subrelationship has to be made with care or it can be made too strong. That romantic love, in its archetype, is a two-person exclusive relationship does not at all prevent individuals from (a) being uncertain about whether they love Tom more than Harry or vice versa, or (b) from wishing that it were possible to love both equally well and to live together in harmony. Indeed, one of the themes of the unconventional world in life and in fiction is the possibility of nonpossessive love. Rimmer (1966, 1968) has used fiction as a vehicle for presenting notions of nonpossessive sexual freedom. And, the literature of alternative life styles and communes make it clear that many have tried some sort of experiment in multiple-partner emotional and physical intimacy. John Irving’s *The 158-Pound Marriage* (1974), shows some of the psychological difficulties of such relationships, as does his *The World According to Garp* (1978). If one can truly free oneself from the passion of exclusivity, then the type of love relationship appears to be transformed into something akin to brotherly love or friendship, it is not merely romantic love minus possessiveness.

Enjoyment of each other’s company is the third element of the cluster of subrelationships that marks the passions of romantic love. It is also, however, a conceptual property of friendships. In both relationships, enjoyment of the other’s company functions logically as a way of designating the relationship as an intrinsic one, that is, as one needing no further explanation for questions such as, “Why do they spend time together?” than “They are friends, or they are lovers.” In either case, the answer could be elaborated for someone who needed an elaboration by, “Well that means, among other things, that they enjoy each other’s company.” Such enjoyment, however, must be construed as dispositional

rather than as occurrent; for it is not incompatible with being very angry or upset with each other on a specific occasion.

The use of enjoyment as an explanation-stopper is relevant to the distinction that Clark and Mills (1979) have made between communal and exchange relationships. Both love and friendship would count as communal relationships; for, in them, one does not participate in the relationship for what one can get out of it. If the members of the relationship participate in it because they need emotional support, economic assistance, an athletic partner, and so on, then one has, respectively, mutual support dyads, partnerships, or teammates—but not friends or lovers. Indeed, it is a fundamental violation of either of these relationships to exploit one's friends or one's lover for other ends.

Two conceptual points need to be made. What are the implications for a relationship when one or more members no longer finds any joy in it? And, it is possible to have love relationships that are not characterized by enjoyment of each other's company—at least initially? The first question may be dealt with by an attributional analysis or, as is designated within Descriptive Psychology, by an examination of possible status assignments available to the describer. In effect, the question for a participant in a relationship which he or she no longer enjoys is "Why not?" One explanation is that the person raising the question has changed. Either (a) he or she is in a temporary state that prevents his enjoyment, or (b) he or she no longer finds the kinds of things that they have done with the other interesting or enjoyable. This latter case is the general case of growing or maturing beyond the other person. When the explanation for the change is attributed to the other person there are also two general possibilities. Either (a) he or she has undergone some externally induced change in his personal characteristics—such as an accident, a mental breakdown, or a severe disappointment in life—that makes them no longer good, enjoyable company; or (b) one has just discovered what the other person is really like, and hence discovered that he or she never really was the kind of person that one would have for a friend or for a lover. The latter attribution follows the logic of status degradation ceremonies.

As an empirical matter, one would expect that relationships in which the members no longer find each other's company enjoyable would be vulnerable to dissolution, but if the person makes either a self status-assignment to his own temporary emotional states or a status-assignment to factors beyond the other person's control, then the relationship could very well survive such joylessness.

The theme of love without initial enjoyment of each other's company has attracted many talented writers of fiction. Among relevant cases are Robert Graves' classic "The Shout" (1929), Maugham's *Of Human Bondage* (1915), V. S. Pritchett's "Blind Love" and his "Noisy" sequence

in *Selected Stories* (1979), and Isaac Bashevis Singer's "The Witch" in *Passions* (1976). Conceptually, we would treat these cases as transformations of the archetypal paradigm case in which the Enjoyment sub-relationship has been deleted. With Fascination and Exclusivity still operative, one generates all the passion one needs to deal with these fictional, and other real, cases of initially joyless love.

Relationships and Behavior

A relationship is a particular state of affairs—one which conveys information about how two or more persons or objects are connected. As such it is *not* merely a summary of prior behaviors among the participants, for relationships guide our expectations about what kinds of behavior the persons will engage in, and, given an appraisal of what their relationship is, that appraisal provides the context within which some behaviors are seen as violative, others as natural expressions of the relationship, and still others as neutral. Ossorio has codified the implications of this general point in his Relationship and Relationship Change Formulas, originally formulated in Ossorio (1967/1981) and generalized in Ossorio (1970/1981). The formulas give us the resources for explaining social behavior, and for formulating accounts both of why the expected behaviors fail to occur and of why a particular relationship changes in the direction that it does.

Construct Validation

The approach taken in the empirical studies to be described next is generally that of demonstrating that individuals who are asked to describe various types of existing personal relationships will describe them in ways that follow directly from the conceptual distinctions that we have presented in Table 1. Thus, our assessment procedures which consist of relationship-descriptive statements, are being subjected to a test of the adequacy of the items and scales to reflect the conceptualization. If the scales are adequate to the general task of describing friendship and love relationships, then certain patterns of results should occur. Rather than tediously repeating the implications of our conceptualization here, we shall build our statement of expectations into the results section and return to the issues of the adequacy of our conceptualization and our assessment procedures in the discussion section.

METHOD

Three separate studies were conducted, varying in sample composition, procedures, and explicit purpose. The first two studies used the same assessment procedure—the 74-item Relationship Rating Form (RRF) and

involved the same task—rating up to six individuals with whom the respondent had one of six possible relationships. In Study 3, a short, modified version of the RRF was used, and the participants rated individuals with whom they had only one of two relationships.

Studies One and Two

Participants

One hundred and fifty persons, 95 women and 55 men, participated in these studies. Approximately two thirds were students who received course credit for their participation, and the others were members of the community recruited through social networks. More than one third were over 25 years old. They volunteered for a study of social relationships which they knew would deal with their "friends, acquaintances, and romantic partners." Each participant was asked to produce a list of close friends defined as "people you can count on to reciprocate your feeling." Each person was also asked to list some people with whom he was on friendly terms, but who were not friends; to list former friends, and to list his spouse, lover, or steady dating partner. Thus, participants identified real people with whom they had relationships that could fall into one of six categories: spouse/lover; best friend; close friends: same sex; close friends: opposite sex; former friends; and acquaintance (with whom they had friendly relations). Not all subjects had relationships falling into all six categories, but the typical participant had at least three or four of the six relationships. One hundred and fifty close friends of the same sex were rated: 119 best friends; 123 acquaintances; 75 close friends of the opposite sex; 73 spouse/lovers, and 110 former friends. Sixteen best friends were found also to be either spouses or lovers and were transferred to that condition for all subsequent analyses. Preliminary data analyses indicated that the minor procedure variations in these two studies did not lead to differences in the results; consequently participants are combined into one group for all analyses reported in this paper.

Relationship Rating Form

Each participant was asked to describe each relationship on a 74-item rating form, with items derived largely from Kelling's (1972, 1979) study. Sixty-seven of the 74 items were grouped conceptually into 16 scales relevant to the subrelationships identified in the paradigm case formulation of friendship and love. Because of the length of the task, some subrelationships were not studied in these two samples. Sexual intimacy was not assessed, nor was status equality.

As can be seen in Table 2, Cronbach's alphas ranged from .57 to .96,

Table 2. Scale and Global Scale Alphas and Stabilities for the Relationship Rating Form in Studies One and Two

<i>Scale</i>	<i>Items</i>	<i>Alpha^a</i>	<i>Global</i>	<i>Alphas^a</i>	<i>Stability^b</i>
Acceptance	4	.80			
Respect	2	.70	Viability	.91	.59
Trust	5	.83			
Enjoyment	2	.88			
Exclusiveness	7	.82	Passion	.94	.67
Fascination	3	.89			
Mutual Assistance:					
Given	9	.96			
Receive	9	.96	Support	.98	.73
Mutual Advocacy	2	.94			
Give the Utmost	4	.94			
Understanding	5	.84			
Confiding	5	.89	Intimate	.79	.82
Spontaneity	3	.57	(not in		.70
Mutual Love	2	.96	global		.59
Stability	2	.69	scales)		.42
Success	3	.94			.54

^aStandardized item *alphas*.

^bGuttman split half coefficient.

all of which indicate an acceptable degree of interitem correlation. A Gutmann split-half coefficient was used to estimate test-retest stabilities. These were based on one relationship (either a Close Friend or Spouse/Lover) which 27 of the participants rated again three weeks later. These ranged from .42 to .82 (Table 2). Data from other studies using the RRF suggest that the stabilities of these scales are somewhat underestimated by allowing the participants to select one relationship for rerating. It seems that the participants tend to pick (a) the person they like the most and (b) the person who is most on their minds. Such a selection tends to reduce substantially the variance of the ratings, and hence to underestimate the stability of the ratings.

In Study Two, the relationship assessment device also included questions concerning common activities engaged in with the person rated, experience with violations or betrayal of the relationship, and items related to Wright's (1969) model of friendship. For love relationships, corresponding information was obtained on the duration of the relationship, commitment to marriage, Rubin's (1970) love and Liking scales and self-reported behaviors that are potentially destructive to the relationship. Only some of these data will be reported here.

Global Scales

Studies One and Two

As a data reduction measure, these 16 scales were combined into 4 global scales on the basis of conceptual similarity and interitem correlations. Acceptance, Trust, and Respect were combined into a single Viability Scale; Enjoyment, Exclusivity, and Fascination into a Passion Scale; Understanding and Confiding into a single Intimacy Scale; and Mutual Assistance given or received, Advocacy, and Willingness to Give the Utmost, were collapsed into a single Support Global Scale. As can be seen from Table 2, standardized item alphas ranged from .79 to .98. The Spontaneity, Mutual Love, Success, and Stability Scales were retained in their original form.

Study Three

Participants were 93 students (56 women and 37 men) in an undergraduate course on the Psychology of Marriage who agreed to describe their relationships with one friend and one lover (either a spouse or a steady date, either current or past). The relationship scales were typically reduced from three to four items to two, and several new items and scales were introduced. The major changes were the addition of two-item scales for Alter Ego, Good Influence, a three-item Sexual Intimacy Scale, a modified version of the Mutual Assistance and Mutual Advocacy/Give the Utmost Scales. Items were also added to the Understanding Scale and to the Exclusiveness Scale, and scales dealing with Conflict, Ambivalence, and Maintenance of the relationship were derived from work by Braiker and Kelley (1979, pp. 152–153). The alphas for these scales are presented in Table 3.

For data reduction purposes, the same procedure of combining scales into global scales based on conceptual similarity and interscale correlations employed in Studies One and Two, was also used here, reducing the number of dependent measure from 19 to 10. Fascination, Exclusiveness, Enjoyment, and Sexual Intimacy were combined into a single Passion Scale. Acceptance, Trust, Respect, and Good Influence were collapsed into a Viability Scale. Alter Ego was added to Confiding and Understanding to form an Intimacy Scale. Revised Mutual Advocacy and Give the Utmost Scales were collapsed along with the general Mutual Assistance scales into a Support Scale. However, the Stability, Spontaneity, Ambivalence, Conflict, Maintenance, and Success Scales were left unchanged for data analysis purposes. Standardized item alphas for the aggregate scales, ranging from .66 to .91, are given in Table 3.

Table 3. Scale and Global Scale Alphas for the RRF in Study Three

Scale	Items	Alphas ^a	Global	Alphas ^a
Acceptance	2	.68	Viability	.66
Good Influence	2	.87		
Respect	2	.59		
Trust	2	.64		
Enjoyment	3	.81	Passion	.91
Exclusiveness	3	.74		
Fascination	1	—		
Sexual Intimacy	3	.96		
Understanding	4	.72	Intimacy	.79
Confides	2	.73		
Alter Ego	2	.84		
Mutual Assistance	4	.73		
Mutual Advocacy-Give	3	.91	Support	.84
Utmost				
Spontaneity	2	.59	(Not in Global Scales)	
Stability	2	.66		
Success	2	.74		
Conflict	2	.51		
Ambivalence	4	.63		
Maintenance	3	.71		

^aStandardized item *alphas*.

RESULTS

Comparisons of the Relationship Types

Expectations

The conceptualization provides strong grounds for expecting love relationships and friendships to differ primarily in the Passion cluster; that is, in terms of Fascination, Exclusiveness, Enjoyment, and Mutual Love. In terms of the Global Scales, the differences would be expected to appear in the Passion and Mutual Love Scales. Depth of devotion, as measured by the Global Support Scale, also should distinguish lovers from friends, but because degree of Support is probably a defining criteria for best friendships, Support should distinguish best friends from other friends. In addition to differing in degree of Support, best friends and close friends ought to differ in Intimacy (which consists of Confiding and Understanding items). All of the scales, however, except the Passion Scales, might be expected to distinguish among friendship levels or types.

Analysis Plan

The overall analysis was carried out in two steps. First, each relationship comparison was treated as a 2(relationship type) X 2(gender of subjects) repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance. There were eight dependent measures: six relationship scales, and two judgment scales (Success and Stability).

If the multivariate F was significant by Wilk's criterion, then an overall discriminant score was computed. Because the discriminant function weights are not robust, we used them only to weigh the scale means before summing them into the discriminant score. The scales having the largest weights contribute the most to the discriminant score, and would, therefore, also have the largest correlations with it. Thus, to obtain a robust measure of the discriminating power of these scales, each one was correlated with the discriminant score. Those having the highest correlations were the ones distinguishing the two relationships the most. First data are presented from Studies One and Two (in Tables 4–6) and then data from Study Three (Table 7).

Spouse/Lover vs. Friendship Types: Best Friend vs. Spouse/Lover

Forty-nine persons (18 men and 31 women) rated both of these relationships. The overall $F(8,39) = 28.95$, $p < .0001$. Neither the gender nor interaction effect were significant.

In Table 4, the means and correlations with the discriminant score for each scale are presented. With the experiment wise Alpha set at .006 (.05/8), the Passion, Support, Stability and Mutual Love Scales had sig-

Table 4 Means and Correlations with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales for Studies One and Two: Best Friend vs. Spouse/Lover Relationship

<i>Relationship Scales</i>	<i>Correlation with Discriminant Score</i>	<i>Relationship</i>	
		<i>Best Friend</i>	<i>Spouse/Lover</i>
Passion	.89*	7.02	8.17
Mutual Love	.41*	4.85	6.88
Stability	-.33*	8.01	6.86
Support	.27*	8.00	8.25
Viability	-.25	7.77	7.49
Spontaneity	-.24	8.13	7.84
Success	-.21	7.89	7.42
Intimacy	-.14	7.55	7.25

Notes: The higher the mean, the more of the attribute that relationship has. $n = 49$ per relationship.

* - $p < .05$.

nificant correlations with the discriminant score. Spouses and lovers had higher ratings on all these scales except Stability. Best friendships, then, were seen as significantly more stable than love relationships, but, as expected, were also less passionate, as well as lacking the degree of devotion found in love relationships. These findings are not surprising.

Close Friends of the Same Sex vs. Spouse/Lover

In general the results reported in Table 5 confirmed our expectations. There was a large overall effect for relationship type: $F(8,55) = 50.13$, $p < .0001$, for the 64 people (24 men and 40 women) who rated both relationships. Again, neither the gender nor the interaction effects were significant.

Consistent with our expectations, the Passion, Support, Intimacy, and Mutual Love Scales had significant correlations with the discriminant score. Spouses and lovers received higher ratings on all of these scales.

It seems safe to conclude that, among our subjects, close friendships between members of the same sex were distinguished from love relationships not only by romantic intensity, but also by degree of intimacy and sharing and by depth of caring and supportiveness of the other person. Both relationships, however, shared a strong foundation of trust, respect, acceptance, spontaneity, and stability.

Spouse/Lover vs. Close Friends of the Opposite Sex

Thirty-seven participants (15 men and 22 women) rated both of these relationships. Once again there was a strong effect for relationship type:

Table 5. Means and Correlation with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales for Studies One and Two: Close Friends of Same Sex vs. Spouse/Lover Relationships

Relationship Scale	Correlation with Discriminant Score	Relationship	
		Spouse/Lover	Close Same-Sex
Passion	.95*	6.98	4.14
Mutual Love	.69*	8.22	5.44
Support	.51*	8.18	6.99
Intimacy	.44*	7.23	5.74
Success	.24*	7.57	7.04
Stability	-.17	6.82	7.10
Viability	.05	7.55	7.31
Spontaneity	-.05	7.81	7.58

Notes: The higher the mean, the more of the attribute that relationship has. $n = 64$ per relationship.

* = $p < .05$.

$F(8,27) = 22.12, p < .001$. Neither the gender nor interaction effects were significant.

The pattern of significant correlations here is quite similar to that found between close friends of the same sex and lovers; except that opposite-sex friendships did not differ from love relationships in the judged degree of Success. These means and correlations are given in Table 6.

Friendship vs. Love: Summary

The common thread running through the contrasts between love relationships and friendship types is that participants consistently express more Fascination, Exclusiveness, Mutual Love, and Enjoyment of each other's company for their spouses and lovers than for their friends. In addition, love relationships are marked by more Confiding and Understanding, as well as a greater tendency to provide practical and emotional Support. Consistent with our expectations, differences in willingness to Support the other in various ways are less marked between spouses or lovers and best friends than between spouses or lovers and the other friendship types.

Only in the Spouse/Lover vs. Close Same-Sex Friendship contrast did Success distinguish the two relationships, with the love relationships being seen as clearly more successful. This may be due to a relative lack of Intimacy in the close same-sex friendships.

Neither judgments regarding the Viability of the relationship nor the Spontaneity scale distinguished friends from lovers in any comparison. These findings largely deal with descriptive contrasts between relationship types as well as construct validity. All scales performed in a manner

Table 6. Means and Correlations with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales in Studies One and Two: Close Friends of the Opposite Sex vs. Spouse/Lover Relationships.

<i>Relationship Scale</i>	<i>Correlation with Discriminant Score</i>	<i>Relationship</i>	
		<i>Spouse/Lover</i>	<i>Close Friends Opposite Sex</i>
Passion	.85*	6.93	4.22
Mutual Love	.60*	7.89	5.09
Support	.53*	8.02	6.47
Intimacy	.48*	6.94	5.19
Spontaneity	.19	7.75	7.27
Viability	.14	7.33	6.93
Success	.06	7.22	6.68
Stability	-.13	6.60	6.77

Notes: The higher the mean, the more of the attribute that relationship has. $n = 37$ per relationship.

* = $p < .05$.

consistent with our expectations. However, some parameters important to friendship and love relationships were not assessed in Studies One and Two. The third study provided an opportunity to deal with this problem and to introduce other important refinements in the procedure.

Friends vs. Spouse/Lovers: Study Three

The revised scale wordings and introduction of new scales in this sample (See Table 3) gave an opportunity for an independent check of the patterns thus far observed and also provided information about the usefulness of new relationship scales. Specifically, we expected the Global Passion Scale containing the sexual intimacy items to differentiate friends from spouses or lovers. We also hoped that the considerably shortened Mutual Assistance, Advocacy, and Give the Utmost Scales (when combined into a Global Support Scale) would continue to distinguish between friends and lovers. However, the addition of the Good Influence Scale to Viability Scale would not be expected to contribute to a differentiation between friends and lovers. The single scales—Ambivalence, Conflict, and Maintenance—were expected to yield significantly higher scores for spouses and lovers than for friends. The rationale was that love relationships, demanding greater commitment than friendships, provide much more opportunity for both conflict and doubt about the relationship to arise. Therefore, if the relationship is to continue, the partners would have to engage in a good deal more relationship maintenance activity than would be necessary for the friendship.

Of the 93 persons who participated in this study, 79 provided complete data consisting of rating for both a friend and a lover. Thus, only 79 participants could be included in the repeated measures 2 (relationship type) \times 2 (gender) multivariate analysis of variance. As in similar comparisons in Studies One and Two, the overall multivariate F for relationship type was highly significant $F(10,66) = 49.43, p < .0001$, while the gender and interaction effects again failed to reach significance at the .05 level.

Table 7 presents the means and correlations with the discriminant score for Study Three. As predicted, the Passion Scale, including the sexual intimacy items, differentiated markedly between the two relationship types, having by far the largest correlations with the discriminant score: .92. At a more moderate, but still significant, level of correlation were Ambivalence, Maintenance, and Conflict. As predicted, spouses and lovers had higher means on these three scales. Unexpectedly, however, the Global Intimacy Scale, including Alter Ego, had a significant correlation with friends receiving a higher mean rating. This is surprising, considering that in two out of three friend/lover comparisons in Studies

Table 7. Means and Correlations with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales in Study Three: Friends vs. Spouse/Lover Relationships

<i>Relationship Scale</i>	<i>Correlation with Discriminant Score</i>	<i>Relationship</i>	
		<i>Spouse/Lover</i>	<i>Friends</i>
Passion	.92*	7.89	4.21
Stability	-.48*	6.39	7.72
Ambivalence	.47*	2.91	1.60
Conflict	.36*	5.32	4.10
Maintenance	.26*	6.41	5.38
Intimacy	.26*	6.95	7.29
Spontaneity	-.20	7.50	7.75
Viability	.15	7.40	7.48
Success	.11	7.18	7.25
Support	.10	7.73	7.71

Notes: The higher the scale mean the more of the attribute that relationship has. $n = 79$ per relationship.

* = $p < .05$.

One and Two, spouses and lovers relationships had higher Intimacy scores. It may be the case that the effect was reversed in Study Three due to the addition of the Alter Ego items. This scale may be more prevalent in, and more appropriate to, friendships than love relationships, especially if the advice sought concerns how to deal with one's romantic partner. Finally, the finding of Study One and Two that best friendships are seen as more stable than love relationships was supported by similar findings in Study Three. Stability correlated significantly with the discriminant score and friends received higher mean ratings.

No other scales had a significant correlation. In the case of the Support Scale, the failure to correlate strongly with lover rather than friendship was not expected. It may be that our drastic surgery on this scale reduced its sensitivity.

Thus, with the exception of the weak finding for the Support Scale, and the reversal of the Intimacy effect, the major findings of the first two studies have been replicated in this study. The overall evidence for the construct validity of the assessment procedures is encouraging.

Comparisons within Friendship Types:

Best Friends vs. Close Friends of the Same Sex

If the research procedures adequately represent the conceptualization, the ratings of best and close friends of the same sex ought to differ most in two areas: Intimacy, as measured by the combined Confiding and Understanding Scales, as well as Support, since the ability to count on

the other, no matter what, is for many people the definition of a best friendship. However, all of the parameters, except those concerning romantic love, could be expected to distinguish the two relationships to some extent.

Ninety-five persons (35 men and 62 women) rated both a best friend and close friend of the same sex. The overall multivariate F was highly significant: $F(8,85) = 10.61, p < .0001$. Once again, neither the gender effect nor the gender by relationship interaction achieved significance.

As can be seen from Table 8, our expectations were confirmed. Support and Intimacy had the highest correlations with the discriminant score. All of the nonromantic scales discriminated the relationships, but so did Passion and Mutual Love. It may be that Exclusiveness and Enjoyment items in the Passion Scale are relevant to distinguishing Best from Close Friendships. When these two subscales from the Passion Global are examined separately, they, and only they, yield significant univariate F s. (Data are not tabled.)

Close Friends of the Same Sex vs. Close Friends of the Opposite Sex

Nothing in the concept of friendship requires us to expect differences in this comparison. It may be, however, that the realities of gender identity and status make friendship across gender lines more difficult, less enduring, and more likely to be disrupted by romantic involvements than friendships between members of the same sex. These possibilities make it important to take an empirical look at this contrast.

Sixty-three persons (33 men and 30 women) rated both a close friend of the same sex and one of the opposite sex. Unlike any other contrast,

Table 8. Means and Correlations with the Discriminant Score for Relationship Scales in Studies One and Two: Best Friends vs. Close Friends of the Same Sex Relationships.

Relationship Scale	Correlations with Discriminant Score	Relationship	
		Best Friends	Close Friends
Support	.82*	7.84	7.06
Intimacy	.80*	7.41	6.09
Stability	.66*	8.03	7.26
Passion	.61*	4.90	4.28
Success	.59*	7.70	7.07
Viability	.51*	7.72	7.24
Spontaneity	.36*	8.09	7.56
Mutual Love	.34*	6.62	5.61

Notes: The higher the mean, the more of the attribute that relationship has. $n = 95$ per relationship.

* = $p < .05$.

this time the multivariate F was non-significant and none of the univariate F s were significant. An examination of the means of the subscales indicates that, while no large differences exist, there was a consistent tendency for the same-sex friend to be rated more favorably than was the opposite-sex friend. Again, neither the gender nor interaction effect was significant. This clearly suggests that gender of the other does not make a dramatic difference in the quality of a friendship once one has been established.

Opposite-sex close friendships appear to be less frequent in this sample than same-sex close friendships; only 56% of men who had a close male friend also had a female friend, and only 44% of the women reported having both close male and female friends.

Overall Summary

When asked to describe and evaluate existing personal relationships, the participants in these three studies described their Spouse/Lover relationships as involving more Passion, Mutual Love, and practical and emotional Support than they saw in even their best friendships. But such friendships were taken to be more Stable. Love relationships, when compared to Close Friendships (where the persons involved were not best friends) were seen as involving not only more Passion and Support, but also more Intimacy (Confiding and Understanding) and more Acceptance, Respect, and Trust. Same-sex friendships and opposite-sex friendships were remarkably similar to each other on all relationship scales and in the pattern of contrast with both lover and best friendship relationships. Thus, the general findings are robust across both same-sex and opposite-sex relationships and across types of friendships.

The modifications of the assessment procedures introduced in Study Three demonstrated that even fairly brief scales could make the same kinds of distinctions among relationship types, with the exception of the Support Scales, where the radical surgery involved in cutting from 24 to 7 items and the rewording of some items seems to have been detrimental to that scale. The addition of scales derived from Braiker and Kelley's research (1979) added considerably to the specification of the contrast between Love and Friendship relationships by showing the importance of conflict, ambivalence, and relationship-maintenance behaviors.

DISCUSSION

Three issues deserve some attention now. In light of these data, and of other existing data: (a) How adequate are the proposed conceptualizations of friendship and romantic love? (b) How promising is the assessment strategy for dealing with aspects of personal relationships of interest

both to practitioners and researchers? and, finally, (c) In what respect is our approach, rooted in Descriptive Psychology, genuinely different from previous formulations.?

Conceptual Adequacy

The fact that a conceptualization is preempirical or nonfalsifiable on the basis of empirical evidence does not, of course, free one from the fundamental question of adequacy. In this regard, the questions may be put as follows: Does the concept of romantic love proposed reflect the phenomena historically recognized under the label "romantic love," and likewise for "friendship?" Is the statement of the archetypal concept clear, and are sufficient guidelines provided to distinguish among borderline cases?

We want to acknowledge a difficulty with our preliminary conceptualization. As we see it now, we gave too little emphasis to Authenticity and, perhaps, too much to Spontaneity. To be spontaneous is to do what one feels like doing, but to be authentic is to be genuine in one's relationship to the other and to treat the other as a unique person rather than as the holder of a position or the performer of certain roles. One can engage in spontaneous behavior deliberately, but authenticity is a relationship that cannot be achieved by deciding to be authentic. Either one is or one is not authentic in one's behavior. La Gaipa's items (Note 7) seems to be an excellent approximation of the relationship state of Authenticity. And, in our view, Authenticity is a subrelationship that is central to personal relationships, such as love and friendship, in contrast to impersonal relationship. Without Authenticity, the opportunity afforded by intimacy is not an opportunity to get to know another person. It is a sham, and what is learned will only incidentally and as a matter of luck be genuine knowledge. Suttles (1970) made a similar point very well in his treatment of friendship, and both Wright (Note 8) and La Gaipa (1977b) have recognized the merit of this position. La Gaipa currently uses four items in his assessment of Authenticity:

"Does not try to take advantage of me or 'use' me."

"I can drop all defenses and be myself with him/her."

"More interested in me as a person than in what I can do for him/her."

"We can express differences of opinion without it coming between us."

We are currently using these items in our research.

La Gaipa's empirical work has shown that, while Authenticity is not of much concern to 9-year-olds when describing their friends, that it is of growing importance to 13- and 16-year-olds (1979), and, that among college students, decreases in attributed authenticity was a major cor-

relate of the termination of friendship (1977b, p. 254). The Authenticity scale was the second most discriminating scale in a contrast between friends and nonfriends (1977b, p. 256). All in all, the work of La Gaipa and his associates makes a very strong case for the psychological importance of Authenticity in personal relationships.

In the context of assessing the conceptual adequacy of this formulation, it is quite natural to ask, "Well, how many dimensions or subrelations are there really?" In our view, there is not likely to be any universally valid answer to this question for two reasons. First, because no limit can be placed on human inventiveness, it is entirely likely that the next generation will make relationship distinctions that we do not now make. Second, the number of conceptual distinctions that one finds it necessary to make in dealing with friendship and love relationships will depend upon the type of purposes that one has. For the purpose of predicting progress in courtships, one may do just as well with a single summative measure of love as with a multidimensional scale making the number of distinctions that we make here. Indeed, as both Murstein (1980) and Rubin (1970) appear to argue, that has been the case in their research contexts. On the other hand Smith (Note 9) has data, derived from Davis's Colorado Courtship Study, that shows greater predictive power (to some criteria of relationship progress) if Passion, Viability, and Degree of Intimacy are taken into account. And certainly in clinical and community contexts, where the clarification of difficulties is often at issue, one may need to use any or all of the eleven distinctions used by us in Table 1. Indeed, one may want to make distinctions that we have left unmade. For example, where is our loyalty scale? Surely loyalty is relevant to these personal relationships. While we do not argue that the conceptual content of a distinction between loyalty and support is already built into our assesement procedures, we do think our items dealing with the person's ability to "count on" the other in various contexts—which is included in the Support scales—captures much of the force of loyalty. But, and this is critical, the issue of how many distinctions need to be made for various purposes is an empirical matter. One has to show—with data—that the distinctions are of no particular use in one context or that insufficient distinctions have been made in another context.

Our own work with factor analytic reduction of the Relationship Scales is quite preliminary, but we are in a position to share some general impressions. We find that, if one combines observations from all the relationship types (i.e., across spouse/lover and the various types of friendship), one gets a very large first factor, accounting for as much as 85% of the common variance. If, however, one conducts the analysis within relationship types, then one gets four to six interpretable factors.

In this case, the first factor seldom accounts for more than 40% of the common variance. La Gaipa (1977b, p. 252) reports considerable variation in the number and content of factors derived from his friendship ratings. We anticipate that the factor structure of relationship scales will vary considerably with the same kinds of conditions that have been demonstrated to affect the magnitude of the correlation coefficient. Among these will be the precise population of relationship types included in the analysis, the number and type of relationship deficiencies in these relationships, as well as several technical variations among factor analytic procedures. It should be clear, however, that the multidimensionality of friendship and romantic love as personal relationships does not stand or fall on the results of factor analytic studies.

Empirical Adequacy of the Assessment Devices

Certainly the data from the three studies are encouraging on this general point. The major findings that should have been obtained, were obtained. Spouses/lovers were consistently rated as more Fascinating, Exclusive, Enjoyable than friends—even best or close friends—and this finding held both in same-sex and opposite-sex friendship. But, it would be disingenuous not to note the important limitations of our test of the instruments. First, the range of participants—while going beyond college sophomores—is not broad yet. Second, the ability of relatively uneducated persons to use these rating scales remains to be demonstrated. Third, more evidence is needed on the stability of the scale scores over time periods when relationships are unlikely to be changing. All of these points are being dealt with in work currently underway, some of which is already available in draft form (Davis & Todd, Notes 6 & 10).

Also, it would be desirable to have evidence that variations in the relationship scales that one would ordinarily interpret as reflecting variations in the quality of the relationship, are significantly related to other psychological variables such as overall life satisfaction or one's ability to withstand or handle stressful life events. Also, clinical interventions that are successful by other criteria ought to make predictable differences in relationships and thus in relation scale scores. Work currently underway by Davis and Cafferty (Note 11) addresses the former points but not the latter.

Relationship of This Formulation to Other Formulations

Any such review will have to be quite selective, for the relevant research literature has grown enormously in the last five years. We shall restrict ourselves to examining two major formulations in the case of

friendship and three in the case of romantic love which have inspired some data collection.

Theories of Friendship

Other than the excellent conceptual paper by Suttles (1970), the major positions that attempt to deal with friendship are those of La Gaipa (1977a, 1977b, 1979) and Wright (1969, Note 8). La Gaipa (1977b) identified his conceptual dimensions through open-ended interviews conducted with 150 participants from all walks of life. The 1,800 statements about the meaning of friendship that were obtained from these interviews were content analyzed and reduced to 152 themes. These themes were, in turn, rated by a panel of thirty judges according to whether or not each theme was "Definitely Essential" to "Definitely Not Essential" to four categories of friendship.

Ratings, then were obtained from different groups of subjects responding to the four [categories] of friendship. Separate factor analyses were conducted (La Gaipa, 1969) using the principal component technique with rotation to simple structure. A total of 11 factors was identified from the responses to the four levels of friendship. The eight major factors were: *Self Disclosure* ("feeling free to express and reveal personal and intimate information"); *Authenticity* ("openness and honesty in the relationship; being real, genuine and spontaneous"); *Helping Behavior* ("expressing concern for one's well being; giving help readily without being asked; providing psychological support"); *Acceptance* ("acknowledging one's identity integrity and individuality; not taking advantage of another"); *Positive Regard* ("providing ego reinforcement; enhancing one's feeling of self-worth; treating one as deserving of respect and as an important, worthwhile person"); *Strength of Character* ("striving to achieve and conform to the objective value system of the society"); *Similarity* ("possessing similar points of view; expressing agreement on controversial issues; possessing similar attitudes and interests"); *Empathic Understanding* ("interpreting accurately the feelings of another person; understanding how one really feels; really listening to what one has to say") and *Ritualistic Social Exchange*. (La Gaipa, 1977b, pp. 251-252)

Clearly there is a high degree of similarity between the relationship factors in our conceptualization and those discovered by La Gaipa and his associates. Our work was entirely independent of his during the first two studies, and so the similarity is a case of independent invention. Earlier in this paper we have acknowledged the need to reformulate our variable Spontaneity and bring it closer to his Authenticity. Now we want to raise questions about two of his factors that seem to us to involve conceptual difficulties of the sort that will lead to unclear empirical findings. The two factors in question are Strength of Character and Similarity.

The procedure that La Gaipa (1977b) used of having judges rate how essential an item is does not necessarily require the judge to make a

distinction between conceptual necessity and strong empirical correlation. It appears to us that, in both of these cases, the factors in question combine two or more conceptually distinct relationship qualities and that they include mixtures of some things that are clearly part of the concept of friendship and others which are not. The two factors which require theoretical clarification, in our view, are Strength of Character and Similarity. Let us examine the content of the four items currently used to assess Similarity.

"We share similar views about things that really matter in life."

"We have many common interests."

"Our personalities are compatible."

"I enjoy the time spent with him/her doing things together."

The first two items are clearly similarity items, but neither compatibility of personalities nor enjoyment of activities together are solely matters of similarity. So in our view, this factor mixes conceptually distinct relationship qualities—similarity of values, interests, and so on and the enjoyment of each other's company. Since the latter may well follow from important differences in values, attitudes or interests, it seems a conceptual error to combine these items. Why? Because data from ratings on these items leaves the degree to which judged similarity of interests and values is indeed a major correlate of friendships or of changes in friendship status and entirely open question. Because one would have difficulty engaging in mutual social practices without some similarity, it does seem to be implicit in archetypal friendships. But there is clearly a question about how to assess the role of similarity for studies which demonstrate that actual similarity in values, and attitudes has very little predictive power to criteria such as heterosexual relationship progress (Levinger, Senn, & Jorgensen, 1970; Rubin, 1974), or level or degree of friendship (La Gaipa, 1977b; Wright, Note 8). The appraisal of a relationship as involving significant similarities, in the manner of La Gaipa's first two items above, shows much more promise as an empirical predictor of relationship status or progress (La Gaipa, 1977b).

The difficulty that exists in the Strength of Character Scale, is a confusion between admiration items and respect items. The conceptual issue is this: Respect, in the sense of respecting the other's judgment, seems to be part of the concept of friendship, but admiration, because it is an attitude that involves inequality and social distance, does not. And, indeed it is interesting to note that this ambiguity may explain some of the failures of the Strength of Character Sale. Mean scores on it did not differentiate among best, close, and good friends, and they only marginally distinguished these three from social acquaintances (La Gaipa,

1977b, pp. 254–256). The “Strength of Character dimension showed less differences between most and least preferred friend than any of the other scales” (1977b, p. 260). Our conceptual point may be put this way: if two persons are friends, and they do not respect each other (to a significant degree or in most respects), that requires explanation. But, if they are friends and do not admire each other, that does not.

It should be clear, however, that in most respects we find La Gaipa’s conceptualization to be quite compatible with ours, and to find the wealth of data that he has collected over the last thirteen years to be, in all probability, the richest body of empirical information on friendship that exists anywhere in this world at this time. We have touched only on some very limited aspects of his work in this paper.

Wright’s Model

Paul Wright, like La Gaipa, has devoted a significant portion of his scholarly career to the understanding of friendship, primarily same sex friendship. His model has undergone two major revisions. In its original form (Wright, 1969), his criterion of friendship was the degree of voluntary interdependence, and friendships were taken to be established because of the degree of benefit in three general areas:

[1] Stimulation value refers to the degree to which one person (the subject) sees another as interesting and imaginative, capable of introducing the subject to new ideas and activities, and capable of leading him into an expansion and elaboration of his present knowledge and outlook. [2] Utility value refers to the degree to which the subject sees another person as cooperative, helpful, and in general, willing to use his time and resources to help the subject meet his own personal goals and needs. [3] Ego support value refers to the degree to which the subject sees another person as encouraging, supportive, nonthreatening, and, in general, capable of helping the subject feel more comfortable and maintain an impression of himself as a competent, worthwhile person. These values may be thought of as the direct rewards in a friendship. . . . (Wright, 1969:299)

An interesting conceptual feature of his early model was the maintenance-difficulty dimension. This dimension takes into account the fact that with some persons, one has to work hard at maintaining a relationship. Such relationships require more tack, acceptance, and patience than an easy relationship. The strength of the other friendship variables was typically found to be independent of the maintenance difficulty dimension (Wright, 1978). In our view, this is one way of systematically introducing a procedure to direct assessment of the constraints of personal characteristics on the realization of a friendship.

In his subsequent revision, two major steps have been involved. First, stimulated by the work of Kurth (1970) and Suttles (1970), he made a systematic distinction between friendship and friendly relations, and he

introduced a second criterion of friendship—personalistic interest in the friend (Wright, 1978). The second step involved the placement of his model of friendship in the context of a theory of the behaving person and of self-referent motivation (Wright, Note 12, 1978). From some very general principles of self-referent motivation, he derived an “investment” model of personal relationships. “The investment involves an expenditure of time, personal resources, and personalized concern. An investment also implies some sort of expected return or dividend. . . . The dividends from an investment of self in friendship include one or more of the following: an enhanced sense of individuality, facilitated self-affirmation, facilitated self-evaluation, and facilitated self-growth” (Wright, Note 12). These tend to be experienced as the direct rewards or benefits of friendship originally identified by Wright. In his final model, there are four benefits or values with self-affirmation being an added benefit. During the 1970’s, Wright has continued to refine his assessment devices and to collect data on topics such as the differences between men and women friendships. While the investment model of friendship is an advance over an exchange model in that it takes explicit cognizance of the long-term character of the relationship, it still appears to us to have the limitations of any analogy in contrast to a representation of the reality of friendships in terms of the phenomenon itself. An intended virtue of a PCF is that one can, by reference to its characteristics, directly give an account of what is special, deviant, or unusual about real cases and also account for the termination or dissolution of friendships.

Let us contrast a means-ends model and an intrinsic participation model to help see the limitations of Wright’s analogy. Investment is clearly something that one does in order to get certain returns—that’s the point of the activity. In contrast, one may, for example, play golf because a variety of extrinsic considerations such as wanting to meet new clients for one’s business, wanting to be one up on other players, etc., or one may play because one enjoys the game or finds it interesting and challenging. Enjoyment is not something extrinsic to the game that one gets by virtue of doing it, but rather enjoyment is the way we have of designating that one’s participation is intrinsic—done without ulterior motivation. Our paradigm cases of intrinsic motivation are games, expressions of emotions, consumatory activities, and play. Thus to formulate one’s account of why people become friends in terms of the rewards (benefits, dividends) that they get out of a relationship runs the risk of denying that they enter into the relationship in a genuine or authentic way. For if they act friendly merely in order to get friendly actions in return, regardless of their feelings or the other, then they are being inauthentic—not relating to the other as a unique individual but as a means to getting good feelings, intellectual stimulation, etc. In this regard,

Wright's model is self-contradictory. Empirically, Wright assesses the person-qua-person variable. Conceptually, it is not yet clear that he sees the pernicious quality of means-ends models.

With respect to the termination of friendships, his new model with explicit reference to self-conception does appear to make it possible for him to deal with the case in which a person remains a loyal friend despite the fact that he no longer finds that relationship stimulating or supportive. Such a person may well do this purely out of his concern for the kind of person he would be if he were to drop a friend merely because of his difficulty or the lapse in the quality of the relationship. His reasons for sticking by his friend then are self-referent in Wright's terms.

Thus, while Wright's assessment procedures get at aspects of friendship that are very important and while his model has been revised to incorporate more of what is fundamental to friendships, the tendency to present the model in investment terms and the lack of a clear criterion for distinguishing friendship and love leave his model short of the mark.

Love Relationships

Three quite different theorist's work will be examined briefly in this section: Lee (1976, 1977); Rubin (1970, 1973, 1974); Hatfield et al. (1979); Walster and Walster (1978); and Berschild and Walster (1974). Lee (1977) makes use of constructive ideal types for a "typology of styles of loving." We find his typology to be very interesting and to find some of the work that it has stimulated (Hatkoff and Lasswell, 1979) of intrinsic interest. But, in our view, what he presents is a typology of man-woman relationships—more elaborate than Robert's (1982) but of the same general sort. Lee's *Storage* seems very much like a person whose primary model or archetype for heterosexual relationships is friendship, and his *Pragma* seems very much like Robert's (1982) partnership model.

Lee's work is extremely provocative, for he gets at types of relationships that are both important and clearly recognizable as typical of man and woman relationships. Following the distinction that Littmann (1982) makes in her work on humor, Lee appears to present a mixture of conceptualization of various prototypes of man-woman relationships and an empirically testable theory about the kinds of persons who will choose whichever types without clearly separating the two. For example, in our view, nothing in the concept of romantic love or passion requires that the lover have an image of ideal physical type and be ready to fall in love with such a person at first sight. (In fact, it is interesting how variable the physical types can be to which the very same person is attracted at different times.) But, such an image appears to be very common among Lee's *Eros* type of lover.

Lee's *Ludus* appears to involve playing at love, and the lover's being

“high” on the experience of having another fall in love with him or her without the lover also becoming deeply involved. This is obviously not a mutual or reciprocal relationship. One can generate such patterns, formally, by deleting one or more terms in our paradigm case of romantic love. *Ludus* involves the deletion of exclusiveness and of authenticity. *Mania* involves the deletion of trust or advocacy (resulting in insecurity in the relationship) combined with an intensification of the state of fascination because the normal ways of expressing devotion are neither possible nor successful. This particular combination is a very destructive one, for it combines intense desire to possess the other with very great fear that one will not or cannot hold the other. Finally, one need only note in passing that *Agape* in its ideal type is not a personal relationship at all. For in it, one is merely granting to one’s “lover” the kind of acceptance or Christian charity that one would grant to anyone.

We hope that it is possible to see how, without additional examples, one can generate all of Lee’s conceptual types and yet keep clear about the difference between a conceptualization of types of man-woman relationships and a theory of what kinds of persons prefer which types of relationships.

Rubin’s (1970, 1973, 1974) formulation is, strictly speaking, a formulation of the attitude of romantic love. “Love is an *attitude* held by a person toward a particular other person, involving predispositions to think, feel, and behave in certain ways toward that other person” (1970, p. 265). Ossorio (Note 5) shows how the concept of attitude as it is traditionally used by social psychologists is a logical counterpart (on the subjective side) of being in a certain relationship (either with a person or with some other state of affairs). Thus, one would expect considerable similarity between an attitudinal analysis of love and a relationship analysis. (Indeed, the assessment technology of this study is equivalent in form to an attitude assessment.) But to start with the reality of being in a personal relationship draws attention to matters that one might not notice from the standpoint of subjective feelings. A critical omission, in our view, is Respect, which Rubin allocates to his Liking Scale. While one can have feelings of love (in the sense of feeling both passionate toward the other and wanting to support the other) one has, at best, a defective love relationship if there is no mutual respect between partners. (Of course, we all know that there are some number of cases in which one partner lives with or marries someone that they do not really respect. Thus, we are not legislating what can happen, but raising the question of what to call such cases when one finds them.) In our system, the answer is clear cut: it is a nonarchetypal case of love without Respect, but a case nonetheless.

In Rubin’s system, one can have cases of high Love scores and rel-

atively low Liking scores. But the Liking Scale is a very imperfect instrument for dealing with such questions because it is not systematically made up of items dealing with, say, respect, admiration, and the enjoyment of each other's company. A similar difficulty, which may have only limited practical significance, exists for the Love Scale. Rubin (1970) alternatively describes love as consisting of three aspects: needing, caring, and intimacy; or of "predispositions to help, affiliative and dependency needs, and exclusiveness and absorption." But, because the criterion of item retention in the development of his scale was a purely statistical one—once the pool of items had been created according to the judgment of a blue ribbon panel as reflecting aspects of romantic love—one is not in a position to say how much each of these aspects contributes to the prediction of any specific criterion. Our conceptual model, and associated assessment techniques, allow one to discover just what else is going on in relationships, say, that are high in passion but low in respect and to determine just how frequent such relationships are found in various ecologies. As they are now used, Rubin's scales do not permit such refinements. It may well be that the difficulties in predictive validity that Dion and Dion (1979) have noted, particularly the better predictiveness for high-love women, is related to this issue.

Lest our views of Rubin's work are taken to be entirely negative, it is important to note that his work brought the phenomenon of romantic love into a central focus within social psychology, and his resistance to formulations of love in purely reward/cost or exchange terms shows an important grasp of a central point that has escaped the third and final theorist under review.

Hatfield is a very talented experimentalist and an engaging popularizer (see Walster & Walster, 1978) who has a penchant for reductionistic theorizing. On the one hand, she proposes that passionate love is a condition that occurs when (a) a person experiences any kind of physiological arousal and (b) attributes the arousal to his or her passionate attraction to another person. This particular formulation goes far beyond what the data cited in its support shows, and involves an entirely unnecessary confusion of the concept of emotion and the concept of physiological arousal. Let us deal with the second question first. In Ossorio (1981b, 1981c, and 1976), the logic of emotional concepts is presented as a special case of the relationship formula. Using paradigm case procedures, it is possible to show that uses of emotional concepts such as fear, anger, guilt, and joy in (a) the explanation of actions, (b) in the attribution of current or temporary states, and (c) in various types of dispositional attributions all are derivable from the resources of the intentional action paradigm and the personal characteristics paradigm. None of these uses presupposes that P's recognition of his emotions

involve first recognizing that his physiological states have changed and then figuring out what emotion he has. The differentiation of emotions is accomplished by the distinctive appraisals of the world that go along with each emotion, that is, danger with fear, provocation with anger, wrong-doing with guilt. Whether or not physiological arousal is in fact a necessary causal condition for the attribution of an emotion remains to be established.

With respect to the case of love, the data collected so far is not clearly relevant—at most, it deals with initial attraction or sexual arousal, not with love—but if the studies were redone with some attention to assessing feelings of Fascination and other Passion items, then one might well find that, having any emotion aroused at the time that a person met someone who was attractive, would make it more likely that the person would describe him or herself as having passionate feelings toward that person. What is at issue, however, is whether findings about temporary heightening of self-attributed passionate feelings have any significance for the development of love relationships. That remains to be demonstrated.

A second kind of reductionistic error is found in Hatfield's formulation of the role of equity in personal relationship such as love relationships (Hatfield, Utne, & Traupmann, 1979). In this paper, she takes it as a starting point (see pp. 100–101) that people maximize outcomes (which is quite different from taking it that persons have reasons for what they do), treats hedonic (pleasure-seeking) and prudential (pain-avoidance) standards as the fundamental standards, and thus has to explain how one could possibly have either aesthetic or ethical standards—equity is, after all, an ethical concept. She treats it as a theoretical question whether or not considerations of equity are relevant to impersonal and personal relationship (104–106). But the question of fairness, or whether one is getting what one deserves out of a relationship, can obviously be raised in any relationship. The theoretical issue is rather whether or not personal relationships involve the kind of mental bookkeeping that Hatfield attributes to everyone in all relationships.

One way to see what is wrong with Hatfield's model of equity, as it applies to intimate relationships, is to imagine that one is in a relationship where one does consciously what she claims we really do unconsciously—namely, keeps a very careful record of our contributions to a relationship, in comparison to the other's contributions, and compares both of these to each person's rewards from the relationship. Anyone who really tries to do such careful bookkeeping will find that the activity of “keeping score” will undermine trust, the kind of taken-for-granted concern of the other's welfare, that is at the heart of such relationships.

Again, one has to be careful in how this point is put; it is not that such record keeping may not be useful for couples who have lost trust

in each other and need to reduce their concerns about exploitation by keeping track, nor that such bookkeeping may not be useful, for a while, when couples find themselves feeling exploited or unfairly treated by each other. Even in these cases, however, our experience suggests that it is not the act of keeping score, but rather the discussion of how things count to each other and the subsequent gain in understanding of each other's values and preferences, that is therapeutic. But this is an empirical point, awaiting research.

To make the conceptual point in another way: Anyone who has to keep track of inputs and outputs reveals himself not to know what a personal relationship such as friendship and love is all about and hence not to be a promising candidate for a genuine personal relationship.

Hatfield tends to treat the issue raised in this context as an empirically resolvable dispute. "Let's collect data on perceived inequities and see whether or not people who feel an inequity of either type—under-benefitted or over-benefitted—in fact try to restore the actual or psychological equity in the relationship." But Rubin and many other theorists who, like us, take the spontaneous willingness to make sacrifices for one's lover to be central to the archetype of romantic love, see this as conceptual issue. It concerns what one is willing to count as an instance of a love relationship.

Hatfield seems to take it that anyone holding this position is deceiving themselves because they think that they or anyone else can act unselfishly (Walster & Walster, 1978, pp. 134–135). But no one who holds the position (that being in love involves the disposition to give one's utmost when the other person needs it) is asserting that lovers do not have personal motivation. Rather the argument concerns the content of that motivation. In one case, to provide assistance and support because one loves the other is the motivation. That is different from providing assistance and support because the other person is going to repay you in some way. The latter is an exchange relationship, and one expects the contract to be met. The former is an intrinsic relationship governed by different norms. Both Clark and Mills (1979) and Schwartz and Merten (1980) have made similar conceptual points, the former illustrating the point with experimental data and the latter with an ethnographic study of one young woman's love relationship.

The relevant standard is that of fittingness or appropriateness. Thus, in a mutual love relationship, one expects the other to provide assistance without getting a *quid pro quo* just as one is willing to do the same thing. The fact that couples in such relationships are often concerned about whether they are being treated fairly by their partners or have problems in the give-and-get areas is not evidence that love relationships are really just cases of exchange relationships. Rather it is evident that in love

relationships, one can quite properly be concerned about whether the other person is reciprocating or whether the relationship is indeed a mutual love relationship. The socialization of both men and women includes cautionary tales about being taken advantage of by members of the opposite sex under the guise of being loved, so it does not require the convolutions of exchange models (with their characteristic defect of ruling out on *a priori* grounds ethical or esthetic motivation) to make concerns about equity in relationships intelligible.

The fact that, in a well-functioning love relationship one gets more when one also contributes more, is fully intelligible within Descriptive Psychology. The enhancement of one's behavior potential (or status) implied by genuinely being in a relationship with another who is a champion of one's interest, who is inclined to give the utmost on one's behalf, who treats one as worthy of devotion, and soon, shows why one would want to have such a relationship and be reluctant to give up even a defective case without a better opportunity. That many real world relationships have problems with respect to the equity or reciprocity of the contributions to the relationship should not blind us to the fact that such problems would not exist unless the participants held a concept of what ought to be, which made inequality of contribution a problem. One need only think of the different expectations that one has for parent-child relationships or teacher-student relationships to see that what relationship one has with the other person is part of the "defining context" of what determines one's judgment of fairness.

Summary of Discussion

In this section we have presented information relevant to the adequacy of this conceptualization to deal with the kinds of facts about friendships and love relationships that are well established. We have also presented information about the adequacy of the assessment techniques as measures of the conceptual distinctions that are relevant to the study of friendship and love. Finally we have compared and contrasted this formulation rooted in Descriptive Psychology with several formulations based on other presuppositions. In the case of general formulations of close personal relationships, the major difficulty is that of having a criterion for distinguishing different types of close personal relationships from each other; for surely love and friendship would qualify as close relationships and yet a conceptual separation of the two has not been clearly presented in the existing literature.

With respect to the models of friendship, two were reviewed. Those of La Gaipa (1977a, 1977b) and Wright (1969). La Gaipa's model appears to have one significant advantage—his conceptualization of Authenticity

and its associated assessment scale—and two potential defects in relationships to our model. The defects concern lack of clarity about two of his conceptual variables—Similarity and Strength of Character. In Wright's case, the defects of the model seemed more fundamental. His model has no criterion for distinguishing friendship from love, nor does it represent several critical phenomena of friendship, such as its being an intrinsic relationship rather than an exchange relationship.

With respect to models of love relationships, three were reviewed briefly—Lee's (1976, 1977), Rubin's (1970, 1974), and Hatfield's (Walster & Walster, 1978; and Hatfield, Utne, & Traupmann, 1979). Each model is seen as having significant defects that could be remedied by making use of the tools of the paradigm case methods and the distinctions involved in this model.

SUMMARY

A paradigm case formulation of friendship and love relationships has been presented. Nine subrelations (Table 1) were taken to be essential features of the archetypical concept of friendship and eleven of the archetypical concept of romantic love. The major conceptual contrast between friendship and love relationships was taken to lie in the contrast between the passionate aspects of love—particularly Fascination, Exclusiveness, and sexual desire—and the milder passions of friendship, on one hand, and the qualities of Support distinctive to the two relationships. Both relationships involve very significant Support of the sort shown by being able to count on each other in both practical and emotional ways, but in romantic love, the quality of Support is most appropriately characterized by "giving the utmost" and "being a champion or advocate" of the loved one, whereas in friendship such support marks only best or closest friendships from one's more ordinary friendships.

Three studies provided very encouraging support for the validity of the scales. The findings were examined in light of results obtained by other researchers, and the conceptualization was compared and contrasted to other views of friendship and love.

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