

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF PETER G. OSSORIO



VOLUME IX:

PERSONALITY AND PERSONALITY THEORIES

PERSONALITY AND PERSONALITY THEORIES



Peter G. Ossorio

DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY PRESS
ANN ARBOR

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First Printing, 2015

Originally published as Linguistic Research Institute Report No. 16, 1977. Linguistic Research Institute, Whittier, CA and Boulder, CO.

Published in Ann Arbor, MI
by Descriptive Psychology Press
3110 Bolgos Circle
Ann Arbor, MI 48105

ISBN: 978-1-891700-12-5

Manufactured in the United States of America. The Collected Works of Peter G. Ossorio

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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PREFACE TO THE SERIES

The Collected Works of Peter G. Ossorio

Peter G. Ossorio's works are unique.

In a trivial sense the same can be said of anyone's work—it is Jones' work, nobody has the same interests and style as Jones, thus the work is unique. But Ossorio's works are unique in the most profound sense possible and on several counts: in the breadth of his subject matter, the depth and rigor of his analysis, the power and clarity of his exposition, and the absolute coherence of his conceptual framework. Most importantly, they are unique in their significance. Peter G. Ossorio has accomplished what nobody else has seriously attempted: he has articulated a rigorous and coherent framework for understanding persons as persons.

If past experience is any guide, this claim will strike some as impossibly overstated, while others wonder why that would seem to be a worthwhile accomplishment. These reactions say a great deal about the intellectual climate of “behavioral science” in the twenty-first century—and they are substantially the same reactions which greeted Ossorio's first book, *Persons*, in the early 1960's. To those who doubt the possibility of such accomplishment, this series serves as a reality check: read the works and judge for yourself. The second group may be reassured by scanning the list of Ossorio's publications; you will discover that the concept of “persons as persons” includes behavior, language, culture, the real world, and the doing of science, psychotherapy, computer-based simulations, and many other significant social practices.

Indeed, Ossorio's work—which has become the foundation and core of a discipline called Descriptive Psychology by its practitioners—has had profound influence in a remarkably broad and diverse set of arenas. Directly, Ossorio has influenced the practice of psychotherapy and the conceptualization of psychopathology; the teaching of numerous aspects of behavioral science including personality theory, projective testing, and multi-cultural studies; the understanding of language, verbal behavior, and its technical implementations within computer environments; the practice and philosophy of science; the understanding of cultural differences and their implications; the technology of information storage, retrieval and utilization; and the creation of robots that exhibit increasingly the important characteristics of persons. Indirectly, through his students and colleagues, Ossorio has influenced many other fields; among them are the theory of organizations and the practice of influencing organizational culture; the development of computer software and artificial persons; economics and behavioral economics; the conceptualization of spirituality; the theory of consciousness, hypnosis and altered states; teaching of ethics and moral judgment; and much more.

Any editor of a series of “collected works” faces an obvious question: why collect the works? Why not let them stand on their own, as published? The answer in this case is simple to give: the large majority of these works have been published only in limited circulation working editions. These works, with few exceptions, were unpublishable within the “mainstream” of behavioral science when they were written. Ossorio was making, literally and intentionally, a “fresh start” on the doing of behavioral science, for reasons which he clearly articulates in *Persons* and elsewhere, and which have become increasingly cogent over time.

Metaphorically, Ossorio was talking chess to tic-tac-toe players, who responded, “That's all well and good, but does it get

you three-in-a-row?” Suffice it to say that the tic-tac-toe players decided what was worthy of publication in mainstream journals and books. And to extend the metaphor a bit further, it is evident that the mainstream of behavioral science has progressively realized that tic-tac-toe is a no-win game, and we perhaps should have been playing chess all along.

For those who have tired of the trivial insularity of tic-tac-toe behavioral science, the present series represents a substantive and substantial alternative.

Anthony O. Putman, Ph.D.
Series Editor
Ann Arbor, MI, 2015

Editor's Note

Descriptive Psychology is a living, growing tradition. Many of its most important concepts and methods—and much of its craft—were presented by Peter G. Ossorio only in spoken, interactive discourse in classes, seminars and talks. We are fortunate to have transcriptions of three seminars given by Ossorio in 1976 to graduate students, primarily in the Clinical Psychology program, at the University of Colorado in Boulder. Dr. Ossorio specified that these three – Seminar on Clinical Topics, Personality and Personality Theory, and Positive Health and Transcendental Theories—be included in his Collected Works.

Transcriptions of spoken materials published as books pose special challenges for both reader and editor. *Personality and Personality Theories* is more a class than a seminar, in that Ossorio presents well-structured material developed over a 12 year period. Ideas flow, but not in the orderly sequence of written material. This is simply the ordinary give-and-take of live, spoken intellectual discourse, which requires of the reader an engaged attention to keep track of what is going on.

One unusual convention: from time to time it proved impossible to decipher a word or phrase from the tape, even with Dr. Ossorio's help. In those cases we use the elliptical form ### to mark something said but not transcribed. Even when a good guess can be made regarding what is missing, the editor followed Ossorio's famous prescription for case formulation: Don't make anything up.

Anthony O. Putman, Ph.D.
Editor
Ann Arbor, MI, 2015

Acknowledgements

Publication of *Personality and Personality Theories* was made possible through the financial support of The Society for Descriptive Psychology and the dedicated volunteer efforts of some of its members, including: Anthony O. Putman, who edited, indexed and published the book, and produced the final printer's version of the manuscript; Lisa Putman, who proofed the final manuscript; C. J. Stone, who scanned in the original mimeographed manuscript and created an accurate and workable computer file version; and the late Mary McDermitt Shideler whose original recordings and transcriptions of Ossorio's seminars made these publications available to future generations.

Introduction

In 1964 Peter G. Ossorio was facing a very practical problem in teaching psychology students, and he decided to make a concerted effort to resolve it. As he put it in *Persons*, the book in which he launched that effort:

It was the classic problem of how to teach students something about the interpretation of diagnostic instruments, case histories, and psychological theories, and about the conduct of psychotherapy and laboratory and field experimentation, without requiring that they give up their own conceptual and theoretical preferences in favor of those of an instructor (hence the descriptive focus). A related goal was to accomplish this within a conceptually coherent, intellectually satisfying, and substantively adequate framework, which is something that our current semantically-oriented methodology and underlying-process frameworks do not, in any case, supply.

He called the core of his effort the Person Concept; over the next four decades it anchored the development of a powerful discipline that came to be known as Descriptive Psychology.

By 1976, when he offered the graduate level Personality and Personality Theories class transcribed in this book, Ossorio had developed and elaborated the Person Concept into a complex body of knowledge and practice. He had written three canonical books: *Persons* (1966/1995); *Meaning and Symbolism* (1969/2010); and “*What Actually Happens*”: *The Representation of Real World Phenomena* (1971/1975/1978/2005), all republished in this Collected Works series. He had produced a large number of papers and technical reports; most cogently, he had taught the Person Concept in dozens of classes and seminars both graduate and undergraduate. By 1976 the material in his Personality and Personality Theories class reflected 12 years of refinement. He knew how to present this material clearly and effectively, in its most precise form.

Personality theory presents an exceptionally difficult challenge to teachers of psychology. As Ossorio puts it in introducing the class to the participants:

The distinctive thing about personality and theories of personality is that this is one place, and probably *the* one place, where psychologists have tried to make sense out of the whole person. ... Everything else about the field is secondary to this, that it represents psychologists' efforts to make sense of the whole person. One of the things that follows is that it is probably the area in which there is most disagreement among psychologists, and the area in which our theories are most defective, least rigorous, and least satisfying from the point of giving us understanding. At the same time, they are the best we have. ...

Furthermore, the disagreement is not on peripheral matters, or matters of detail. The disagreement exists at the most fundamental level. So it isn't as though we were all pretty well agreed on the fundamentals, but there's a lot of leeway on the details or on the periphery. So again, the disagreement that exists is not a trivial matter. It's one of those facts that we're going to have to come to terms with.

In short, there is no agreement among theorists of personality regarding almost anything, importantly including what the term "personality" means. Accordingly, Ossorio provides a framework for understanding and comparing personality theories:

In regard to that question of "What does constitute a theory of personality?" I've provided you with a working criterion that is three questions. And I would say that any body of writing that provides a general and systematic answer to each of these three questions is a theory of personality. And the three questions are:

- (1) Why do people do what they do?
- (2) What are the differences among people? and
- (3) How do people get the way they are?

So those three elements are:

- (1) a universal account of behavior,
- (2) an account of individual differences or personal characteristics, and
- (3) a developmental theory—how do people get the way they are?

That combination is the minimum it takes to pretend to deal with the whole person and with all persons. So we'll examine these theories that we're going to look at, at least we'll start out asking what were their answers to these three questions?

Coming to terms with these questions, as it turns out, requires the full complexity of Descriptive Psychology. Accordingly, the first half of the class consists of Ossorio at the top of his game, teaching that full complexity to a group of attentive and highly motivated graduate students. If someone wants to know in depth and in detail what Descriptive Psychology is, this is the single best source for finding out. Essentially, reading these first 11 sessions is like auditing a master class with the creator of the discipline.

The second half of the class begins with a tour-de-force application of Descriptive Psychology. Ossorio leads the class through an exacting and disciplined exercise of describing a therapeutic interaction. Specifically they take on the interaction between Fritz Perls and "Gloria" in a famous video series in which Perls and two other notable therapists (Carl Rogers and Albert Ellis) are videotaped in an initial therapeutic session with the same client. Unpacking what Fritz and Gloria were up to, as it turns out, requires a masterful appreciation of how interaction between people works, along with a rigorous discipline to avoid "making things up". The same mastery and rigor are then applied to the case of Veronica, an example of psychopathology and therapy taken from a casebook. The power and value of Descriptive Psychology come alive as Ossorio and the class examine these interactions.

The remainder of the class articulates the personality theories associated with three classic figures in psychology: Sigmund Freud, Gordon Allport and B. F. Skinner. These chapters are problematic: In 1976 these theorists were well-known and studied, while in 2015 they are treated more as historical figures in psychology. Ossorio does a remarkable and thorough job of showing what sense these theories make; students of psychology in 2015 may find themselves wondering why they would care. But if you read these chapters as a way of seeing how Descriptive Psychology does justice to specific personality theories, you may find yourself in a position to make sense of theories you do care about.

And that, as a teacher of psychology students, was Ossorio's intent right along.

Anthony O. Putman, Ph.D.
Ann Arbor, 2015

SESSION 1

July 12, 1976

Okay, let's start talking about personality. The distinctive thing about personality and theories of personality is that this is one place, and probably *the* one place, where psychologists have tried to make sense out of the whole person. That's a classic phrase: "the whole person". Everything else about the field is secondary to this, that it represents psychologists' efforts to make sense of the whole person. One of the things that follows is that it is probably the area in which there is most disagreement among psychologists, and the area in which our theories are most defective, least rigorous, and least satisfying from the point of giving us understanding. At the same time, they are the best we have.

So in studying this topic, we're faced with certain constraints. There are a lot of theories, there's a lot wrong with those theories, so we don't want to just learn the theories as God's truth. On the other hand, they are what we have historically, so we have to get acquainted with them. Since there are objections to them, we also have to be good critics, examine them critically, and see what's good and what's not good about them; that is, where they succeed and where they don't succeed. To do that job, we need to address ourselves to the problem: what are the problems of understanding people? How could one go about understanding them? And finally, the issue of disagreement: one of the things we need to understand is why there is so much disagreement. And to give you an idea of the order of magnitude of that disagreement, in the text that I'm considering for next year in place of Hall and Lindzey, there are something like 50 theories of personality. And that's not all there is. That's just the better-known ones. So when I talk about disagreement among people who give theories of personality or in their overall approaches to people, it's not a trivial matter.

As a matter of fact, I would say that's one of the first facts that we want to have a good, hard look at. If you like to start off with the simplest, the most

obvious, and the hard facts of the matter, one of the hard facts of the matter is wherever you look, there's disagreement. Furthermore, the disagreement is not on peripheral matters, or matters of detail. The disagreement exists at the most fundamental level. So it isn't as though we were all pretty well agreed on the fundamentals, but there's a lot of leeway on the details or on the periphery. So again, the disagreement that exists is not a trivial matter. It's one of those facts that we're going to have to come to terms with.

Now, at that point, in larger scope, think about the fact that disagreements among people generally are the rule rather than the exception. You look around you and ask yourself, "How many things would everybody in the room agree with me about?" There may be nothing that everybody in the room would agree with you about. So part of the interest of the disagreement among our theories and theorists of personality is that they reflect something more general, namely, the disagreements and differences among people. So understanding those differences about theorists either will help us understand the more general differences among people, or we will understand those differences in theorists by first coming to understand differences among people generally.

If you start out to categorize the theorists and the theories, there are obviously a lot of different ways you can do that. Again, that's one of the brute facts. If you take a collection of things, there's always going to be some unknown and probably large number of different ways of classifying those things into different kinds. There's all kinds of ways of classifying theories of personality or approaches to personality. One of the ways that I think is illuminating and helpful is a simple two-by-two classification [Fig. 1].

	Method Oriented	Subject Oriented
Old	Freud	Allport
New	Skinner	Existentialists

This is the classification that I've used to select those particular theorists that we're going to spend some time on in class. I've picked the theorists to represent these four distinctions. The Old vs. New is obvious; we don't need to spend time on it. There is a difference in style, in the kind of ideas, in the way people thought today as contrasted with fifty years ago, and all you've got to do is compare two pieces of writing in psychology, and you can tell right off, just by looking at the kind of language, whether you're dealing with old or new. This distinction [vertical line] is one that has probably divided the field from the very beginning, and even today. I think many people would agree that it's the most important division in the field—the most important in two senses: one, in that this distinction is as fundamental as you get; the other is that if you think of the arguments that go on among theorists, the arguments over this difference are as bitter as anything that goes on.

Let me explain a little more about that distinction. The method-oriented theorist has a method, a way of approach, a set of procedures, a way of talking. For him, going through those procedures is the same as being scientific, so he gives first priority to the method and says, "Whatever we can find out using that method, that's what I will accept as what we know about people." Notice that that has nothing to do with subject matter. You can take that approach with anything. You don't need to know anything about a subject matter in order to take that kind of approach. And indeed, the people who operate that way make a point of that. They say, "The scientific method is not restricted to any given content. It is a universal way of acquiring knowledge. So our best bet in understanding people is to use this way, that works everywhere else, and apply it to people and see what kind of knowledge we can get. Whatever we get that way will be scientific knowledge."

The people who take the opposite approach say, "Our prime job is to understand people and to do justice to what we already know about them, as well as new things that we may discover. Therefore, if any given set of methods, including the so-called scientific method, does not give us that kind of understanding, so much the worse for the method. We'll stick with what we know, and remain true to the subject matter. And over time, we may hope that our methods will get better, but we're not going to give up the subject matter now just because we don't have the kind of methods that will give us access to them."

You can see why that kind of division would put people at each other's throats, because that division gets at the legitimacy of what each one is doing, and mostly what they will say is, "You're unscientific, and I'm scientific."

That's the kind of division there is in the field. Over and above just the division in the kinds of theories themselves, there is also the division about the approach, and what the proper approach to the understanding of people is. I said before that the disagreement exists in the most fundamental ways, so it isn't just a subject-matter disagreement, it's also a "what's the proper approach?" disagreement.

One of the reasons why disagreement presents a special problem is that part of what we learn, when we learn about scientific method, is that scientific truths are those about which all trained observers will agree. I'm sure you've heard that somewhere along the line. It's one of the first things you learn when you read something about scientific method. And yet here we have an area in which competent and trained observers don't agree. They don't agree on experimental results, they don't agree on appropriate methods, they don't agree on theories, and they don't agree on their descriptions. This is one of the reasons why some people have said, "Well, it looks like the scientific method just can't be used with people." If it depends on consensus, if it depends on everybody's agreeing, if that's essential to the method, and what you in fact encounter is that people pretty much disagree about everything, it doesn't look like you can use that method.

But then, that brings with it an embarrassing conclusion: then it doesn't look like we can have any genuine knowledge about it, either. You can see that when you try to understand people as a whole, you can get into trouble very quickly, like we just said. If you follow that line of thought, each step seems reasonable. It is reasonable to say, "If it's genuine knowledge, everybody ought to agree, or at least competent people ought to agree." And because that makes sense, it also makes sense to say, "Well, if you can't have that, then it doesn't look like you've got knowledge."

But then we also do know that we do have knowledge. There's nobody in this room who would honestly say, "I don't know anything about people." You obviously know something; in fact, you know a lot. So one way of being stuck is having knowledge and not being able to show that it is knowledge, not being to explain how there could be such knowledge, and yet you're sitting there having it. Then that may lead you to doubt whether you really do have it. Or it may lead you the other way, to start claiming a lot more knowledge than you have. If you start appealing to intuition, it's hard to know when to stop.

Well, you can see that there's problems all over the place. And these are problems that have bothered psychologists, theorists, methodologists,

critics, and consumers. By “consumers” I mean the people who read psychological theories and either believe them or don’t, and either use them or don’t. Most of us are consumers of psychological theories. Even if we didn’t learn them as a theory, we got them second-hand from somebody else, who learned it and believed and now thinks and talks and acts that way.

Let’s come back to the subject-matter: what about people? What kind of first steps can we make in understanding people? One common first step is to give a definition of the subject-matter. If we’re going to understand people, let’s have a definition of what is a person? Then at least we’ll know what we’re studying, and we can get on with it. Let’s do a painful exercise. Let’s take about five minutes and try to define a person, and see where we get. And I don’t mean just go through the motions. I mean try. The reason it’s worth trying is: if we could get one, that would be nice, it would be nice to have, so one of the first things we ought to do is try to come up with a definition of “person”. If we do, what kind of candidates do we have?

Q. *One problem is that it needs to include everyone from an infant to a senile old person, and everyone from someone who’s mentally retarded clear to a genius. Albert Einstein or somebody.*

P. Okay, did everybody get that? One of the first problems that hits you in the face is that there’s such a wide difference among people in their characteristics, from a newborn infant to an adult, from somebody who’s mentally retarded to somebody who’s a genius. People along those different ranges have very different characteristics. How then can you give one definition that applies to all people? You can see where that might make it look hard.

Q. *They’re all similar organisms interacting with their environment.*

P. Okay, one of the ways you can get around with that kind of detail is to go to something else, and here we have a candidate: “the result of an organism interacting with an environment”. Is that a definition? What more could we add?

Q. *Wouldn’t it be easier if we could go to a scientific fact, like when a doctor says that when the brain waves stop or the heart-beat ceases, there is no longer a person? Wouldn’t it be more comfortable to slip back into scientific—*

P. Yeah, it would. The suggestion was: “Wouldn’t it be more comfortable to appeal to scientific facts, in the same way that we appeal to the physicians to tell us when somebody is dead, because he says that when the

brain waves stop, or when they get totally disorganized, then the person is dead.” Couldn’t we do the same thing sort of at the other end—like when do you begin having a person? And then we would appeal to the geneticists or the embryologists or somebody like that. How would we know if we had a good definition? Suppose he said, “You’ve got a fertilized egg, as soon as it’s fertilized, it’s a person.” That would leave us exactly with the first problem, namely, how does that help you since it still allows for all of that variation? And normally a definition will get you out of that problem.

Q. *Maybe there’s no such thing.*

P. Beware of anything that leads to that kind of conclusion. As a matter of fact, one of the classic forms of argumentation is to start with a supposition and pursue it, and at some point you say of the consequence, “But that’s nonsense, so I know that my assumption wasn’t true.” When you get a line of thought that ends with “there are no people”, about that time you say, “Let’s go back to the drawing board.” If you come to the conclusion that there are no people, that there’s no such thing as behavior, that there is no knowledge, any of these drastic conclusions—you just go back to the drawing board, because you know that something went wrong somewhere.

Q. *What I meant to say is, maybe it’s an artificial separation. Because of our ability to be aware of ourselves, we make—maybe we’re just partitioning a certain phenomenon from the rest of nature, and that’s an artificial discrimination we’re making with our ability to be aware of ourselves.*

P. That artificial discrimination is something that has been used by a lot of people as *the* defining characteristic of people, namely, that they are aware of things, in contrast to chairs, atoms, fetuses, etc. That that is the difference between people and other things. But also, if you pursue that line of thought. I think you wind up with an impossible conclusion, namely, that we have no knowledge, because the distinctions that we invent are artificial and they don’t correspond to what’s out there, and therefore it’s not knowledge.

The problem is that you have to present that as knowledge. If that comes through to us as a piece of knowledge, and we accept it as knowledge, that’s when it carries weight. But then if we look at what you’re saying, what you’re saying is that we don’t have any. So that’s the kind of talk that wipes itself out. That’s why I say that when you come to a conclusion of these drastic sorts, you can bet that it’s gone wrong somewhere, and don’t agonize over it. You just go back to the drawing board because you know you’ve got an impossible conclusion.

This was part of history, by the way. We're just reliving rapidly some of the traumatic events in the history of people trying to understand people. All of the moves that we can think of easily now, somebody—and some very shrewd somebody—has made in the past. Why? Because we all do have some kind of common understanding of that subject-matter, namely, people; and the kind of things that come to mind by way of making sense are not going to be just thoroughly idiosyncratic. What comes to mind here, now, when we try to do this, will make sense. But it will also have made sense to other people in the past, and you'll find it in the history of psychology or philosophy.

Are there any other good candidates for a definition? Well, one of the drastic conclusions you might come to is, "We can't even get started, since we can't come up with a definition."

Q. *### [about self-awareness]*

P. Try it: a person is a self-aware entity.

Q. *You know never know if somebody else is self-aware.*

P. Basically, it's not that there's something in principle wrong, but the notion of self-awareness is at least as mysterious as the notion of a person.

You won't have any easier problem starting with self-awareness as against person. You'll still need a definition of "self-aware", and that's where you'll run into a lot of difficulties and a lot of disagreement.

Q. *We're discovering that porpoises and chimpanzees are developing our language, and we're getting this transition. Now, some of the fundamental historical ### this is a person, this is an animal ###.*

P. If you have a good idea what a person is, one of the things that you ought to be able to do is judge how close to being a person something is, and you can say, "A chimpanzee is a lot closer than a clam, and a clam is immeasurably closer than a table." Then you can take the next step and say, "Chimpanzees, at least some of them, are so close that maybe in some ways we ought to start treating them like people." Then you have to worry about which ways—down to the next level of detail.

Q. *I was thinking maybe self-awareness could be reduced ### look at it as perception turned inward, because we do have a psychology of perception.*

P. Well, we do and we don't. If you look at theories of perception, you might very well wonder whether we have a psychology of perception. The same problem.

This notion of self-awareness, though, as I said, some people have taken that or a related notion as *the* defining characteristic; and, as usual, when you have a notion like that, and you have a bunch of people who disagree with each other working in the same field, you develop language that is non-committal.

So we've developed terms that refer to something sort of that way, but we're not committing ourselves to any sort of detail, because it's the details where everybody's going to disagree. And the term I have in mind is 'psychological reality'. Theorists nowadays do a fair amount of talking about what is psychologically real or not. Notice that the problem of psychological reality is not something that could arise in connection with a table or with a plant or with an organism. It is something that could only arise for an individual that, in ordinary conversation, you would be inclined to say was aware, experienced, had experiences, had thoughts, feelings, etc. Then you could talk about what was psychologically real for this individual, and what wasn't.

It's at this point that you run afoul of this [Fig. 1, p. 2: Method-oriented vs. Subject-oriented]. What is this 'psychological reality'? Can you see it, touch it, feel it, measure it, subject it to an experiment? The answer is: it would be pretty hard. You have to get more sophisticated in how you talk about your subject-matter, because you certainly can't point to psychological reality; and if you claim to be able to measure it, that measurement is going to be at some distance from the phenomena.

So, not too surprisingly, two-thirds of our population of experimenters and theorists would say there is no such thing. It's just a crazy way of talking. It's just an attempt to talk in science the way you do in commonsense language, and stop it.

Let's do a less painful exercise. In fact, it's more like a fun exercise. Let's start with the notion that there is something in this notion of psychological reality, but it isn't something you can point to. Now the question is, how do we have access to it? How could you assure yourself or get somebody else to see what you're talking about when you talk that way?

I want you to think of somebody whom you know quite well, whose face you would recognize. I'll call that person Joe, but you just substitute the name of whatever particular individual you have in mind. Now I'm going to ask you to imagine that I show you a photograph, and it looks just like Joe. So I ask you, "Is this a photograph of Joe?", and you look at that thing care-

fully, and you say, “Yeah,” because it looks just like Joe. Then I hit you with a question, “How do you know that’s a photograph of Joe, and not of somebody who looks just like Joe?” And you have to admit, “Well, maybe it isn’t a photograph of Joe. Maybe it is a photograph of somebody else who looks just like Joe.” Certainly, from that photograph, there’s no way of telling. So it could be a picture of somebody else.

Okay, now suppose that instead of showing you a photograph, how about drawing me a picture of Joe. So you sit down and scribble around for an hour, and finally you’ve got something that satisfies you, and you show it to me. And I say, “Is that a picture of Joe?” and you say, “Yeah.” And then I hit you with the same question. “How do you know that’s a picture of Joe, and not somebody who looks just like this picture?” The interesting thing is, on this one, you have no problem whatever. There is no question about whether it’s a picture of Joe. Is there? If you had drawn that picture of Joe, and you show it to me, and I say, “How do you know it’s a picture of Joe and not somebody who looks just like this?”, would that really raise any questions about whether that’s a picture of Joe? I think not. Now, why? What’s different about this situation from the other—so different that in the one case, there’s every doubt, and in this case, there’s no doubt.

Q. *There’s a connection ### from you observing Joe and then forming a picture in your head, and then drawing a picture from that. It’s a direct connection to Joe.*

P. Why would a direct connection like that make a difference?

Q. *I don’t think it’s so much that there’s a more direct connection. It’s that you know the connection. If I took the picture myself. I’m relatively sure that the picture was of Joe.*

P. If you took the picture, there would still be the question of who you took the picture of. Was that Joe, or somebody who looked just like him?

Q. *But then possibly all the memories I have of Joe might not actually ###.*

P. So again, you see, in this case there is no such question, and the important thing is: why? You start by reviewing that and assuring yourself that indeed these are two different cases: that in one case there is a question of that sort, and you could be wrong; in the other there isn’t, and you couldn’t be wrong. And then the question is why? And the puzzling one is the second one, because it’s easy to see why you could be wrong about the first. It’s not that easy to see why you couldn’t be wrong about the second.

Roughly, the reason why you couldn't be wrong is that you drew it as a picture of Joe, and since that's what you drew it as, that *makes* it a picture of Joe. Since that's what makes it a picture of Joe, there is no question about is it or isn't it.

Now take a third case, where I say, "I want you to imagine Joe's face, so sit back and relax and whip up a good image, good enough that you're satisfied that it is an image of Joe." You sit back and you do that for three minutes, and you finally say, "I've got it." Now I hit you again with the same question. "How do you know that that's an image of Joe, and not an image of somebody else who looks just like him, or somebody else who looks just like this image?" Is this example like the example of the drawing, or is it like the example of the photograph?

Q. *The drawing.*

P. Okay, it's like the drawing. There is no question about whether your image is an image of Joe or of somebody who looks like him. Why? Because that's what you produced it as. Since you produced it as an image of Joe, that makes it an image of Joe.

Now what's this notion of "producing it as"? That's a different version of "psychological reality". What you produced it as is what its reality is for you. Notice that by pointing to these kinds of facts, we take it out of the realm of something mysterious that you can't point to or see or touch or feel and instead look at certain obvious facts, because once you get out to them, it is obvious that the image couldn't be wrong and that the drawing *couldn't* be wrong, just as obvious a fact as how the photograph *could* be wrong.

So by looking at that kind of fact, we give ourselves a way of pointing to something, and saying, "That's the kind of thing I'm talking about when I say 'psychological reality', and that's the kind of difference it can make." So that's a way of getting at some psychological things, something about people, in ways that don't leave you guessing what's going on in somebody's head, that don't leave you guessing about something that you can't see, touch, and feel. Because there you're dealing with facts just as obvious, just as observable, just as agreeable-about, as any other kind.

Q. *I still can't see ### there's a different reality for each person, so how can you generalize? There are different facts depending on the reality of each person.*

P. Yeah. What I'm raising, in effect, is the question: how could anybody say what you just said? If you don't have the notion of a psychological reality,

you're not going to even think about the possibility that different people's psychological reality are different. You've got to have some way of talking about psychological reality in order to say, "Well, everybody has his own world." Otherwise, if you just start with "everybody has his own world", then you're into an impossible situation, because if so, then your world is different from mine, and there's no connection, and what are you telling me? Or what could you possibly tell anybody?

The problem is: how can we talk about such things in a way that doesn't create the solipsism problem? Because notice how easy it is to start with statements like, "Everybody lives in his own world. No two people have the same world," and then generate the conclusion, "My God, everybody is isolated with no possibility of understanding or communicating with anybody else." Because you've started by putting them in different worlds, and then there's no way really to bridge the gap afterwards. And that's one of those impossible conclusions, and as I say, if you wind up there, you go back to the drawing board.

On the other hand, it obviously makes sense to us to say things like, "Everybody lives in his own world." So the conclusion we draw is not that there's something wrong with that, but that just starting that way is the wrong way of going about it. But that's one of the kinds of things we want eventually to be able to say without getting into trouble.

Q. *Is this psychological reality self-created, then? Drawing the picture or forming the picture in your head—is that only what it consists of?*

P. Notice I didn't say anything about drawing pictures in your head. I just pointed to the difference between could you be wrong and couldn't you, so you can then start constructing explanations in terms of pictures in your head, but then you will have that problem.

Q. *Couldn't solipsism possibly be avoided by saying that we have slightly varied and yet interrelated worlds?*

P. No, you still have the problem: who in the world would be in a position to have the knowledge that that was so, and there's no way anybody could. You see how easy it is to draw a conclusion that we can't have any knowledge.

Q. *Possibly we can have knowledge, but I don't think that we can know that we know and show anybody else that we know it.*

P. You've got to at least know that, and if you do know that, then it's false. That's the theory ###.

Q. *It's something that I'm stating that I know.*

Q. ### language is shared ###

P. Well, language is one of those things that you have a lot of divisions of this kind about. Some people have used language as *the* thing that distinguishes people from non-people. Others have said that language is just another form of behavior, and it's just an expression of the variety of behaviors that you find among organisms.

One of the things about language is that it is public. We can say this very comfortably, and I think nobody would really have trouble with it. In point of fact, about ten years ago, and for a period of about ten years, there was a flurry of argumentation in the literature about whether there could be such a thing as a private language. And the net effect of that discussion is no, there can't be. And there can't be a private language for the same reason that you can't have private money. Money is inherently a social thing, it is a medium of exchange. That's why you can't have your own money, because it's not a medium of exchange if it's purely private.

Just imagine a situation where I hand you a five-dollar bill, and I ask for change for a twenty, and you look at me and say, "What are you doing?" And I say, "Well, for me that's a twenty." About that time, you'd either slug me or have me put away. The same kind of logic holds for language. It can no more be the case that words mean what I want them to mean, than it can be the case that my money is worth what I want it to be worth. It's essentially public. So focusing on language does raise the issues of solipsism again. If you give language a primary place, you're not going to start off saying, "Everybody lives in his own world."

Again, this is typical. We have two things, each of which makes sense, each of which represents a lot of important knowledge we have about people. And it looks like they contradict each other. On the one hand, we want to say that everybody lives in his own world; on the other hand, we want to say, "Language is public, no question about it." That's, again, the kind of problem you run into in this field.

Back to the question of definition. If you can't give a definition, what can you do? By way of prelude, let me point out what's wrong with definition. What's wrong with definition is: it always takes you somewhere else. [change tape] So we would have a number of terms here. And now we would

have this problem of, yeah, but what's an X, and what's a Y, and what's a Z? So we would then have to say, an X is—and then give a definition of an X, and then another definition of a Y, and then another definition of a Z.

People are	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	X	Y	Z
X is	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	a	b	c
Y is	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	a'	b'	c'
Z is	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	a''	b''	c''

And so we would be generating new terms here [a, b, c; a', b', c'; a'', b'', c''], and while we started out with one word that we needed to understand, now we've got something like nine or ten, and that's only in two steps. About the time you start seeing the need to define these, you say, "Back to the drawing board." In fact, it is impossible always to have a definition, because you'd have to have an infinite number of terms. The only way a definition will work is if you have some terms that you can understand and use without a definition. Then you don't have to go on forever defining them.

Those terms that you can understand without a definition will generally be your most fundamental terms. And guess what? That [People] is one of our fundamental terms. Now what a definition does, it takes you from this [People] to whatever this [X, Y, Z] is. And that's how you wind up talking about something else instead. You start out wanting to know about this [People]; you give a definition that gives you some different ideas—and they have to be different, or it's not a good definition—and you wind up talking about these things [X, Y, Z] instead of what you started out with. So definitions are by no means a cure-all or something you always want.

Definitions have very limited use, namely, when you already have language that you can use without definitions, when you understand it, and when there is something unclear that you can see needs to be defined. So in this case, we're stuck with that.

"People" is one of those notions that we understand without ever having had a definition. You certainly didn't arrive at your present understanding of people by somewhere along the line having had a definition. So this

is one of the notions that we understand without a definition, without being able to give one, without ever having had one. The question is then: how do you work with it?

And there are two kinds of answers. One, there are a couple of alternatives to definition that do even better. The other is, instead of trying to define this, you simply put it together with a bunch of other terms that you understand, and you have a system of ideas that you understand.

Think, for example, of the concept of a trump or a finesse. If we're sitting around here playing bridge, and I play a card, and somebody says, "That's a finesse," you would have a hard time understanding a finesse if you took that card, and took it in the lab, and subjected it to a very minute examination, because the fact, the reality of finesse, does not lie in the card. It lies in the whole complex of what's going on there, and in that complex, if I play that card that way, then that's a finesse. But unless you have that whole set of things going on, you don't have any finesses.

Now think of this term [People] along the lines of finesse, that it's not something you're going to understand by looking at it very closely, but rather, it's something that when you reconstruct the context within which there is a place to talk about this, then you'll understand it. Just as to understand a finesse, you've got to understand about bridge and how it's played, to understand people, you've got to understand what goes with people and how.

The two things that obviously go with people are behavior and interaction with other people. There is no way that you could have a person with no other person, or a person who didn't behave at all. A person who didn't behave at all would be like this [points to table]. In fact, I could call this table a person, but there wouldn't be much point to it because there's no way that the table can behave in ways that show that what I say is so or not so. Whereas if I say, "He's intelligent," or "He knows how to play bridge," or "He likes her," his ways of behaving are ways from which you can decide, "Yeah, it's so," or "No, it isn't." But if I say, "That table is sitting there solemnly," or "The table doesn't like me," or "The table is just waiting for the bell to ring," there's no way you could tell that that was so or not so because the table doesn't behave. So two things that most obviously go with people are behavior and interaction with other people.

Q. *What about Robinson Crusoe-type of situations? Or, say, the boy who was just discovered in Africa who they think possibly had been raised by chimpanzees, or—? They extended beyond just interacting with people, interacting*

with their environment.

P. When I say you can't have a person independent of other people, I don't mean you can't have a person by himself. It's more like saying you couldn't have the number 5 independently of other numbers. I can go in the next room and be by myself. That doesn't mean that there are no other people. It just means that I'm by myself. But think of the things that I could do by myself—suppose I go in there and solve a problem in arithmetic. Were there no set of people out here in which there was the concepts and the practice of doing arithmetic, what I would be doing there couldn't possibly be arithmetic. So without these people, I couldn't be doing what I'm doing there. And then just extend that to any of the behaviors that I might be doing there, and you'll find the answer comes out, "Were there no people, there wouldn't be a person there."

Q. *That takes care of Robinson Crusoe. But what about that hypothesis of someone without a human society?*


P. That puts it up to you. Would you call that person "a person", and if so, would you straightforwardly call him "a person", or what? Because one of the rules of thumb on that is: if all persons were like that, would our concept of a person be the same as it is? And the answer is clearly not. So if you're going to include a person like that as a person, it's got to be by courtesy. It's got to be as a special kind of person and not just straightforwardly a person the way anybody in this room is just straightforwardly a person. Now that's a problem that we can deal with, too, the issue of a straightforward person versus a special kind.

Now we want to do two things. We want to give ourselves ways of talking about psychological reality without generating the classic problems of experience, of can you see it, touch it, feel it, or things of that sort. Secondly, we want to do the job of a definition, even though there is no definition. The first job is done by the schemas that you have in your outline and that we'll be going through. The second is done by a couple of devices which I will now go through, and there's a brief reference in our outline to it. There are two devices that we're going to use here, that can be used when you would like to have a definition, and can't. And they will do the job of a definition—and more, usually—so they're not second-best to a definition. These are the two devices [(1) and (2)].

- (1) Paradigm Case Formulation**
- (2) Parametric Analysis**
- (3) Calculational System**

Then we have a third that we're going to use that's related to both of those. Let's take this one first: Paradigm Case Formulation. A good example of that is a problem that arose not too long ago, when somebody wanted to study families. The first question he got hit with was: what is a family? And there's your definition problem.

If you think of that definition problem about families, you'll see that you have the same issue. Families are not all alike. There is no one thing that's common to all families. What he did was to give an example of a paradigm case formulation, and here's how it works. Think of all of the cases that you want to include. In this case, think of all of the cases you want to include as a family. A definition would, in one stroke, draw a circle for you. It would identify the cases that you want to include, and exclude everything else.



Stage 1: Introduce paradigm case

Stage 2: Transformations, e.g.:

- a. one parent**
- b. number of children**
- c. sex of children**

In a paradigm case formulation, you do this a piece at a time. You do it in stages. So Stage 1 is, you introduce a paradigm case. A paradigm case will identify some of the cases you want. In the particular example I have in mind, he said: consider a family consisting of a mother, a father, a 17-year-old son, 17-year-old daughter, a 5-year-old son, and a 5-year-old daughter.

Now there's a family if there ever was one. And indeed that's true. So that identifies some of the cases that you want to include among families, namely, a case where you have a mother, father, older daughter, older son, younger daughter, younger son. That only gets you some of them. Certainly there's a lot of families that are not like that.

So in Stage 2, you introduce transformations. And introducing a transformation consists of saying, "Change that paradigm case in this particular way, and you'll still have it." Change this family that I just mentioned, in a particular way, and you'll still have a family. You could say: change it by dropping one of the parents, and you'll still have a family. That gets you a few more of the cases that you want to include as a family, namely, families with only one parent.

Then, number two, you say: change the number of children. There don't have to be four; there can be any number. So if you change the number of children in that original paradigm case family, you'll still have a family. So that gets you all of these other families with a different number of children.

Then you say: change the sex of the children. There don't have to be both boys and girls; there could be all boys or all girls, or anything in between. That gets you a whole lot of other families.

Then you're into places where you probably start getting disagreement. So far, I doubt whether anybody here would disagree that you had a family if you have the original family, if you drop one of the parents, if you change the number of children, if you change the sex distribution of the children. But now when I say: add additional parents, some of you would probably say, "Huh-uh, that's not what I would call a family." Other people would say, "Yeah, that's a family, too."

So you can get into an area of specifying cases that other people would say no, that's not. What that does is to enable that disagreement to be clear, so that when you say "family", that person knows that you're including these cases that he wouldn't, and he is then in a good position to make allowances.

One at a time, you see, with your transformations you include more and more of the cases you want until you've got them all. By the time you've finished, you've got all of the cases that you wanted to include and excluded everything else; and so you've done the same job as a definition would have, except that there is nothing they all have in common. That's why you couldn't give a definition. But even though there is nothing they all have in common, you can still give a paradigm case formulation.

One of the things that a paradigm case formulation does for you, that a definition wouldn't—it's somewhat like a theory, in that when you see how these groups are connected with the transformations, you have some understanding of why we would call all of them "a family", even though there is no one thing they all have in common. So the connections whereby you introduce these are also connections whereby you understand how come anything within this region is the same sort of thing, why it makes sense to call them all the same thing.

We'll find ourselves with this kind of problem over and over again. When you're talking about people, you're almost never in a position to say, "This is specifically true about all people." Instead, you need to be carrying this kind of schema with you so that you can use it over and over again with respect to cases where there is no one thing in common, but if you put it all together, it shows some unity. So think of this example of the family as a good example of how you can get at that whole set of families without a definition, with nothing in common to all of them. As I say, that's a problem that arises over and over and over again. It's more the rule than the exception when it comes to people.

The second device is a parametric analysis. This is one that we're going to use for both persons and behavior. In a parametric analysis, you give up asking, "What is it really?", and instead you ask, "How does one thing of this sort differ from another thing of this sort? For example, with colors, instead of asking, "What is color, really?" you say, "Well, how does one color differ from another? How is one color the same as another?" Instead of asking, "What is a material object?" you say, "How does one material object differ from another? How can a material object be similar to another?" And the ways in which a particular thing of that kind can be the same as or different from another gives you your parametric analysis.




FIGURE 4

There is a familiar example that probably appears in every psychology introductory text there is, and that's the example of color. Almost certainly you have encountered a diagram that looks generally like this [Fig. 4], namely, an arrangement of colors that goes from white to black or light black to dark, in which the rainbow colors are arranged in a circle around this central axis, and in which the bright colors are further out, and the grey colors are in toward the axis. This is known as the color pyramid or—it's known by a number of names. What this is, is a three-dimensional arrangement for showing how colors resemble each other or differ from each other. The three dimensions are this one [vertical line], the circle, and the distance out from that center [arrow]. There are standard names for them. There's also more than one set of names. Probably the most common is: *brightness* for the dimension that goes from white to black; *hue* for the rainbow colors red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet; and *intensity* or *saturation* for the amount of grey versus the brilliance of the color. These are parameters of color, and this whole arrangement is a parametric analysis. As I said, it consists of giving up the question, "What is a color, really?"; and saying, "How do colors resemble and differ from one another?" And they do so in these three ways.

Notice, when you have this, you are then in a position to deal with colors, and to deal with the fact that you've got this color and not that one. You're in a position to deal with similarities and differences. In that respect, it's better than a definition, too. This is more a working device for somebody who's going to get in there and do something with that subject matter. And some ways of doing it are more convenient than others; and for colors, this sort of distinction has proved very, very useful. It's not really that arbitrary; we make that kind of distinction pretty easily anyhow.

To put it differently, we've been making these distinctions about color even before psychologists and other people started studying them and gave us formally these distinctions. We already did distinguish between light colors and dark ones, between black and white. We already did distinguish red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet before there were psychologists, and certainly we distinguished bright colors from grey colors. So what's been done is to systematize this whole area of visible color, put it in a form that's useful for working with, and it just happens that those are distinctions that we had all along anyway. That's one of the things that makes it useful: we don't have to learn a new set of distinctions to work with color; this simply systematizes the way we've been systematically working with colors anyway.

This will also be the case—we're going to give a parametric analysis of behavior, and it will not consist of esoteric distinctions. It will consist of distinctions that we already know and can work with, which is one of its virtues.

A parametric analysis, then, is another thing that you can do in place of a definition when it comes to starting from scratch and addressing a subject matter. We clearly have that problem when it comes to studying people. How do you start, given the case that however you start is already prejudiced by your approach, by your theory, by your implicit assumptions, etc.? How do you start? How do you start in a way that is as neutral as possible? Schemas of this sort are as neutral as you can get. You have a certain kind of arbitrariness in that you could have started with a different set of distinctions, but anything you could do with another set, you could do with this.

It's like having the system of latitude and longitude for the earth's surface. That system is arbitrary; you could have started in some other place as the zero meridian. You didn't have to do it from north pole to south pole. You could have done it in some other way. But any other way of doing it would give you equivalent results. You couldn't do any more with one of these others that you can't do with the system we have. So in a situation like that, the important thing is not that you pick one that's guaranteed to be the right one, but rather, you pick one that will do the job, and then any other, equivalent way of doing it will merely do the same job, and so you're not losing anything.

We need something that will do a systematizing job on people, and we're going to approach it via some parametric analyses—among other things. This is the kind of thing that will occupy us for at least two weeks here, and that's the first major part of this course, is to get some familiarity with some of these devices that enable us to deal with facts about people in a non-prejudicial way, and that don't get us into the kind of problems that I've mentioned. Secondly, is to get some practice at using this stuff with people, and that's why we have the case-book, is that when you read those cases, you say something here is puzzling, something here I don't understand, something needs to be explained.

One of the virtues of having a system of concepts for understanding people is that you can use them to generate the explanations that you need in order to understand actual individual people. So the use of the case-book, then, is to bring this to bear on some actual problems, because the problem of understanding the people in the case-book is no different from the

problem of understanding somebody that you know very well, including yourself. You have the same tools to work with. So checking this stuff out and saying, “Can you actually make sense out of a person using these notions?”—that should take several days, maybe a week.

Then, the final, large block is to examine the theories, and at a minimum, these four [Fig. 1, p. 2: Freud. Skinner. Allport. Existentialists] and possibly one or two others depending on how fast we go, and ask of them: How did they do in addressing the questions that we’ve already been through in trying to understand people? How much of that do they give us? Where do they fall down? How come the theories are different in the way they are? How come Freud put it in the way he did, and Allport put it in the way he did? So the last block will be a critical analysis and review of some of these representative theories.

Somewhere along the line, if we get a chance, we’ll talk about assessment and measurement, but that’s up for grabs, because in a five-week session, a lot depends on just how fast you go. So assessment is something which will be optional. If we get a chance, we’ll get to it.

As far as examinations go. I’m not inclined to give a lot of examinations, partly because they take class time. On the other hand, people tend to get nervous if we don’t have examinations. So my best guess is that we ought to have one somewhere during the five weeks and then a final. For next hour, if you can get hold of Hall and Lindzey, read the first chapter, the introductory chapter, which just has to do with the general notion of personality theories. If you get hold of the Outline, read it through section 11, just to get an idea of what there is to be covered. We will not cover all of that, but you’ll get a notion as to the kind of things that we’ll encounter. Most of what I talk about in class will be represented briefly in that Outline. In the next two weeks. I’ll be expanding on the brief things that are in the Outline.

SESSION 2

July 13, 1976

P: Yesterday I made a point of how much disagreement there is in the area of personality, in the area of trying to understand people as a whole. I think I said that this wasn't just something that was unfortunate; it's one of the hard facts of the matter, which you want to be able to deal with.

I also mentioned how much disagreement there is in theories. One way to get a handle on this is to notice how theories are constructed or what they're like. What they're like is that they consist of a small number of fundamental statements about people; and then from this small number of fundamental statements, one derives additional statements that give us some of the detail, some of the elaborations. But one starts with this small set. It's that set that contains what our picture of human nature is, and it's that set about which there is all of the disagreement. If you read somebody's set, you'll look at that and say, "Ah. I agree," and somebody else will say, "Nah."

Since this is what inevitably happens, if you're looking for something that is common to everybody, you're not going to look for a magic set of fundamental statements. That is, you're not going to keep looking for a new set of statements, given the history that every such set that anybody has ever thought of gets rejected by a sizable proportion of the population. So if you're looking for what's common to everybody, knowing that kind of history will discourage you from looking for still a new set that may work this time, in spite of 4,000 years of written history.

It's not that easy to think of an alternative, though. But we can generate an alternative by asking: What enables two people to disagree about something? For example, if I say, "That's a table," and you say, "No, it isn't," or if I say, "It's going to rain tomorrow," and you say, "No, it isn't," ordinarily we would take it that we were disagreeing, (1) about whether that was a table, and (2) about whether it's going to rain tomorrow. Or (3) is he angry right now? We take it that we do disagree there.

Now how could we possibly disagree? What has to be the case for us to be able to disagree? What has to be the case is that we have to have the same concepts. In the case of the table, if I say “There’s a table there”, and you say “No, there isn’t”, what we share is the concept of the table.

If I say “It’s going to rain tomorrow” and you say “No, it isn’t”, what we share are the concepts of raining and tomorrow.

And unless we shared those concepts, we couldn’t disagree about those things. We would simply be talking about different things, and we couldn’t disagree. So, at that point, it’s easy to see that one of the things that people can share—much more widely than they share beliefs or postulates or facts—are concepts. When it comes to simple things like “Will it rain tomorrow?”, it’s equally simple to specify what concepts we are sharing or what concepts we have to share to disagree about that.

When it comes to the vast range of different ways that we disagree with one another, or agree, if you ask *what could people share that would enable them to disagree in all of those ways?*, that’s not an easy task. And yet, there may well be something that people share that enables them to disagree in all of those ways.

The Outline, the material in the Outline, reflects a candidate for what people could share that enables them to disagree in all of the ways that we know they do. That formulation is known as the Person Concept, and it has four major elements: Person, Behavior, Reality, and Language. Of these four, we will look at some aspects of these two [Person and Behavior], because these are the ones that are directly relevant to personality theorizing. These [Reality. Language] we will not deal with, but they’re there.

Let me introduce another idea here. Imagine that I sit here, and I start drawing lines, like this and then like this [Fig. 1].



FIGURE 1

I could stand here all day and draw lines like that. If you looked at all of those lines, you could say, “Well, what he’s using—he’s got a storehouse or a repertoire of lines and they can be straight or they can be curved, and

they can be of any length, and they can be of any curvature—they can be tight curves or light curves, whatever.” And indeed, all of the lines that I’ve drawn are either straight or curved, and they have some length and some degree of curvature. So if I had a store of lines like that, I could use these ingredients to construct something like this [Fig. 1]. Notice that this thing is not something that could be true or false. It’s just a bunch of lines there on the blackboard. So I can spend all day using a supply of lines and putting them together in certain ways, and I’ve got a peculiar something that can’t be true or false.

But as soon as I do a certain thing with it, then it can be true or false. If I say, “This is what my house looks like,” after I’ve done all of this, then that statement can be true or false. But this [Fig. 1] can’t, and these [the straight and curved lines] cannot.

The way this Person Concept works, and the way the notions of Person and Behavior work, primarily they give us ingredients. These ingredients are distinctions or concepts which cannot be true or false. Those concepts can be used to generate constructions. Those constructions can’t be true or false. However, those constructions can be used to describe people and behavior, and as soon as you do, you’ve got something that can be true or false.

So in dealing with the Person Concept, and the ingredients and the constructions, we’re dealing with things that can’t be true or false, but are things that would have to be shared by people who disagreed about such things. And the kind of skill that I want to see you develop is the skill of taking ingredients, using them to make constructions that you can then use to describe people and their behavior—including your own self and your behavior and including some of the people in our casebook.

I stress the fact that these things cannot be true or false, because I don’t want to generate fruitless disagreement. When I talk about these things, it sounds as though I’m telling you things that could be true, because I use declarative sentences. And as soon as I do that, somebody—probably half of you—will be tempted to disagree and say, “Well, how do you know that?”

It isn’t a case of knowing that. It isn’t a case of telling you something that could be true. It’s a case of laying out something for you. So even when I sound as though I’m telling you truths, take it from me that I’m not, that what I’m doing with this stuff is more like holding up something for you and saying, “Notice! Notice this feature, notice that feature, notice how it works. Notice that it doesn’t work this way.” Those are not statements. Those are not true or false things. Because the end product, as I say, is that you should

be able to use some of these things in certain ways, not that there should be some statements that you believe. So this is a skill-building class, not a truth-and-belief class.

Q. *But you said that when we wanted to put them to use, then we have to verify if they're true or false.*

P. No. I said that you have to verify—I said they could be true or false, and you couldn't verify them all. You can verify any one of them, but if you tried to verify every one of them, you couldn't. You might ask yourself when was the last time that you tried to verify some statement. It may have been years ago. The way that you live your daily life does not involve, to any large degree at all, verifying statements. You encounter a whole lot of things, you believe a whole lot of things, you disbelieve a whole lot of things, and that's commonplace. And you do that every day.

What you don't do every day is verify statements. For example, when you walked in the room, and you saw some chairs, you took it that there were chairs here. You didn't do anything to verify that. You simply acted accordingly. When you sat down in a chair, you were acting accordingly. Now if you had tried to verify that this is a chair, all you can do is come up with other statements, like: *it looks like a chair, it's got a seat, got a back*. And you say, "But maybe I ought to verify those. Does it really have a seat? Does it really have a back?" And there's no end to that. So you couldn't possibly verify every kind of statement that you make or every truth that you believe. Verification is an exceptional thing, and it has to be.

The first thing we're going to talk about that's going to sound like giving you some truths is the parametric analysis of behavior. To tie it back to yesterday's example, remember we used the example of the color pyramid; and the parametric analysis of color into brightness, hue, and saturation; and said that these are ways that colors can differ from one another or be the same as one another.

Now, if you wanted to use the notation that we're going to use to formulate that, it would go like this: where B would stand for Brightness. H would stand for Hue, and S would stand for Saturation, and C for Color.

$$C = \langle B, H, S \rangle$$

FIGURE 2

What this notation tells you is that to specify one of these, namely, a color, you have to specify something of each of these sorts. So if you want to specify a color and distinguish it from other colors, you've got to specify its brightness, its hue, and its saturation, and that indeed will distinguish it from other colors. If you want to specify a kind of color, you simply give less detailed specifications of brightness, hue, and saturation. For example, you might say, "a light color". You say "a light color"—and in effect you're saying, one that lies up here [toward the white pole of the diagram]—that's a perfectly good specification of it, and you would have done it by specifying something about its brightness.

So when it comes to specifying, the parametric analysis tells you what you have to specify.

$$B = \langle I, W, K, KH, P, A, ID, S \rangle$$

I = Identity
W = Want
K = Know
KH = Know-How
P = Performance
A = Achievement
ID = Individual Characteristics
S = Significance

FIGURE 3

The comparable formula for behavior—not too surprisingly, behavior is more complex than colors, so we have more parameters. Again, keep in mind that these simply represent the ways in which one behavior can resemble another behavior or differ from another behavior.

Remember, I said yesterday that this parametric analysis involves distinctions that we already know, that are familiar ones, and that we can use without definitions. And you notice that there's nothing mysterious up here [on the blackboard]. By way of clarification, let me say a few words about each one of them.

Identity has to do with whose behavior it is. Every behavior is somebody's behavior, and so behaviors can be the same or different in that respect, namely, whose behaviors they are. So two behaviors of mine will be similar in that they are both my behaviors. No matter what other similarities they have, they're similar that way. If I sit in a chair and you sit in a chair, those two behaviors are different in at least that respect, namely, that one of them is my behavior, the other is your behavior. So this aspect of behavior is simply whose behavior it is.

The K, the *Know*, refers to the fact that whenever you behave, you're making some distinction or another. For example, if you sit in a chair, you're at a minimum distinguishing chairs from other things, and you're distinguishing the location of that chair from other locations. And you're probably distinguishing other things that's hard to tell just from the fact that you're sitting in the chair. And recall, if I say there is a chair there, and you say, "No, there isn't," we're both distinguishing between chairs and other things, between chairs being there and not being there.

One way of settling for yourselves whether these are simply arbitrary is to try to get along without them. Try to imagine a normal behavior—like coming in and sitting in a chair, or going out and taking a drink of water, or reading a book—try and imagine any such behavior, and then try supposing that in that behavior, no distinction whatever is being made. I think you'll find you can't do it.

And whatever behavior you take it to be will have some implication about what's being distinguished. If you're reading a book, you're distinguishing the ideas and the words that are there, and you're distinguishing the book from other things. If you're taking a drink of water, you're distinguishing the place, the water, and faucet, and whatever is there. So whatever the behavior, it involves making some distinction.

In the history of psychology, this aspect of behavior has gotten known as the Stimulus. In psychology, when you talk about the stimulus for a behavior, you're talking about what the behavior is a reaction to. But whatever the behavior is a reaction to is something that *that* behavior has distinguished, because you can't react to something if you can't distinguish it.

Now, this notion of Know is broader than the notion of a stimulus. In the psychological literature, a stimulus for my behavior here now has to be here, now. Something that happened yesterday can't be a stimulus for my behavior now. Something that may happen tomorrow can't be a stimulus for my behavior now. The only thing that can be a stimulus is something that is here, now.

In contrast, this notion of knowing or making a distinction is not restricted to what is here and now. So that for example, if I ask you, "Is it going to rain tomorrow?", one of the distinctions I'm making is between it's raining tomorrow and it's not raining tomorrow, and that's not something here and now.

If I tell you that there isn't an elephant on that table, I'm using the

concept of an elephant. I'm making that distinction and using it, but I'm not responding to an elephant, because there isn't an elephant here to be distinguished.

So the distinctions that we use in our behavior include the kind of things that psychologists call "stimuli", but they include a lot.

Want is the motivational aspect of behavior. Or rather, it is one of the motivational aspects. Here, again, you can try the test of thinking of an ordinary behavior and then try to think of it as having no motivation. For example, suppose I tell you that I'm going to go out and take a drink of water out here, and then I say, "But I don't want that water." Immediately, you don't understand my behavior. When I first said, "I'm going to take that drink of water," that sounds familiar, and that sounds like you understand what I'm going to do.

But as soon as I say that I don't want the water. I've taken away with one hand what I've given with the other, and I'm leaving you wondering, "Well, what is he up to?" In that sense, you don't understand, because to understand my behavior, you need to know what I'm up to, you need to know what I want, what I'm trying to get, what it would be that would satisfy me, what it would be that would make that behavior a success.

That aspect of behavior is the motivational aspect, and *Want* is the term that we use for that.

Know-How refers to the learning history that makes what I do non-accidental. Try the same example. Suppose I tell you, "I'm going out to the hall and take a drink of water," and then I say, "But I don't know how to walk." Well, if I don't know how to walk, it's going to be a gigantic coincidence if I manage to make the right movements to get me out to the hall to the water to get that drink.

And if it is a coincidence like that, if my getting out there is not an expression of what I know how to do and what I learned to do, you don't say it's something I did. You say it's something that happened. For example, if I walk in, and I stumble on the doorstep, and I fall on my face, you don't say, "Gee, what a skilled performance that was," because you don't take it that falling and stumbling is an expression of what I know how to do.

On the other hand, if I'm a circus clown, and I come in and take a prat-fall, then you can say that was a skilled performance, because that one, even though it might look the same, is an expression of something I know how to do. Since it is, I can do it on purpose.

That's one of the key aspects of this Know-How, that if it's something you know how to do, then you can do it on purpose, and that's why it's not accidental when you do it. Whereas if it was something you didn't know how to do, you couldn't do it on purpose. You'd have to wait for it to happen. And that's not how behavior occurs. Your behavior is not something that you sit around, waiting for it to happen. It's something you do. So that aspect is got at by this: what you know how to do.

Performance or procedure gets at the fact that behavior is a process. It's a process that takes place at a certain time and place; it has a certain duration; and it's interruptible because it has a certain duration. For example, if you think of the behavior of reaching for the microphone and putting it here, that behavior would take a couple of seconds, maybe; and it takes place at this time and place; and I could stop half way. Because of the fact that it takes time, it also implies that if I start it, I don't necessarily finish it, because it may stop half way or somewhere along the line.

Try to imagine a behavior that didn't take any amount of time to do. Try thinking of my moving that microphone from here to there, or my walking down the hall and taking a drink of water in no time at all. It doesn't happen. Every behavior takes some amount of time, and that's because every behavior is a process that has a beginning, duration, and an end.

The process feature, the performance, is one of the most visible aspects of behavior, and that's because it's all here-and-now where the behavior is. If I reach for that microphone and put it over here, the performance occurs at exactly that time and place.

In contrast, the distinction I'm making doesn't occur. *What I want* is not something that occurs, and *what I know how to do*—that learning history—was some other time, some other place. So you'd have a hard time from just watching me, deciding what I know, what I want, or what I know how to do.

On the other hand, when it comes to deciding what my performance was, you're not limited that way. You're limited by the fact that you have a hard time describing it, but you have every confidence that you saw it all, because it was all right there. You look out the door and see somebody going down the hall, the thing that strikes you is the performance, and that's what you're getting at when you say somebody's walking down the hall. But from that, you don't know who it is; you don't know what they want, because you don't know where they're going; you don't know what distinctions they're making, except they're probably distinguishing the hall; you don't

know what learning history, but you have some idea of the kind of ability they have. The thing that it's tempting to think you've got really tagged is this [Behavior].

I say "tempting" for a good reason, namely, that again, historically, in psychology, this aspect of behavior has been taken to be Behavior, and when psychologists have studied behavior, mostly they have studied performances. And the reason they study performances is that those are what are here and now to be seen, and the presumption is that you're not going to get the necessary agreement among observers unless you deal with things that are here now to be seen.

Now, from this, there is also usually a further assumption, that when you see me, what you really see is my performance, and you make inferences about all of these others, that you make inferences about the behavior. For example, that if I actually do this [move the microphone], the idea is that what you really saw was my movements—that's the performance aspect of it—and from that movement, you made some inferences about my behavior, about various aspects of my behavior. And you can see that indeed that's a tempting sort of notion. It's a comforting sort of notion. If it is. It takes very little effort to show that it's also wrong.

To show that it's wrong, just ask yourself *what were my movements there?* I think you'd have a hard time saying what my movements were. You don't have a hard time saying what my behavior was. You'd say, "He moved the microphone from there to there." So from the fact that you can easily say what my behavior was, you can't say hardly at all what my movements were. It follows that you didn't find out what my behavior was by first knowing what my movements were and then drawing an inference. There's just no way you could be doing that.

Furthermore, it is not the case that things like movements are something that you can generate a whole lot of agreement on, in contrast to some of these [W, K, KH, etc.] or in contrast to behavior. There's a lot of times when you'll get more agreement on some of these or on the behavior itself, as against the movement.

Take a simple thing like that [tossing a piece of chalk and catching it], and if I asked each of you to describe the behavior, you'd probably say something on the order of, "He tossed a piece of chalk in the air and caught it." There'd be great agreement on that. If I asked you to describe the movements, not only would you have trouble, you'd also have descriptions that varied, that were much more different from one another than your descriptions of

the behavior. So it's not the case generally that there's more agreement about performance or movement than there is about behavior. But it's tempting.

Okay. *Achievement*. A behavior always makes a difference. Something is always different afterwards from what it was before. If the behavior is successful, one of the things that's different is that you have what you wanted, and you didn't before. That's the criterion for a successful behavior is that what you have at the end is what you wanted at the beginning. But even behavior that is not successful that way makes some kind of difference. It has some kind of result, some kind of outcome. That's the aspect that we are getting at with this notion of achievement.

This is also the place where we get to talk about results of my behavior that I don't know about, or that I didn't intend. For example, if instead of moving this microphone, I get here and start tearing it apart, some achievements would be quite visible, and we would all agree that I had taken the microphone apart. On the other hand, if you happen to know that this was owned by the university, you could also give a description that I might not have known about, namely, that I'm destroying government property. Or if you're somebody else, you could give a description that said I exerted a force of so many foot-pounds on this thing, and that's something that I might not know about, but you might. And that, too, would be one of the results of my behavior.

So in general, behavior will have some unintended consequences, and usually it has same intended consequences. The intended ones are the ones which you want. So this [Achievement] is that aspect of behavior.

Now ID—the original notation here was *Individual Differences*. Partly for grammatical reasons, it's more usual to say *personal characteristics*—personal characteristics include what are traditionally called “personality characteristics”, and those are the ways that people differ from one another or are similar to one another. When we come to this one, we're going to do a parametric analysis of persons to come up with a systematic notion of how people differ from one another or resemble each other.

Among these notions are things like states, traits, and attitudes. For example, suppose that I walk in and start making all kinds of nasty comments and getting sarcastic with anybody who talks here. You can look at that behavior and say, “He's being hostile. That's hostile behavior.” Then you think about it some more, you can see a number of possibilities. You can say, “It looks like he just got up on the wrong side of the bed this morning. He's in a bad mood.” Or you can say, “Maybe he doesn't like students, he's got a

negative attitude toward students, and that's why he's doing it." Or you can say, "Maybe he's just a mean SOB, and he does that with everybody."

Notice that there's a considerable difference in how you would handle it, what sorts of things you would expect to be effective, depending on which of these three you thought it was.

- If you thought it was just a case of being in a bad mood, you'd probably handle it by just waiting for it to go away, because you figure it would.
- If it's a matter of not liking students, you couldn't handle it that way because you wouldn't expect it to go away. So you'd have to have some other way of dealing with it.
- And if it's the way that I treat everybody, that would make it even harder.

So if it was only with students, you'd expect that when I go out somewhere else, I'm not going to be that way, but if I'm just that kind of guy, then even when I'm out at the bar drinking or somewhere else—in the library studying—I'm going to be doing those kinds of things. So your expectations would be different.

And each of those things, either the kind of person I am; the kind of attitude I have; or the kind of mood I'm in, you would see that hostile behavior as an expression of that. You'd say, "He's doing that because he's that kind of person. He has that characteristic, and that behavior is an expression of it."

Well, every behavior is an expression of at least one personal characteristic. Usually, a given behavior is an expression of some number of them. So again, which personal characteristics a given behavior is an expression of is an aspect of behavior whereby behaviors can resemble each other or be different from one another.

That's the ID or Personal Characteristic parameter.

Q. *Is past history included in that?*

P. No. Personal Characteristic and Know-How are what free you from history. Because it's true, if I have a given characteristic, I have it because of my history. If I have a given know-how, I have it because of my history. But what's at work here is not the history; it's the know-how or the characteristic, and I could have got it in any one of a number of different ways.

And it doesn't matter which way I got it; what matters is that I have it. So that way, you can understand my behavior by reference to the circumstances and me, and you don't have to know all my history to understand me.

Which is nice, because we never know somebody's entire history. So if we had to have that in order to understand behavior, we'd never understand behavior.

Significance. We'll say more about both personal characteristics and significance later. I'll try to give you a fast example on significance. Suppose that as I'm standing here. I look up at the ceiling, and I see the thing starting to cave in, and I say, "Get out of your chairs and move." If you ask, "What did I do?", the first description to give is, "He said, 'Get out of your chairs and move.'" Then you would ask, "Why did he do that? What was he doing by saying 'Get out of your chairs and move.?'?" and the answer there would be, "He was warning us of danger." So now you have a second description of my behavior, namely, warning you of danger. You have two descriptions [A and B] and they are connected in a particular way, namely, that I was doing one of those by doing the other. I was warning you by saying, "Get out of your chairs."

When you have that kind of connection between two behaviors, you can say that the first one is the significance of the second one. *Warning* you was the significance of the behavior of saying, "Get out of your chairs." And you might ask, "What was he doing by warning us?" and I'd say, "Well, maybe there's another one back here." Indeed, in clinical work, in diagnosis and assessment, this is the kind of thing that you're doing routinely. You look at what somebody said or did on a task and you say, "What was he doing by doing that? What kind of person would do that here, in these circumstances?"

Q. *What's the difference between Significance and Want? Want is motivational?*

P. Consider one of the things I said about Want is that a successful behavior involves having here, as a result, the thing you want. Now if you take these two behaviors of saying, "Get out of your chairs," and the other one, warning you about the ceiling, and ask *what would make each of those successful*, what it would take to make successful the behavior of saying, "Get out of your chairs," is simply succeeding in uttering the words. What it would take to make the other behavior successful, namely, of warning you about the ceiling, would be that you get out in time.

So in this behavior of warning you about the ceiling, what I want is for you to get out in time. In this behavior of saying, "Get out of your chair," all I want is to have said that. So there's a different want for each of these two behaviors, that goes with the behavior itself.

The significance comes from the fact that there's this relation between the two behaviors, namely, that you're doing one by doing the other. So there's two different wants there, and two different behaviors, and you're doing them both at the same time, in the same way, in the same place.

Notice what that takes. If I went out there and faced north, and shouted, "Get out of your chairs and move," that wouldn't succeed in warning you about the ceiling. If I do it here now when that thing is falling, then that behavior will be a way of warning you. But if I do it in some other circumstances, it won't be a case of warning.

So these connections are very, very situational, and on different occasions, if I wanted to warn you, I would do it in different ways. Behaviors are connected that way, and that aspect which we normally talk about the meaning or the meaningfulness of behavior, as against the superficial descriptions or the surface descriptions, that's gotten at with this parameter.

Q. *Would you clarify the relationship between significance and achievement?*

P. The achievement is simply the outcome, what difference it made; whereas the significance parameter has to do with a relation between two behaviors, the relation being such that you do one by doing the other.

Q. *You wouldn't say that you achieve A by doing B?*

P. If, in fact, you did achieve A, you could say you achieved it by performing B, but you might not achieve it. As I say, I might say that and not succeed in warning you. In that case—

Q. *A would remain the significance of B.*

P. Right. Try the formula that we used yesterday: A is the significance of B because that's what I produced B as. I produced that as a warning, and whether it succeeds or not doesn't change that fact. [change tape] ### is one, warning you about the ceiling is the other. And notice: I'm doing the one by doing the other.

Q. *Would you go back over the fact that the past is not material to understanding the person—?*

P. Yeah. Think of my sitting down here and working out my income tax return or working out my bank balance, and you say, "He's doing some arithmetic here." And you say, "How come he's doing that?" And one of the answers is *because I know how to do arithmetic*. Now I could have learned how to do arithmetic by learning it in school, by reading books; and if I

learned it in school, I could have been taught in any one of a dozen ways. The learning history for that might have been any one of a large number [of learning histories], and it wouldn't matter as long as I now know how to do arithmetic, that's what explains my doing the bank balance.

Q. ###?

P. No, not that it doesn't make any difference. It's that you don't need to know that in order to understand the behavior. What you need to understand of behavior is that I know how to do arithmetic. You also know that that does depend on what happened in the past, but you don't have to know *what* happened in the past to understand that behavior. Remember the consequence: if you had to, you would have to conclude that you have never understood any behavior, and that nobody ever has either. That's one of those back-to-the-drawing-board conclusions.

Q. *History determines Know-How, and to some extent Know.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *So you can use—if you don't absolutely know it from present, you can use his knowledge of history to help you determine Know-How and Know.*

P. Yeah. As a matter of fact, one of the things I can do is if it looks as though he's making some distinction, and I know his history, I might say, "There's no way with that history that he could have learned that distinction. He must be using some other one."

Okay, those eight aspects are the ways that one behavior can be like another or different from it. And the similarity can be in terms of any one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight of those.

- You can specify a kind of behavior just by specifying something about any one of them.
- You can specify kind of behavior by specifying something about any one, two, three, etc., of these.

Now what we want to say is: *this is a representation for the concept of Behavior*. Notice that we haven't used this to describe any behavior. All we've done is introduce some notation that corresponds to the concept of behavior, namely, the concept of Behavior as something that has these aspects. Just as this [C = H, S, B] is a representation of the concept of Color as something that has these aspects.

But you can also see that by introducing these, we set the stage for making a lot of distinctions and giving a lot of descriptions of behavior. If you

didn't have these distinctions, there's a whole lot of descriptions that you couldn't give. In fact, if you didn't have these distinctions, there isn't any of the behaviors that you normally recognize as behaviors—you wouldn't be able to talk about them.

The first thing to be said about that concept of Behavior is: it isn't that simple. That's just where we start. Think of a different kind of concept, like the difference between the concept of white and the concept of arithmetic, and ask, "What do you have when you have that concept?" When you have the concept of white, you've got something that can be used to distinguish white things from other things, and that's about it. That shirt is white, the chalk is white, the wall is white, this is white, and this [the table] is not. This is the kind of case that leads people to think of language like tags that you put on things, because this use of the word "white" is very similar to putting a tag on things, that says "white" on it. And that notion of language works pretty well when you've got a concept like white.

In contrast, what do you have when you have the concept of arithmetic? There, to be sure, you still have it like a label. You can look over and see what somebody's doing, and say *he's doing arithmetic*. So you still have the recognition of instances. But you also have something much more, namely, if you have mastered that concept, it means you can do arithmetic, and being able to do arithmetic means that there is an indefinitely large number of different arithmetic problems that you can solve. There's an unlimited number of different arithmetic problems that you can handle just from having mastered the one concept.

How come? Well, it's a peculiar kind of concept, that's how. Think of other examples that work like arithmetic and others that work like "white". If you think of language, or an English grammar, that works like arithmetic. Mastering English grammar means that you can produce an indefinitely large number of different sentences, all stemming from the one sort of learning. You don't have to engage in any piece of learning for every different sentence that you utter or recognize, any more than you have to engage in a different piece of learning for every different arithmetic problem that you can solve.

On the other hand, a word like "big", a concept like "big" is like "white". You distinguish big things from small things, and that's it. The characteristic that distinguishes arithmetic and grammar and a few things like that is that it's a calculational system.

You recall I had this on the board yesterday when I put up Parametric Analysis and Paradigm Case Formulation. I also put up Computational System. Let me give you a brief specification of what a calculational system is. It's anything that fits a certain kind of schema, and the schema is fairly simple.

In a calculational system, you begin with one or more Elements given. You begin with at least one Operation that can be performed on an Element. And the result of performing that Operation on an Element is a Product. And every Product is an Element. That's it. That's all it takes.

Element	Operation	Product
1	Add 1	2
2	"	3
3	"	4
		-
		-
		-

FIGURE 4

To give you an example, let's use a numerical one, and start with the number 1. That's our original element. And start with an operation that says, "Add 1." If you perform that operation on that element, you get a product [2]. That product is an element, which means that you can perform this operation on it.

Suppose you do, you add one, and you get another product. That product is an element, which means that you can perform that operation on it. If you do, it's still another product, and you can see that there's no place to end. With a simple scheme like this, you can generate an infinite set of products. So just having mastered this simple arrangement enables you to generate an infinite set of results, each different from the other.

A calculational system is the one way that we know of to have some kind of grasp of infinite sets of things. When you have an infinite set, you can't survey it, you can't count it, you can't inspect it. Your only hold on it is your mastery of the calculational system that generates the products.

Now notice the contrast between the simplicity of what you would have to learn, and the number and variety of possible different things that you could generate. Seeing how simple it is helps us understand how come, with a finite learning history, you can learn something that enables you to do an infinite number of different things.

Now a calculational system is simply an extension of a paradigm case formulation. You notice the resemblance: the original element is like our paradigm case. The operation is like a transformation. And a transformation gave you products, too. The main difference is in that in a calculational system, what you generate as a result, you can plug back in and do some more transforming of it, whereas in a paradigm case, you're always starting from the paradigm case. And it's because you can operate on the result that you produced earlier—this is why you can go on forever.

You recall that a paradigm case formulation is something that does the job of a definition, and then think about the resemblance between a calculational system and a paradigm case formulation. You'll see that a calculational system is also something that will do the job of a definition. Since it will, one can represent your having that concept by representing your having mastered that calculational system.

Q. In paradigm case formulation, is not a finite amount of cases a result of—that process?

P. No. It's only finite because somebody is doing it, and human lives are finite, but in principle you could just keep adding transformations. But you'd have to do each one from the paradigm case.

Q. *Like as applied to a family or something like that, you'd have a finite number of cases.*

P. Yeah. You see, if you had to go on forever, you couldn't use it in place of a definition because you'd never finish. But likewise, if you're counting, you don't have to count forever. You just count as high as you want. The important thing is that you can understand that having a certain kind of concept can be represented by saying that you have mastered a certain calculational system. The reason that's important is that this concept of behavior that we just went through is a calculational system. When you learn the concept of behavior, what you learn amounts to a calculational system. You can use that one concept to generate an infinite set of forms of description of behavior just from having learned that one concept.

This is important because that, again, is one of the brute facts about human behavior; is that you're constantly doing things for the first time. People do not engage in repetitive, machine-like behavior; they do different things; they do novel things; and they do it routinely, not as exceptional things, but routinely.

The most obvious example is language. Every day of your lives, you encounter sentences that you never heard before, you utter sentences that you never uttered, and you don't do it by having practiced that sentence, either having practiced seeing it or hearing it, or having practiced uttering it. You do it essentially flawlessly the first time. Why? Because you don't have to learn it that way if you have it as the result of a calculational system. All you have to know is how to do that kind of calculation.

The same goes for behavior. You can easily recognize behavior that you never saw before, just as easily as you can understand a sentence that you never heard before. Why? Again, because what you have, when you have the concept of behavior, is a calculational system. Because it puts you in touch with all of these products, you can recognize one of them if you've never seen it before, or you can produce one of them if you've never done it before.

So in your own behavior, when it comes to doing something you never did before and certainly haven't practiced, you can do it because you can generate the concept of that particular behavior from the calculational system. And the observable variety and novelty of human behavior is such that nothing other than a calculational system approach will do justice to the variety and the novelty.

So one of our flags, as it were, when we start looking at theories, is to have this down in your book: How does this theorist handle the problem of novelty and flexibility in human behavior? How much justice does this theorist do to the fact that people do novel things routinely? And that makes for an interesting point of comparison among theorists, to see how well they do on that. As I say, the only way to do it justice is via a calculational system formulation.

It's one thing to say, "Behavior must be calculational, because look, we have this phenomenon of novelty and flexibility and creativity." It's another to say, "How? What calculational system?" We can do it by using that formula right here [Fig. 4]. The concept of behavior that we generated via the parametric analysis is our original element for a calculational system. The operations that we can perform on this—there are two major ones and two minor ones. The two major ones are substitution and deletion.

Now for this and some other purposes, I'm going to introduce a second notation as an alternative to this [the formula], and this notation is this [the diamond].




FIGURE 5

You can see that what it does is, it picks out the middle five out of these eight aspects of behavior and ignores the other three. So it represents a more limited concept of behavior than this [the formula]. But there's lots of times when this is all we want to talk about, and we don't want to talk about these other aspects [I, ID, S], and so it's nice to have a notation in which we're not carrying these extra things along all the time.

The other thing is that sometimes things come through easier with this notation [the diamond] because it's visual, it's diagrammatic, as against this one [the formula]. So you'll find that very often, in fact probably more than not. I will use this notation [the diamond], rather than the more complete one. We'll use this notation to illustrate the operation of substitution. How would you interpret this diagram [Fig. 6]?




FIGURE 6

Take it that these [small diamonds] are the representations of behavior just like these [the big one], so that you would have a K, W, KH, P - A.

Q. You're substituting *Know* by a description of two other behaviors?

P. That's close. What this is, is a representation of a behavior in which the distinction that's being made is the distinction between this behavior [left small diamond] and that one [right small diamond]. If I sit down in a

chair, and I do it on purpose, then I'm distinguishing between sitting down in a chair and any other behavior I know of. If I say, "That curtain is blue," I'm distinguishing blue from any other color I know. So normally, when you talk about distinctions that are being used or concepts that are being used, this is the one that's being used [left small diamond], and over here [right small diamonds] are all of the things that it contrasts with.

Q. *Would you give that definition again, of the two diamonds up there?*

P. This is a way of representing behavior in which the distinction that's being acted on is the distinction between this behavior and any other behavior. Notice that this is simply a special case of the general formula that says you're always making *some* distinction, that every behavior requires that some distinction be made. With this formula, you're specifying something about *which* distinction is being made, namely, you're specifying that one behavior is being distinguished from other behaviors.

Q. *You have three or four of those distinctions up there.*

P. Right.

Q. *Would you use that as a formula, so that the one on the left is always the one that's performed, or—*

P. No, just the one that's distinguished. You're specifying which distinction it is by putting some content up here, instead of just having K [on the big diamond]. And that's like in your colors, saying "a light color". There you're saying something about [the] brightness parameter. Here you're saying something about the K parameter, the cognitive parameter, and by saying something about it, you then distinguish a certain kind of behavior from any other behavior. The original unspecified one, you can use for any behavior whatever. As soon as you specify up here something about this parameter [K], then that will fit only some behaviors but not others. So you've succeeded in distinguishing some behaviors from others by specifying this one [left small diamond].

Q. *Does the behavior on the left correspond with the behavior represented by the larger diamond?*

P. Not necessarily. You see, if I say of him that he's sitting in a chair, my behavior here of saying that he's sitting in a chair involves distinguishing the behavior of sitting in a chair. But that behavior is different from this one [the big diamond]. So it's not necessarily the same one. Describing behavior requires one behavior of describing, and the other of whatever the behavior

is that you are describing. So in general, these are not the same.

On the other hand, the special case where they are the same is of considerable importance. When you have this one [K on big diamond] being the same as this one [K on small diamond], what does that represent? Remember that this is merely cognitive, what you're distinguishing. If the behavior you're distinguishing is the same as the behavior that you're engaging in—?

Q. *That you know what you're doing?*

P. That's right. Anybody who does something and knows what he's doing has got to be represented this way. If you're sitting in the chair and know it, then your behavior of sitting in the chair also involves making the distinction between that behavior and any other, so to describe or represent an individual who knows what he's doing, you need specifically this kind of representation [Fig. 6], because this one [Fig. 5] won't do. All this one [Fig. 5] says is that something is being distinguished. This is how you can specify that what is being distinguished is exactly the same as what's being done.

Q. *Can you give an example of otherwise, of not knowing what you're doing?*

P. All of the interesting ones are going to be of the unconscious motivation type. Notice that there's nothing that says that you have to distinguish the behavior you're engaging in, and because you don't have to be distinguishing the behavior you're engaging in, there is a place and a possibility for engaging in some behavior that you don't know about. As I say, the interesting ones are the unconscious motivation ones.

Q. *If you're sitting in a chair but you're not thinking about the fact that you're sitting in a chair?*

P. It doesn't matter. If you know you're sitting in a chair, you don't have to be thinking about it. We decide that you knew it by asking you and having you tell us, but you wouldn't have to be thinking it to yourself all the way through.

Q. *What about the case where there are two—two operating simultaneously?*

P. Remember the case of doing one thing by doing another. You might know the first one without knowing the second one. Or to put it differently, if one gives a representation of your behavior, potentially you may know any part of it, and you may not know any part of it. There's no part of it that

couldn't be unconscious, there's no part of it that has to be. So for a particular case, you can divide it any way you want as to how much of a person's behavior is something he knows he's doing. And that's one of those things that different observers are going to disagree mightily on because it's not an easy task. But you can give this kind of description, and this kind of notation gives you the tool with which to do it.

Ordinarily, we expect that a person knows what he's doing, and that's why it's so hard to find exceptions. Because just normal, everyday behavior, you'd just automatically take it for granted that the person doing it knows what he's doing.

For example, there's no question in my mind whatever that you all know that you're sitting in class, that you're sitting in a chair, that you're hearing a lecture, or any of these things. I wouldn't even bother to ask you. And when you go to the grocery store and buy a loaf of bread; or when you walk down the hall and say hello to somebody; or when you see somebody getting in a car and driving away, you just automatically take it that they know what they're doing.

And in the special cases where we think that a person doesn't know what he's doing, we have a strong tendency to lock him up, either for his protection or for ours or both. Because a person who doesn't know what he's doing is dangerous.




FIGURE 7

Let me quickly now introduce another substitution, namely, down here [Fig. 7, W] If substitution up here [K] is a way of specifying what is being distinguished, then substituting down here is a way of specifying what is wanted. This is the Want parameter, W. So substituting here is a way of specifying something about what is wanted.

What's the implication of substituting the formula for behavior here? What can this be used to represent that the other one can't? You're specifying something about motivation.

Q. *That distinguishes the want in this case from other wants?*

P. Yeah, it will. And specifically, what can you say about it? Just formally, you can say that what's represented is that this [top W] is the behavior that's wanted, and the success of this behavior will be if that that behavior is what occurs.

So now if you ask *what can this be used to represent*, the answer is: *an individual who not only knows what he's doing, but does it on purpose*. That is, he's choosing this behavior. The doing of that behavior is something he wants, and he does it. So what he does, we normally say he does on purpose. He chose that behavior over and against whatever alternatives he had.

This, too, is part of our paradigm case person. We normally take it for granted that not only do people know what they're doing, but they do it on purpose. And again, if we have somebody that we think is not choosing his behavior, we lock him up, too. We say he's out of control.

So these kinds of representations are the kind we need to get at some of the fundamental things about people as we normally take them to be.

Notice, however, that we're not committed to saying anything. All I've said here is that this is the kind of individual that is represented by this diagram, but I haven't said that everybody is like that; and if you didn't believe that, you could use this to deny that people are like that, the same way that I pointed to the house and said, "That's what my house looks like." I could have pointed to it and said, "That's not what my house looks like." Likewise, here I can point to this [the diamonds] and say, "That's how normal people behave." But you might point to the same thing and say, "That's not how normal people behave." So this is a vehicle both of understanding, of representation, and disagreement. We're still operating neutrally with this, not saying something.

Okay, we'll continue this tomorrow. By tomorrow, you should have the Outlines, and some of this material will be in the Outline.

SESSION 3

July 14, 1976

Peter: Are there any questions from last time? [laughter] I didn't say laughter; I said questions.

Q. *The answer is, apparently, "Yes."*

Q. *I read through your Outline last night. I noticed that yesterday's lecture was contained in the Outline. To me, your lectures seem a lot more clear than the Outline. I think I'm going to have to read it through about three times—*

P. That's why I said that the Outline is just an outline, and I will be expanding on it in the lecture. I don't take it that you could just read the Outline like a textbook and get the material. It's more like class notes that—you know, they don't do the job.

But what happened was that you don't get closure on this stuff until we finish, pretty much; and originally, when I just lectured without notes, people would get very uptight because they couldn't see where it was going, they didn't know how far along we were, etc.; and so I just whipped up these notes and said, "Okay, there it all is, and now you know what we're going to be covering, you know where we are at any given time, and that helps to introduce order and meaning into this." And I think it does help that way. But certainly I would not hand that Outline to somebody to read.

By the way, they have more copies of that Outline. They originally got 28; they had 28 in the bookstore yesterday, and will get a few more today. So by the end of the day, today, they should have enough for everybody.

Q. *About the midterm exam—*

P. The timing of the midterm, I think, is either after we finish the Outline or after we do the exercises on assessment of individual people. Either one of those two places is close enough to the middle, and there's a good end-point. The alternative, by the way, is to give you 15 minute tests like every Friday, or something like that. And somehow I find that that breaks

up the day, so I'd rather just have one in the middle and let it go. Whatever the timing, the major part of the midterm will be the Descriptive Outline, so that will be the major content. And we'll try to have a question and answer session just before, so that you can review, and whatever questions you have then, you still have a chance to ###. Okay, any other questions from last time?

What we were doing, we were going through the derivation of different forms of description. I introduced the idea of a calculational system as a way of representing the concept of Behavior, and then made use of the calculational system in the form of Element-Operation Product to start generating some of the complexity that's concealed in that simple formula.




FIGURE 1





FIGURE 2

These first two [Figs. 1 and 2], in which we performed the operation of substitution on the formula, and wound up with a new formula. We had these two, and these will have names [Cognizant Action Description and Deliberate Action Description]. There's a table—one of the appendices in the Outline has all of these, including their names.

Remember, the practical guideline in this notion of substitution is that you substitute in one of the parameters, and what you're doing by substitution is simply specifying the value of that parameter. So if you substitute for the cognitive parameter, you're simply specifying part of the value of the cognitive parameter. If you substitute in the motivational parameter, you're simply specifying part of the content of that motivational parameter. A third substitution is here in the performance parameter, and I've drawn it differently because, as you'll see later, it's more convenient to

have the diamond inside right here rather than outside, the way it is on the others. But it has no further significance.



Significance
Description

FIGURE 3

Now what does this diagram represent? If, in substituting here, we're specifying the value of that performance parameter, what would this represent? When it comes to substitution, you just do it kind of mechanically. What you have here is a behavior in which the performance is another behavior. This case we've already seen before, because the relation of these two behaviors $[B_1, B_2]$ is that of significance.

You remember I said that with significance, whenever you have a case of doing one behavior by doing the other behavior, the relation between them is that the second is the significance of the first. So in this case, this behavior here $[B_2]$ is the significance of this behavior $[B_1]$ because you're doing B_2 by doing B_1 . As I commented, it's these descriptions—if you start with ordinary behaviors like what somebody said, or the fact that he's sitting talking, or that he said a particular thing—most or all of the clinically interesting examples come from going the next step. What was he doing by saying *that*? What was he doing by doing *that*? And those are the kinds of answers that interest us as clinicians.

Q. But your diagram there doesn't include the significance. You just add that in there?

P. No. The significance *is* this second behavior. Now if you were describing this behavior $[B_1]$, indeed you would put this behavior $[B_2]$ as the significance. That would be in the description of $[B_1]$. $[B_2]$ *is* the significance of $[B_1]$. So you do it by filling in here $[B_2]$.

Now the reason that it's convenient to have the thing on the inside is that you often want to ask, "But what's the significance of this one $[B_2]$?" Then you simply draw another diamond $[B_3]$ and it's easy to do. And if you want to ask what's the significance of that one, you simply extend, and you can do that as many times as you want, and it's very convenient.

One of our exercises will indeed involve looking at some interactions between people and doing this kind of analysis and diagram to see what sense it makes. That will be one of the exercises we do during that third week.

Q. —?

P. When you wind up, one of the diamonds is on the outside, and the other is on the inside. The outside diamond is the significance of the inside diamond. The outside diamond is the meaning of the inside one. The outside one is what you're doing, or what you're up to, by doing the inside one.

At some later time, particularly if you get into the business of giving descriptions like that, you'll appreciate how easy this is. I don't mean how easy it is to give the actual description. I mean a contrast to certain systems of thought that give you access to this, but you have to work like heck because there's so much apparatus required and so much postulated in order to talk about this other thing that is the meaning of what you normally say. And psychoanalytic theory is a prime example, and we'll go through that, and you'll see. In this way, you just go through it directly with no fuss or bother.

That's the third form of description that you get by a substitution operation. So these two [Cognitive and Deliberate Action Descriptions] get you at some of the things that we have in mind normally with people, that everybody has in mind with people, whether you're a psychologist or not. You always take it that normally the people around you, and you yourself, know what you're doing and do what you're doing on purpose.

Q. *Deliberate action requires cognitive action?*

P. Right.

There is a connection between these two that I didn't mention before, and I'll mention now. Any value of the W parameter has got to be included in the value of the K parameter, because you can't want something if you can't distinguish it. You have to distinguish it in order to pick out that as what it is you want. So that's why here [Fig. 2, p. 28] we have two diamonds, one for the Want and if it's in the Want, then it has to be up here in the

cognitive parameter, too.

Q. *Could you repeat that?*

P. Yeah. You can't have a substitution only in the W, without also having it in the K, because whatever it is you want, you must be discriminating it from other things. And that's why when we substitute a behavior here [W], we have to do it up here [K], too. So there is this kind of connection between these two parameters, between the Want and the Know. Whatever is in this place [W] has to be up here [K], too.

Social Practice
Description




FIGURE 3A

We have one more that is of interest: this one is a substitution in the Achievement parameter. Remember, Achievement parameter talks about what the result, what the outcome is, what difference the behavior makes. So this diagram, where you substitute in the Achievement parameter, represents a case in which this behavior [B] is the outcome or result of this behavior [A].

Q. *Would you be able to give an example?*

P. Yeah. I just did. A question and an answer is a prime example of this. The behavior of giving the answer is a result of, an outcome of the behavior of asking the question. The easiest example is if you see somebody and you say hello, and they say hello. Their greeting is a return of your greeting, so their behavior is the outcome of your behavior. Or if I throw a piece of chalk at you, you reach up and catch it, your catching it is the outcome of my throwing it to you.

Q. *But if I just put up my hand to keep from being hit by the piece of chalk?*

P. That's still the outcome, if you do it in response to my throwing it.

Q. *The significance of it is something else, because it's not the desired—or, assuming you want me to catch the piece of chalk.*

P. Yeah. This doesn't have to be the desired result. In fact, as you well know, given these examples, a lot of times the result you get from other people is not the desired result.

Q. *The example about ###?*

P. Okay. I just did that, too. If I'm going to take a drink from that cup. I can't just reach out and do it. But if I first step over here, then I can reach out and do it. So the second one of simply reaching out and doing it is a result of the first one, which is stepping close enough to do that. So when you're dealing with one person, usually this sequence is simply the sequence in how you get something done, and doing the first one puts you in a position to do the second one, which when you've done that, puts you in a position to do the third one, and so forth until you've got it all done.

Q. *How's the connection between the two behaviors established? What criteria are you using that assigns cause and effect?*

P. Separate this kind of problem from what we're doing. With respect to any of these forms of description, you're going to be faced with a problem: if you actually use it to give a description, how do you know you're right?

The question, "How do you know you're right?" is a different question from what it is you're doing. There has to be something that you're doing before you're in a position to ask, "How do I know it's right?" And we're only talking about "it". We're not dealing yet with the issue of how do you know you're right. And the reason is that asking, "How do I know I'm right?" is itself simply one form of behavior which, unless you systematize it, if you just leave it in as a wild card, it'll ruin the whole thing. If you always ask, "How do I know?" you wind up with the conclusion that you don't know anything and that nobody ever did.

And that's why you can't just allow that as a wild card. You have to examine that as a form of behavior and ask. "What sort of behavior is that? Where does it make sense?" Because it makes sense on a given occasion, like when I'm warning you about that ceiling; or on other occasions it's nonsense, like if I go out and stand out there and say, "Watch out." It all depends on the occasion whether you're doing something that has any point if you ask, "How do I know?"

As you can see, one of the new things that's introduced here is the possibility of more than one person. All these [other diamonds] have to do with single behaviors, and every behavior is someone's behavior, so if you have only one behavior, you can have only one person. But now here [Fig. 3A], since you have two behaviors, you can have more than one person. So the primary interest of this is that it gives you access now to patterns of behavior, patterns that involve more than one single behavior; and there, once more,

the primary patterns of interest are those that involve more than one person. So you have access to social patterns of behavior, patterns of social behavior.

Now there is a connection between these two forms of description [Significance and Social Practice], namely, that whenever you are engaging in some pattern of behavior that is larger than a single behavior, that pattern that you're engaging in is one of the significances of your behavior. So for example, if we're sitting down here playing chess, playing chess is a pattern of behavior that involves more than one behavior. On this occasion, I move Pawn to King 4. If you were describing that behavior of moving Pawn to King 4, one of the descriptions you would give up here for the significance of that is, "I'm playing chess." So whenever you have a pattern of behavior, that pattern is the significance of the particular behavior that is involved in it. Playing chess is what I'm doing by moving Pawn to King 4, just like warning you is what I'm doing to saying, "Watch out."

These are the four major forms of description stemming from substitution operations. Are there any questions or discussion about those four?

Q. *What's the name of the fourth?*

P. The name of the fourth is Social Practice Description. Social practices are patterns of social behavior, and that is going to be an important enough concept for us so that at a later time, we'll develop a more detailed format for giving descriptions of or representations of social practices. Just doing it in diamond form will not get you enough of the right kind of information, so we need a more detailed one, and we'll do that later. Here, I want to stress the continuity, that you get the notion of a pattern of behavior by performing operations on this one single concept, so that it's not just something totally different from any of the other stuff. It's part of the same conceptual system.


You might wonder why we call these "descriptions" instead of just "kinds of behavior", because here, for these four, for every form of description there is also a different kind of behavior. And if we only had these four, we wouldn't be calling them "forms of description"; we'd be calling them "kinds of behavior".

But with this operation [Deletion], what we generate are ways of talking that don't correspond to differences in the phenomena. They are just forms of description. So there's a point in talking about these [Substitutions] as generating forms of description or ways of talking as against types of phenomena.

The reason for having this kind of operation and that form of description is that oftentimes, you don't want to talk about everything there is to talk about behavior. Just as, if you're talking about tables, sometimes you only want to talk about their color; you don't want to talk about their size, their shape, or whatever. Or sometimes you only want to talk about the area, and you don't want to talk about the color or the mass or the location. So with deletion operations, we give ourselves a chance to talk only about some aspects of behavior, and leave other aspects out.

Deletion

Activity
Description



And the first one we do that way is this [Fig. 4], and that's an Activity Description, and in the Activity Description, you do deletion here in the motivational parameter, and what you're left with is a form of description in which you're not saying anything about the motivation.

Now there's two main reasons why you might want to talk that way. One, there are plenty of cases where you can give descriptions of behavior, except that you don't know about the motivation; and since you don't know, you don't want to commit yourself. So you talk in a way that doesn't commit you. You give an Activity Description.

The second reason why you might want to talk that way is that whether or not you know about the motivation, it doesn't matter. For example, giving rules of games, I think, is one of the better examples. If you were going to describe chess or tennis or baseball as a form of behavior, you would not talk about the people's motivations, because it doesn't matter why somebody does these things as long as he makes the right moves. As long as he does the right things, it doesn't matter what his motivation is.

So in the representation of social practices, you almost inevitably are going to use Activity Descriptions, because what you're interested in is a pattern that, as far as you're concerned, does not depend on motivation. The participants in that pattern don't have to be motivated in any particular way to be engaging in that pattern. As long as they are performing in the right way, making the right distinctions, and the performances are not accidental, they're playing that game.

As psychologists, clearly, we're going to be interested in social patterns,

because that's where you find one of the prime areas of lawfulness in human behavior. The same way that when two people are playing chess, their behavior is lawful because there are rules of chess, and they're following those rules. When people are having dinner, or having a conversation, or building an automobile, or driving to work, those things are also patterns of behavior. And since they're engaging in those patterns, their behavior has that regularity. And it makes that kind of sense. It isn't merely regular; it's also intelligible.

Q. *It's only when they violate the rules that you are concerned about motivation?*

P. No. A lot of violations of rules, you explain just on the ground that they didn't know how, so still you're not necessarily engaged in motivation. There's a different class of violations where you are, but then what you do is, you introduce a new pattern and say, "That's the one he's engaging in, and he's just going through the motions of this one;" or, "That's what he's really up to, even though visibly he's doing this." Any case where you have an ulterior motive, you can do that.

Q. *Can't the pattern be the significance of the behavior?*

P. Yeah. You see, what you have then are two patterns, one of which is only being done in this sense, that he's going through the right motions. The other is being done in the full sense in that he is motivated. And it's usually less visible—that's why you call it an ulterior motive.

Deletion

Performance
Description




FIGURE 5

If we delete these three aspects of behavior [K, W, KH], what we are left with is talking about the Performance and the Achievement. If you recall, I said that the Performance gets at the process or procedural aspects of behavior and mostly that amounts to—or colloquially, we talk about this as 'movement'. In point of fact, you would have to say 'movement' or 'posture', because we're not always moving.

Now, there are a lot of movements that are not behavior, so a description of this sort will give you a description of behavior which is of the sort that doesn't distinguish it from movement.

Let's anchor on a couple of easy examples. You know that ordinarily if somebody moves his hand toward your eye very rapidly and gets close, you blink your eye, and you do that involuntarily. Or if somebody taps you here in the right place, and you're sitting properly, your knee will jerk without—it does it on its own. Those are examples of movement that you would not call 'behaviors'. Why? Because there's no motivation, and they are not the exercise of any kind of competence.

But those two examples have this particular feature, that you can also do them on purpose. If I ask you to blink your eye right now, there's nobody here that I would take it couldn't do that. Well, when your eye blinks, there's no difference in that movement. There's nothing different there in the case where your eye blinks or in the case where you blink your eye. And yet one of those is a behavior and the other isn't.

Likewise, if I ask you to flex your knee, you could do that, too; and again, in the movement of your leg, there's going to be no difference in general between the movement when I tap your knee and the movement when you just swing your leg. So movement-wise, Performance Description-wise, there's no difference between jerking your knee or your knee jerking; and there's no difference between blinking your eye and your eye blinking.

Sometimes, that's all we're interested in. Recall, last time I said that psychologists have studied performances an awful lot under the heading of Behavior. It's often convenient to study performances because they are right there, they are here and now, and they're *all* there here and now. There's no parts of them that are somewhere else, some other time, some other place. They're all right here and now, and that makes it convenient to inspect.

Deletion

Achievement
Description




FIGURE 6

Here [Fig. 6], we've wiped out everything except the Achievement parameter, so naturally enough, we call that an Achievement Description. In this kind of description, we are only talking about the outcome, the results, the difference that the behavior made. And the two easiest examples. I think, are products and test-scores.

If I make a cup out of clay, you can point to that cup as the product of my behavior, as the outcome, as the achievement. You say, "He made that." Or if you give me a test and I score 83 on it, that test-score is an achievement. Or if I have an accident, and I total my car, totaling the car is an achievement. It's living dangerously, to be sure, but it's an achievement.

One of the distinctive features about achievement descriptions is that you may or may not be able to reconstruct anything about the rest of the behavior. If you just have a test score on me, and the test score is 83, there is very little that you could reconstruct about the behavior that produced it. At most, if you know what kind of test it is, you know that I sat around and gave answers to questions; or that I had to do some arithmetic problems; or that I had to repeat some numbers, things of that sort. That's only if you know the test. If all you know is that I got 83, or that I got an IQ of 113, it would be very difficult for you to reconstruct what my behaviors were, just from knowing about that aspect.

In contrast, if you have a performance description, it's a lot easier, practically speaking, to reconstruct what some of these others [W, K, KH] are. If you have a videotape or an audiotape of an interview of one of you with me, that audiotape is a product of both my behavior and the interviewer's behavior. From that audiotape or videotape, you have a good chance of reconstructing a lot of the behavior.

Q. *With that performance description, you also talk about an outcome, an achievement?*

P. Yeah. It's not easy to separate performance and achievement if you're dealing with a behavior at all. If you're not dealing with a behavior at all, like if you're just looking at the clock, then it's easy. But if you want to deal with behavior at all, this [Performance Description] is the closest thing, and the reason is clear. Both of these [P and A], in contrast to these [K, W, KH] are here and now. If I make that cup, that result is there at the same time that my making it is there. So there is a closer connection between these two, and that's why it's hard to separate them.

Q. *But they can be separated?*

P. They can, as you can see here. You can separate the cup from these.

The other thing is that it's easy to get a record of both performance and achievement, or if not a record, the thing itself. The cup lasts, and you can carry it around, and you can have different people inspect it, and you can come back and look at it another time. My behavior of doing it, you can't

carry around, you can't look at again more closely, you can't show it to other people and see if they agree with you about it, because when it's gone, it's gone. But the result or the record of it, if you have a videotape of it, that you can carry around, that you can study over and over again, that you can have different people look at.

So again, it's much more convenient, technologically speaking, to study performances and achievements, because you can make records, and those records are portable, and you can make records that are relatively permanent. So you shouldn't be surprised to find that psychologists have been studying performances and achievements, and doing it by making records of them, doing it by having a lot of people looking at them, doing those things that obviously you can do.

Q. *[about KH]*

P. Remember the two examples I gave of blinking your eye or jerking your leg. From the movement itself, since the movement doesn't require the competence—because after all, you can do it on a reflex basis—that performance is not logically tied into the competence. It's only if you've got behavior here that it's tied in.

But if you want to be neutral as to whether you have behavior, then you don't put in competence. You just put in the movements. Or think of the other example I gave you yesterday, of stumbling as I walk in the door. There, too, you have a movement, and yet if I stumbled by accident, that whole thing is not an exercise of competence. It is just movement. On the other hand, if I'm the clown at the circus, and I do that, then it is.

But if you just want to study the dynamics of the movement, or if you want to study how soft the floor has to be before I injure myself, you don't care whether it's competence. You want the performance and the achievement.

But basically, you can separate any of these [parameters of behavior] that you want. You can take any one, any two, any three, any four, five, six, seven, or eight of the aspects of behavior to talk about. You might have some reason for any particular choice. These simply represent the kind of choices that are common, that when it comes to talking only about some aspects of behavior and not others, these are the kinds of things that have, in fact, commonly been done.

Q. *What about the distinction with K? Wouldn't you be distinguishing, when you're stumbling through the door, that you were stumbling through the*

door and not walking through the door?

P. Yeah, but again, you might not be interested in whether I distinguish it or not, if you're just interested in the stumbling. Likewise, if I tap your knee and your knee jerks, almost certainly you're distinguishing that, too; but since your distinguishing that is not part of its happening, because it would happen whether you were distinguishing it or not—

Q. *You're sitting in a chair whether you're distinguishing it as a chair or not, too.*

P. Yeah, right. If I'm only interested in your posture, then I do this [Performance Description, Fig. 5]. I am indeed not interested in whether you know you're sitting, or why you would want to sit, or what kind of competence you're exercising. If I'm designing chairs, for example, and I see you sitting this way and that way, and I measure to see how it fits or whether you're squeezed, all I care about is this [P]; and even though I take it that you do know this and that you're doing it on purpose because I asked you, that's not part of what I'm studying.

Q. *Then where would the K fit in, in overall behavior with Want and Know-How?*

P. In just the way we've set.

Q. *Would you have to distinguish it then? Would you have to make a conscious distinguishing that you're sitting in a chair, for it to fit into the—*

P. No. In general, with this formula for behavior, you've got to make some distinction. You couldn't sit in the chair if you couldn't tell where the chair was. But there's one distinction you don't have to make in order to sit in the chair, and that's the distinction of sitting-in-the-chair. You don't have to know that you're doing it in order to make the proper distinctions for doing it.

If that sounds fuzzy, just imagine not you, but a white rat, and imagine a common experiment in which you train the rat to jump to the blue triangle instead of the white circle, and clearly you can train the rat to jump here instead of there. So you can say that he can distinguish the blue triangle from the white circle, and so he will jump to the blue triangle when he's hungry, because that's where we fed him. And all of that is nice. And then you say, "Ah, one of the things that he is not distinguishing is the behavior of jumping to the blue triangle." He doesn't need to distinguish that in order to jump to the blue triangle. All he needs to distinguish is the blue triangle. So he

can jump to the blue triangle without knowing that it's a blue triangle, and without knowing that that's what he's doing, because all he really needs to discriminate is blue triangle.

Q. *Okay, but why isn't that the same ###?*

P. It is. Remember, I said that these do not correspond to phenomena. These are only ways of talking. So here [Figs. 4, 5, 6], when we delete these [W, K, KH], we are not assuming that there is a phenomenon that has only these things [e. g., P, A]. We're assuming that the phenomenon is of this sort [Element in Fig. 1, p. 48—the full diamond], but we're only talking about these aspects of it. It's like saying, "If I only want to talk about the surface area of the table, I don't assume that there's something there that only has surface, there. I know that there's a table with a shape, a size, a location, but I don't want to talk about those; I only want to talk about that aspect. So likewise here, with these descriptions, we only want to talk about these aspects, but what there is, there, is this whole thing [the Element diamond]. So we're just not talking about some aspects of it.

Q. *So any one of them that you're talking about exists alone.*

P. No, we're saying they don't exist alone.

Q. *They don't exist alone, but when you're talking about them, you can talk about them as existing by itself.*

P. It may sound that way, but don't do it. For example, if I talk about 'the length' and 'the width', it may sound as though there's something there that just consists of length and width, but since we all know that that's not so, we just take that in stride.

Q. *Do you only use performance descriptions for aspects of behavior that could be on a reflex level, like posture but not ###?*

P. Yeah. That's not *why* you do it, but it follows from the nature of a performance description that when you talk that way, it could be a non-behavior.

Q. *You couldn't give a performance description, then, of tying your shoes?*

P. Yeah, because here you're not saying it's a reflex. You're just talking about it in such a way that if it were a reflex, that way of talking would still be applicable.

Q. *So you can talk about motivation without discrimination?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *Although that doesn't occur.*

P. That's right. It's like being able to talk about size without shape. Although it doesn't occur by itself, you can talk about it by itself. That's one of the key features of language, is that you can have a lot of things there and only talk about some of them, that language is a way of getting at only some aspects of things instead of having to deal with the whole complex world. We only deal with some aspects, with some facts.

Q. *You can have all those things without talking about them, but this involuntary reflex, that—you're saying—is not a behavior. Does that mean stumbling through the door is not a behavior if there's no intentionality?*

P. Right.

Q. *So in other words, a behavior has to have all those aspects you listed, even though you may not talk about them.*

P. Right. That's why I say that these are just ways of talking.

Q. *One thing I'd like to know, then: if our behavior must have all those aspects [tape ends] ###?*

P. Remember, I said you don't have to distinguish any behavior that you do. You have to make some distinctions, but you don't have to distinguish the behavior that you're engaging in. The rat has to distinguish the triangle from the circle, but he doesn't have to distinguish his own behavior. So it takes some distinction to engage in that behavior, but one of the distinctions that is not required is distinguishing the behavior itself. The behavior of jumping to the triangle is a different concept than the triangle. It's a different distinction. The only distinction it takes to engage in the behavior is the triangle. You don't have to distinguish the behavior in order to engage in it.

But as I say, you think about white rats that way. If you're talking about a person, normally, you're so used to taking it for granted that a person knows what he's doing and does it on purpose, that it seems artificial, and indeed it is. It would be a strange person who behaved that way, who did things and didn't know that that's what he was doing.

But recall what I said yesterday, too, that it's the fact that you don't have to know what you're doing in order to do it, that leaves room for some interesting sorts of descriptions along the lines of unconscious motivation. If you had to know what you were doing in order to do it, there couldn't be any such thing as unconscious motivation. You would always know everything about

what you were doing, and clearly you don't, because oftentimes you re-think something and you say, "Oh, no. I was doing such-and-such."

So you don't just automatically know whatever it is you're doing. What happens is that you always have available *a* description of what you're doing, but not every description that you could have. As I say, that's where some of our more interesting problems and procedures are, in dealing with those things that people are doing that they don't know they're doing. It's a therapist's stock in trade, his being able to see what people are doing that they themselves don't know. Or a coach. A coach can tell that you're holding your elbow too high, and tell you about it, and you're doing it, but you don't know that that's what you're doing.

Q. *But you know you're playing football—*

P. That's why I say that you always have *a* description of what you're doing, and it's usually not incorrect, but there are other descriptions that are correct and applicable that you often don't have.

Q. *If you train the rat to jump to the blue triangle, then that rat has to have the ability to discriminate the jumping behavior from all the rest of the behaviors*

P. No. He just needs to be able to do it, and do it when he sees the blue triangle. That's why the discrimination he needs is the triangle, not the jumping.

Q. *Yeah, but you reinforce it, or whatever, to train him in some way to discriminate that behavior from his entire behavioral repertoire.*

P. No. You've trained him to discriminate the triangle.

Q. *What if you want him to jump instead of walk over to it? Then he has to discriminate jumping from walking.*

P. No, he doesn't.

Q. *Then how does he know which one to do?*

P. He doesn't. He just does it. He will regularly jump instead of walk because you only reinforce the jumping, but that doesn't—

Q. *Okay, but he's still...got to discriminate what is reinforced and what isn't reinforced.*

P. No. Let's see if I can think of a parallel logic here. If you have a motor and the motor will only run when it's got gasoline in it, you don't say that the

motor has to discriminate the gasoline in order to run. All it has to do is have the gasoline in order to run, but it doesn't have to discriminate—

Q. *The rat has to be alive in order to jump.*

P. And it has to be hungry, and it has to distinguish those things, but then what happens is: it does that, and it doesn't have to discriminate the doing of it any more than a motor needs to discriminate its own activity in order to operate. It only has to have the necessary conditions.

Q. *You can't train a motor to perform on command.*

P. You can get it to operate under the right conditions, and you can get a rat to operate under the right conditions, too. And if you loosen up those main bearings that hold the cam shaft, it'll operate differently. And if you starve that rat for 15 hours instead of eight, it'll operate differently. So you operate with rats and machinery in a causal way. You say, "If I do this, it'll do that. Under these conditions, it will do that." And somewhere within that, if it's a rat, he will also have to be making distinctions, but he doesn't have to be distinguishing everything he does.

Q. *You have to admit that the rat is responding to the same principles as the 1-1/2 horsepower Briggs and Stratton.*

P. How's that?

Q. *Well, I mean, a lawnmower motor doesn't operate according to the same principles as a rat, any more than a rat operates in the same way as—*

P. No, but there are some similarities, because you can give causal descriptions in both cases, and that's what I'm talking about, that under certain conditions, something will happen whether he knows about it or not.

Q. *What's the line between what you have to discriminate to call it a behavior, and what you don't? Because like in an involuntary reflex, like the eye blinking, physiologically you have to distinguish that there's something there, to blink your eye, so in fact the discrimination has occurred and a behavior has occurred, even though you're saying that that's not ###.*

P. For the eye blink, you may need this [K] but you don't need that [W]. There's no motivation that goes with that eye blink.

Q. *Yes, there is. You don't want your eye hurt. You don't want something to get in it, so you shut it.*

P. If you do this with infants small enough to not know about getting hurt, they'll still do it. If you do this with organisms that you would

absolutely swear couldn't conceive of being hurt, because they're not that smart, they'll do it, too. So you know you have a phenomenon that doesn't take any motivation—not the kind that we have. Not the kind that you have when you sit around saying, "I'll get my eye hurt if it hits me." It doesn't take that to have your eye blink.

But that is the difference if that's what's going on. If you're sitting around saying, "I'll get hurt so I'd better close my eye," that's a behavior.

Q. *Can you take that into phobics? You've got a phobic where he's got that same kind of ###, stimulus or a conditioned response or ###?*

P. You can approach it either way.

Q. *### would not be a behavior, because it's linked in some way to a—*

P. You can approach it either way, and it has been approached both ways. You can approach that it is indeed just as causal consequence, and what you need to do is change those causal conditions. Or you can take it that he really is afraid of something, but not what he seems to be afraid of, and so you start looking for the symbolic significance of the thing he's afraid of. And phobias have been handled successfully both ways.

The difference between those two approaches is one of those differences I was talking about, where people will disagree about people. Theorists and therapists will disagree about phobias in just that way. Again, that's one of the brute facts of the matter.

Q. *So, in effect, your descriptions are aligning themselves to those particular—*

P. No, saying that you can use this either way. If you have somebody who has a phobia, and he's afraid, say, of open doors, you can turn to this symbolic significance description [Fig. 3, p. 49] and say, "The open door reminds him of such-and-such and that's what he's really afraid of," and then start treating him for that fear. Or you can give a form of description which is two steps down the line, which is a cause-effect description, and say, "What we have is a reflex, what amounts to a conditioned reflex, with this as the stimulus, and what we've got to do is de-sensitize that." Either way, there's a formula here for representing the state of affairs that you want to describe.

Q. *Okay, you have a couple of different descriptions to describe the same phenomenon.*

P. Yeah. You see, the point of seeing that you have all of these forms of description available is to emphasize that an Observer has the choice of

how he describes things, that the bare fact that there's something out there doesn't causally make you describe it correctly. As an Observer, you've got to take your pick about how you're going to describe it, and that's going to be *your* behavior. What we're simply doing is looking at the kind of ingredients that give you the kind of representations that people can have for behaviors. It's not saying, "This is how it is."

Q. *So for there to be behavior, there have to be all these parameters, and if you're missing, like, W, there is no motivation and you're not calling it 'behavior'.*

Q. *That's not the only one. If a different parameter is missing, then it's not behavior, too.*

P. Right. Now notice that even that doesn't commit you to any facts. If you thought that no behavior was motivated, you'd simply say, "This [Activity Description] will be the normal form of description that's applicable to what we see around us." So just the fact that we have a schema that contains these for behavior is not committing yourself that what you normally call 'behavior' has all of those. It's simply that if you wanted to, you've got it available.

If you don't want that much, you've got these more deficient forms. And you can take your pick of using these for convenience, or for a special purpose, or because you believe that that's the way things are.

Q. *You can use these to describe reflexes?*

P. Yeah, you give this kind [Performance] of description. And then you have to add, "And what there is there isn't of this sort." This description is neutral; it will not say that it is a reflex, and it won't say that it isn't. But you can engage in a second behavior that clarifies that as far as you're concerned, there isn't any, and that that is a complete description.

Q. *So a clinician could ### all those possibilities in his head, and then because they don't know which is right or wrong, go through and test for the correct diagram?*

P. No. There's an infinite set of possibilities. What happens is, if you don't know or are not sure, usually there's only a small number of possibilities that you're going to take seriously, and then you do some checking as to which one looks best. And if you can't get good checks—one way of getting good checks is to treat it as being one or another, and see if you can get away with it. That's what you do every day. That's the normal way of dealing, is to

take it that things are as they seem, act accordingly, and if you don't get into any trouble, who's to say otherwise?

Remember the issue of walking in that door and sitting in that chair. You took it that it was a chair, you treated it accordingly, and so far as I can see, you're getting away with it. Now if you had stopped and said, "But that doesn't satisfy me. I want to know: is it *really* a chair?" you'd be here next year still trying to find out *is it really a chair?* There's no way of finding out for sure, absolutely, completely.

And behavior is not of that sort. You don't spend your life really making sure. You take it that it's the way it looks unless you have reason to think that it's deceptive, and then you make some checks. If the checks satisfy you, you don't make every other check you could. You stop there and treat it as a chair.

Just think how different life would be if you had to always be checking on everything. Literally, it would be impossible. The kind of lives we lead would be literally impossible if you had to check on everything. And if you even went a little bit in that direction, life would be extraordinarily different. But we'll get to that kind of consideration later, too.

Identity




FIGURE 7

Okay, I said that deletion and substitution were the major forms of operation. There's a couple of minor ones that we can go through quickly. There is this operation called Identity. You don't do anything to it. You just leave it alone and put it over here as a product. This operation is like adding zero or multiplying by one. It's just a formal move that leaves you with exactly the same thing you had.

And since it is purely a formal move, you can expect that the reason is a purely formal reason; and it is, namely, that what you want to be able to do

is make some simple statements, and in this system, the simple statement is that all of the products are forms of description. Since this is itself a form of description, you want it out here as a product, not merely as your original element, and that's why you put in an identity operation to have it as a product. Then you can say simply, "It is the products of this system that are the forms of description of behavior." So that's a formal thing that you don't have to worry too much about. It simply gives you back your starting formula as one of the forms of description.

Reduction

Cause-Effect Description




FIGURE 8

In the reduction operation, what you do is, you eliminate the distinctions among parameters, so you no longer distinguish cognitive, motivational, and competence. You simply lump them all together and don't make that distinction. Likewise, you lump together performance and achievement and don't make that distinction. Then what you wind up with here are two distinctions instead of five. You have a form of representation that has two elements instead of five. Here we have five; here we wind up with two. And what you wind up with is a cause-effect description. Cause-effect descriptions are very familiar: you have these two elements, and they stand in that relation.

Q. *So some of the parameters are being lumped into cause, and some of them into effect?*

P. Right. There's going to be different ways of combining. The general feature of a reduction operation is that you wipe out the distinctions. In the deletion operations, you kept the distinctions but just said, "I'm not talking about some of them." In the reduction operation, you wipe out the distinctions themselves, and anything that you would have put in one or another of these places, you simply put in this one place [C or E].

One of the things you wipe out, then, is the distinction between cognition and motivation, and that's where you can then talk about a condition, a

prior condition which if it occurs, will have a certain effect. You don't have to say that it has to be distinguished or that it has to be wanted or that you have to have prior experience. You simply say, "If it's there, then there will be this result. So by wiping out the distinction between cognition, motivation, and competence, you can give a mechanical, cause-effect sort of description.

Recall that I said it's the competence, the know-how, the learning history that prevents the performance from being accidental, if the performance is an expression of your learning. That non-accidental feature is what's preserved here. The cause and effect connection is not just a coincidence, that this thing happens to occur after this. If you want to say that, you simply say there's a correlation or there's a statistical association. If you want to claim that the connection is not accidental, that it's not just a correlation that this happens or this happens, then you talk about cause-effect, and what's in a cause-effect description that is beyond statistics is that it's not accidental. Well, in this diagram, this connection is one of non-accidental, and that's what's preserved when you lump this [K, W, KH] together, and this [P, A] together, the connection between these two is non-accidental.

You can have different theories on top of this notion as to why it's non-accidental, and one of those theories is that *it's non-accidental because it's necessary*. That's how you get a position called Determinism—or an apparent position. But the explanation of why it's non-accidental is something separate from, and over and above, simply saying that it is connected and it's a non-accidental connection. You can have any number of theories about how come it's non-accidental.




FIGURE 9

Now this particular form of description has a lot of practical value. It's not accidental that people have evolved that form of description. To see its

value, you can do some diagramming. Suppose that there's a state of affairs which I want [G] and don't have the requisite know-how to simply bring it about. Then I've got a very human type of problem. There's something I want. I can't just straightforwardly accomplish it, is there some way I can have it?

What we do is we say, "Okay, let's—[Fig. 9]—"if I could straightforwardly bring it about, we could diagram this, this way," that it is the achievement of a behavior I know how to engage in. If so, then I know how to do it, and just go ahead and do it.

It's when this isn't so that I have this kind of problem. If I don't just straightforwardly know how to bring it about, if it's not something I can do, is it forever out of my reach, or what?

Well, no, it isn't necessarily forever out of my reach, because I can say, "Okay, let's try supposing that this is the effect of some cause, that there is some condition which, if that comes about, this [A] will come about non-accidentally. And I establish by observation whether there is some condition which, if it is present, this one [A] will be present, too. If I find a condition of that sort, then I ask of this, "Is that something I know how to bring about?" If it is, then lo and behold, I can get what I want by making use of this causal connection.




FIGURE 10

If it's not something I can bring about, guess what? I can do the same thing all over again and say, "Well, okay, let's see if we can find a cause-effect connection in which this one is an effect." If we do find one, then we've got, again, this possibility. Is this condition now something I know how to bring

about? If it is, then I can get what I want. If it isn't, I can do the same thing all over again. We can string these out as long as we want.

So cause-effect conditions give us a form of representation in which, at this end, there is some behavior with its effects; and the effects of that behavior connect through this causal chain to something we want. So having cause-effect connections available as forms of description extends the range of what people can do beyond just those things that you can do directly. And that's certainly a useful thing to have.

The second sort of value you get out of cause-effect conditions is where it connects to your behavior not at the front end but somewhere along here. Because if you have causal sequences, you can make an observation here and say, "Gee, because of this causal chain. I can expect this sort of thing next year." If you're an environmental expert, you do this thing all the time. If we continue pouring pollutants in that stream, by next year all the fish will be dead. So let's take action somewhere in the middle to prevent this thing from continuing. Again, the value of that sequence is to give you connections, and to give you something that connects to a possible behavior on your part, or somebody's part.

Now, the usefulness of the technique is based upon the fact that if these things are going to happen that way, it doesn't matter why. So you have a form of description that doesn't bother with 'why', only with 'when'—when it's going to happen. You're not concerned with whether the individuals involved know about it, or whether there's any motivation to bring it about, you're only concerned with is it going to come about. So with the form of description that way, you have direct access to that sort of consideration.

Cause-Effect
Description




FIGURE 11

There's two main cause-effect formulas that we're interested in. One is the one that I just diagrammed [Fig. 8, p. 67], and the other is this one, where you combine all four of these parameters [K, W, KH, P] and leave the achievement alone. This kind [Fig. 8] of cause-effect sequence is used a lot by psychologists who are interested in manipulating or otherwise having

effects on behavior.

As a psychologist, if you simply want to know *what does it take to bring about a certain behavior*, you're asking, "What are the causal conditions under which this behavior is to be expected—?" And so you can use this kind of formula to ask and answer that kind of question.

And normally, you put it in terms of stimulus: *what's the stimulus for that response?* You don't have to call it 'stimulus and response', but you are making use of it as a cause-effect connection.

And usually, a psychologist who asks that implicitly has his own behavior at the front end: "How can I bring about this behavior on somebody else's part?" or "How could somebody bring about this behavior on somebody else's part?" So normally, you still have an intentional action or a deliberate action on this end, even though you're using a formula for behavior in which that behavior is an effect of a cause—that's going to be somebody else's behavior. Your behavior is full-fledged behavior.

The other is that philosophers have been interested in the notion of people as agents. The reason is that your own sense of yourself is that you cause things to happen in the world, that you can do things that produce results non-accidentally. Most of your behavior is guided accordingly: that if you want something, you do something to bring that about; and when it comes about, it's not an accident, and it's not just a correlation. It comes about because you made it come about, you brought it about.

Now, the sense in which people cause things to happen has been a major topic in philosophy as long as we've had philosophy, and the topic is usually called 'Agency', in some form or another, 'Human agency': *what is it to be a human agent? what is it to be an agent?*

This [Fig. 11] is the notion that they're working with. If you combine all of this [K, W, KH, P], then you as the person are the cause of what your behavior brings about. And this fits, phenomenologically, how people think about themselves, is that they can bring things about in the world.

Q. *Are you demonstrating free will versus determinism?*

P. No. I'm simply saying that if you want to adopt a particular theory of cause and effect, you can talk determinism. If you want to use this kind [Fig. 11] of causal formula, you can be a—what?—a theologian, an existentialist, a whatever. I'm saying that this is the kind of difference that it takes to make that kind of difference.

Q. *Is this a matter of degrees between these two positions, like ###?*

P. As a matter of fact I wouldn't even think of them as opposites. They're just two very peculiar sorts of theories.

Q. *I'm just saying, is there a way of representing an in-between ###?*

P. Remind me, when we come to the Judgment Diagram, how you do the quantification.

For next time, pay special attention in the Outline to two things, (1) the Maxims, which are in one of the appendices; and (2) the Individual Difference notion, because one or the other of those is what we'll get into next, and maybe both, next time. The Individual Difference concepts are, I think, about paragraph 4 in our Outline, and there's a list of those personality characteristic type concepts.

SESSION 4
July 15, 1976

Peter: In connection with the book, those of you who already have Hall and Lindzey read it all, read it like you would a novel, don't study it. I will assign specific chapters to study. You'll get more out of it if you don't try to memorize all of those ###, if you don't try to get too familiar with all of those theories. I just want you to get an exposure, and some familiarity with the range of thought that's been presented to us. And you'll get that just by reading. So read it through a couple of times, fast; and then in about three weeks, I'll start assigning chapters.

Q. *I have a question on the diamond diagram—the little diamond over the K, what does that exactly mean?*

P. It means you're specifying the content of the K.

Q. *Does that mean that you're not interested in the other ones?*




FIGURE 1

P. No, it just means that you're specifying this. You put a diamond here [the small one], it means that the distinction that's being acted on is a behavior. If you put 'chair' there, it means the distinction that's being acted on is the distinction of a chair from other things. If you put 'tomorrow' there, the

distinction being acted on is tomorrow versus other times. So anything you put here is simply a way of specifying what the discrimination is that's being acted on.

When you put the diamond there, or when you put anything there, there's no implication that that's all there is. All you're saying is that *what's there includes this*.

And the same goes for substitution in any of the other places. You're specifying the value of the motivational parameter or the performance, etc.

Q. *With the reduction operation, when performance and achievement are ###.*

P. It means that there's some result. You're not distinguishing between the kind of result that's a performance and the kind that we would call achievement. We're saying something happens.

Q. *What would be the ramifications with that on some sort of written test?*

P. It means there's no difference between, or we don't distinguish categorically between, your writing down an answer and the answer that we take around with us. Both of those are simply the result of those conditions that led that to happen.

Q. *What would be the purpose of ###?*

P. If you don't care. If all you're interested in is what is going to happen, and you don't want to introduce ahead of time any sort of categorization, you just say it's something, and then you introduce some new taxonomy for what. You always need a taxonomy or a vocabulary for specifying what it was that happened, but you don't have to use this one.

Q. *Also, on the social practice description, I wasn't able to see what the function of wanting would be, in the diamond on the right.*




FIGURE 2

P. We don't specify that, because we don't specify what this behavior [diamond B] is. It is whatever Want goes with this behavior, whatever that may be. If it's a case of my throwing a chalk at you and you're going like this [ducking], probably what you want is not to get hit.

Q. *But it's not specified beforehand at all.*

P. No. All that's specified is that this one [B] is a substitution under the A.

Q. *Does that mean that the whole second diamond is an achievement of the first?*

P. Yeah. All of this—as a matter of fact, it's for the sake of this diagram that we have a diamond with the thing instead of a five-pointed something with five parameters. It's easier to draw this kind of diagram [Fig. 2] with the A sticking out. There's not a mysterious other reason why the A doesn't appear as part of the diamond. It's just a matter of convenience. And in fact, some people do use a pentagon to emphasize that there's nothing special about the A, that that's simply one aspect of behavior.

Any other questions about yesterday?

Well, let me add a couple of things: one, the general comment that after you've been through these various forms of description and the notion of a calculational system, I think you recognize that the concept of behavior is a much richer one than it ordinarily seems. There's a lot more in it than you ordinarily think of when you say 'behavior'. It isn't just a general term for something-or-other; it's a whole complex conceptual system in itself.

And yet it operates as simply as Element-Operation-Product. It's because it operates that simply that one can master it as easily as we do. If you say, "How easy is that?" think of a one-, two-, or three-year-old child. About the age when he starts asking *Why*, he's picking up this concept of behavior. As you know, children are notorious at around that age, for following you around, and everything that happens, they say, "Why? Why?"




FIGURE 3

The other thing I didn't illustrate in drawing any of these diagrams, but consider this one, this [B] being a conventional social practice diagram. You have a behavior [A] in which the discrimination is that of a social practice [A], and that [B] is the social practice being engaged in. Now I could stand here all day and make substitutions or deletions or further elaborations [C] on any of these. I could stand here all day and draw a more and more complicated diagram, and only at the end say, "That's what she did."

So the construction of forms of representation with these behavioral resources is very much like the other example I gave you, of my standing up here all day adding more and more detail, and finally saying, "That's what my house looks like." Now one of the virtues of being able to do it this way is that you can avoid any form of *how-do-you-know?* question until you're prepared to meet it, namely, at the point where you say, "That's what she did," or "That's what my house is like." Then you're prepared to deal with questions of truth or accuracy. But until that time, you're free to follow your own ideas of what you think or what you want to say, first.

So again, it's a strong technical convenience to be able to operate that way and face truth questions when you're prepared to and not have to deal with them when you're not.

Also, let me mention a form of description that is not in your book. Think of this as a conventional social practice description, and then do one other thing: somewhere in the sequence, delete a KH. What the deletion of KH anywhere in that sequence does is to make it uncertain. When you have a string of intentional actions, since the performance and the achievement are simply an expression of competence, there isn't any practical question about *will you succeed?*

Course of Action
Description




FIGURE 4

And a social practice is that kind of thing. Social practices in general are the kind of thing that one can learn well enough; and that most people do learn well enough; so that if you start to do it, if you try to do it, there's no real question *will you succeed?*

On the other hand, there's a lot of situations in life where there is a something that we want [Fig. 4. G], and our efforts are by no means random, and yet we do not have a practical guarantee of success. Under those conditions, we talk about a *course of action*, a course of action directed toward getting that goal and maybe making use of a lot of knowledge along the way—the more knowledge we have, the less it is a trial-and-error business—but we don't entirely, just straightforwardly, know how to do that [Fig. 4. G].

So somewhere along the line, we're counting on something on the order of luck, accident, coincidence, chance. I would venture to say that a majority of our everyday behavior is of this sort, because we're constantly in the course of working toward things that we don't have a guarantee we're going to get; but neither is it so far out of the question that it's impractical; so we do try, and oftentimes, we succeed.

Now the next thing to be said is that whenever you're engaging in a course of action, you're also engaging in a social practice. And the best way to show what's involved in that is to give an example. And the fastest example that comes to mind is playing chess, which is a social practice.

If we sit down to play chess, and we know how to play chess, there's very little practical question, "Will we succeed in playing a game of chess?" or "Will we succeed in sitting down and having dinner?"

In contrast, think of the outcome of winning at chess. If the two of us sit down to play chess, winning is something that neither of us is assured of. So winning at chess is something that we can work toward, use our skills toward that goal, but it's not something that we simply know how to do. So we have that goal, and we engage in courses of action directed toward that goal, but were we not already engaged in the social practice of playing chess, we couldn't have that goal. It's only for somebody who is playing chess that the goal of checkmating the other person's king is a possible goal.

So if we weren't already participating in this practice, we couldn't engage in this course of action. And in general, the only way that you can have a goal toward which you engage in a course of action is, if you're engaged in a social practice that makes that goal desirable. It's only within some form or another of activity that anything is desirable or undesirable. So whenever you have a goal you desire and are working toward it, there is something else that you're doing that makes this [G] desirable.

For future reference, there is a distinction to be made among social practices, namely, between intrinsic and non-intrinsic practices. An intrinsic

practice is one that can be understood as being engaged in without a further end in view. That is to say, one that we can understand somebody doing not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake.

And again, games are good, prime examples. When somebody is playing chess just because he enjoys it, and not because he wants to get something else out of it, he's participating there as an intrinsic practice. If somebody only plays chess because of the social companionship it gets him, or because of something else that it gets him, then for him, it's not an intrinsic practice. It's simply a means to an end.

Some social practices, the non-intrinsic practices, are like a course of action. You can only be doing those if you are already engaging in an intrinsic practice.

For example, think of doing arithmetic. There is a social practice. However, it's not the kind of thing that we can understand somebody doing for its own sake. You don't just add numbers just to be adding numbers. There's always something else that you're doing by the addition. Whether you're figuring out your grocery bill, straightening out your bank balance, paying your income tax, counting your change, or whatever, there is something else that you're doing by doing the arithmetic.

Interestingly enough, language is of this sort. Whenever you utter words, whenever you say something, it's never just for the sake of saying something. There is always something you're doing by saying what you say.

The key feature of intrinsic social practices is: they are one of our fundamental anchors. They are our candidates for "There is a complete description of the behavior." You see, if you reach the point of describing somebody's behavior in terms of an intrinsic social practice, since it is the kind of thing that could be done without any further end in view, without any further motivation, without any ulterior motives, it is a candidate for "That's all that's going on." So we have formally a candidate for *complete* descriptions of behavior.

In contrast, if you can't give that kind of description, you know you have an incomplete description. If you can only describe him in terms of same non-intrinsic practice, like, "He's sitting in a chair," you know that's an incomplete description. You're missing something. So the intrinsic social practice, then, is formally what we need to give complete descriptions of behavior.

Now there are two important cautions here. Number one, if you give an intrinsic practice description, that's not a guarantee that that's all there is. It's merely a candidate. The principle is: when you reach one of those descriptions, you take it that's all there is unless you have some reason on that specific occasion to think otherwise. In effect, the burden of proof is on you or anybody who wants to say, "No, there's more going on."

And sometimes, indeed, there is more going on. So giving intrinsic practice descriptions is not a guarantee that you have a complete description.

Secondly, an intrinsic practice is merely one that *could* be understood as being done for its own sake. It doesn't mean that on any occasion, it *is* being done for its own sake. Chess is an intrinsic practice because it can be understood as being done for its own sake, but you can have two people playing chess, neither of whom is doing it for its own sake.

So those are two cautions in the use of intrinsic social practices. This will be important later, because we'll find a surprising set of examples of intrinsic practices, and we'll deal with those later.

Okay. I think that's about all I wanted to say about developing forms of description. If there's no questions on this, we'll go on to talk about persons.

Q. *Two questions. One, then a non-intrinsic social practice is any social practice that isn't intrinsic? And the other thing, you were talking about an intrinsic social practice as being what's needed to give a complete description of a behavior. ### Can there be more than one complete description of the behavior?*

P. Yeah. Ordinarily, people are doing more than one thing at a time, and you can get two different observers, or three or four or ten, each giving a complete description in terms of a different intrinsic practice and have none of those descriptions be demonstrably wrong. So you just take that as it comes.

One last comment: the complexity on this notion of behavior operates at both ends. What you're observing by way of somebody else's behavior has that kind of complexity, but also, your own behavior that you produce has that kind of complexity. So complexity exists on both ends, not only out there for what you observe, but what you're doing.

For example, in observing. Anybody who's observing or describing behavior is up to some social practice himself. What he's doing may be even more complicated than what he's observing. Also, it may be even more

mysterious and in need of explanation than the behavior of the individual he's observing and trying to explain.

Now, we want to talk about people, and what we'll do is essentially a parametric analysis, namely, derive a set of distinctions which we can look at and say, "Those are the ways that one person can be the same as another or different from another." And these ways, these parameters, the examples of those, will be the kind of notion that traditionally is called a 'personality variable', so those notions will be central to the subject matter of this class.

In order to develop these systematically, we'll introduce—guess what—a definition. Furthermore, it's the definition of a person. And that definition is merely a paradigm case, in a paradigm case formulation, so it's merely a start. But it is a definition, and the definition is this: *A person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of intentional action.*

In passing, notice some contrasts here. Notice what it is not. Contrast this, for example, to the definition of a person as a kind of organism. There's nothing here about organisms. One of the implications of that is that a person doesn't have to be an organism. What it says is: as long as you have an individual that behaves in this way, and that that is his history, that's a person. Now if you ask, "Who do we know that behaves this way?" we're back to us and organisms, but there's room there for non-organisms, and there's a good deal of point to not just being stuck with organisms.

Q. *Aren't there other organisms besides people that ### intentional action?*

P. Yeah. One of the things I'm considering doing with this definition, and I haven't quite worked up the courage to do it, is to substitute 'deliberate action' instead of 'intentional action'. That will rule out all your other organisms. The only reason I haven't done it yet is that I like to mull things over some before making changes. But that looks like an indicated change, and that would do that job. And the reason for that change is that intentional action is perfectly okay for describing the behavior of rats, the behavior of plants, or other organisms, but for our behavior, you need the deliberate action and some more complicated.

Q. *It still wouldn't necessarily rule out all animals.*

P. No. Again, for example, if we found that dolphins talked and laughed at jokes, and did various things that we would recognize as intentional action, we'd say, "Well, there's two kinds of people, now." Or if IBM built a complicated something that would do the same sort of thing, we'd say, "Hmm,

I guess we've got a non-organic person here." But you would hold them to this. He can't just come out with computer output the way a computer system does; he's got to behave intentionally. If it does, then it's a he or she instead of an it.

That's just in passing, because we're not going to exploit that kind of possibility here.

Q. *If the definition would let in plants, and so on, how could we live with that as a definition of a person?*

P. That's why I'm considering changing it to 'deliberate'. Keep in mind that deliberate action is a special case of intentional action. It's not wrong; it's just misleading.

Q. *Maybe we should think of it as either one or the other, then. You're mulling over changing—*

P. The change is to a more restricted definition. The other one would still be true. It just may not be restrictive enough.

Q. *So this is—rather than a definition, it's one property of people.*

P. Yeah. If you accept the other as the definition, this is simply a necessary condition.

Q. ###?

P. When you've got a tightly organized system, you never know, if you make a change one place, what it's going to do elsewhere, and I just haven't had time to look at that. There's nothing specifically that I see wrong with doing it. It's been suggested several times in the last year, and my reaction is always the same, namely, "Yeah, that looks like a good idea. We'll probably do it next year."

For the time being, let's see if we can still work with just intentional action and keep this qualification in mind. For one thing, it's easier to draw diamonds than to draw the other one.




FIGURE 5

With that definition, what we've done is introduce something logically new, namely, a life history. We've introduced this kind of notion [Fig. 5]: the individual's life history from birth to death. Furthermore, not just a homogeneous stretch of time, but rather, a process divided up into episodes, each of which is an intentional action. This would be the pictorial version of this definition: an individual whose history is a history of intentional action. Now if we work with this diagram here, instead of the bare notion of people, suppose we work with this and say, "Okay, how could one of these [A] be the same as, or different from, another one of these [B]?"

Q. *It could be determined by comparing their intentional actions.*

P. Okay, already in talking about behavior, we have the ability to distinguish one action from another, or one type of action from another, so we can certainly distinguish two histories by which actions occur in those histories. What else can we use for distinguishing one of these from the other?

Q. *You can distinguish achievements.*

P. The achievements will be part of distinguishing behaviors. The achievement is an aspect of the behavior.

Q. *The amount of intentional actions?*

P. You could use the sheer number of different actions that occur. More generally, not just number, but pattern: in what order, in what pattern, do these things occur? How many actions would you say a person engages in in his lifetime? Anybody have a guess? Whatever the number is, it's large, right? If you just take the things that we have here, the type of behavior and the pattern, and assume that in all cases it's a large number that you're dealing with, now ask yourself "How many different ways are there, here? How many different possibilities are there?"

And the number is astronomically large. In fact it's more than astronomically large; it's one of those impossible numbers, because you're dealing with a number of permutations and combinations of these things, taken one at a time, two at a time, three at a time, four at a time, and that kind of number goes up tremendously as your original number goes up.

Furthermore, for every such thing, you can multiply it by the number of different behaviors that we can distinguish, and that is an impossibly large number, too.

So the total range of possibilities for people being the same or different from one another is impossible to manage. It's comparable to the number of

ways that two figures, like that and that [Fig. 6]—how many different figures could you have? Well, if you accept irregular figures like this, an impossibly large number. There's no way to handle that kind of thing one by one, and if you can't do it with calculation, you've got to do some grouping.




FIGURE 6

For example, if you're dealing with figures like this [Fig. 6] and you can't systematically do geometry on them, you might group them into small figures and large ones, or irregular ones and regular ones, or continuous lines and discontinuous lines. You would need some sort of categorization, because you couldn't deal really with all of the particular cases, because there are too many.

This is the position that we're in with respect to differences among people. There are so many specific ways that one person can differ from another, that we say at the beginning, "It's hopeless, everybody's unique." And you'll find that one of the four theories that we're going to talk about, namely Allport's, that's one of his fundamental starting points, that everybody is unique. Well, you can see why, when we've just taken a gross look at the matter, we'd say, "Yeah, that's one of the things that you need to be able to say is that everybody's unique, because look, it's impossibly large." On the other hand, most people don't do that. Or having said that, they then go on to do something to make it manageable.

What we do to make it manageable is introduce some fairly crude distinctions on this. For example, one of the things we do is to distinguish frequency—relative frequency, not absolute. For example, if we identified a certain type of behavior—let's call it generous behavior or hostile behavior—and counted, "In this life history it occurs there, there, there, and there [filling in diamonds on A. Fig. 5]. In this life history [B], it occurs there." Now if you look at those two you say, "Ha, yeah, there's a noticeable difference. In this one [A], this same kind of behavior occurs a lot more often than it does over here [B]." So we can use the fact that this kind of behavior occurs a lot more often to characterize this entire history [A], because indeed, the frequent occurrence characterizes the history, not any one point in time, and not any one behavior. The behavior is characterized as hostile or generous,

but the frequency characterizes the history. So it characterizes the person whose history it is.

In general, then, we can set up a distinction by specifying a type of behavior and a pattern of occurrence. Any time we can do that, we can say, “That’s one of the ways in which one person can be the same as, or different from, another.”

Our first systematic derivation is the notion of a trait description, and that you generate by specifying *any* type of behavior and a frequency pattern. You generate a trait description by specifying any particular sort of behavior and a frequency pattern of occurrence. A frequency pattern is simply one in which it occurs often, but with no particular relationship among the different occasions, just often.

One of the implications of saying ‘any’ is that for every type of behavior that you can distinguish, there will be formally a corresponding trait description. If we can distinguish hostile behavior from other behaviors, then we can distinguish the trait of hostility from other traits. Because a person has the trait of hostility if that type of behavior—namely, hostile—occurs frequently in his life history.

Q. *Is this the definition of trait?*

P. Yeah. No, wait a moment. It’s not a definition of trait. It’s a definition of a trait description. I said that you generate a trait description if you specify a type of behavior and a pattern of occurrence.

Q. *What’s the definition of a trait?*

P. There is one, but I’ll talk to you after class on that.

Q. *Some characterizations like that ## the circumstances ###.*

P. Remember we’re dealing with a paradigm case formulation yet, and we’ll get to that—that’s part of why we need some transformations later.

You recall that definition of a person as an individual whose history is paradigmatically a history of intentional action, you recognize that if you just took that as a definition, you’d throw it out right away, because all of us spend at least one third of our lives, roughly, not behaving, because we’re asleep. So in the lives of people that we know, there are substantial periods of time during which they’re not behaving. They’re either asleep, unconscious, stoned, or in some other sort of condition. So we would reject that definition straightforwardly, out of hand.

But that's why we put it in not as a straightforward definition, but as a paradigm case: because when we make certain allowances, then we can accept it as a definition. And in fact, the kind of concepts that we're generating are what we will need to make those allowances. That's why we have to start with the paradigm case, generate certain things, and then we have the ingredients to come and clean it up.

And there is at least those two ways of cleaning it up, namely, the periods of time when you're not behaving, and then this one, that if you have a pattern, you don't necessarily have the trait. So those are two things that need to be cleaned up here, and keep your eye open because we will.

Okay, any question about a trait description?

Again, a reminder: any type of behavior can be turned into a trait description.




FIGURE 7

Here's a variation on a trait description, and that's an attitude description. An attitude description meets the same conditions for a trait description, and one other one in addition, namely, that you specify something about the cognitive value of the behavior that you're using here. When you're specifying the type of behavior, you specify something about the cognitive parameter. And this is because an attitude is always an attitude about something. A trait is not about something. A person who has the trait of generosity or hostility or friendliness or whatever, that's all you say. But a person who has a hostile attitude or a friendly attitude, always has a hostile attitude toward something or somebody. If he has a friendly attitude, he's friendly toward somebody or something. So attitudes have objects. This is what they're commonly called, whatever the attitude is about is the object of that attitude.

So to specify an attitude, you have to specify an attitude object, which means you specify something about the cognitive parameter. And that's the only way that it's different from a trait.

You might ask, "Why do we need both of these?" The ones that we're going to generate are only the ones that people have used a lot. There's all kinds of esoteric ones that nobody ever thought of, or used, that we could generate this way. But right now we're only doing the ones that are common and important.

Given that they're so similar, how come we need them both? Well, we need them both because people's behavior doesn't simply show this [trait] kind of simple regularity. If you go by traits, you're going to constantly be surprised by people. You'll find somebody who's genuinely stingy, and you find him on this occasion behaving in a generous way. You find somebody who's genuinely friendly, and lo and behold, on this occasion he's just bitchy as hell.

How come? And how do we take account of that? We take account of it by noticing further regularities, namely, that somebody who is in general friendly might be unfriendly toward somebody he knows, or a certain class of people, or on certain kinds of occasions. If so, we have an additional regularity, and if we have that in mind, we'll be less surprised by what he does because we'll know that when he is with that person, it's different. He may be friendly with everybody else, but when he comes to this one, huh-uh.

We're all familiar with that kind of regularity, too. We're all familiar with the fact that with different people, you're friendly or unfriendly, that on different sorts of occasions you're generous or ungenerous, this kind of difference.

Okay, that's how you generate attitude descriptions, and that's what attitude descriptions are used for.

We also have the notion of an interest. We speak of a person having an interest in baseball, an interest in art, an interest in politics, an interest in some particular other person. And we have tests of interest.

What it takes to specify that kind of description is to again specify a behavior and an object. Interests, like attitudes, have objects. An interest is always an interest in something or other. So the behavior in question has to have an object.

Secondly, it has to be intrinsic. It can't be merely instrumental. Somebody who plays chess purely in an instrumental way, we would say, "It looks

like he has an interest in chess, but it isn't a genuine interest because he has this ulterior motive." It's only a genuine interest if the behavior is intrinsic, if it's not merely instrumental. So you have these two conditions: an object, an intrinsic, and frequency again.

Q. *### back to traits, but I was wondering: you say 'any behavior'. When you're talking about that, are you being consistent? It sounds like you said in hostile behavior, saying that when he kicks the door, kicks the door, and things like that, just like 'kick the dog'—the frequency with which he kicks the dog.*

P. Either way. You can talk at the level of kicking doors—he's the kind of guy who goes around kicking doors. Or you can talk about hostile behavior and recognize that examples of hostile behavior can include kicking doors and kicking dogs.

Q. *Is the hostile attitude, then—specifying 'hostile', is that an example of attitude?*

P. If you can specify the object. If somebody goes around kicking doors and kicking dogs, and spitting on horses and running down pedestrians, he's probably got the trait. On the other hand, if he only kicks dogs but is gentle with cats and people, then you may say that it looks like he's hostile toward dogs.

Q. *The interest description—how does that fit in with what we're just talking about, somebody who's going around kicking dogs and horses?*

P. This is a different sort of notion. Think of having an interest in baseball. There isn't a single kind of behavior here [interest diamond. Fig. 7, p. 85]. All there is, is behavior that has baseball here [K parameter].

Q. *Still an object specified, though.*

P. Yeah. Think of the different ways you could show an interest in baseball. You could go watch baseball games, you could join the baseball team, you could read baseball books, you could buy biographies of the famous players, you could trade stamps, you can do all kinds of things, all of which have as their common object, baseball. They're not the same kind of behavior. They have a common object.

So with interest, you don't identify it by the kind of behavior, you identify it by what the behavior is directed toward. That's why, as I say, when you speak of an interest, you never have an interest in the abstract; it's always an interest in whatever that object is. That's how we distinguish one interest from another, is primarily by the object.

Q. *Is interest a sub-set of attitudes?*

P. Remember this condition [intrinsic]. There's no such restriction on this one [attitude].

Q. *So all interests are attitudes, all attitudes aren't interests.*

P. You could do that, but I don't think it's going to get you much mileage. The reason is that we use them differently. It has a different feature, namely, that there isn't one single kind of behavior, the way there is over here [trait, attitude]. With an attitude, there is still a kind of behavior that you engage in toward the object. With an interest, there isn't a single kind of behavior that you engage in toward that object.

Q. *With an interest, then, you don't specify behaviors.*

P. No, you specify the object; whereas with the attitude, you specify both the kind of behavior and the object. You say, "He has a hostile attitude toward dogs," so you're specifying both. Whereas when you say, "He has an interest in chess," you only mention the object, not the kind of behavior.

Q. *So you could have any kind of attitude toward chess.*

Q. *It seems like it has more to do with the motivational parameter than with—.*

P. Well—here [intrinsic]. Saying that the behavior is intrinsic, or that he participates in it as an intrinsic practice, gets at the motivational parameter, since he's not doing it for ulterior motives. He's doing it for its own sake. And that's not something we say about this.

Q. *Where do you make—how do you make the distinction? You could look at any behavior, any interest, and say of the one who is engaging in it for the object itself or for an ulterior motive.*

P. That's right.

Q. *So how do you make that distinction, in the end?*

P. In any way you know how, because you have to.

Q. *It sounds rather arbitrary.*

P. No. It simply reflects the fact that we have no guarantee that our descriptions are true. In effect you're asking, "How can you guarantee that your descriptions are true?"

Q. *What I'm saying is that if the intrinsic element is necessary to determine an interest, you never know for sure—*

P. Yeah, but you never know anything for sure. Remember what I said yesterday, if you wanted to make absolutely sure that that was a chair you're sitting in, you'd be here forever, and you still wouldn't be sure. So when it comes to that, the fact that you're never sure about behavior doesn't make it extraordinary and difficult. It says that it's one of those everyday things, none of which you're ever sure about.

And indeed, part of the consequence of the 'you can't be sure' is the fact that different observers will in general disagree, because it doesn't come with a label that says what the proper description is. The fact that behavior is ambiguous is one of the most fundamental features of it, and we'd be dead without that.

Again, use that rule of thumb that I've appealed to several times: think how different life would be from what we know it actually is, from how we live it, if behavior were completely unambiguous, if all you had to do was look and you knew exactly what was going on, and with no question about its accuracy. Life would be extraordinarily different.

Again, remember I said to separate the problem *is a particular description true?* or *how do you know if it's true?* from the conceptualization of what it would be if the description were true. Here we're only interested in, "What would you mean if you said, 'The guy has an interest in chess?'" And that's a different problem from, "Well, if I say, 'She has an interest in chess,' how do I know that's true?" If I can't get clear about what I mean, I don't have a problem with truth. It's only if there is something that I mean in saying, "She has an interest in chess," that then there may be a question, "But is it true?" So this kind of problem has to take priority.

Q. *Would you tell the difference between trait and attitude, for instance, by observing not a single behavior but a whole series of behaviors?*

P. Generally speaking, you don't draw this kind of conclusion about a person from just looking at one behavior. That's part of the force of going through the life history, is that you normally wait some period of time and see some of these occurrences. On the other hand, that's never enough. Even when you do, that's not foolproof at all.

Q. *Where I'm coming from. I'm trying to translate this system into something that I could use to provide some understanding.*

P. Yeah. Well, stick with 'understanding' and not 'truth'. The question you asked was a 'how do you know?' question. And that's a truth question.

Here, the understanding comes in seeing what the difference is, and what you're doing differently if you say "he has an interest" than if you say "he has an attitude" or that he has a trait, or that he has some of these others. That's a different question from, "Well, but is it true?"

Q. *What I'm seeing in the interest description is the behavior varying and the object staying constant. In the attitude description, I was wondering if you could apply those concepts to that.*

P. Well, you could say that the behavior doesn't vary, in that you always have the same description: it's hostile behavior, for example, or friendly behavior.

Q. *The behavior doesn't vary, but the objects do.*

P. No, and the object doesn't either. If you have a hostile attitude toward dogs, the behavior is hostile, and the object is dogs, so neither of them changes.

Q. *Then really the difference in those terms is, one thing that varies in the interest description being the K?*

P. Yeah. You can see from what we've said that, as an observer, very often you can probably use one or the other of these equally well. If you were watching somebody and knew certain things about him, you could equally well talk about an attitude or an interest.

But if I draw you something like that [a four-sided figure], you could equally well talk about that as a square, as a rectangle, or a trapezoid. That doesn't make it mysterious or peculiar. It's just that this kind of figure fits all of those descriptions.

And certain kinds of things that you might see would fit equally well these two descriptions [attitude and interest]. And when you have a case like that, you don't have to pretend that it's really one or the other, any more than you have to pretend that this is really a trapezoid with right angles and not a rectangle with equal sides. It's isn't really one or the other. It's something for which both descriptions are equally applicable.

Since you can have cases like that, these descriptions [attitude, interest] can't be formally mutually exclusive, because they're not. And that's one of the sources of the difficulty when you try to give a description, is that very often more than one description applies correctly.

Okay, one more of these. In a style description, you specify something about the performance. For example, if you say that a person has an

awkward style, you're not specifying a kind of behavior, you're saying that whatever behavior he engages in, the performance has this feature, namely, it's awkward. Or if you speak of somebody having an energetic style, or an expansive style, you're not saying that he behaves in certain ways, that is, in certain kinds of behaviors. You're saying the performance aspect is different, that all of his behaviors—roughly all—show this feature. So the frequency pattern is a strong frequency pattern.

As I say, essentially you mean all, with some practical exceptions. A regional accent is of this sort: somebody who talks with a southern accent is not engaging in different behaviors, in that he's using the same language and using the same vocabulary, but his manner of speaking, his performance, is different and distinguishable.

Q. *It's a way of specifying a total lack of frequency in someone's behavior, as opposed to ###?*

P. Not with this [style], but the next round, we'll have exactly that kind of notion. Here we're dealing with frequency; the next round we're dealing with possible and impossible.

Now this, too, has been studied by psychologists, mainly about 50 years ago. Currently there's a little bit of research in it, but not much. What happens is that psychologists are primarily interested in style descriptions because style descriptions involve only performance and not motivation. And they're used as a way of denying motivation, and it's not only psychologists who do that, it's all of us.

Think of such a common description of a person as, "He's not really hostile, that's just his style." By that, you imply that he doesn't have hostile motivation, that he doesn't mean it that way, that's just the way it comes across. So one of the prime functions of style descriptions is to deny motivation, because a style description is based only on that performance. And we use that denial to account for misleading appearances. Somebody can look as though he's hostile, when he's not.

If you look in your Outline, you'll notice that all four of these types of description come under one single heading, and that's Dispositions. Traits, Attitudes, Interests, and Styles are dispositions. If you look over here [Fig. 7, p. 85], you'll see that what they have in common is down on the second line, "Frequency, Frequency, Frequency, Strong Frequency". That's what you're getting at in calling them all Dispositions. Because they're all based on frequency patterns, you can come up with rules of thumb to get at that by

saying, “If a person has a disposition (be it trait, attitude, interest, or style), he will show it if he has a chance, unless—”. Because if a person is a certain kind of person of this sort, he can be expected to show it. Why? Because these are based on frequency. Or to anticipate a little, you can say, “He will show it unless something prevents that,” and that *unless something prevents that* is cleaning up that second item, that somebody who has a trait doesn’t necessarily show it; and that somebody who acts in a certain way doesn’t necessarily have that trait.

Notice how crude these distinctions are, relative to all of the variety and complexity that’s inherent in the life history with the pattern of different kinds of behavior. These are very crude distinctions, but they have the virtue that they’re manageable; and so we use them. And they make a difference to us, and that’s why we use them, too.

The way they make a difference to us is that we’ll treat the person differently depending on these descriptions. We expect different things from them if we have these descriptions.

So giving this kind of description is not just an intellectual or academic or spectator sport. It’s what we have to base our behavior on toward the other individual. Since, by and large, we have to behave toward the other individual in some way or other, we can’t escape from giving these kinds of descriptions, explicitly or implicitly.




FIGURE 8

Our second set of notions is Powers, and here we have three notions. Ability is a very common notion. We constantly are talking about, so-and-so’s ability or about our abilities; or we’re testing somebody’s abilities; or we’re worrying about their disabilities; or we’re worrying about our own disabilities. This notion of ability is very familiar and very important.

Ability is hinged on achievement, and ability is always an ability to accomplish something or other. So type of behavior is specified in terms of

achievement: the ability to. And the pattern is a Yes/No or Can/Can't. If the person has the ability to do arithmetic, he can do arithmetic. If he doesn't have the ability, he can't.

What's the implication in the life history? If you don't have the ability to do arithmetic, there are certain kinds of behaviors that cannot appear [in life history] at all, namely, arithmetic. Anything that involves doing arithmetic is something that will not appear and can't.

Q. *Are we specifying frequency of can and can't situations?*

P. No. Can/can't is a limiting case of frequency. It's either zero or some. That's why I said Yes or No. Either it does appear, or it doesn't. We don't count it. We simply say, "Can it or can't it?"

So specifying that somebody lacks a certain ability is to imply that that part of behavior does not appear in his life history. Specifying that he does have the ability is to imply that it could appear—not that it does but that it could. You can have an ability and never ever show it. Or you can have an ability and show it very infrequently, like once in your life.

Powers are not geared to frequency the way Dispositions are. It's one of the differences. Powers are geared to possibility and impossibility. So when we say you have the power or ability to do something, we mean you have that possibility.

Q. *Are you referring to both learned and innate kinds of ability, or to one or the other?*

P. Either way. In point of fact, I think that it works out that it has to be learned, but I'm not sure. The reason is, the different formulation of ability is: if you have the ability to do X, then if you try, you can be expected to succeed.

I don't know if that would hold with completely unlearned achievements. Certainly the achievement doesn't have to depend only upon what you've learned, but I'm not sure that it could depend only on what you haven't learned, because if it depends only on what you haven't learned, where would you have a behavior at all? You'd have something like a reflex.

Q. *I was thinking—innately, for example, a woman has an ability to have a child, to give birth, but may not necessarily do so. However, if it's a learned ability, I can't think of an example where a person would never perform a skill.*

P. Well, think of the ability to kill people. A lot of us never show it.

Q. *Are you saying we don't have that ability, then?*

P. No. I'm saying you can have that and never show it. And with some abilities, that's good. With respect to giving birth, compare it with saying that everybody has the ability to bleed when he's cut. In fact, we do bleed when we're cut, but you wouldn't call that 'behavior'. You wouldn't say *that's something we do* in the sense of action. It's something we do in the sense of what happens. And you might say: giving birth is more like that than it is like a behavior, and it's the kind of thing about which you can take your pick; and different people will disagree with you.

Q. *If you take your pick one way, though, it becomes an ability.*

P. Yeah. No matter which way you pick, there will be people who disagree with you.




FIGURE 9

Okay, now make sure you understand Ability, because I'm going to define the other two as special kinds of ability. Definition number 1, of Knowledge: a person's knowledge is the set of facts and/or concepts that he has the ability to act on. And by 'action', we mean Intentional Action. The second definition, of Values: a person's values are the set of priorities among motivations that he has the ability to act on. Now let me take a fast short-cut here and bring something out with these three.

These three Powers notions correspond to the three parameters of Intentional Action that are not occurrences. You have the cognitive parameter, the motivational parameter, and the competence parameter for Intentional Action. Neither knowledge, motivation, nor competence is an occurrence.

In contrast, performance and achievement are occurrences. They do occur at a given time and place.

Now, when you think of a person's knowledge, his values, and his abilities, you can think of a repertoire of items that he has to draw upon for

these three aspects of his behavior. And then it comes through clearly that a person can't engage in any behavior that would require knowledge or distinctions that he doesn't have. He can't engage in any behavior that would require motivation that he doesn't have. And he can't engage in any behavior that would require competence that he doesn't have. And that's why these notions connect with Yes/No, or Possible/Impossible. So that a person's repertoire of knowledge is what he has to pick from in constructing his own behaviors. His motivations are what he has to draw upon in choosing his motivations.

Q. *I was wondering what you would say, like birthing a baby is not an ability. Would sexual intercourse be an ability?*

P. Yeah, because that's clearly behavior, whereas giving birth is an achievement, and it's most clearly an achievement, and it's not clear that there's any single kind of behavior.

Q. *The other thing is, some people can't have babies.*

P. Yeah, as I say, it's the kind of thing that you could describe both ways, because it has some of the right features.

Q. *But you could say that sexual intercourse is, like, innate, and therefore it's not an ability like—I mean—*

P. Well, you could say it's innate, but I wouldn't want to. But if you did, you might think of it along the model of bleeding when you're cut. That's something you don't have to work at, it's not something you have to learn how to do. Okay, we'll pick up here next Monday.

SESSION 5
July 18, 1976

Peter Last time, we started talking about individual difference concepts or personality characteristics (as they're usually called). What we did was introduce the notion of a life history.




FIGURE 1

We did it by way of a definition: a person is an individual whose history is paradigmatically a history of intentional or deliberate action. We then asked, “How could one of those be the same as another one of those, or different?” The answer was, “They can be different in all kinds of ways. The number is too large to manage, and so we need to introduce some kind of categories or taxonomies or whatever to give us a manageable set of ways that people differ from one another.” Then we started generating those ways, by introducing the notion of a type of behavior and a pattern of occurrence and saying that every different specification of a type of behavior and pattern of occurrence will give you one of these crude categories for how people resemble or differ from one another.

And we used that to derive our first four, the Dispositions. The common element of Dispositions is that the pattern was always some kind of frequency pattern, so that dispositions connect to what you could expect a person to do. Then we went to Powers, defined ability in terms of achievement, and then defined knowledge as *the set of facts or distinctions that the person has the ability to act on*; and then values as *the set of priorities among motivations that the person has the ability to act on*. So we got ourselves three ability- or power-type notions, then we went on to see that the three correspond to these aspects of behavior [Fig. 2]. I think that’s about where we stopped. Any question about this material here?

Q. *Could you distinguish between values and knowledge ###?*




FIGURE 2

P. The attitude requires a specification of a type of behavior, and I was using ‘hostile’ kind of as the standard example—a hostile attitude toward something or other. The something-or-other has to be specified here [K], by specifying something about the Know parameter.

In contrast, knowledge is simply *the set of facts you have available*. In a given behavior, you’re using one of them in that behavior, but you’ve got a whole lot of other ones that you’re not using. That whole set of things that you could use is your knowledge.

Q. *And the values are the ones that you—*

P. The values are the priorities here, motivational, and it’s because you have priorities that you’re able to choose one thing over another.

Any other questions?

I think at the end of the hour, I used this to explain why it’s not accidental that we have three general power-type notions. The three correspond to these three [K, W, KH]. And these three are different from these two [P, A], in that these two are occurrences, and those three are not. The performance and achievement occur at a time and place, and once they’ve been done, they’ve been done.

In contrast, your knowledge, although you gain it at a given time and place, from there on out it just stays with you. The same with your values and the same with your abilities: once you acquire them, they stay with you unless you lose them.

Q. *Why is knowledge not a performance?*

P. Think of all of the things that you’ve learned over the years that you have in your head and that you could think of; you could say; or you could use; but you’re not doing it right now.

Q. *So it has to be a physical, noticeable action to be a performance?*

P. Yeah. Remember, the performance is process, time and place, duration. So the process of sitting in the chair and staying there is one that occurs at a time and place, but if you know that Peking is the capital of China, you don’t have to be thinking about it, you don’t have to be using it. You might have acquired it twenty years ago, but you have it now. And your having it now is simply expressed in the possibility that you could engage in behaviors that call for that knowledge. But you don’t have to be engaging in any of them in order to have it, and you don’t have to even be thinking about it.

Q. *But when one is thinking about them, it is an occurrence.*

P. That is an occurrence, yeah.

Now, if you ask what kind of things are these, in contrast to the occurrence parameters, you get an interesting answer; or rather, you get some interesting answers, one of which is: these are psychological reality parameters.

From the viewpoint of performance, remember I said that a performance description doesn't distinguish between action and movement. And so, if it only had to meet up with the requirements of performance and achievement, it needn't be behavior at all.

What makes it behavior is the psychological reality provided by the fact that the individual is making a distinction, acting on motivation, and exercising skills. And it's a different behavior depending on which knowledge is being used, which discrimination is being acted on, which motivation is there, and which competence is being exercised.

Remember when we talked about psychological reality initially, I said that your image is guaranteed to be an image of the person you're thinking of, because that's what you produced it as. Well, your behavior here is guaranteed to be your behavior—it's guaranteed to be that behavior—because that's what you produced it as, and you couldn't have produced it as that without having the relevant knowledge, motivation, and ability.

So these [the Powers] are psychological reality parameters.

When it came to the pattern of occurrence, we said Yes/No, and there's a simple formula for reminding yourself of the nature of that connection. The formula is: you can't use what you don't have.

In any given behavior, you're using some of the knowledge you have, some of the motivation you have, and some of the ability you have. And what you have to draw on is your pool of knowledge, motivation, and ability. And that's what you have to use, and you can't use what you don't have, which is to say that *you can't engage in any behavior that would require either knowledge or motivation or ability that you don't have.*

That's why these concepts, the specification of them, is a way of setting limits to a person's possible behaviors. They're a way of saying what a person can do or can't.

There are other powers notions than these, and in particular, the notion of Capacity is one we'll want to look at in connection with something else, very shortly. That's why it doesn't appear in the same place on the list [Fig. 3].

<u>Dispositions</u>	<u>Powers</u>	<u>Comparatives</u>
Trait	Knowledge	State
Attitude	Value	Status
Interest	Ability	
Style	Capacity	
	<u>FIGURE 3</u>	

Okay, let's move on to the third column, which is Comparatives, and we have mainly one, namely, State. Here we can give a definition or something close to it. The definition is this: when a person is in a particular state, there is a systematic difference in his powers and/or dispositions.

So we've used our first two notions here, Powers and Dispositions, to define ourselves a comparative. So when a person is in a particular State, there's a systematic difference in Powers and/or Dispositions.

Now think of a kind of state that we normally distinguish. We talk about somebody being sleepy, being tired, being drunk, being overjoyed, being depressed, being in a sad mood—there are not an indefinitely large number of states that we distinguish commonly, but there's a fairly sizable number. What's implied when we say, for example, that a person is tired?

Q. *You're comparing it to a state ###.*

P. Yeah. Let's introduce the notion of a normal waking state or a baseline state. You compare: one, a state is something temporary. You use a state description when you're talking about a certain block of time. You go into a state, and you can come out of it. That is, states are temporary and reversible. During that period of time, you're contrasting how you are with how you would have been if you hadn't been in that state. When you say a person is tired, you're contrasting how he is during that period of time, from how he would have been if he wasn't tired.

One of the things that you're not implying is that any particular kind of behavior takes place. If you lined up ten people who were tired, you would not see ten people engaging in the same kind of behavior. So States do not connect directly to Behavior the way that Powers and Dispositions do. That's why you don't define it in terms of Behavior; you define it in terms of Powers or Dispositions which, in turn, connect to Behavior.

What kind of difference, say, does being tired make? What kind of difference in Powers or Dispositions? Generally speaking, you lose abilities. Generally speaking, when you're tired, you lose some of the abilities that

you normally have, and you lose them partially or entirely—for example, the things that you could normally do quickly, it'd take you a longer time. Things that you could do easily, you do with more difficulty. Things that you could normally do accurately, you do, but you make mistakes. It makes that kind of difference.

In terms of dispositions, it makes a difference in what you're inclined to do, what you're likely to do. It makes a difference in the kind of things that you can enjoy. It changes your values. So if you had to very briefly indicate the kind of difference there is here and here [Fig. 1, p. 97. A and B], it would be like saying, "Well, you subtract a few things out. You subtract out a few abilities"—that's the kind of difference that we're talking about. And that would be a crude characterization, but close enough for a lot of purposes, close enough for a summary. When you're tired, you lose a lot of abilities. You might add *and a lot of initiative*.

The interesting thing about being tired: it exemplifies two things. I said *if you lined up ten people who are tired, you wouldn't see ten people behaving in the same way, or in any particular kind of way*. And that's because what you do when you're tired depends on what you do when you're not tired, and that's different.

However, imagine ten people who are very tired, and then imagine ten people who are completely exhausted. The ten people who are completely exhausted will resemble each other. That is, tiredness, along with many other states, is susceptible of an intensity rating. That is, you can talk about being more or less tired. And when you reach the extremes of tiredness, then indeed, the range of behavior begins to narrow, and people begin to look alike.

The limiting case, when all ten are lying on the floor and are completely unconscious, exhausted, they look very much alike. However, the similarity that we see is not because they're behaving the same, but rather, it's because they're not behaving. Because when you see them very exhausted, mainly what you're noticing is that they're not behaving much. Then when they're completely exhausted, they're not behaving at all. And that's the basis of the similarity. So even though the people begin to resemble each other, the behaviors don't particularly.

Also, your behavior when you're slightly tired resembles very much your behavior when you're not tired at all. But your behavior when you're exhausted is generally substantially different.

You can see that it would be hard to find any kind of simple regularity in the kind of change that occurs, even if you were just sticking to being tired. It would be hard to specify any kind of regular change; and in fact, there isn't any. And if you extend to other states, there isn't any regularity you can point to, not of a specific kind.

That's why we say simply *there is a systematic change, a systematic difference in your powers and/or dispositions*. Because it isn't that you get more alike, it isn't that you get more different, it isn't necessarily that you lose abilities because sometimes you gain abilities, and it isn't necessarily that there's change in powers—sometimes the change is only in dispositions or vice versa. So about the strongest general statement that you can make about States is simply that there is a systematic change in Powers and/or Disposition, and then you go down to the specific states that we distinguish, and they all fit that description.

There is a general category of states that is of special interest to psychologists, to clinicians, and to personality theorists, and that's the notion of a pathological state. Many of the personality theories that we now have were created by people who basically were therapists and wanted something to use in the course of dealing with what they considered to be pathological states. So there's a non-accidental connection between the general character of personality theories—and particularly some set of them—and the notion of illness or pathological state.

Given that general definition of state, we can now give a definition of a pathological state, which is this: when a person is in a pathological state, there is a significant restriction in his ability to engage in intentional action.

Notice some of the features of that definition. One, it's keyed to Powers. It says, "When a person is in a pathological state, he loses some of his powers." Even that's a misleading way of putting it. For a person to be in a pathological state *is* to have lost some of the powers. It's not that the state causes him to lose powers. To speak of him as being in a pathological state is to speak of him as having lost, importantly, some power.

Secondly, the power in question is simply the power to behave: "a significant restriction on his ability to engage in intentional action". The restriction in question is a restriction in the power to behave.

Thirdly, this definition doesn't tell you who's in a pathological state. That is, the definition doesn't give you a criterion for deciding who is in a pathological state. What that implies is that it's up to an observer to make

that judgment, as indeed we do. And what that ought to suggest is that different observers are going to disagree about it—as we know they do.

Q. *Then does the determination of the pathological state depend on knowledge of past history of the person's behavior?*

P. No. Think of the same problem in the small. Suppose that I tell you, “This guy is no good as a baseball player because there’s too many things that he can’t do. He can’t pitch, he can’t bat, and he can’t run.” What would it take on my part to make that kind of judgment and not have it just be ignorance, arbitrary, or guesswork?

Q. *Watch him play.*

P. One, I should either watch him play or get the equivalent information; but two, I’ve got to know about baseball. I’ve got to know enough about baseball to know that these things are crucial, and that if you can’t do those, that makes all the difference in the world. Whereas if you’re just impolite to the fans, that’s a handicap, but you can still play.

Likewise, what you have to know as an observer, to make that judgment, is the culture that you’re talking about, the society that you’re talking about, because in different societies, different things will be crucial, different things will be more or less important. And so, to decide that the person’s restrictions in doing those things is significant, you need to know what is significant, you need to know what’s important. And you need to know what the person can’t do. If you have those elements of information, then you can make that judgment in an informed way.

Q. *What about someone who’s intention is going around killing people? Where is the restriction on his behavior? What would you compare—?*

P. Probably here [Value], if there’s going to be one.

Q. *So you compare that to certain value systems?*

P. Look. Think of this problem with children. If you get a kid who just does what he feels like, you say, “This kid lacks self-control. He’s unable to resist temptation.” The notion of just acting on—doing what you want to do without regard for others involves that you don’t place enough value on those considerations involving them to be able to not do it. You remember the definition of values is in terms of the ability to act on a priority, and if the person you’re talking about is either a criminal or in a pathological state, we would say that his priorities don’t enable him to give other people enough priority to keep from being dangerous to them.

Q. *You're saying that his priorities are restricted?*

P. His priorities restrict what he can do, because then he can't do anything that gives other people a break. And instead of 'can't', you can water it down to whatever the actual range is. But that's where you would express his limitation. That's where you would express it as a limitation. Conceivably, it could be in the other two, but it's not likely, practically speaking.

Come back to the definition, and one thing that may not be obvious but is there, is that this definition holds equally well for what we normally call physical illness and what we normally call emotional or mental illness. Ordinarily, you think of physical illness as there being something wrong with your body, for example, a broken leg. You say, "Surely you're talking about something wrong with your body, there."

But now consider the possibility: suppose that if somebody had a broken leg, it made no difference in what he was able to do. Suppose that somebody with a broken leg could run around and walk and climb stairs and kick soccer balls and high-jump and do all of the things that a person can do who hasn't got a broken leg, and that furthermore, it didn't hurt a bit, it didn't distract him, it had no effect on his experience. But the break in the bone was there. Would we talk about illness, there?

No. No matter what the physiological thing is, if it makes no difference in our behavior, we do not even think of calling it an illness. The illness consists of the difference in our behavior, in our behavior possibilities. Then when it comes to an explanation of how come that restriction, that's where we go to body descriptions. "Well, the reason he can't walk or run is that he's got a broken leg." So the reference to the physiology comes in the explanation of the pathology, not in the identification or description of the pathology itself.

Likewise, the emotional conflict is not the pathology. It's the explanation of why a person sits in the corner and cries all day. The pathology is that if you sit in a corner and cry all day, can't bring yourself to do anything else, you are severely restricted in what you're able to do. And it's when we look for explanations that again, either we go to things like emotional conflicts or to lack of learning or some physiological condition.

So the ordinary distinction that we carry between mental and physical illness comes in the explanation of the illness. The illness itself will fit this definition.

I think you can see by examining the definition that something that made no difference in our behavior possibilities, you wouldn't think of calling 'illness'; and in fact, we have that kind of example all over the place. There are all kinds of physiological anomalies that people show, for example, the structure of the hair on your forearm can be very different and very strange in different people, and that's known to happen; but because it makes no difference in our behavior, we don't call that a certain kind of illness and try to treat it and cure it. So it isn't just a matter of physiological anomalies. It's a matter of what difference it makes in your behavior.

Q. *For your example of the hair-pattern on your arm, if for same reason you thought, "My God, what a horrible hair-pattern," and you altered what would be your normal behavior because of that ###?*

P. That again would come under values or knowledge. It would have a comparable place as, for example, if I want my nose straightened because I think it looks bad. I don't say, "I'm sick because I've got the wrong shape nose." I just say, "I'd rather have a straight one than—", and I don't talk about illness. I talk about cosmetics. And that would be the same way, if I thought the pattern of hair on my forearm was horrible. I still wouldn't say I was sick. I'd just say that I'm ugly and try to change myself accordingly.

Q. *It seems to me that you can almost extend that type of thing, though, under a category of mental illness, that their conception of themselves as ugly, if that changes their behavior.*

P. That's right. If the fact that I consider my fore-arm or my nose ugly keeps me from doing all kinds of important things that I would otherwise be able to do, then I am in a pathological state, and that is the explanation—that I consider myself ugly.

Q. *Then you can have different intensities——*

P. Right. It can be more or less restrictive, and that's what corresponds to how deep the pathology or how important the pathology or how serious.

One of the problems in the theory of pathology is just the fact that pathology is different across time and place. If you try to define pathology by reference to certain behaviors that were pathological, you would be embarrassed by the fact that somewhere else, at some other time and place, that behavior would not have been considered pathological; and that if you just stayed where you were and waited 20 or 30 or 50 or a hundred years, it wouldn't be; or if you traced history back a hundred, 200, 300 years, it

wouldn't have been either.

Q. *I was wondering about some kinds of diseases, such as certain cancers, that don't have any effect on your behavior in the initial phases but would seem to be definitely pathological.*

early cancer

pathology




FIGURE 4

P. Remember what I said about causal descriptions, that if you have a set of causal connections, you can look back over here and say, "Here is what we can expect in the future unless we prevent it." Your early cancer is one of these things of which you can say, "Well, it's not making any difference now, but given the connections that we know of, here's the kind of thing we can expect in the future, and that thing will be pathology." Since you know that, you try to intervene here [arrow] to prevent the pathology, even though you wouldn't say it was pathological here [x], in that if it never changed, you wouldn't be inclined to do anything. It's this, the sequence.

Q. *Just another facet: if you don't know you've got the cancer, you won't know about it unless it's been discovered at some kind of cellular level, and you'll never know it otherwise until it actually affects your behavior.*

P. Right. And sometimes not even then. Things can make a lot of difference in your behavior, and you don't notice it, particularly if they come on gradually.

One reason for that is that people are changing all the time. Think of five years ago, what you were like five years ago, and then how you're like now, probably there's some fairly strong changes, and they were not planned; and you didn't suddenly wake up one morning and say, "I'm different," because it's been happening gradually.

So right now, the way you are seems natural, but five years ago, the way you were then seemed natural. So when changes happen gradually at

roughly that pace, it's awfully hard just to assimilate them and have a new baseline, and there's a lot of things you don't notice.

In connection with the notion of a pathological state, we have another notion that's important, and that's the notion of a need. And we can give a definition of need, too. A need is a condition which, if not met, results in pathology.

Q. *I noticed in the text that people ### a great deal of need both physical and mental, so we're going to apply it to those?*

P. Yeah. Since the definition of pathology is common, the definition of need is. Think of something like vitamins. If you don't get enough vitamins, if you don't get the right kind, you're going to be sick, one way or another. If you don't get enough food, you're going to be dead. If you don't get enough oxygen, or you don't get it fast enough, you'll be dead, too. Death is the limiting case of a pathological state. There your behavior potential is completely zero.

But also, things like order and meaning—if the world was chaotic for you, you'd have nothing up here [K] to use, and you wouldn't be able to act at all. So indeed, the notion of need as *a condition which, if not met, results in pathology* is common to both the mental and the physical type illnesses.

Furthermore, need is not a motivational phenomenon. Just from the fact that if you don't get vitamins, you'll be sick, from that it does not follow that you're motivated to get vitamins, one reason being that you may not know anything about them.

Q. *If a child is not given love, are you saying that he's not motivated to seek it out? If we feel very unloved and very lonely, etc., we aren't motivated to seek it out?*

P. No. I said, just from the fact that a person is lacking something he needs, it doesn't follow that he's motivated.

Q. *Not necessarily, but he could be.*

P. Yeah. If he is motivated, you need another explanation than just to say he needs it.

Q. *Okay, he wants it.*

P. But wanting it is different from needing it. History is full of examples of people wanting things that were bad for them and not wanting things that they needed.

Q. *So what other explanation is there? If he needs love, he goes after it.*

P. The first thing you want to ask is, “Does he? Does he go after it? Is that what he’s going after?” Because look, we have a paradigm for reacting to needs, and that is this: if you think you have a need, then you’re motivated. As soon as you think you need vitamins, then you’re motivated to get them. As soon as you think you need rest and relaxation or anything else, then you’re motivated to get it. But you have to believe it.

Now it doesn’t matter if your belief is correct or incorrect, you’ll still be motivated. If I didn’t need vitamins at all, but I thought I did, I’d be motivated. So the motivation doesn’t depend on the correctness or the actual need; it depends on believing that I have that need. When it comes to children, that explanation is a little bit awkward, because you have to suppose that the child knows about this and that’s why he wants it; and if you aren’t willing to suppose that, then you have a couple of switches.

One, you say, “Well, it isn’t love he’s after, it’s something else that I think he can recognize, like comfort versus discomfort or something cruder.” Or you just construct a completely different explanation.

Q. *If he wants it—he may not necessarily need it, but he wants it—suppose a child wants something that—as you say, many people want a lot of things that aren’t good for them. Then how do you go about changing the wants—how do you change your own wants?*

P. We’ll get to that later. We need more background notions to be able to talk about that. We haven’t got there yet.

Q. But I want to know now.

P. You want what you want when you want it, eh?

Q. *How would that—relate that idea of need and want to, say, monkeys with mother deprivation.*

P. What’s the problem?

Q. *If you have a monkey ### one example of just a wire mother and another of a terry-cloth mother, and a monkey with a wire mother is in a more pathological state than the monkey with a cloth mother. There’s a need there, but the monkey doesn’t necessarily know it wants it, because—*

P. It doesn’t necessarily want it. In fact, that kind of evidence is to the effect that it doesn’t. It just shows the results, namely, that it’s unable to relate to other monkeys, and it doesn’t even want to do that.

Q. *But if it has a choice between the two, it will choose the cloth mother.*

P. Yeah. For a monkey, that should qualify as pathology. Any monkey that will choose a cloth and wire apparatus over another monkey—that's a bad state to be in—for a monkey.

Q. *That would be a restriction on his knowledge.*

P. Well, of his potential, because think of all of the interactions that he can't have with other monkeys because he prefers the terry-cloth and wire. And he doesn't miss them, either. He doesn't miss those other possibilities.

Q. *I was thinking of one step before that, you have just a wire model and a wire and terry-cloth one, the monkey will choose the terry-cloth mother.*

P. Right.

Q. *And I think the idea is also that a monkey with a terry-cloth mother would be less pathological than the one with just a wire mother.*

P. Probably.

Q. *Where does the concept of want or need—*

P. What you can say is that monkeys ought to socialize, and that a monkey that can't socialize is severely restricted and, therefore, in a pathological state. Then you can say, having that kind of history makes the monkey unable to socialize. And the one with the wire mother is even more restricted that way than the one with the terry-cloth mother. And so the one is more pathological than the other, but they're both in a pathological state because they can't socialize.

Q. *I understand the pathological state, but between those two artificial mothers there seems to be a knowledge—*

P. The difference there is reflected in the difference here [Fig. 3, p. 57, knowledge], here [values], and here [ability]. They have different discriminations because they have different histories. They certainly have different motivational priorities because when given the chance, the one will choose this one; and the other will choose that one. They're certainly limited in what they're able to do. So that kind of history will restrict you all the way around. If one doesn't get you, the other two will.

Q. Can we talk about need itself as being pathological?

P. No more than you can talk about behavior itself as being pathological.

Q. *I'm thinking if a person has a need that simply will not or cannot be*

met, you'd have to say the need itself is pathological, because it will always be leading him into a pathological state. ### the need has got to be changed.

P. Look, if you lock me in an air-tight room I'm going to need oxygen, and after a while it will be the case that that need cannot possibly be met—that is, in any practical sense, it can't be met—

Q. *You can have a priority of needs. Some needs, if they aren't met, you die.*

P. Yeah, but the logic is the same. Just because it can't possibly be met doesn't mean that the need is pathological. You might say, "I'd be better off if I didn't have that need, since it can't be met," but it would be strange to say that just having that need was pathological. There are other kinds of needs that are more plausible talking about them as being pathological. They're comparable to the business of thinking that I'm ugly and what follows from that. If you think of a person who has a tremendous need for admiration, for example, or a tremendous need for power, and then you see what follows as a consequence, you might say that having that need is pathological. But that's secondary. Or you can say, "No, it's not that having the need is pathological, but look what it does: it puts you in a pathological state,"

Q. *It's what you do to get there that makes it—*

P. No, it's what you can't do because you're so strongly motivated to get this, that's where the pathology lies. It's like having tunnel vision or being a fanatic, that being so strongly oriented in one way restricts you in all kinds of other ways.

Q. *Like when drug addicts—*

P. Yeah, like "I've got to have that fix", yeah.

Q. *### aren't we using more our common perception of the word 'need', in that it's connected with motivation, motivation for wanting admiration or wanting drugs, there has to be an element of motivation there, whereas the definition of need, need producing a pathological state doesn't seem like it necessarily has to include motivation.*

P. Yeah, that's why I mentioned that as soon as you believe you have a need, then you've got motivation.

Q. *A person can need admiration without knowing it and be in a bad way until he gets admiration.*

P. Yeah. You see, needing admiration won't necessarily lead you to do a lot of things to get it, but you might indeed do them without knowing you have the need, the reason being that if you do do things that get you admiration, you may find you like it because of how that need operates, and then once you find you like it, you're on your way.

By the way, that's the crude description of how you get new motivations. You get into it without being motivated to do it that way, and you find how it hits you, and if it hits you right then, the next time around you're motivated.

Q. *It gives you pleasure.*

P. It's satisfying. There are other satisfactions than pleasure, and we'll get to that.

Q. *As far as the drug addict is concerned, if there wasn't a limit—if it would take 15 pounds of heroin or something—if he could just keep getting more and more; and he did all this successfully; then he wouldn't be pathological, because he's succeeding in filling his need.*

P. No. Remember, the pathology wasn't specifically in connection with the need, it's in what that prevents him from doing, what else that prevents him from doing, and if his whole day is geared to getting that drug, and he has no time for anything else, then he's in a pathological state no matter how successful he is in getting the drug. Now if he could get it instantaneously, without any effort, and it had no other effects, then indeed you could say—

Q. *But in the first case, then, the observer is making the judgment—*

P. That's right.

Q. *—on what he should be doing instead of getting his fix.*

P. No, not on what he should be doing, but what he's missing, what he's missing out on.

Q. *That's a judgment right there.*

P. Yeah. That's what I said, that to make a judgment about pathology, you need to be in that position. You need to be familiar with the social milieu so that you know what's important and what isn't, and you need to know the facts about the person.

Q. *But wouldn't it be a lot more stable, as far as ### goes, a lot safer to look at need from the before point of view, how the person gets—what led the person to need that in the first place, what went wrong where the need ###.*

P. No. You won't find much regularity at all that way, and there doesn't have to be any regularity at all. It's like asking, "How did everybody get here, in this room?" There's a million ways, a million paths, a million starting points that you could have come from to wind up here. And there needn't be any regularity whatever about those starting points or about those paths.

Q. *So you're saying that there doesn't have to be any agreement?*

P. There doesn't have to be any regularity for there to be agreement on. History is not a good anchor that way. You don't find a lot of regularities in history. You find them in principles, in definitions, etc., but not in historical ###. Furthermore, think how chancy it would be to have to know histories, because those events, when they're gone, they're gone; and you generally don't have records of them. So if you had to know about histories, you'd be in sad shape. And so would we all.

Okay, so much for pathological states and the associated notion of need. That's simply a special case of this notion of State. As I said, I mention that because it's particularly important in the context of personality theories and understanding people.

There's a different set of states that are also of interest to us. You remember the example of being tired, and then being exhausted, and the limiting case of being unconscious. What happens, and what is the case, when you're unconscious or when you're asleep?

There you certainly have a reduction in powers and/or dispositions. In fact, you have such a wholesale reduction that one of our first temptations is to say that you lose them all. Certainly, if you're sleeping, you're not exhibiting any behavior, so you're not exemplifying any powers or dispositions. So as I say, the temptation is to say, "Well, during that period of time, you've lost all of your powers and dispositions. Then when you think about it a little more, you say, "No. I haven't lost it all." One of the things you still have the ability to do is to wake up. That makes all the difference in the world.

Q. *That's if you're asleep, not if you're unconscious.*

P. Even if you're unconscious, you still have the ability to wake up under certain conditions; and if you don't, then you're not just unconscious, you're dead. So if you're asleep, you still have the ability to react to loud noises or to being pushed around or to falling on the floor or various other things of that sort. And that's what normally happens. When you wake up, you start responding to noises around you, or sights, sounds, etc.

Q. *But recovering from unconsciousness is not usually a behavior.*

P. No. Neither is waking up.

Q. *So it's not changing an ability.*

P. No, the ability is the ability to respond, but if you do respond, you are behaving, and you can short-cut it by saying, the ability is the ability to wake up. Because there's no limit to the kind of responses or behaviors that you engage in on waking up, so the only commonality is that it represents waking up rather than that it's a certain kind of behavior. Because what you regain is the ability to behave differently, to respond to things around you with behavior. Whereas during the time that you're asleep, you can't do that, and you're not doing that, but you have the potential for starting to react, and that potential is what you retain even throughout the period of sleep.

Q. *That particular potential, even though that's not strictly speaking classified under ability—*

P. The achievement—you remember, I said you define ability in terms of achievement. The achievement is just any behavior at all. That's why there's no point in trying to classify it as to type.

Q. *Sleep and unconsciousness represent a pretty severe restriction on your powers, so it's just up to the observer to subjectively determine whether that's pathological or not?*

P. Yeah. Since our society and our way of living is geared to people sleeping eight hours a day, roughly, somebody who does that is not in a pathological state. You wouldn't judge that he's in a pathological state just on that account, because since the whole set-up is geared to that, you're not restricted materially, that way. It's not just any limitation that leads you to judge pathology, because every single person is severely limited relative to the different things that a person might do. Any one person is strongly limited, but society is not set up for individuals who can do everything. It's set up for individuals who have a certain range and a certain minimum here and there; and there is no single set of things that you have to be able to do to participate in that society; but there are things that have more or less of a presumption.

For example, if you don't know who you are or where you are, there's a strong presumption that you're unable to participate. On the other hand, if you don't like Coca-Cola, there's no presumption there. And if you can't play

a musical instrument, there's no presumption that you're in a pathological state.

Q. *So pathological state depends on the culture, too.*

P. Yeah, exactly.

Q. *I could be in a pathological state right now, but I could move out of my culture and be just perfectly fine.*

P. Yeah. As I said, that's one of the embarrassments of trying to define pathology in terms of behavior: you find that kind of relativity, and then you spend the rest of your life looking for that magic description that is not susceptible to this relativity; and the disagreement problem is always there. So having a content-free definition is an advantage, because that's also culture-free. It'll apply anywhere, any time, any place.

Q. *Would you please repeat that?*

P. Having a content-free definition of pathology is also having a culture-free definition, because this definition is good any time, any place, any culture.

And on reflection, you would say, "Yeah, we have to have that notion already, because we can already understand that in some other culture, somebody is sick, but not because he behaves like somebody that *we* would consider sick." So our notion of sickness, and our ability to understand that *in another culture they judge it differently* implies that we have a notion of pathology that isn't culturally relative. Otherwise, if we had, we'd simply say, "They're wrong." Since we don't, that implies that the notion that we already have and commonly work with is not culturally relative.

Q. *Would one way of expressing that difference in pathology be via the sickness—maybe I'm blind in one eye, which in this culture doesn't affect me that much; but if I'm in a hunting culture or something, I lost binocular vision so that it actually affects my behavior.*

P. Right. So we can understand that kind of difference perfectly well, which is why I say that it's clear we're working with an understanding of pathology that is not just restricted to the behaviors that we would consider pathological here.

The unconscious-type thing is what we need to clean up that definition. Remember, when I gave the definition [of a person]. I said if you took it straightforwardly, the fact that we're asleep eight hours a day would lead you to reject it right off the bat. Now we can clean it up by adding a qualification.

In the paradigm case formulation, the definition says, “a person whose history is a history of intentional action.” Now we can say, “By a person, we mean either somebody like that, whom we’ve never heard of; or if you change that person and allow him to be in any one of a number of states in which he’s unconscious but still retains the kind of power that we recognize; then he is also a person.” So by allowing that transformation of unconscious states, we can use that definition as a paradigm case. And now we’ve included all of the persons we know.

But you see, we needed to develop this notion of State in order to be able to formulate the Unless Clause, the exception, the transformation. That’s why we couldn’t do it from the very beginning. So *a person is somebody whose history is a history of intentional or deliberate action except when he’s unconscious*. That’s not a definition; that’s an explication.

Q. *And that doesn’t have to be total unconsciousness. Were you trying to include as a possibility unconscious motivation?*

P. Just ‘unconscious’. Sleep is more important than unconscious motivation in this respect. We could already handle unconscious motivation before we had this problem. It’s the business of being asleep or drugged out or whatever, that’s when you’re not behaving at all.

You should notice that we needed the notion of person, because it’s the notion of person that crosses that gap in time when you’re not behaving. The sequence of behaviors stops and then picks up, and what gives you the continuity through that is the person. It’s the person who retains the ability to wake up during that period of time when there’s no behavior.

But remember, we said that every behavior is somebody’s behavior. So implicitly, we already had this in mind in the original formulation of behavior—that you always have a person who’s doing the behaving.

P. Let’s move over to here [Status], which I think will catch some of the interesting cases. This is a leftover notion if you derive it this way; it’s an important notion if you derive it in a different way, which we will later.

Remember, I said that a state is temporary and reversible, and all of the states that I’ve mentioned are temporary and reversible. Now, there are some things that are just like states, but are not temporary or are not reversible. And when we have a condition like that, we use a different way of talking and a different notion, called Status.

Some of our prime examples are being blind, being mentally retarded, and being a child. Being blind, until recently, was neither temporary nor

reversible. It was permanent and irreversible. In fact, a lot of cases still are permanent and irreversible.

Being mentally retarded again is—at least so far—permanent and irreversible.

Being a child is not permanent, but it's not reversible. You don't go into and out of the state of being a child. You start there and you move out of it, and you can't go home again.

So since the common notion of state depends heavily on its being reversible and temporary, we need another notion for those conditions that either are not temporary or are not reversible, and that's this. And the difference shows up in the way we talk.

We talk here [State] of a certain kind of person. We talk about a person having a headache or having cancer, but we talk about him being blind or being mentally retarded or being a child. So in effect, here [Status], since it is not temporary, we talk about the kind of person he is, whereas here [State] we talk about the condition he has or is in. So the notion of Status, then, is the same as the notion of State, except it's either not reversible or not temporary.

Now think of that whole set of notions, every single one of the Traits, Attitudes, Interests, Styles, Abilities, Knowledge, Values, States, Statuses—think of that whole set back under the more general heading of Individual Differences—how one person can be the same as or different from another. I said that there are countless possible notions of that sort, that we only in fact have used a small number.

Actually, that depends on what you call 'a small number'. One of our famous people in psychology went through the dictionary and counted 18,000 terms that referred to individual differences. So 'small'—18,000 is small compared with the great variety that are possible. But most of us don't use 18,000. We get by with anywhere from 20 to a hundred because we don't need more.

The question is: *how do we use them?* Why do we need them? Are they dispensable? From the viewpoint of some theorists and some methodologists, they're either dispensable or unfortunate necessities. Dispensable in the sense—this is one such theorist talking—that when we know all there is to know about humans and their behavior, we will have one story for everybody, and we will not be involved in individual differences. The only reason we have to do that now is because we haven't achieved that level of

knowledge. So we regard individual differences as kind of error variants that simply reflect the lack of precision of our measurements and the lack of detail in our theories. And give us a thousand years, and we will do away with all of that. That's the anchoring point of view, that they're unfortunate, and dispensable in the future.

The next one is: *well, probably we never will be able to dispense with them, because our theories never will be that refined and our measurements never will be that good, and that's just unfortunate.* It would be nice if things were neater and simpler. Or it would be nice if our measurements and theories were better, but we just have to live with it, and over time we'll hope to cut that down to as small an amount as possible, so that we can approximate this condition where we have a single story for everybody.

In contrast to those kinds of views, and there are all kinds of variations, let me give you a heuristic example for a different sort of understanding about individual differences or personal characteristics. The heuristic example is in terms of what I think is a very common phenomenon. Think of doing elementary geometry, absolutely elementary, where you have a two-dimensional coordinate system marked off with a metric so you can have coordinates. And let's say you have a pair of numbers out here, and this one is $(-2, 4)$, this one is $(8, 6)$.




FIGURE 5

By the way, the two coordinates are a parametric analysis. The two-dimensional coordinate system—these two ways [I and II] are the two ways that any number can differ from another number or any position can differ from another position.

Okay, we have these two coordinates of 8 and 6, and -2 and 4. Now, one of the things we know from geometry is that if you shift the axis [dotted line], two things follow. One, any point now will have a different set of coordinates. This one [(2, 4)] will now be (-1, 7); and on this coordinate system, this one [(8, 6)] will be 12, say, and 5.

The first conclusion, then, is that the coordinates in general will be different. The second one is: if you know the angle of rotation, you can figure out what that difference is. If I know how we started, I know what the coordinates were there, and you tell me the angle that we moved this thing through was $29^{\circ} 30'$, I will be able to figure out what the new coordinates are. But that's the minimum information that I need to do that.

Now think of each individual person as a coordinate system. Every person has his own view of the world; and so he operates like a coordinate system, and the world is plotted onto his framework. In that case, if you have another person who's different from you, you have a problem. How is he different from me? What difference does that make? And what you need is the equivalent of "What kind of angle do I have to rotate my coordinates to get to him? What kind of adjustments would I have to make on how I see the world to arrive at how he sees the world?" And if you can do that, then you can understand his view of the world, and you can understand what you would expect him to do differently from you.

The Personal Characteristics perform exactly this job for us. They are the equivalent of saying, "To get from me to him, you have to rotate 29° ."

Except that instead of 'me', we start with what you might call the standard normal person, who is that very unusual person, namely, the one who's absolutely average in every respect. There is no such person, but conceptually that's our baseline. We say, "Okay, take that fictitious person. How would you have to adjust him in order to arrive at this actual person?" When you say that he's friendly, or that's he's hostile, or that he's generous, or that he knows how to do arithmetic, the information that you're giving us is *how does he differ from just anybody?* And that's equivalent to saying, along certain dimensions, you take this standard somebody and you rotate, you make that kind of change, and you've got him.

But having done that, you know the difference between how he sees the world and how you do, because you've also got your own picture of how you have to rotate the standard person to get you. You think of yourself as friendly, generous, intelligent, loyal, trustworthy, etc. Again, you're talking about how you would rotate that standard person, how you would change him, in order to arrive at you.

So if you think in general of personal characteristic descriptions as doing this job for us, of giving us a systematic way of making the adjustments that are needed to understand how somebody else sees the world—and not merely sees the world but in terms of powers, etc., how he's able to behave—then you'll see that this is not something that's going to disappear over time, that this is not something that's dispensable, and it's not unfortunate.

In fact, we would be in an extremely precarious position if we didn't have them, because then, indeed, we would be cut off from one another. We wouldn't be able to understand one another. The only people we could understand would be people who are exactly like us. And we'd never get somebody like that.

So the whole set of notions of individual differences are not just something that you have left over when you take out the regularities of human behavior. You can use them that way, but that's not what they do for us normally. What they do for us normally is to help us translate one person into another. And that is just as lawful as any other aspect of people and behavior.

We do this all the time perceptually. Take this cup, for example. If each of you had a camera and took a picture of it, or if each of you drew a picture of it from where you sit, every one of you would draw a different picture, and all of your pictures would differ substantially from my picture, because in most of yours, the handle would be on the left, and on mine it would be on the right. That doesn't bother us in the least. And in fact, if any of you drew exactly the picture I drew, I would say, "What's going on? That can't possibly be."

In order for us to agree about that cup, your pictures have to be different from mine. But they can't be different in just any old way. If any of you drew a circle and said, "That's what it looks like to me," again, I'd say, "No way." But there are a lot of drawings which differ from mine, and I would say, "Well, yeah, if that cup has the shape that I see it as having, and it looks the way it does to me here, then your drawing *is* the way it would have to look to you over there."

So in effect, it takes a different drawing on your part to agree with me. The same drawing, I would say *no*. And that's because we understand how these things work. We understand that if you're seeing it from a different place, it would have to look different, and that that isn't disagreement, it's agreement—if it's the right kind of difference.

Okay, that's a prime model for how you can have objectivity with relativity, and not subjectivity. The fact that we all have a different story doesn't mean that we're all making it up, or that we have no hold on reality, or that we're all in a world of our own. On the contrary, only because we have a common world are we able to say that each of us ought to see it differently.

Q. *Would you repeat that again about how we can have objectivity—?*

P. Yeah. What we have here is relativity, and relativity is usually equated with subjectivity, because objectivity is usually equated with everybody says the same thing. But what we have here is a good example of a case where agreement requires that people say different things, so that you have relativity, but it's objective, not subjective. And it's only because we have a public world that we are able to say, "Different people ought to see it differently." So from this approach, the fact that everybody sees things differently, that you can say now, "Everybody lives in a world of his own," does not create or reflect the kind of solipsism problems, the kind of isolation problems, the kind of knowledge-is-impossible problems, that historically these kinds of statements have led to. And the way out, what makes it work, is that we have Individual Difference notions. The Individual Difference notions are what hold everything together, that enable us to make these translations to another person.

This is why I said: in general, with an Individual Difference description, that tells you what allowances to make, what to expect differently, how to treat that person appropriately, and how to treat him effectively. All of that is carried by an Individual Difference description. Those are the various general uses of Individual Difference descriptions because of this [Fig. 5, p. 67], because they work this way.

I guess we're running late. Let's pick up next time.

SESSION 6

July 19, 1976

Peter: Last hour we talked about some of the other individual difference concepts. We talked about Powers, about States, pathological states, unconscious states. And at the end of the hour. I gave a heuristic example of how to understand all of these individual difference notions as something that connects people to one another, rather than something that expresses divisions. Are there any questions about that material? Any questions about the whole set of notions of personal characteristics? Okay, let me go into several elaborations now, that are going to be important to us.

First, you may recall when we were talking about different forms of description, and we generated the social practice description by substituting in the achievement parameter. I said that social practices are important enough so that we have a more detailed format for talking about social practices. So today, I want to begin by talking about social practices.

One: a social practice is a process. A social practice is something that occurs at a time and place, takes some period of time to happen, and is interruptible in that it may start and not run to completion. Those are the general characteristics of a process. The general characteristics of a process include occurring at a given time and place, having a duration, having a beginning and end, and being interruptible in the sense that it can start and not finish.

With the notion of process, as with other fundamental notions, you don't really have a definition, and what you need in order to deal with processes is again a parametric analysis, namely, some formulation of the ways that one process can be the same as or different from another process. Then you can start identifying, describing, particular processes and dealing with them in some kind of lawful way.




FIGURE 1

This descriptive format, which is called a Process Description, is a way of doing that. That is, specifying stages, options, elements, eligibilities, individuals, and contingencies is a way of specifying those ways in which one process can be the same as or different from another. So if you want to talk about a certain kind of process, you have to do some of this specification implicitly or implicitly.

Now the kind of process that clearly we are most interested in as psychologists are behavioral processes, which is to say, processes in which the components are behaviors. Putting diamonds in here indicates exactly that—that you’re dealing with a behavioral process whose components are going to be behaviors.

The first feature of a process is it’s extended through time, and certain changes take place over time. That is, a process takes place in stages. So one way of specifying something about a process is to specify how many stages it has, and/or which stages they are.

Secondly, one of the characteristic features of processes is that they can occur in more than one way. You think of a behavioral process like taking a drink of water, walking out the door, drinking some coffee from the cup, pacing up and down on the floor—think of how many ways there are to do each one of those. The different ways that you can do the same things are options. In any process, you not only have different ways of doing the whole thing; for each stage, in general, you have different ways of accomplishing it. But in this process, you have stage 1, and you have some number of different

ways of accomplishing stage 1 [cf. Fig. 1, p. 70]. You have stage 2, and you have some number of different ways of accomplishing stage 2, and likewise all the way through. So again, it's characteristic of processes that there is more than one way in which it can be done. And that is represented by showing how many options and which options they are.

For a lot of things in which we're dealing with behavioral patterns, these two [Stages and Options] are the only two things we need to take account of. This gives what you might call the gross structure of the process. However, that is not all there is to a process. For some purposes, we'll need these [Contingencies], at least. So we'll need to talk about some of these, too.

You think of a process specification or a process description more or less along the lines of a recipe in which you give a batch of ingredients; and then you tell how they go together and what you have to do with them to get a cake or a pie or whatever the recipe is a recipe for.

The specification of elements is like the specification of ingredients. The elements are all of those things that have a part in that process. In a behavioral process, clearly the most important elements are usually going to be people, but plenty of processes require some other ingredients beside people. For example, a football game requires not merely the players, but the uniforms, the ball, the goalposts, and the field—none of which is a person, but they are essential parts of the process.

When it comes to elements, the other good heuristic is to think of a play, a play like Hamlet, and then think of the elements as simply the characters in the play plus all of the props, like the, castle, the skull, all of the things that have a part in the play as such. So formally, the process consists of those elements.

However, that's only in the abstract. That's like seeing Hamlet written down as a play. If you're going to have an actual occurrence of that process, you're going to have actual individuals. If you're going to have an actual performance of Hamlet, you can't just have written down the character of Hamlet and the king, etc. You have to have actors who are real actors or actual individuals, and you can't just have it written down that there's a skull and a castle; you've got to have a prop, something you hold in your hand, and those are the skull and the castle. So real occurrences of that process require real things, not just formal elements.

What connects these two sets is the eligibilities. Which individuals play which parts? The reason you need something like eligibilities is that very often, a single individual can play more than one part. The same actor who

plays Hamlet in Scene 1 may be the spear-bearer in Scene 2. The spear-bearer and Hamlet are two different elements in the play, but on a given occasion, the same individual might play both.

Secondly, of course, on different occasions you might have a different set of actors playing that play. So you'd have a different set of individuals, but you'd have to have the right number and the right kind of individuals to fit the formal specifications of what kind of elements that play, that process, requires. So these three things [Elements, Eligibilities, Individuals], think of as a unit, and those three things take care of the recipe aspect of processes. It is ingredients and how they go together.

The Contingencies stem from back over here. I said there are different ways of accomplishing stage 1 and different ways of accomplishing stage 2, etc. In what you might call a loosely structured process, or an unstructured process, you could take any one of the ones in stage 1—let's say this one [Fig. 1, p. 70, diamond A]; combine it with any one of the ones in stage 2, like for example that one [B]; add any one of the ones in stage 3, for example this [C]; and any one of the ones in stage 4, for example that [D]; and any combination of that sort would be an occurrence of the process.

It happens that most processes are not that open-ended, that unstructured. With most processes, you get constraints of two kinds. Number one, which is the concurrence constraint, that if it goes a certain way in one place, then there's some limit to how it can go in the other places. You think, for example, of a chess game as fitting this schema very closely. You have the two players, and first White makes his move [stage 1], and then Black makes his move [stage 2], and then White makes his move [stage 3], and so on. Clearly. White has a certain range of options for an opening move, and Black has a certain range of options for an opening move, but once White has made opening move, his range of options next time is going to be different. So what he has open and available afterwards depends on what has occurred before. Because of that, you can't combine just any possibility here [stage 1] with any possibility here and here and here [stages 2, 3, 4]. So you express those limits by stating some co-occurrence constraints.

Or think of a process of making dinner, and you start out by baking a chicken pie, and then you're going to eat. If you started by baking a chicken pie, you can't continue by eating roast beef. What you eat has to be what you made, even though in the abstract, chicken pie and roast beef are both possibilities under what you could have made, and they are both possibilities under what you could have eaten. But if you made the one, you can't eat the

other. You have to eat the one you made. So again, it's that kind of constraint.

So that we take care of by co-occurrences, and co-occurrences do not just connect forward, that is to say that if you have something earlier, you must have something later. You can also say: if you ended this way, you had to be here or here [C or c'] at stage 3. So there's no built-in directionality on the co-occurrence constraints.

You recognize that if you do it forward, you can easily reproduce a causal connection, by saying, "If this [A'] is what happens at stage 1, then non-accidentally or necessarily or something of the sort, this [B] is what happens at stage 2." So all you have to do is tighten it up a little, and you can reproduce our classical causal connections here.

Q. *So if at the end of all the stages, we have a certain one marked off, can we then go back and say exactly where we were at stage 3, 2, 1, by simply knowing where we are at this present time?*

P. If you know that you're here now, can you figure out that you must have been here at stage 3, and here at stage 2.

Q. Yes.

P. Not unless there are tight connections, and usually, for any process that I know of, there are not that tight connections. They simply aren't. And there's no reason why they should be.

Q. *It would make it a lot simpler.*

P. Yeah. There are reasons not to be sorry that life isn't simpler than it is. Occasionally, we lament, "Gee, if only life was simple and things were orderly," but in fact, as you'll see in a few minutes, it's good that it isn't.

Now the other kind of contingency that gives some internal structure to this is attributional constraints. Attributional constraints consist of saying, "For an individual to make this choice [A] as against the options [A', A''], he has to be a certain kind of individual. For example, he has to have a certain ability, or he has to have a certain piece of knowledge, or he has to be following a certain strategy, or something about that individual, and say, "It would take an individual like that to make this choice as against the others."

We already saw some of that here in the eligibility statements, when we said that some of those elements have to be persons, and some of those elements can't be persons. Those are attributional constraints. It's the same kind of notion, that to fit in in a certain place, or to make a certain choice, the individual has to be a certain kind. Clearly—say, in a football game formally

if I'm a quarterback, I have an option of throwing a hundred-yard pass. On the other hand, unless I'm an exceptional quarterback. I don't really have that option because I don't have that ability. Only somebody with that ability could have taken that option.

Q. *Would it be correct to say that for an individual to choose an option over another, he must have the ability for that option or the knowledge?*

P. Whatever it takes—ability, knowledge, motivation—whatever it takes, he must have those in order to have that as an option.

Q. ###

P. Think of when the first move is the snap of the ball, and then I fade back to pass, but in the meantime—and you need another of these diagrams for the tight end—the tight end is running out. One of the co-occurrence things is that unless he runs out, I'm not going to throw the ball; and also, I'm going to throw the ball where he's going to be, not somewhere else. So my later behavior, my choice of options here [stage 3] is guided by and limited by what he does, that is, by what goes on earlier in the game.

When you put together all of the possibilities given by Stages and Options, and specifications of Elements, Eligibilities, and Individuals, and then add the constraints that go with Contingencies of both kinds, you have specified implicitly or explicitly all of the different ways that this process could occur.

Any one of those ways is a version. Whenever a process occurs, it occurs in the form of one of its versions. To say, for example, that we're holding a class right now is to talk about a certain kind of process. To say that we are doing it right now is to say that the particulars of what have happened and are happening fit as examples in the general diagram of all of the different ways that one could have a class. What we're doing now is one example. So again, whenever a process occurs, it occurs in one of its versions, which is to say, in one of the ways that it can occur.

Just by way of cleaning up something, what I've given you is not a full process description. It's called a Basic Process Unit. It's a unit of description because one of the features of processes, since they extend over time and are divisible, is: you can take any part of it—that is, any stage—and redescribe that as a process, divide that into stages with options, etc., and have yourself just as elaborate a description of this part of it as we had for the whole thing. Likewise, you can take this whole description and say, "It, itself, is merely one of the stages in a larger process." So you can elaborate this both upward

into more and more complicated and bigger processes; or you can get more analytic and redescribe some portion of this in as much detail as possible, and then take one of the stages of that one and redescribe it, and so on ad infinitum.

That means that you can describe processes using this kind of format, at any level of detail from the history of the universe down to the smallest sub-atomic particle. There is no limit on the size of unit that you can describe with this, because it's recursive.

So what we're looking at here is simply the logical unit that gets repeated over and over again as you want to go up or down. Some descriptions require that. Again, a lot of times you can get by just with this, and it works fine.

Now let me give you a classic clinical example, and it's known as Dinner at 8:30.

Imagine that I tell you that yesterday I went home at seven o'clock, and we had dinner at 8:30, and the dinner consisted of having steak well done. You listen to that description, and you kind of yawn because you've heard that kind of description over and over, and it could as easily apply to half the people in Boulder as to me. So even though true, it hasn't told you much about me, and it's not a very interesting piece of information.

Now suppose that I add that yesterday morning I had a big argument with my wife, and we never settled it; that usually I do get home at 7:00 but usually we have dinner at 7:30, not 8:30; and that I like steak but I like it rare, and I hate it well done.

At that point, you see, you start smiling because you've got now a different picture of what was going on there, and if you had to describe it, you'd use some such terms as, "She's really giving it to me," or if you wanted to be more polite, you would say, "That was an expression of hostility." Or you would say, "That was a piece of hostile behavior."

The interesting feature about that piece of hostile behavior is this: on the first description, if you had been following me around, you could have given that description. You could have said, "He left at 7:00, he got home and they had dinner at 8:30, and the dinner was steak well done." Those are the kinds of things that you can establish just by being there and looking.

On the other hand, the expression of hostility—had you been there, you wouldn't have had to see anything that looked whatever like hostility. In order for that behavior to be hostility, she didn't have to look hostile, she

didn't have to sound hostile, she didn't have to throw the plate at me or do any of the things that look like hostility. All she had to do was have steak well done at 8:30. That's all. And you couldn't just from looking have told that it was an expression of hostility.

On the other hand, as soon as you know these facts, you have very little trouble recognizing that it's an expression of hostility.

That is typical of clinical judgments. One of the items of folklore that we have going is that clinical judgment requires paying very careful attention to people's tones of voices and postures and things like that—that that's the main sort of thing that clinicians do by way of being sensitive to people. I wouldn't want to deny that one does pay attention to these things or that they can be important. I would want to say that that's the minority of the kind of judgment a clinician makes. It's a minority of the kind of judgments that people make.

The majority of important judgments are like the one in Dinner at 8:30, where what you're doing is not making use of sensitivity to tones of voice and postures, etc. What is it instead? Not reasoning; recognition.

What is it you're recognizing? What you're recognizing is the choice, that of all of the ways of having dinner, choosing this one qualifies as an expression of hostility. And you recognize this very easily if you're familiar with the practice, and if you're familiar with the relevant facts. Then you can recognize what choices got made.

And it's the choice that is most revealing, not the performance. The performance was simply the performance of bringing in the dishes, putting on the steak, putting the steak in the oven, and all of that. That's not at all revealing. But choosing this way of doing it is not only very effective, it's also very revealing.

If you had to, you could give a redescription of having dinner at 8:30 in a way that would bring out what was hostile about it. For example, the first thing you would say is, "Well, she served dinner late," which, indeed it was.

Saying that it's at 8:30—unless you know that usually we have it at 7:30, you don't know that that was an hour late, and that's a crucial factor.

Likewise, if you didn't know that I hated it well done and liked it rare, you wouldn't be able to say that she served me something that I hated.

By the time you put together those two things, namely, that she served me something an hour late that I don't like, and then there's an implication that if she's my wife, she knows I don't like that, so it's not just an accident—

at that point it's beginning to look like hostility.

And then when I add that we had this argument in the morning that never got resolved, I've given you the motivational basis for her being hostile. And you've got now a pattern that all fits, and so you recognize that and say, "By gosh, that looks like an expression of hostility."

None of that depends on performance, particularly. As I say, the performance is simply having dinner at 8:30. But by recognizing the nature of the choices, and the fact that that set of choices does express—is an expression of this motivation, then you can recognize that what was going on was an expression of hostility.

So because there are these attributional constraints—that it would take a certain kind of person to make a certain kind of choice in a social practice—we reverse that connection and say, "If we see a person and his choices in the various social practices that we're familiar with, we can now work that connection the opposite way and draw conclusions about what kind of person he is." And indeed, that's the way we normally do it. It's by seeing people make choices, by seeing which of their opportunities they take and which they turn down, we draw conclusions about what kind of person this is. And that's how we generate our personal characteristic descriptions, by and large.




FIGURE 2

Let me draw a second connection here. Recall this diagram for deliberate action. We talked about choosing one behavior over a set of alternate possibilities. Now we can draw this kind of connection, namely that this set of behaviors, the one chosen [a] and the alternate possibilities [b, c, d] are simply one of the columns in the social practice description [Fig. 1, R']. If you're engaging in this practice and you're at this stage, you have these choices, and those are the choices that you're going to choose among, because if you're going to do it you're going to do it in one of the ways it can be done. You're not going to do it in every way it can be done. So you choose one of these [options], and that's what's reflected here [R], in this diagram, which simply says that you choose a behavior among some number.

So you can say: the reason we have choices in our individual behaviors is that we are participants in public patterns of behavior that have those choices, that offer those choices. And since we can only do it in one of the ways that it can be done, we have to make that choice if we're going to participate in that pattern.

You can't get out of it. It's like saying, "If you're going to play chess, you have to make a move. At every point you have a lot of possibilities, but if you're going to actually play, you play by choosing one of those possibilities and making the move." That's how a game gets played.

Likewise, that's how social patterns of behavior get enacted. It's by the players choosing one of the possible moves. But it's the structure of the game that has the conclusion that that's what they're doing. If there were no game called chess that had those possibilities, I could sit here and move things on a board all day, and I wouldn't be playing chess.

Q. *Then you are implying that the individual has freedom to decide on his options. No?*

P. No more than I'm implying that he's a Republican. You can ask of a hypothetical individual who does this, "Is he free?", but you might just as well ask, "Is he a Republican?" Because either one of those has nothing to do with what's going on. If he makes a choice, which is to say, he does it in one of the ways he can do it, that's enough. He's made the choice. To ask, "Is he free?" is to introduce simply a totally different context of ideas, as totally different as asking, "Is he a Republican or a Democrat?" This doesn't prevent people from doing it, but we also ask sometimes, "Is he a Republican or a Democrat?"

Q. *What determines co-occurrence contingencies?*

P. Nothing. Co-occurrence contingencies are simply a finer description of what game it is. Either the game has them or it doesn't, and whether it does or not depends on what game it is.

Q. *But aren't co-occurrences the same thing as social restrictions, social obligations, etc.?*

P. No.

Remember the chess game. If you wind up with this position, there are only certain positions you could have been in one move back. And that has nothing to do with social obligations. It has to do with the rules of the game.

Q. *But isn't it similar?*

P. It's similar in that the restrictions can be of various sorts.

Q. *You have more choices—you're ### restricted in social things. You probably have more choices than you do with co-occurrences. Like in a chess game, you only have one choice.*

P. You have all kinds of choices. That's the nature of the game, that at every move, you've got a whole lot of choices.

Q. *Yet there's only one that's the best move.*

P. If we only knew what the one was! What you do is, you make the best move you can, but you have no guarantee that that's the best move. And if you had a guarantee, your opponent would, too.

Q. *Yeah, but you can't move a pawn backwards.*

P. No, you can't; because if you did, you wouldn't be playing chess. It's not that you can't move a pawn backward; it's that you can't move the pawn backward in a game and still be playing chess. It's not a causal restriction on you. It's a restriction on what it is you're doing.

Q. *So that, in one sense, you can't engage in certain behaviors and be—*

P. And be engaging in certain behaviors.

Q. *—and be engaging in social behaviors, remain a functioning part of society?*

P. Well, if you take this in the large, that's the end-point. You can't do something that's counter to chess and be playing chess. You can't do something that isn't driving a car and still be driving a car. You can't be doing something that isn't one of the ways of eating dinner, and be eating dinner. That's all that these co-occurrence constraints give you, is that if you're doing

what you're doing, there are only certain things that qualify, and anything else doesn't. It's not that you can't do anything else. It's that if you are doing something else, it's something else you're doing and not this.

Q. *Can you put it on a much larger scale and not just talk about specifically playing chess or driving a car or eating, but put it on a larger scale where we're talking about a person and a life pattern?*

P. Can you give me an example?

Q. *Like, at one point in my life I have X amount of options, and so I take this. At another point I—could you use it as a pattern of somebody's life?*

P. Yeah, if you pursue what kind of—how a person lives his life, it breaks down into social practices. That is, a person's life history will break down into participating in social practices, and then other organized sets of practices that are larger than just one.

For example, making a living, raising a family, or almost any hobby, will not be a single practice; it will be a whole collection of practices. And these are the things that people participate in or enact, in the course of their lives.

Then if you think of how all of those could go together in one life, then you can start describing people's lives or your own life. Then you can also make such statements as, "Well, I could have done that, but it wouldn't have been me," and that would be your personal equivalent of saying, "I couldn't have moved the pawn backward and still be playing chess."

Again, it isn't that you couldn't have done it. You couldn't have done it and be you. That's a way of saying that in some fundamental sense, it wouldn't fit.

Q. *Does the knowledge parameter fit in as being able to discriminate between stages to make these choices on options?*

P. Yeah. Remember the diagram [Fig. 3, next page], when I said you could start adding here and here [small diamonds], and I could stay here all day just elaborating this diagram. But if you look at what I did draw, what I drew was a social practice here, which meant that in this behavior, you were discriminating a social practice. And if you wanted to mark this stage [n], you're discriminating this stage in the social practice as the one that you're doing now. And most people are doing that.

Q. *What is the social practice in that diagram?*

P. The whole thing is a diagram of a social practice. What you put at the

top is a name, and that name is the name of the whole social practice. Then this is an analytical description of it, and by specifying these various things, you distinguish that social practice from some other ones.

But the description of this form also give you a working leverage on examining, studying, connecting different aspects of this to other phenomena.




FIGURE 3

Q. *If you're describing a discrete part of somebody's behavior using that paradigm, how will you ever know what all the options are that are available to that particular person, in order to make an accurate description of what he knows about?*

P. You don't. If you're playing a game of chess, how will you ever know all of the options you have at a given stage? You don't. That doesn't keep you from playing chess in the way it's played. That is the way it's played. You operate in the absence of any such complete information, and that's essential to the nature of the game.

Q. *I think a good chess player knows what options he has.*

P. Not all of the possible options. He has some descriptions, but he can't pursue all of the consequences of making this move down to the 30th follow-through move. He has some notion about his options, but not a complete description of all of the possibilities.

Q. *Right, but when he's at, say, stage 1, then he can look at the board, look at each piece, and see what—I think it would be pretty easy to describe the options available because there's a finite set, and the pieces are in a given position on the board. And in this kind of a situation where we're describing persons, it seems as though there would—*

P. Anybody can keep track pretty well of that first option, of “What’s my next possible move?” But if what you want to do is keep track of all of the possibilities that stem from each of those possibilities, then that quickly gets out of hand.

Q. *What I was going to say was: at each discrete point in the game, you can look at the board, and there are still only a certain number of moves that you can make, and you choose among those.*

But getting back to people and describing behavior, can the environment constrict the person’s choice, the person’s options? For example, if we look at the people in concentration camps or Canon City, are their options in the way that they behave restricted?

P. You can have it either way. As an Observer, you’re engaging in some social practice, and when you describe somebody as being restricted or not restricted, you’re describing it that way is one of the options in whatever you’re doing. You could describe our behavior in this room as restricted, because we can’t move up through the ceiling; we can’t move down through the floor; we can’t move out through the wall; if we want to get to the hall we have to go out one of the two doors. So you can say, “My God, our behavior is restricted.”

But you can also say, “No, what this room gives us is a lot of opportunities. We have an opportunity to sit down, to stand up and walk around. We have opportunities to walk out into the hall, we have opportunities to write on the blackboard or to jump up and down, so what do you mean ‘we’re restricted’?”

If you want to focus on the fact that I can’t do these things, you say my behavior is restricted. If you want to focus on the fact that in this room I can do those other things, you say I’ve got a whole lot of opportunities. And it’s not as though one, as against the other, of those descriptions is true.

And that would hold for a concentration camp or any situation whatever. Any situation will provide some opportunities and have some constraints. And usually, the opportunities are tied into the constraints. If there weren’t this kind of constraint on chess behavior, you couldn’t have the opportunity to play chess, because the constraint consists of the fact that if you’re going to be playing chess, doing something else isn’t playing chess. If you wipe out that distinction, then you lose the opportunity to play chess. That’s the price of wiping out those constraints.

So if you took that to the extreme and said, “I want to wipe out all of

the constraints on my behavior,” you would also have wiped out all of your behavioral opportunities. And that would leave you nowhere, and that’s a bad place to be.

Q. *I was just trying to figure out a way to somehow bring this into graspable size, in terms of the set of behaviors that a person has and his options.*

P. What I’m saying is that it’s already graspable, that we deal with this routinely every day. It’s not a difficult thing. It’s only difficult if you push it to extremes, like talking about “all of the possible options”. If you just say, “A person operates in the knowledge of some options, and that’s what he has to base his decision on,” it doesn’t look impossible. It doesn’t even look difficult. It’s when you push it to extremes that then you run into problems.

And, as usual, that’s not the way it works. The fact that we don’t know all those doesn’t prevent us from doing it the way we do it.

Q. *### of the first one, we’re not interested in what possibilities there might have been or the why of the choices, only in the pattern of the choice itself.*

P. No, sometimes you’re interested in the why of the choice. For example, you might be interested in why she chose to have dinner at 8:30. And then you have an answer. But notice, the answer is another pattern. The answer to “Why this choice here?” is that there’s another pattern being done simultaneously. [change tape]

Remember that I said that ordinarily, people are doing more than one thing at a time. The Dinner at 8:30 is a prime example. There were two things going on there, not just one. And whereas for just having dinner, there were all kinds of options, think of how much narrower the range of options is for having dinner *and* expressing hostility. If you’re going to do both of those simultaneously, you don’t have the same kind of leeway. And the more things you’re doing at the same time, the fewer ways there are to do all of those things simultaneously.

Q. *I should think there would be clinical significance to learning what options a person has and doesn’t have relative to those other variables—Know-How and Motivation.*

P. There is, except that usually you’ve learned it already. Remember, I said that what it takes is familiarity with the society, namely, familiarity with the social practices; and most of the ones that you encounter in clinical practice are quite familiar to you. You’ve already learned them. And it’s background learning, not having a list of, “Here are the options of stage 1 of

practice X.” It’s just your general familiarity with how things get done.

Now, you can go wrong. On a given occasion, you might make a mistake based on the fact that there were options that you weren’t familiar with. So that’s something to watch out for.

But basically, the learning, the knowledge of that sort, you already have. You don’t learn it when you get trained as a clinician. The training more consists of reminding you to pay attention to it, and then reminding you when you’ve failed to pay attention, and so forth.

Q. *The social practice description doesn’t have to involve more than one person?*

P. No. A social practice doesn’t have to involve more than one person.

Okay, the thing I want to get across is that this diagram [Fig. 1, p. 70] connects to this [Fig. 2, 75], that these are not just two unrelated diagrams. The logic of stages and options creates the notion of choice; and that’s what’s shown here; and that connection is not accidental. These are just two ways of talking about the same phenomenon, namely, what people are doing.

Q. *If you define the social practice in terms of opportunities—if you describe it in terms of one person, or human beings who have very different ### Taking from the description of deliberate behavior, there are only a certain number of choices I could make, because I only have certain parameters of knowledge, motivation, and know-how. However, the options that are available to another person, or to people overall, are larger. So if I’m making a description of a social practice for me, it would be much more limited than one for everybody.*

P. Yeah. As a matter of fact, if we drew a diagram for you, that would be one of your personal characteristics, that for you, this was the set of possibilities in that practice. Because that does stand in contrast to the set of possibilities that goes with that practice as such.

It’s like picking out the words in a dictionary, and underlining in red the ones that you know and saying, “Look, the underlined set is a characteristic of him. Those are the ones he knows.” But this would be set against the whole dictionary, which is some approximation to the range of words that somebody could know.

You can see, then, that if you come to actually describe a social practice, you’re going to face that problem: that when you’re laying it out, are you just giving yours? or have you got something that goes enough beyond you to say

“this is a public description”?—that those are the possibilities that go with the practice, not just the ones I know.

Sometimes there are practical problems there.

Now, are there any questions about the social practice or how it connects to deliberate action?

Okay, let’s pull a switch. I think several days ago, I said to read the section on Maxims. The Maxims are one of our ground-level moves in dealing with the question *how do you know?*

It’s not inherent in the notion of a behavior description that the description is correct. It can be wrong. Descriptions can be inaccurate, incomplete, less than rigorous, imprecise, ambiguous, and on and on. And sometimes we worry about that.

-	-	-	T'
-	-	-	T'
-	-	-	T'
<hr/>			
T	T	T	T''

FIGURE 4

On the other hand, we also have to be careful how we worry. For example, suppose I have a column of figures, and another column of figures, and another column of figures, and I get a total here, and a total here, and a total here. Now suppose I ask, “How do I know that those are the right totals? Well. I could do it over again, but then I could still ask, “How do I know that those are the right totals?” In effect, just asking flatly, “How do I know?” in most cases is a hopeless question, because the answer is, “You don’t,” and that isn’t helpful.

In contrast, a practical question like, “I’m worried about this, what can I do to check?” oftentimes will lead you to something you can do to check. In this case, you can do things to check, one of which is simply to do it over again. And it is a check, but it’s not a guarantee.

Another is, you can add them up this way [horizontally], and then add up those totals [T’], and compare that with adding these three [T] up. If you

get the same answer [T"] both ways, you say, "That's pretty good evidence that I haven't made a mistake."

Or you could look at this and say, "Look, there's five one-digit numbers. How could I down here get a six-digit number? No, that's impossible. I don't care what's going on, you can't get a six-digit number out of five one-digit numbers. There's something wrong." So you start over again.

There is some number of things you can do by way of checking. And normally, that's the kind of thing we have in mind when we say, "How do you know?" And when you say, "Yeah. I'm sure," it means that you've done some checking, some of the kind of checking that can be done, and it's come out okay.

If you were really worried, you would do it again or something, and even that wouldn't be a guarantee. In general, the amount of precautions you take is a direct function of how important it is not to be wrong and how likely you are to be wrong. If it's extremely important not to be wrong, and I'm fairly likely to be wrong, then I will go to all kinds of extraordinary measures to try to make sure. If I'm unlikely to be wrong, and it doesn't matter much anyhow, I probably won't take any precautions.

Remember the case of coming in and sitting in that chair. When it comes to mistaking a chair for something else, you're unlikely to be wrong, and if you are, it probably doesn't matter anyhow, and you don't take precautions. You don't investigate *is this really a chair?* So you have that whole range of cases, between the case where there's genuine uncertainty and it's important not to be wrong; to the other end where there's little or no uncertainty and it doesn't matter whether you're wrong; other things lying in between.

Now when it comes to checking on behavior descriptions, we have several angles on that, and the maxims are the first one. The maxims are like this cross-check in here [Fig. 4, p. 79] where you added up this way [horizontally] and see if your grand total [T"] is the same.

The way that works is this: given the parametric analysis, you can see that behavior is a complex phenomenon. Because of that, the occurrence of a behavior is a complex phenomenon. The fact of a certain behavior occurring or of a certain kind of behavior occurring is a fact that breaks up into a lot of other facts.

Compare it with the fact of somebody driving a car down the street. You can put it in a single sentence, but it's a complex fact. Number one, because driving is fairly complex; and number two, because automobiles

are complex. So in that one statement, “Somebody is driving a car down the street,” you have implied a lot of particular facts, each of which can be checked on.

For example, if we all looked out and said, “There is nothing moving on that street,” we’d conclude your statement was false, because if there’s somebody driving a car down that street, something is moving on that street; you’ve implied it. And we can check on whether something is moving on that street.

Likewise, we can look and say, “Well, there’s a car there, but there’s nobody in it. What do you mean, somebody is driving down that street?” When you said *somebody is driving*, you’ve implied a person at the wheel. That’s a fact that can be checked independently. When you said *he’s driving a car*, we can examine that object; and if it doesn’t have a motor, it’s not a car, and so he’s not driving a car down the street.

So in general, a description of a complex phenomenon, even though it can be stated simply, implies a lot of different facts, and generally those facts can be checked. And when you check those particular facts, that is a check on your original description. That’s why, in general, the nature of that kind of check is like this [Fig. 4]. You simply take it in a different form, but it ought to add up to the same thing.

Q. *It seems to some extent, if you talk about checking on facts, you go back to a little bit of what we were talking about right at the beginning, about definitions. How can you actually have a fact without absolute definitions?*

P. Notice, we didn’t define anything about cars, etc. What we make use of is *if it’s a car, it’s got to have a motor*, and if it doesn’t have a motor it isn’t a car; and therefore, that description would be wrong. Or that if somebody is driving a car, there’s got to be a person; and therefore, if there’s no person there, that description is wrong. This is not definitions.

Now take, along the same model, the description that such-and-such a person is doing such-and-such a thing. Actually, somebody driving a car down the street is a direct example. And then let’s see, in general, what kind of facts are implied by that, so that you can use them to check on the original description.

The checks come in the form of slogans or maxims, and that’s what appears in the Appendix. The slogans or maxims or rules of procedure, like the rules of chess, and the way you use them is this: if my description fits this

maxim, then it's potentially a correct description. If it violates the maxim, it can't be a correct description.

So that's very much like taking the rules of chess and saying, "Well, if my description of a game fits these rules, then it is potentially a correct description of a chess game. If it violates these rules, it can't be a description of a chess game.

The first maxim on that list says, "A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason to think otherwise." Why is that a necessary feature of behavior descriptions? Why is that a limitation on whether a given behavior description is correct or not? Briefly, if you violate that one, you wind up with the conclusion that nobody knows anything.

To see that, just try the opposite-type maxim. Try a maxim that says, "A person doesn't take it that something is as it seems, unless he can show that it is." And let's just start with a description, "P" that's the way it seems. For here, you can substitute something like "he's driving a car down the street" or "he's sitting in a chair". And the principle is: don't take it that X unless you can show that it is—that you're not going to take anything to be what it seems unless you can show that it is. You look here, and you say, "It looks like P; now I'm going to have to show that it's P."




FIGURE 5

So, you engage in a procedure, and let's call that an experiment. It doesn't have to be an experiment, but there has to be something you do to show that it is P after all. Whatever that procedure is, you're going to have some evidence. If it's an experiment, the data is the evidence. If it's a procedure, the result is the evidence. Either way, you're going to collect evidence. And now that evidence either is in favor of P, or it's not. Either one of those is a possible conclusion. You might suppose that if you get this [E is evidence

for P], you're home free; you have shown that P. But you take a second look at this and you say, "Oho, it only looks as though E is evidence for P, and it only looks as though I've done E. I'm going to have to show that." And how do you show it? By doing a new experiment to show that E is evidence for P. So you do another experiment [Ex₂].

Now you get new evidence [E₂], evidence for this statement. And if it's positive, you might think you're home free now. But no, you look back over here and you say, "My God, it only seems like this is evidence for that. I'm going to have to do an experiment to show that."

Well, about that time you stop, because you see that it's hopeless. If you always had to have some further evidence to show that your original conclusion is true, you can never get all of the evidence that you have to have in order even to have that first conclusion. So you wind up with the conclusion that you don't know anything, and what's more, nobody else knows anything. But then you also have to conclude that you don't even know that. And so the general condition of knowledge, then, has been violated.

In contrast, in behavior, you have a cognitive parameter. If you have a cognitive parameter, knowledge is possible, so any principle that would imply that it isn't is not going to be a possible principle for giving a behavior description. It might be a good principle for giving some other kind of description, but not a description of behavior.

So Principle One is, "A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason to think otherwise." What that amounts to, in part, is saying, "Knowledge is possible." Or, for people, knowledge is not impossible.

And that's not a constraint that you want to object to. That's not something that prevents you from describing any behavior you want to describe. On the contrary, it's something that prevents you from describing behavior in an impossible way.

Incidentally, this particular principle is important for scientists, because part of the folklore is that this [Fig. 4] is how scientists proceed—the hard-headed, down-to-earth, skeptical, and that they don't take it that anything is so unless they can show it. Well, next time you hear that, you just say, "Boloney," because that's impossible and nonsensical.

What they do primarily is to take a few precautions with a lot of things they do. They routinely take some of these precautions, but it isn't as though they always followed this principle. They couldn't. But in actuality, you can take any particular statement and say, "I want more evidence for it." You can

do that. But you can't adopt this as an in-principle principle, or there is no knowledge. So the kind of skepticism that is appropriate for scientists is not this kind, but this kind [the diamond].

Let's do some cross-checking on some of these things, and get a little more assurance that we're not wrong on this.

Q. *I keep seeing that statistics and probability get into this and that that could be a partial solution to ###.*

P. Statistical evidence is not better than other kinds of evidence. You would still need evidence that the statistical evidence—

Q. *### and it can be used to predict things pretty accurately.*

P. Do you have statistical evidence that statistics works? You see, if you push it, you're always going to find that you didn't take that last precaution, that you've accepted something because you can't take every possible precaution.

Statistics are no different. There's nothing about statistics that says that's the appropriate thing to use here. There's nothing about a statistical model that says the world works that way. We can choose to use it. Or we can choose to sit in that chair and not work. So statistics is one of the things we use, but it's not a cure-all, and it's not an in-principle solution.

Q. *I meant as a partial solution.*

P. Well. I hesitate even to call it a partial solution.

Q. *### and it's useful.*

P. Yeah, but there's all kinds of things we can do that are useful.

Q. *So taking that point of view, it isn't necessarily ###.*

P. No, that's right. There are all kinds of things we can do. But they will fit this kind of formula [the diamond], that it isn't that we've got some foolproof way of knowing that what we say is true, just that for any given statement, there are various ways of checking on it that will make sense. Sometimes a statistical approach will make sense. Oftentimes, it won't. In fact, more often than you would expect, it won't. That's why I don't want to be that enthusiastic about statistical approaches. They're over-sold, it's not that they're no good.

So the temptation will be to use them where they're not appropriate, rather than not to use them when they are.

Q. *I want to defend the scientific method. They say that when they do these experiments to verify P, that if they can reproduce consistently the same results, that represents a—*

P. But look, the logic of this doesn't matter how many times you repeat this experiment and get E, you still have the statement that E is evidence for P, and *that* one is not one that you do experiments for. If I go collect data and say, "Gee, this data fits my theory," I don't do a new experiment to decide whether that data fits my theory. I just present it baldly to you with no evidence and expect you to agree. Or disagree. But what I don't do is do another experiment to check on this statement [that E is evidence for P]. The precaution we take is somebody repeats it, and that's like adding this column twice [Fig. 4, p. 79]. But as far as this [E is evidence for P], with no evidence whatever I say, "Look, here's my results, they support my experiment, my theory." I don't give you evidence that it supports the theory. I appeal to you to see that it supports the theory, and that's the way we operate.

Q. *Is that the difference between describing the phenomenon and defining it, though? Are they jumping one step?*

P. No, it's the difference between communicating in the way we do in science, versus some mythical model of what science is like. Science does not operate this way ["don't take it that X unless you can show that it is"]. That's a myth. We operate more this way [Fig. 4], which is a practical way.

So what I'm saying here is not that *science is bad*, as that *this is a bad story about how scientists operate*. And the reason I point it out is that very often, this is what you hear as the story of how scientists operate. So I'm just criticizing it as a bad account of science, not criticizing science as a bad thing to do.

Okay, that's only Maxim 1. As I say, the force of that maxim is that knowledge is possible. And it's only if knowledge is possible that you then have a question, "Is what I think I know here, so [is it the case]?" If knowledge is impossible, you don't have that question.

Now Maxim 2 says that if a person recognizes an opportunity to get something he wants, he has a reason to try to get it. What that does is remind you of another feature of cognition, namely, that behavior is directed toward what you distinguish. If you don't have a chance of getting something, you're not going to try, and you don't have any reason to.

If for some strange reason I wanted to sit up on the roof of the building, I wouldn't right now have any reason to try, because I can't right now see any

way of doing it. On the other hand, if I was standing outside, and I saw a ladder going up there, then I would have reason to climb that ladder.

So the reminder is, then, that the K parameter, one aspect of it you could describe as, “You have to see opportunities for behavior before you then do what amounts to taking those opportunities.” And that’s just another way of repeating that behavior has a cognitive aspect, that the cognitive thing is not just there accidentally, unconnected to the behavior, it’s the cognitive aspect of that behavior. It’s the distinction I’m acting on.

But notice, it’s in a little different form. It says, “If a person recognizes an opportunity to get something he wants, he has a reason to try to get it.” The reason is that the kind of description that you might be tempted to give is one in which you’re talking about somebody responding to something that he has no way of knowing. Then having the maxim in that form is a good reminder that you’re talking about this as though he could know that, and you know there’s no way he could. So there’s got to be then something wrong with your description.

The next one has to do with motivation, namely, “If a person has a reason to do something, he’ll do it unless he has a stronger reason not to.” The second one talks about when you have a reason; the third one talks about what you do when you do have a reason. What you do when you do have a reason is, you act on it unless you have a stronger reason not to act on it.

Q. *What if you just lack the competence? Does that count as a reason not to?*

P. If you simply lack the competence and don’t know it, you’re going to try and probably fall on your face.

Q. *If you lack competence and do know it—*

P. If you lack the competence and know you lack the competence, then you won’t see this as an opportunity, so you won’t have a reason to try.

This maxim about choice connects to the business of choosing options in a social practice. Whatever choice we see a person making, if we know some of the alternatives, we say, “Since he chose this one, he had more reason to choose this one than to choose some of the others,” so we draw conclusions about motivations and values that way.

And the classic paradigm for finding out which of two things a person wants most is to set up a situation where he can have one or have the other, but he can’t have both. You put him in that situation; whichever one he takes,

you say, “Aha, that’s the one he wanted most.” And that’s the simplest, most clear-cut and definitive, although not foolproof, way of finding out which of two things a person wants most, is to see which he chooses when given the choice.

Okay, let’s continue on the Maxims next time, so review those.

SESSION 7
July 20, 1976

Peter: Last hour we talked about social practices and choices and some about the Maxims. Any questions on that material?

Q. *How do you describe behavior in which the choice, whatever the person did, was not—he did not choose it by his own will. Somebody else did it for him, for example a child, and the mother decides that that day he's going to eat peas. He did not make that choice. That choice was made for him.*

P. Remember, the mother may decide that today that child is going to eat peas, but she can't eat those peas for him. And many a time it turns out that that child doesn't eat the peas. Children are notorious for that. Let me get into something that touches on that question.

Yesterday we were talking about the Maxims, and the second and third maxims referred to reasons. Now, reasons is not something that we talked about before, so let me digress right now, and introduce the notion of reasons in a systematic way, and then we'll pick up and continue with the Maxims.




FIGURE 1

We talk about this diagram [Fig. 1] in terms of representing a case where an individual chooses one behavior over a set of alternative possibilities. In a system, that kind of statement is a dangler, in that it implies something else that isn't there yet, namely, that there is some basis for doing the choosing. When we say that the individual chooses the behavior, we're implying that there's some basis for doing it. Because if there were no basis, then whatever behavior came about, you would say *it just happened*; you'd have no reason to say *it was chosen*.

In this connection, it's instructive to ask: What kind of answers do we, in fact, accept as answers to "Why did you do X rather than Y?" For example, "Why did you drink some coffee from the cup instead of throwing the chalk at the clock?" What kind of an answer would be an answer to "Why did you drink the coffee?"

Well, one answer would be, "I'm thirsty," and—what? "Drinking the coffee would make me less thirsty." In contrast, if I say, "You know it says 9:05," you wouldn't consider that an answer to that question. It's not a bad answer; it's a non-answer. When it comes to "I was thirsty," you might not believe me, but you would take it as an answer.

So examples like that clearly establish that there are some things that you can say by way of answering the question "Why did you do that?" but not everything is going to count as an answer. So that puts us on the trail of what sorts of things count as an answer or what sorts of answers are genuine answers to that kind of question.

Consider if I had said, "Well, I like coffee. That's why I drank the coffee." That would be an answer, too. Or if I said, "I thought it would taste good." Or if I said, "I thought it would be enjoyable to spend some time drinking coffee."

Q. What about "well I always do at that time of day"?

P. That's a non-answer. Now if you think of those kinds of answers, "I like it. I would enjoy it. I thought it would taste good," you recognize a similarity in that kind of answer; and there are a whole lot of answers of the same general variety; and they all have that same commonality; and we get at the commonality by having a categorical classificatory term, namely, *Hedonic*. All of these answers in one way or another refer to something being pleasant or unpleasant.

So, without taking the trouble to survey all of the possible answers that come under this heading, we can say that some of the bases for choosing one behavior over others have to do with what is pleasant or unpleasant, and

that answers of what sort will be acceptable as answers. Now think of the other answer, “Well. I was thirsty.” I would elaborate that back in this way by saying, “And I thought I would enjoy some coffee.” Or I can elaborate it by saying, “And I really needed that coffee.” Or I could say, “I’ve got a hangover and I’ve got to have that coffee to straighten me up a little.” Or, “I’ve got a headache”, or “I’m tired and I need that coffee to pep me up”—

PERSPECTIVES

Hedonic
Prudential
Ethical
Esthetic
Artistic
Social
Intellectual

FIGURE 2

- Q.** *You’re still seeking the pleasant over the unpleasant.*
- P.** No. None of those answers have anything to do with pleasure.
- Q.** *Yes they do! [laughter].*
- Q.** *It’s relief from the unpleasant.*
- P.** No. Look—just think that any one of those answers that I gave, I could have been talking about a bitter, unpleasant-tasting medicine: “I need it because I’m thirsty. I need it to straighten me up. I need it to pep me up”—all of those don’t refer to pleasure.
- Q.** *But if you follow these out, it’s pleasure.*
- P.** Not necessarily.
- Q.** *Or less unpleasant.*
- P.** Think of medicine or think of vitamins. Vitamins don’t make you feel better, but you sure as heck need them.
- Q.** *They do make you feel better, though.*
- Q.** *If you don’t have them, you feel bad.*

P. Did you ever see somebody go to a pleasant, euphoric death—oxygen starvation, something like that? You see, things that you need, even when you get them, don't necessarily make you feel good, and that's not the point of it. You don't take medicine that you need because it makes you feel good. You do it because you need it.

We'll come back to that issue of "Isn't it?"

Any answer along that general line, "I'd be hurting if I didn't," or, "It's good for me," is going to be a different kind of answer. Since what's involved is your self-interest or your interest, call it *Prudential*.

A third kind of answer is hard to generate from the coffee example, but suppose I tell you I'm going to pay my gas bill tomorrow morning. You say, "How come you're going to do that?" You would hardly expect me to say it's pleasant.

Q. *Getting gas is, though.*

P. You might expect me to say, "I'd be hurting if I didn't." At least, you wouldn't be surprised. But I might also say something of a different kind, namely, "I owe it to them because I got the gas from them. Since I owe it to them. I have an obligation to pay them back." Saying *I have an obligation* or *I owe it to them* or *it would be wrong for me not to* is a very different kind of answer than either of these [Hedonic or Prudential]. So those kinds of answers we have a general term for, and that's Ethical.

The last kind is a little more of a grab bag in that the different examples don't have the same kind of unity or clear resemblance to one another that you find under these three headings. You have to work a little to get at the thing they all have in common.

Consider if I'm drawing a picture—here I am, drawing a picture on the wall, and I make one particular line here. And you say, "Why did you draw that line right there, that way?" You can see that I probably wouldn't say, "I thought it would be fun," and I probably wouldn't say, "I'd be hurting if I hadn't," and saying that *I have a duty or obligation* or that *it would have been wrong not to* doesn't seem to fit either.

The kind of answer that would fit has something to do with the nature of the picture. I might say, "Well, it wouldn't have fit the picture if I had drawn it differently. The thing then just wouldn't hang together." Or if I'm writing a poem, and you look at the third line and you say, "Why did you write the third line that way? Why did you use that as the third line?" Again, I make some reference to how the whole thing goes together, and the fact

that had this been different, the whole thing wouldn't go together as well. So what we're dealing with is some general notion of Fittingness or appropriateness, and there are three major varieties.

The first one is Artistic, and that's the one we've just seen a couple of examples of.

The second variety is Social. Remember the example of walking down the hall and seeing somebody and saying *hello* and then they say *hello* back. That's a good example of social appropriateness. When you meet somebody, you know it's appropriate to greet them; and if somebody greets you, it's appropriate to greet them back. And it's not because it's pleasant; or because either of you would be hurting if you didn't; or because you have an obligation; or it would be wrong. It's simply that in a social context, some things are appropriate and some things are not, and there it is.

Or consider if one of you came in this morning with a bagpipe and started playing it right now. What would we find objectionable? Not necessarily the music. What we would find objectionable is that it's inappropriate to play a bagpipe in a Personality class. At least I hope it is.

In effect, in a social milieu, some things are out of place and others fit. So it's a different brand of fittingness than writing the third line in the poem or drawing a particular line in a picture, but it's still an issue of fittingness. So Social appropriateness is one of the varieties of fittingness.

The last one: imagine that I say *there's a cup on the table*. Then you ask, "Why did you say there's a cup on the table?" Now again through the list, it's unlikely that I say it just because it's fun to say that. There's no reason why I'd be hurting if I hadn't said that. Certainly it doesn't look as though I have any duty or obligation to say that. And it isn't a matter of artistic fittingness because I'm not doing anything particularly of that sort. Nor is there a social issue in the way there was with the other examples.

Normally, the kind of answer you get if you say, "Why did you say there's a cup on the table?" the answer would be *because there is a cup on the table*. That's an example of fittingness. Anything that involves correctness, accuracy, precision, coherence, will be an example of Intellectual appropriateness.

Q. *That doesn't answer the question why you said there's a cup on the table. It just says why you said "There's a cup on the table" versus "There's an elephant on the table". It explains why you said it was a cup versus something else, not why you said it.*

P. That's right. The answer to why I said it would be given by a significance description, "What was I doing by saying there was a cup on the table?" And the answer might be that I was making a point for the class.

Now each of these, independently of the others, is a basis for choosing behaviors.

For any behavior you might think of, it would make sense to ask, "Would it be pleasant? Would it be in my interest? Would it be wrong not to do it? Is it the fitting thing to do in any one of these three senses [artistic, social, intellectual].

Q. *Where does altruistic behavior fit in on that?*

P. Well, you have to make it fit, because that really calls for a theory, and theories simply fit up here [K on the diamond] under the individual difference. You see, if you master a theory, you have a set of concepts that's available to use in your behavior; and if you have a set of principles, it works the same way. Altruism is either a case of a theory—acting on a theory or acting on a set of principles. But if you wanted to describe the basis for that, you'd probably pick this one [ethical], since that's the general kind of theory it is. Somebody who acts altruistically is acting on an ethical basis.

I said that each of these represents independently a basis for choosing behaviors. One of the implications of saying 'independently' is that, in general, you wouldn't necessarily make the same choice on each of these bases. What you would choose on the basis of pleasantness isn't necessarily the same as what you would choose on the basis of interest.

Bad-tasting medicine is a commonplace example. What you would choose on the basis of pleasant or self-interest isn't necessarily what you would choose on the basis of right, wrong, duty, obligation, etc. There's very often conflicts. And what you would do on any of these bases isn't necessarily the same as what you would do on the basis of fittingness. So the fact that we have more than one basis for choosing behaviors sets up the possibility of a conflict in choosing behaviors.

Rather than talking about a basis for choosing behaviors, we follow traditional terminology and call these 'kinds of reasons'. We talk about hedonic reasons, prudential reasons, ethical, or esthetic reasons for doing a behavior. And we indicate that diagrammatically by putting R's, for Reasons. And reasons can be for or against doing something, so you indicate for and against a given behavior [with + or -]. Likewise, for any of the rejected alternatives, there will be reasons for and against.

Q. *When you say ‘conflicts’, you mean within the person?*

P. Yeah. I owe that gas bill, and I have the money, but if I spend the money that way I’m going to go hungry. I’ve got a conflict. Why? Because I’ve got a reason to pay, but I’ve got a reason not to pay. That’s where you connect back to that maxim. Whichever one I do, you’ll say that’s the stronger motivation.

Q. *Do you ever choose something because it ### more than one of these?*

P. Yes and no. You could say *no* and back that up, but oftentimes you do take account explicitly that you’re satisfying more than one reason.

One of the questions that commonly arises, and has arisen in the history of philosophy is: *are these four different things, or are they all a variety of one thing?* That’s what we were verging on in suggesting that these things really were a kind of pleasure. We weren’t going that far, but that’s the kind of view that there has been. And in fact, there have been moderately influential theories in philosophy picking either of these [hedonic and prudential] as *the* basis for choosing behaviors; and all of the other ones either as variations or as illusions.

So here you have Hedonism, which is the theory that motivation universally and generally is hedonic, that whatever you do, whatever anybody does—first, last, and always—is motivated by pleasure or pain; and that what seem to be choices on other bases are simply ways of getting different kinds of pleasure or pain.

Egoism says it’s all self-interest, and no matter what you do, whether it’s getting pleasure or doing what you promised or doing what’s fitting, is always a case of acting in your interest, or you wouldn’t do it. If there was nothing in it for you, as the saying goes, you wouldn’t do it.

Q. *How is that different from Hedonic?*

P. Here they’re talking about your self-interest, not pleasure. What they say is, “Sure, it’s in your self-interest to have pleasure rather than pain, but that’s why you choose pleasurable things, not because pleasure is primary, but because that’s in your self-interest.” Whereas in contrast, the hedonist would say, “What you’re after is pleasure, and of course you feel better; if you’re healthy, you feel better if you look after your interests, because then you don’t suffer. But really, you’re after pleasure.”

I think you can see—you get the feeling of a little bit of sleight of hand there.

In fact, these are the two historical theories. If you wanted to, you could whip up a corresponding theory of each of these kinds [ethical, esthetic]. You could say, “Everything you do is what you think is right, and of course you think it’s right to get pleasure rather than pain; and of course you think it’s right to look after your interests. Why wouldn’t you?” So you could say, “Really, all of these things are cases of doing what you think is right.”

And obviously, you can do the same thing with this [esthetic], “First, last, and always you’re doing what’s fitting, and getting pleasure rather than pain is just one kind of fittingness. Doing what’s in your interest is another kind of fittingness; and doing what’s right is a third kind of fittingness; but first, last, and always, you’re doing what you think is fitting, appropriate.”

Part of what you need to see is the symmetry, that you could make this move picking any of these four. It isn’t that one stands out in that respect; you could do it with any one of these. The second thing you need to see is that the distinctions are indispensable anyhow. Even if you say it’s all pleasure, you wind up keeping these as different kinds of pleasure. Even if you say it’s all self-interest, you wind up keeping these as different kinds of self-interest. Even if you say it’s all ethical, you wind up keeping these as different kinds of ethical satisfaction. Or down here, different kinds of fittingness.

Thirdly, recognize that in saying, “Really, it’s all this or this or this,” you’re violating Maxim 1. It doesn’t seem to us that all of our choices are of the same kind. It seems to us that sometimes it’s this way, sometimes this way, sometimes this way, and sometimes that way. If somebody chooses to say, “Well, no matter how things seem, here’s the way it is,” you’ve got a transcendental theory, and the feature of a transcendental theory is that there is no way, no evidence, that could show it to be wrong.

Which means that somebody who tells you that is not giving you factual information, he’s just giving you a way of talking. He’s just giving you a way of relabeling all of these things. Rather than four independent things, you have one general thing and three other varieties. By the time you see that that kind of theory is non-factual, that you could do it with any one of these; and that even if you do, you have to keep the same four distinctions; about that time, I think you lose most of the motivation to try anything of the sort, and say, “Okay, we’ve got four distinctions. There are four bases for choosing behaviors;” and anybody who wants can add a peculiar theory of that sort on top of that. But this is what we really have to work with.

Q. *In terms of the conflict between those parameters, what’s going on,*

what process is taking place, when he decides what parameter will arrive at a decision, what option to choose?

P. Probably no process. Let me get into that in a minute. This is a diagram for reconstructing behavior, and you can reconstruct any behavior in this form. What it is, is a way of diagramming having a variety of reasons. Conventionally, the diagram has four R's because there are four of these major kinds of reasons.




FIGURE 3

What the diagram represents is that it's circumstances that give you reasons. The circumstance that the coffee is there gives me a reason to drink if it I like coffee. If the coffee-cup was elsewhere, I wouldn't have that reason. The circumstance that *I got the gas from them and they've sent me a bill* gives me a reason to pay them back. If I hadn't got the gas, and if I didn't have a bill in my hand, I wouldn't have any reason to pay the gas company anything. If we hadn't been walking down the hall and met each other, I'd have no reason to say *hello* to you, because you'd be off somewhere else. So it's circumstances that provide reasons.

Q. *You can cause a circumstance to come about, though.*

P. Yeah, as a result of a behavior, which in turn is on the basis of reasons and circumstances.

Now here is where you get a chance to show the possibility of a conflict, because reasons can be reasons for or against. You can say, "Well, I have hedonic reasons for, but prudential reasons against, and I have both—I have ethical reasons both for and against, and esthetic reasons against,"

That's quite a mish-mash. You've got several kinds of reasons for, you've got several kinds of reasons against, you have reasons both pro and con, and that's normal.

What happens? In the face of these circumstances, and acting on these reasons, you make a decision and you behave. You act on that decision or judgment.

How do we talk about this connection here [between the R's and the D]? We talk about giving weight [W's] to different reasons. If the behavior occurs, then the positive reasons carried more weight than the negative ones. That's again a variation of that maxim [#3], that if you have a reason to do something, you'll do it unless you have a stronger reason not to.

Well, here's a way of diagramming that. If you have these reasons to do it, you'll do it—unless you have stronger reasons not to. So whichever behavior you've got, the positive reasons outweighed the negative ones.

Q. *You've got four C's up there, but wouldn't there be just one circumstance giving rise to four possible sets of reasons?*

P. Yeah. What you have is one circumstance [C'] or one situation. However, in that situation, you have to pick out the relevant facts, and those are what's done here. Only some facts in the situation are relevant to the hedonic reason, some other facts usually are relevant to here [prudential], so since you have to break it down, you might as well just say there are circumstances.

The weights that these reasons carry are a function of the person; different people will give these different weights.

Now, it's not—and let me emphasize this—this is not a process. This is not, in general, how it happens. This is a reconstruction, and where that's most crucial is here. Very often people get into problems by trying to figure out *how* you go from reasons to decision and looking for a way of calculating, "Given these reasons, what's the correct decision? What kind of weights should I give these to make a correct decision?" And there is no such thing. You can get into a lot of agonizing looking for that foolproof way of going from reasons to a decision.

Q. *Then why doesn't it happen haphazardly? Why don't we just make irrational decisions ###?*

P. Because you're not haphazard. You're you. If you were a haphazard individual, indeed, your choices would be haphazard, because what enables

you to do this is simply that you're you; and being the kind of person you are, this reason *does* carry that amount of weight. You don't have to go through a process of giving it that weight; it has that weight for you.

That's gotten at with this values notion, the priorities. That's why I said a minute ago that there probably isn't any process. You don't go through a process of giving weight to reasons. Instead, what you do is review reasons that *have* different weights for you, and that have different weights for different people. Again, this is how your choices reflect the kind of person you are.

Now let's raise a question: How do we find out about these things? How do we actually reconstruct a person's behavior this way? The answer is: we have direct access to the two ends. We can observe the behavior, and we can observe the circumstances in which the behavior occurs.

Q. *Do we know what aspects of the circumstances go into each—*

P. I was just going to say: remember, as usual I'm not talking about foolproof knowledge. When I say *we observe the circumstance*, that's all I mean. And the same with the behavior. When we observe the behavior, we're not necessarily correct, but that's what we have, and that's how we do it.

To put it differently, this procedure will work unless we're wrong. [laughter] And that's the normal, effective way of operating. So we observe the circumstances, and we observe the behavior. From the circumstances, since we have the right kind of knowledge, too, we can figure out or simply tell at a glance what kind of reasons those circumstances present. So from here [circumstances] we can work our way to this [reasons].

Over on this end, since the behavior stands in a one-to-one relation to the decision, there is no problem in making our way from the behavior to the decision or choice. Whatever behavior was engaged in was the one that was chosen or decided upon. So if we're inaccurate here, we'll be correspondingly inaccurate there.

Now, from knowing the pro and con reasons, and knowing what the decision was, we also are able to reconstruct which of them carried more weight. So we can fill in this kind of information.

Q. ### ?

P. From knowing what the reasons were, and whether they were pro or con, and knowing what the decision was, we can figure out which carried more weight, the pro or the con reasons. And, of course, in general, it'll be the pro reasons because we are looking at an actual behavior that has already

occurred; therefore, the pro reasons did carry more weight. Then from the weighting—which carried more weight—we draw conclusions about the person.

Q. *All the C's stand for one circumstance that's taking place?*

P. No. There's the one circumstance [C']. These C's represent the relevant facts in those circumstances, that are relevant to each of these reasons.

Q. *But the person can have just one reason, can't he?*

P. No. That's what the diagram is, that you have all of these—you have four reasons, four kinds of reasons. You may have pro and con reasons of the same sort.

Q. *Are each of those reasons the four categories?*

P. Yeah. That's why conventionally the diagram has four Rs, not because there are only four possible reasons, but because there are four categories. If you were actually diagramming for a particular person, you might have 10 reasons under one category, and three up here. But when we're just dealing with this in a general way, as I say, the convention is four Rs because of these four categories.

Q. *How does irrational behavior come into that? Is there any way of doing that?*

P. Yeah. You can criticize this decision as to whether it was correct or not or whether it was the right decision; and the nature of the criticisms follows from this [the Rs]. Either you gave too much weight to something, more than you should have, and that's why you chose this way rather than the other way; or you left out something, some consideration which would have given you a reason to do something different. Or you brought in a consideration that was irrelevant and you should have left it out, but you didn't, and that's why you made a bad choice.

Beyond that, you have the general issue of competence. We might say, "Well, you're the kind of person who in general doesn't have the ability to handle this kind of reason," or "in general is bad with these". So there are various ways of accounting for bad decisions, and any case of irrational behavior, any case of being out of contact with the world, will be formulated that way.

Q. *Let me see if I understood one assumption that you made: that if we wanted to make a decision, we would be getting ourselves into a great deal of difficulty by putting down and going through this before we made the decision. Really, this works best after the process has all taken place.*

P. No. This is the kind of thing you do when you're troubled. Then you sit down and review, and the value of it is that you get a chance to check that you're not leaving anything out, that you're not bringing something in that you should have brought in, and that you're not over-valuing or under-valuing one of these things. But in the end, you decide.

Normally, you do not go through any such process. The reason is that there's a clear preponderance of one or the other reasons. Since there is a clear preponderance, you have no significant conflict, you simply go ahead and make the decision easily, naturally, spontaneously, without thinking. It's when they're close, when it's not clear which is the way to go, then you sit down and think; then you may make lists of pros and cons and do other things like that. And that's an assist. But you couldn't normally do that for every possible behavior.

Q. *It looks like, in some cases, there are processes you go through, then.*

P. Yeah. That, you see, you would spend a period of time doing this, and that would involve a number of different behaviors; and you could say that the person is *thinking it over*, he's *trying to make up his mind*, he's *pondering*, or things like that. But this is also a reconstruction of behavior that you do just like that, without thinking, and most of our behavior is of that sort.

Q. *Can some of these reasons be left out, relative to certain situations, like a situation that didn't have any ethical consequences? When that happens, do you delete—?*

P. Well, again think of this [weights], that you can characterize a person by what kind of consideration generally carries more weight with him.

But now, you also have a different thing. If it comes to deciding what movie to go to tonight, for example, you'd think it was strange if I made the decision primarily on the basis of an ethical reason. Not because it's impossible or doesn't make sense, but rather because normally, that's not the kind of thing that we see as an ethical issue and operate with in terms of ethical reasons. Instead, we operate primarily on the basis of hedonic reasons, and that's appropriate.

In contrast, when it comes to paying my gas bill, that we normally think of in terms of owing money, which is an ethical proposition, and we don't tend to think in terms of deciding on that in terms of *would it be fun?*

So for different practices, on different occasions, it is appropriate to give different weights to different reasons.

Now, what enables us to do that? Again, you have the same kind of question that you had. When you have a choice of one among several, there has to be a way of picking. There has to be a basis. If you're going to give different weights to different reasons on different occasions, there's got to be a basis for that, too.

The basis for that is built into the social practices. Depending on what you're doing, different weightings will be appropriate. And in the limiting case, for practical purposes you can say, "Yeah, here, there is no ethical issue. Ethical reasons are irrelevant." But not in principle. In principle, all of these are relevant for every single behavior.

Q. *I was going back to the idea that it all depends on the person, and in using your example of the movie, if I'm greatly opposed to—say, horror movies, blood and gore—then it would be an ethical issue.*

P. Then indeed it would, yeah. That's right. That's why I say, just in general, we consider it appropriate to make it essentially just on this [hedonic], but it's not impossible for it to have an ethical aspect. [change tape] It's not even impossible for it to have a predominantly ethical aspect.

Q. *When you're talking about competence in the person, in reference to the reason that he chose, are you only being competent in your rational behavior, or are you ### competence in any kind of behavior?*

P. Remember, every behavior has a competence aspect. In general, we take it that a normal person has a normal level of competence with respect to all of these. Exceptional people, we say, are deficient, significantly deficient, in some one or another of these. And these are sufficiently important so that if anybody was completely lacking in any one of these, normally that would be an immediate basis for saying *he's in a pathological state*.

Q. *It seems that children lack some of the ethical considerations. Would you say they are pathological?*

P. No. Remember what I said about children: they're in a special status. If you're drunk, you also lose some of this, but we don't say you're in a pathological state. We just say that's what normally goes with being drunk. But if a

child never acquired this mastery, then we would say that was pathological.

Q. *I'm still hung up on that irrational behavior a little bit. If you have a schizophrenic who is not dealing with reality, and they're hallucinating, would that be a form of hedonic behavior, because it's relieving tensions ###?*

P. You don't know what it would be. If all you can say is that it's relieving tension, that's a causal explanation. What you do know is that the failure is down here with that intellectual perspective, that that's where the failure is. Somebody is distorting reality, he's not calling a spade a spade, and so he's failing in the use of that perspective. If you can't tell the difference between there being a cup there and there being an image of your mother there, you're lacking the competence that most people have, and it's that kind of competence that enables you to construct and maintain a coherent world to behave in. So if you can't do that kind of things, you don't have a coherent world to behave in, and that's one of the general features of a schizophrenic.

Q. *I guess I was trying to say that would be their primary reason, their primary motivation? Would it be more of a hedonic type?*

P. No. Mostly we understand pathology as deficits, and deficits are not motivated. So you don't look for a reason for being schizophrenic. Instead, you look for reasons why the schizophrenic person does what he does; and then—when you look at those reasons and what he does—that's where you often make the judgment that he's out of contact. Because acting that way, on those reasons, is an expression of incompetence. It's a failure of some sort.

In contrast, if you have a kid doing arithmetic, and he does it badly, one of the most common answers is, "Well, he hasn't yet learned." Since there's no reason why he should have, you don't think of it as pathological. But when an adult can't keep track of himself or the world around him, then you say, "That is pathological."

Notice what it takes to do that. It takes somebody who himself can make those kinds of judgments and isn't taking it that he himself is wrong.

What's *not* required is that you know for sure the truth about the world. All you have to do is be able to make that kind of judgment and not be taking it that you're wrong. Then you can go ahead and make those judgments. And that's what we do. When we decide that somebody is out of contact and that he needs to be taken care of, it's not that we're assuming that we couldn't be wrong. It's just that we're not worried about being wrong on that occasion. But we could be.

Q. *Just point out on the diagram where you would put irrational behavior.*

P. Right here [B]. If it's irrational behavior, it's here. If you want an explanation, if you want a reconstruction of what behavior it was, then the whole diagram. But just for the behavior—here.

Q. *Again, just in terms of the diagram, judgment is related to persons, right?*

P. Yeah. Normally we speak of judgment when it comes to verbal behavior. Any other kind of behavior, we speak of decision. And that's because in the situations that we normally describe as expressing a judgment, it's going to be verbal behavior. So there is some point in having a separate term for verbal behavior.

Okay, back to the Maxims. The last one we saw was the third one, and it says, "If a person has a reason to do something, he will do it unless he has a stronger reason not to."

By the way, we worked hard and had a lot of fun writing these maxims in such a way as to make them sound maximally trivial. The reason was that it is of interest not to get across the idea that these maxims are informative, that they contain empirical knowledge. They are supposed to have the same kind of triviality as a mathematician who writes down this $[A = A]$ or this $[A + B = B + A]$. When you look at those things, you don't look and say, "Gee, that doesn't tell me anything I didn't already know." You say, "Hmm, those are the fundamental things in mathematics." They're completely trivial, but they're also fundamental. Saying that a person will do whatever he has a reason to do, unless he has a stronger reason not to, think of along these lines: completely trivial but fundamental. And they are put in the form of maxims rather than postulates or something else, to get across the notion that they have no truth value. Again, they are not informative, they don't have truth value. They are principles to follow in giving descriptions of behavior and people.

Along that line, imagine the result if you tried to give a description that violated Maxim 3. You'd have the same kind of problem as in physics if you said, "Here's a big force and here's a small force operating on this object, and lo and behold, the object moves that way [to the left]." Well, you can't get away with that. If you started out that way in physics, you would wind up in one of two places—no. I don't mean that kind of place. Either you would say, "We were wrong about which was bigger than which," or we would say, "There's obviously some other one over here [on the right] that we didn't




FIGURE 4

take account of, and that's why the thing moves that way." What you can't do is just leave it in a form in which the smaller force prevails over the larger force. That's just not the way that kind of notion works.

Now the same goes for motivation. That's not the way motivational notions work, to say that a weaker motivation will prevail over a stronger one.

There is a problem with Maxim 3, though. Namely, it does look obviously correct, but it also looks obviously wrong, and that leaves us in a kind of bind. The way that it looks obviously wrong—there are two kinds of things that you might mention as counter-examples. The one is, it seems to imply that at any given time, you are doing the one thing that you want most, and that's almost what it literally says.

Now, ask yourself what you're doing right now, and if that's the one thing in the world you want most, [laughter] And the answer is going to be *no*. Well, there it looks like on the face of it, you've got an exception to Maxim 3, and so it's problematical.

On the other hand, if you just think along the lines of "the greater force must prevail over the smaller one," you'll say there's no way that could be wrong.

Q. *The first one could be argued just by saying that anything we choose to do, we chose because at that time we wanted it the most.*

P. Yeah. Again, that violates Maxim 1, though. I could tell you that what you really want to do most is be sitting here in class, and you'd sit there and say, "Nonsense."

Q. *Maybe we don't really want to sit here in class, but we want to have it behind us, [laughter]*

Q. *We want to have the degree, so—.*

P. Okay, some such answer is going to make sense, but notice, we're going to have to work for it because it doesn't come for free, here.

Q. *I think it depends on how you define ‘want’. I’m thinking of a philosophy that says that whatever you do is what you want to do. ### someone’s got a gun at your head and says, “Do this,” you’d rather do that than be shot.*

P. That’s what we just got through outlining on the board, that whatever you do is what you have stronger reasons to do. And if somebody holds a gun to your head, “if you do what I say” just means that you have a stronger reason to do that. The gun to your head was just one of the circumstances that gave you some of your reasons for acting.

But even so, you see, when it comes to the gun to your head, I think you’d be quite willing to say, “Yeah. I did what I had a stronger reason to do.” But when it comes to sitting in class, you’d say, “No, that’s not what I want most. I’ve got other things, even now, that I want more than this.”

Q. *Do we have stronger reasons to do something else, though?*

P. That’s what we have to work through. All I’m saying is that on the face of it, the fact that right now there are other things you want more, and you’re not doing them now, seems to violate that maxim. And that’s why we have to work at getting an answer, even though you can kind of sense the lines along which the answer lies.

Q. *There’s no time constraints on that maxim. It doesn’t say you’re going to do it at that time. It says you’re going to it ### doing more than one thing at the same time.*

P. It better imply that, because it’s certainly not the case that whatever I have stronger reason to do some other time, I’m going to do now. The reasons and the behavior have to be at the same time.

The other kind of example that seems to violate Maxim 3 is when, in a colloquial way of talking. I say, “I’d really rather do X, but I’m going to do Y.” Or, “I really would rather have been doing X, even though right now I’m doing Y.” “I really would rather be down there drinking some coffee than sitting here attending class, but look where I am.” So that, too, seems on the face of it, at least, to violate the maxim.

Q. *That’s the same example as the gun, isn’t it? For example, I would really prefer to ###.*

P. Yeah, you could use it with the example of the gun. In both of those cases, you seem to have an example of not doing the thing that you want most.

Q. ###.

P. The problem is not that we need to save the maxim. The problem is that that maxim seems so obviously foolproof, and yet you can also think of these examples.

Q. *What leads you to jump to the conclusion that one might want to do something more than what one is doing?*

P. One often says that. That doesn't imply—

Q. *It doesn't necessarily mean—it could just be that that person is dealing with the dissonance, and that's one way of dealing with it, but it—*

P. But that's taking the easy way out, because if somebody gives you a statement like that, you don't want to in-principle say, "Oh, you don't mean that." You want to take due account of what could they mean by that. And maybe they are serious, and maybe they're not just handling dissonance. They may be saying something that's quite true.

Q. *Well, they may be, but you don't know, so how—*

P. Well, you want to look at the possibility, because if it's even possible for it to be that way, then there goes Maxim 3. If it's possible to violate that maxim, even if it never in fact happens, it's a bad maxim. That's why it's embarrassing.

Q. *My idea is that the question hangs on what constitutes the strength of a reason. You're talking about one reason being stronger than another. In this case, especially in the second example, it sounds like you're comparing two different classes of reason—say, a hedonic reason of wanting to drink coffee, and a prudential reason of being in class in your self-interest, so that would seem to resolve that conflict.*

P. No, because remember, in the diagram you had reasons pro and con, and some of those could be hedonic and others could be prudential; and it doesn't matter what kind of reason it is, if it's a reason pro and the other is a reason con, you have a conflict, and the stronger one comes out.

Q. *But if your hedonic principles say that you'd rather be drinking coffee, but you have that hedonic principle weighed less than the prudential principle which says that you should be sitting in class, then that would seem to resolve the problem, doesn't it?*

P. No. Why pick the hedonic one to say, "I'd rather do that," since the other is stronger? Why not say, "I'd rather be doing that"?

Q. *I guess it depends on why you'd say you'd rather be doing something.*

P. That's right. You see, we need familiarity with what's going on when somebody says, "I'm going to do X although I'd rather be doing Y."

Q. *Would that be a case of the irrational action, somebody's actually doing behavior that ###?*

P. It would be hard to find one, since the want is one of the aspects of behavior, and if you have a principle that says, "The stronger reason wins out." So it's pretty hard to see how you could have a violation except in these two counter-examples. The two counter-examples don't look irrational.

Q. *I don't think that really you would—it's really, you still have a strong reason.*

P. The question is, how to formulate that?

Q. *Okay, maybe you want to eat a banana split but you don't want to gain weight, so looking at that banana split you say, "I wish I could have that, but I'm not going to eat it because, in the long run. I'll be more happy if I don't." So your long-term goal outweighs the short term. So really, you're doing it because you want to.*

P. But then why not say, "I really would rather stay thin"? Why say, "I really would rather eat the banana split, but I'm going to stay thin"?

Q. *Because at that minute, you would really rather—*

P. No, because if at that minute you would really rather, why don't you do it? [laughter] See?

Q. *If you know that your metabolism was faster, and then—*

P. Then you can eat it fast, eh?

Q. *Then you could eat it. In that case, ### you'd rather eat the banana split, but you know that you're going to gain weight, so you wouldn't rather.*

Q. *That still does not make you not think, "I wish I could eat it."*

P. Yeah, but when we say, "I'd really rather do X but I'm going to do Y," it's more than just "I wish I could." There's something different and stronger there.

Q. *Doesn't that just represent a conflict? I don't see the problem.*

P. Yeah. At a minimum you've got a conflict, because you want to do X and you want to do Y. The problem is that the way you talk, it sounds like the

one that you're going to do is the one that you want less, or the one that you have less reason to do.

Q. *I'm sure if you sat down and talked with anybody who said something like that, they'd tell you what they really think about it ###.*

P. No, because when you sit down and talk, the way it comes out, they really would rather do X than Y.

Q. *She wouldn't rather eat a banana split, though, than not gain weight. If you asked her, she would say, "Well, I would eat it but I don't want to gain weight."*

P. Yeah, but also, right to the bitter end saying, "I really would rather—"

Q. *She's wrong. [laughter]*

Q. *Even if you say it, it doesn't matter how you say it. It matters what you do, that tells you which reason is stronger. So it really doesn't violate Maxim 3.*

P. We can't get it that easily, because that amounts to just saying, "You're wrong," and it isn't just a case of "you're wrong" or "you're just talking badly". It does make sense to say that, and we've got to see what sense. And when we do, we'll see that it doesn't violate Maxim 3. But that's why I say that this one, we have to work for, because it doesn't come for free. Even though we know what the answer has to be, we have to generate it.

Q. *I would like to know what distinctions you're making or assuming between wanting to do something, having a reason to do something, and rather doing something. Just semantically. Because wanting to do something sounds more to me like it fits only in the ### principle.*




FIGURE 5

P. Okay, here's the Want, it's an aspect of Behavior. Here's the reasons, they're reasons for or against the whole behavior. That's the difference between Want and Reasons. The Want is an aspect of behavior; reason is not. Both of them are motivational.

Q. So you would say that you could only want to do something if you had a reason for wanting to do that.

P. No. You can want something, and if your behavior is successful, you achieve it. But you have reasons for engaging in that behavior, reasons for and against. So Reasons and Want are different kinds of motivational concepts, just as Know-How and Ability are different kinds of competence concepts. And in fact, one of the maxims that may appear shortly is one that connects these two, and the maxim would read, "If a person wants something, he has a reason to try to get it." But they are two distinct motivational concepts.

Briefly, the way out is Maxim 4. Maxim 4 enables us to work through the issues that are raised with Maxim 3. And it's not obvious, because if you look at Maxim 4, all it says is that if you have two reasons for doing X, you have a stronger reason for doing X than you would if you had only one of those reasons. If you have two reasons for doing X—if you have these two reasons, you have a stronger reason for doing X than if you had only or the other of these two.




FIGURE 6

Notice that does *not* say that *two reasons are stronger than one reason*. A common misunderstanding of these is to think it says, “Two reasons are stronger than one.” It doesn’t say that, and it’s not true. What it says is that *two reasons are stronger than either one of them*. And you say, “Of course! That’s right.”

So we start with this maxim, but it still isn't obvious. You have to again do some finagling. And the key finagle is to invent a couple of other behaviors.

Q. *I don't understand why "two are stronger than one" isn't the same as "two are stronger than either one".*

P. Look: these two reasons [R_1 and R_2] are not stronger than some arbitrary third reason. They're only stronger than either one. There's no way to compare the strength of these two with an unknown third, so you can't, in general, say that two reasons are stronger than one. But you do know that if you really have two reasons and not just one, then the combination is stronger than either one, because the combination includes either one, and something else besides. And that's what makes it foolproof.

Q. *Is that a case where one reason is negative and the other is positive?*

P. Remember, the formulation is, "If you have two reasons for doing X," so you're not talking about where you have a reason pro and con. You're talking about two reasons pro.

Q. *Another question: you're saying if you had two reasons to do X, you have a stronger reason to do X—is that second reason kind of a composite, or is it motivation, or—?*

P. No, just a stronger reason.

Q. *And you can combine R_1 and R_2 , or what?*




FIGURE 7

P. Try it in physics. If you have a force here and a force here [F and F'], the force on this object is greater than either one. Now you wouldn't always say it's a composite. You could figure out what it is, and you can add them, but that force is a third force [3].

Now let's take the case where you have two things, and this is more important than this, **but you're doing this right now**. And let's give a reason $[R_1]$, and let's give a number for the strength of that reason $[N_1]$, so you have this reason for engaging in the first behavior $[B_1]$, and that's the strength of the motivation. You have this reason $[R_2]$ for doing the second $[B_2]$ and that $[N_2]$ is the strength of that motivation. Now we ask, "What about a third behavior?", the third behavior being doing both B_1 and B_2 . If you have a reason for doing the first and a reason for doing the second, you certainly have a reason $[R_3]$ for doing both.



FIGURE 8

Now we ask. "What about the strength of this reason?" The answer is going to be, "Whatever strength it has is going to be greater than either of these two" $[B_3 = B_1 + B_2]$. So you're going to have a stronger reason for doing them both than you have for doing either one separately.

Q. *What if the behaviors are mutually incompatible?*

P. Then, being ingenious creatures, we invent still another type of behavior, which is $R_4 = \text{first } B_1 \text{ then } B_2$. Again, the reason for this will be greater than for either one.

Now, this $[B_2]$ will only work if you see an opportunity to do both. If you have no opportunity, you're going to be stuck with one or the other, and that's where Maxim 3 will operate directly. But in a situation where you can do both, or you can do first one then the other, then you can have apparent violations.

And the case of sitting here in class is this kind $[B_3]$, generally speaking. You're not *just* sitting in class; you're also getting a degree or doing something else that you do want. Or this in itself is not that important, but it's part of something that extends into the future, and the whole thing is important. Notice that you would postpone doing something you really wanted more, if you knew that you were going to have a chance at it later, so you have the

opportunity, and the one you want less, you're not going to have a chance at later. Then you've got the alternative of doing them both in this form [B4], or doing the one you want most, and you'll have more reason to do this.

Q. *Where would the diet example fit in there? Because if you went on a diet, if you really wanted a banana split, and postponed the banana split, you'd—*



FIGURE 8

P. No, we haven't handled that one yet. We're just handling the first one, where you're not doing the one thing you want most now. In the case where I say, "I'd really rather be at UMC drinking coffee, but I'm going to the library to read a book," there are several possibilities, but the major possibility is that you're contrasting this W and this W. When you say, "I would rather be at UMC than going to the library," you're saying that this W [UMC] is stronger than this W [library]. Then when you say, "But I'm going to do this [library]," what you're implying is that this whole package is stronger than this whole package. And that's why this contrast is legitimate. You don't wind up saying that you don't really mean it. What happens is that you're only talking about one aspect of your motivation, and that's also why it doesn't violate the principle, which involves your entire motivation.

Q. *So the idea of doing what you want—*

P. Either way, you're doing something you want.

Now this maxim was not put there for the sake of cleaning up Maxim 3. It has a very important independent interest. You could call it the socialization maxim, because the contrast between Maxim 3 and Maxim 4, if you think of it in these terms, is *the* major difference between infants and young children and normal adults. The transition from operating the way you would operate just with Maxim 3 at face value, to the way that is shown here, is the major transition that you're looking for in socializing children.

To see that, just imagine what life would be like if you operated just in terms of a set of mutually exclusive reasons or wants, and at any given time, you simply acted on the one that was strongest. That's how an infant operates. At least, our picture of an infant is that indeed is how he operates. Our picture of a white rat is that that's how the white rat operates.

One of the main things that you learn when you grow up is to pull together your various motivations so that you're always acting as a single person with a set of values, a set of competences, instead of just switching from one thing to another thing to another thing to another thing, depending on what motivation is strongest at that given time. So the acquisition of normal adult status is to a large extent the transition from operating purely with Maxim 3 to operating primarily on the pattern of Maxim 4.

That is one of those things you want to look at your various theories in terms of, see how they handle that kind of transition. You'll find some interesting results. Because one feature of personality theories is some account of development from infancy to adulthood. So keep your eye open for how the various theories handle that kind of transition.

But as I say, that's the primary function of Maxim 4, is to get at that kind of thing. But look at the simplicity here. All it says is that two reasons are stronger than one of those, but it has consequences that are not obvious just from looking at this inequality.

Okay, those are the two motivational maxims. We'll continue next time with the rest of the maxims.

SESSION 8

July 21, 1976

Peter: How about last time? Any questions?

Q. *Which of the maxims did you refer to as the socialization maxim?*

P. Number 4.

Q. *Of Maxim 4, you said it didn't simply mean ### $1 + 1 = 2$, the sum of the two reasons ###.*

P. You can try working with numbers there, but it's not going to be easy, just giving numbers to the two reasons and adding them up. The most you can say is that the combination is greater than either, and then it's up for grabs what set of numbers, if you want to work them like numbers, will work. We've tried some things like that, and sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn't.

Q. *Are you saying that the combination is greater than either alone because you have two choices?*

P. No, the combination is greater than either, but it's because it includes either one and more.

Q. *So the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.*

P. No, the whole is greater than any of its parts, as long as it's got more than one part.

Q. *Than any of its parts put together.*

P. No, just greater than either component.

The next maxim is a breather, that's Maxim 5, and it says, "If a situation calls for a person to do something he can't do, he'll do something he can do." What could be simpler? In fact, that's just a reminder of the whole notion of powers.

You remember how we explained the notion of powers is that a person has a repertoire of knowledge, values, and abilities; and those are what he draws on in any given behavior of his, and if he doesn't have the knowledge, the motivation, or the know-how for a given behavior, he can't engage in that behavior. The additional thing that that maxim reminds you of is that when it comes to explaining human behavior, and when it comes to explaining what people do, it isn't always a problem of somebody does something and you want to know why he does it. Fairly often, it's a problem of somebody doesn't do something, and you want to know why he didn't do it. What this reminds you of is that one of the major explanations for why he didn't do it is that he couldn't.

The other main use for Maxim 5 is in the development of the notion of unconscious motivation, and I think we'll probably get into that tomorrow. Any questions on Maxim 5? As a reminder, it just reminds you not to attribute things to the person that he doesn't have.

Those first five maxims are keyed to the notion of behavior, the notion of intentional action. The first two are keyed to the cognitive parameter; the next two are keyed to the motivational parameter; and the last one is keyed to the competence parameter. The next four have more to do with persons than behavior.

The next one [Maxim 6] is that a person acquires facts by observation and thought. Remember, one of your personal characteristics is the repertoire of knowledge that you have that you can use. Maxim 6 tells you how a person gets it—at least, the repertoire of facts. It's acquired by observation and thought. So for example, if you walk in the room, you see a bunch of people, you've acquired a fact: there's a bunch of people in the room. You do that quickly and easily, without a lot of effort. You do that routinely, all of your waking moments. You're always noticing something as long as you're awake at all. You're acquiring a lot of facts that way, and that's how you have a repertoire of facts to work with.

The next one [Maxim 7] says, "A person acquires concepts and skills by practice and experience." Two things here: the contrast between how you acquire facts and how you acquire concepts and skills. With facts, you simply observe and you've got it. With concept or skills, you have to acquire them by practice and experience. You don't get those just in a flash. You don't learn how to ride a bicycle just like that, you don't learn how to distinguish a camera just like that. You don't know how to recognize the parts of a carburetor just like that. You work at it.

Or without working, you simply do the right things, get the right kind of experience, and you learn it.

Second, the relation of concepts to facts. You have to have the concepts in order to acquire facts. If I don't have the concept of a chair, I can't, by looking over there, discover that there's a chair there. I may discover that there's something there, but I can't discover that there's a chair there unless I have acquired the concept of a chair.

So the acquisition of concepts, in this sense, is prior to, more fundamental than, the acquisition of facts. If you didn't have the concepts, you couldn't acquire the facts.

Thirdly, notice that concepts and skills are lumped together in one statement about how you acquire them. And that may be surprising, because concepts and skills are quite different sorts of things. In fact, they are two distinct parameters of behavior.

To see the connection, there's an additional clause on this maxim, and either it's stated in the maxim, or it can be used as an auxiliary explanation. The maxim says, "You acquire concepts and skills by practice and experience." The addition says that the relevant practice and experience is the participation in some social practice or practices that either call for that distinction or require that skill.

That's a tip-off that the reason they're there together is that social practices require that they be there together. What you learn by participating in social practices is to distinguish those things that are called for and treat them accordingly. And in learning the distinction, you're acquiring concepts; in learning to treat them accordingly, you're acquiring skills.

Q. *How does modeling fit into that? ### vicariously, without practice?*

P. It's an intermediate case, because you can look at somebody doing something and if, from that, you can just go ahead and do it, then you had all the necessary skills, and what you acquired was the fact that this was the way to do it. If you can't just go ahead and do it, if you still then have to do it yourself a while before you can do it, then you didn't already have all of the concepts and skills. Sometimes it works one way and sometimes another.

Any question about why concepts and skills are lumped together in the same formula for how you acquire them?

Okay, let's connect that back to that diagram of social practices. Remember, we said that some of the options in a social practice could be taken

only by somebody who had certain personal characteristics, among which was knowledge. Let's make that stronger.

Most social practices are—you might say—actively designed to be done differently depending on certain facts, and somebody who participates in that practice has to acquire that kind of fact as he goes along, or ahead of time, in order to do it. So it's not at all accidental that the choice among options often depends on the individual having certain facts.




FIGURE 1

The simplest and most clear-cut example here is a chess game, because what one of those persons does depends on what he sees the other person doing. He has to have those facts in mind in order to make his choices, and chess is designed to be played that way. It would be a strange chess game if the two players just made their moves without knowing what move the other player made. In fact, I doubt whether you could really do it, because you'd be trying to put your piece in the same square as somebody else. So this notion that within social practices, some distinctions are required and then you act differently, that's built into the notion of what a social practice is.

Furthermore, the reason you need the concepts you do is to participate in the social practices that are available to you. You don't now need a distinction that is only going to be used 3000 years from now, somewhere else, to do the things that they will be doing 3000 years from now. You need the distinctions you need to do the things that *we* do here. So again, it's more than a coincidence that the concepts and skills you acquire are geared to the social practices that are available.

It isn't quite as simple as simply being inducted into set of practices, and the example of modeling shows some of the ways in which you can push to a limiting case, that you can just watch somebody do something and then go out and do something different yourself.

But also, there are a very special set of social practices whereby people acquire some concepts and skills, and those social practices—those special ones—are the basis for the entire institution of education. You learn a lot of things just sitting in class listening to somebody that you wouldn't normally call 'practice and experience'. I can sit here and lecture about carburetors or about how to cure a person of a phobia, and you just sit there and you learn. Now you wouldn't normally call that participating in a social practice that involved discriminating carburetors or phobias, and yet it is. Isn't it?

If that's one of the things that people can stand and lecture about, in the social practice of holding a class, then clearly the distinction of any subject matter of that sort is one of the concepts that may be used in that social practice. So that in sitting here listening in class, you are participating in a social practice that involves that distinction and require some kind of treating it accordingly. But you can see how different this is from the picture I may have drawn, that you just go out and practice doing something, and that's how you learn it. So don't underestimate the range of social practices that will involve a given concept or skill or the range of the ones where you can learn by participating in those.

Maxim 7 is a kind of breather.

Q. *I'm a little puzzled by the use of 'thought' in Maxim 6. How does that relate to the concept of 'facts'?*

P. Suppose I tell you that I have a car, and then somebody else tells you that I just bought a new car. At that point, you may draw the conclusion that I've got two cars, and nobody told you, and you didn't observe that I had two cars, but by putting together two facts that you've acquired, you generate a third fact. That's why the addition of 'by thought'.

Q. *And what specifically is a concept?*

P. A distinction. Whenever you distinguish something from something else, you're using a concept, and as I use the term, when I say 'to use a concept', it's equivalent to 'to distinguish between X and some set of alternatives'. There's no restriction on what the X is. Any distinction whatever.

The next one, Maxim 8, is like Maxim 4 in that there's more there than meets the eye. Maxim 8 starts out with a very simple logic. It says, "If a person has a given person characteristic, he acquired it in one of the ways it can be acquired." That's about as exceptionless a statement as you can encounter. It would be hard to get upset, or argue, or enthusiastic, or anything about that.

However, it gives us a chance to elaborate on what's involved in this notion of acquiring a given person characteristic.

It reminds us that when we're talking about a person, we're talking about a life history, and that since you're not born with all of the person characteristics that you have at any given time, you must have acquired those characteristics sometime during your life. Therefore there's got to be some way of acquiring personal characteristics. So we find it convenient to use the diagram that's called the Developmental Schema, and that's a diagram in your outline, and it's labeled reasonably accurately [Outline p. 9].

Now what we did with the Developmental Schema is to include two parts, only one of which deals directly with Maxim 8. But we put them together because the combination of those two parts which appear in the Developmental Schema covers the range of phenomena that a personality theory covers. So it makes a good point of reference to look at that diagram, and then look at a personality theory and fill in the diagram in terms of what the personality theory says. So let's go through the two parts of that schema, recognizing that only the second part corresponds to Maxim 8, [Cf. Fig. 2]




FIGURE 2

The first unit involves a three-way logical relationship. The terms are Behavior, Circumstance, and Personal Characteristics. This unit is what we have available for explaining behavior. We need all three, because a given person will not engage in the same behavior in different circumstances. We need the personal characteristics because not everybody in the same circumstances will engage in the same behavior. If you're going to understand the behavior, you've got to understand both the personal characteristics, what kind of person it is, and what the circumstances were.

These are strong connections, but they are not quite deductive. But it is almost the case that if you know any two, you can figure out the third. Almost. If you know any two, you can almost deduce the third, and what we do, in fact, is find out all we can about the other two and, from that, draw

conclusions about the one that we're interested in, and we may be interested in any one of these.

If you're a diagnostician, or if you're working on assessment, you want to know a person's characteristics, because that's your end product. So you look at his behavior and you gimmick the circumstances by standardizing them, for example, giving him a test or setting him up certain known tasks, you know how hard they are, you know how other people do; and so when you see him do what he does in those circumstances, it's easier for you to draw conclusions about what kind of person he is. But even if you're not a diagnostician, if you're just getting acquainted with somebody, you still observe his behavior in the circumstances that you see him in. By making use of whatever you know about the kind of choices he makes and what kind of person it takes to make those choices, you draw your conclusions about what kind of person he is.

On the other hand, sometimes you're dealing with somebody that you know very well; and you're not in doubt about his circumstances; and he tells you about a behavior of his that surprises you. Then you draw conclusions that the circumstances must have been extraordinary in a certain way.

Or again, sometimes you want to predict behavior, and so you make use of what you know about the kind of person; and what you know about circumstances; and you say, "Well, in these circumstances, this kind of person would do such-and-such." That's the one that's chanciest, but you can do it, and we often do.

Now, you can do these things because these connections are logical ones, and because of that, as soon as you have information here [PC] and here [Circs.], you can draw conclusions about here [Behavior]. Information about any two will give you some conclusions about the third. This is what we routinely make use of in explaining and understanding behavior.

This sort of thing will appear in personality theories, because every personality theory has a general formulation for the explanation of behavior. And it will correspond to this [the triangle].

Now, as soon as you talk about what personal characteristics a given person has now, you raise the question, "How come he has *those* characteristics and not some others?" So that's how you generate the second kind of explanation, which is, "How come a person got the characteristics he has?"

And that involves a different schema: Capacity + History → Personal Characteristics. This, too, is a three-way connection; and unlike that one

[Fig. 2, triangle], this set of personal characteristics is almost always the thing that we're interested in. Over here [Fig. 2], you can be interested in any one of the three and often are. Here $[C+H \rightarrow PC]$ almost every time it's this [PC] specifically that we're interested in. Occasionally it's this [history], but usually this one [PC] So that our question generally is, "How did a person acquire the characteristics that he has?"

At this point, you can recognize the language of Maxim 8: If a person has this set of characteristics now, he acquired it in one of the ways that it can be acquired. So the elaboration consists of, "What is this notion of 'a way that it can be acquired'?" What can we say about that? And this is what we can say about that [circumstances]: this is how you acquire personal characteristics.

You acquire a given characteristic by having had the prior capacity and the appropriate intervening history.

Q. *What's the definition of 'history'?*

P. Just history. Time—calendar time, biography, what happened to you between ten o'clock today and twelve o'clock. That's history.

Q. *Origin—is that the origin of my life, or—*

P. Yeah, that's the origin of whatever individual you're talking about.

Q. *Okay, so we're not going to get into any of these ideas that—*

P. Yes. Yes.

Q. *What does the symbol up there "T" up there mean?*

P. T minus one—that's just to indicate a prior time from here [Now], because we're going to extend backward to minus 2, minus 3, etc.

For this, take a commonplace example like learning arithmetic by attending class in third grade. You attend class in third grade, and that's that prior time, and you get exposed to some set of historical circumstances—the class is run in a certain way according to a certain method. You've got 30 people in the class with you. Some of those people will learn arithmetic, and they will have acquired a new ability. Some of those people will not learn arithmetic. They may acquire something else, but they don't acquire that one.

So the history alone is not enough to guarantee the result. Only if you're dealing with a certain kind of person will *that* history give you that result.

If you think that's getting picky, just imagine a clam instead of a person

in that seat, and imagine what it would take to get that clam to do arithmetic, and you recognize that, indeed, the broader your scope, the more obvious it is that important differences lie here [PC]. Whereas when you're dealing with a homogeneous group of students, you might easily get the impression that it's all method—that all you've got to do is do certain things, and you'll get a certain result. And that's if they're so much alike that there's very little variation, you can be tempted into that conclusion. But in fact, there's very few things that one learns that everybody learns just by going through the same thing.

That phenomenon is the basis for special education. If one of those kids in that class doesn't learn by going through the regular class, you try to figure out some other history that he could have, that would result in that characteristic, namely, the ability to do arithmetic.

Which histories generate which results with which people is an empirical matter. We have a lot of observation from the past as to what works with whom. We certainly don't know as much as we need to know, or would like to know, about it. We certainly don't know all there is to know about it. What we can establish by observation, a la Maxim 6, is that certain things work with certain kinds of people; and if we can identify those kinds of people, then we can treat them appropriately.

But we are constantly adding to our stock of facts about what methods work with whom. It's because there are different methods, demonstrably, that no one method works the same with everybody; and secondly, that it's an open-ended set that will never finally find everything there is to know about that, that the wording of Maxim 8 is as open-ended as it is. It just says, if you have it, you got it in one of the ways it can be gotten, and how many ways there are is open. At a given time, as Observers, we know of some number of ways, but it's an open-ended set. The other thing that reminds us of is that there isn't one way that people acquire a given characteristic.



FIGURE 3

I've introduced this notion that I mentioned earlier, namely, Capacity [Fig. 3], remember, on that list of Powers. I put 'Capacity' down at the

bottom, and said *this is really a Powers concept, but it works a little differently, and we'll encounter it later on*. Here it is.

What's different about this one than the other Powers concepts is that this one does not connect directly to behavior. You remember, the other powers connected directly to your behavior, because they were your repertoire for drawing upon in a given behavior. So, for example, if you have the ability to play the piano, given the right circumstances you can go ahead and play the piano. So the ability connects to behavior that directly. On the other hand, if you only have the capacity to learn how to play the piano, there is no set of circumstances in which you just can get in there and play. What happens is that there is a set of circumstances whereby you can acquire the ability.

So the result of this Power is not behavior, but other Personal Characteristics, and that's why this stands in a special place. It is not just one Power among many; it is the Power to acquire Personal Characteristics of whatever kind—not just Powers, but Dispositions and States.

So Capacity is a potential notion. If you have the Capacity for something, you have the potential for something, and what makes that potential actual is the history. Given the right history, you actualize a certain potential. Given a different history, you actualize a different potential. Or you actualize the same potential in a different way. So this whole formula [Fig. 2, p. 101] is a formula for how potential gets actualized. That is the essence of development, of how what is potential earlier becomes actual later.

You still have the same kind of question here [Capacity] that you had here [PC], namely, if a person is the way he is now because he had this potential prior—together with a history—how come he had that potential prior? You have two kinds of answers: one is that the personal characteristics he has then is what gives him the capacity to acquire these [PCs]. When you talk about Capacity, you're simply talking about the potential for acquiring certain Personal Characteristics. But if you ask, "What gives you that Capacity?" the answer is, "The Personal Characteristics that you had then." Then you say, "How come a person acquired those Personal Characteristics?", and you have the same thing all over again. You have a prior Capacity here [PC'] and the right intervening history here [space between PC' and PC], and that's how you got these Personal Characteristics [PC].

Q. Where does Capacity lie? At any point in the history?

P. Yeah. This logical unit $[C+H \rightarrow PC]$ you can now just repeat back and

back and back, and there's no specification of time. You can do it by the minute, by the second, by the hour, year, or whatever. And each time you work it backward, you will be going back to a stage where the person had fewer, or less, or earlier Personal Characteristics.

So you've got a simple schema here which in practice you do repeatedly. You start with whatever characteristic you wonder about, and you explain it according to this by taking an earlier time, and the Capacity then, and the intervening history. It doesn't matter where you start, it doesn't matter how far back you go, it doesn't matter what personal characteristic you have, that's the logic of developmental explanation.

Different theorists, in their theory, will have different notions about Personal Characteristics, and about what kind of Capacities, and about what kind of histories.

But what makes them all developmental explanations is that they fit this formula.

Q. *If you carry it back to the extreme, to biological origin, Capacity is determined by biological structure or—*

P. You can do it two ways. One of the things you can see is that if you just keep going, you can't keep going forever. You come to some point that you call the Origin [Fig. 2, p. 101]. The origin, you'll encounter when you've wiped out all of the person's personal characteristics, because for any given characteristic, there was a time at which he didn't have it. So by working your way back, you reach a point where he doesn't have any. Then you have an interesting problem, and again, this is one of the ones you want to look at these theories to see how they handle this problem.

What do you do about this peculiar point in the person's history, the starting-point? How do you manage it? Because notice that this one, this schema [$C+H \rightarrow PC$] is a way of explaining how you get from some characteristics to others. Reaching this point of origin presents you with a new problem, namely, how do you get some characteristics from nothing? And that looks like a hard thing to do. But the logic of developmental explanation pushes you there, and so most theorists have something in their theories to deal with that, because indeed one does get pushed to that point, that there is a point of origin; and at that point there are no characteristics; and how do you get from nothing to something?

Q. *How about instincts, if there are any such thing?*

P. 'Instinct' is one of the possible answers, but again, notice how peculiar an answer it is.

Q. *That's not uniquely personal, either.*

P. Well, that's the most common move, is to get out of the problem in one form or another by saying what you just said: it's not really going from nothing to something; it's going from something of a different kind to something of this kind. But that presents problems, too.

The two most common things here [point of origin] are: you go to biology and genetics and say, "Well, you have those, and that's how come you can develop," or you go to reincarnation and say, "No, that wasn't an origin. The origin, if there was one, is way, way back; and what you have here as a starting-point is just the characteristics that you've acquired in your previous lives."

Both of those kinds of theories have difficulties with them, and for some people the difficulties are decisive; for others, they are not. The difficulty with the first one is that you've changed the subject. If you want to talk about biology, you can talk about biology all the way through here. But then you're not explaining people and their behavior; you're explaining the functioning of organisms. So any reference to your biological makeup at birth, or your genetic structure, if that's all there is to it, you've simply changed the subject-matter from talking about people to talking about organisms, and that doesn't explain anything about people. It might connect to an explanation, but that isn't one.

Q. *Couldn't you just say that the only thing that was prior to origin was biological, and that—*

P. Well, as I said, you've got a biological account afterwards, and that's continuous; and if you want to do biology there's nothing to keep you from doing it; but it isn't psychology. So giving a biological explanation of a biological phenomenon is not giving a biological explanation of a psychological phenomenon.

Q. *Couldn't you say that the psychological phenomena started from the biological phenomena, which is the only thing present before Origin?*

P. You have the problem of how could it possibly? That's like a flower-pot turning into a coach and horses, you've got two very different kinds of things.

Q. *Tadpoles turn into frogs.*

P. Those are both organisms.

Q. *Isn't part of a person's personal characteristics determined by their biology?*

P. No. Biology is just another way of talking. It isn't that biology is real and people are not. Talking one language or talking another are two ways of talking, and that's why I say if you're going to talk about one subject matter, you won't get an explanation by talking about another subject matter. That's the difficulty, which is a formal one; and as I say, for some number of people, that doesn't bother them, and they go ahead and say, "Well, it's biological." I'm just saying what the difficulty in that is, and I'm not saying that it's entirely decisive.

Also, there are ways around it. But if you just take it straight and say, "It's biological," you do encounter difficulties.

Q. *Would Jung's 'collective unconscious' be a solution?*

P. Yes and no. In so far as he's appealing to your brain structure, it's just another version of appealing to genetics. But notice that in some ways, that sounds a little more plausible. Why? Because it has some of the features of the reincarnation explanation, too. It does extend the time to the past.

You see, a genetic explanation doesn't really. It just starts here and says, "Because you've got this stuff here, that's why you develop here." You can trace it back, but it doesn't matter. Whereas for the Jung explanation and the reincarnation explanation, it's essential to trace this history back.

The difficulty with the reincarnation explanation is that for most of us, it simply violates Maxim 1. It doesn't seem to us that we've lived past lives. We make no observations and acquire no knowledge that even suggest that. And so even if there are people who say, "For me, it seems that way," if you're going to give a general explanation for people, you still have problems. There are also practical problems in how much you can use an explanation of that sort if you can't remember any of that stuff. Because then, in effect, you're free to make it up, and then—why bother?

Q. *I still have some problems with your separation between biology and psychology, making it as absolute as it seems.*

P. Try it with economics or try it with physics.

Q. *Doing physics instead of psychology?*

P. Yeah. Or economics. Or art or baseball.

Q. *I have a feeling that as far as economics, or even baseball, poverty or wealth will affect personality, playing baseball might affect your personality, so I can't make that complete separation.*

P. Look, you've got to draw a distinction between what you're talking about, and what it connects to. If you talk the way you just did, then indeed everything is everything, personality is baseball, it's economics, it's genetics, it's physics, it's chemistry, it's everything. But then how come we talk about 'personality'? On the other hand, obviously there's nothing that we can talk about that couldn't make a difference to people, there's nothing that we talk about that doesn't somehow connect to people.

So the problem is to preserve the connection, so as not to imply that those things are off in some other time and space independent of us, but also not to confuse talking about people with talking about something other than people.

Q. *But you're not doing that here, either, with biology.*

P. Well, biology is biology. No, you're talking about organisms. There is no theory in biology where the word 'person' appears in the formal theory. You have cells, you have connections, you have tissue, you have chemical constituents, you have organisms, you have organs. Nowhere is there any person.

I can point to a table and we can talk about it in chemical terms, we can talk about it in physical terms, we can talk about it in economic terms, we can talk about it in artistic terms. It's the same object. But when we talk about it in chemical terms, we're within a set of concepts that have no place for the artistic components. When we talk about it in physical terms, there's no place for the economic things, because physical terms form a system. And when we're talking about economics, there is no place for the physics. And what I'm saying is, that when we talk about people as people, it's different from talking about organisms as organisms. And if we're going to use one to explain the other, we've got to have some connection. We can't just substitute the one for the other, because that's changing the subject.

Q. *Isn't the artistic factor of that table largely dependent on the chemistry of it?*

P. Not at all. If it looked the same, it could have any kind of chemistry you want.

Q. *How could you say that? It's wood, right?*

P. Right, and if wood were made of different chemicals from what it is, it would still be wood. And if it looked the same, it wouldn't matter what the chemical composition was, or what it was made of chemically.

Q. *But it wouldn't look the same.*

P. Okay, but the key is: it has to *look* different to make an artistic difference. It's not the chemical composition as such.

Q. *But it wouldn't look the same if it had a different chemical composition.*

P. Maybe, maybe not. With some chemical compositions, obviously it wouldn't look the same. But with others, it might look the same.

Q. *So there's no relation between what it looks like and its chemical composition.*

P. No, you know there's a relation, that's why we're able to say, "For some. I would bet that if this were made of steel, it would look different." But neither I nor you nor anybody else is in a position to say, "It couldn't possibly be made of anything other than it is, and look the way it does," After all, look how good the movie studios are at faking the appearance of things. And also, notice that it doesn't have to look exactly the same in all respects, just those respects that are important to an artist.

Q. *So getting back to the personal characteristics, then you're saying that it doesn't have to be a particular biology to determine personal characteristics?*

P. Yeah, that's right. You could have a different biology and have those personal characteristics. You can't deduce the personal characteristics—

Q. *### historical experience and practice, you'd have a different biology and still have the same personal characteristics.*

P. Yes, absolutely.

P. Look, think out of those 30 people, that 26 that do learn arithmetic. They've got a different biology, but they wind up with the same personal characteristic. And they don't even have the same history, but they wind up with the same personal characteristic. So you can have a lot of variation on the biological end and on the history end—

Q. *### variation in the degree of arithmetic they know and how well they know it, right?*

P. Is it impossible that two people know it exactly to the same degree? If not, just imagine those two people, and then try to imagine whether you think their biology and their history was also identical, and I think you'll say *no, it didn't have to be and it probably wasn't*.

Q. *Right, but if their history was the same—if their experience was the same, then wouldn't their capacity or biology have to be the same?*

P. No. Again, you may be putting more in the word 'experience' than I am. If we both look at that clock, and we both say it's five to nine, in ordinary circumstances, I'd say we were having the same experience: we're seeing the clock. That experience might make—and normally would make—a different difference to you than it did to me. So you have a case where we both have the same experience, but it doesn't have the same effect on us. Why should it? There's simply no presumption that it would have the same effect, any more than there's a presumption that if you kick two different objects, it would have the same effect, like if I kick the table or if I kick this. Just exposing things to the same influence doesn't carry the presumption that you're going to get the same effect, because it all depends on what the nature of those objects are. The effect of an experience all depends on the nature of the person whose experience it is. And those connections are what 's given here [C+H \rightarrow PC].

Q. *By behavior you mean intentional action, so actually you don't really go all the way back to the origin. You go back to some time when the infant wasn't—at some point, the infant makes his first intentional behavior.*

P. No, with intentional action, this problem is even more clear than usual, namely, there's enough components in intentional action so it's clear that at birth, the individual doesn't have enough to engage in intentional action at birth. And so there you really do have a clear problem of how do you get from no action to some action. Once you can have action, you have the kind of history that gets you additional characteristics, but how do you get from being unable to behave to being able to behave?

Q. *It seems that the only way out is that biopsychological kind of model like a Piagetian, where the infant comes into the world with certain reflex schemas that you built out of trying the behaviors out. It's a dilemma—how do you get out of it?*

P. The way to get out of it—the first thing is to lay it out clearly and see just how much of a dilemma it is.

Also, remember, up here [Fig. 2, p. nnn] we have a model for how to make some of these connections and get out of some of these problems, namely, this connection [PC = Capacity]. Remember, the formula says you have these characteristics because you have a prior capacity and the intervening history. And you say, “What gives you this capacity?”, and the answer is, “the personal characteristics you have here [T-1, T-2, T-n].”

Now, these do not have to be of the same kind as this. So here you have a model for how to introduce data of a different kind, and explain the capacity. Even though it's the capacity that explains these characteristics, you can also appeal to something else to explain the capacity. Now, that's the kind of connection that would legitimize the reference to anything biological.

But also keep in mind that biological is just a way of talking, and people knew about people and their bodies long before we had such a thing a biology. In those days, had you been dealing with this problem, you wouldn't say it's all biological. There wasn't such a thing. You would talk about people's bodies, and you say, “An infant at birth still has a body, and the kind of body he has is one of his personal characteristics.” And indeed it is. The kind of personal characteristics that we've been talking about are the ones that are distinctive to people.

But after all, some of your characteristics are like you have dark hair, you're 6'3" tall, you weigh 140 pounds, and you have two arms, and those arms are constructed in certain ways. So the kind of characteristics that people share with material objects, you have to handle in a special way because those are accidental.

For example, if you only had one arm, that wouldn't make you a non-person even though most people have two arms. So having two arms is not essential to your being a person. Having a body constructed in a certain way isn't essential to your being a person. So the essential things about people, the kind of differences, the kind of characteristics that go with being people, are the kind that we've been dealing with. And those basically are the subject matter of personality theories.

However, problems like this [Origin] remind us—even if the philosophers didn't—that people also have bodies, and that what your body is like is a feature of you, it's not just something outside of you. So at this point, we may want to take advantage of that and talk about those kinds of personal characteristics that people have by virtue of what their bodies are like.

Notice that doesn't involve talking about biology. You could have a theological system for talking about your body and what it was like. You don't need the concepts of biology. You can introduce any kind of concept dealing with the human body, and that will do the job—in principle.

Q. *So there's really no dilemma in the first place. You really do have personal characteristics at birth, it's just that they're different characteristics than the ones you—.*

P. You still have the problem of what you have up here [the point of origin]. Over here, we had a clear notion of Capacity and said, "That is what is explained by your personal characteristics." Over here, it's not clear that the same notion of Capacity will do the job.

Q. *But you do have personal characteristics when you're born.*

P. You can construct that kind of explanation by attributing personal characteristics of certain kinds here. Then you still need a Capacity type of notion.

As it turns out, you don't need any of that. There is a way of doing this in such a way that you don't need to appeal to biology at all, even in the form in which I said it looks legitimate.

And that's why I've been making a point of it. If you had to do this in the end, anyhow. I wouldn't be giving you such a song and dance about separating the biology from the psychology. But in fact, you don't have to do it at all, even though you can, and that's important to recognize.




FIGURE 4

The way you don't have to do it at all is this: you look at this notion

that we had of Ability, and now of Capacity, and you construct a dimension. What this dimension is, is this: when you say that a person has the ability to do something, and if you don't qualify it, that means "under normal circumstances." Normal circumstances includes a wide range of circumstances. What goes with having the Ability is that in that range of circumstances, the person could be expected to succeed if he tried. So the dimension has to do with the range of circumstances in which success is not surprising.

And when you have an Ability, that range is maximal. Talking about a person's having an Ability carries the strongest implication about there being a wide range of circumstances under which success would not be surprising.

Obviously, we don't always want to go that strong because the phenomenon isn't always of that sort. So we have, in the language, a set of terms for marking a narrower range. Think of the difference between saying that somebody has the ability to hit a home run, versus saying that a person is capable of hitting a home run. Saying he has the ability to hit a home run implies that he can do it pretty much at will. Saying he's capable of it is to say, "Don't be surprised if he sometimes hits home runs. He is capable of it."

But when you're talking capability, you're more or less implying, "under favorable circumstances", not just under any old circumstances but, with a little bit of luck, he will hit a home run. Or as they say in football, on any given Sunday, any one team is capable of beating any other team—not that they have the ability to, but they're capable of it. Given a few breaks, given this and that, they're capable of it.

At a lower level, you talk about liability. You say something is liable to happen. You say, "Watch out for this guy. He's liable to blow up and lose his temper," When you say things like that, you're not saying, "Don't be surprised, it'll happen fairly often," you're saying, "There's enough chance to be worth watching out for. There's enough likelihood to be worth taking account of. It's greater than zero."

Now, if you have a sense of that dimension, just push it to the extreme, and what is the weakest thing we could say? What's the weakest implication we could give? Presumably, the weakest implication is only to say, "There's at least one circumstance—out of all possible circumstances, at least one—where success would not be surprising." That's as weak a statement of this kind as you can make, that there's at least one.

We don't have a term for that, because we're not usually dealing with extreme cases, so we made up a term and called it 'merely able'. A person is

merely able to do something if there is at least one circumstance in which his success is not surprising. Notice how different that is from talking about an ability. It's a much weaker sort of implication.

This gives you the entree to how a person can succeed at something without having the necessary ability to have done it on purpose. It is possible to succeed even when you don't have the ability to succeed. It is possible to accomplish the elements of a behavior even though you don't have the skill. You can still do it successfully in a non-accidental way. And it's from that kind of achievement that you acquire the ability and the distinctions, etc., so that, at a later time, you have all of the requisite knowledge, know-how, etc. So these limiting-case type of personal characteristics are what you can get started with in order to acquire the normal kind of personal characteristics that we've pretty much taken for granted here.

Q. *Doesn't that imply that if you start out merely able, it would take a tremendous amount of luck to go the first step?*

P. That's right. As soon as you make as weak a statement as this, then you say, "But heck, how except by absolute blind luck would that one circumstance ever be encountered? Why doesn't every infant die shortly after birth? How come?"

Here we go back and say, "Social practices are not called 'social practices' for nothing." Most social practices involve more than one person, and what you get with infants is not a one person striving for survival. What you get with an infant is basically a two-person social practice in which one of those persons provides all of the necessary abilities and knowledge, etc. And that person is commonly known as 'mother'.

Q. *That is the normal circumstance, though, for an infant.*

P. Well, the ways that mothers raise children are themselves the product of a lot of social evolution. We know a lot about how to raise kids, and that's part of the knowledge that we all acquire in growing up. So when you get a mother taking care of a newborn infant, the fact that the conditions for the success of that infant are met are not at all accidental. It's just that the statistics of the definition would indeed lead you to say, "My God, it would be extraordinary if many of them survived."

But in fact, it is not a matter of statistics. We see to it.

So the acquisition of characteristics by the child is a joint accomplishment of the child and the mother, and this [merely able] is as much as the

child has to contribute. He has to be merely able. The structure of the practices is such that the other person, the mother, can contribute everything else. That's what normally happens.

Notice that to say that a person is 'merely able' amounts to no more than saying, "He has some potential. It is possible for him." If it's at all possible for the individual to acquire the characteristic, there's got to be at least one circumstance in which he can do it, and that's all that you're saying here. So that to generate this notion of 'merely able', as a limiting case here [Fig. 4], is over here [Fig. 2] to be stuck with no more than saying, "It's possible for infants to acquire characteristics, and that carries no implications beyond behavior and beyond persons." That's why you don't have to go to biology, reincarnation, or anything else. Because a mere possibility needs no further explanation. That's a brute fact.

Q. *It still seems that you've got to have something in there for the potential to acquire that.*

P. Yeah, the history. The history is how that potential gets actualized. But remember, the history is the participation in a joint set of practices with the mother. So with that history, it's not surprising that an individual of that general kind will acquire personal characteristics.

Q. *So when is this joint venture terminated? When he decides—when he discovers—*

P. As usual, you have disagreements about that; and you have disagreements not merely among families, but between the parents and the children; and, indeed, a lot of trouble in families comes over the issue of when do you let go and how. Because there's nothing in the logic of this to tell you when is the time, and the right time is not the same for everybody. We have norms: we say, "Well, around age 18, or around age 21, you ought to leave home." That's normal and expected, but for some people it might not be so. For others, 14 might have been the right age.

Q. *I'm not concerned about the right age, but when do you distinguish the break is actually made? What is the criterion you use to decide when it is terminated?*

P. In a sense, it's never terminated. You're always a member of your family. You have other joint ventures with other people, but you continue to be a member of your family and in that sense it isn't terminated. Why would it need to be?

Q. *Why is it called ‘personal characteristics’ when it’s really a joint characteristic?*

P. No, no, it’s a joint venture, but the characteristics of the child are *his* characteristics, and the characteristics of the parent are the parent’s characteristics. There’s no mixing on those, any more than there’s a mixing in the different members of a baseball team. The pitcher’s characteristics are his. The first baseman’s characteristics are his. Just the fact that they’re doing something together that makes a difference to them doesn’t imply a mixture of characteristics. They’re separate, definite individuals, each with his characteristics. The only limitation on those characteristics is they have to be such as to enable those two people to do that thing together. Other than that, they could have any characteristics.

Q. *So getting back to Origin, you still see them as distinct characteristics, although one arises out of the other?*

P. Sure. The one arises out of the interaction, the participation. The child’s characteristics don’t arise directly out of the mother’s. The child’s characteristics arise out of the joint participation with the mother.

Q. *For there to be a joint participation, it seems like there has to be two distinct entities or individuals.*

P. That’s right: the mother and the child.

Q. *Then you’re saying that one of the distinct entities arises out of the two distinct entities.*

P. No. I’m saying you have two distinct entities, the child and the mother. The child does not have any of the normal personal characteristics. What he has is this, this peculiar personal characteristic [merely able], and that’s all he needs to have in order to acquire the usual ones.

Q. *Aren’t you back to ###?*

P. No, because this is not a positive description. It’s merely a logical condition, that it has to be possible for him to acquire those characteristics. And if it were not possible for him to do it, it wouldn’t happen. Since we know it happens, we also know it’s possible. So you’re not implying any new facts in attributing this [merely able] to him. That’s why I say, when you get down this far, you’re really not implying anything more than bare possibility, and that doesn’t need explanation because no matter what else you’re explaining, you reach an ultimate point of saying, “That’s how things are.” Even

if you went to biology, you would still ask, “How come having this biological structure gives you that potential?” and you wind up saying, “Well, that’s the way it is.”

The ultimate explanations are non-explanations, because you don’t have an infinite regress of explanation. So whatever path of explanation you take, you’re going to wind up with a limit where you say, “That’s how it is.” And you won’t get out of that by taking one path or another in explanation. Going to biology won’t save you from that. Going to reincarnation won’t save you from that. So the fact that you encounter it here is not a matter of encountering a problem here that you wouldn’t encounter with some other line of explanation. You’re always going to reach that point.

Q. *Could we take a minute to talk about the test and when it’s going to be and what it’s going to cover?*

P. No. I haven’t decided enough about it to make it worth talking about.

Q. *Could you give an example of a personal characteristic that would come out of the joint venture between the infant and its mother?*

P. Yeah—being able to suck. A child is not born being able to suck, but if you put your finger or a nipple here, pretty soon it will turn.

Q. *It could do a number a things with it. Why does it suck? It must be an instinct or something already there.*

P. Okay, remember I said, you can always add things. You can always invent explanations for how come this potential, and biology is one, instinct is another, reincarnation is another.

Q. *So you’re just saying “that’s the way it is”?*

P. Let me suggest a meditation exercise for you. Ponder this statement during the week: “Things are what they are, and they don’t need something else to make them what they are.”

SESSION 9

July 22, 1976

Peter: Let's get back to where we left off yesterday. I can usually tell when I start sounding like I'm making statements because people start agreeing or disagreeing with me. And that's what happened last time, so now's a good time for a reminder that statements is not where it's at.

In presenting you this schema. I'm not telling you that this is how things are. I'm saying, "Notice how this schema brings out essentially developmental ideas, and that if you work it certain ways, you reach this problem [origin]; and that there are at least three major ways of dealing with that problem; each of which has some advantages, each of which you can find things to disagree with or object to." And as you might guess, different people, having different interests, concerns, etc., are going to make different choices there if they think about it at all—which most people wouldn't, since they're not involved with this [origin problem] at all.

There's a couple of other things I want to mention about this before we go on to the issue of disagreement. By the way, these are the topics I want to cover before we go on to the exercises.

Disagreement, negotiation
Emotion
Unconscious motivation
Relationship and status




FIGURE 1

The first one is a reminder that this line here [Fig. 1] is that history of intentional action that we've been talking about, that in this diagram, this line here is a long process divided into episodes, each of which is an intentional action, except those periods of time when you're unconscious.

So the history whereby capacity is transformed into ability is a history of intentional action. It isn't just living and breathing for a period of time; it's primarily what you're doing during that time, what you're responding to, what effect it has on you.

Secondly, one of the things that applies to this kind of phenomenon—namely, development—is an old, old principle, and the principle is that different effects require different explanations. Just to say *if we have two different things here, we require that somewhere the explanation of the two is going to be different*. We will not accept that the identical explanation explains two different results. This shows up particularly in historical explanations because there it comes out in the form *if you have two different results, you have to have somewhere two different histories*.

You can see that the logic of the principle is kind of like the logic of Maxim 3; it's simple and obvious, namely, that *if you have two different results and you have the same explanation, that explanation will not explain why you have one rather than the other, or when you have one rather than the other*. So it's an incomplete explanation. So we require that an adequate explanation not be the same for two different results. And we can see to it, generally speaking. Whenever we make distinctions, we can trace history back and find some difference—and usually some relevant difference—to account for the differences that we observe so that we do wind up with—at least by postulation—a different history for every different result. And sometimes we have to go to some lengths.

For example, I think the issue came up last time, *if you trace back here the degree of learning, wouldn't you find some difference back there if two people hadn't learned arithmetic to exactly the same degree?* And naturally we would expect that there would be some difference back here.

The reason we can carry this off is that this is reconstruction. In a reconstruction, we can see to it that everything we distinguish now, that we want to explain, we either discover or attribute [to] something different in the history. And that is not merely harmless but appropriate in a reconstruction.

Part of why we can do this is the logic of this trio of Capacity, history, and Personal Characteristics. You run into problems as soon as you try to work the thing forward instead of backward, because when you take your reconstruction that you worked backward, starting from what you know now [T-n], and work it forward, then since you have a unique account for everything that you observed, lo and behold, suddenly it looks like everything that happened *had* to happen because of its unique history. That's a notion that it's easy to fall into, and for an antidote, let me recommend two exercises.

(1) Instead of working with a reconstruction, try predicting, and see if the kind of facts that you can establish convince you that such-and-such *has* to happen. I think you'll find that all of a sudden, when you take the same kind of facts but have to make a prediction, things start looking very uncertain again, whereas when you used them with a reconstruction, and reconstructed the person's history, somehow it all seemed inevitable. So working the same ideas and the same information forward in a genuine prediction will tend to bring back to you that it's not that certain.

(2) Have ten people give a reconstruction of the same event or phenomenon or personal characteristic. You'll find in general that you get ten reconstructions, all of which are unique. But if things had to happen in only one way, at least nine of those ten have got to not be true. And if the odds are that bad, what's the odds on yours?

Notice that neither of these two exercises is a proof, but if you go through them, as I say, it will weaken the tendency to use reconstructions and see things as inevitable and necessary.

Q. *Do you have a model to explain how it is that sometimes we [are] able to predict?*

P. Yeah. Remember I was saying about the connection between personal characteristics, circumstances, and behavior. If you know both of these [PCs and Cs] well, you can predict.

Q. *But not ###.*

P. Yeah. You can't expect to predict, partly because you never know all of these [PCs and Cs], also because of the time gap, circumstances can change. But you can indeed predict.

Okay, let me tie back in one last thing, something I think I said earlier, namely, that personal characteristics are a way of freeing us from history. That shows up in this first unit [the triangle]. When you explain a behavior by a reference to a combination of circumstances and personal characteristics, that's it. You do not then need to know the history whereby the person acquired the characteristic. It's his having the characteristic that explains the behavior. You can raise another question about how he got the personal characteristics, but that's another question. It is not part of the answer to why did he do what he did.

So the explanation of why this man solved the arithmetic problem is that he has that ability and the circumstances call for it. The history of his going to school and learning is not part of the explanation of that behavior. It's part of the explanation of his having that ability.

This enables us to have explanations without having to know everything about everything. If you had to have explanations for everything that connected, you'd have to know eventually everything about everything in order to have any explanation. So explanations are finite, and you can have explanations even if they in turn raise other questions. Any further questions about that developmental schema?

Q. *Am I just misreading from yesterday that there is a kind of a—I know you don't use these terms—I kind of have a feeling of a mind-body dichotomy, where we're separating out and saying that behavior is not related to the body in any way, that they're two different things.*

P. No. Body things come under the heading of Performance. You see, when you're describing my performance in going like that, you're describing how I move my arm, how my wrist turns, and if you want to do it in detail, you talk about my muscles or my neurons and all of that. So it comes under performance.

We have one more maxim [Maxim 9]. That one says, "Given the relevant competence, behavior goes right if it doesn't go wrong in one of the ways it can go wrong." This is the action-equivalent of Maxim 1. Both Maxim 1 and Maxim 9 are very similar. Maxim 1 has to do with knowledge. Maxim 9 has to do with action, but the logic is the same.

When we accomplish something by exercising some of our abilities, for even such a simple thing as drinking from a coffee cup, imagine all of the ways that that could go wrong. Imagine the possibility of tripping, of knocking up against this and spilling it, of raising it and dropping it, of not being able to hold onto it, of raising it and spilling it all over yourself—there's all kinds of ways that that could go wrong.

Now, when you succeed, through the exercise of competence, you do not do it by figuring out all of the ways it could go wrong and preventing them. That would be impossible. And the demonstration of that is pretty identical to the demonstration with Maxim 1 that that's the only way you can have knowledge. Namely, suppose I have a task [T] I want to accomplish, and then I think of several ways that that would go wrong. And then I have to do something to prevent this one [W_1], and then something to prevent this one [W_2], and then something to prevent this one [W_3], and then something to prevent this one [W_4]. My doing something here [W_1] is a new task, because I have to accomplish that precaution, and it can go wrong [W_a], so I have to figure out how my precaution can go wrong, and then take precautions against each one. But those precautions can go wrong, and you can see that you never end. You never even get to the second way it could go wrong [W_2].




FIGURE 2

So again, successes are not to be accounted for by somehow figuring out everything that could go wrong and preventing it. Which is simply a reminder that then it's the competence that explains. Somebody says, "But how come you did succeed in drinking from that cup, if you didn't take all of those precautions?" The answer is, "Because I know how to take drinks

from cups.” And no explanation along the line of, “Well. I prevented this, this, this, and this,” will be sufficient.

Q. *What type of psychology or philosophy would this represent—where people believe that you have to keep preventing—*

P. Interestingly enough, there is almost that kind of principle in Freud. It’s not quite, but as you read Freud, you could paraphrase what he says as “Behavior goes wrong unless it goes right in one of the ways it can go right.” You have Id functioning unless somehow, through some historical accident, you manage to have Ego functioning. Try that out and see if you could work that, and I think you’ll find you can’t, because if it’s going to go wrong unless by accident you see to it, or something happens to make it go right, it would be extraordinary if you could make it go right in all of the ways that it could possibly go wrong.

Or think of cognitive theories that postulate a built-in bias in human knowledge, like the built-in bias to have a favorable self-concept. As soon as you introduce a bias, it amounts to saying, “Well, then things are going to go wrong because of that bias, unless somehow, on particular occasions and particular ways you manage to neutralize it. And that’ll give you the same kind of result.

Q. ###

P. Yeah, there are many theories that say, “People just have a built-in bias in favor of themselves. They distort reality in order to have a favorable picture of themselves, and that’s just a general principle about people.”

Q. *Don’t some people have a built-in bias against themselves?*

P. That would work the same way. Any kind of bias, if you postulate it as a general principle, will give you the same problem, because it amounts to, “What you think you know won’t be true, unless by accident something happens to neutralize that bias.” So it doesn’t matter whether the bias is favorable or unfavorable.

Q. *Is that the bias ###?*

P. Presumably, if you distort reality, somewhere you’re liable to get in trouble. But if it’s a cognitive theory, you wind up with a problem in relation to knowledge. If it’s a Freudian kind of theory, you wind up with a problem in connection with behavior.

Okay, let’s talk about disagreement. The first question I want to raise is why do we make such a big deal about disagreement? Why do people get

bothered when disagreement arises? Why is there such a big deal made in science about *you have to have agreement among observers*? By now, we all take it for granted that agreement is important, but let's ask, "How come? Why is disagreement to be avoided?"

Q. *The reason it disturbs us because we have the assumption that everybody has the same perception of the way the world—and I guess along with that, it requires similar personal characteristics and past history.*

P. But we don't have that assumption, because one of the earliest things that came out is the notion that everybody lives in his own world, so we clearly don't suppose that everybody is alike that way. And theories don't really. But that makes it all the more mysterious why, in the face of that kind of notion about people, all of a sudden, out here we find that disagreement is seen as something that has to be avoided at all costs, almost, and agreement is seen as something very important. And this is against the background of understanding people as, in general, quite different.

Q. *Disagreement would—say you were going to do some research, and you can get agreement, somebody approves of what you're doing and likes it ### and you get support. But if they disagree with you, you can have a heck of a time getting help ###. Well, the disagreement is a hindrance to you then. It's like with parents. If you agree with your parents on something, everybody will cooperate to make that thing happen, and there again, if they don't like it, they're not going to help you.*

P. Okay. That's the answer, roughly speaking.

There's two answers, and I think you mentioned both of them. A lot of the things that people do together require agreement. If you have disagreement, you can't do those things together. So the importance of disagreement boils down to the importance of the thing that you can't do together unless you agree. And that's going to differ from occasion to occasion.

There are some things, at some times, that are more important to agree about than others. Take any kind of teamwork or team game, for example. If you're playing doubles in tennis, or if you have a football team or a baseball team, imagine how a baseball team would function if they couldn't agree on who was the pitcher, or if they couldn't agree where first base was. I'd be very surprised if they succeeded in having a baseball game if they couldn't agree about those things. On the other hand, look at all of the things they wouldn't have to agree about. They wouldn't have to agree about anything outside of baseball in order to play baseball together.

So one of the things that we do not require for social cooperative behavior is complete agreement. We only require those agreements that are essential to carrying on the joint activity. So as I say, it's the importance of the activity that would be prevented by disagreement—that's why disagreement is important, that's why one might be motivated to—in the face of disagreement—see if you can get agreement.

Disagreement is possible at any time, at any place. There are no circumstances, no sorts of cooperative behavior, in which you're guaranteed against any possible disagreement. And in fact, in almost any circumstance, disagreement—relevant disagreement—is a practical possibility.

Given that, it would be extraordinary if we just left it to chance how you resolve or try to resolve disagreement. Something like that is too important to be left to chance. So not surprisingly, what we have available is a special social practice, and for that practice we use this term, negotiation, which becomes appropriate to engage in whenever there is a disagreement. And although it doesn't guarantee agreement, it guarantees a resolution, for both parties to the disagreement. In principle, you always wind up with solution. You don't necessarily wind up with agreement.




FIGURE 3

To see how this works, we have to now use that notion of a social practice; and fortunately, we only need to use the first two aspects.

This is a four-stage social practice. And let's imagine this as a two-person interaction. Stage 1 is that each of the two people present their positions. If the positions are not different, you stop there because it doesn't look as though you have a disagreement. If the positions are different, then it looks like a disagreement, and you continue.

The second stage is to criticize or defend each of those positions.

The third stage is to adjust a position if it encounters a criticism that can't be defended against. The final stage is to draw a conclusion. You can see, it isn't as simple as 1, 2, 3, 4. What you have are repetitions here, that is, you go through cycles of criticizing, defending, criticizing, defending, each time. If the criticism can't be defended against, you make an adjustment; and then you go back to criticism, defense, etc. In this stage, you bring out all of the criticisms that seem legitimate. And either they get defended against or the positions get adjusted.

Secondly, in the course of either criticizing or defending, somebody may present a fact and generate disagreement about that. In that case, you simply take that one, you start all over again and negotiate that difference, and then come back to this one.

So the pattern is a recursive pattern because you can generate disagreement in the course of this procedure for resolving disagreement. When that happens, you simply take it there, and resolve that disagreement, and come back to the first one.

If you always disagreed wherever you possibly could, you'd never finish, so the way of doing this right is not that you disagree wherever you possibly could. Rather, you disagree wherever you actually disagree. And those will be a finite set. You will only have certain criticisms, certain objections, and those you can get out in a finite period of time, so that negotiation does come to an end.

Since you bring out every criticism that seems legitimate—you don't have to have a guarantee that it is, because part of the defense against it may be to say *it's not a legitimate criticism*—since you bring out every criticism that even seems legitimate, by the time you finish, all of the questions that you have about this thing have been raised and something done about them. Either they've been defended against, or the position has been adjusted. So in the end, each of the participants has all of his questions taken care of. He has no further questions to raise about it.

What happens in the end? First, what you wind up with needn't be either of the positions you started out with. Both positions might have been changed in the course of the negotiation. Even so, what you wind up with may or may not be agreement. If it's agreement, you heave a sigh of relief and go on about your business, because then there's no further problem.

If there's disagreement in the end, what you found out is that you really do disagree, because the net effect of going through all the criticisms, etc.,

having both positions survive criticism, shows that there really was that difference, and the two of you really do differ in that way. At this point, each of the observers has a new problem, and that problem can be diagrammed.




FIGURE 4

Use X to indicate what the topic of conversation was to begin with, and A and B the two participants. The initial task of the two participants was to account for this phenomenon [X]. But once you have a negotiation that ends in disagreement, each of these two people has a new something to account for, namely, *how come this other person describes it the way he does, considering that I'm describing it the way I do, and I'm not wrong—and he's not wrong? How come he's seeing it that way?* Likewise over here, *he* has the problem of explaining not merely what went on here [X], but *how come this other person sees it the way he does and can't be shown to be wrong, even though that's different from how A sees it.* So what each of the persons has now is that he needs to explain not merely the phenomenon, but how the other person saw it.

The reason there's a guaranteed resolution is that you account for those differences by giving personal characteristic descriptions. This is exactly the problem that I said is solved by ID descriptions. You wind up with a conclusion about what kind of person this other person is. And you pick one that fits, and that does account for that difference, and now you have everything accounted for. And he, likewise, picks a description of you that accounts for why you see it that way, and now he has everything accounted for. Neither of you has any further questions about the matter, so you both go away with a resolution. You both understand the situation, you both have accounted for everything that went on, and you have different accounts. But neither of you walks away puzzled. Each of you understands, each of you has no further questions to ask about it.

Q. *It seems to me that there's no way agreement can ever be reached, since you're always getting two personal histories, accounting for the two people who are having the disagreement.*

P. No. The personal histories don't count—that's what I was saying in connection with the developmental schema. It's the personal characteristics and circumstances that explain the behavior.

Q. *Aren't the personal characteristics always going to be different?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *And if you're going to use those to explain why a person has a certain type of position, then everyone should always have a different kind of position.*

P. No. That line of thinking leads to the conclusion that none of us could agree with anybody else.

Q. *I believe that.*

P. Well, I agree that you believe that. There's a counter-example.

So we agree on a lot of things. Like I said, there's a lot of things that we have to agree on, or we can't carry out our joint activities. But we don't have to agree about everything. So just having different characteristics—having nine different personalities on a baseball team—doesn't mean they can't play baseball. It just means they all have to know baseball, and the other things don't interfere.

Q. *### a different perception of what baseball is.*

P. That's fine. That doesn't keep them from playing baseball. But if they disagree about who's pitcher, they can't play baseball. There are some things they do have to agree on. Even though you can say their perceptions are different, they don't disagree about that fact that Joe is the pitcher.

Q. *But what is Joe? They all perceive Joe differently.*

P. They don't need to perceive him the same; they just need to agree that he is the pitcher. Not how he looks—

Q. *They're all agreeing on something different.*

P. No, they're not agreeing on their perceptions. They're agreeing on that fact that Joe is the pitcher, and that's all they need to agree on. They don't have to see him the same. He doesn't have to look the same to them. They don't have to think anything else the same about him. None of those things are required, only simple things like "Joe is the pitcher". And that we

certainly do agree about. How many would disagree—like, there's a coffee cup on that table? You'd better not.

Q. *How do you explain—by walking away from a negotiation where you don't understand the other person, you don't understand why he feels that way? Wouldn't that be a case where there's no resolution?*

P. No. That's an ID description of yourself: "I'm confused. I don't understand." That's an ID description. So you just pulled the switch and gave the ID description of yourself instead of the other person. It works either way.

Q. *So it doesn't mean, when you leave a negotiation, you have a description of B—if you're A?*

P. No, you have a description of how come you saw what you saw, how come things are the way you saw them. And part of the explanation is that you don't understand B, and that's why you saw what you saw, or heard what you heard, or understood what you understood.

Q. *So you're not really describing B.*

P. No. If that's not part of what went on, then your description of what went on won't include that you understand B. It'll include that you don't understand B.

Let me add a little bit of detail here. Some of the descriptions that you might give of the other person will amount to saying, "Well, there are different ways of looking at this, and I've got one, and he's got the other, and they're both okay."

Others will amount to saying, "I'm right after all." For example, if you give ability descriptions, if you're arguing about whether so-and-so is angry, and you say *Yes* and he says *No*, one of your descriptions might be, "Well, he's just not sensitive to anger." That description of him implies that as far as you're concerned, you're right and he isn't; whereas other ID descriptions would imply that you're both right, neither of you is incorrect, and there are just two different ways of looking at it.

When you give a description of yourself, I think it's most often of this disqualifying type, where you say, "I just don't understand. I guess I'm not sensitive enough. I guess I don't know as much as him," or things of that sort. And that just—I think—happens to be a fact, that when you use a self-description, it's most often of that sort rather than the other kind.

Q. *Why is that? Why do we disqualify ourselves more often than we*

qualify ourselves?

P. I didn't say that. I said, "When you give an ID description of yourself instead of the other person, you're most often disqualifying yourself." But most often, you give a description of the other person. So it isn't that most often you disqualify yourself. You have a choice of who you give the ID description of, either myself or the other person. Most often, it's of the other person.

Q. *And you don't make any qualification about yourself.*

P. No. When I say, "He's just not very sensitive to hostility," I'm talking about him, not me. However—

Q. *But you're implying that you are.*

P. You're implying.

Q. *You're really saying, "I'm okay, but he's not."*

P. Well, you're implying it. In effect, you're not raising questions about me; you're just saying something about him. And clearly the implication is, "Since I'm not raising questions about me, I'm taking it that I'm okay."

Now, on those minority of occasions where I do give a description of me, that's where I say most often, "I'm disqualifying myself."

Q. *It seems as though I can resolve it by saying, "I don't understand what he's saying. He's crazy."*

P. There you've combined both. "I'm confused, but I'm okay at being confused because he's confusing, he's crazy." You can hit them both.

In any case, it's personal characteristic descriptions that resolve this difference, which the negotiation established to your satisfaction is really there. Remember, initially I said, *if you state the different positions, they have to at least look like a disagreement, or you've got no problem.* But some disagreements are merely apparent disagreements, and a negotiation in that case, hopefully, will lead to agreement.

Other initial differences are real differences, and by negotiation you find out that they are, and then those need explaining, and ID descriptions give you that kind of explanation, because that's what ID descriptions are all about.

Q. *If ID descriptions give you that reason why you're different, then why wouldn't ID descriptions be identical if you were agreeing?*

P. If you did agree, you don't need ID descriptions.

Q. *But shouldn't ID descriptions also indicate that there is agreement? If they can also indicate that there's disagreement?*

P. Sometimes, but those are peculiar cases. When you get agreement, what you jointly agree to is that *the reason both of you say that that's the case is that that's the case*. And that doesn't call for any special ID characteristic on your part. It's just that you haven't made a mistake about it.

Q. *Does that mean it's true?*

P. No, it just means that you're not doubting it. You can be mistaken. We can all be mistaken about this coffee cup being here, but how many of us would really doubt it and do anything to check on their doubts? We don't have that kind of question, so we don't raise it, and that doesn't mean we couldn't be wrong.

Q. *But shouldn't that indicate that we've had similar experiences of coffee cups?*

P. Well, probably. If you ask, "How come we're all so sure about this?," that's probably the answer. And somebody who had extraordinarily different experience would probably not even recognize it as a coffee cup.

Q. *When you have that type of negotiation that ends with you discounting the other person as being confusing, where does the adjustment of positions come in? It seems to me like you'd get stuck at 2 and never get to 4, because you start out with the assumption—*

P. No, remember, you give this description at the end. That's part of your conclusion. Your conclusion now has to do not merely with this [Fig. 4, p. 208. X], but with him, too.

Q. *But in order to state the positions you had, ###.*

P. If he was being confusing, you would probably have criticized the unclarity of his position or the contradictoriness of his argument, or something; and at some point, you would stop. If you got to the point where you said, "This guy's crazy," you would stop negotiating—and you're at that point.

Q. *So you skip the ###.*

P. At any time, if you come to that conclusion that the person in question doesn't have the competence that it takes to negotiate, you stop

negotiating. It's like starting to play a chess game with somebody and finding that he puts pieces here, there, and there—you stop playing chess with him.

Q. *It seems to me that the biggest or most complicated disagreements involve emotional issues that aren't—like my husband and I are trying to decide on something that's just 90% emotional that we both think we ought to do, but we don't want to do. And I'm trying to figure out how you plug that in.*

P. Okay, let me enrich the mixture a little.

Negotiation is for the sake of arriving at a good answer—good in the sense of either true or right—in the case of action. It is easy to confuse negotiation with bargaining. In fact, a lot of cases of bargaining, you call 'negotiation' in ordinary language. In bargaining, there is no issue of a good answer or a right answer; it's merely an issue of who's willing to do what.

Now, in human interactions, those two things tend to go side by side, tend to get sandwiched in between one another. For example, you might negotiate who has a right to do what there, and maybe decide that you have a right to make that decision. Then he says, "But I really can't live with it," so then you say, "Well, if I give you what you want, what will you give me?"—and that's bargaining. So in situations like that, you're probably involved in both negotiation and bargaining.

I made a reference to that it takes competence to engage in negotiation. As with any social practice, it takes some kind of competence; and as with any social practice, you can do it right, and you can do it wrong. Whereas we can't specify all of the ways you can do it wrong, we can hit some major paradigm cases of doing it wrong, and these will help our understanding of how the thing works.

Let me quickly go through a set of about five horrible examples of how not to negotiate. You'll recognize these from your own experience.

Horrible example #1 is the person who won't negotiate, who—as soon as you disagree with him—says, "No, you're wrong," and goes directly down here. You've all met people who are more or less like that, and we say—what? Arbitrary, authoritarian, opinionated, bigoted, arrogant, we've got a whole set of taxonomies for that kind of thing.

Then #2, the converse: the person who will never stop negotiating and refuses ever to draw a conclusion. He always thinks of one more possibility, and one more possibility, and one more possibility, and one more argument, and maybe this, and maybe that, and "Gee, I just don't know," and "We can't be certain, "—we have a lot of uncomplimentary terms for him, too. We call

him obsessive, we call him uptight, we call him this, that, and the other, because that's not the way to negotiate either.

The point of negotiation is to reach a conclusion. Somebody who just keeps spinning it on and on and on is just holding up the ball game. So that's not a legitimate way to negotiate.

The third horrible example is what you might call the con man. The con man is one who announces himself in this general vein: he says, "Well. I'm very open-minded. I'll listen to anything you have to say, all you've got to do is prove it to me." In negotiation, there's no such thing as proof. In human affairs, there is almost never any such thing as proof. So somebody who puts on this act of open-minded but says, "All you've got to do is prove it to me," is somebody who—in spite of the appearance of open-mindedness—is going to believe whatever he wants, because there's no way you're going to prove different to him.

A variation on the con man (and this you find more often in scientific and academic circles) is one who says, "I'm very open-minded, you don't have to prove things to me, you just got to show me convincingly, but you've got to show me in my terms." There's no guarantee that those terms are the proper terms for showing what's there. So again, somebody who says that is somebody who probably is going to hang onto whatever he believes, because you're not going to be able to show him in his terms.

And the con game is the contrast between the presentation of being very open, but at the same time an arrangement that makes it almost impossible for anybody to get through and change his mind. And that's why we call it a con man.

Another one you find oftentimes in experimental research. This is a person who says, "Well, look, we've got to reach an agreement here. Let's flip a coin." You can see that any question that you can answer by flipping a coin is almost certainly not the question you had in mind, because that's not a way to arrive at a good answer.

The reason I mention research is that part of doing research consists of operationalizing. For example, if I want to study people's hostility and the conditions under which it's shown or under which it arises, I can't just study hostility as such. I have to do something of a more concrete sort, and the paradigm of that "something of a more concrete sort" is a five-item hostility scale. And I administer the five-item hostility scale, and that's my operationalization. And I do my experiment, and I report my results in terms of what

I found out about hostility.

And then, as a good critic of research, you look at that, and somewhere along the line you spot what I said, and you say, “Hah. Is an answer to these five items a way to judge how much hostility somebody has?” And you say, “Well, probably not. He’s studying something, but he isn’t studying hostility.” That’s like looking over there because that’s where the light is, instead of looking over here because here’s where you dropped the coin. You can use a five-item scale in a piece of research, but unless it’s an extraordinary one, it’s not a way of studying hostility.

And yet that’s the kind of thing that researchers do constantly, because they have to have something concrete. As I said, you can’t study hostility in the abstract. You’ve got to study it in some more particular form, and unless you pick the right one, you’re just studying something you can study instead of studying something you wanted to study.

The reason it ties in with agreement is that part of the notion of saying “a five-item hostility scale” is that somebody else can use the same scale and repeat your results, and that’s how you get agreement.

Also, a five-item scale is one that different observers will agree as to what the score was. You get another sort of agreement there. And it’s because of the importance of agreement that we pick these measures like five-item scales to use in research, but unless they’re relevant, we’re in the same position as the person who says, “Well, we’ve got to have something of that sort. Let’s flip a coin.”

There’s one more that slips my mind. If I remember it. I’ll mention it.

Anyhow, as I said, all of these ways of doing it wrong are familiar to you. I’m sure you’ve encountered examples of people more or less like that.

Now, this whole notion of negotiation, as I’ve presented it, you can think of as an explication of two kinds of things: (1) the scientific search for truth. When researchers do research and theorize and present data, and then somebody else comes around and says, “But that’s not what the data shows,” that public discussion has the form of a negotiation of this sort. You get positions presented, you criticize and defend them, maybe new facts get introduced with new experiments, and finally you wind up—hopefully—with a conclusion about it. So the social structure of scientific discussion and experimentation is of this sort.

Q. *I think I remember—last time you discussed this, you mentioned in criticizing a ### position—*

P. Oh, that's right. The other one is what we call the debater. The debater is not interested in getting a good decision; he's interested in winning. So what he does, he defends only his position and criticizes only the other position. And so for him it's a contest, not a negotiation. Negotiations aren't contests, and if you treat them that way, you're not doing good negotiating. And that's one I'm sure you're all familiar with.

Okay, now what you do with the other person in negotiation, you can do with yourself by thinking about it. When we were talking about the maxims, and I said *they can be used to check on the correctness of your description*, you can plug it directly into this, where you start with how things seem, and then you on your own introduce another position that says, "Maybe it's not that way. Maybe it's such-and-such instead." And then you go through exactly the same thing. You examine the evidence for and against, does it fit or doesn't it, how do I know, etc.; and you adjust your position if you think of a criticism that you can't meet; and finally you draw a conclusion.

So this public pattern, this social practice pattern for negotiation is, at the same time: (2) the pattern for individual critical thinking. A good many of our more interesting—clinically interesting—psychological phenomena have to do with two or three-person patterns in which the same person is all three. For example, a pattern in which one person criticizes another is a simple, visible, public pattern. When you get the same person in both places (i.e., when a person criticizes himself), then you get some interesting consequences. So you can use social practice patterns to clarify what's going on in somebody's head.

I think we need to go to this topic [Relationship and Status] next.




FIGURE 5

Let's look back at that first unit on the developmental schema, namely, the unit for explaining behavior by reference to circumstances and personal characteristics. That formula is a rigorous one. This one [PC+C → B] is logically tight. However, it's unusable. The reason it's unusable: it depends on all of the characteristics and all of the circumstances, and we never know

what all of a person's characteristics are, and we never know what all of the circumstances are. So, in the rigorous form that would satisfy a critic, we can't use it.

And yet, we go around giving descriptions of people and behavior all the time. So either we're doing something illegitimate here, or there's a different way to do it. The answer is: there's a different way to do it. And the way we do it is by talking about relationships [Fig. 5, p. 120, oval].

Relationships are a different way of packaging the same set of facts, because in one package, you include the person and some of his circumstances; because you're talking about his relation to something-or-other; and that something-or-other will be part of his circumstances. (The important cases, or the usually most important cases, are where you're talking about another person, but it doesn't have to be.) So when you bring in some of the circumstances *and* the person, then you've got a new package: it's a relationship.

Now, consider an actual case of a relation where you have A being a friend of B and then you watch what they do. Some things that they might do would fit the fact that they're friends, other things they might do would not. If you understand friendship, you'll be able to make judgments about whether this behavior fits or whether it doesn't, whether what they're doing expresses friendship—or something else. We also have ways of deciding that somebody *is* a friend of somebody else, partly by observing that kind of behavior. Since we have both of those things, we have ways of deciding that a certain relationship holds, and we have ways of distinguishing behaviors as expressive of that relation or not.

Given that, we can use the relationships that we know how to establish and generate a legitimate expectation about the behavior. And that legitimate expectation is formulated in the Relationship Formula that's in your Outline [pp. 19-23]. The Relationship Formula says that *if A has a given relation to B, his behavior with respect to B will be an expression of it unless—*. Then there's a set of conditions for the exceptions.




FIGURE 6

The reason that there are exceptions, or the reason you allow for exceptions, is: *since you only used up some of the facts, you don't know but what there are other facts that are relevant*. You use these facts to give you a legitimate expectation, but if some of the ones that you didn't know about or ignored are relevant, you may be wrong. So you take account of that fact by having an “unless” clause. The “unless” clauses reflect the different ways that the behavior could fail to occur.

So the first “unless” clause is, “unless the person doesn't recognize the relation for what it is”. For example, if somebody is a threat to me, you would expect me to behave accordingly. But if I don't recognize that that person is a threat, then you wouldn't expect me to behave that way. So one of the possible exceptions is: *I don't recognize the relation for what it is*.

The second exception is: “unless there's some other relation that takes priority”. If he's a threat to me, I will generally avoid him, but if I want to borrow money from him, I will approach him. Depending on which is more important, I may approach him even though he's a threat to me. So one of the possible exceptions is if there's something else in the picture that counts for more, if there's another relationship that takes priority.

The third “unless” clause is simply: “unless he's unable to engage in that behavior.” If I'm unable to engage in any of the behaviors that would express that threat relation, then I won't engage in them. That's one of those cases where the answer to “Why didn't he?” is, “He couldn't.” The “unless” clause is “unless he's unable to at that time and place”.

Q. *Are these mutually exclusive, or do they ###?*

P. You can have them all. Each one simply specifies *a* way in which it may be the case that that behavior doesn't occur. So it may be the case that not only don't you recognize the relation, but you have something else that takes priority, and you couldn't have anyhow.

The fourth one, I think you couldn't also have. The fourth one is back to up here [Fig. 6, p. nnn. K]. The fourth one is: “unless he mistakenly thinks that the behavior he is engaging in *is* an expression of the relation”. I may recognize that he's a threat; and there's nothing that takes precedence; and I know how to do some of those things; and I think that I'm doing something that expresses that relation; but in fact, I'm wrong. In that case, that's another way that I might not be doing something that expresses the relation, and that hinges on the fact that normally, I not only am making some distinctions, I'm also distinguishing my own behavior. So I might be mistaken about that

behavior.

In the other case, we said I might be mistaken about the relation, and that would prevent the behavior. But if I'm mistaken about my behavior, that, too, could prevent my behavior.

So those are the four "unless" clauses, and because you can see that what they do is they tap the parameters of behavior, and both kinds of cognition that are involved in deliberate action, there's not going to be a fifth, sixth, or seventh.

So you add those qualifications. Then, when you use a relationship to say, "Given that relation, I expect the behavior to express that relation..." and then you say, "...*unless* some of these things are so."

It happens that that's a completely general formula. It holds not merely for a person and a non-person, it holds for non-persons. It holds for tables, chairs, bugs, atoms, molecules, anything. So our use of it for people is not an exception to our use of it for anything else.

There's a more complicated Relationship Change formula, and just as the relationship formula corresponds to the first unit [Fig. 1, p. nnn, triangle] in the developmental schema, the Relationship Change formula corresponds to the second unit [T-1, T-2, etc.] because it explains how you can acquire relationships, and generally explains how relationships change by virtue of the interactions that people have.

Let's start with an example. Suppose that you meet somebody that you never met before. At that point you're strangers, and that is the relation between you, namely, strangers. There are certain ways that you treat strangers that are appropriate, and if all you ever do is treat the other person as a stranger, you're going to remain strangers unless by accident.

However, if you start treating that person not as a stranger but, say, as a potential friend or as a potential something, so you don't merely treat him as a stranger. You start doing things that express, for example, either trust or liking. And that behavior is successful. Then your relationship changes in the direction of trust or liking or whatever it was, and if you do enough of that, lo and behold, you do trust that person, you are friends, you do like him.

So the relationship changes in the direction of the behavior which didn't fit the existing relation. Remember, trusting behavior does not fit a relation of stranger, but if you do it and get away with it, the relation will change in the direction of more trust.

Likewise, if you start out with two friends and one of them does something that violates that friendship, that relation is going to start shifting in the direction of mistrust; and if the person does enough of that, lo and behold, after a while, they're not friends any more. Instead, the one mistrusts the other.

So you gain and lose relationships by the nature of the behavior that you engage in that doesn't just straightforwardly fit the relation you have. That's what's formulated in the Relationship Change formula, which is in the Outline [pp. 20-21] so I won't go through it in detail.

But you can see that's what corresponds—if you use a relation to explain the behavior, you can ask, “But how come he has this relation?” and the answer once more will lie in the history of the behavior of those two people.

So the Relationship Formula and the Relationship Change Formula give us ways of describing, predicting, explaining behavior that's an alternative to the Developmental Schema, the units 1 and 2. So we have two ways, now, of doing the same job of explaining behavior and explaining how a person got that way. The difference is that the relationship approach can be used on the basis of the kind of observation we do, and on very limited information. It doesn't take much information, it doesn't take much observation, to draw the conclusion that A is friends with B, or that A doesn't like B, and expect him then to act accordingly. So that approach, since it enables us to have legitimate expectations, reasonable predictions, on the basis of limited data of the kind that we can establish by observation—that is practical, that is usable. And that's what we in fact do use most of the time.

Notice that it doesn't prevent us from doing this kind of thing [PC+C+B] sometimes, and just keeping in mind that we don't know all of the circumstances or all of the person.

Q. *### because you don't know all the relationships, or just that you don't know—*

P. No, that's what the “unless” clauses are about. If A is friends with B, you expect him to act on it unless some other relation takes priority.

That's how you take account of the fact that you don't know all the relationships. It's very similar to that old example in physics: if I apply a force to this cup, we expect the cup to move in the direction of the force. If it doesn't, we say, “Ha, there's something else operating, there's another force on it.” But given that we know this force, we do expect that it's going to move.

And likewise here. Given that you know that A is friends with B, you expect that they'll act accordingly. If they don't, you say, "Ha, something else is in the picture," and I can construct—I can reconstruct what it could have been. And then given that additional relationship, you now have a new expectation, and you can check that. And if it comes out the way you said, you say, "Well, you see, I told you." If it doesn't, like the physicist you say, "Well, there must have been still something else in the picture;" and having observed what did happen, I can now reconstruct what else could be in the picture and give you a new prediction.

And you can go on forever, that way, just like the physicist: if each time the cup moves in a direction he's surprised at, he can reconstruct a force that would account for it; and then when he tries that out next time, if he's still surprised, he can then reconstruct another force—and he can go on forever that way.

Q. *But all he knows is that—he doesn't know why.*

P. No, but he can make up an explanation that fits what he did observe, and then he can check that explanation. If you were always wrong, it wouldn't be useful, but in fact both in physics and in normal human interactions, usually you come up with an answer that works, and then you say, "Well, I guess I now know what was in the picture." The physicist eventually gets it close enough to predict to his satisfaction, and he says, "Well, I guess we now know all of the forces that were operating." But physicists don't in principle have a way of establishing all the forces on a given object, and people don't in principle have a way of establishing all of the relationships that a person has or all of the personal characteristics or all of the circumstances. You work with what you have.

That's why I emphasize that the relationship approach is practical, because it enables you directly to work with what you have, whereas with this one [$PC+C \rightarrow B$] you're always fudging, and you can fudge and get away with it, and it's legitimate in that sense; but in certain respects that's not satisfying if you always have to fudge. So this one turns out to be more useful.

Part of the reason for talking about relationships is that there's a certain set of relationships that are of special importance, because those enable us to deal with emotions. Let me right now hand out—there are two sheets here; take one of each [Emotion Formulas Chart and Unconscious Motivation sheet]. Let's make a fast start on the notion of emotion and see how far we can get.

The first thing we want to do is take a paradigm case of emotional behavior, because we want to start out with a case about which there really isn't any doubt *is it emotional behavior or not?* because we want to be sure when we examine it that we're examining a case of emotional behavior.

The example that I made up and that I outlined in the Outline [p. 22] is the case where a lion walks in the room; and I jump out the window; and you ask me, "Why did you jump out the window?" and I say, "Because I was afraid of the lion." Since you know about lions as well as I do, it's a convincing answer, and you have no doubt, and I have no doubt that that was a piece of emotional behavior, because doing that because I was afraid of the lion *is* emotional behavior. It's a case of acting out of fear.




FIGURE 7

If we take that description of that behavior and start diagramming it, what do we come up with? The first thing we start filling in here is the lion; it's one of the salient aspects of the situation. The lion, the room, the window. We probably need more, but I think you can get the idea that I have to discriminate the various things that were involved jumping out window in my behavior of jumping out the window. So let's stop with the lion, the room, and the window, and maybe just add "inside and outside the room", since I also have to be making that distinction.

What is it that I want there? Or better yet, what's my performance?

Q. *Jumping out the window.*

P. Jumping out the window. Again, that's elliptical, because I also have to run over there and then jump out the window.

What's my achievement? You have several descriptions. I get away from

the lion. I get out of the room. I get out of danger. I reach a place of safety. So there's a number of descriptions here [A]. Now back to over here, what is it I want?

Q. *To escape danger.*

P. One is to escape danger.

Q. *Reduce fear?*

P. No. Had you asked me afterwards *was I afraid?* I'd say, "Hell, no, I was too busy getting away from the lion." Or if you asked me *did I feel afraid?* So I'm not thinking about my fear, I'm thinking of the lion then; so I'm not thinking in terms of reducing my fear. I'm escaping danger, getting away from the lion, getting out of the room—all of those that you have over here [A], assuming that my behavior is successful, those things are things that I want.

Remember, we said that anything that's down here [W] has to be up here [K], and one thing that we have not put here [K] that isn't there is this [he adds 'danger' to the diagram], so we have to add over here.

The more you look at all of this, the more you say, "Hmm, there's something missing here. This doesn't quite jell." So we go back to the drawing board and try it again.




FIGURE 8

Notice, by the way, that this one [KH] you don't try to fill in. Why? Because you don't know what my learning history was that enabled me to jump out the window. You just have the confidence that I did have a relevant learning history, and that my jumping out was not accidental; it was something I knew how to do. So you just note that, but you don't try to fill it in.

Now this [Fig. 7] gets us the concrete circumstances about the lion and the room. This [Fig. 8] gets at the emotional aspects of it. Notice that it might have been the case that I look at that lion, and I yawn and calmly walk out the other door. In that case, you wouldn't be inclined to say I was afraid of the lion. So just having a lion in the room is not enough for me to be afraid.

What's missing? I need to see that lion as dangerous. Unless I see him as dangerous, I'm not afraid and can't be. Seeing him as dangerous motivates me to escape the danger, and that's the motivation for the behavior. Then you can say, "Since it's the lion that I see as the danger, I'm motivated to escape the danger by getting away from the lion"—which I then do. By jumping out the window, I not only get away from the lion. I escape the danger.

So the structure of that emotional behavior is that of a symbolic behavior, where you do one thing by doing another thing. And the outer diamond here is the emotional part. Without it, just the inner one would not be a case of fear behavior. You need the outer one.

But fear behavior doesn't occur in the abstract. There has to be a lion or a something, and so you need the inner one, too.

So the emotional behavior intrinsically requires this kind of structure: the outer one to give you the emotional aspects, the inner one to give you the concrete circumstances.

Okay, let's stop there and pick that up next time. This one is in your Outline [p. 22], and I think there is some explanation along with it.

SESSION 10

July 26, 1976

Peter: Anybody have the right time?

Q. Seven after.

P. We started talking about emotion last time. We want to finish that, talk about self-presentation, and then go into an exercise, a videotape exercise; go through one of the cases in the case book; and then start talking about psychological theories. Let's start where we left off, then.

Recall that what we did was take a case of fear behavior, and we picked one that was guaranteed to be a case of fear behavior. And what we had here was the lion, the room, outside. This is the diagram.




FIGURE 1

I think, that's in your Outline. Either it's this one or they're all combined into one diamond. I'm not sure which is in there.

Now what we want to do with this is ask *what makes it a case of fear behavior?* We know it's a case of fear, but not all of its aspects are essential

to its being fear behavior. One way of approaching it is to ask *what could we remove?* or *what could be different and still have a case of fear behavior?*

Q. *Performance?*

P. Yeah, when you have a case of fear behavior, you don't necessarily jump out windows, so you can wipe this out and still have fear behavior—a fear behavior. Notice you can't wipe this out and have the same fear behavior you started with, but you can wipe this out and have something that is a fear behavior. What else can we wipe out?

Q. *The K, because it doesn't have to be a lion.*

P. Okay, when it's a case of fear, it doesn't have to involve lions or rooms, so we can cross that out.

Q. *Wouldn't that just be an anxiety? In other words, when you fear something, you have to know something about it.*

P. We're not saying there's nothing here. We're just saying that whatever is here doesn't have to be the lion, the room, etc., to be fear.

You can see that if you wipe out the lion, you're going to have to wipe out getting away from the lion here [W], and if you do it here, you're going to have to do it here [A]. So we've wiped out all of the values of the parameter of the inner diamond, and all we have left is Danger up here, and Avoid Danger here, and then Avoid Danger here.

Q. *That 'avoid danger' is the achievement of the second, the larger diamond?*

P. That's right. Okay, what about what's left? Can we remove that [avoid danger] and still have fear?

Q. *Yes. You can talk about pain—avoiding pain ###.*

P. Pain is different from fear.

Q. *You want to avoid the pain, just as if you want to avoid the lion eating you, so you would—*

P. But remember, this says "avoid danger", not just "avoid".

Q. *But you could be fearful of the pain.*

P. Yeah. Then the pain would be the danger, like the lion is the danger here.

Q. *### a case where there really is no true danger, but you perceive that it's danger.*

P. Don't you have a K up there in your behavior, if you perceive a danger? And aren't you afraid if you perceive a danger, whether it's there or not?

Q. *Or free-floating anxiety, can't you just wipe out the occasion completely out of the ### K?*

P. No. You don't wipe out the danger; what happens is that you don't have a definite object here [K]. You don't have anything that you identify as being the danger to you. Ordinarily, that comes about if you're simply in a generally uncertain position; and in a generally uncertain position there, indeed, isn't anything you can localize.

Q. *Did you say that you can have fear behavior without performance?*

P. No, not this performance. You see, wiping these out—these are like deletion operations. We're not saying there's nothing there; we're just saying it doesn't have to be this.

Q. *But do you have to have a performance?*

P. Yeah. You can't have a behavior without some performance.

Q. *A performance could be freezing or something like that?*

P. In that case, you're probably not behaving. You're probably in a panic state.

Q. *And how would you describe that state?*

P. Not with behavior, because either you would simply have a specific behavior description, or that would be one of the times when you're not behaving. When you're in shock, and you're just sitting there trembling, you're not behaving because you're not doing anything that's motivated, you're not trying to get anything you want. You're just sitting there. So that's one of those non-behaving states.

Incidentally, let me digress a minute on that business of panic. You could use the ingredients that we have already gone through to draw the conclusion that a panic state is possible, and you could reconstruct it in this way: you could say, "When does a person go into a panic state?" Number one, when he's in danger; and number two, when he can't do anything about it. Because clearly, if there's danger, and you can do something, you ordinarily do something and that's it—like jumping out the window. Put me in a closed room with a lion, then I might go into a panic state because there's no way out and nothing to do.

Q. *Couldn't you panic and—you could do something, but you can't because you panic.*

P. Yeah, but you don't panic if you can see something to do. You might be mistaken in thinking there's nothing to do, and get panicked, and then not see something that you would otherwise have seen.

Q. *How would you diagram that? Would you delete the K, in that case, because the discrimination wasn't made? Or the distinction wasn't made between what you can do and not being able to do anything?*

P. Yeah, you would not suppose that that distinction is being made.

Come back to the notion that the situation in which you get panicked is where there's a strong danger and nothing you can do about it. That's the combination that would ordinarily give you panic.

In that context, think of Maxim 3, that says, "If you have a reason to do something, you'll do it, unless you have a stronger reason not to." In a condition of a strong danger, you have an overwhelming motivation in that what you have a reason to do is to get away from that danger, to avoid the danger. That motivation will exceed any other motivation you have at that time by a long shot.

If there's nothing you can do to escape the danger, you're in effect caught in a bind where you won't try to act on any other motivation because this one is so predominant. For example, if the lion walked in the room and you were closed in, and you saw a chance to play solitaire because you'd got a pack of cards, you wouldn't think of playing solitaire. You can do other things, but you are so poorly motivated that way, as compared with getting away from the lion, that you're not about to take opportunities to act on any other motivation. But you don't have any opportunities to act on this one. There's nothing you can do to get away from the lion. That combination will leave you with nothing to do. There is no place you can go, and that's why you sit there and don't do anything.

The same will hold for any predominant motivation of that sort. If it's predominant enough, and there is no way of acting on it, then there is no behavior that you have both the proper motivation and the opportunity to engage in—and that's where you go into emotional states and don't do anything.

Q. *What I still don't understand, these diagrams are diagrams ###?*

P. Right, so if you're in an emotional state, you wouldn't do it this way.

You would simply give an ID description saying, “He’s in a panic state,” or “He’s in a blind rage,” or something. You would give a state description.

The discrimination of danger is the essential feature of fear. Without seeing something as dangerous, there’s no way to be afraid. Secondly, there is a connection between these two [Danger and Avoid Danger].

Q. *Wait. I really got lost back there. What were you saying—any predominant behavior plus no motivation to change it?*

P. No. If you have one predominant motivation, like here, and no way of acting on it, you don’t have an opportunity to engage in fear behavior because there’s no way. But also, you’re not going to act on any motivation to do anything else because the fear motivation is so predominant. Therefore you won’t behave at all, because you don’t have any opportunity either way. You have the motivation for fear but no opportunity [to act on it]; you have opportunity for something else but no motivation to act on it; so the combination of that leaves you with nothing to do.

Q. *How would you describe the—doing something, going on in the face of danger? If someone recognizes it was dangerous, also recognizes there isn’t anything they can do about it, ### do something else?*

P. Simply say that the differential in motivation is not that great. When I say “predominance”, I really mean predominance. That’s why I used the trivial example of playing cards. You could do that, but you’d never ###. Motivation doesn’t work that way. If there’s that much of a difference, you’re going to stay with the strong one. Where they’re closer, then you can switch from one to another.

Q. *Then there’d be some secondary motivations that—*

P. Yeah, there would be other motivations which, given the better opportunity to act on them, you would then take.

Appraisal - tautologous
- automatic
Mere Description

The essential ingredient for the general case of fear is the discrimination of danger. Now this discrimination of danger is not merely an observation. It’s not like looking over at that wall and saying it’s cream-colored. So

we need to introduce a distinction, and this is the one that we're using currently. The difference between them is this—here's the definition of an appraisal: An appraisal is a description which carries tautologous motivational significance. Mere description, by contrast, does not carry motivational significance.

And that is the difference between the two. An appraisal is a kind of description that carries motivational significance. A mere description is a mere description and carries no motivational significance.

Q. *What's "tautologous"?*

P. Remember the examples I wrote on the board, of $A + B = B + A$, or $A = A$? A tautology is a logical truth of that sort. I put it on there specifically because it would be in some ways more convenient to say "automatic", but "automatic" leaves room that it's a causal connection, and that would be wrong. So I put the word "tautologous" in there to indicate that the connection is a logical one, not a causal one.

One way of emphasizing that is to say there is no gap between this and this—between the discrimination of danger and this motivation. To see something as dangerous *is* to see it as something to be avoided. It is the same thing, to see it as dangerous is to see it as something to be avoided. So there's no process connecting the discrimination with the motivation. To have *that* kind of discrimination *is* to have *that* kind of motivation.

In effect, it is the general function of concepts like that—namely, appraisals—to guide behavior. If you see the thing as cream or as yellow and hairy, those distinctions give you no basis to act on. If you see that yellow, hairy thing as a lion, that still gives you a basis but you don't have any motivation. As soon as you see the lion as dangerous, you're set to act. So the function of concepts of the appraisal sort is to guide behavior. You might say, socially speaking, that's where our knowledge of how to treat things is codified.

Now, for fear, there is another condition that you can't really diagram, and the condition is that you have a learned tendency to act on that discrimination without thinking, without deliberation. So when I see that lion as dangerous, I have a learned tendency to act on that distinction without stopping to think.

Q. *That's not a behavior—*

P. No, it is. I learned it. That's an expression of my Want, as well as my learning up here. Think not of dramatic examples like a lion, but think of walking in and seeing the chairs and sitting down in one. Ordinary perception works exactly the same way: you had to learn to make these different distinctions. You had to learn to walk.

But when you walk into the room and sit in the chair, you don't have to stop and think. You simply see it, and it is the kind of thing that one sits in, you're already in a situation that makes that appropriate, you simply do it. You don't ever have to think about things like that.

Now, seeing something as dangerous is exactly the same thing. It brings to bear things you've learned. The way it operates now is automatic. So you have this tendency, then, to act automatically.

Note that it's only a tendency. This is not to say that whenever you have emotional behavior, you have impulsive behavior. I can see that lion, and think it over for a few minutes, and then jump out the window, and that's still emotional behavior.

However, I do have that tendency as soon as I see that lion. What that tendency does is to do two things, [Cf. Fig. 1, p. 126, curved arrow]. One, it gets at an important feature of emotional behavior, namely, that impulsive aspect. It's because of that impulsive aspect that emotions present control problems, because they are the kind of thing that one acts on immediately without thinking unless something operates to prevent that.

And as you might well imagine, acting immediately without thinking, in the face of emotional situations, is likely to result in behavior that's not very prudential. That is, it'll get you into trouble, either prudential or ethical or appropriateness. It will get you into trouble in those ways if you simply act on an emotional basis. So that—the impulsive condition—then, is why there is a problem of emotional control.

Secondly, the impulsive condition is what distinguishes specifically fear behavior from related behaviors like being cautious or timid. If I saw that lion and said to myself, "Well, I don't want to stick around here and get scratched up, so I'll get out of here," and then I calmly move out that window—if that's all that happens, you wouldn't be inclined to say I was afraid. You'd say, "Well, this guy is being cautious, he's being business-like, he's being prudential, he's looking after his interests;" but you wouldn't say, "He's afraid." It's the tendency to act without deliberation, then, that distinguishes the emotional behavior from related non-emotional behaviors.

If you look at the combination—that the discrimination goes with the motivation, and the motivation goes with a tendency to automatically perform—you have something that looks an awful lot like a reflex, since once the discrimination is made, the behavior will occur unless—. Because you have a logical link that's tight, and you have a learned tendency that connects this to this—connects performance to motivation. So between the two, once you make the discrimination, that behavior is going to occur unless—. And what's why the control problem.

Q. *Are you saying that this is a reflex or just looks like a reflex?*

P. No. Practically speaking it operates like one, in that once the discrimination is made, the behavior will occur unless—. But something then has to prevent it, or it will occur. The same thing—if somebody taps your knee, unless you're holding your knee straight deliberately, that knee will move when it gets tapped right. Okay, that's what you would get for the general case of fear. That's what it takes to have a fear behavior.

Now we'll make a similar move and say, "Okay, but fear behavior is just one kind of emotional behavior. What does it take to have emotional behavior?" What about this example could we wipe out and still have—not fear, but emotional behavior?

Well, we only have three candidates left as to what we could wipe out, so if we ask *what could be different about this diagram and still have a diagram of emotional behavior?* we start up here [danger], because clearly emotional behavior doesn't have to involve danger. That's what goes with fear. But if it's anger or guilt, shame, joy, or some others, it's not going to be danger, so we wipe that out. Once we do that, we clearly are going to wipe out the motivation to avoid that danger; and once we do that, we're going to wipe out the achievement of avoiding danger; and what do we have left?

Q. *The arrows.*

P. That's right. We have no content, we just have the diagram, and what's left in the diagram is this arrow [K to W] and this arrow [W, KH, P], and just the general notion of symbolic behavior. So we've reached the point of saying, "Okay, emotional behavior as such is a case of making a discrimination and acting on it; and this discrimination is one of the kind that has automatic motivational significance; and you have a learned tendency to act on that discrimination without deliberation." If your behavior fits both conditions, it's emotional behavior. I think it's in your Outline somewhere [pp. 21-23], but let's go through it briefly.

Emotional behavior generally involves making a discrimination that has automatic or tautologous motivational significance, and having a learned tendency to act on that motivation or discrimination without deliberation.

Q. *Would you repeat that first part?*

P. You're making and acting on a discrimination that has a tautologous motivational significance. In fact, you're making an appraisal.

Q. *And the second part?*

P. Is that you have the learned tendency to act on that appraisal without thinking. Just given those conditions, you have a case of emotional behavior.

We then turn around and say, "Okay, what distinguishes one sort of emotional behavior from another one? What distinguishes, say, fear behavior from anger behavior, from guilt behavior, and so on down the line?" Now that we have a general formulation for emotional behavior as such, we can then do what amounts to a parametric analysis and say, "Okay, how does one emotional behavior differ from another? What distinguishes one general kind from another?" The answer is primarily in the discrimination, primarily in the appraisal.

The emotion chart that I passed out—one of the columns says discrimination. That in any emotional behavior, you're making a discrimination of this appraisal sort. In that chart, you get the correspondence, for which emotion you are making which appraisal.

Now we want to look a little closer and see why it is that it's the discrimination that's the key difference between emotions. We come to some interesting conclusions, namely, that emotional behavior has a situational basis. In the case of fear, the situational basis is the danger. More specifically, the basis for emotional behavior is a relationship. You recall, we just got through talking about relationships as something that connects the individual to some aspect or part of his circumstances. Here you have a case in point. In the case of the lion.

The lion is the relevant part of my circumstances, and the notion of danger is the name of the relation that holds between the lion and myself. The relation between the lion and me is that the lion is a danger to me. That's a perfectly straightforward relation, like saying the cup is to the left of the microphone, or the chair is next to the desk. The lion is a danger to me.

Q. *Could you then say that there's always an object of emotion, an object of a person's emotion?*

P. Object in the broad sense of situational, not necessarily an object like the lion.

Q. *Yeah, but that way, it could take the place of the danger.*

P. No, that is the danger.

Q. *But I mean, in a basic diagram of emotional behavior, would you say that—you eliminated the danger aspect. Could you replace it by just saying 'object'?*

P. No. You see, in the original example, we had the particular object [Fig. 1, K], and the discrimination of danger here [K], and we said, "If you're in danger, there's got to be some danger. It's not in the abstract. In that particular case, it's the lion that's the danger. But also, in that particular case, it's the lion that stands in that relation to me. It's the lion that is the danger to me. So you have the specifics of the lion, or the particular danger—if there was a sword hanging over me suspended by a thread, the sword would be the danger to me. So you always do have something of a circumstantial sort that you can say is the danger.

But you also have to distinguish it as dangerous, because in the same circumstance, if I didn't distinguish it as dangerous, I wouldn't be afraid and I wouldn't treat it that way. So you always have—and that's what the structure shows—you have an inner diamond that gives the concrete particulars of what the danger is, or what the provocation is, or what the wrong-doing is, and then the appraisal that it is dangerous, that it is wrong-doing, that it is provoking, etc. And it's the combination that gives you emotional behavior.

Q. *Is appraisal the same thing as discrimination?*

P. No. Appraisal is a specific kind of concept or description, namely, one that carries motivation. But a description like "This is a wooden table" is a mere description. So think of two kinds of description or two kinds of concepts, one that carries motivation and the other doesn't. That's why we need two terms, to indicate that if you say 'appraisal', you're implying a motivational aspect.

I might add that 'appraisal' is a neutral term for what usually gets presented in non-neutral terms, because it's called either 'a value judgment' or 'a subjective judgment'. Both of those imply it's bad, at least in a scientific context. So talking about appraisal is talking about that kind of thing, the thing that generally gets called 'a value judgment' or 'a subjective judgment'.

As soon as you see that the discrimination is a discrimination of

a relationship, you'll also see why it's a subjective judgment or a value judgment, because you're evaluating the situation relative to you. When I see that lion as a danger to me, that's when I'm motivated. If I see that lion as a danger to that mouse, I'm not going to be afraid. So an appraisal essentially is evaluating the circumstances relative to me, and that's why it's subjective, in that it holds for me but not necessarily for anybody else.

On the other hand, any one of you could be spectating and also say, "The lion is a danger to him"—meaning me, and you wouldn't be afraid. So the emotional behavior stems from evaluating your circumstances relative to you; and since it is relative to you, it's relative to you then and there; and what's dangerous to me here and now needn't be dangerous to me later on or in the past. It needn't be dangerous to me somewhere else. It needn't be dangerous to anybody else.

So these judgments specifically tie a person to his circumstances at a given time and place, and that's why you will not find generalization. That's why, indeed, they do not hold across people. You would expect people to disagree in what they said was dangerous to him, because different things would be dangerous to different people.

So remember those terms: 'subjective judgment', 'value judgment', and 'appraisal'. Recall how they're based on the fact that emotional behavior is behavior toward something in your circumstances that you evaluate relative to you.

Q. *What would you call the incidents where someone is viewing another person's danger, like in the lion situation I'm watching you, and I perceive that it's a danger to you?*

Hedonic
Prudential
Ethical
Esthetic

P. Let me digress a minute [Blackboard]. What I said about appraisal holds for each of these notions [HPEE]. These are our general appraisal terms, and they work exactly like the notion of danger. I said, "To see something as dangerous is to see it as something to be avoided." Well, to see a behavior as pleasurable is to see it as something to be done. To see it as unpleasant is to

see it as a behavior not to be done. To see a behavior as in your self-interest is to see it as something to be done. To see it as being against your self-interest is to see it as something not to be done, and so on.

And in fact, the fear motivation of danger is simply a special case of prudential motivation. When you're in danger, it's your self-interest that's at stake, it's your well-being. So this kind of emotional motivation is simply a special case of using this principle [prudence] for choosing behaviors. And all of these work with that logical behavior, that to see behaviors in these ways is to have reasons for and against doing them, is to be motivated pro and con.

Now, in the case where you see me in danger from the lion, in respect to that danger, you're not involved, so you give that as a mere description: "He is in danger from the lion." However, seeing me in danger might give you ethical reasons to try to help me, and those you would not be a mere spectator on; that would be an appraisal for you.

Q. *If you're afraid for someone—you see a baby who's in the street, and you see a truck coming at it, and you aren't really in danger yourself, but you'll want to try and go out and get it even—I have a little bit of trouble just an ethical description to that, especially if it's your child. There's more than ethical.*

P. You have three things, at least. You have the empathy with the child who is in danger. You also are afraid of what might happen to the child. And you have any number of these at work motivating you to save the child. It isn't just ethical, it's also esthetic. If it's your child—

Q. *Is that then an emotion?*

P. No. But—and we'll get to this—it's a fact involving an emotional concept, namely, you're empathizing with the child's fear. So—

Q. *It's not necessary that the child's afraid.*

P. Then there's no empathy. Then you're merely afraid of what's going to happen, or what might happen, to the child. And having that happen to the child is also a danger to you.

Q. *Because the child is ###.*

P. In contrast, somebody you don't know, it wouldn't be a danger to you but you'd still maybe have esthetic or ethical motivation.

Q. *So danger doesn't have to be directly physical. It could be a—psychic—*

P. Yeah, most dangers that affect us are not physical, in the sense that physical dangers we have fairly well in hand, and we don't usually have to worry about them. If you get a strange illness or cancer or something like that, then you have danger. But if you think of just your ordinary round of daily life, the avoidance of dangers is built into the set of social practices and customs that we engage in. We simply—they do not expose us to danger, by and large.

The dangers that they do expose us to are the emotional, the interpersonal: where do I stand? where do I fit? There, it's much more up for grabs who's in danger and who's not and what the danger is.

So, indeed, the emotional conflicts that we encounter, having to do with danger, are almost never physical dangers. They're things like the danger of losing your job, the danger of splitting up with somebody that you care for, the danger that somebody doesn't think as well of you as you would like—there's all kinds of possibilities of that sort.

I don't want to present this merely as a dangler. I did intend to present it, but it seemed like a good time to. The way that these [HPEE] work to select behavior is the way that I described for appraisal. That is the function of these, and that's how we derive them. We said, "How does a person choose one behavior over another?" and the answer was, "These ways." What we didn't say then is that *the way these things work is like the way that danger works, namely, with a logical connection to motivation.*

If you look at your chart [p. 536], the top three lines are what you might call the Big Three in emotions, and that's anger, fear, and guilt. If I set you the task of writing down a list of emotions, the odds are very high that in whatever order they appeared, anger, fear, and guilt would be your top three.

You can check this out just by asking any of your friends, "Give me five emotions," and see if out of those five you don't invariably get anger, fear, and guilt. Anger, fear, and guilt also loom large in psychoanalytic theory. You look at psychoanalytic explanations of psychopathology and conflict, probably 100% of those explanations involve anger, fear, or guilt, or some combination.

Let's go through briefly what goes through those two. We've been through with emotion, you have the discrimination of danger and the motivation to escape. You notice, in your chart, you have column indicating (1) which emotion it is, (2) what discrimination is acted on, (3) what relation is discriminated, (4) what kind of behavior is motivated. And those

are tied together the way they were in the diagram: if you see danger, you're motivated to escape.

What's the corresponding thing for anger? Anger is the emotion, provocation is the discrimination. Provocation is also the relation. When I'm angry at somebody, it's because that person has provoked me, and 'provoke' is the relation between him and me.

Notice, by the way, that these relationships are one-directional. If he provokes me, there's no implication that I provoke him. If he's a danger to me, there's no implication that I'm a danger to him. So these are the kind of relation that are one-directional, not two-directional. By that I don't mean that it couldn't work both ways. It's that if I, in turn, am a danger to him, that's a totally independent fact. It in no way follows from his being a danger to me.

Q. *Does that relationship here have any diagrammatical place in that—*

P. No. That's simply what is discriminated. That relation is what is discriminated. That's why, if you'll notice, the two columns—the items that appear under Discrimination are exactly the same as the items that appear in the column Relationship: because it's the relation that you discriminate.

So, in anger, there is a general kind of discrimination, there is that kind of relation, namely, provocation. There is a general kind of behavior that's motivated, and it's the kind that we call 'hostile' or something of that sort.

In guilt, the discrimination is wrong-doing, and there's two kinds, or two cases, because you can discriminate wrong-doing before the fact and after the fact. If it's before the fact, then you're motivated not to do it. If you see a certain behavior as a case of wrong-doing, then you're motivated not to do it, so it's another avoidance one.

If it's after the fact, the same discrimination—namely, wrong-doing—the interesting thing is that in wrong-doing, you're on the opposite end of the relation. You are doing wrong to somebody. In the other two, somebody is a danger to me, somebody provokes me. In wrong-doing I am wrong-doing to somebody.

Now, if somebody's wrong-doing to me, that would normally be a provocation. So guilt comes from my doing wrong to someone else. If I discriminate that, then I'm motivated either to avoid if it's before the fact; or after the fact, the motivated behavior is penance or restitution.

Q. *So the wrong-doing before the fact is more or less I feel guilty about*

having thought of—

P. No, you don't feel guilty. If I think of doing something that strikes me as a bright idea, and I'm sitting here enjoying the prospect, and all of a sudden it hits me that by God, that would involve breaking a promise, then I shrug and say, "Well, I guess not." I don't feel guilty. It's if I actually do it and then I see it as wrong, then I feel guilty.

Q. *So your Guilt one is not what we would commonly call guilt.*

P. It's not guilt feelings.

But notice that there's a separate column for Feelings. The reason is this: that in the face of provocation, and in the course of engaging in hostile behavior, or in the face of danger and in the course of engaging in fear behavior, you do have experiences. And we can say of those experiences that generally, they have a certain qualitative difference, so that it feels different to act angry and be angry than it does to act afraid and be afraid. Both of those feel different than acting guilty or being guilty.

So the feeling is the experiential aspect, which is something quite different from the motivation, the relation, the discrimination, etc. It's simply another aspect of the situation, is that you do have experiences, and we point to those experiences by talking about the feeling of fear, the feeling of anxiety, the feeling of guilt.

The feeling is the aspect that has gotten overdone, I think, in that it's the one aspect that's not essential. Nor does it have the kind of unity that you kind of take for granted when you talk about 'the feeling of fear' or 'the feeling of guilt or anger'.

To satisfy yourselves on this, just think of the last three times that you were angry and then ask yourself *was your experience the same on each of those occasions?* And the answer will almost certainly be *No*. It feels different to be irritable and respond irritably, as against when you're resenting something that somebody said and you're feeling resentful, as against when somebody really puts it to you and you fly into a rage. Those are simply not similar experiences, and they're quite different and distinguishable. They're all anger.

So you can remind yourself of that with a slogan. The slogan is: *the feeling of anger is whatever feeling I have when I am angry*. And the reminder is that *it's not the feeling that makes it anger*. If it is anger, then since you have feelings, whatever feelings you have are the feelings of anger.

And that's like saying, "The experience of crossing the street is whatever experience I have when I do cross the street." It isn't the experience that makes it a case of crossing the street, but since it is whatever experience I have, then is the experience of crossing the street.

So it's not to deny that we have emotional experiences or feelings. It's to deny that they are what make the emotion, emotion, any more than the experience that I have of crossing the street is what makes my behavior a case of crossing the street. To put it differently, if there were no behavior of crossing the street, there couldn't be any experience of crossing the street. If there were no behavior that was fear behavior, there couldn't be an experience of fear.

So again, there's no way of denying we have experiences, but they are not what make emotion emotional. They are simply one of the aspects, and they have a lot less unity than you might suppose. And you can just check that by referring to your own experiences.

Now if you look down at the chart [p. 536], you'll see that those are more or less well worked out, and if you really set out to do it, you could probably refine the distinctions, the discriminations, come up with words that really got at it a little closer, but those are good approximations.

You also are faced with the fact that there are borderline cases. If I set you the task of writing down a list of all of the emotions, probably the first five or six on that list would appear on everybody's list, but beyond that, two things: (1) the later ones would begin not appearing on somebody's list, and also, for any one of you, after about 10 or 12, you'd have a hard time. You'd have a hard time mentioning more than 10 or 12 items that are different emotions. By the time you go through anger, fear, guilt, and then joy, and then sadness, and then despair, and then jealousy, envy, shame—even with shame, you see, you start backing off and saying, "I'm not sure that is an emotion. It's a lot like it, but somehow it doesn't seem quite the same simple, clear-cut case as anger."

Q. *### you might blush, and ###.*

P. Well, on second blush you might.

But that's the point, you see, that there are a number of phenomena that are like emotions, they are enough like them so that if you wanted to say they were, nobody could show you were wrong; but if you wanted to say they weren't, nobody could really show you were wrong, either; because they have enough in common, but enough not in common; and probably shame

is one of those. Greed is another. Ambition is another.

Q. *Don't greed and ambition fall under attitude more than under emotion?*

P. You can talk about attitude, but mostly people would call those motives. You say, "He did it out of greed, he did it out of ambition," and those are motives. And indeed, 'motives' is a more general pattern than emotion, but it has a lot in common. You might say *an emotional pattern is a motive pattern with some special features, one of which is this impulsiveness*.

And that's why you can have borderline cases of motive patterns that are very much like emotions, but not quite. Because what you're dealing with is a domain of motives within which there's a special set of ones that are emotions, and there's no clear, sharp, definite dividing line. You can have things that are like emotions in some ways but unlike in others.

Now, think of the difference between being stumped after about 12 items on a list of emotions, and the large, large number of possible relations that you can have with relevant parts of your circumstances. We get at some of these because, by subdividing, under every one of those general emotional categories, you will have a number of different specifics that we distinguish.

For example, under anger, we distinguish irritable, annoyed, angry, hostile, enraged, full of hatred—we have a whole set of terms partly for distinguishing intensity but partly for distinguishing qualitatively different sorts of anger notions, different kinds of provocations. But even so, our terminology lags by far the specifics, the specificity of possible actual relations that fit under these general headings.

So again, like with our ID notions, you take these emotional terms as sort of ways of lumping things together that we can distinguish more finely, but it would be very unhandy to have to have a name for every single one. We get by with these general names. But basically, it's the relation, and there's a lot more relations that we can discriminate than we have emotional terms for.

Q. *How exactly do you discriminate between emotions and those similar patterns that aren't emotions?*

P. It depends on what the similar pattern is. Mainly, for borderline cases, the impulsivity is one of the main distinctions between specifically emotional and just motive patterns.

Q. *So a particular person could be, could train himself through some peculiar pattern, and that really isn't emotion.*

P. For example, take the example of somebody who's ambitious. Remember, we said that somebody who was ambitious might get into troubles because of his ambition. You think of ambition as falling somewhere here as a principle for choosing behavior, and then think of a very ambitious person as one for whom it is impulsive. He automatically chooses that behavior that fits his ambitions without stopping to think. You might say, for him it operates like an emotion, but for most people it doesn't, and that's why we wouldn't generally call it an emotion. But for him it might as well be, because for him, it is that automatic.

As I said, once you get into it, it's easy to see why you can have borderline cases. There's several different ways of having borderline cases; and we have conventions for which we call emotions and which we simply call motives. Those are reasonable conventions, and I wouldn't want to say the distinction is arbitrary; but it's hard to draw the line, and there will be borderline cases.

Q. *It seems as though ambition in the one case might be a case of emotionally motivated or ### behavior, where the emotion involved is not necessarily ambition, but maybe something on a less conscious level, in other words, some insecurity or fear or something.*

P. Yeah. You can have behavior that consists of acting out of fear, and performatively it looks like ambition and maybe is; and you would say basically, though, it's fear behavior because he's satisfying the one motivation by satisfying the other. In a way, that has nothing to do with whether it's conscious or unconscious.

Connect that back to that relationship formula. Recall, we said the relationship formula is a universal formula—it holds for everything, not merely people. It provides a general framework for explaining behavior.

Now what we see is that emotional behavior is simply a special case of having certain kinds of relationship with things in your environment. But basically, it has the same logic, it fits the relationship formula. Since it does, you can say, if a person has an emotional relationship, he'll act on it unless—. And indeed, that's what the relationship formula says in general: If a person has a given relationship, he'll act on it unless—.

Q. *Are you saying that emotion is just a special case of relationships in*

general?

P. Yeah, emotional behavior.

One last move with emotions. Recall when we were talking about personal characteristics, we introduced the notion of a life history, we talked about a type of behavior and a pattern of occurrence, and from that generated notions of several dispositions; several powers; and states and statuses. For any distinguishable type of behavior, you can generate a corresponding state, attitude, interest, ability, knowledge, value, state. This holds for any behavior; therefore, it also holds for emotional behavior.

So if we can distinguish, say, fearful behavior, we can immediately—using those kinds of connections—generate the notion of a trait of fearfulness; an attitude of fear toward something; a preoccupation or interest in a fearful object; a fearful style—a timid style; knowledge of danger or fear; motivational priority that gives a high priority or a low priority for fear behavior; the ability to distinguish fear; to control fear behavior; and the state of fear.

You can generate all of those emotional concepts using the standard personal characteristics of type of behavior and pattern of occurrence. That's why it makes sense to use the same word, because, indeed, all of these things are tied together by that kind of connection, that as soon as you have that type of behavior, there is a corresponding trait, attitude, interest, value, knowledge, ability, and so forth.

So with emotional terms, we use them across this whole range. We don't use emotional terms just for emotional behaviors. We also use them for traits, for attitudes, for states, for abilities, and so forth.

The main thing is that since we use the emotion term across this whole range, and the range includes logically different kinds of things, there is no one thing you can say about emotion. There are no general principles, because you either are talking about emotional behavior, and there, there are principles, but they don't hold for emotional states, etc.; or you're talking about emotional states, and there, there are principles but they don't hold for emotional traits or emotional behavior. So unless you're clear about which you're talking about, you're not going to find any universals, you're not going to find any regularities, because it's a heterogeneous set of things.

This is one of the reasons why emotion has been very difficult for people to study and come up with any generalizations, because they've lumped together all of the emotional phenomena under the heading of Emotion and then looked for regularities and haven't found them. And that's why.

Keep in mind that problem and understand it that way—that you’re dealing with logically different things, therefore, there’s no reason to expect that there would be anything common across these. So you have to separate out, are you talking emotional behavior or is it emotional states, or what? Then you can hope to find regularities.

Now let’s make a move from relations to status. A relationship is a way of connecting a person to something in his circumstances. A status assignment is a way of placing a person in his circumstances, and implying a whole lot of relationships without mentioning them. A status assignment is a way of placing a person in his circumstances, thereby implying a lot of relationships without having to mention them all.




FIGURE 2

That’s a crucial technical convenience. Imagine, for example, here I am, and I’ve got a relationship to every single thing in the room. I’ve got a relation to the cup. I’ve got a relation to that chair and that one and that one and that one. I’ve got a relation to the clock, the TV, this light, that light, that light, her, him, him, the briefcase, etc. Every single thing in this room, I have a distinct relationship with.

Also, every single thing in this room has a set of relations to all the other things in the room. If you had to talk about the room in those ways, you’d never get finished. Instead, we have a very different way of doing it, namely, imagine a map of the room with everything placed somewhere. The place of each thing in the room automatically carries with it the implications about the relations to everything else. So instead of specifying my relation to everything else in the room, once you have a map, you say, “He’s standing in front of the blackboard.” If you’ve got the other things in the room placed where they are, saying, “He’s standing in front of the blackboard,” immediately implies all of the other relations, and you don’t have to go through a list of a thousand relationships.

That's normally how we operate with things. Occasionally, we pick out a relationship, but also, to a large extent, we look at a domain and where a person is in it. Where a person is in it gives us his possibilities for behaving.

Standing right here, I can grab the cup and take a drink. If I were standing over there, I couldn't. I would have to walk here first. So what I can do with the things around me depends on where I am in relation to them.

We can extend this notion of relationship from this simple geometric one that we've dealt with in the room, to all of the kinds of relationships there are, like *being friends*, like *being a threat to*, *being in danger from*, *being provoked with*, etc. Then we can talk about where a person stands in relation to the world around him, and it will not just be a set of geometrical ones, it will be a set of also personal relations. That whole set of personal relations gives us his potential for behaving.

We have, as usual, crude language for doing this, for placing a person, and this is known as 'status assigning'. In a status assignment, you place a person and you treat him accordingly. This notion of placing people and treating them accordingly gets us into—I think—our last topic, which is self-presentation, what's involved in self-presentation.

In talking about personal characteristics, personality characteristics, we said that one of the values of having that kind of description of a person is that you then have a guide as to how it's appropriate to treat him and what you can expect from him, and maybe how it's effective to treat him.

Q. When you say you "treat somebody accordingly to their status assignment", that's essentially you treat them according to the ### relationships that that—

P. Yeah. I can assign somebody the status of *my friend*, and then I'll treat him like a friend. Or I can assign him the status of *a danger to me* and treat him accordingly. My being able to do this reflects the fact that facts don't force me to see them. He may be a threat to me or not. Either way, I can put him in the place of being a threat to me. He may be my friend or not; either way, I can treat him as a friend and think of him in that way.

Q. So it all depends on how you interpret the facts, not how the facts are.

P. You run a problem there. Who's to say what the facts are that I'm interpreting? Talking about status assignment is a way of not generating that problem, not generating the problem of who's to say how things really are, that all of us are merely interpreting.

Back to what the value of a personal characteristic description is, is that you then have guidelines how to treat a person, how it's effective to, what's appropriate.

Given that it usually takes a certain amount of observation of behavior before you're competent in that kind of description—and you remember why: because it depends on that life history, and you don't usually make that kind of judgment on the basis of one behavior; it usually takes you a while—you have to observe a number of choices in a number of situations before you have competence in your ID characteristics.

Now we have a problem which has become much more salient in recent years than it ever was before, namely, how do you deal with somebody who's essentially a stranger to you? Because you've never met him before, and yet you've got to have some kind of interaction with him. You can't just treat him like a stranger. In a complex, mobile society like ours, you're constantly having to deal with people you don't know, and yet you can't just be stand-offish. You've got business, you've got some other thing going, and you're missing this traditional basis for how you treat him, namely, knowledge about that person.

What has evolved—not so much 'evolved'; it's been there all the time but has assumed more and more importance these days—is self-presentation. The person, in effect, tells you what kind of person he is, and how he wants to be treated, and is offering to treat you accordingly. That is a device that enables interactions to get off from a standing start. You don't have to have, then, a history of acquaintance with the person in order to deal with him.

Status assignments and self-presentations work in two directions. I can present you myself, a certain kind of person, and if you watch conversations between people who have just met each other, you'll see a lot of this going on. One way or another, what I say to you implies "I'm this kind of person." In presenting myself to you as this kind of person, I'm doing two kinds of things. One, I'm inviting you to treat me accordingly, to treat me as that kind of person. And two, I'm promising you to act accordingly, namely, to act like that kind of person.

So it's like offering you a contract. "I'll be this way if you treat me accordingly." As with all contracts, it doesn't have to be accepted. I may present myself to you with this implied invitation, and you say, "No, you're *this* way," and then you're doing the same thing. Or, in contrast with my presenting you myself in a certain way, I may put you in a given position, with the im-

plied promise of treating you accordingly if you'll act that way.

For example. I may start treating you very deferentially and respectfully as though you were a great authority. In that way, I'm inviting you to act that way and, in effect, promising to treat you that way if you act that way. So you can put either yourself or the other person or both in a given position to set up the basis for an interaction.

So with first meetings, this is one of the most important things that goes on, is setting the stage, going through self-presentations, locating the other person in your world, locating yourself in the other person's world, so that you can then get on with relating and interacting. In this sense, it's very much like the negotiation of differences. There's a lot of things that can't go on until you've got each other placed at least that well.

The first exercise that we'll go through—I think, tomorrow—will involve a videotaping in which you'll see this kind of thing going on, where you have two people who have just met, and you'll see interactions going on that would be hard to understand if you didn't understand how self-presentations and this kind of negotiation go. Because they are not simply engaged in social practices.

Okay. I think it's time to quit. We'll just carry on next time.

SESSION 11

July 27, 1976

Peter: Last time, we continued talking about emotions. We went from the example of fear to the general example of emotional behavior, had a specification in general about emotional behavior, came back and reviewed the fact that the differences among different emotions stem primarily from the discrimination; followed that up by saying that the discrimination is the discrimination of a relationship which exists between you and something in your circumstances; and that because of this, that relation is peculiar to you—generally speaking. It would be different for other people at other times and places, and different for you at other times and places or circumstances, so it's not the kind of thing that would be the same across people and across time. We went from that to the notion of self-presentation, made the point that self-presentations enable us to short-cut the process of getting acquainted with another person long enough to know how to treat him appropriately, effectively, etc.

I guess one of the things I didn't mention is that since it is a short-cut, it is even less foolproof than the normal process of getting acquainted, which itself is not foolproof. And particularly, self-presentations can be deceptive. Somebody may in effect promise you something that he's not prepared to follow through on. That's one of the things to look out for in self-presentations. Okay, any questions about that material?

Let's make another connection, then. Think of that relationship that's involved, say, in hostility, where you have somebody provoking somebody. What we did was develop that that generates the motivation, and given the learned tendency, once that condition holds, you can expect that behavior to take place unless—. The place to move from there is to see that hostile behavior—engaging in hostile behavior—is a participation in an intrinsic social practice, and we more or less codify that by having special emotion formulas.

Provocation	Hostility
unless--	
a. doesn't perceive	
b. stronger reason	
c. unable to act	
d. mistakenly thinks he is	

FIGURE 1

The emotion formulas have the same structure as the relationship formula, since they are special cases of it. The unless clauses are the same as in the relationship formula, namely, unless the person doesn't perceive the provocation for what it is; unless he has some stronger reason not to show hostility; unless he's unable to act in a hostile manner; and unless he mistakenly thinks that he is acting in a hostile manner. So the unless clauses are entirely parallel.

Take the main clause rather than the unless clauses: this is a shorthand description of an intrinsic social practice. And you might think of it on the model of a two-move game, where this [provocation] is Move 1, and this [hostility] is Move 2, and that's all it takes. It's only a two-move game.

Remember the definition of an intrinsic social practice is: one that can be understood as being engaged in without a further end in view.

Q. *How do you know there's no further end in view?*

P. That's a separate question. The decision on a particular occasion that there's no ulterior motivation is up to the observer.

But remember Maxim 1. Since an intrinsic practice is a candidate for there being all there is, unless you have some particular reason to think that there isn't, you take it there isn't because that's what it looks like.

Q. *But there's no reason that it has to be an intrinsic social practice. It could be something else.*

P. No. Remember, the definition is that it *could* be understood, not that on any given occasion it is being done without ulterior motivation. Remember, I said, about chess, that sure you can play chess with ulterior motives, but it's an intrinsic social practice because it *can* be understood as being done with no ulterior motive, and that's what raises the question on a particular case—is there or isn't there ulterior motivation?

Q. *Intrinsic practice only means that it can be, it doesn't have to be.*

P. That's right.

Q. *I'm wondering—in most games-type books on human behavior, such as Berne, there's always ulterior motive. That's the whole point to playing the game.*

P. No. There's no ulterior motive for the game. The game is the ulterior motive for the choice of options in normal interactive social practices. If somebody sits around playing "wooden leg" or "yes, but", they're engaging in ordinary social practices of question and answer, and advice-giving, and so on. But their choice of options within those practices constitute playing a separate game which Berne has identified. For *that* game, there is intrinsic motivation.

Q. *Can you work it backward, so from a person being hostile, he can't but be provoked ###?*

P. Yeah. If you see hostility, you automatically look for a provocation, because somebody who is hostile must have seen some provocation. It doesn't follow that if he saw provocation, there was provocation there. So one of your options, if you see somebody showing hostility and you can't see any provocation, is maybe he saw it when it wasn't there. On the other hand, you'd better look carefully before you reach that conclusion.

Now, you can use the ulterior motivation test to check are these intrinsic social practices? Just ask yourself: *if you saw somebody being insulted and responding with hostility, would you inevitably ask, "Yeah, but why did he really show hostility?"* For is the insult enough to make it intelligible that the person would respond in a hostile way?




FIGURE 2

Well, it is, because if you recall [Fig. 2], this is a logical connection. To see something as provoking *is* to be motivated to be hostile. Since it's a logical connection, to behave with hostility in the face of provocation is necessarily intelligible without anything else in the picture. Because of that connection, any emotional behavior is going to have that feature, that you

can understand acting in this way in those circumstances without there having to be any other, ulterior motive in the picture.

Q. *You're saying it's a natural, causal relation for that to happen?*

P. No. I was very careful to deny that it's a causal relation at all. I said it's a logical relation; that's why the definition of appraisal says 'tautologous motivational significance', to indicate it's a logical and not a causal relation. In a causal relation, there would be a gap between here [provocation] and here [hostility]. There is no gap. There is no time gap. To see it this way *is* to be motivated. It's not that you first see it that way and then you're motivated.

Q. *It's logical for somebody to act with hostility if provoked?*

P. I wouldn't say it that way. People have all kinds of qualms about what they call "logical". What I'm saying is that there's a logical connection between discriminating provocation and being motivated to behave in a hostile way. Because it's a logical connection, it's understandable that a person would behave with hostility in the face of provocation, and you don't need some other motivation of an ulterior sort to explain it.

Q. *Okay, but you're not saying anything about its rightness or wrongness.*

P. No.

Q. *You're just saying that it is logical that that would happen?*

P. Well. I didn't say 'logical'. I said 'understandable'. Without ulterior motivation. If you said 'rational', I'd agree with you.

Q. *Why wouldn't 'logical' fit?*

P. 'Logical'—you hesitate to talk logic when you're talking about emotional behavior, because nobody's doing logic there. But somebody who behaves in a hostile way in the face of provocation is being rational.

Q. *But you said it was a 'logical' connection.*

P. Yeah, it's a logical connection.

Q. *I'm not quite clear on the logic of it. Could it be logical to expect someone to respond that way?*

P. No. Again. I worry—that's a good, ordinary way of talking—but I worry about the word 'logical'. You can say it's 'reasonable' to expect—

Q. *Okay, then where does this become a logical connection?*

P. The connection is logical. Because the connection is logical, it's

reasonable to expect that under these conditions, you'll behave that way.

Q. *Why is the connection logical?*

P. It just is. That's the kind of connection that *is* logical. Nothing makes it logical. You might say we selected a logical connection. Why is a deduction logical? It just is. That's the kind of thing we call 'logical'.

Q. *Because we're making a deduction?*

P. Yeah, or if you say, "Red is a color", that's a matter of definition. And you say, "Why is it logical?" Because a definition *is* a logical thing. Here, this [provocation elicits hostility] is more like a definition. That's why I keep putting it in the form of a definition, that to see things this way *is* to be motivated this way, that there's not a connection between the two, there's an identity. Since there's an identity, you don't need something extra to understand somebody acting on this motivation given this situation. This doesn't mean there couldn't be anything else. It just means that you don't have to have it, it's entirely understandable without anything else in the picture.

Q. *If you're saying there's an identity between the two, is that the same thing as saying they're one and the same?*

P. Remember about that complex fact that divides into different simpler facts. You have one complex fact that you can analyze into this fact of this kind of discrimination, but also this fact of this kind of motivation.

Q. *What motivates the provocation?*

P. Nothing, necessarily. The provocation may be entirely unintended. The provocation may be somebody else's achievement, and they never meant that to be a provocation. Somebody may insult you unintentionally, for example.

Q. *What if it's intentional?*

P. Then they have a relation to you in which this behavior is an expression of it. Why would somebody want to do you in? Well, there's a lot of relations that somebody might have to you that would lead them to act that way. For example, if you're a threat to them, they try to do you in. You see them trying to do you in, you get angry at that. Why wouldn't you?

Q. *Then the hostility would have an ulterior motivation, too.*

P. No—provocation. Somebody trying to do you in is a provocation, so for whatever reason they're trying to do you in, if they do that, you can get provoked and respond with hostility.

Q. *But you could also have a hostile relationship with someone would need to be based on prior provocation?*

P. No. Sometimes etymology helps, and in this case it might. ‘Hostility’ is based on the word ‘hostis’ which means ‘enemy’. If you have that kind of relation with somebody, that you’re their enemy—and you can water that down to, “If you have a genuine conflict of interest with somebody”—what’s in your interest is against theirs and so there’s a conflict. When you pursue your interests, you’re going to be injuring that other person, and that will be a provocation. So you don’t have an infinite regress of prior provocations. You can start with just this kind of thing. And that would be a case of intentionally doing him in.

Q. *So a hostile relationship wouldn’t necessarily—does a hostile relationship require provocation?*

P. No. You might say, if you start—imagine starting out being enemies with somebody just because of the nature of the circumstances. Then as soon as you start acting on that relation, you’ve got either a hostile action or a provocation.

Q. *I could have a relationship without having necessarily—*

P. Any behavior, right.

Q. *What exactly, there, is intrinsic?*

P. Nothing is intrinsic. It’s the practice that’s intrinsic. It’s an intrinsic practice, and all that means is given by that definition. It’s a practice that can be understood as being engaged in without any ulterior motive.

As I say, think of it as a two-move game. If somebody sees danger and tries to avoid it, do you really need an ulterior motive to explain why he’s trying to escape the danger? No. You just need to see that he sees danger, and that does explain why he tries to escape. So, in general, because of this logical connection that’s implied by the notion of appraisal, any emotional behavior will be a participation in an intrinsic social practice.

If you recall what I said about the importance of intrinsic social practices, it’s that they are the anchor for explanations of behavior, since they are the only candidates we have for the complete story, the only candidates we have for ‘that’s all there is’.

Now, given that emotional behavior is a participation in an intrinsic practice, then it will follow that emotional explanations are candidates for ‘that’s all there is’. And it’s because of this that so much of the explanations

that we have about psychopathology and about why people do what they do are emotional explanations. It's not because there's something peculiar about emotions; it's because emotions have the right logical structure for being final explanations.

Q. *What did you say that intrinsic social practices were candidates for?*

P. For understanding or explaining behavior. Until you reach the point of giving an intrinsic social practice description, you know there's something you left out. You know there's something you haven't yet understood about it. In contrast, as soon as you reach one of those, then that may be all there is to it.

Q. *Might there not be some underlying thing behind emotion that's causing that emotion, so that that isn't all there is?*

P. No. What could possibly fill that slot?

Q. *If, like, the emotion you describe may not be the real one?*

Q. *The explanation of why they had the emotion in the first place could be ###.*

P. Yeah, but again, you're simply going back to the issue that you have no guarantee of being right; that you can give an emotional explanation and be wrong; and you can have a person who's acting out of fear; and to you it looks like he's acting out of anger and so you give a provocation-hostility; and all the time what's going on is fear. But it isn't as though, then, the fear underlies the anger. It's that you were wrong about the anger.

And if you've got both fear and anger, they can stand in a number of different relations to one another; and there's nothing to keep a person from being both fearful and angry at the same time and acting on it. But then you wouldn't want to say, just on that basis, that one of those 'underlies' the other, or that it causes it, or anything like that. You simply say there's two emotions being ###.

We'll see some peculiar combinations of that sort when we do the case-history in the book. As a matter of fact, now that I think of it, read in your case book the case of Veronica. The subtitle is, "The Invisible Net". That's one that will give us a lot of chance to exercise giving emotional descriptions that tie into each other in a number of ways.

Any further questions about what's involved in saying that *to engage in emotional behavior is to participate in an intrinsic social practice*? Just by way of exercise, you might try writing about a half-page explanation of that.

Q. *The reason we can view it as having a ‘without further end’ is because the relationship between Know and Motivation is a direct and not a thinking—*

P. No, not between K and Motivation in general, but when you have an appraisal, then the discrimination and the motivation are logically tied. But only when you have an appraisal. If you have a mere description, there is no such tie. Then the only tie is that whatever you’re motivated to get, you also distinguish.

Q. *Do emotional behaviors fit the paradigm of choice-behavior ###?*

P. Yeah, it fits this one [Fig. 3, next page]. The circumstance—the relation that you discriminate over here in this diagram—is simply one of the relevant circumstances that gives you a particular kind of reason for behaving. And that reason will be in competition with other reasons that you have. And so you have a choice of options that depend on which of these reasons or combination carries more weight with you.




FIGURE 3

Q. *Can emotion be a case of ethical or prudential or—*

P. Yeah. One of the—emotions don’t always fall neatly under one of the four categories, but two of our three do. That is, fear simply falls under Prudential, and guilt falls under Ethical. Hostility, you would have to say, has generally aspects of both Esthetic and Ethical.

If you see that emotional behavior is intrinsic social practice because of this connection, now recall that I said that *appraisals work the way these four categories [Rs] work*. In fact, these are simply the general cases for appraisal.

Now transfer that understanding to this: that when a person acts on reasons, that makes his behavior intelligible, too. This is why historically the language of Reasons is what we have evolved to make people’s behavior intelligible or to express what we find intelligible about it.

Q. *Don’t you mean: when a person acts on intelligent reasons, that makes*

his action intelligent? Because—

P. No.

Q. —*because if you don't put that in—isn't it like saying that when a person acts, that makes his actions intelligent?*

P. I said 'intelligible', not 'intelligent'. Somebody who is acting for bad reasons or showing poor judgment is still intelligible once you understand what he's doing.

Q. *So then you say that he's intelligible because of the mere fact that he can act?*

P. No. If you understand his reasons, even though they may be bad reasons for what he does, that still makes him understandable—that he's acting for those reasons and that's why he does what he does. You may criticize him for doing it, but at least you understand what it is he's doing, and you understand it well enough to criticize it.

Q. *What if his reasons are absurd?*

P. Then either you'll have stronger criticisms, or you really won't be able to put it in this framework, and then you just say, "I don't understand what he's doing." But unless you can, you do wind up saying, "I don't understand."

Q. *Are reasons then intrinsic social practices under some personality theory, or some theory that would say it can happen, on the basis of "this is what I choose to do for this reason", and then do that action?*

P. If you look at personality theories, there's practically none that deal with reasons at all. Most personality theories are not geared to making people's behavior understandable. They're geared to making it predictable. And that's a very different project. You remember, we were developing forms of description, and we developed the cause-effect description through the reduction operation; and I said, "This is good enough if you're only interested in whether it happens, and don't care about why, if you're only interested in what happens rather than in understanding."

So indeed, the project of predicting whether something is going to happen is different from the project of understanding what does happen. Most personality theories, as I say, are geared to predict what happens.

Q. *Would you say that "that act is reasonable" should be a candidate for an intrinsic social practice?*

P. You have to watch your grammar. It's not the reason that's the practice, but you can connect them by saying, "Acting on this particular reason is also a case of engaging in an intrinsic social practice."

Q. *Is that another way of saying that you're—that the significance of the behavior is the reason? Are you doing something by doing behavior because you have a certain reason to?*

P. You wouldn't normally have that be the significance of your behavior. Normally, there's something you're doing by doing that, and the reason is not the thing that you're doing by doing it. The only time you would have those two identical is in the case where I'm trying to do, say, the right thing; that is, the right thing is what I am literally trying to do. I'm concerned about doing the right thing, and that's what I'm trying to do. Then my reason, which would also be the right-wrong kind of reason, would be the same as the significance, which would be doing the right thing. But as you can see, that's a rare sort of occasion.




FIGURE 4

Let's extend this connection, come back to social practices, and get another view on this issue of *how do you know you're right?* and what that concern is about and what hinges on it.

Imagine any kind of ordinary interaction of a non-trivial sort, like you're having a heart-to-heart talk with your wife or your girl-friend. So there's an ordinary-type situation, and it's not trivial, because important personal things are at stake there.

In that kind of interaction, you're operating with a picture, and a fairly complex picture, of the other person and what the other person is doing. In that sense, it's comparable to a chess game, where in making your move you have a fairly complicated picture of what that other person is up to, and

you have a complicated set of considerations whereby you choose your own response to it.

If you're a good chess-player, you don't really have to think much about that; it just comes naturally. If you're a normal adult, you don't have to think much about operating with all of that complexity with another normal adult; it just comes naturally; but it is that complicated if you want to reconstruct what it is.

It's in this kind of context that you hear primarily what I call The Old Lament, namely, "If I could only be sure." "If I could only be sure what he really thinks. If I could only be sure what she really means. If I could only be sure how she really feels. If I could only be sure who I really was or what I really want or what's really going on here." "If I only knew..." —and you can fill in the blank with a number of clauses like that.

The pay-off is in a suppressed second clause, namely, "...then I'd know what to do," "If I only knew how she really felt, then I'd know what to do. If I only knew what I really wanted, then I'd know what to do. If I only knew what he really meant, then I'd know what to do." So the point of the laments is that if you only knew those things, then you'd know what to do.

Q. *This lament is relevant to an intrinsic social practice, is it?*

P. It's relevant to anything. You could say, "If I only knew what intrinsic social practice she was engaging in, then I'd know what to do."

Q. *But aren't intrinsic social practices ### that identity between—*

P. Yeah, but it doesn't mean that you automatically know what somebody is doing. Remember, the example I gave is somebody may be acting out of fear, and to you it looks like anger. Both of those are intrinsic practices, but just because somebody is doing that doesn't mean that you automatically know what's going on. Social practices don't come with their names written on them. That's why there is always this issue: when you decide what it is, how do you know? Or how can you check, or something?

Q. *Is the broad classification 'angry behavior' as an intrinsic social practice, assuming anger is the correct description—*

P. It's not anger that's the practice. It's provocation-hostility that's the practice, and that's what you're participating in when, in the face of provocation, you act angry.

Q. *And then what you're not sure of is that ### that you understand the correct provocation.*

P. Or you look at something that looks like anger and say, “Yeah, it looks that way, but maybe it isn’t. Maybe there something else going on than provocation-hostility.” So in that kind of context, then, is where we have the normal, important kind of uncertainty about what’s going on with the other person.

And one of the places that bothers us is this [“Then I’d know what to do”]. If there were no such uncertainty, then we’d know what to do. And that sets the stage for a famous tradeoff, namely, you can play it more or less safe.

There’s a lot of descriptions of what a person is doing that are very safe to give, and you can be very sure. Remember in the example of Dinner at 8:30, you could be very confident saying that we had dinner at 8:30. You could just about bet your life on that, that you wouldn’t be wrong about something like that. And if you’re having a conversation with somebody, unless you’re absent-minded, you can be pretty sure that you remember what it was the person said. And so giving a description, “He said such-and-such,” is also fairly safe. Or saying, “He asked such-and-such.”

From there on out, though, your descriptions get more and more chancy, and they more and more tend to raise the issue, “Is that really so, or am I just inventing it? How do I really know?”—and so forth.

You can see that, under conditions of risk, one of your options is to play it safe. The price—and that’s why there’s a trade-off—is that the safest descriptions are almost invariably the most impersonal, the least significant.

Think of the difference between the description of having dinner at 8:30, and the description expressing hostility as a continuation of that argument this morning. If you stick to the safe descriptions, then since they are also the least significant, you will be operating at a low level of significance. That’s a condition that we normally describe by saying *your behavior is superficial, your relation is superficial, you’re just going through the motions*—or language like that—to get at the importance of what’s missing; and that what’s missing is on the order of meaningfulness, of significance, of personal as against impersonal, of important as against trivial, of authentic as against merely conventional.

Q. *Those various kinds of description, do they vary ###?*

P. Right. If you think of our forms of description, the deliberate action is the most meaningful. With that form of description, you can have access to all of the meaningfulness and significance of a person’s behavior. If you give any of the others, you have less of that significance, and very often much

less.

Think of the difference between seeing this interaction between two people as an expression of hostility, and understanding why on the basis of the earlier argument; versus merely seeing somebody walking down the hall and being able to say they're walking down the hall—having no idea, though, what they're up to, what they're getting out of it, why they're doing it, where they're going, or anything else. You can treat somebody as 'somebody who's walking down the hall'—mainly, that just means you don't get in his way. And that's not a very personal or meaningful sort of interaction.

On the other hand, if there is a background of relation; and I'm expressing hostility to you; and you understand it, whatever way you treat it will be more personal and more meaningful than however you would treat the person who's just walking down the hall.

So the trade-off, then, is meaningfulness versus safety. The descriptions that you give and act on, of other people, in general the more meaningful they are, the less safe. And vice versa: in general, the safer the descriptions of other people that you give, the less meaningful. That's not a tight logical connection. It's merely a strong statistic. The very safest descriptions are highly likely to be the least significant. As you might guess, people will differ in how they deal with that trade-off. Some people will operate at a maximum level of significance, be wrong a lot of times, but life is very meaningful. Other people will play it about as safe as you can get, and they will seldom be wrong but they look more like machines.

Q. *### when they're both acting in a different way, is that ###?*

P. You have a problem if you're acting at a greater level of meaningfulness, and somebody else is treating you at a lower level, it's like trying to interact with a stone wall. You're not getting any of the responses that are responses to you, because you're just being dealt with at a sort of global, sociological level. So you don't get the responses that you would normally expect. And then that gives you very little to go by, yourself, and pretty soon you find you have to deal with this person at, his level, the lowest common denominator. Now you don't have to—that's just a strong influence. It's hard to have a meaningful interaction with somebody who isn't listening.

Q. *Then the alternative is to just leave that person ### or else to deal with him at a lower level?*

P. Yeah. You give an ID description that tells you what he doesn't react to, and then you disqualify and make allowances and deal with him in those

terms that you can. In effect, you interact with people in terms of what you share with them, and somebody who's not prepared to interact personally, you can't have a personal interaction with.

Q. *How would you define a 'conventional' person? Is that one who deals on that level of the least significance?*

P. Yeah. Again, remember that's a statistical connection, that somebody who's conventional is somebody who does the kind of thing that anybody might be expected to do properly. And those things will be so public and so non-situation that he simply will not be responding appropriately to different people and different situations, and that's where you get the impression that you're dealing with a machine and not a person—an etiquette machine, you might say, or something like that.

Q. *How do you deal with things like blocking and repression in a relationship?*

P. Remember the—that's right: we haven't talked about unconscious motivation. Remember the sheet you got that has the derivation of unconscious motivation on the basis of something being unthinkable because it's unworkable. And it's simply an elaboration of that maxim that says *you can't do what you can't do*. So if, in a relationship, something comes up that you can't handle, then you won't see it that way, and somebody else will call it 'blocking' or 'repression' or something else. Instead, you'll see it as something you can handle, and—

Q. *Would that be safety, then?*

P. It wouldn't be this kind of thing, because what you see it as that you can handle may still be at any level of meaningfulness.

Q. *I'm confused about this, if you're having a conversation, and it sounds like there's a continuum between meaningfulness and safety.*

P. We're talking about two kinds of safety here. The safety I'm talking about is *not being wrong*. The safety you're talking about is *not dangerous*. You need a very different kind of explanation there, and that's the unconscious motivation. Somebody who's merely concerned not to be wrong about the other person is not necessarily somebody who's in danger from the other person. But somebody who blocks and represses in a relationship is somebody who sees some danger somewhere. So you simply handle them along those two lines.

Q. So you could have a meaningful relationship and ###?

P. Yeah. As a matter of fact, you might say it has to be meaningful at least at the level of your seeing yourself in danger. That may not be 'very', but it's that much.

Okay, there's the trade-off, meaningfulness versus safety.

Now let's turn the screw another notch. I've used the chess game as a good example for a social practice, because it has a regular sequence of alternating one person's behavior and then the other and then the first and then the second, and so forth. So the structure of chess matches fairly well this conventional diagram [Fig. 4, p. [145], and that means it's a good example.

Now think of a chess-player who is only a chess-player and not a full-bodied human being. He's only a chess-player. And think of the rules of chess, which specify two players, so the rules of chess make a place for a chess-player, and the rules limit how the pieces move but they don't determine how the pieces move.

But the rules also specify that the function of the two players is to remove that uncertainty. The players' function is to choose moves, because the rules don't specify moves. So you might say *the function of the players is to resolve the uncertainty left by the rules.*

Now given the nature of chess, imagine a specific form of The Old Lament: "If I only knew the sequence of moves that would certainly win, then I'd know what to do." What could be more natural than for a chess-player to want to lament the absence of a guaranteed way of winning? You say, "Sure. For a chess-player, that would be ###."

But now also ask yourself, "Suppose there were such a thing as a guaranteed win? What would that do?" The answer is, "It would wipe out chess-players." If there were a guaranteed win in chess, there would be no uncertainty, there would be no place for the players. We would have lost that game. So even though for a chess-player, nothing could be more natural than for him to lament the absence of a guaranteed win, in fact, were he to get what he wanted, he would be wiped out.

Now transfer that same picture to real life. The essential thing about human beings is that they make the decisions that resolve the uncertainties, and that's why we have all this business of choices and options and reasons. You need a player to do that. Were there such a thing as guaranteed knowledge, certainty, from which your behavior followed automatically, there'd be no place for people. You could be replaced by a computer immediately. The

essential feature of people is that uncertainty, that people can and do easily operate under uncertainty, and that's essential to being a person, in the same way that the uncertainty left by the rules of chess is essential to being a chess-player.

So if you see that kind of relation, you can still lament, on occasion, but you won't do it in principle. Nor, as you'll see when we get to the existentialists, will you use this kind of lament in a pessimistic way to say, "Jesus, this is what we're stuck with, that's the human condition, and that's bad but we're stuck with it." You don't get that pessimistic outlook on the whole issue of uncertainty, if you have this view.

Q. *### maintaining that status quo is where it was at, if that was indeed the human condition, why is there always such strivings on the part of the chess-players, as well as being part of the human condition? Why does the chess-player always want to win? Why does he always want to make the right moves? Why does he always want to know which option to ###?*

P. The uncertainty isn't the whole story. Just say that given the nature of chess, you would like to have the guaranteed win because you're trying to win, because that's the nature of that game. So the uncertainty is not the whole story. After all, there is a game there that has the uncertainty.

Q. *But the purpose of the game is to make the right moves also.*

P. No. The nature of the game is to win by checkmating the king, and the only criterion for the right moves is *does it get you there?*

Q. *But you're still trying to make those moves.*

P. In other games, you don't have a goal like that. For example, if you're playing tag, there is no goal like checkmating. There is still the difference between playing that game and doing something else.

Q. *We're always trying to understand social interaction—our social interactions—*

P. Remember what I said about courses of action, that *given an intrinsic social practice, depending on what the practice is, certain circumstances or states of affairs will become desirable*. And then, if you're participating in that practice, you can have those—and usually will have those—as goals that you then try to accomplish. And I think that's what you're talking about—that we do indeed participate in larger units than simple social practices. Those units mark for us certain states of affairs as desirable, and we spend a lot of our time trying to reach those goals.

One—maybe a last—move here. Let's talk about influence. People influence one another. Some ways of influencing are of more interest to psychologists than others. For example, in general, you can influence somebody by affecting his circumstances, which in turn makes a difference in what reasons he has, and so forth. And those are kinds of things which we know about routinely, and are not—that kind of knowledge is not peculiar to psychology, so unless you have some technical aims in mind—like for example in behavior modifier you always have some particular thing in mind—you kind of downplay that, and you focus on the kind of influence that people have via their interaction.

We had an example where we were talking about social appropriateness and I said *question and answer are an example of social appropriateness*. If somebody asks you a question, it becomes—generally—appropriate to answer. So somebody who asks you a question, in general, is exercising an influence on you, namely, he's giving you a reason to answer. By his own behavior he is making it appropriate for you to respond in certain ways and not others.

Q. *How do you separate that from the description of circumstances, reasons, decision, behavior?*

P. I said specifically, this is influence through interaction. For example, I could influence your behavior simply by locking the doors. That wouldn't be influence through interaction. On the other hand, if I say, "Watch out for that thing falling on you," and you run, that's influence through interaction.

Q. *Then interaction is still part of the circumstances, isn't it?*

P. My prior behavior and yours is part of your circumstance, but remember, your interaction also involves what you're doing now.

Q. *Isn't that considered part of my circumstances?*

P. Not until it's done. You see, what you're doing will never just be past history, because you're right now doing it. Your past history, what you've been doing, will be part of your circumstances. But you're always right there at that leading edge.

From the structure of social practices, we can derive two general kinds of influence principles. The first one is simple, familiar, and it is exemplified by the question and answer. That principle, just by convention we call Move 1, and the formulation of that principle is: "Move 1 invites Move 2". Whenever two people are together, and one of them initiates a social practice that

calls for a continuation or response by the other, the first person has made Move 1 in that practice. His having made that first move invites, influences the other person to continue and make the second move.

As I said, asking a question in order to get an answer is a legitimate example of this Move 1. Provocation-hostility: you provoke somebody, you get hostility in return. Remember the phrase, “You’re asking for it”: you’re inviting hostility if you give provocation.

Q. *And we are able to influence ourselves?*

P. Hold off on that. You always have problems when you make the two identical, in terms of who’s the influencer and who’s the influencee. When it’s two people, you don’t have a problem, but when they’re both the same person, you do have a problem of who’s doing what to whom, and who’s having it done to him.

Most normal interactions are of this sort. You simply encounter people, you participate in social practices, when you finish, there’s an occasion to start another one, and one of you does, and things just keep flowing that way.

The second principle, as you might guess, is called Move 2. And this one is sneakier and more complicated. The principle Move 2 is phrased in this way: “Making Move 2 makes it difficult for Move 1 not to have already taken place.”

Q. ###?

P. No, it’s almost the opposite. It’s more like creating something out of nothing.

Take a heuristic example here. Suppose that right after class, we’re all just standing around talking, and somebody comes up to you and makes a comment to you that you could equally well take as an insult or as a friendly joke. If you take it as an insult and treat it accordingly, that other person is going to have to work hard not to have it have been an insult, because your treating it that way makes it that, unless he succeeds in making it something else.

Conversely, if you treat it as a friendly joke and he really wanted to insult you, he’s going to have to start all over again, because your treating it as a friendly joke has made it a friendly joke—unless, again, he succeeds in getting it counted as something else.

Now, if I simply come in and treat you as having been insulting, that’s a Move 2. In effect, I’m putting you in the position of already having done

something, and I'm already treating you accordingly. And you're going to have to work to not have it be the case that you did what I'm treating you as having done. You have to work to get out of the spot that I've put you in by making that move.

And that's why the principle is phrased in the way it is. It's not that you can't, but the pressure on you is to go along because there is greater or lesser difficulty in getting out from that spot. The more difficult it is to get out of the spot, the more the pressure on you is to go along.

Think about what we were saying about self-presentation last time. Self-presentations will, in general, be either Move 1's or Move 2's. If I present myself to you as somebody of a particular sort, generally speaking, I'm making Move 1, because I'm inviting you to make Move 2, which is to treat me accordingly.

Conversely, status assignments are mostly Move 2's. If I put you in a given position, and then start treating you accordingly, see how that fits the Move 2 definition.

So self-presentations, then, are a way of influencing people, and as we were saying last time, the point of it all is to set up a framework within which certain kinds of interactions can take place, to set the stage for those. That's what you're initiating when you do this self-presentation. You're inviting the other person to treat you in those ways that you want and not in any other ways. Or when you put the other person in the position that you want him in, so that you can interact with him in the ways you want, again that's what you're getting out of it, you're setting the stage for the kind of interaction that you would like to have, the kind of relationship.

But that does, as I said, get things moving. It is a way of influencing the course of events in the direction you want them to go.

As you can see, there's no guarantee that you succeed. And indeed, in the videotape that we'll see, you'll see a certain degree of lack of success in people trying to do that. Let's start with that tomorrow.

Let's go on to another influence principle: this one is known as Poisoning the Well. To understand that, you come back to the diagram for deliberate action, and the normal case of somebody distinguishing behaviors and choosing among the alternatives.

Now, the behavior is distinguished under a given description, like drinking coffee from the cup, or putting somebody down, or asking a question, or whatever. It comes under some description, because I have to

understand it in some particular way in order to distinguish it from others. And various descriptions are possible.




FIGURE 5

Poisoning the Well consists of redescribing the behavior that I choose in such a way that under the new description, I have reasons not to do it that I didn't have before. You're not generating any new reasons; you're simply tapping reasons that I already have, and it's the new description that taps them.

So, for example, if I'm choosing the behavior under the description of "enjoying the coffee, drinking the coffee," etc., and you give me another description, "you're ruining your health." If I accept that description, that doing that is a way of ruining my health, then I have a reason not to drink coffee that I didn't have before, because I already have standing reasons not to ruin my health. So once you describe this behavior as a way of ruining my health, you're tapping my existing motivation not to ruin my health [R circled]. Tapping that motivation may make the difference between my doing it and my not doing it. It may. In any case, you can see why we call that Poisoning the Well, because you're poisoning the motivational sources of that behavior.

Q. *I could give you a reason—if you decide not to do something. I could always give you a reason to do it.*

P. Okay, now the mirror image—you see, this is a negative reason. The mirror image is Salting the Mine, where you redescribe it in a way that gives you additional reasons to do it.

Q. *What's it called?*

P. Salting the Mine. It's a time-honored western practice. Again, you can see why the title, that if you redescribe it that way, in effect you're making it look better than it did originally. And if that description gets accepted,

then indeed you have more reason to do it than you realized initially. Notice, this will only work if the person does have the motivation you take it he has. If I'm not at all concerned about my health, then telling me that drinking the coffee is ruining my health will not give me additional reasons not to do it. So these two moves of Salting the Mine and Poisoning the Well are effective if the motivation that you think is there, is there. Because you're not creating new motivation; you're simply connecting to existing motivations.

Q. *Is that something you do to yourself, mostly?*

P. A lot of it does. You see, when you think something over, "Should I do this or should I do that?," some of the things that happen as you go through some of these redescriptions—"Should I take that second cup?"—one of the things that might occur to me is, "That might be bad for my health." And by going through that operation myself, I get the same effect. Except there, you simply call it 'thinking it over,' or if somebody else is doing it to me, that's distinctive enough that we call it Poisoning the Well.

Interpretations, in psychotherapy, are almost invariably of this sort, and that's how and why they work. When that famous psychoanalytic therapist makes his famous statement, "It looks like you're doing this because you hated your father," the effect it has is of poisoning your well, because ordinarily seeing your behavior as something that you're only doing because you hated your father gives you a reason not to do it. So in general, interpretations in therapy that are designed to get you to change, if they work, work this way, because they get you to see your behavior differently, and so that affects your priorities and your choices, and therefore your visible behavior.

What we'll see in that videotape is two people not merely interacting, but trying hard to influence each other; and it's a therapist and a client, so you're not surprised that they're sitting there trying to influence each other.

Now here's what we'll go through. We'll show you the videotape, and it's about a 20-minute tape. And it's a staged performance by a famous psychotherapist named Fritz Perls. It is one-third of a trio in which three famous therapists conduct half-hour interviews with the same client. The client is really in therapy, but she is not in therapy with any one of these three therapists. She simply agreed to put on this demonstration, and she's talking about her problem, and each of the therapists then, gets a chance to interact with her for half an hour or so in order to demonstrate how he does therapy. What we'll see is one of those three people, namely, Fritz Perls, and how he does it. We'll also have ahead of time, at the first five minutes or so of the tape,

his explanation of how he does therapy. And one of the things I want you to examine critically is: does what you see him do fit what he says that he does? And if you find some mismatches, they'll probably be interesting. The other thing is, you then watch the interaction and ask yourself, "What's going on? How do we understand this episode between these two people?" And you're going to experience a characteristic difficulty. (1) It goes by pretty fast, and if you're trying to be good observers, you're going to find that it goes so fast that you're going to lose track of things, you're going to miss things.

(2) You'll also probably experience the strain of the ambivalence of safety versus meaningfulness, because in a dialogue like that, you have kind of a 100% safe description, namely, "He said, she said, he said, she said," and so on. To save you the trouble, after we get through, we'll give you a transcript so that you have it there in writing what he said and what she said, and you don't have to waste your time reproducing it.

The problem with "He said, she said"—if you merely have what he said and then what she said and then what he said and then what she said—what you have is meaningless because it leaves you with the question, "Why would she say this [P₁] if he said that [T₁]?"




FIGURE 6

This is not just a sequence of four behaviors. This is an interaction, and part of the problem of understanding it as an interaction is to connect what one person does to what the other person does. That is, whatever the client does, it's going to be in response to what the therapist does, and whatever the therapist does next is the client's response to the therapist's first behavior, and so on down the line. A transcript of who said what will not give you any connections across those behaviors, and so it will leave the sequence totally unintelligible. What you have here is simply a description of this behavior, and then a description of that behavior, and then of that one and of that one, and there is nothing to connect them up.

You can bet that Gloria is not just sitting there behaving. She is responding to Fritz Perls. So any adequate account of what's going on has got to provide us with connections between those two people, connections between their behaviors. And you can't do that by playing it safe—not this way [Fig. 6]. You can try kind of the opposite extreme and try to empathize with either Fritz or Gloria, and then you'll have a tendency to pick up more meaningful descriptions, but you'll find that other people in the room will also disagree with you more. If they've been doing the same thing, they will be reading other things into Fritz than you did.


Q. *Is everything he says—is there a reason behind every sentence he says, or every question? Or does he just talk to facilitate the conversation?*

P. That would be a reason. Remember, the Reasons Diagram can be used to reconstruct any behavior, so we can always use it to try to reconstruct here. As I say, you have that tradeoff between the security of this transcript-type description and something that makes sense out of what's going on.

Ideally, you need them both. For example, if you want to give a meaningful description that says that she's expressing hostility to Fritz, if you only say that, there's no way to check it. On the other hand, if you have both, you say, "Here, by saying this, she's expressing hostility." Somebody who wants to question whether she's really expressing hostility goes to the transcript, what she said, and he can make up his own mind whether her saying that in this context looks to him like an expression of hostility. But if all you say is, "On the third response, Gloria expressed hostility," there's no way for anybody—including you—to check it.

So the problem with the more meaningful ones is, if you only give those, there's no way to check. The problem with the safe ones is, if you only give those, it's meaningless.

And that's why, ideally, you want both. And that's why we set up the problem in the way we do. We provide one, namely, the transcript, and then we can have fun doing the other. But we always have the transcript to come back to, to start with in generating our more meaningful descriptions. And the descriptions will be of this kind: we start with the transcript, namely, what he said, and then ask, "What's he doing by doing that?"



And then, “What’s he doing by doing this?”—just keep Fritz giving answers as long as we can give answers, and then move on to Gloria and what she’s doing, and we start with the transcript again. She said this, what’s she doing by saying that and what’s she doing by doing that. And if we do it right, at some point those descriptions will connect, and that’s how we know we’re on the right track. If none of our descriptions connect, we know we’re on the wrong track. And if the way they connect is an intrinsic social practice, then we’ve got a candidate for saying, “That’s it.” So that will be the nature of the exercise, and we’ll begin with that tomorrow. But also—remember to read Veronica in the case book.

SESSION 12

July 28, 1976

Videotape of Fritz and Gloria. Introductory statement by Fritz Perls:

"In the safe emergency of the therapeutic situation...the patient begins to take risks. And to transform his energies from manipulating the environment for support into developing greater and greater self-support, that is, reliance on his own resources. This process is called 'maturation'. Once the patient has learned to stand on his own feet emotionally, intellectually, and economically, his need for therapy will collapse. He will wake up from the nightmare of his existence. The basic technique is this: not to explain things to the patient, but to provide the patient the opportunities to understand and to discover himself.

"For this purpose, I manipulate and frustrate the patient in such a way that he is confronting himself. In this process, he identifies with his lost potential—for instance, assimilating his projections by acting out...the alien parts of himself. Principally, I consider any interpretation to be a therapeutic mistake, as this would imply that the therapist understands the patient better than the patient himself. It takes away from the patient the chance of discovering himself, by himself, and prevents him from finding out his own values and style.

"On the other hand, I disregard most of the content of what the patient says and concentrate most on the non-verbal level, as this is the only one which is less subject to self-deception, than is verbal, pseudo self-expression. On the non-verbal level, the relevant gestalt will always emerge and get dealt with in the here and now."

Transcript of the first dozen interchanges in the interview between Fritz and Gloria:

F-1: We are going to have an interview for half an hour.

G-1: [sits down, lights cigarette] Right away, I'm scared.

F-2: You say you're scared. But you are smiling. I don't understand how one can be scared and smile at the same time

G-2: And I'm also suspicious of you. I think you understand very well. I think you know that,., [sighs]., when I get scared. I laugh and kid to cover up.

F-3: But you have stage fright.

G-3: Uh...I don't know. I'm emotionally aware of you. I'm afraid that...uh...I'm afraid that you're going to have such a direct attack that...uh...you're going to get me in a corner, and I'm afraid of it. I want you to be more on my side. [hand on chest]

F-4: You say I get you into a corner, and you put your hand on your chest.

G-4: Uh-huh

F-5: Is this your corner?

G-5: Well, it's like—yeah, it's like—I'm afraid, you know.

F-6: Where would you like to go? Can you describe the corner you'd like to go to?

G-6: Yeah. Uh...it's back in the corner where I'm completely protected.

F-7: And then you would be safe of me—from me.

G-7: Well. I know I wouldn't really. But it feels safer, yeah.

F-8: Well, imagine you are in this corner, and you're perfectly safe now. What would you like to do in that corner?

G-8: I'd just sit.

F-9: Just sit.

G-9: Yes.

F-10: How long would you sit?

G-10: I don't know. But this is so funny, as you're saying this, this reminds me of when I was a little girl. Every time when I was afraid, I'd feel better sitting in a corner. Panicky—

F-11: Okay. Are you a little girl?

G-11: Well, no, but it's the same feeling.

F-12: Are you a little girl?

G-12: This feeling reminds me of it.

Peter I don't know how much you caught of the introduction. It took a little while to get warmed up to it.

Remember, yesterday, I said one thing to look for is compare what Perls says about how he operates, with what you see by way of how he operates. We may find some discrepancies. One of the interesting ones is that that's how he says he operates. He says he looks for discrepancies between what a person says and how they're non-verbally behaving, and that he concentrates on the non-verbal behavior. If you think back over that twenty minutes, would you say that Fritz was concentrating on the non-verbal behavior?

Well, I don't think you would. He did a lot with the verbal behavior. He did, you notice, from time to time, make that kind of comment, but you would hardly say that what he was mainly doing is working and looking at the non-verbal part. You can also see—if you just took that straight, and I asked you, "What was going on there?," there's so much that went on in that twenty minutes that you'd have a hard time. And if we replayed the first minute, and I asked you, "What went on there?," you'd still have a hard time.

Part of it is, you can't remember. If you tried right now to recall that first minute of conversation, even now, half an hour later, even with the summary from Fritz, you still probably couldn't do it.

Q. *I remember how I felt about his approach. I remember that very plainly, but I don't remember exactly what it was.*

P. Right. Remember what I said last time about that, that it's true that you normally react and think about it at this higher level of significance, but then if that's all you have, you don't have any way of checking on it. Let's replay the first minute or so, because that's about as much as is on this first page of transcript...As you can see, there's a lot of things going on right from the very beginning, there. Let's start from the beginning and start reconstructing some of the things that were going on. The first thing we do, with Fritz—

Incidentally, one of the things that I haven't mentioned is that normally, when we talk about behavior, we do not do it by specifying values of parameters. We do it by giving what amounts to the name of the behavior. The name implies the different values, but they're not usually mentioned. Transcript of the first dozen interchanges in the interview between Fritz and Gloria: see p. 155.




FIGURE 1

The first thing we know about this behavior is the verbal performance, and that's what's on the transcript. And automatically, the next one is that Fritz says that, so the first description of this behavior is that Fritz says, "We are going to have an interview for half an hour." So on all of these, the first description of the behavior is simply that either Fritz or Gloria says what is on that transcript.

The interesting question, then, is what they're doing by doing that? So our first question, now, is what is Fritz doing by saying, in that setting, "We are going to have an interview for half an hour"?

Q. *Is he officially beginning it?*

P. Okay, he's initiating the interview. Once he says anything, that interview has begun. So one of the things he's done is he's initiated the interview.

What else has he done by saying that we're going to have an interview for half an hour?




FIGURE 2

Q. *Sets up the structure for the behavior for the next half hour.*

P. Okay, view he's not only initiated, he's set up the structure, at least in part. Saying that *it's going to be for half an hour* is setting some limits, it's to that extent saying, "This is how it's going to be;" and saying that *he's setting up structures* is a common way of referring to that kind of move.

So we have two things that he's doing by saying, "We're going to have an interview for half an hour." Is there anything else we want to say at this level, that he's doing by saying "We're going to have an interview for half an hour"?

Q. *In one sense, he's putting himself in a controlling position, because he's setting a limit—*

P. That goes on the next move. This is what he's doing by setting the structure. So we would catch that by going to the next one. So far, though, we're asking is there anything else at this level that he's doing by saying, "We're going to have an interview"?

Well, if nothing comes to mind, you just plow ahead; so if nothing else comes to mind at this second level, you go on to the third: what's he doing by either initiating the interview or setting up the structure? We've had one answer, and what was that again?

Q. *That he's setting himself up in a power position in one sense, because he's setting limits on the time. He's saying, "I have the power to say how long we'll be here."*

Q. *Why is that separated from setting up structures?*

P. Because this is what he's doing by setting up the structure. Is there anything else he's doing by setting up the structure, by saying, "We're going to have an interview for half an hour"?

Q. *In a sense, he's introducing himself as a person. Any behavior is going to show something of himself ###.*

P. From here, once you have something like this [asserting power, control, authority], you can go from here to a self-presentation, but you could directly call this a self-presentation, that he presents himself as somebody who is in power, who has control, etc. That's part of the force of saying 'asserts' or 'affirms', is that this is how he presents himself.

Now ask yourself where these descriptions are coming from. How come you can from these words [F-1], give some of these kinds of descriptions? They certainly don't come from any particular place. You don't get these answers here by having particular items of information, the way you have about this one [F-1]. You get these answers from your general familiarity both with how it goes in therapy, and how it goes in interviews, and how it goes between people.

And this interaction exemplifies all of those. It exemplifies how things go generally between people: these are not Fiji Islanders, they're the very kind of people that we know about. It exemplifies an interview, and there are all kinds of interviews, and there's some common features of interviews, and this exemplifies an interview.

It also exemplifies specifically a therapeutic interview. Therapeutic interviews have their own special characteristics, so you draw upon your knowledge of those things that this whole situation exemplifies, and then you can recognize that saying this is taking the first step, and taking the first step this way [F-1] is behaving this way [Fig. 2, diamonds 2 and 3].

If you ask *what else?* you start running out of answers, and on the first move, you don't know when you've got enough because you don't know if it connects or not. So here, you just keep pushing as long as you can think of something, because right here we're not worrying "Is this really true?" We're asking, "Which descriptions apply to that behavior?" and we're writing them down. If, at a later time, we want to reject any of these, for any purpose, we can always scratch them out.

As an additional one, let's put in something else, namely [adding to Fig. 2], Offers Reassurance. Where this comes from is the general feature that people are uncomfortable with uncertainty. If you're into a new situation, you generally are uncomfortable unless you have some guidelines as to what kind of situation and how it's going to go. If you have those, then you can anticipate what you're going to be called upon to do, what you're going to be

faced with, and you're more comfortable, you're less anxious. So providing that structure initially ought to have that kind of effect, and if you think of interview situations generally, this is a common thing, that the first thing that happens is that somebody says, "This is how it's going to be." And it's for that reason, that until people know how it's going to be, they're going to be looking around, they're going to be wondering, they might be anxious because of what they think it might be going to be. So one of the first things you want to do to set people at ease is to lay it out some way, "This is how it's going to be."

Q. *When people are completely sure of themselves, self-confident—taking away that power?*

P. Not if they take it in the right spirit. Why would you get mad at somebody who's doing something to reassure you? You might not like it. You might think it was unfortunate that you lost out, but why would you get angry?

Q. *That's what I mean, "Angry" was an extreme word. Maybe uncomfortable, or preferring to have the ###.*

P. Again, in a therapy interview, particularly an initial therapy interview, the client is almost never in that position, because if he was, why would he be there? So particularly in therapy interviews, you figure that the client is wondering what it's going to be like, how it's going to go, and would like to have some sort of structure.

Q. *To me there's an opening or something in this first comment, that he's not offering too much reassurance. Usually when you meet somebody, you make a move like "Welcome," or "Have a seat," or something like that, and in this particular case, Fritz was careful not to do that.*

P. He gives a little but not too much.

Q. *And the little in a kind of neutral way.*

P. Notice how that resembles the Dinner at 8:30. If you didn't have any sense of how much reassurance people normally give out of ordinary civility in a formal context like that, you wouldn't be able to make that kind of judgment—that this was not that much; therefore he's being careful, he's holding back, or something.

Q. *It seems like that's an awfully big step to take, from 'setting up structure' to 'offering reassurance'.*

P. That's why I explained where that comes from. If you just took it from here [diamond 2], yeah, it looks like big steps. But if you remember that this is how things often work, and that that's why, then it's much easier to recognize this as an instance, that indeed people do set structures by way of reassuring people that it's not going to be some unknown, horrible thing, it's just going to be this sort of thing. And it's fairly explicit that that is one of the reasons for doing that. So given that, in the general case, it makes all kind of sense that it's working here. Or to put it differently, this is at least a correct description in that if he wanted to offer reassurance, this is a way of doing it.

So the only thing we don't know is did he mean it that way? But notice that Gloria, in responding to Fritz, doesn't know either. She doesn't have anything more to go by than we do in watching the tape, except that she's got a little better view. But when he says that, she can't read his head and know that he really means it that way or not. As I say, she has exactly the same thing to go by that we do. And if we can see it, she can see it. If we can respond to it, she can respond to it. But also, vice versa. If she can see it and respond to it, we ought to be able to also.

As I said, if we don't need any of these, or if we want to reject them later, we can just cross them out. Not all of these descriptions lead anywhere, but some of them do, and that's the purpose of putting them all in, is that you don't know yet, so you put them in. Also, we can always come back later and add something, if something occurs to us. But so far, you see, what we've done is to start here [diamond 1] and move up, and wind up with things like this [diamond 3].

Q. *Would you call the last one an intrinsic social practice?*


P. Not yet. Until we see something else, these are not obviously social practices. However, if you work hard, you could make them into it by taking relevant circumstances in the general situation and putting them together with a redescription here, which eventually we will probably do. But just from this, it doesn't really actively suggest any intrinsic practice.

Q. *When you said something about when you notice that people aren't like us, and that means we can't relate to them or something, maybe I've picked up an instance, but I think that he had just a little bit, just a tiny bit of trouble with English. I think he made a mistake during the interview——and I think it was more of just not feeling terribly sure of himself. And right away, that means that he's a little bit different, at least to me.*

P. I don't think anybody ever said of Fritz Perls that he wasn't sure of himself. His stock in trade is quite the opposite. And you notice that when he did correct himself in English, it didn't bother him a bit. He just corrected it and went right on. Now if it was somebody else—if it was just somebody that you noticed had trouble with English, that would be a reasonable conclusion.

Q. *But it is to me because I don't know about his reputation.*

P. This is part of the background. You remember I said that Fritz and two other famous therapists are putting on this demonstration, and one of the things that Fritz is famous for is, he's in complete command of the situation—as far as he's concerned.



Okay, let's go on to Gloria now. And she says, "Right away, I'm scared." And she smiles. I don't know if you were able to see the smile or see more than the bare fact that she did smile, but it wasn't what you might call a 'merry' smile. It was kind of like a grimace, kind of like a giggle-type smile.

Now, what about that? What is she doing by saying "Right away. I'm scared"? Don't be afraid of taking small steps and saying trivial things like, "She's telling him how she feels." Because these small steps make the whole thing hang together. If you just started from here [diamond 1] and went off to here [diamond 5], it would look like magic, like crystal ball gazing, or something. The intermediate steps pull the whole thing together. So let's put in something of the sort.

Q. *Doesn't she also in a sense affirm his control, power, authority? She says, "I'm scared," so if he's made a self-presentation as "I'm in control," she's saying, "Yeah, you are in control."*

P. Well, you can read it several ways. Let's wait a few notches before we get to that.

Q. *Can you include the smile in that first diamond?*

P. No. You'd better put another diamond, because the smile is down here as the P [performance].

Q. *So that would be a separate description?*

P. Yeah, she's doing two things, smiling and saying that. We combine two. Anytime you have two things at the same level, you've really combined two descriptions into one. If that's all you have, it works out conveniently just to put them together. The more you have, the more you want to just draw separate diamonds for them. That way you keep track of them a lot easier. And the fact that they're separate diamonds brings out visually that there's several things going on at the same time.

Q. *She's presenting herself in certain ways.*

P. What is the nature of the self-presentation?

Q. *Intimidated, helpless, as being intimidated?*

P. I'm not sure about that one. How about something else?

Q. *Unsure?*

Q. *Straightforward?*

Q. *Uncertain?*

P. No. Remember she says, "Right away, I'm scared," so she's not presenting herself as straightforward. It's something on the order of 'scared'. What kind of person would be scared?

Q. *Unsure.*

Q. *Weak.*

P. Yeah, weak, unsure. You can clump together a bunch of adjectives, and the whole clump will carry the message of what kind of self-presentation it was. No single one of these would really do a good job. If you just said 'weak', that doesn't really do justice to 'scared'. If you say 'scared', that doesn't do justice to some of the implications. So you put together a bunch of adjectives, and the whole bunch locates what general kind of thing this was.

One of the intermediates, by the way: look carefully at the words there, "Right away. I'm scared." If you think about the implications of that wording,

“Right away, I’m scared,” how would you would react to an intermediate one that says that her being scared is not Fritz’s fault, but rather, it’s something she brings with her?

To see the rationale for that one, imagine that right now somebody walks in and hands me a telegram. That telegram is sealed, and I look at it and I say, “Right away, I’m nervous. Right away, I’m scared.” What does that tell you? It tells you that it’s not the content of that telegram that’s scaring me. It tells you that I already have some reason to be scared, because since I haven’t even opened it, it’s not what’s in it that’s scaring me. It’s what I know might be in it, and that’s something I brought with me when I came here. So that phrasing, “Right away” or “already”, indicates that it’s something that I brought with me, and I’m not just reacting to what’s here. When she says, “Already I’m scared,” or “Right away, I’m scared,” it carries the same kind of implication. It isn’t that there’s something scary here that she has every reason to be scared of. It’s that she’s the kind of person who will get scared. She’s the kind of person who will find or has reason to be scared. And that’s part of the self-presentation, and that’s part of why it’s so easy to react to it as a self-presentation. There’s a message there in that wording about her as a person, and not just about what’s going on.

Q. *You haven’t put in things like motivation and—*

P. No. That’s why I said initially that we handle behaviors primarily by giving them names which imply things about cognition and motivation, but we don’t go around specifying values because that takes too long and is too tedious. It would be impractical to talk about behavior by specifying values. It’s in the reconstruction that we go around specifying values, usually.

Q. *When do you reconstruct, only at certain times?*

P. Whenever it makes sense. If you were Gloria, and you were thinking this over afterwards; or if you were Fritz and were thinking this over afterwards, you would in your head be doing some of this stuff. And notice that even this does not require really specifying values.

On the other hand, at the point where you might ask, “I wonder if she really meant—” or “I wonder if he really meant—” this, at that point you would be asking questions about motivation.

Q. *When she lights a cigarette, that would be a separate diamond. Could there be any implication ### from that?*

P. Yeah. Again, think of when people sit down and light a cigarette. It's a very common thing that when you go to a meeting, the first thing you do is light up a cigarette.

Q. *But wouldn't that be significant of some uncertainty or—*

P. Yeah, that's what I was saying, that when you start something like that, there is uncertainty, and there is a certain amount of tension that you could expect just from that. And one of the common reactions is to do things that reduce tension, and lighting up a cigarette is one of them. So you could use that as evidence that she, too, like many other people, is feeling a little nervous there, and that all the more, that would support this.

Q. *Doesn't Fritz also light a cigarette later on in the interview?*

Q. *A cigar.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *What he's doing while he's doing that—*

P. Sure, that's the thing. He keeps her enough on the defensive so she can't start asking him, "How come you're pushing *your* feet?" and so forth. But again, that's Fritz's style. That's one of the things he's famous for, he always puts you down, he always keeps you on the defensive. And you heard what he said about it: "In the safe emergency of the therapeutic situation, I frustrate people to bring out some of their hidden potential." So he isn't just being nasty. He's—

Q. *It really works, then, in other words. People who are in therapy with him—they get better, or—*

P. That's what we hear. [laughter] Well, you can kind of see how, because there were moments there it was clear he had gotten through to her, and that she was responding in what, on the face of it, is a favorable way. So you can see how that kind of technique might produce good effects.

Q. *But what I'm saying is that it doesn't always work. It seems like it can't always work.*

P. No, and as a matter of fact, there are places in that interview where you could see that he was trying things that just didn't—

Q. *I don't think that's really a fair criterion. I don't think anything will work all the time for everybody.*

P. No, of course. And that is to say that it's not the technique that works,

it's the person who uses his understanding as to when and with whom to use which techniques, and how far to push them, and so on. But still, you can distinguish his way of doing therapy because it's characterized by that kind of technique, as against—for example—one of the other ones, Carl Rogers, who would never do something like that.

Q. ###

P. No, and that helps people, too. So it isn't that one of these works and the other doesn't.

Q. *I think in an interview afterwards she said that Fritz was ###.*

P. No, what she said was she thought that he did help her some, even though if she had to rate them, she liked Carl Rogers best.

Q. *But she said that the one who would be most valuable for her to work with, she thought, would be Fritz.*

P. Did she say that?

Q. *Yeah, but she liked Carl Rogers best.*

Q. *Isn't she saying to him also, "Don't ###?"*

P. Yeah. From the self presentation—you can automatically, from a self-presentation, go to the contract part. You remember, I said about a self-presentation that *it's an invitation to be treated that way*. [Adds to Fig. 3, "Invites F to treat her as weak, unsure."]

Q. *It's ### more reassurance there. By representing herself this way, she's saying, "I need more."*

P. Not necessarily, but I guess it's about time to look at that [adds: "rejects reassurance"]. If somebody does something to reassure you, and you say, "I'm scared," one of the things you've told him is he hasn't succeeded.

Q. *That's why I disagree with "It's not your fault, Fritz," in that statement before. I think she just comes right out and she tells him, "Hey, you're being rough with me."*

P. "You're being rough with me because I'm this kind of person who is already afraid."

Q. *I think it's more that she expects him to be rough with her, which isn't the same thing. Because if he's being rough with her, that's already reacting to the first thing he says. But if she expects him to be rough, that's something she views in the therapeutic situation.*

P. Notice that by presenting herself that way and inviting him to treat her that way, she's structuring the interaction. She's saying, "This is how I want things to go." So she's also rejecting his affirmation that it's he who is going to say how things are going to go.

Q. *There's a power struggle going on right away.*

P. Yeah. Remember what I was saying yesterday, that's exactly what you expect in initial encounters. How is it going to go? Who is going to have a say about how it's going to go? And one way of doing it is through self-presentations. Another, you see here.

Q. *So she rejects—*

P. She rejects his affirmation that he's going to decide.

Q. *Which level is that on?*

P. This is the next higher. By inviting Fritz to treat her this way, she is structuring the interaction. By structuring the interaction, she's rejecting his structure of the interaction.

Q. *After she says this, why—is it part of his approach not to come back and to give her more reassurance? Is it part of his approach just to leave her a little bit uncertain about what is going to happen?*

P. No. One thing about reconstructions, they can make it sound as though you had things more clearly in mind than you did, and I doubt whether Fritz had these things that clearly in mind. This is the kind of thing that we handle mostly without thinking, mostly just intuitively, and we do the right thing and you can describe it that way, but if you asked Fritz, was he thinking of giving her reassurance, he'd probably say no. That's already built in to how one handles this kind of situation, and he doesn't have to be thinking specifically about giving her reassurance.

Q. *But if somebody said to you, "I'm scared," wouldn't it be an automatic response to come back and reassure them just a little bit more of what was going to happen?*

P. No, it wouldn't be an automatic response, but remember that impulsive aspect of emotional behavior: you have a learned tendency to try to help somebody who asks for help. But you don't necessarily act on it. This is clearly that kind of move on her part: she's asking for reassurance or help or something, and you would have an automatic tendency to respond by offering that.

But you don't have to act on it. The other things may prevail, and for Fritz, here, other things did prevail, because you notice that he made one of those moves that's distinctive, or at least typical, about his ways of doing that. Namely, he comments on a discrepancy, apparently, between what she says and how she's acting.

Now, if you notice that, if he noticed that, and it didn't seem to him that she was scared, that would explain why he doesn't just offer her reassurance when she asks for it, because he doesn't think she needs it. So until he's satisfied that she is scared, he's not going to treat her as being scared. So he raises that question.

Q. *How does he take steps to restructure ###?*

P. By his next move. She sets up this kind of structure where she's going to be weak, and he's going to be supportive. The first thing he does is to violate that. He's rejecting her. As she pointed out, he doesn't give her what she asks for, so he's not going along with her structure.

So in these first few comments or interactions, you can see some jockeying in several respects: how it's going to go, who's going to have the say-so about how it goes. Now if you look at what connects to what, as far as we've gone, you see two connections. There are two of these descriptions that connect over here [Figs. 2 and 3], namely, the offer of reassurance and the rejection of the reassurance; and the affirmation of the authority and the rejection of the affirmation. So in terms of its being an interaction, these descriptions that connect across will be the primary account of the interaction. But the other descriptions don't just drop out. She is doing this and this and this [Fig. 3, diamonds 1, 2, 3], but it's these connections that explain how come she does this in response to what he does. She doesn't just come out of nowhere with this self-presentation. It is a response to him. That, as a response to him, gives us these descriptions.

So he's offering something and she's rejecting it. He's presenting something and she's rejecting it. And she is offering something in its place. That kind of sequence makes sense. It's familiar to us, we know how it happens, we know in general the kind of reasons why it happens, and that's what we see going on between these two people.

Now, had we stopped before we got to these, we would have nothing that connected across, and therefore no way of understanding how come, if he said that [F-1] she would say this [G-1].

Q. *On this safety thing, we're becoming more and more unsafe as we move out toward the larger diamonds, aren't we?*

P. Well, yes and no. Recall when we were talking about performance descriptions, I said it's a temptation to think that performances are better known to us than actions, and then I gave you the example of an action where you could easily say what action it was, and you'd have had a hard time saying what the performance was. With these kinds of things, up here [the larger diamonds] these are the kinds of things that often are the easiest to see, because that's the level at which you have to be seeing it in order to respond to it. You certainly don't have time to start from what he said and reconstruct all of this, in order to say something. What Gloria is doing, and what most people would do, would be to take what he says already as this [largest diamond]. This [F-1, G-1] is merely the performance. His behavior is that of doing these things [larger diamonds], and that's what you respond to. So in a sense, these [middle diamonds] are not less safe than these [largest diamonds].

On the other hand, clearly this middle level—you could probably get more agreement about these than about this [diamond 5]. Or not necessarily more agreement—that more people would see this than would see that. You would get some people that when you say this, would say, “Oh, yeah,” but they didn't see it. But they would see this [middle diamonds].

Q. *So you're kind of guessing on what levels they're responding to each other.*

P. No, you don't have to. You just generate these descriptions, and then you see what connects, and whatever connects, it looks as though that's what she's responding to, because why else would she do this [G-1]? You're still not saying, “I know for sure that that's what's really going on.” You're saying, “Look, these descriptions apply, and in terms of these descriptions, these qualify as responses to these. These [smaller diamonds] don't qualify as responses. So as a response, these have a special status. Under this description [diamond 4] or this [diamond 5], her behavior is understandable as a response to his, *if* you understand his as one of these [diamond 4 or 5]. So in that way, you get both the interactive parts and the non-interactive. This is what she's doing [G-1], but this is the sense in which what she does is a response to him. So you get both of these by just putting it all in.

Q. *Would you look at those other parts as reactions to her own self?*

P. Not reactions to her own self. These [Fig. 3, diamonds 1-31 are the kinds of things that tell you already something about her. What kind of person would react to that in these ways? What kind of person would have this sort of thing to say to somebody else? So these behaviors which are not directly a response to Fritz, these behaviors express her ID characteristics. And these descriptions are part of what Fritz has to go on when he responds to her. Remember, he better not be in the position of guessing what's going on in her head, because if we can't do it, he can't do it either. All he has to go by is that she sits there, smiles, and says, "Right away, I'm scared." So that's what each of them has to go by, is the very kind of thing that we say.

Q. *They're both bringing something to the situation with them.*

P. Exactly. You have to. You have to bring that background knowledge, or you don't know how to deal with what that other person does.




FIGURE 4

Okay, let's try—what is it he says? "You say you're scared, but you're smiling. I don't see how you can be scared and smile at the same time." We could take that as three behaviors, but let's lump them all together as one. So the first thing is that he says that to her.

Q. *Exposing an inconsistency.*

P. Mentions an apparent inconsistency. By mentioning, "You say this, but it looks this way," by mentioning that apparent inconsistency, he's challenging her description. He's saying, literally, "I don't see how things can be the way you say." By challenging that description, he automatically invites an explanation.

This is one of the points where Fritz is doing something phony—or rather, later when he says, "Look. I didn't ask you for an explanation. You're responding to the Fritz of your imagination, not the Fritz that's here." That's phony, because in that kind of context, to challenge a thing is to invite an explanation. And she was not being unrealistic in seeing it that way. Now he

may not have meant it that way, but—you may not have meant the insult; it's still an insult. He may not have meant that this way, but it was still an invitation to explain.

Q. *He also—he says, “I don’t understand how you can be scared and smile at the same time.” I think he thinks he understands.*

P. Yeah, and that's what she tells him. She says, “I think you understand,” and he probably does, so again he's—in that sense he's doing something phony, in that he's playing dumb, and that's the way he is telling her that she's doing, he's doing this. But again, he's doing it on purpose. He's doing it to provoke something.

Okay, let's make a quick one here [adds to Fig. 4, “reaffirms authority”]

Q. *Well, he tells her he understands right away, he understands that she's being phony.*

P. What he's doing here, he's failing to follow through on her invitation that this is how she wants to be treated, so this is a rejection of her structuring of how the interaction should go. By rejecting it, he reaffirms that he's going to decide how it's going to go. So here you get another connection: that she rejects his control and asserts hers. He now rejects hers and reasserts his.

I guess it's time to stop. We'll continue a little on this next time, and then go on to the case of Veronica.

SESSION 13

July 29, 1976

Peter: Is there anybody who now does not have either one of the two textbooks? Is that because it's not there, or because you haven't looked lately? You still have several days for it to come in, and just get it as soon as it gets here. We'll go over those theories in class, too. [Blackboard]


Study Freud not on exam

Re-read Jung not on exam

Monday, take-home, due Wednesday

Read 'em and weep.

Okay, we were reconstructing this interaction, and we got as far as Fritz's second response. Now let's go on to Gloria's second response.



She says, "I am also suspicious of you. I think you understand very well. I think you know that when I get scared, I laugh to cover up." [p. 155]

Now, let's do this one in three parts. Let's start with just the first one, "And I'm also suspicious of you." What is she doing by doing that?

Q. *She's afraid?*

P. Watch those big jumps. Like I said, don't be afraid of stating the obvious, and one of the obvious things here, she's continuing what she was saying before.

Q. *Do we have to elaborate on that and say, "Continuing self-presentation as a suspicious person?"*

P. No, this is good enough since you already know what the self-presentation was. About five seconds ago, she gave a self-presentation, and now she continues it. It's not going to change. She hasn't said anything that's incompatible, she is just continuing. If you want to, you can mention what she adds, namely, "suspicious", and that is a little different from the weak, scared, frightened, nervous, timid, etc.

Q. *She's kind of defending herself by weakening her stand, it seems like, by making her stand a little less extreme.*

P. I'm not sure "suspicious" is less extreme than afraid.

Q. *In a weak-strong continuum, it is.*

P. Where is somebody who's suspicious, on a weak versus strong continuum?

Q. *Less weak than afraid. I think she's picking up this challenge, and that's one way people ###*

P. Okay, you could say it's less weak, but that's reaching a little. It is true, but it is also reaching.

Again, don't be afraid to stay with the obvious. What follows from the fact that she continues her self-presentation is that she ignores what he said. If I'm saying something and then you say something, and I just keep on going, I've ignored what you said. So the next one up that follows directly from here is that she's ignored what he said.

Q. *Could you say that by doing that, she was maintaining a certain distance from Perls, social distance. In F-2, he seems to probe a little bit, and—*

Q. *What about she tries to explain?*

P. We're only doing the first sentence now, and the reason we're doing them separately this time is that she's doing different things in the three sentences. What's she doing by ignoring his comment and maintaining or increasing the social distance?

Q. *Isn't she still trying to keep her authority? I think maybe she's trying to ###, because she keeps away from it, she doesn't touch him by doing that.*

P. Remember, the self-presentation, when she did in her first comment, we saw was a way of structuring the interaction, and that, in turn, is making a controlling move. Now if she continues that self-presentation, it still has those features, and so it is still a controlling move.

Furthermore, it's more emphatic as a controlling move since she has ignored what he said in the meantime and just continues it. If you look at this, you draw the same conclusion about she's doing something that isn't all that weak, but it's not in terms primarily of what she says, it's in terms of what she does.

Now this [Fig. 1], once more, connects across to Fritz's behavior, this one [maintains social distance] and this one [reaffirms control, structure], whereas the others don't particularly connect.

Q. *Where would the "ignores F-2" connect to? The statement where Fritz mentions the inconsistency?*

P. Yeah. You can be darn sure that she's ignoring it, not that she didn't hear it, so if she doesn't do anything that is an overt response to it, she's ignoring it, because what he said definitely calls for a response from her, and as we'll see in the next two sentences, she does indeed respond to it. But she begins by ignoring it and instead, continuing what she was doing.




FIGURE 2

Okay, let's move on to the second *affirms control* sentence. And here she says, "I think you understand very well. I think you know that," and then trails off. What's she doing there? Remember, Fritz's number 2 is, "I don't understand how you can be frightened and smiling at the same time." Here she says, "I think you know very well. I think you understand."

Q. *Does she challenge it, then?*

P. Yeah, except there's one or two intermediate moves. If you start down low, what she does is describe Fritz or assign him a status of one who knows. If you put it that she assigns him the status of one who knows, then she is rejecting his claim to have the status of one who is puzzled or needs to understand. And so she rejects his demand for an explanation.

But you can also say that's an accusation. Somebody who asks for an explanation, who doesn't really need it, is in Fritz's word, playing dumb and being phony. And indeed, in ordinary contexts, if somebody asks us for an explanation, and we know they already know the answer, more often than not we say, "He has an ulterior motive, he's being phony here, he's playing games with me," or something of that sort. And once more, this is Gloria controlling the interaction rather than going along with him.

Notice that quite a few of these will connect, because he's made a self-presentation, and she rejects it. He's made a demand, and she rejects it. He's affirmed his control, and she rejects that and affirms hers. So in this one, there are several connections across.

Okay, let's go on to the third one. Here she says, "When I get scared, I laugh to cover up," or "I laugh and kid to cover up." What's she doing there?




FIGURE 3

Q. *Isn't she offering him an explanation?*

P. Right. She explains why she can be afraid and still smiling.

Q. *But she still doesn't turn over control to him, does she?*

P. No. Well, she does give him what he wants—what he asked for. By explaining why she can be afraid and smiling, she gives him the explanation which he asked for, and that one connects to his behavior of asking for the explanation.

Q. *When she sighs and does it, isn't she also still keeping the same self-presentation ### take care of me or whatever?*

P. You can get that from the posture, the sigh, which is not all that dramatic, and if you were just watching, you wouldn't immediately draw that conclusion, but knowing what she said, you can say that her posture, etc., fits. You can also, though, draw similar conclusions if you look at the sequence now, of this one [Fig. 1, p. 291], then this one [Fig. 2, p. 293], then this one [Fig. 3, p. 294]. In this one [Fig. 1], she ignores him and just continues right on with what she was doing, so you might say that's a strong rejection. In this one [Fig. 2], she overtly rejects his demand and tells him why. And in this one [Fig. 3], she meets his demand and gives him what he wants. So there's a sequence there from rejection to compliance. But it's not that at first she was fighting him and now she isn't. That's not the way it comes across, does it?

How does it come across?

Q. *I think she still wants control. I think she's still maintaining control.*

P. Yeah. How is she maintaining control, given that she winds up in this apparently compliant posture?

Q. *Because she's explaining it, but she's not saying that it's wrong or "I'm being phony" or "It's the correct thing to do to smile and be scared at the same time."*

P. Even so, that leaves her in a position of justifying herself in the face of his challenge, and if that was all that was going on, you would say, "Yeah, he is in control."

Q. *She's still keeping her self-presentation of "Please help me. I'm helpless, and—"*

P. Yeah, you could read that into it, that if she winds up with compliance here, one of the messages is, "I'm not going to keep fighting you," and that goes with the self-presentation that she's scared of him.

Q. *She's contrasting her sense of generosity ### he's wrong and she's blameless. There's something about she's nailing him and making sure she's totally innocent.*

P. Something along that line.

Q. *So he owes her something after that. I think.*

P. Okay, can we reconstruct that more plainly? You see, there is something about the sequence that has that flavor.

Q. *She's diverting him?*

P. Well, no, because she winds up giving him exactly what he asked for. But notice, only after telling him how unreasonable it is for him to ask it, and how phony it is, then she gives it to him. So in effect, she's—as Gideon said, she's being generous. She's presenting herself as the picture of sweet reasonableness, and she's going the last mile to give Fritz what he wants, even though he's being phony and unreasonable. So since she's giving it to him for free, because he's totally unjustified in asking for it, she's still in control.

Q. *She's initiating a ###.*

P. She's not initiating, because all of this is definitely a response to him. What it comes out as is that she's giving it to him for free, and therefore she's in control because it was her choice, he didn't force her to do it. But notice that that, too, fits the self-presentation of somebody who isn't going to fight Fritz, somebody who's really okay if he could only see that. And there is an accusing aspect to this whole thing. "If he can only see—", "If he wouldn't be the way he is, if he wouldn't be phony, "

Q. *But you also wanted that as giving in to her expectation of him, since she assumes he's the expert, that even though she thinks he understands, there must be a reason why he's coming across that way, "I'll give it to him and we'll see where it goes from here, "*

P. She might have that, but we're guessing, because that's not what she says.

Q. *Are both of those inferences ### to the meaning, both of the inferences—mine and the other?*

P. You see, the one fits what we know. The other is what you might call a blind guess that depends on something being so that we have no evidence for, but might be so. We have no evidence of what she thinks he thinks, except insofar as what they're doing exemplifies patterns that we recognize. In this sequence, noticing the public, the conventional, the face-value of the sequence is different from guessing what's in his head or guessing what she guesses is in his head.


Q. *It seems as if the aim of her control throughout the hour so far has been to get him to go easy on her, and so that idea of debt, that he owes her something after she's been so agreeable, is that the aim of it?*

P. It has that effect, too.

Q. *These are all behavior diamonds, right? ###*

P. Yeah, and you would need to connect something like that to all three, or at least more than one. You see, she's not putting him in her debt just by giving him the answer that he asked for. It's because she gives him an answer that he really has no right to ask that now he owes her something.

One of the other things you begin to pick up here is that she's not going to fight openly. She may object, but look, she winds up giving him what he wants. So that you wouldn't, at that point, expect the later interaction to be just a kind of a stand-off where both people are stone-walling. Here she has a good chance to do that if that's the kind of thing she's going to do, and she doesn't. So although that doesn't guarantee anything, you begin to expect that she's going to continue to act in this style.



Now he says, "But you have stage-fright." "Stage-fright" is one of Perls's technical terms. It's a term that gets at your self-consciousness, your awareness of what other people are thinking about you, and the inhibiting effect that that can have on you. In effect, he takes the common notion of stage-fright and incorporates it into his system without much change at all because it has exactly the features that he wants, namely, the inhibiting effect of having in mind what somebody else thinks about you. And that's exactly the central feature of stage-fright. But he then uses it as a technical term within his system. So here, it's hard to say how he's using it, and the safest thing—since we don't know—is to think of him using that simply as ordinary language and not as one of his technical terms. Because so far as we know, he has no reason to think that Gloria understands that as a technical term. It just happens it is.

What about that, “But you have stage-fright”? Remember, this follows her explanation, “When I get scared. I laugh or kid to cover up.”

Q. *Is he saying, “Continue along those lines”?*

P. He might, except to get that you’d have to put some intermediate step.

Q. *### trying to make a mockery of what she says, instead of taking it seriously? Stage-fright isn’t something you say it’s a big deal.*

P. Well, no, it has both aspects. Stage-fright—we recognize that people get stage-fright and it’s serious, in that it really is inhibiting and may ruin an important occasion.

On the other hand, it’s also clear about stage-fright that there is no real danger, and so in that sense it’s phony, and you’re making it up. So the notion of stage-fright carries both aspects of that.

Probably the first step you should put in is that he offers an explanation or interpretation of how she’s feeling.

Q. *### kind of like a stalling state of feeling.*

P. That one depends on the tone of voice. If he said in a firm, assertive tone of voice, “You have stage-fright,” that would be different from his saying in a more reflective voice, “But you have stage-fright.” It’s somewhere in between, I think, but Fritz’s style is more the assertive one, and you can take your pick how much you want to say he’s laying it on her.

Q. *Doesn’t it also imply that what she’s doing—that she must consider what she’s doing a performance?*

P. No. I wouldn’t take it that way. The essential feature, as I say, is simply the inhibiting effect of keeping in mind what somebody else thinks, and you don’t have to be putting on a stage performance for that. It can be any real-life activity. So I don’t think there’s the implication that it’s a performance.

Q. *If you say somebody had cold feet, you don’t say he has stage-fright. Like ### going to perform, like somebody in front of a class—*

Q. *It’s being recorded, and she knows she’s being recorded.*

Q. *I felt that way in the picture, some. Maybe she did, also.*

P. But remember now, this comes right after she has told him how she feels, and why; and if you suppose that he’s referring to the fact that this is a staged performance, then he’s bringing this out of nowhere. If this is

an explanation on his part, a reinterpretation or an elaboration on how she feels, then it's a response to what she said. There's nothing to keep it from being both. He might have chosen this occasion to bring in that comment about their setting, there, at a time when it was also appropriate in the conversation. So those two are not incompatible, and it could be he's doing both. In which case you would simply put a double thing here [Fig. 4, p. 167, second diamond]. And if that were the case, that would be more of a reassurance. Commenting that she has stage-fright is a little bit reassuring since it implies a recognition on his part of the kind of hard time that she's going through right now. So it would be more like a repeat of the first one, where by saying, "We're going to have an interview for half an hour," he's doing something reassuring.

Q. *I felt like he was challenging her when he did that, that he was putting her on the spot, putting her on the defensive.*

P. Okay, how?

Q. *He was asking her—but also I think that the transcript should be, "But do you have stage-fright?", not, "You have stage-fright," as if the only reason that she was doing all this with the smile stuff is that she's putting on a performance like she said, and if she wasn't putting on a performance, then she shouldn't have stage-fright, and therefore she shouldn't be smiling.*

P. How would you diagram that?

Q. *Maybe it would be a couple of levels up. I don't know.*

P. What would be the next connection? If he's giving her an explanation, one of the things to note is that it's a different explanation from hers.

Q. *Challenging her control?*

P. Well, he doesn't have to be challenging her control, although he might. If he gives back a different explanation from hers, one of the things he can be doing is challenging her explanation, saying, "This one is the right one instead of yours."

Now, if he wanted to give that implication that she's being phony and putting on a performance, then you would almost have to interpret this one that way, namely, that by giving her the different one, he's challenging hers. Because she certainly is not saying of herself that she's putting on a performance and being phony. So that line of development begins by saying it's a different explanation, and then challenges hers, and then offers an alternative. And if the alternative is the kind that you say, then that's an accusation

on his part that she's putting on an act and being phony. Except keep in mind that follows not just from the fact that he gives an alternative, but that he gives the one he does, namely, the stage-fright one, because not any alternative would do that job.

Q. *My reaction to it would have been—would be, his having called her a phony, in the sense that it's something that you can get over and not so much a real, conscious self-presentation.*

P. Yeah. The implication in stage-fright that the danger isn't real, you could read in here as a message of hope, that since the danger isn't real, you can get over it.

Q. *Could there be in any later diagram, could there be any element of a note of reassurance in using this terminology in the very beginning of our diagram? Could he not only be offering a different explanation, but also a note of reassurance?*

P. Yeah, almost any explanation, in therapy, will have that effect. The reason is that an explanation takes it out of the realm of the unknown and possibly unmanageable, and puts it in the realm of the known and presumably manageable; and a non-psychological explanation like that, an ordinary-language explanation, gives it the air of a practical problem that we know how to handle, and in that sense would be reassuring.

Q. *So even though he does later accuse her of being phony, he is reassuring her here.*

P. Now, at this point, ask yourself *how much of this did he choose?* We can give these descriptions and say, "These descriptions apply in some sense or another." If we now tried to guess about what's going on in Fritz's head, that is, how much of this had psychological reality for him, we run into some interesting issues.

Number 1, our best candidates for which ones have psychological reality are the ones that connect, because we know that psychologically he is interacting, he is responding. So any description of his behavior that *isn't* a response to her is going to be suspect—unless it connects to one, and that's what we've been doing here: we've been connecting them to one another, and some of them do connect to her. But clearly, the ones that connect to her are the best candidates for psychological reality.

Secondly, the outer diamonds are where we would normally find intrinsic social practices, and those are our best candidates for psychological

reality, too.

But thirdly, if we look at all of the descriptions we have—and this is probably particularly true here but it's true all the way through—look at all the descriptions we have, we could raise a couple of kinds of questions: #1: Did he really mean all of them?; and #2: If he didn't, were there some that he really meant and others that he didn't? The answer is, we don't know, and it doesn't have to be either one of those.

Q. *Would you repeat that, please?*

P. Does he really mean certain of those and not mean the others? For example, does he really mean this ["offers alternative"] and not that ["accuses her of being phony"]? Does he really mean only to offer this tenuous bit of hope because the danger isn't real but not mean the accusation? Does he really mean to offer reassurance in the sense that here's an explanation, but not in the sense that since the danger is unreal, you've got a chance to recover?




FIGURE 5

Come back to our notion of deliberate action and introduce the notion of ambiguous behavior. The notion of ambiguous behavior you could probably define, or at least clarify enough for our purposes, by saying: *an ambiguous behavior is one that could equally well be taken as either A or B.* Or: *an ambiguous behavior is one that could equally well be taken as any one of the behaviors that fall under the general kind X*—for example, that fall under the general kind 'reassuring'; or that fall under the general kind 'hostile'. You can make comments, you can engage in behaviors that could be read in a number of ways, all of which are hostile; or that could be read in a number of ways, all of which are sympathetic.

You would distinguish that kind of behavior by specifying incompletely, in this behavior description. If you had to diagram 'sympathetic behavior',

that would be like diagramming ‘fear behavior’; namely, that there would be particulars, but the essential features are content-free, the way that ‘danger’ and ‘avoidance’ are content-free.

Now, you can choose an ambiguous behavior for its ambiguity. You can pick your behavior just to be generally reassuring without picking it specifically to be reassuring in a particular way. And even though you wind up saying a particular thing, it’s not that you want it to be reassuring in a particular way, you just want it to do something reassuring. That gives you an ambiguity all within the range of a certain kind.

Take the next step, and imagine two very contrasting kinds, then imagine picking a behavior that could be seen either way, in two very different ways. Then think of picking a behavior because it has that ambiguity.

Q. *Sarcasm.*

P. Cases of sarcasm, irony, etc., are standard kinds of cases of things that can be read more than one way. But think of such a famous line as, “What do you want to do tonight?” Think of that as being read as an open, honest, enthusiastic invitation; or as an expression of boredom, or as an accusation of neglect. And then think of how one handles that kind of thing. If somebody says, “What do you want to do tonight?” you almost certainly have to place it in one of those categories, and then you treat it accordingly.

One reason why somebody might make a comment, or engage in a behavior, that had that ambiguity is precisely to give you a chance to pick whichever way you want it to go. And that happens a lot in normal human interactions.

It also happens a lot in therapeutic interactions. In effect, instead of a definite contract of “I’ll be this way if you’ll be that way,” you have an open-ended contract where “here’s the ball, you run with it”.

One of the values, then, of that kind of ambiguity is that in a social setting, in an interactive setting, it gives both people some say-so in what goes on. It isn’t a case of one person deciding and the other one just going along with it. Each one of them has a chance to get a say-so in it. So it has a positive social value. It has a value that you couldn’t get if you just chose definite behaviors with definite implications.

Q. *And also it has information value.*

P. Yeah, because when you see what that other person does, it has good diagnostic value.

Q. *It has additional character if you're making it as a response instead of the initial thing, as Fritz is doing here. It's unclear whether he's responding to her, ignoring her. There are a lot of things that are unclear here, and it's his ambiguous response rather than—*

P. And it gives her a chance to go one way or the other.

Q. *Among other things, it also gives her a chance to wonder what happened to what she said before.*

P. That's right.

Q. *She can get confused if she wants to.*

P. The main message, now, is that ambiguity is no less definite than definite behavior. You're making no less definite a choice when you say, "I want something that could equally be X or Y"—that's no less definite than choosing X. If you choose something that has the general character of X, that's still as definite a choice as saying, "I want Y." The definiteness of the choice comes up here in the clarity of the distinction, not in the amount of detail. Because the detail, you put down here.

When I decide to take a drink, here. I don't choose the detail of the movements, postures, movements, etc. I let them take care of themselves. When I choose to make a reassuring comment, I don't sit around and construct a sentence out of words. Once I decide what to say, the words come naturally. So when it comes to level of detail, that's taken care of here. The definiteness of the choice comes in the clarity of the distinction, and saying either X or Y is just as clear a distinction as saying X. Saying something of this general sort, X, is just as clear a distinction as saying something of this particular sort X, [change tape]

Q. *### that I'm able to make a distinction between the different kinds of sympathetic behavior, or the effects.*

P. No, any more than letting the movements take care of themselves implies that I can distinguish every possible move that I can make.

Q. *Then how does that make it ###? To me, it seems that there needs to be some kind of distinction between ambiguous behavior. Many times I would make a statement that has implications I didn't think about when I say it. In those cases, I didn't distinguish between those implications, but the performance had ambiguity. So is that ambiguous behavior?*

P. Well, is it? If it could have been taken either way, yes, it's ambiguous that way. However, you might say it was ambiguous but it wasn't chosen to be ambiguous. It's clear that behavior can be ambiguous because we've already seen how you can describe the same behavior in a variety of ways and not be sure whether it is. My point is that it can be chosen as ambiguous, and that that choice is just as clear—is no more unclear—than the other kind of choice.

Q. *So if I choose to make a somewhat vague self-presentation, then that could go one way or the other—for example, if I don't want to be too specific—*

P. If you don't want to make any promises.

Now let me turn the screw a final notch. All behavior is ambiguous. There is no behavior that couldn't be understood in more than one way. At least, there is no behavior that we're guaranteed couldn't be understood in more than one way.

Q. *That's not to say it's not purposeful, then?*

P. No, it's just that there is no guarantee for any behavior that it can be understood in only one way; therefore, even if there were by accident some such behavior, we'd have no way of knowing it.

Once you see that, you can then come back to the fact that people don't let things like that alone. Behaviors can be classified on a dimension of more and less ambiguous, and obviously there are some times when it's in our interest to have behaviors be as unambiguous as possible. So we introduce a distinction now between situational and conventional forms of behavior.

Think of any kind of thing that you might accomplish by expressing anger or expressing an attitude of deference, respect, or dislike. There will be conventional forms of expression. If it's anger, it's yelling, cursing, hitting somebody in the jaw, doing that kind of thing. Or saying, "I'm angry at you." Words have conventional meaning, so verbal behavior will always fall in the conventional category—at least under a first description, it will always be conventional.

Now, the value of conventional behavior is that it's unambiguous, relatively unambiguous. That's why if you want to get across to somebody how you feel, you will normally adopt one of the conventional forms of expression—because of its lack of ambiguity. So you either tell them, or you enact a conventional form of expression.

Q. *Do you mean conventional as opposed to ambiguous?*

P. No, situational. Think of that Dinner at 8:30. That is situational, in that it depended on those actual circumstances: serving steak well-done at 8:30 is not a conventional form of expression of hostility. Its being an expression of hostility depended on the circumstances in which it was done, and that's what made it an expression of hostility.

Notice that it's also ambiguous, in that if I had accused my wife of being hostile, she could have said, "Huh? What do you mean? We're just having dinner." I wouldn't be able to pin it on her, because indeed, it's ambiguous because there is another description which also is correct, and so she can claim that that's all there is, and there's no way to show that there's anything more. And yet, you know darn well.

Q. *And she knows darn well.*

P. So with situational forms of behavior, you get the, "Who, me? That's not what I was doing. Here's what I was doing."

The disadvantage of conventional forms of expression are that since they are conventional, they can be faked. Words have conventional meanings, so somebody can lie to you. There are conventional forms of expression of anger, so somebody can pretend to be angry when he isn't. So conventional forms make pretense easy. They make deception easy.

Now, the situational forms of expression have the kind of mirror-image. The disadvantage is that they are more ambiguous, but the advantage is that they are harder to fake. Somebody who really dislikes you is going to have a very hard time hiding that if you interact with him a lot. If you see his behavior toward you in a number of situations, it's unlikely that he will succeed in counterfeiting liking in all of those occasions, in all of those ways—in all of those ways that would come naturally and easily if he really did like you. And so you're very likely to pick it up if you're at all tuned in.

Q. *In other words, any expression is likely to have both situational and conventional aspects or components?*

P. Yeah. Except when you look at it, you can do a fairly easy job of classifying this one as basically situational, this is basically conventional. You have corresponding advantages and disadvantages: situational behavior is harder to fake, but it's also more ambiguous.

And there, again, is the kind of trade-off we're viewing. It stems from the fact that behavior is essentially ambiguous, and all you can do is take

steps to reduce ambiguity by having conventions, but that's as much as you can do.

Q. *Can you give an example of a situational form of behavior for, like, anger?*

P. The Dinner at 8:30 is one. That's exactly what it is. You see, if you were angry at me and you knew those things, you could get at me by giving me steak well-done at 8:30. If it was a different situation, if you were my lab partner in an experiment, you could get at me by faking the numbers.

So, depending on the situation, the different situations give you different opportunities to engage in hostile behavior; and if you're motivated, you'll see those opportunities and take them. If you're not motivated, it's hard for you to see them, much less take them convincingly.

Q. *Because conventional behavior can be faked more easily, it seems like it could also be more ambiguous from an observer's point of view.*

P. It's only ambiguous this way: either it's sincere, or it isn't. But it's not ambiguous about what it is if it is sincere. You might say *it's either X or it isn't*, but that's the only problem; whereas if you just watch somebody, you've got the question of *is it X or is it Y or is it Z, or is it A, B, or C, all of which are quite different?*

Well, you can see that on different occasions, your preference would run one way or the other. Sometimes you want the guarantee of sincerity, and you look for situational things, or you engage in situational behaviors. Other times, you want the lack of ambiguity, and you go for the conventional forms.

Q. *Can one ask about the situational expression if it's personal characteristics or ID characteristics? If one person always is very really ### when they're angry, that would be—if someone expresses their anger through, say, only a change in tone of voice, but expresses no conventional forms, they could still be angry, but you attribute the difference to ID characteristics or—*

P. Yeah. Where it shows up is not so much in the behavior as in the sensitivity. Some people will not recognize anger or boredom, etc., unless you tell them or do something equally conventional. Other people will pick up the slightest choice aspect of when you're feeling a little bored or when you're a little bit irritated, so the differential is not so much on the behavior side as on the cognitive side.

In fact, that differential is important enough practically so that we even have a jargon term for it in clinical practice: a person who looks for the conventional, explicit, you call the “nuts and bolts type”. Can you see it, touch it, feel it? “Why didn’t you tell me you were angry? How was I to know if you didn’t tell me?” This is the kind of thing you get.

You can see that as soon as you start allowing ambiguous behaviors, this whole interaction is going to take a sudden jump in richness, because it’s complicated enough when you work with definite descriptions like this. It becomes more complicated when you start putting in the kind of ambiguities, the kind of opportunities that each provides for the other, and which opportunities get taken.

We’ve been doing that informally, without recognizing what we’re doing, simply by connecting one to the other. We say, after all, one could have responded to Fritz’s opening move in a different way from the way that Gloria did. So her doing it that way is a selection from the possibilities that were open to her. All we’ve done here is emphasize that Fritz’s behavior indeed did leave those possibilities open because—like all behavior—it was ambiguous.

Q. *Can there be connections between Gloria’s descriptions and the descriptions that—you said that psychological reality is affirmed by connections between Fritz and Gloria—*

P. No. I just said those are among the best candidates, because it’s unlikely that she’s just oblivious to Fritz, so something about what she does connects to what she sees him as doing. And that kind of behavior would be one that connects.

Q. *The types of behavior that connect between Gloria’s descriptions of Gloria’s behaviors, would those also be good candidates for Gloria’s psychological reality?*

P. No. Only when you get to the point where they are engaging in a practice, then you could say that there’s a good chance that both of them know that they’re doing that thing together, and so that gives you connections between Gloria’s behaviors on two different occasions. But what we’ve seen so far, we haven’t seen any social practices take place yet, except minimally, because every time one of them starts something, every time one of them makes a Move 1, the other one rejects it and makes his own Move 1, and nothing yet has got started.

That’s why we don’t see strong connections this way, except between adjacent behaviors. A little farther down the line, they will start talking

to each other instead of jockeying, and then there will be more thematic development.

Q. *Looking at, like, hidden agendas, things that are going on with just one party that the other party isn't even aware of but that are spicing the interaction at least one-sidedly—*

P. The self-presentations and the efforts to control would fall under that heading. You can bet that thematically, the self-presentation that Gloria makes right in the beginning is going to appear in her behavior further down the line.

After all, remember, we've only looked at the first two interchanges of a lengthy sequence. You would get thematic stuff by actually going through and then coming back and looking for those connections. So you would go through the transcript and then come back.

Q. *There's one more thing about ambiguity of this kind. One way of looking at it is that it gives the other person a choice; but another way of looking at it, it's clear that he could say, "Well. I didn't mean it that way at all." It removes the choice to a certain degree.*

P. It just makes the choice risky.

Q. *What is this 'just'?*

P. It just makes it risky; it doesn't cut it off. That's the kind of risk that I was talking about last time. If you play it safe and don't take one of those choices, you'll wind up just at the level of "hello—hello— isn't it a nice day?". Now, you can jockey like this and look for clarification, etc., but at some point somebody has to tread water.

Q. *So if I wanted to change the subject, I could clear my throat, but it would be very risky for you to interpret it as a particular thing and respond very sharply to that.*

P. It might.

Q. *I might also be telling you that you were about to do something else—that kind of thing. This thing has some of that kind of character, how do you—is there any particular way that's—*

P. No. You see, the same general principles apply. That's why I emphasized that the choice is simply a choice of behavior, and all of the apparatus that we've developed, when we're working with definitely described behavior, will then apply. So you don't need any special way of diagramming it.

Q. *But if you want to say, by doing all this it increases the risks for her in taking that course, in a way it seems like that should belong in a bigger diamond.*

P. Yeah, right. If that's what you thought he was choosing his behavior as, or if you thought that it was clear enough that doing that had that effect, you would simply write it down.

Q. *That thing with those stages. I can think of behaviors that happen simultaneously, not in any connection to each other chronologically, like one thing happens now and in response to that, this happens—like musicians on a stage or something like that. How do you form connections between behaviors like that? It can't be—*

P. You simply go three-dimensional on this. You have the same problem in a football game. You've got 22 men doing different things on the field, it isn't simply sequential. You have to do this diagram for each of the 22, and in order to map each of the 22's behavior, then you get a third dimension in which you specify the contingencies, etc. That's just for diagrammatic purposes. In principle, you could put down every one of the 22 and every one of the stages, but that makes it messy. It's easier if you just add another dimension to the representation.

Now practice giving this kind of description on some of the rest of the transcript, because you may get that kind of exercise on that test. Keep in mind that take-home tests have to be different than if you're all sitting here, and this kind of exercise is well suited for a take-home exam. So do some practice, and even if it isn't on the test. I think you'll get something out of it.

Q. *Will we have a chance to know if we're doing it right or wrong on our own, before you give the test?*

P. How do you mean?

Q. *If we practice during the weekend, we may be completely off base in a lot of our comments—we've practiced but we're still not ready for the test. ### during class or something?*

P. Yeah. If you want—I'll tell you what. How about taking the section from G-3 to G-5. Do that over the weekend, and then if you like we'll go through it very briefly on Monday morning.

Q. *There are different interpretations for each diamond, so it would still be valid—*

P. Yeah. You see, what I said is, these are correct descriptions in that they're not false, and you have your observational capabilities to tell you that.

What you don't have is the psychological reality: which ones did he mean and which ones didn't he mean? Keep in mind, though, that one doesn't have to know that, because if we don't know it, neither does Gloria, and yet look, they behave toward each other in the way people do. So it isn't as though you had to know that for any normal purpose that people have with each other.

That's part of the riskiness in the ambiguity of behavior, is that there are possibilities, they are correct, but you don't know which is correct. You don't know which one the person meant.

Q. *So ### if it's pretty obviously an ambiguous situation, would not you just list those different possibilities within the same diamond?*

P. Yeah, that's what we do when we have more than one significance for the same behavior, we just come from the same diamond and put two answers, because it could be one or the other or both, and those descriptions do apply.

Q. *And if the two significances themselves have different significances, then you'd have to—*

P. Then you might as well put a second diamond and have two continuations, because it gets too confusing to have to connect this to here and then this to there.

Okay, mainly what I want you to get out of this exercise is qualitative. You're not going to become experts at doing this. But it is a chance to use some of the things that we've been talking about, and use it in what, even though it's staged, is pretty close to a real-life segment of interaction. Because that's what these things are for, is to be used with live people doing the kind of things that people do. So a little bit of exercise doing that is the right kind.

Similarly, for our next exercise, which is to look at the case of Veronica [Goldstein and Palmer, *The Experience of Anxiety*, 163-175]. I trust you've all read that case now.

The first thing we want to do is to ask: *what do we want to know?* Somebody only becomes a case in a case-book if there's something hard to understand. In the case of Veronica, there are some things that are

hard to understand, there are some things that are perplexing and that we would need to have answers to if we're going to wind up saying, "Yeah, we understand what's going on with Veronica".

So the first task is: what questions do we have? What questions do we need answers to in order to understand what's going on with Veronica? How about a list?

1. Why is Veronica afraid to leave home?—Why is home safe?
2. How connect to the first instance (shopping)?
3. What was going on in the first instance?
4. Relevance, if any, of family pattern (mother, grandmother. Veronica) to present symptoms?
5. Why *this* pattern of occurrences?
6. Why does Veronica leave therapy at the time she does?

Q. *What's causing Veronica's phobic reactions, or generalized phobic reactions, to being outside?*

P. Reformulate that to have no assumptions.

Q. *What's causing Veronica's fear reaction? Why is she anxious when she's outside? [P writes Question 1 on blackboard.]*

Q. *Why doesn't she leave home? You say she's afraid—that assumes there's fear.*

P. That's what she says. Okay, that's clearly a prime candidate. Why? Because that's her presenting symptom. Her being afraid to leave home interferes so much with her normal life—you remember that definition of pathology, that we say something is wrong, something needs to be done, she's sick.

Q. *The next question might be: How is that connected to the first instance of fear? [P writes Question 2 on the blackboard.]*

P. And what was that first instance?

Q. *She was shopping with her mother.*

P. The third one is pretty obvious, namely: What was going on in that first instance? [P writes it on the board.]

Q. *What's similar about the first instance and the instances that follow?*

P. That's this one [#2]. Now don't make up questions. The issue here is What question do you have about Veronica? not, What questions could you think up that might be interesting?

What questions do you have that you would need the answers to in order to understand Veronica and what goes on with her?

Q. *The significant interactions between her grandmother and her mother and Veronica when she was a child, in terms of the present symptomology. [P writes Question 4 on the blackboard.]*

P. "If any": we don't want to assume that any particular thing is significance or relevant. We want to ask, "Is it? And if so, what?"

Q. *That would fall under #2 also*

Q. *What about what goes on at home? What is she doing while she's at home? Why is home safe?*

P. That would be here [he adds it to #1].

Q. *What's the pattern of occurrences, if there is one ###?*

P. You pretty much know what the pattern of occurrences is, don't you? Because they are described there. What else would you need to ###? [writing #5 on the board.]

Q. *Why she leaves therapy right after she gets married?*

P. Better be sure of the fact, there. She leaves therapy when?

Q. *After she marries—*

Q. *No, before—*

Q. *And she called the therapist back to say she got married.*

P. So what's the question, then? Is there still one?

Q. *Why does she leave therapy at the time she does? [P writes #6.]*

Q. *So how do you decide which of these questions is not just purely interesting and not that you really need to know?*

P. You decide, that's why I said *don't make up questions*. If you need the answer in order to be satisfied that you know what's going on with Veronica, you ask it. If it's just a question of would it be nice to know...

Q. *But you're never going to know that unless you know what's going on*

before you ask questions.

P. Well, given the ambiguity of behavior, if it's not an essential question, you might be wasting a lot of time that could be better employed elsewhere, if you ask too many of these "wouldn't it be interesting" questions. And given the likelihood of finding a convincing answer, you want to cut that down as much as possible.

Also, part of the heuristic value here, since we're only going to do this case and not some of the others, is to get a feeling for what are the kinds of questions that are crucial, as against all of the possible questions that you might ask just out of interest or curiosity.

I think we did a pretty good job of the first three. They're pretty crucial in that you could hardly claim to understand what was going on with Veronica if you couldn't supply some answer to each of these three. From there on out. I think we're getting borderline, we're getting more into things that would be interesting, but they're not on the same order as the top three.

For next time, review this list, decide whether you've got any additional important ones and whether you want to keep all of these, because we're going to work to generate answers to each of these. So every one that you want to maintain, you're going to have to work for.

Q. *What you need to do is to choose the main problem that you want to deal with, with Veronica, and then if she has any other—*

P. No, not the main problem you want to deal with. What you need in order to understand her.

SESSION 14
August 1, 1976

Peter: Did anybody have any trouble doing those responses?

Q. *You might give us some idea if we wrote the right things for it?*

P. Where did you start?

Q. *G-3 [p. 274].*




FIGURE 1

P. Okay, start with G-3. What did you do with G-3?

Q. *Not accepting ###.*

P. The first thing is the sentence; the second thing is the self-description.

Q. *Breaking it up into pieces?*

P. You can do it either way. There's enough unity in the whole string of sentences to do all at one time. If you want to, you can do it one sentence at a time, and you'll see a lot of commonalities. So if you take it all at a time, you'd have at least these kinds of things, that she is giving content here in that description; that's why it's not just a self-presentation, but also—given what she's done—this is a self-presentation, too.

Q. *What about her saying, "I don't know." He's telling her she has stage fright; by saying "I don't know", she might have been rejecting?*

P. Yeah. Ordinarily you'd say she's sloughing it off.

Q. *Yeah, like trying to avoid that ###?*

P. You don't need to go any further. You can if you want to, on it, because the thing that does come through clearly is that she's rejecting the suggestion. In that sense, you still have the issue of the control move. Beyond that, it's hard to say. You can make a lot of interesting guesses, but don't guess. Go by how it looks and pass up all of the interesting possibilities.

Q. *Could you distinguish between self-description and self-presentation?*

P. Any self-description will count as a self-presentation in general. You just decide which you want to emphasize, whether you want to emphasize the information in the content or whether you want to emphasize the communication of "here's who I am". Again, in early encounters, it's more likely to be a self-presentation than in later encounters. So since this is still just her third thing, and she has been doing some self-presentation, it's hard to get away from seeing this as a continuation.

Q. *Are you going sentence by sentence?*

P. You can do it sentence by sentence.

Q. *What are you doing?*

P. Up here, I put them all together.

Q. *When he offered, "But you have stage-fright," I looked at that at one of the higher levels as expressing his professional role as a clinician, and when she said, "I don't know," I also added in there that she took that, as well as not accepting his assessment, she wasn't accepting his status.*

P. Yeah. One of the ways that you can do this is by interpolating fictitious content that rounds out the statement and gives you a clear statement. For example, in that one it would be very easy to say, "I don't know," and then in parentheses, "And you don't know either." And then the force of it comes out much more clearly if you put in that kind of thing. Saying "You don't know either" is just another way of getting at what she's saying by saying that. So if you want to use a device like that, you can do that, too.

Q. *That doesn't count as guessing?*

P. No, not per se, because if you have a clear enough basis for it, you can say it, and if you tortured the language you could put it in this form.

The issue about guessing or not guessing is not the form you put it in, but whether there's enough there for you to say it looks that way, versus "gee, it might be what way". And if it's only a case of "gee, it might be that way", you're guessing. So, one of the things that you need is to have a sense of the difference between "it looks that way" and "it might be that way".

Now, the reason it's important is that when it comes to "it might be that way", it might be almost anything, and you get lost in a mass of mere possibilities. So when you go by "it looks that way", you have some guidelines out there.

Q. *Sometimes people don't say what they mean, so how do you know that she's ###?*

P. You don't, and in the case where she's not saying what she means, you simply have a contrast between what she's doing by saying it, and either what she says or what a person normally is doing by saying that.

The classic case of that is where somebody says, "Yes. I'm absolutely sure," and you say, "That's an expression of uncertainty," because she's being too emphatic or something like that. Because just think of what it would take, what you would have to have available in terms of other knowledge, other facts, in order to say of somebody that he wasn't saying what he meant. You'd have to have enough facts for it to look that way, because if you just encounter that out of the clear blue, you'd take it that he meant what he said.

Q. *If interpolating fictitious content, like, "Well, and you don't know either," is acceptable, then why is it not acceptable to say that she is taking objection to his self-portrayal?*

P. It is. It's a different way of saying exactly that, and it's precisely because you could have put that at the next diamond that you can also interpolate down at the lower diamond. If you ask *what was she doing by saying, "I don't know."*?, one of the answers is *she's rejecting his status as an expert*.

And, as a matter of fact, don't leave that out. The interpolation is just to bring it out more clearly, but the next diamond is, and because she says that, what's she's doing is rejecting his status as expert. It just comes through more clearly if you add some of that interpolation, and the reason is that you take it you're not adding, but rather that she only expressed part of what she had in mind. But you don't need to do any of that, you don't need to do any interpolating. If you see a chance to make it clear by doing that, that's okay.

Q. *It just kind of seems that the object of making a behavior description should be to make it as clear as possible; and, therefore, if there's opportunity to ###. I mean that would be my evaluation of it.*

P. Yeah. What I'm trying to get across is that something like that is not a routine device. You use it on occasion when it seems appropriate, in the sense that it does indeed make it clear. But you can't routinely do that and get any mileage out of it. So that's why I'm saying you can use it if you see a chance—go ahead and use it, but don't think you have to. In contrast, the diamonds you do have to, and those you can routinely use.

Any other problems with this response here?

Q. *I added—I'm not sure if this is guessing or not—I picked up on it on seeing that Fritz was talking about her being a little girl and she gets into the corner and would like to be rescued, and ### one of the last levels of significance. I have "trying to reduce anxiety associated with the situation".*

P. Which response is this?

Q. *This is G-3, she says that she's afraid he's going to have a direct attack: "You're going to get me in a corner and I'm afraid of it. I want you to be more on my side." So up until that time, if you had just given me F-1 through G-3, I might not have said that; but knowing what he said further on, through the transcript. I picked up on that theme, and I was wondering if that's guessing. Is Fritz guessing?*

P. Well, I would say it's guessing, but I wouldn't argue that too strongly. I think it begins to fall in that range where you say, "Well, there are different ways of looking at it, and different people will see different things". At that point, I don't see a clear enough basis for saying that she's doing anything about anxiety.

It's much more clear that she's back to the self-presentation and control, because she's had a self-presentation going in Response 1. She continues it in Response 2. She continues it in Response 3, and here she puts it about as clearly as you ever get it: "Look, this is the way I am. I'm afraid you're going to do that. I want you to do this." Now, that doesn't sound frightened or anxious, it sounds like she's directing traffic.

Q. *Well, she says, "I'm afraid." That's why I just assumed there was some sort of anxiety, and I just said "anxiety", and I didn't try and pinpoint it as being afraid of Fritz or being afraid of herself or being afraid of ###.*

P. At this point, it might help to look back just at those three descriptions, and ask yourself: do the three descriptions of her three responses—do they look like somebody who's afraid? I think the answer is *no*. She's doing too good a job of staying in there, of presenting, of controlling, of rejecting—

Q. *But that just may come out of it, you know. You get obsessive-compulsive kinds of behaviors arise out of anxieties, and—*

P. Yeah, but look, remember the general effect that fear has on you. It lowers your skills, it lowers your attention, it lowers your effectiveness, it has (in general) a destructive effect.

Q. *That's when it's overwhelming.*

P. No. Even moderate anxiety, unless you're doing simple things, will have a tendency to reduce your effectiveness in the very kind of things that you normally do. And when you see as flawless a performance as this, it just doesn't look like any kind of anxiety. Which is not to say it couldn't be there.

Q. *We shouldn't believe her, then. She says in G-1, "I'm scared." She says in G-2 she's suspicious, and she's laughing to cover up. She says in G-3 she's afraid. Now that's a problem there, because now you're saying, "Don't believe her." I'm just saying anxiety can be ###.*

P. All I'm saying is that so far, even though she's said it, she doesn't look it. I'm not saying she's not scared or anxious, but I wouldn't take it that she's scared or anxious just because she says so. And when I look at what she's done so far, she doesn't look any of these. She's doing too good a job.

That still leaves room for *yeah, she really is*—I'm not saying she really isn't—but neither at this point would I say it looks like she is. But you're right. There is a good possibility, and because there is a good possibility, I wouldn't argue too much with somebody who says, "It looks to me that way."

Q. *I just saw it's a ### for that fear reduction.*

P. Well, it could be. If I was going over your thing, I would just put a question mark on it. I wouldn't count it wrong. I would say that's a questionable judgment, that's the kind you would want to negotiate, maybe.

By the way, you recognize that when we're into these descriptions, we're into descriptions that could be correct or incorrect, and that, therefore, what I said about *different people will see different things*, and the possibility of negotiating disagreements and getting resolutions, all of those things apply to descriptions like this.

Q. *That only applies to agreement—negotiation only applies to agreement. You can't alter correctness.*

P. You negotiate when you disagree, and in this case, where he says, "Well, it looks like she's anxious," and I say, "No, it doesn't look like she's anxious. So far, it only looks like a self-presentation," that's Stage 1—an apparent disagreement about whether it looks like she's anxious.

Q. *If you both have correct descriptions, a compromise is not necessarily going to be any more correct.*

P. No. In fact, it probably would not be correct. The point is that: at that point, we're into the first stage of an apparent disagreement, and we could find out whether we really disagreed by negotiating. Okay, anybody else have any questions or problems with G-3?

Q. *Do you diagram her putting her hand on her chest like a little interlude? It's going from that thing to the next thing. She doesn't say, "Hand on my chest," but he comments on it.*

P. If you were doing this sentence by sentence, you would, in effect, do those simultaneously, unless there was some other effect, like we say in the other one. Basically you would bracket them as, "These are the different things she's doing there," and then one of these would simply be putting her hand on her chest, and that's a Performance only.




FIGURE 2

At face value, that's all you have. Now if it looks to you like an expression of anxiety or something like that, then you can put that in here [X].

Q. *If you feel like she's gesturing, pulling toward, or pleading, "Please help me," can you say that?*

P. Yeah, but if you're going to do that, you might as well assimilate it to the self-presentation and just give a Performance Description. You connect the performance to this [bottom diamond in Fig. 2], which indicates that the performance is *this* kind of performance, of "poor me" or something like that. One of the main reasons for doing it separately is if you're following the division of verbal and non-verbal. Sometimes it is of interest to do the non-verbal behaviors that you can spot, and then do those separately from the verbal and see if there's anything shows up in the one as against the other.

Q. *So if they're the same, it doesn't—*

P. If they're the same, then this one [the non-verbal] hasn't added all that much and you might as well just incorporate it. Likewise, if the major things you get out of these four are all the same, you might as well just lump them together.

Q. *And the way you do that is not only include what she says in the Performance Description, but ###.*

P. Right.

Okay, what about Fritz, now? Anybody have any problems with "you said I get you into a corner, and you put your hand on your chest"?

Q. *Wouldn't you ask—finish that one with saying something about she's trying to control the situation? Are you implying that in saying ### self-presentation?*

P. Yeah. One of the virtues of this kind of thing is that it's neutral. You don't say she's trying it; you're simply saying she's doing something for which that description fits. She is doing something that has that kind of influence on what goes on, namely, it influences, it controls. And it is not a continuation of his. That's why we say it's a rejection of his move.

Now, whether she means it or not, it is of that sort. You remember, last time I raised the question *since that's so, it does leave you, from time to time, with questions*, "Well, but which one does she really mean?" And less often than you might suppose, that makes a difference. By the time you get through seeing which descriptions apply, you normally don't have many questions at all about which one did he really mean? and which one did she really mean?

Okay, what about F-4? "You said I get you in the corner and you put your hand on your chest."

Q. *He's correcting her, and he's trying to come back to the way he wants the conversation to go.*

P. Again, the earlier ones are fairly trivial. He says this [F-4], that's a comment on the contrast or the connection, because he brings them together; and as before, this is an invitation—at least, if not a demand—for an explanation of the connection. By doing that, he's ignoring her “treat me gently”, because this is not gentle treatment.




FIGURE 3

And in ignoring that, he's challenging her self-presentation, and that's questionable but we'll put it in; and he is once more coming back to he's going to control this interaction.

Q. *I didn't see it that way.*

P. What did you have on that?

Q. *When you said that, I was paraphrasing her fear and describing physical movement, that was the lowest beside the actual sentence.*

P. That's the comment in which he brings those two together.

Q. *This is where I depart. Through that, he communicates the importance in those behaviors. Again, I saw him as asserting the clinical role. Out of all those behaviors available to him, he picked those to make a comment on, to describe.*

P. [adds “implies importance” to Fig. 3] Yeah, you could put an additional one on top of it. You see, asking for an explanation does suggest that it's important.

Q. *Then he asserts his role, that's the control part.*

P. There's two things to the control: the authority that goes with his role and the actual control.

Q. *Couldn't you ###?*

P. In the sense of deciding what goes on and how it's going to go, and so far those two have gone together consistently; whereas with her, it's the self-presentation and the control. It's via the "poor me" self-presentation that she is constantly making controlling moves here. Because the control consists of "I want you to treat me that way".

This fluctuates, but as you pursue the thing through, at many points it gets very easy, because you're taking advantage of the flow and the continuity. At other places, where there isn't that flow and continuity, then it becomes more difficult again.

In this case, I think we have the advantage of what's been going on up to this point, and it makes it very easy just to sort of write those right off. As a matter of fact, you need to watch that, because sometimes you do that, and you overlook something that was going on, just because this one was so easy.

And the same in the actual interaction. If you're sitting there responding, it's very often easy to respond to something and miss something else that's going on.

Q. *I added something after "asks for an explanation". I put down, "It's such a common analogy between putting her hand on her chest and crawling into her corner," and later he goes on and asks her, "Is this your corner?" and she goes off on a tangent. Do you put that into your "asks for an explanation"?*

P. Yeah, except don't use hindsight. From what happens later, that is a good bet—it's a moderately good bet—but if you didn't know that what happened later had happened, would it still look that way?

Q. *He makes sort of an analogy between—"You said you get into a corner and then you put your hand on your chest", making an analogy between getting into a corner and putting her hand on her chest.*

P. Okay, there you have an option. In the one, there's a connection like in the other case. There's not an analogy between smiling and being frightened, there's a connection. And he says, "What is it?" Whereas here, you can say: *what he does is to make a connection between the two, and he asks, "What about that connection?"*—which is what he did before.

Or what you're saying is: *he's drawing a parallel between them, that he's providing the answer to what the connection is, namely, that the one is a parallel to the other.*

Now, if you introduce that, then it wouldn't come through as asking for an explanation, because he's given the answer to what the connection is, and then you wouldn't get any of these others.

So you take your pick at this point, because this one will rule out a lot of the others [e. g., challenge, control].

Q. *Again, couldn't it just be that—like the one before, where he asked her something and she says, “You know the answer,” couldn't he be doing that again, and still get all those other things? He's still asking, “Is this a parallel for you, even though I know it's a parallel for you?”*

P. He could be, but again, it's not like the other one, where part of why she says, “I think you know,” is that we all know. We all know about laughing when you're nervous, and so somebody who acts innocent and says, “How can you be laughing if you're nervous or afraid?”—we automatically take it that he knows it, and therefore, it's a funny question.

A connection like this doesn't have that same solid basis for saying, “Yeah, you already know the answer.” It would be hard for him to carry that off. He would almost have to be giving her the answer in the sense of presenting it as an interpretation or something. Again, if you started out that way, that would be one of our options of what else to say about it.

Fortunately, you don't have to be right every time, because the mark of having gone off is that you simply have a bunch of descriptions that don't really connect much anywhere, and so they haven't done you any good. But unless you keep doing it, you pick up again. So if you got a description that just kind of led nowhere, either that was a behavior that was an interpolation and really didn't connect; or you have a bad description and missed out on something; but you pick it up again.

Q. *And it's one indication of correctness that you're able to connect the descriptions?*

P. Yeah, it's a fairly strong guideline, because, almost invariably, you can find a good one that connects. Occasionally it looks like something just got tossed in, and there's no reason why it couldn't. But if you have too many of those unconnected ones, you'd better do some reviewing.

Q. *If someone has just very disparate behaviors, they're going everywhere,*

then the description of their behavior will not have connections as well, right? And could still be correct.

P. Right.

Q. *Wouldn't they still have connection, if they were in that sort of state ###?*

P. It would be a commonality, but we're talking about a connection between his behavior and hers. If she was just confused, she wouldn't be responding to him, and there would be that commonality in her behaviors: that they were non-responsive, they were confused, they were this and the other; but you wouldn't see her responding to him.

Well, how about G-4?

Q. *I have the sentence "then affirms Fritz's paraphrase as being correct". The thing about that, I think, is that she invites Fritz to communicate the clinical significance of those remarks. And then the significance of that is all of a sudden she's jumped into a patient role, where now she's acknowledging—no, that might be out of line. I was thinking that she might be acknowledging Fritz's role as the expert, because now she's attaching some significance to his statement by doing that.*

P. This is one where you probably need to remember the tone of voice as she said it. It was not an affirmative "uh-huh", it was more of a non-committal or even—you might even think of it as a sloughing off "uh-huh". I think the most you can say is that she's not fighting, up here.

Q. *That she was choosing not to explain things to him?*

P. Or to put it differently, I don't think that when he said that, it had any impact on her. She just kind of shrugged and said, "Uh-huh," in contrast to the other one, where it clearly did have an impact.

And when you come right down to it, why would anybody be curious or comment on this? You say you're afraid, and you put your hand on your chest—that is different from "how can you be afraid when you're smiling?" That has a clear implication, and it's clearly understandable as something to comment on, but this one—it's like my asking you, "How come you're holding your finger like that?"

Q. *It may have some clinical significance, though. As a lay person, she's coming in and here's this guy with a Viennese accent—*

P. And a beard.

Q. —*and a beard, who looks like he knows what's happening, and when he makes a statement, you tend to attach some significance to that. You think, "Well, he's not just pulling it out of the air." And I took it as kind of an indication that she didn't know what he was doing—*

P. Like I said, at least she's not hiding it.

So this is the first time that she hasn't made counter-moves. She just sort of dead centered.

But also, I think you had a good idea, but you want to trace it back one more. When you say she finally gets into the patient role, indeed, this is about the first time that they haven't just been jockeying. But notice what it follows: that he starts using her language. She says, "I'm afraid you'll get me in a corner," and then he asks something about that corner. So he's picked up on something she's done, and now, lo and behold, she's a little more cooperative, too.

If you continue with F-5 and G-5, this is the first place where you could say they're into a normal conversation, in that there is something they're talking about rather than jockeying around. So indeed, you can say *at this point it begins to look more like traditional therapist and client.*

Q. *So that at G-4, could you just have a two-level diamond, and say that she avoids confrontation or avoids a challenge and just leave it at that?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *And then to on to F-5?*

P. Yeah. You see, that "uh-huh" is one of those ambiguous behaviors that we're talking about. It can be taken as putting a stopper but a mild one; it could be taken as an invitation to go ahead since she hasn't put any stoppers; it could be taken as an attempt to be neutral; it can be taken as a mild recognition of his authority. You can read it a lot of different ways. What they all have in common is that it's not a strong move. Qualitatively, you can read it a lot of ways but whichever way you read it it's not a strong, definite move.

Q. *### the tone of voice there?*

P. Yeah. The tone of voice, as I say, is missing, and if we had the tape here and replayed it, my recollection is that you'd be less inclined to see it as a simple affirmative, and would read it more as a mild negative or an attempt just to ignore it.

What about F-5, "Is this your corner?" Now he's bringing out that

connection, of the parallel, that her doing this is her being in that corner that she wants to be in.

Q. *Can you just say that he's asking for further explanation, and the significance of that is probing into her ideas?*

P. No. You can, but you're missing that he hasn't just asked for an explanation. In effect, he's offered one. In effect, this is a trial balloon on his part, and the trial balloon is the idea that her doing this is a self-protective gesture.

Q. *By using her language, would he give this indication?*

P. No, just from what he says, "Is this your corner?" The suggestion that this is her corner is suggesting that her doing that is a self-protective thing, since what she's described for her corner is the corner where she would be safe. So he's trying that out on her. It isn't just that he's asking for an explanation; he's really trying out this one and asking, "How about it?"

Q. *Okay, so if we said that he was asking for a further explanation, that he was probing into her ideas, then you could go one further and say to bring out by probing into her ideas, he's trying to bring out his interpretation.*

P. "Probing" is a little strong. It hasn't got that much of a thrust. That's why I say it's kind of like a trial balloon, and she can shoot it down if she wants. But it's his idea, so it's not just asking. He is trying something.

In that sense, yeah, he's probing. But for an anchoring point on the probing, just imagine a prosecuting attorney pointing his finger and saying, "Now, isn't it the case that on the night of the 24th, this is what you did?" Well, that's not the way this comes across.

P. Okay, how about G-5 now?

Q. *F-5, you just agreed that it was just a trial balloon? Or he was trying to guide her?*

P. No, just a probe, a trial balloon, with the invitation to her to provide an answer. You see, he asks her, so that calls for her to answer. And that's what she's responding to when she says, "Well, it's like—yeah. I'm afraid."

Q. *### the power to, in the sense that he's the one who's doing the explaining, saying "Look, this is just the way it is," he's got control. Do we keep carrying that part through in our explanations? Because it's kind of implicit in there.*

P. Well, no. You see, once it stops being an issue, you kind of drop that, because there's no point in carrying all the way through that each time he

does something, he's acting like a therapist, or that he's doing what goes with his role as a therapist. It's only when it's something over and above just that, or when it's an issue.

Well, notice that G-5 is again back to the same presentation, but now without the "I want you to treat me that way" implication. Now it comes out as an answer to his trial balloon of, "Isn't it that way?"

Q. *It's like, in the first sentence, she was at a loss, like she's lost control, she didn't expect him to react that way; and in the second sentence, she sort of returns back to her terms.*

P. Yeah, if you just looked at the first one, it's definitely a non-answer, and you might say *she's at a loss*. At least there's nothing definite that she's going to do with that question of his. And then coming back to the presentation of "I'm afraid": formally, it is an answer, but that may be just a way of getting off the spot, because it doesn't look like a good answer. An attorney would say that's non-responsive.

Q. *Maybe she's just kind of asking him to confirm that she really doesn't know?*

P. No. I think the "you know" is an idiomatic device, it's not doing much.

Q. *You don't think we can read something into it, like—*

P. Like what?

Q. *Like a confirmation of "I'm afraid, you know. You know that? Will you confirm that you really agree that I am?" And again the gesture.*

P. That would depend on the tone of voice, and not the tone of voice but the phrasing of the sentence. Because if it has that significance, it comes out as a separate phrase, "You know," or—

Q. *Put in a comma.*

P. Yeah, but that's the kind of sentence. [laughter] There are no commas on the transcript. The more is just added on, a continuation of the same sentence, you know—like that—the more you don't give it a separate significance, and I really don't recall that well, except if I had a guess, I would vote for the run-on, not much significance.

Q. *Except that there's a question mark, which means that she's asking him to accept her evaluation. I sort of felt like she's asking him to accept her evaluation and not push the issue any more.*

P. Yeah. You can say that without having to depend on the interpretation of ###. You see, she is offering him an answer in that sense: this is what she wants him to accept.

Q. *You say she's offering an answer. Isn't that going beyond description and finding a connection between something that happened previously?—between an answer and a statement before? Is that still considered a description, by calling it an answer?*

P. Yeah.

Look: what we're doing routinely by going up the ladder with these diamonds is starting with a small context, and as soon as we go from here up here, we are bringing in other facts, we're bringing in a larger context.




FIGURE 4

Q. *The facts are coming out of what's in the circle on the inside, right? No, the facts are coming out here (larger circle). That's why when you bring these additional facts to bear, you get a new answer about what she's doing. Then when you add some more, the facts out here [larger circle] are what give you a new answer. So the movement up here [on the diamonds] is in effect enlarging the context.*

Q. *But isn't one enlarged out of the other?*

P. No. That's why you can't deduce going up here [small to larger diamonds]. You're not working with the same set of facts, and as soon as you ask *what are you doing by doing that?* you're allowing now additional facts; and that's what gives you the answer. You're basically working parts and wholes. But that's why you as an Observer have such a major contribution: it's because you have to bring in relevant facts. They aren't just right there in the words that she utters, sitting there.

Q. *They can include previous—*

P. They can include the previous context, they can include general knowledge about this kind of situation.

That, I think, is probably enough to give you a sense of how you do these things.

Now let's turn to the case of Veronica. You can regard this one as an intermediary exercise.

The major thrust of the field of personality, in studying personality, is not to understand behavior, but to understand persons. It just happens that to understand persons, you won't get very far unless you understand their behavior; but there is a difference between simply diagramming an interaction and saying, "That was what was going on between these two people," versus doing a case analysis where we, in effect, reconstruct Veronica's life history; reconstruct what kind of person she is; and use that in explaining why she does certain things; and why certain things had the effect it did on her. Doing that, you wind up understanding Veronica, not just understanding what she was doing on a given occasion.

At the same time, if you remember the questions that we had on the board, of the first three, we had two major ones—one, *why was she afraid to leave home?* and the other *what was she doing on that first episode at the department store?* And then the third of those first three had to do with the connectedness: *how did the whole thing develop?* [change tape]




FIGURE 5

So what we have here is a picture of a life history, and we enter at a certain point [X], namely, the point at which Veronica comes to the clinic; and then we're giving a rehash of selected facts backward; then some later history about the course of therapy at the clinic. So the account kind of brings us in here [X], and it's at this point that you have the problem, namely, that she's afraid to leave home.

But we're also given some clearly relevant facts back here [diamonds on the left], that she's been afraid for some time; that before the time that she was afraid to leave home, she was able to go out but would get panic attacks at various times and places; and at those times she would come back home. So this particular condition of being able to leave home extends back in time.

There's a sequence of events prior to that that clearly connects, and then what's of interest to us is the first time that panic-attack type of thing

happened. And that's the episode in the department store. Now that makes that particular behavior a strategic one to examine because:

(1) it looks as though the same kind of thing was going to happen later on from time to time, and

(2) it clearly connects to the later change of being afraid to leave home.

So for beginners, let's look at that behavior in the department store.

You recall the description of that was that this was around Christmas time, the stores were crowded; she was out there with her mother, and they were in a large department store. And one of the relevant facts about her mother is that her mother was the kind of person who would give clerks a hard time. And this would embarrass Veronica. And on this occasion, nothing of that sort had happened, but Veronica was sure that it was just a matter of time, so she wasn't feeling that good about it.

Somewhere in the middle of their shopping, Veronica had this great urge and just took off and went home.

Now, I think that in the case history, you have a discrepancy: that in one place, I think, it suggests that she was standing there with her mother and took off; and in the other, it sounds like her mother went to the rest room, and while the mother was there, Veronica took off.

Of the two, if you had to decide which was more plausible. I think the rest room is. Because if they'd just been standing there, and Veronica started walking off, you would expect the mother to say, "Hey, where are you going?" or something like that. I don't think much hinges on which of those two it was. Veronica's explanation was, "I don't know why I did it. I just got the urge. I just had the impulse,"

That's pretty much the background of that original behavior. So let's start with, what was the behavior? She left the store. Now what? What's she doing by leaving the store?




FIGURE 6 - Fear Behavior

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t
or

Q. *Relieving anxiety or attempting to relieve anxiety.*

P. What anxiety?

Q. *Of being embarrassed.*

Q. *Would you say just getting away from her mother?*

P. Well, that's one of the things you want to decide. If you want to tie the mother in this quickly—you see, you can say *she was just avoiding embarrassment*. Or you can say *she's getting away from the mother* and then go to: *by getting away from the mother, she's avoiding the embarrassment that would be caused by that*.

Let's put that in. At this point, embarrassment or the possibility of embarrassment is like the lion—that is, a danger to be avoided. So if she's avoiding danger—

Q. *Even though there is no actual danger?*

P. No, the danger is there. It's just that there's no actual embarrassment; but the danger of it is clearly there. We're told that she was convinced it was going to happen. You might say *she's in danger; she just hasn't been hurt yet*. But neither have I been hurt when that lion walks in. That's when you have a chance to avoid it.

Q. *So we're seeing embarrassment as her—as something that would hurt her.*

P. Yeah. That's why it's something to be avoided, it's dangerous.

So far, we have a case of fear behavior, right? Suppose we start it all over again and ask *how else could we describe that behavior?* We start again by saying *she leaves the store*, and what other description would apply?




FIGURE 7 - Hostile Behavior

Q. *What it does to her mother. Obviously, being away from her mother, her mother is very angry, and she obviously knew that would happen.*

P. What's the mother angry about?

Q. *She was left. At least that's one level.*

P. Part of the anger on the mother's part is: if you were out shopping with somebody, and they just took off, that does leave you with the problem of how to get home, and things like that. So it is the kind of thing that the mother would get angry at.

Q. *Well, she had a lot of hostility towards her mother, for whatever reason, and that would be one way of letting her know.*

P. That's right. You see, at this point, you look at this and you say, "Provocation elicits hostility." Now because you have that, seeing something that looks like hostility leads you to look for the provocation; and if you can't find it, that's grounds for not being that sure that this is hostility. The question is, what is the provocation? If this is hostility, what's the provocation?

Q. *The way the mother brought her up?*

P. No. You see, one thing about explanations: oftentimes you need to explain not merely why something happens, but why it happens when it does. And standing conditions like that won't explain why she behaves this way *now*.

If you can combine a standing condition like that with a sudden, new opportunity, or something like, then you could use it. But this doesn't look like a sudden, new opportunity.

Q. *But she embarrassed her in the store and that's provoking enough.*

P. Well, but on this occasion she didn't.

Q. *She was about to. [laughter]*

P. Okay, somehow that sounds relevant, but you've got to show the relevance. What is the relevance of Veronica's certainty that it was only a matter of time and that her mother would do that?

Q. *Her mother was hostile to her.*

P. Not necessarily hostile. She might just be arrogant rather than hostile.

Q. *It goes back to the longitudinal diagram [Fig. 5, p. 183], the life history? It's happened so many times that she just knows—*

P. That's right. What's the provocation, then? If she just knows it's going to happen, over here [Fig. 6, p. 184], we counted that as the danger. Is it also a provocation? Or if not, what is the provocation?

Q. *Her recall of previous situations, familiarity with—*

P. No, that would just put her in touch with the facts, but what are the facts that constitute the provocation?

Q. *Her mother is making her uneasy.*

P. Keep going. But remember, that is beginning to sound like the fear again.

Let me give you an example here. You remember the example of the lion. Suppose that I told one of you, "Look, go over in the next office and bring me my book that's on the desk, will you?" So you go in the office and all of a sudden we hear loud, sudden, and strange noises, and you come tearing in; and the first thing you do is slug me on the jaw.

The second thing you do is to say, "Why the hell didn't you tell me there's a lion in your office?"

Now, the question is *why would that be grounds for you to get angry at me, if I sent you to the office for a book, knowing that there was lion in there?* Putting you in that kind of position is a provocation.

So Veronica's mother was putting her in this kind of bad position, and that is a provocation. If you had to clean it up or shorten it, you could say *the mother was being inconsiderate*. That's a weak, probably, description, but it gets at the kind of provocation it was: it wasn't an overt action that hurt, it was putting her in the position where she could, and we have a range of terms for that, among which 'inconsiderate' is a weak one.

So the inconsiderateness was the provocation. Being put in that position of danger was the provocation.

So notice, we've got two descriptions: one is that it's a hostile behavior; another is that it's a fear behavior. There's nothing at all incompatible between the two—it should be both of them at the same time.

Q. *When you diagram that, would you put the 'inconsiderate', the position the mother puts her in, that would be above the 'provocation', that's its significance?*

P. No.

Q. *Wouldn't you put after 'leaves mother', then put 'hostility', an act of*

hostility or something like that, on the next diamond after 'leaves mother'?

Q. *You could say 'reacting to inconsiderateness'?*

P. This [provocation elicits hostility] is the next one

Q. *Then does that have further significance than inconsiderateness?*

P. No. The inconsiderateness would be in the K value—that's the provocation that she's recognizing and responding to. So that would be an elaboration of here, what the mother was doing that was the provocation.

Q. *The provocation is this K value for the hostility.*

P. Yeah. Remember that one of the "unless" clauses is "unless she doesn't perceive the provocation for what it is". So if you see her reacting with hostility, you presume that she doesn't fail to perceive the provocation. So you would put that up in the K value. It's like over here [Fig. 6, p. 184], you presume she sees the danger.

Q. *Okay, so then it looks like the K value for leaving mother in the lurch is that she knows that leaving her means that mom's going to have to get home on her own. Is that—?*

P. That's part of it. I doubt if that's all that's involved in the expression of hostility. Even without the "leaving-home" problem, imagine that you went shopping with somebody; and you both got there in your own cars; you're shopping together; and all of a sudden the other person is gone. You'd still be ticked off, because that's inconsiderate, too. So there's several ways in which doing that to the mother is an expression of hostility.

Having parlayed the hostility into a provocation-hostility, now let's turn to the choice issue. How many of us would have handled that issue that way? How many people do you know that would have handled that issue that way? It's true that when it's your own mother, it's different; but if you had a mother who did that, would you deal with it this way? If not, what, are some of the alternatives?

Q. *Not go shopping.*

P. That's going to get her mad, too.

Q. *Confronting her with it verbally.*

P. You might confront her with it. You could tell her to shape up or else—politely, of course, since it's your mother. But that's one of the major things: that you would let her in on the fact that you didn't like to be

embarrassed that way; and that if she was going to do it, you'd prefer not to go and so forth.

What does that say about Veronica? Why not—how come she doesn't do it that way?

Q. *She's afraid of her mother.*

P. What's she afraid of?

Q. *Crossing her mother.*

P. What's the danger in crossing her mother?

Q. *Her mother might reject her.*

P. Okay, there you have a sequence of fear behavior again. There's something she's afraid of, that she's avoiding by not confronting her mother but doing it this way instead. So this expression of hostility is the starting-point, then, and what she is doing by expressing hostility that way is avoiding a confrontation.

Q. *But she gets her confrontation-preserving relationship.*




FIGURE 8

P. But you see, one of the features of when the mother comes home angry is that Veronica says, "I don't know why I did it." So she doesn't have to bear the responsibility for it. So that kind of anger is bearable. But again, that's going to raise the question *what kind wouldn't be bearable?* Apparently the kind she's avoiding here. What's she avoiding by avoiding the confrontation with her mother?

Q. *Embarrassment,*

Q. *Rejection by her mother?*

P. Okay. This one you can put in either positive or negative terms. You

can put it *she's avoiding rejection*, or that *she's preserving the relation she has with her mother*. Given what you know about the mother and what you know about Veronica and their relation, it does stand out as plausible that Veronica would see the possibility of that relation being threatened if she ever stood up to her mother. Because she never has.

Q. *So could you say, "avoiding standing on her two feet"? Or "avoiding being alone"?*

P. Avoiding being alone, you could, but that's implied here. You don't talk about somebody avoiding something unless there's some motivation; and if you say she's avoiding being alone, we don't know of any reason why she would want to avoid standing on her own two feet. We do know a reason why she would want to avoid being alone, why she would want to avoid jeopardizing the relation with her mother, but not why she would want to avoid standing on her own two feet.

Q. *Could she also be avoiding her—like, by avoiding confrontation, avoiding her own anger, her own individuality? Would that be—*

P. I was just going to raise that question.

P. One of the things here that you can say that she's avoiding is *she's avoiding an open expression of anger*. *She's avoiding explicitly being hostile*.

Q. *This is ambiguous behavior, then.*

P. Well, so far it's not very ambiguous. It's just complex in that a lot of descriptions apply.

Q. *I think—she runs away, her mother could think that she ran away because she was sick and had to go home.*

P. You see, saying "I don't know why I did it" not only makes it ambiguous, it in effect makes it non-behavior. "That wasn't something I did, it's something that happened."

Q. *And that makes it so the mother can't come down on her for it.*

P. That's right.

Q. *She's avoiding the responsibility for her action.*

P. [nods affirmatively]. Now, is that just here, or is there something else? What's to be avoided? Try it out. Suppose that she had done this straightforward confrontation and open expression of anger. How would Veronica count that? What would she see herself as doing by doing that?

Q. *She'd see herself as being a bad girl.*

P. That's right.

Q. *As a ### in a Rogerian kind of sense.*

P. You don't have to be a Rogerian. There is something wrong with just leaving your mother in the lurch or just putting your mother down. In effect, it is guilt-inducing. What we know, though, from Veronica, suggests that for her, it would be even more that way than for most people because of that prior relation, of her prior training, etc.: that what most of us would slough off and say, "Well, that's unfortunate if you have to put your mother down," etc., but for her, you figure it counts for more. So by doing it in a way that is not deliberate but is merely something that happens to her, she's also avoiding guilt. Because it gets done, but it's not her doing. So instead, she has only the minor guilt of having unintentionally caused her mother some inconvenience.

Finally, think of her history and of the deaths in the family; and of her mother's traumatic reaction to the father's death; and the major effect on her and her mother of the grandmother's death. From that you can pull in another thread that's a bit tangential, but it adds to your understanding here; namely, that for Veronica, to leave somebody is to desert them, and to desert them is to do something very bad to them. Because that's been her experience when people have died or left, that it has traumatic consequences. So her breaking loose from her mother, her doing these things to her mother, for Veronica would stand out as even more serious than they would for most of us.

Q. *If we didn't know the facts of the two deaths at this point—*

P. Then we couldn't say this. You see, now, we have that whole case history to work with, so we can bring all of those things in.

What we wind up with is something like five emotion descriptions for the same behavior. You have this fear behavior [Fig. 6]; you have this anger behavior [Fig. 7]; you have this fear behavior [Fig. 8]; you have the guilt behavior; and then you have another fear behavior, probably, in avoiding the guilt, just as this fear behavior [Fig. 8] is avoiding the direct expression of anger.

And you can see that one of the keys is in the avoiding the responsibility, that this is a behavior which is remarkable in how well it fits Veronica's requirements at that time. It's like killing five birds with one stone. It's a very

efficient, effective way of simultaneously accomplishing a lot of things, all of which are things that Veronica wants to accomplish—has reason to. And part of that is to avoid the responsibility, because doing that openly, on purpose, is something that for her would be unthinkable.

If you recall that sheet on Unconscious Motivation, the derivation is: If something would be unthinkable and you do it, you're simply not going to see yourself as having done that. You'll have a different account of what it was you did.

Well, this kind of behavior—the hostile behavior, the guilt-inducing behavior—is the kind that it would fit to say *it looks like for Veronica that's unthinkable; therefore if she's going to do it at all, she's going to have to do it without knowing that that's what she's doing*. And that's what we see here.

Q. *Would one of those behaviors seem to be more significant in indicating what happened to her later? That's where I thought you were going, is that you'd say one—*

P. No, that's where we now want to turn.

This one, since it was the first of what you might call *the panic-attack episodes*—even though, notice, she doesn't say there that she was panicky; she just says she has the urge; the later ones, clearly she says 'panic fear'. But just from the general appearance of this, you'd be surprised if she didn't experience it as fear, as panic.

P. [indicating Fig. 5, p. 330] So that's what happened here, on this occasion. And now what we're told is that on certain other occasions, not very frequently and not all in the same place, but at various times and places Veronica would get the urge to get out and go back home. And if you think of what some of those places were, one of them was in the parking lot of a supermarket; another was a meeting at school; another was a meeting with her church acquaintances—I forget how many there were, but those three stand out. Can you recall offhand any of the others?

Q. *On the way to the dentist's; the grocery store; a friend's house; and a church party.*

Q. *Teaching class, also.*

P. One of the things that's puzzling is, there's nothing obviously in common with those situations. It's not like somebody who's afraid of elevators and gets panicky. Here, on these occasions, it seems very mysterious. Here we need to bring in more facts about Veronica, and I guess we'd better stop

now because it's time.

I'll pass out the exam. It's due Wednesday. Look it over quickly right now, and if you have any questions, I'll answer them. These should be fairly brief answers, and as long as they're legible, you don't have to type them; although, obviously, that's preferable. The main thing is: don't talk a lot on these. Think about what the right answer is, and just say that as clearly as possible, and normally it will be a code answer.

SESSION 15

August 2, 1976

Peter: Yesterday, we talked about what kind of behavior was going on in that department store and got, I think, a fairly clear picture of a reasonably complex set of emotional descriptions of that one behavior, of what Veronica was doing. And one of the things about that reconstruction, I think, it made that behavior un-mysterious, as having those descriptions, you would no longer be asking yourself, "But why did she run out of that department store?"

One of the lines of thought that we didn't develop, I think, was this: recall that we noted that most of us would not have handled the situation that way, that probably most of us would have done something on the order of a confrontation; or if we had waited, would have done something on the order of explicit hostility toward that mother. So either before the fact or after the fact, we would have expressed where we stood on that.

One of the things that Veronica was avoiding was not merely the danger of embarrassment, but also the danger of explicit hostility with her mother. We saw that she had strong reasons to avoid explicit hostility with her mother, namely, that to do so would have threatened the relationship.

If you think about that for a minute, though, you get another interesting thought, namely, that if that was a danger to her, if that was something she was avoiding, then you might say she must have been on the verge of doing it. Because if it was the kind of thing that she simply would never think of and had no strong inclination to do, then she wouldn't have been in danger of doing it.

So if you think of her as avoiding overt hostility on the grounds that it's dangerous, then to be dangerous, she had to be close to actually expressing it. So this is one of the clues we have that something is going on with Veronica over time, that some change is happening over time, and that here is where it first shows itself in some way or another.

And the kind of change that we're thinking of is reasons pro and con expressing hostility toward her mother. Over time, she has reasons to do it, but she has a stronger reason not to. But if the reasons to do it keep growing, then at some point they're going to be approximately equal; and if they keep growing, at a later time they will be stronger; and they will come out and do something.




FIGURE 1

So what this picture [Fig. 1] suggests is that she's in that mid-point where the reasons, the motivation to be hostile toward the mother, are as strong or almost as strong as the reasons not to, but not quite, therefore, she is now in danger of expressing those. Where, in the past, she's had the motivation but there's been no danger of expressing it, because the other was clearly predominant, now with both of them about equal, she is in that danger.

Now, using that as a clue, we think back to Veronica's history and her relation with her mother with this in mind. And what we see is not so much an issue of hostility but something more general, namely, independence or autonomy.

Veronica's history is one where she's been very closely tied in with the family. She has had a definite place in the family, and it's a non-negotiable place and a dependent place. And any ties that she might establish elsewhere have been discouraged. So the net effect is to leave Veronica with essentially no ties outside her family; a definite place in that family; no negotiation about that place; and it's a dependent place. And that's what she's hurting from, and she knows it.

Recall that she describes herself as a good girl and says this wistfully; has made a couple of breaks to get out of the house (recall her earlier and disastrous marriage). She does operate independently in a number of areas. For example, at school she's a good school-teacher.

So there she's on her own, doing something that she's competent at. She handles the family finances. And she has a church group of friends, a church-related group of friends where there, too, she operates independently of her

mother. So those are the three main areas in which she operates at an adult level of competence and without much reference to her mother.

Now think back on those occasions where she gets the panic attacks [Fig. 1, arrows]. Now, whereas before, we couldn't find anything in common with them, now we do see something that provides if not a complete commonality, at least a very strong thread, namely, she gets the panic attacks in those areas where she has been and does operate competently and independently of her mother: the grocery store—you remember, she handles the family finances, including doing the shopping; at the church—you remember that's where she has a group of her own friends; at school—which is one of her primary areas of competence. Certainly the dentist wouldn't swing you pro or con. It's not obviously a place where she operates independently; but clearly, it's not tied in to her mother, either. And if you wanted to, you could work it around to include the dentist visits into the notion that she gets the panic attacks when she's operating in areas of competence. Notice, she never gets them in the presence of her mother again.

What is the effect of those attacks, those panic attacks? It is to get her out of those areas and back home, out of the areas where she's operating independently and competently, and back home where she has this child-like relation with her mother. So from this point of view, the achievement, the primary achievement of those panic attacks is to preserve and restore her relation with her mother and take her out of situations in which that relation is threatened. So that's what she's doing by doing that.

Bring this together with the notion that this is building up over time, that the motivation or the inclination, or both, toward independence are building up over time; and that that first episode marks the crisis in which they're about equal; and so things are up for grabs. Again, you might ask *what accounts for the building up over time? How come it's increasing over time?* Part of the answer is implicitly given by that Relationship Change Formula: the more she has areas in her life in which she does operate competently and independently of her mother, the more that is characteristic of her as a whole person; therefore, the less inclined and less motivated she is simply to have that dependent relation with her mother, the less well it fits her.

Secondly, there is a powerful but relatively unnoticed influence that comes from the outside. There is a constant pressure on adults to be adults and to be independent and autonomous. That's one that we're likely not to notice; but if you want to check on how powerful those influences are, just try acting like a 10-year-old for the next day, and see all of the many ways that you get pushed back into line if you try to be that way.

So there's a whole lot of influences out there that are hard to pin down, hard to summarize, but they're there. So between those two, we can account for why you would expect this to be building up.

In effect, during this period of time, she has to work harder to preserve that childlike relation against her own inclinations and ability to be independent. One of the motivations there is one that I think we did comment on last time, namely, in her history, people leaving people is a traumatic thing. For her to leave home is not as easy for her because she would see it as doing something bad to the mother.

And the mother would see it that way, too.

So by virtue of her background, not only is it harder in terms of she's not inclined to be that independent, it's also harder in the sense that she has more resistance from the mother. For her, it's a more serious thing than it is for most other people.

So, with respect to independence, she's in a position of having to do more with less. And that's why, at age 29, she's still her mother's girl. But what we see is a fairly normal progression except that most people do it ten years earlier. Most people do it in their late teens and early twenties. It takes Veronica longer because of that background.

At this point, the transition to staying at home and being afraid to leave is easy, because it's simply an extension of the same story, namely, a more extreme measure to preserve that relation that she has at home with her mother and get away from situations where she's being independent and autonomous—which, by now, is just about anywhere. So staying at home has the same function as the panic attacks away from home. All of them are expressions of the same conflict that we saw in that first episode.

If you understood the thing this way, would you have any further questions about what was going on with Veronica? We did have some other questions, and I said the other ones were peripheral. The main questions are: *why did she stay at home? What was going on in that first episode? And what's the connection between them?* And also, I think, a question about these panic attacks.

We've explained what it was, why it occurred when it did—namely, that's the crossover point where that motivation is getting strong enough. We've explained the continuation, and then why the shift from panic attacks elsewhere to just being afraid to leave the house.

Well, just for the heck of it, try to think like a therapist and ask yourself, “If I wanted to change Veronica, how would I try to get her to change, and how would I do it?”

Q. *Let me ask a question first. If she stays at home, then the things that you mention as being motivation for change, her being autonomous, are no longer present. She no longer has a job and—*

P. The opportunity isn’t present, but the motivation still is. In fact, it’s because the motivation is so strong that she’s got to remove the opportunities. In the classic literature, this is known as “Get thee behind me, Satan”. Stay out of temptation’s way, and you won’t fall into sin.

Well, that’s what Veronica’s doing. She’s getting away from those situations where she would be most inclined to do something that she still doesn’t really want to do. Keep in mind that if she were to do something like that on the spur of the moment, when she was feeling particularly independent, she might still regret it later, because she wasn’t yet ready. So it’s the kind of thing where you have to prevent yourself from doing it even on those occasions when right now you feel like doing it, because you’re still not ready to live with it

Q. *### her relationship with her mother? Just like simply moving out of her mother’s house, not in close proximity with her mother, she will have to either ###?*

P. I wouldn’t so much say “resolve it” as change it. She has to have a different relation with her mother because that’s part of—

Q. *But any other type of approach to her mother, the mother-daughter relationship or the mother-child relationship wouldn’t ###*

Q. *Doesn’t she first have to realize that that’s what she was doing?*

P. That’s one of the classic approaches, is in effect to use a Well-Poisoning approach by getting her to see that she has too child-like a relation with her mother; except that we have some evidence that she already knows that. So just calling that to her attention and getting her to see it might not work.

But certainly that’s one of the first things you would think of, if you just had somebody with that problem. You’d say, “How do we get a change?” One of them is just that, to get her to see what’s going on, and then let her deal with that. And ordinarily that would have a Well-Poisoning effect, and you would see some change. Then you would ask, “Is that enough?” and if it was, you’d stop; and if it wasn’t, you’d try something else.

Q. *It seems like a real part of it is the death issue, and I don't know how you'd deal with that; but it seems like she needs to know that if she leaves her mother, she's not killing her; or she's not going to die; or it's not that kind of total rejection.*

P. Yeah. Beyond working on the child-like relation, you might work at some of the other influences that keep her there, one of which is the issue of doing something dreadful to the mother by leaving her.

And you could do that two ways. One is to start redescribing the mother in more selfish terms. The other is to talk about the issue of leaving and what goes on when somebody leaves. Because you might say *there's where she has one of her distortions of reality, is in her view of what it means to leave somebody and what the consequences are.*

And there you could just do a little bit of educational work. Seeing her mother as more selfish might not be hard, because again, we have some evidence that she was already beginning to see her that way. She's beginning to see her mother's demands as demands and not simply as the natural way things are.

Q. *Couldn't you make a case where it would be better for her mother, too, that her mother comes out—well, she ###.*

P. You could, but I wouldn't push it too far. You want to be careful about wanting to change people just on the grounds that they could be better. Otherwise, we're all candidates.

Q. *Aren't you then assuming the mother's responsibility and not making the mother assume her own responsibility at what to do whenever her daughter leaves, what to do with herself? That's her responsibility, not the daughter's.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *And then you're trying to ### and protect the mother.*

P. Again, you can get her to see that, but still, if her mother is going to be absolutely crushed—whether it's reasonable or not, if that's the predictable consequence of her leaving, she has that reason not to leave. After all, it's her own mother.

Q. *What about, like, desensitizing? Because if she does the things then in real life and sees that all these things aren't going to happen, and it's safe for her to go.*

P. It's not clear they're not going to happen.

Q. *What if she tries it ###?*

P. No, I'm thinking of what if the mother throws a fit? You can't guarantee—

Q. *And she hasn't seen that her mother was dying, or she is helpless. She's just angry.*

P. Have you ever seen a mother put on a good act? [laughter] You can't guarantee that she'll experience it as a success if you get her to leave, because the mother is likely to throw a fit, and so you've got to do some inoculation or preparation for that first. And part of the inoculation is getting her to see her mother as selfish. Then when the mother throws a fit, she can then see it as selfish behavior, rather than she has hurt her mother, she has betrayed, left her, etc.

Q. *It seems like a big part of Veronica's reasoning for ### on this is that she doesn't want to be rejected, so if there was a way to get her acceptance in other forms besides her mother—*

P. Yeah. You see, the strength of the motivation here is that that's all she has. She doesn't have relations, strong personal relations, with anybody else. So it isn't just that she wants to stay with her mother, it's that that is all she has. So one way out of that is indeed to encourage relations with other people, so that the mother won't be in that monopoly position. That certainly would be one of the directions you would go, as a therapist. In fact, I think that in the report that we have of the course of therapy, that was one of the directions they went.

Q. *I have often wondered: in therapy, do you do ### like a program where you are operating to establish relationships with other people in order to get a more healthy ### other people, they let them down, they both have a relationship, and they're not prepared to make that social change and establish that friendship because they're ###?*

P. A person would have to be pretty fragile before you have to take any very special precautions.

Remember, she has a history of being able to make friends with other people. She has operated competently in a number of areas, and there's no reason from that to expect that if she went out and made some new friends again, or got reestablished with her old friends, that she'll suffer a whole lot of disappointment and regress. She's done it before. So all you'd need to do would be to encourage it and get her back on that track.

If somebody really was that fragile, then you would prepare them, like we talked about preparing Veronica to leave her mother, to be prepared for what's out there and some of those possibilities, and what one does in case certain things happen. Then if bad things happen, they're already prepared to deal with it.

Q. *That's where that "unless" clause is coming in, because that way, if you were rejected in a relationship, you could say that this person wasn't prepared to establish the relationship at that time.*

P. Yeah. That just comes under the general heading of getting the person to be more realistic about relations, emotions, and what goes on.

Q. *Wouldn't you still have to somehow alleviate those anxiety attacks? Because you couldn't establish a relationship if every time you went over to somebody's house, you had an anxiety attack and had to leave.*

P. If that's the way it worked, probably the easiest thing to do is get the cooperation of the person she's going to visit, rather than put it off until she can do it on her own. Here again, recall that one of the people that she initially went to see did a desensitization thing with her, in which he had her go further and further away, and it didn't particularly work.

Q. *That's a desensitization?*

P. Well. I take it it was desensitization—going further and further away each time is the kind of thing that one would do in a desensitization.

Q. *There's no relaxation technique that was involved with it?*

P. Yeah, you could use a variety of techniques to get her to be less anxious, but probably the most powerful one is to get her to see it as not dangerous. Because, remember, the danger to her is the loss of relation with her mother. As soon as she sees that, if she's willing to try at all, she's not going to be just treating it as dangerous. If she's willing to try visiting friends, visiting friends is no longer than unknown danger that's been facing her up to now, so she ought to be much better able to handle that.

Q. *To try to get her to change her ideas about her mother or even to see that she might not need to have the anxiety attacks, can't you do role-playing things?*

P. Yeah, you could have her role-play telling her mother off; or just being casual with her mother; or role-play some other relation with somebody else—indeed, yeah.

As you can see, there's a variety of things that you can think of to do, that all make sense to do. Any one of them or any combination might be successful, once you have a picture like this of what's going on with her.

At the same time, it's also the case that there isn't some magic formula, that there is a set of things for you to do as a therapist and if you just do those things, then she's cured. A lot of it consists of trying things that make sense, see if they work; if they don't, you try something else until something does work. And then you pick it up from there and keep going. What you have for orientation is the principles that you have to work with, and the kind of change that you see is needed. And you keep reviewing your ideas of what kind of change you see is needed, because you might be wrong.

But that's, very briefly, how one uses a reconstruction of a person and what's going on, and connects that to what do you do about it if you want a change.

Let me point out that this is a reconstruction which is for a therapist, because certainly there's a lot of aspects of Veronica's life that we haven't even dealt with. For example, we haven't dealt with what it means to her to be a school teacher and what that's like, and what went into it, and where she might go in those directions. We haven't dealt with what goes on in church, and her religious views, and how that fits in. There's a lot of things in her life that we simply haven't touched on.

What we've done is give a reconstruction that is selective, in that what we have in mind all along is understanding those things that look mysterious, namely, why does she stay at home? what happened there? why does she have those panic attacks?

We could do the same kind of reconstruction with those other areas in mind, but unless you have some purpose in the reconstruction, you never end. Then it becomes a gigantic task. As soon as you have a purpose, you can do a reconstruction for that purpose, a more limited reconstruction, and that's what we've done here.

The kind of reconstructions that you do on the basis of personality theories will be very much like this. Keep in mind that most personality theories were written either by therapists or for therapists or both. And, of course, the primary example of that is Freud's theory. Okay, any questions about this reconstruction and what went into it, and what we got out of it?

Q. *Roughly how long would a therapist take to make those reconstructions?*

P. I'd expect to have that picture by the time you did the initial interview.

Q. *It's—unless he's really wrong, unless something else entirely is going on.*

P. Yeah, unless something just hasn't showed up that's quite important, you pretty well have the whole picture—at least the picture that you need. So you can start right away doing some of these things, even on the first interview.

Q. *As a therapist, would you actually transcribe the interview—the kind of analysis we give with Fritz and Gloria?*

P. No. It takes too much time. You do this in your head. From being used to doing that, you simply do this in your head as it comes, so that you're building a picture of Veronica as soon as she comes in. You don't wait until the end of the hour and start reconstructing. You're already doing it as you're talking.

In general, you do not build up a picture of a person from scratch. You start with that norm, the person who's average in every respect, and then any facts that you acquire about a given person, either directly by observation or indirectly from what they tell you about themselves, that simply starts enriching and detailing the picture of *that* person as against just any person. But you're already starting with this general picture of a person, and you're merely adjusting it in terms of the information that you pick up. That's why as soon as you start picking up information, you are building up a picture of this particular individual.

And oftentimes you don't need much, and you've got enough to go by. Then you just keep checking it from time to time; but in retrospect, you find that you had it in the first five minutes or the first hour.

It's time, then, that we went on to look at theories of personality. Theories of personality, in part, we will want to reconstruct like the case of Veronica or like Fritz and Gloria, namely, what was Freud up to? And what kind of person would talk about people in the way that Freud did? But as with the Fritz and Gloria transcript, our first interest is, what did Freud say? So we need to review now some of the major aspects of Freud's theory of personality.

Keep in mind, by the way, that Freud did a lot of writing. Most of it was not on what we abstract as the theory of personality. Most of it was on other topics. There's only certain parts of Freudian theory and Freudian writing

that deal with what we would call a theory of personality.

In regard to that question of, what does constitute a theory of personality?, I've provided you with a working criterion and it's in your Outline and that is three questions. And I would say that any body of writing that provides a general and systematic answer to each of these three questions is a theory of personality. And the three questions, just to refresh your memory, are:

- (1) Why do people do what they do?
- (2) What are the differences among people? and
- (3) How do people get the way they are?

So those three elements are:

- (1) a universal account of behavior,
- (2) an account of individual differences or personal characteristics, and
- (3) a developmental theory—how do people get the way they are?

So that combination—

Q. *What was the first one?*

P. Why do people do what they do?

That combination is the minimum it takes to pretend to deal with the whole person and with all persons. So we'll examine these theories that we're going to look at, at least we'll start out asking *what were their answers to these three questions?*

What was Freud's answer to Why do people do what they do? What was his answer to What are the differences among people? And what was his answer to How do people get the way they are?

By pursuing what was the theorist's answer to these three questions, we will also be getting at what is there about what he said that makes what he said a theory of personality. So it's a fairly parsimonious way of approaching this.

If we now ask *what was Freud's answer to Why do people do what they do?* and what we have in mind is: What was his universal principle for behavior?, the answer jumps out, namely, instinct. So his answer is: People do what they do because their behavior is an expression of instinct, or exemplifies instinctual behavior.

Let me digress a little historically. At the time of Freud's early writing, explanations in psychology were primarily instinct-explanations, and the major theorists had lists of instincts that they then used to explain behavior.

Their list of instincts looks a lot like what you would write down if I asked you to write down a list of major traits that people have. Think of what you would list as traits—things like friendliness, generosity, greed, hostility, those kinds of traits. If you look back through your lists of instincts, that's the kind of concepts you find.

Now, there were two kinds of problems with the instinct approach as it was practiced in Freud's day. One is that, embarrassingly enough, everybody came up with a different list. That's a familiar problem, because we find that, even today, when it comes to things like basic human needs, everybody comes up with a different list. That was true then in connection with instincts.

Part of the embarrassment is, if these things are supposed to be fundamental and universal, why is it that everybody comes up with a different list?

The second was that they tended to be non-explanatory, in that their use in explanation was too simple. For example, if you had hostile behavior, you said, "Well, that's an expression of the instinct of hostility." If you had social behavior, you said, "Well, that's an expression of the instinct of gregariousness." And it began to look as if you were just doing some word games, where you would redescribe the behavior as instinct and then use the instinct to explain the behavior; and that wasn't really getting you a lot of mileage in terms of helping you to understand it. It was just re-naming it.

And thirdly—this one didn't bother people as much as the other two, but it's there—it sort of suggests that there's no real change in people, that there's a certain stock of kinds of behavior, and that's characteristic of people and there will never be another one, and they never were any different. So it gives you a static picture of people and their possibilities.

One of Freud's accomplishments is to come up with a concept of instinct that didn't have these disadvantages. He didn't have a list of instincts, so his use of 'instinct' for explanatory purposes was quite unlike McDougall's, say, or anybody else who had a list of instincts. He had a single, content-free instinct. And he was able to do that because of the way that instinct operated.


So let's come back now, and ask, "How does this notion of instinct operate? How does the instinct operate as far as Freud goes?"

We get two accounts of instinct. The first one was need and wish, and that's too simple to get much mileage out of, although we'll come back to it.

The other one, which is emphasized in your book [Hall and Lindzey], it has four major ingredients, and the ingredients are Impetus, Aim, Source,

and Object. Those are not just aspects of an instinct. Those things go together in a particular way, so we can diagram it in that way [Fig. 2]. To begin with Impetus: Impetus is a quantity of energy.

Source is a place and a structure. And the structure is such that it can be more or less activated by this energy [Impetus]. So down here you have a quantity of energy, here you have a place and a structure at that place which is such that it can be more or less activated by that energy.



Up here you have the Object, which is a psychic representation. It's a mental thing, an idea, a psychic representation. All of that connects to your visible, overt Behavior, our visible, overt Behavior has some Result, and the Result that is of interest is whether it achieves the Aim.

The Aim is to reduce to zero the energy in that Source.

Q. *On Behavior, all of that connects to visible, overt behavior?*

P. Yeah, and that Behavior has some Result, of which the Result that's of interest is whether it succeeds in the Aim, whether it achieves the Aim; and the Aim is to reduce the energy back down to zero.

So what you see of the instinct is that it has the structure of a cycle, a cycle in which overt behavior occurs at one point in the cycle.

Now the Source is a place, I said, it's a place in your body which, when it gets activated, results in the production of a psychological or mental happening—an idea, a representation, a psychic object. The production of that object leads to—causes—overt behavior. In turn, the overt behavior causes some result, and if it's successful in psychoanalytic terms, the result is the achievement of the aim, which is that the energy in the source goes down to zero. It's because that's the aim that you speak of discharging instinctual energy by means of behavior. If the behavior is successful, the energy is in

effect discharged, because what was active here no longer is active. It's been used up.

Any questions so far about this notion of instinct?

Q. *Is that another form of—would you call that cathexis?*

P. No, we're not yet in a position to talk about cathexis. We'll develop that from this.

Q. *I'm not clear on what a Source is?*

P. It's a place in your body, and it's a structure there. It's not just an undifferentiated place. It's the kind of thing that can be activated. Think of a motor: a motor is a structure, but it can be activated or non-activated depending on whether you hook it up to some energy.

Q. *Could you latch that into a particular instinct?*

P. That was where Freud left it, too. These are hypothetical places, and the closest he came to specifying where they actually were was the erogenous zones—initially the membrane around your mouth. He says that stimulation there energizes, and that's where you get the energy. That's one of the earlier sources. But his version of it was, "Well, we don't know enough about physiology to really do a good job of saying where they are or how they work, but we know they're there." And he never really did much more than that.

Q. *A source is not like a desire or a need or anything?*

P. No. A Source is a place. A desire or need would be up here [Object]. Anything that you experience is up here. If you can imagine what goes on in your body when you get thirsty, you don't know the details but you can figure that there's something here that is in one condition when you're thirsty and in a different condition when you're not thirsty. That's the kind of thing he had in mind, that something goes on, and when it's in a certain condition, you're energized, and when it's in a different condition, you're not. You can see that it would make sense, even if you couldn't pinpoint the physiology of where it was and how it worked. You could easily use that as a model and say that *there is something of that sort there. Give us more time and we'll get more details, but we already know how it works.*

Q. *Two questions. First, then Impetus can be external or internal?*

P. No. An Impetus has no features. It is merely a quantity.

Q. *Of energy.*

P. Yeah. It has no features, it has no aspects, no nothing. It's just a number, a quantity.

Q. *Okay, so it's not a physical energy, or it doesn't have to be.*

P. No, it is physical energy, except that physical energy has that feature. Physical energy has no features, it's simply a quantity.

Q. *But you can specify where physical energy is coming from.*

P. Oftentimes you can, but that's why this is the model, that there is a place that gets activated by the energy.

Q. *Then where does the Source come from?*

P. It's there. Remember, the Source is a structure, a bodily structure.

Q. *Genetically determined?*

P. Presumably, if it's determined at all, but it's also determined by your behavior, since if you don't behave in the right way, you starve very quickly, and you don't survive.

This cycle has been compared, and by Freud, to a reflex. You can see why: there's no stopping place. Once you've started here [Impetus], it just runs on. Unless you've got a malfunction, once you start, it goes. That's like a motor: once you turn it on, it'll go. So the way this operates, then, is on the model of a reflex. Once you have the energizing, it'll go and you'll get that behavior.

Q. *Does the Aim supply energy to the Impetus, then, or does Aim—*

P. No. Aim has no features, either.

Q. *Then how does it contribute to the quantity of the Impetus?*

P. No, the Aim *is* to reduce the amount of energy there.

Q. *So if the energy is reduced. I don't see how the system keeps going.*

P. We'll see shortly. Think of this as a paradigm case formulation, and this is the paradigm case of instinctual behavior, and we'll do some elaboration; but all of the elaborations will still leave it instinctive behavior. And it's not until you make some of the elaborations that you've got something to directly describe people's behavior.

This one will describe a newborn infant's behavior, but not until you bring in the results of learning and other apparatus here would you be in a position to describe a normal adult's behavior.

Again, one of the achievements of this theory is to have a single notion like instinct that can describe and account for things as dissimilar as the behavior of a newborn infant and normal adult behavior with the same notion, namely instinct. And the reason is that you have what you might call the primary case of instinct, which is all that you need for the infant, and then by elaborating it—which still leaves it instinct—you’ve got something to describe adults.

This thing is not, as you might guess, free from possible criticism. If you were going to start being critical, you would put big question marks there [Fig. 2, 353]. Here, this question mark [A] would represent the classic mind-body problem: How could a happening in your body possibly produce experience? That’s the classic mind-body problem; Freud did nothing to contribute to its solution.

Q. *Would you repeat the question, please?*

P. How could a happening in your body possibly produce an experience? The two things, experience and bodily happenings, are of logically different kinds, so there is a problem drawing a causal connection between them. There’s no problem drawing causal connections from one physiological happening to another. There’s no real problem in drawing causal connections from one experiential happening to another. There is a problem drawing a causal connection either between a physiological happening and an experiential one, or the other way around—between an experiential one and a physiological one.

You see, the other half of that problem is, how can simply deciding to reach for the cup have the consequence of moving my arm, which is a physical object? So that’s the mirror-image of the mind-body problem: How can an experience or a mental event produce a physical event [Fig. 2, B?]?

Q. *I remember reading that they define Object as the Behavior as well as the psychic representation. Is that a way to kind of escape that problem?*

P. No. We’ll get to the elaboration of Object here, but it won’t do anything with that problem.

Q. *When you talked about instincts, I have a question. Hall and Lindzey talk about the difference between instinct and instinctually. I don’t get the difference. They say something like ‘instinctoid’ and ‘instinctlike’, but—*

P. Where do they say that?

Q. *I forget.*

P. Find it and let me see it, because I don't really recall seeing that kind of statement.

Q. *Maybe on Maslow. Maslow is one of the big ###. A lot more to learning rather than being automatic and winds up being very different. There's something that's vaguely like what apes have rather than ###.*

P. I think you'd better find it. Okay, any other questions about this representation of instinct?

Notice it's a cycle, the connections are causal, and this part of it is physiological and this part of it is psychological [cf. Fig. 2, p. 353].

Q. *How can the Behavior-Result be exclusively psychological?*

P. That's the defining characteristic of psychology, it deals with behavior as against movement.

Q. *As far as cause is concerned.*

P. No, just that that's the subject matter.

Q. *It seems that it's usually, if not always, via physiological components.*

P. Again, remember what we said about that. Physiology deals with certain facts, and as such, they're not behavioral facts. You could be a vegetable and have most of the things that your physiologist talks about going on. You'd have no behavior. It just happens that when you have behavior, when you have people who are built like us, those physiological descriptions also apply.

But they are not the subject matter, unless you re-interpret physiology as dealing with people's—*people's*—bodies and performances, in which case physiology stops being a separate discipline.

The key there, of course, is that you don't have to have persons who are organisms. Because a person doesn't have to be an organism; therefore, you can't define a person in terms of physiology. But if you just deal with the persons we know, yeah, those two go together.

Q. *You say a person doesn't have to be an organism, that's more or less given. It seems to me that it's exclusively theoretical. Does spirit exist, or—*

P. No, no. Look. Think of being around in 1918 and studying airplanes. All the airplanes that we knew then were made of wood frames with guy wires, covered by canvas and run by internal combustion motors. And all of the planes we had were of that sort, if they weren't gliders.

Now, you could have defined a plane, then, as something made out of wood, wire, canvas, with an internal combustion machine; and if you had, you would have devoted your efforts to studying those things, and we would have never had jet planes. Because a plane isn't something made out of wood, wire, and canvas. A plane is something that flies.

So you don't define a machine in terms of what it's made of. You define it in terms of its function. The same goes with people. If you notice our definition of a person, it's "an individual whose history is a history of intentional action". There's nothing there about what a person is made of. As long as a person functions like a person, it doesn't matter what he's made of. Even now, nine tenths of your body could be replaced with non-organic components, and you'd still be you, and you'd still be a person. It does not take being made out of protoplasm to be a person.

But as I say, we are in the same position as back in 1918: all of the ones that we know in fact are of this sort. So for practical purposes, you say that person equals organism.

Q. *Then you could conceivably have a robot that's a person.*

P. Yeah. Except if it was a person, you wouldn't call him a robot any more. You only call him a robot if he's a machine that's like a person, but if he is a person, you call him Joe.

Q. *How does Aim connect to Source?*

P. Aim is not a thing; it is just a fact. The aim is to reduce the energy in the Source.

Q. *Through the Impetus.*

P. No, just to reduce it. As I say, the Aim is not a thing like the Source is a thing. The Aim is not a structure. It's like saying *the goal of this thing is to reduce the energy*. Saying *it's the goal* merely says *that's what you will count as successful*. That's why I put the question mark here. The achievement that is of interest is this state of affairs, namely, there being no longer any energy here [Source]. So it doesn't have a separate existence. It's simply the criterion for the success of the operation.

Q. *I'm just trying to get the logical connection between Aim and the Source. Why would it connect to Impetus, then?*

P. To reduce the energy in the Source.

Q. *That's originally how I thought it was, but then I got confused as to why it goes directly to the source.*

P. Because the Aim refers to both the energy and the Source. It's to reduce to zero the energy in the Source, not the energy in the whole body but the energy in the Source. So because of that, I draw the two arrows.

And one reason why you can't just get by with an arrow here is that this is not a thing. Causes have to act on things. The forces in machinery connect the parts. This [Source] is the part. These two [Impetus and Aim] are merely facts.




FIGURE 3

Let me give you a heuristic here. Did you ever see a thing like this? It's a little black cube about eight inches on a side, and it's got a switch right here. And you find these in hobby shops or places like that, or magic stores or trick shops or things like that. What happens is this switch has an On and an Off, and if you turn it on, what happens is that this lid starts raising so that it comes up like that [dotted line], and an arm comes out from in there, comes around, turns the switch off, goes back in, and the lid comes down.

Now that's the model for the Impetus [laughter]. Activating the Source is like turning the switch on, and what that does is produce a series of events. And the Behavior is like the arm, and it turns the switch back off. And it is that simple. That's the way the thing works. In effect, the point of this whole thing is to get you back to the condition you were in before you started. This is one of our original homeostatic models, is that disturbance of the homeostatic condition sets up forces or events designed to bring it back to the original condition. So think of that little black box.

Q. *So you still can't say what keeps turning on the switch, can you?*

P. No. Roughly, it's your metabolic processes. You eat—you accumulate energy that way, and the energy is discharged either through your reflexive internal activities, or through your overt behavior. That's where the energy

comes from here [Fig. 2, arrow below Impetus]. So this is not a closed system. You're constantly getting energy put in.

Now back to this question mark. I said you have a kind of a categorical question: *how could a psychic or experiential thing cause a physical object or a material result here?* Freud's solution is simply to ignore the problem and say, "It happens." He's not interested in explaining how it possibly could happen, or why you're not talking nonsense when you talk that way. He says, in effect, "That's the way I'm going to talk because that's the way I want to talk, and you can talk all you want but that's what happens."

That still leaves a problem, namely, of which object and which behavior. You have the general problem of how could something psychological cause something of this kind? [Behavior], but you also have the specific problem of why the particular behavior and not some other? And there Freud does have an answer, of why the particular behavior and not some other one. And to see what the nature of the answer is, we come back to the notion of what this Object is.

- a. Object**
- b. Circumstances**
- c. Pattern of Behavior**

It turns out that, for Freud, when he talked about a psychic Object or an Idea or a psychic representation, he didn't mean something like a table. He didn't mean the kind of thing that we would normally call an object. Instead, he meant something more complex, and it had three ingredients. Those three were—what we normally call 'objects' is the first ingredient, things like chalk, cups, microphones, chairs, tables, oranges, etc. Those are included.

Secondly, circumstances, for example, the chair and the cup and the paper and the microphone and the chalk are here, or this whole room—those, too, were included in his psychic representation.

And finally, a pattern of behavior.

Furthermore, these are not just three unrelated aspects. At this point, we come back to this formulation [need, wish].

You say, "What's the wish?" The wish is to engage in this kind of behavior with respect to that object in these circumstances. That's what's involved in this psychic representation, is the wish to engage in this pattern of behavior toward that object in these circumstances. That explains why the behavior is the behavior it is, because lo and behold, the behavior itself is simply a

case of treating that object in this way in these circumstances.

So, in the object, then, in the psychic representation, is the mirror image of the overt Behavior. It has exactly the features of the overt Behavior, and that's why it explains and that's how it explains why the particular behavior occurs, because of the particular psychic representation and the one-to-one relation.

Q. *How does that fit into representations that aren't acted on, or that are acted on in a different way? I take it that Behavior merely mirrors the Object, the psychological representation. The Ego is supposed to be in there some way—*

P. We haven't gotten to that yet. Ego has to be derived from this. The distinction between Ego-function and Id-function is one of the secondary elaborations of this.

Q. *The implication there is that you simply act on that fantasized Object.*

P. That's right. That's why I said that what we have so far is geared to the newborn infant, not to somebody who has a history of learning and Ego-development. That's why we have to elaborate this, to get those kinds of things.

And indeed that's the way it works. You simply have the fantasized Object and Behavior on that basis. But that doesn't change as you grow up. The only thing that changes is what kind of Objects you have up here. But the connection doesn't change, and the form of the explanation doesn't change: you engage in this behavior because it is a case of treating that Object in this way in those circumstances, and that's what you had in mind.

So the nature of the explanation is going to stay the same throughout. What we're going to do is just simply account for the fact that adults have different things in mind.

Q. *Thought also is a further derivation?*

P. Freud never said much about thought, not in the sense that thought is a topic for study. He said a lot about thought in the sense that we talk in ordinary language about: "I thought that this was this" or "I thought about such-and-such". But in his technical terminology, there is no place for thought. All there is, is a place for psychic representations, ideas that come and go, and are produced by this. And the sequence of ideas that come and go would be redescribed, and referred to as 'thinking'—at least some of them.

As I say, there's no systematic place in his system for thinking. But given that he can represent the flow of ideas, he doesn't need a separate notion of thinking for most of what he does with it.

Okay, learn this and have it well in mind, because this is what we're going to develop tomorrow into some of the elaborations for accounting for behavior. For right now, let's do something else with it, namely, let's compare the psychological part of instinct with the notion that we developed as Intentional Action, and see what's common, what's the overlap, what's missing one place that appears in the other.




FIGURE 4

The first thing we want to ask is *what is there in the instinct that corresponds to Object the cognitive parameter?* The first one is the Object, because that is the psychic—the idea. Then if you come down to the differentiated notion of Object, you lump these two together [Object and Circumstances] and say that's the cognitive part.

What's the competence aspect? It would be this. Any time in one of these theories that you see something referred to as 'guiding behavior', it will be of this sort [KH], because this has the function of keeping this [IA] from being accidental, and that's what you're getting at when you say that something 'guides' it. You're saying *it's not accidental*. So if you have in mind to follow a certain pattern of behavior in treating this object, following that pattern of behavior is the behavior-guiding aspect.

Q. *Would that still be like the reflex?*

P. If you raise the question *what about that first time?*, you have the ori-

gin problem. Beyond that, this reflects your learning. It's only on that very first occasion of your very first behavior that you can raise the question of *where did it come from?* You recall I said *look in your theories for that problem and how it's dealt with.*

By the way, somebody raised the question about the exam. There is a question there about the origin problem in the development of personal characteristics. Is everybody clear about what the origin problem is? Remember, in class we took the developmental schema and traced it back to the beginning, where you had no characteristics and only had the issue of how do you deal with that, how do you deal with the origin? Well, that's the origin problem referred to in the question.

Now, for the motivational thing, we come back to this formulation [Fig. 4], that you have a wish which is to treat those things in this way, and the fact that you don't have any extra element here reflects the fact that whatever is in the W has to be in the K. That's why you don't have any extra content motivationally.

Now the Performance is clearly the Behavior here. What Freud is calling Behavior here [Fig. 2, p. 353] is what here [Fig. 4, p. 362] we would call Performance. And the Achievement obviously is here [Result]. The main difference is that the Result, in general, includes more than just the Aim, and you'll have a Result even when the Aim is not satisfied. But the achievement of the Aim falls under the heading of Achievement here.

Q. *I'm not sure I understand how circumstance would fall into the cognitive parameter. I know what's supposed to be in W ###.*

P. Yeah, but you remember the wish is the wish to treat that object this way under those circumstances, so the specification of treating that object that way in these circumstances is a specification of what you want.

Q. *How do you get to that notion of homeostasis?*

P. The homeostasis is not a psychological one. The homeostasis is a physiological one. This [side of Fig. 2] is physiological. The energy is physiological.

Q. *So we just don't deal with it.*

P. We're just so far talking about this part. It's the psychological part of instinct that corresponds to Intentional Action. Think about that, that you have the same distinctions over here [Fig. 2] as we have here [Fig. 4]. We'll talk some more about that tomorrow.

SESSION 16

August 3, 1976

Peter: Yesterday we developed what you might call the primary concept of instinct, and that corresponds to this diagram [Fig. 1]. Are there any questions about the elements of the diagram, or how it works as a cycle?




FIGURE 1

Now we're going to go through about three or four rounds of complication on this. If there are no questions here, the first complication is to introduce a number of different Sources instead of only one. With each Source is a corresponding Impetus. You remember, the Impetus is just given by a quantity.

Now consider these Sources to be independent of one another and mutually exclusive. By 'mutually exclusive', I mean that only one of them can produce an Object at a given time. In the original cycle, you had a Source which, when activated, produced a psychic Object. When we introduce a number of different Sources, now we have the mutual exclusion principle that only one of them can produce an Object at a given time. So if one of them is producing the Object, the others are not—at that time.

Now, as soon as you have that, you need a principle for specifying which one of these is going to be active at any given time. Since only one of them can be active at any given time, and you have more than one, you need a principle that says which is going to be active at a given time.

The principle is quite simple, namely, the one with the most energy. Each Source has some amount of energy associated with it, the source with the most energy is the one that's active at that time.

Notice how that would work over some number of cycles. If at a given time, this one is the one that has the most energy, that one will produce an Object; the Object will produce a Behavior. If the Behavior is successful, the energy in this Source will be reduced. Since it is reduced, one of these others will now be the one that has the most energy, so it becomes operative, and you get a new cycle. The energy there is reduced, one of the others then becomes one of the ones with the most energy. So you just keep cycling around picking whichever one of these has the most energy, and that is what will determine the next cycle.

Now, what happens if, on the cycle, this one [Impetus N_1] has the most energy and the behavior is unsuccessful? In that case, this [N_1] remains generally the one with the most energy, and you'll simply have a new cycle in which the same Source is again active.

So this feature of the theory corresponds to what we observe, namely, that people act on their motivations; and when one motivation is satisfied, you then act on another motivation. So you don't just come to a standstill for a while and then start up again. You're always acting, and as soon as you satisfy one, you act on the next one. So this principle gives you, then, that kind of picture of instinctual functioning. Is there any question about that?

Okay, let's go on to complication number two. This is the principle of displacement, and this is *the* learning principle in psychoanalytic theory.

Recall, in talking about the Object, we said *that for Freud, that's not the usual notion of Object although it includes the usual notion of Object*. At the same time, it is not an object, it is an idea. The whole thing is a psychic representation of these sorts of things [Fig. 1, a, b, c]. A psychic representation is not object like that [table, cup, etc.].

We talked about the Behavior being a case of treating that Object in that way in those circumstances. Remember, this is simply a psychic Object, not a real object, and you can't treat a psychic Object any way. You can't behave toward a psychic Object, you can't manipulate a psychic Object, you can't produce results with a psychic Object. So you have to have real objects

and real circumstances, and over here the real behavior pattern. So kind of out of the clear blue, we introduce objects and circumstances here [Fig. 1, upper right], and these are real objects and real circumstances.

Now you come across a problem, namely, that the real objects that are in the person's actual circumstances need not resemble in any way whatever the psychic object that he has in mind. I can stand here and think of elephants, but that has no implication whatever that there's elephants around us. The psychic object simply has no relation to the world around you, in principle. So having this object in mind is no guarantee whatever that there's any such thing around to be acted toward. If you had to have an object exactly like what you had in mind, that would bring everything to a screeching halt, because since it isn't there, you can't do anything.

Instead, in terms of the theory, what happens is displacement, and what that involves first is that you pick the object in your circumstance that is most like the object that you have in mind, and you treat it, insofar as you can, in the ways that you had in mind with your original Object. You select the object, the actual object in the circumstance, that is most like the Object you had in mind, and you treat it as much as possible in the way that you had in mind.

Notice that this is a kind of combination parsimony and inertia principle. It says *you keep going with the idea you have in mind even though there's nothing there that corresponds, but also, you make the minimum change*. You pick the object that's most like it, so that you have to alter your behavior minimally.

It's partly because there is no guaranteed correspondence that you have the issue of whether the Behavior will in fact succeed in achieving the Aim. If the object is just too far out of line from what you have in mind, then there's a good likelihood that no matter how you behave toward it, it won't achieve the Aim. If you're thirsty and all you have is a microphone, it's unlikely that you get your thirst satisfied.

Q. *You say there's no guaranteed correspondence between Aim and the Object?*

P. No, between the psychic Object and the real object.

Q. *Is there any explicit description of how one chooses the similarities, or—*

P. You'll find that, over and over again in many of these theories, is that the issue of similarity is sort of swept up under the rug. If you think about it

hard, you get bothered, because it all looks then very mysterious and sort of like magic.

Q. *It seems that if your psychic Objects were too far out of line with your world, you'd become ### and you'd never get out of it. You'd never satisfy the Aim, you'd never reduce the need, that need would remain at the highest energy level, you'd never even be able to choose a more ### Object.*

P. Yeah. You're anticipating the origin problem here, but we need to work through the notion of displacement before we can see a way out of it.

The origin problem appears here in the form of, "How does the body know what Object to produce?" Because indeed, if the Object is too far away from what's really around you, you're not going to be able to satisfy your Aim; and yet, why would your body know what's around you, since what's around you depends on the circumstances—the place you were born, the particular room that you're in—and there's no reason why there would be anything in your body that would respond to that or know about it in advance.

So there you have one version of the origin problem: How do you have, in a sense, some knowledge without having acquired it? And the notion of having some knowledge without having acquired it puts us in the predicament that it all looks like a gigantic coincidence: that your body just happens to produce the right Object. As a I say, that's a version of the origin problem, and we'll come back to it after we deal with displacement.

Q. *How in terms of fantasy—that can be satisfying in terms of Aims also.*

P. Minimally. And that itself is also mysterious.

Q. *But it's definitely not dealing with the objective world.*

P. Right. What Freud says is that indeed, just having the fantasy Object will do something to satisfy the Aim, but not much. And there is nothing in the theory to explain why that would satisfy the Aim.

So, in general, just go with the principle that you have to have real objects, or you get no satisfaction, because it's only in very peculiar circumstances that you would ever make use of the notion that just the fantasy itself can be satisfying.

We haven't yet reached the displacement principle. All of this is part of the background.

In the case where you do have an object that is not the one you had in mind; and that you do behave toward it; and the Aim is achieved; then the

next time that same Source is activated, the Object that will come to mind will be different from what it was last time. And the difference is that it will be more similar to this one [Fig. 1, *object]. It will be more similar to the real object that, last time round, succeeded in satisfying that Aim. Notice the implications: if the environment is stable and that kind of object is still around, then there will be less difference than there was before between my psychic Object and the real object.

If you think of this cycle repeated over time, there is no limit to how close my psychic Object could eventually be to that real object, because it just keeps getting closer. To the extent that that real object continues to satisfy my needs, continues to satisfy the Aim, my psychic Object will keep getting more and more similar to the real object. So that eventually my psychic Object is very much like the real object.

Q. *Fantasies can be similar to psychic Objects, okay? And then you will be acting out your fantasies, they kept getting closer and closer to the real object, in effect that's what you're—*

P. You're always acting out your fantasies. You see, all you have to go by is this psychic Object. You do not have real objects. All you could ever have is a psychic Object. So in effect, you're always just acting out your fantasy. However, the principle of displacement says that if you do that successfully, your fantasies will become more and more realistic. So that if you survive to engage in some learning this way, it's no longer just a great coincidence that you'd succeed in acting out your fantasies, because you will fantasy just the sort of things that there are around you.

This is another point of weakness in the theory. If you ask yourself *who would ever be in a position to establish that that was so?*, the answer is *nobody could possibly*. To establish that this is so, you'd have to go on and compare people's psychic Objects with the real objects around them and see that they were similar.

But nobody, including an investigator of such matters, would ever have anything except his own psychic Objects. In psychoanalytic theory, there is no access to the real world. There is no access to real objects. All anybody ever has is these psychic Objects. So nobody could possibly do an experiment to show that this displacement principle is true. As a matter of fact, nobody could do an experiment to show that there were any real objects out there for the displacement principle to operate on.

Now you can see that with this principle at work, as soon as you have some number of cycles, as soon as you've lived through some period of time, you're going to start getting individual differences in which psychic Objects come to mind under a particular condition. Two people with different histories will evolve different psychic Objects. Because the psychic Object reflects the real objects that they've interacted with and the way that they've interacted with those real objects, since those in general will be different, people's psychic Objects will be different.

Q. *Is that why people get all ### expectations?*

P. In part. If they've had an atypical history, what for them seems normal and natural is for us atypical. Somebody who's always had his way may well grow up thinking that's the natural order of things. Then we call him 'spoiled' or something else.

Q. *You said the Aims would be different?*

P. No, the Objects. The Aim never changes. It is to reduce the energy in the Source.

Q. *No, but I mean, the reason we get individual differences is because everybody has their own psychic Objects which are satisfied in different circumstances?*

P. No, psychic Objects aren't satisfied. It's Aims that are satisfied. People acquire different psychic Objects because their Aim has been satisfied via different interaction with real objects.

Q. *Does everyone start out with the same psychic Object, at the origin?*

P. Well, that's another version of that origin problem, and the answer is *how could we possibly know?* You could just as easily say yes as no. Either way would be embarrassing.

In a way, if you tie to genetics, you already have differences there so you can say, "Well, there's no reason why that original Object has to be the same for everybody, if it reflects your genetic makeup." On the other hand, the more you allow genetic variation, the more mysterious it becomes that under all of those conditions, in general you get the right Object produced.

Q. *It just seems that if you allow different psychic Objects at the origin, there's no need to even put in the bit on different life histories. As far as producing different psychic objects—*

P. Right, except that keep in mind that one of the things we want to

account for is change. No matter what you start out with, and how different you are, you also want it to be possible for people to change, and this will do it.

Q. *But if an infant starts out with a simple multiple-choice test, either there's a breast there or there isn't—*

P. Well, you could put it that way. It's hard to know what an infant starts off with. There's very little restriction on us in what we say about infants. We can make up anything we want, and those infants will not object, they will not negotiate with us. It's going to be a unilateral description in the same way that I can describe that table in any way I want, and it will not object.

Q. *Life is really beautiful until personal differences arise.*

P. It's the Garden of Eden. And we do do a lot of reading back into the infant things that are intelligible to us as adults.

Q. *This may not ###, but just talking about the infants, what about this idea that the infant achieves from the mother through electrical impulses feelings about himself, so before even the mother births that the child is already receiving some kind of concepts of himself?*

P. I don't know of any good evidence for that. In principle, it's that origin problem again. Just as you can talk about your genetic makeup accounting for everything that happens, you can also postulate these electrical influences, before you have any ID characteristics, generating some of them.

But keep in mind, if you put it cognitively that the infant is recognizing these impulses, then you're attributing some fairly elaborate cognitive apparatus to that infant, and at some point that becomes implausible. If it's merely a causal influence, then it's like genetic structure, in that it's simply the way your body is at a given time.

Q. *What do you call a theory like this that can't be falsified?*

P. Just a normal scientific theory. [laughter]

Q. *### a scientific theory was its ability to generate research.*

P. That's nonsense, and it should be obvious nonsense. The fact that people do a lot of research with a theory doesn't, and couldn't possibly, make it a good theory. I could make up a nonsensical theory and have a thousand people doing things with it. That would not make it a good theory.

Q. *I'm not addressing whether scientific theories are good or bad, but just if it is a scientific theory, it doesn't seem to fall into the description that Hall*

and Lindzey give of good theories in terms of—it's parsimonious, I guess, but it doesn't generate the research, so you can't falsify it.

P. Psychoanalytic theory has generated a lot of research, in fact, probably more than any other psychological theory. What you can't do is falsify it, but you can't falsify any theory. Theories are of such a nature that no possible observation would be incompatible with that theory.

What happens is that you have theories, and then you do some bridging, and then on the basis of what you observe, you make decisions about whether to continue to use the theory or to modify it. But the observation itself is never directly, logically, incompatible with the theory. The observation will never show that theory to be true or false.

Q. *You can't even do that, though, I wouldn't think, because, for example, if you wanted to get to psychological Objects, it's impossible to even get to that level of description where we can bridge and start to theorize.*

P. No, we can use this. We can use it, for example, directly to account for infant behavior. We can use what we have so far to account for learning.

What you can see, though, is that we need more than the universal theory. But that is also universally true of any scientific theory: you need more than the theory. You need a few facts to go by. And the facts in question would be facts about the particular individual, what he had already learned. Then we could start predicting how he would treat a particular sort of object. But given that kind of fact, indeed we could use this theory to predict what somebody would do.

Any questions about the principle of displacement and how it operates as a learning theory?

Okay, let's go to complication number three.

Over time, you acquire a multiplicity of psychic Objects, so just as we complicated it earlier by introducing from the very beginning a multiplicity of Sources, now we're going to talk about a multiplicity of psychic Objects. [Adds upper left to Fig. 1, p. 365]

Now we're going to allow something that we didn't allow initially, namely, that acting with respect to one Object can satisfy more than one Aim. For example, if you had this first Source operative, that that generated your psychic Object, and you behaved in terms of that psychic Object, the Result of that Behavior might be not merely the satisfaction of the Impetus here [N₁] or the satisfaction of the Aim here. It might also satisfy the Aim for

either of the other two $[N_2, N_3]$ as well.

Let's add another complication.

I've been talking about the satisfaction of the Aim more or less as though it were all-or-nothing. Quantify that. The Aim may be satisfied to a greater or less degree, anywhere from 0% to 100%. Freud's comment is that it is almost never 100%. The most you ever get, he says, is partial satisfaction, partial reduction of that energy.

Q. *Are you saying that the Behavior satisfies the Aim?*

P. The Result of the Behavior is the satisfaction, to some degree, ranging from zero to a hundred percent, the satisfaction of the Aim.

Q. *Some of the complications have been things that have been added, but if the Source and Impetus and so forth are biological, then this one almost follows without adding anything to it. It's just a complication that arises by itself. For example, if to satisfy some other Aim, I drink something—I wind up doing something that results in drinking something, it's hard to imagine how that wouldn't satisfy any thirst that I was having. So this complication is different from the other ones in that it's not actually—*

P. No, it is, and it doesn't depend at all on being biological. All it depends on is you have a system of things that are interconnected.

Q. *You could have a rule, though—formally, this is a complication, you could have a rule that only the Source could be satisfied for which—*

P. Right.

Q. *But if you keep in mind the biological character of these particular things, then this particular complication is kind of unavoidable.*

P. Yeah. But see, the point of all of these complications is to elaborate what's a very simple logical notion into something that fits a lot of complications we know are there. And this one will fit any interactive system.

The same thing will hold in your motor. If you did something that screwed up your fuel line, that would also affect the carburetor and it would affect the rings and it would affect all kinds of things in that motor, because they all are working together. So you wouldn't be surprised to find the same thing in an organism.

Q. *Does this complication also imply that more than one Object is associated with a given Source?*

P. Yeah. That you know already just from the displacement principle, because on a new occasion, there may be a new object in the vicinity and the old object isn't there when you're activated.

Q. *The displacement principle is just that the Object will change in that direction. It doesn't imply that they're necessarily equal ###.*

P. Okay, let's talk about regression.

Come back to the notion of displacement. What we developed was the notion that when you have a real object that succeeds in satisfying the Aim, then the next time round, the Object that comes to mind will be more like that real object.

Suppose you continue, and that real object stops satisfying your Aim. You'll get displacement away from that and in some other direction. With a history of partial satisfaction or partial presence, you're going to develop a number of psychic Objects there, stemming from the same Source. But I think that even with that problem, we won't be able to deal with it until we go through this.

Q. *What happens with chance satisfaction?*

P. It simply operates the same way.

Q. *You choose a real object?*

P. Whatever real object you were behaving toward, it will make a difference next time. Even if the connection was just accidental, it will still make this kind of change, because you'll have no way of knowing.

Q. *But then the next time, it would be even more likely to be displaced away from that object.*

P. Yeah, if it just happened by accident, you'd figure that statistics will catch up with you, and it will stop being satisfying and some other one will become more satisfying.

Q. *In that theory, they talk about people successfully get to the genital stage, ### on phallic, is that the same thing—*

P. No. That has to do with the development over time of personal characteristics, and we haven't got there. We're still dealing with the first question. *Why do people do what they do?* When it comes to *How do people get the way they are?*, then we have that kind of problem. It's true that there you also have regression, etc., and it works there because it works here. If you understand how it works here, there's no problem about how it works if you

regress from the phallic to the anal or whatever.

Q. *I want to see if I understand this correctly. If, after a while, the real object fails to satisfy, then you go ahead and choose another object?*

P. The next time round. The next time round, your psychic Object will be less like that real object than it was before. In effect, the similarity changes will lag one cycle behind the actual event. If it succeeds, the next cycle around the object is more similar. If it fails, the next cycle around the object is less similar. And it's that change that is the displacement. The psychic Object is displaced from one occasion to the next, or from what it would have been if what happened last time hadn't happened

Q. *That's not necessarily regression, is it?*

P. No. What I'm saying is that the principle of displacement will operate whether in normal learning or in regression, because both of them are learning.

Q. *It seems like, to an extent, you could have a negative satisfaction of Aim.*

P. Hold off on that.

We need several principles here. One is that you have—over time, having some experience operating this way [Fig. 1], you will acquire a repertoire of psychic Objects. Number 2, any given Object may have satisfied any number of these Sources, and to any degree. Okay, the last ingredient—I think—that we need here—

Q. *Could you repeat that second principle, that any psychic Object—*

P. The Object may have satisfied any of the Sources in any degree. So for a given psychic Object, you can have three numbers here [N_1 , N_2 , N_3], representing the degree to which acting on that Object has satisfied these three Aims, on the average, in the past.

So each Object, then, is differentially associated with each of the Sources by virtue of the history of satisfaction of those Sources.

Q. *### those Sources are independent?*

P. Now they're not. If they started out independently, then in the course of acting on the Object that came from one Source, you could, in fact, satisfy a number of them. If that happened, then they would stop being independent. But you started with them independent, and they become independent that way.

The last one is: when the Source is activated by this energy, and produces a psychic Object, we now have the notion of energy being carried through to the Object. That is Object cathexis. [Fig. 1. E]

Q. *Would you repeat that last?*

P. So far, we've had energy activating the Source. Now what we need is to think of the energy as flowing through the Source and into the Object, so that the energy activates the Object.

Now get this picture in your mind: you have a Source with a certain amount of energy in it. You have an Object that gets acted on, and that action satisfies the Aim but not completely. There is a proportion.

The next time round, think of that proportion, that the Object will draw energy from that Source but not all of the energy, only in proportion to how satisfying it was.

So that for example, if, on Cycle 1, you have a certain amount of energy, and acting on this particular Object satisfies it to a degree of two-thirds, that is, it reduces the energy by two-thirds, the next time round, whatever amount of energy you have here [Source N_1], two-thirds of it will be drawn to this Object. So the Object is drawing energy from the Source in the proportion that that Object was satisfying in the past. So to the extent that it's completely satisfying, it will draw all of the energy. To the extent that it is not completely satisfying, it will only draw that proportion of the energy.

Q. *I don't see how a psychic Object can draw a high energy from a biological Source at all.*

P. Well, but remember we said: *that is the mind-body problem, and Freud does not deal with it.* He just says it happens.

Q. *What kind of energy could he be talking about a psychic Object drawing?*

P. You don't need to create any new difficulties other than the basic mind-body problem [laughter]. All you need to postulate is that the energy gets used up in the physiology, and the way it gets used up determines which Object comes out. You don't really have to think of the energy going into an Object, and basically it doesn't, but that's the easiest model to think of, that the Object is drawing energy from the Source because it's the amount of energy that determines what happens.

Q. *Thinking does burn up calories, too.*

Q. *Doesn't that mean that if an Object draws a certain amount of energy the first time around, then the degree to which the Aim is satisfied will cause the Object to draw the same amount of energy again?*

P. No. The proportion of satisfaction will be operating then. If you had 10 units of energy the first time; and you had this particular Object; and you acted on it; and you reduced this Source by, say, 7 units, so that you've got a satisfaction ratio of 7 out of 10; on the next time round if you had 10 units of energy, only 7 of those would be activating that Object. The other three would remain here in the Source. Those three units of energy would be unused by that Object.

Q. *I don't understand.*

P. Just take the numbers. If you're working in terms of—okay, let's translate it into phenomenology. If you have a motivation and you act on it, but it's not entirely satisfying, then the next time you have that motivation, you will be motivated to do partly something else, because it wasn't completely satisfying; but partly you'll be motivated to do what you did before, because that also was partly satisfying. So our motivation will be divided into the motivation to do what you did last time, which was satisfying, and the motivation to do something that satisfies your original wish in ways that it wasn't satisfied last time.

Q. *Is there an initial time round where all the Source-energy goes into the Object, or does it start out accidentally, or—*

P. Initially, you figure it all goes in. That's your original hallucination with no reality constraints whatever. It just all goes there. Once you start learning, then you get those constraints.

Q. *So you're not actually reducing the Impetus?*

P. Yeah, you're reducing the Impetus.

Q. *So you never have a hundred percent—*

P. No, that's why you don't run down, because you've always got some energy in the system.

Q. *Is it like the ### system? So you might say, the next time round—let's say that the first time it drew out like about 6 or 7 or whatever. The next time around, would it also just draw 7?*

P. No, it depends on how satisfying it was the second time. In effect, you keep a running average of how satisfying it's been in the past, and if you

do a running average, that's the proportion of the energy it will draw this time.

Q. *So if it goes like from 7 to 6 to 2, then you're going to get rid of it?*

P. Well, no, you'll still be carrying it. If it goes from 7 to 6 to 2, your running average is somewhere around 4, but if it goes from 2 to 2 to 2 to 2, after a while your running average is down around 2.

Q. *It can't ever go the other way, though?*

P. If that starts becoming satisfying and your running average goes 7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, then after a while your running average is going to be up around 8. In effect, the amount that you draw, the proportion of energy that you're using with this Object simply reflects the degree to which that Object has been satisfying.

Q. *But you haven't eliminated the Object if it begins to ###.*

P. You see, the running average never goes down to zero. It can't. Numerically, it can never down to zero as soon as you have any positive quantity at all. It'll go down small, but not zero.

Q. *How could it get large again?*

P. Simply because on repeated cycles of becoming more satisfying.

Q. *If you only put two in, you're only going to get two—if you only put two units of energy in, say it satisfies those two units, but it'll never go to three or four because you didn't put those in.*

P. That's right. We're just talking about proportion, now. How much of the energy that's here will it draw? As far as how much energy is here, we already worked that out in just dealing with multiple Sources, namely, that the Behavior will have the effect of raising or lowering. At a given time, there will be a certain amount of energy, and the proportion of that amount is what is drawn by the Object. [change tape]

Q. *How does that explain the fact that people are constantly picking Objects that don't satisfy them?*

P. Because they think they do. You're not guaranteed that what you try will succeed in the way you hoped.

Q. *According to that, that should have some effect on your physiology.*

P. No, according to this, the way you pick simply reflects your past experience. Your past experience of satisfaction with various needs will

determine which Object you produce, and therefore which Behavior you engage in.

Q. *Even if it's consistently one ###.*

P. Yeah. The numbers simply pick out which Object happens, but they don't affect the principles on which the system operates. The system will operate no matter how satisfying or unsatisfying your experience is. And it would have to.

Q. *Does cathexis involve the whole cycle, or just between the Source and the Object?*

P. No, the cathexis is like Impetus: it is a quantity and is the quantity of energy associated with a given Object. Okay, now copy this table down, because it's a way of introducing order into all of the various things that we've been talking about:

cathexis = +
anti-cathexis = -




FIGURE 2

You have several different Objects. You have several different Sources. Each Source has a quantity of energy associated with it at that time. That's what the T_1 conventionally means: "now". So at that time, there is this much energy in each of the Sources. Each Object has a connection to each Source, and with that connection goes a proportion. And that proportion is that running average that I've been talking about: the degree to which acting on that Object has satisfied the Aim of that Source.

So you have a satisfaction number connecting each object with each Source. That's why there's so many lines and so many numbers. Each Object connects to each Source with a satisfaction number.

Now, each Object has associated with it some amount of energy [N_1 N_2 , etc.]. That amount of energy is a sum—here's the description of the sum: for each Source, you multiply the degree of satisfaction by the energy in the Source.

Q. *So the energy is really associated with the Source?*

P. Yeah, the energy is still associated with the Source just like we worked it out here [Fig. 1, and Fig. 3].

Q. *Not with the Object?*

P. That's what we're generating. You have energy associated with Objects, and the energy associated with the Object is a function of the energy associated with the Sources, and the degree of satisfaction, the history of satisfaction.

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Object} & & \text{sum of} \\ \text{cathexis} & = & \% \text{ satisfaction} \\ \text{(energy)} & \times & T_1 \text{ energy} \end{array}$$

FIGURE 3

Q. *The energy associated with the Objects, then, will always be less than the energy associated with the Source?*

P. No, it's independent. If you run this sum, you have $10 \times 0.6 + 8 \times 0.4 + 12 \times \text{—}$

Q. *You said we could never completely satisfy an Aim, so you could never completely eliminate the energy in a source.*

P. Right. What that says is that these proportions are never as high as 1. They're always somewhere between zero and 1.

Q. *Then the sum of your percent of satisfactions will always be less than 1?*

P. No. These do not add to 1. You can satisfy these Aims to any degree between zero and 1. They don't have to add up to anything. All you know is they add up to less than 3, because each one is less than 1. That's the only limit.

Q. *What's the summation of all that, again?*

P. You can calculate the Object cathexis. You do it with this formula, summing across Sources: $\% \text{ satisfaction} \times T_1 \text{ energy}$.

Q. *Do you ever really calculate that for any one person? Or are you just using this to describe how—*

P. Yeah, this is the conceptualization.

Q. *Is it still the Source with the most energy, or the Object with the most cathexis, that now determines that?*

P. Hang on. What this set of connections gives us, now, is a way of associating a certain amount of energy with each Object, based on the history of satisfaction with these instinctual Aims, and the amount of energy at a given time associated with it.

Q. *So you just assign those values, a satisfaction percentage, on purely—*

P. No, this is just a conceptual example. This could be—

Q. *You don't calculate it.*

P. No. If you wanted to predict, based on this, you would have to have some record that would enable you to plug in this number up here—

Q. *So to do this, you multiply $10 \times 0.60 \times -50 \times$ —*

P. No, $10 \times 0.60 + 8 \times 0.40 + 12 \times 0.10$. It's the sum of the satisfaction times the energy. So for each of these Sources, you have energy and proportion.

Q. *That's only for one Object, right?*

P. For one Object, you have as many sum-terms as there are Sources. Because for each Object, you've got to figure out how much it's drawing from each Source. That's what this sum is, how much it draws from each Source, and you add them up.

Q. *You said an Object can't draw from—can only draw from one Source at a time?*

P. No.

Q. *It can draw from more than one Source at a time. Then the way you have those numbers written right now, the percentage of satisfaction, they can draw more than—I'm seeing this drawing 110%. But that's not right, because I'm looking at the amount it draws from each one.*

P. That's right. That's our next step. The first step, you had to see that this a way of associating an amount of energy with each of the psychic Objects.

Q. *Did you say you can't have two Objects—tap on two psychic Objects at the same time, so that way you never get into the more than 100% satisfaction problem.*

P. That's part of why. There's another reason, namely, there's no issue of 100%.

Q. *Well, if you could do two things at the same time—*

P. You do two things at the same time—

Q. *Satisfying one this amount, and the other that amount, but not adding the two amounts of satisfaction together?*

P. No. You see, in the case that you would normally be inclined to talk about as having two psychic Objects and doing two different things simultaneously, all you've got to do is make a more complicated psychic Object, and you've got it.

Q. *Yeah, but if just in that case you did two at the same time with Object 1 and Object 2, then you would have satisfied simultaneously 60% and 50% of Source 1, which would have been 110% of it. [laughter]*

P. It doesn't work that way.

Q. *It's like the old arithmetic problem, if one child can drink two-thirds of a cup of orange juice, and another—*

P. Stop!

Q. *—how much of this cup of orange juice can two children drink?*

P. That's right. That's the same kind of problem. Now, given that there's a quantity of energy associated with these psychic Objects, you now have a new principle for which Object you will have in mind at a given time, namely, the one with the most energy.

Q. *Say that again, please.*

P. Given that you can associate an amount of energy with a psychic Object as such, now you have a new principle for which psychic Object comes to mind at a given time, namely, the one with the most energy. Initially, we developed that the psychic Object that comes to mind is the one that is derived from the Source with the most energy. Now we say, since there's energy in the Object, it's the Object with the most energy, and it doesn't matter where that energy comes from. Whichever one has the most energy will be the one that comes to mind at that time.

Q. *Won't the Object with the most energy come from the Source with the most energy?*

P. No. You see, this is, I think, what we were verging on. At this point, what you can see is that you can have more energy in a given Object than there is in any one Source. Since it's drawing from various Sources, there can be more energy in a given Object than there is in a Source.

Q. *It seems like repression would enter into whether these Objects would come to mind or not—like energy going in the opposite direction.*

P. Okay. I guess this is a good time to talk about anticathexis. So far, we've been talking as though learning is always from positive experience, and the only difference is to what extent these Aims satisfy.

Now, in fact, you know that's not true. Behavior of yours can be positively a failure, can be positively painful, and in psychoanalytic terms, it may increase the amount of energy in a given Source. So that what you learn is not merely *that's not a way to satisfy that Aim*. What you learn is: *if that's your motivation, this is something not to do*. This notion of learning that *this is something not to do* is expressed with the notion of anticathexis.

Q. *You said you can increase the amount of energy in a Source. Can you also extend that so you can increase the amount of energy in an Object?*

P. The increase in the energy in an Object simply comes from what it satisfies. Increasing the amount of energy in a Source is the opposite of satisfaction. The satisfaction is to reduce it; if you increase it, that's experienced as tension, as painful, something—it's not just lack of satisfaction.

Q. *Would that give you a negative number?*

P. No, it doesn't give you a negative number in the percent of satisfaction. It gives you a different structure, namely, of an opposing force. That's why you call it anticathexis. It's not merely a lack of satisfaction, it's a learning that this is a thing not to do. So what you're learning is an inhibition, that this is something not to do.

That anticathexis draw energy from Sources just the way that cathexis does. So indeed, with every Object, then, you have positive cathexis and anticathexis.

Q. *It draws energy from the same Sources?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *It acts, then, as ### to reduce the draw of energy?*

P. No, it doesn't reduce the draw; it just neutralizes it. Because the effect of energy available for acting on this Object is the algebraic sum.

Q. *It's kind of like the thing we were talking about with reasons, where there's pros and cons—*

P. Right.

Q. *### anticathexis?*

P. Think of putting your finger on a stove. You get burned, you jerk back. What you learn is that that's something not to do. You've got an anticathexis on that object.

Q. *How does that energize the Source, in what way?*

P. It doesn't energize the Source.

Q. *You said it increases the energy in the Source.*

P. Oh, whatever Source is involved in that pain is what's increased. You remember, we said *there are not definite locations for these Sources*. They're just somewhere in your body, and whichever one was involved in the jerking your finger away and the pain, that's the one that got the energy increased. And that energy is what's being drawn on—or that proportion is what's being drawn on—in terms of *that's not a thing to do*.

So you acquire inhibitions that way, just like you acquire behavior tendencies the other way. And in terms of the theory, it's very simple. It's simply a question whether the energy is increased or decreased.

Q. *The stronger the anticathexis, the more or less likely it'll be that you'll do it.*

P. Yeah. If you have a strong anticathexis, it would take a lot of positive energy to give you any positive motivation at all.

Q. *Can there be a point where it neutralizes?*

P. Yeah. For example, you can have Objects that are primarily negative and with very little positive. Or you can have equal, in which case it's completely neutralized.

Q. *And then what kind of a state are you in?*

P. Look: we have a lot of normal learning about things that are simply things not to do, things that you wouldn't think of trying—like climbing on the roof and jumping off. There's all kinds of things that we have learned primarily as things not to do, and they are the ones we are simply carrying around with a negative cathexis.

Q. *How would something like masochism work, which would be something*

negative that you do?

P. In one way or another, a case of masochism is going to be something where you have a negative cathexis, and that's why it draws your attention. Why would somebody do something painful? But somewhere along the line, you've acquired an unusual positive cathexis, and that's why you do it. And the trick is, in a given case, to figure out what that positive cathexis is.

Q. *Is that the way he explains a lot of abnormal behavior?*

P. Yeah. It's like asking, with Veronica, *why did she do something that got her mother mad at her and got her into all that hassle?* The answer was *there was something that counted for more.* But if you just looked at her doing something that gets her into a hassle, indeed, you wonder why. And you know what the answer has to be: *there's something else that counts for more.* The same goes for these energy considerations. Somebody does something for which you know they have a negative cathexis, then there has to be a positive one that counts for more.

The other thing is: within some limits, things that, for most of us, have a negative cathexis, for this person, don't.

Q. That could be part of some of the learning, too.

P. Yeah. So you have both kinds of ###.

Q. *So in the case of Veronica, the positive cathexis would be the reduction of anxiety, the negative cathexis would be the effect of this interaction, the self-defeating aspect of this and that?*

P. If she recognizes that. Basically, this is simply part of the apparatus for explaining why people do what they do.

Let me bring out a comparison which I think will show this in a particular light. You recall this principle with the Sources, which says: *Whichever Source has the most energy will produce the Object that you act on.* Compare that to Maxim 3, the maxim that says: *If you have a reason to do something, you'll do it unless you have a stronger reason to do something else.* In effect, this principle dealing with Sources is the equivalent of Maxim 3. No matter what the motivational concept, whether it be energy or probability or habit-strength or reasons, it will always work that way—that the stronger prevails over the weaker. So in Descriptive, we say, "If you have a reason to do something, you'll do it unless you have a stronger reason to do something else." Here, Freud says, "If a given Source is activated, it will determine your behavior, unless there's another Source that has even more energy."

Q. *Why are you talking about Sources now and not Objects?*

P. I'm saying that this principle dealing with Sources is the equivalent of Maxim 3. It has the same logical form. You get the same kind of mileage out of it.

Q. *Couldn't you extend this—could you apply the same analysis to Objects?*

P. That's what we have over here [Fig. 2, p. 209], and this one is the equivalent of Maxim 4. You remember about Maxim 4, that says: *two reasons are a stronger reason than either one of those*. We said in connection with Maxim 4 *this is the one that expresses the fact that people do not just act on the one thing they want most*. There is some way of dealing with all of your motivations simultaneously.

Q. *In that sense, you use composite Objects?*

P. Not composite Objects. Objects that draw from different motivational Sources. In that sense, acting on this Object is a way of integrating those different motivations. And that's exactly what we saw with Maxim 4, when we invented the behavior of first doing A then B, or doing both A and B. In fact, if you act on this Object, and it satisfies these two Sources, you're doing both A and B.

So the net effect of this development of the multiplicity of Sources, and multiplicity of Objects, and all of these calculations about energy will give us the equivalent of Maxims 3 and 4.

Now, you recall that the psychological part of that instinct, the Object and Behavior, were also the parallel to the five-parameter representation of Intentional Action. If you put the two together, the concept of instinct as we've elaborated it corresponds to the concept of Intentional Action, plus Maxims 3 and 4, plus a learning principle

Q. *I'm sorry, could you repeat the same thing you just said?*

P. The concept of instinct as we've developed it so far corresponds to the concept of Intentional Action, plus Maxims 3 and 4, plus a learning principle. And that learning principle is going to find its equivalent in Maxims 6, 7, and 8—the acquisition of facts, the acquisition of concepts and skills, the acquisition of personal characteristics.

Part of why I mention the equivalents is, again, to comment on the place of physiology in psychoanalytic theory. If you read the theory, the idiom is a physiological idiom. He talks the language of biology plus psychic Objects.

Talking about energy distributions, talking about Sources, that's biological kind of language. You would expect that if the biology of it was really that fundamental, the psychoanalysts would have been among the leaders in the study of biology. According to the theory, that's where all of the real action lies. The key event in all of this is that it's set off by the activation of the Source, so if you were thinking of that biologically, and you wanted to do some studies on this theory, wouldn't one of the obvious moves be to study more biology and locate those Sources, measure that energy, etc.?

Q. *And wouldn't Freud love that analysts be physicians always?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *I think of the instincts as biological kinds of things—*

P. Well, this is the concept of instinct.

Q. *The concept of energy, it seems he's dealing with it in physics kind of sense, in terms of you have so much energy, and you can put so much of it one place and so much of it in another, and it can move back and forth but you can't have any more than you start with, you can't destroy, you can't—those are physical kinds of—*

P. Well, would you then expect them to be studying physics? The fact is that they never did, and that's not accidental. They weren't really interested in physiology, even though the theory is cast in a heavily physiological idiom. If you see that the language of the physiology—what it's doing is giving us the equivalent of Maxims 3 and 4, and you remember what those maxims are, are constraints on possible accurate behavior descriptions or person descriptions. Then with a little bit of historical perspective, you get another answer to what the physiology is doing in psychoanalytic theory, namely, putting it in physiological terms this way.

What it does is to provide a guarantee that the body works in such a way that the behavior that we know about is possible. And you would never even think of that except that historically, that was one of the important things in Freud's day. It was the mind-body problem, it was connecting behavioral explanations with physiological explanations. That was a criterion that operated before you started theorizing. If this was going to be a decent theory, it had to show the connection between your body and anything mental. And this theory does it, and it does it by incorporating into the account of the body just those restrictions that are essential to have behavior.

In our development of the maxims, it's clear there's nothing physiological about that set of considerations. That's part of the logic of the concept of behavior. But if you put it in physiological terms and say the body works that way, the net effect will be to say, "The body works in such a way that the behavior that we know about is possible."

And to accomplish that is not a trivial thing. To do it in this kind of detail, and to carry off the description of the body, incorporating all of those principles that are essential for behavior, is not at all trivial.

And nobody else has really accomplished that since Freud. Everybody else simply waves his hand and says in one way or another, "Body and mind go together." Freud did it in technical detail.

But at the same time, we need to understand that the physiology was honorific, that it was not central to his theory. It was instead a way of making the theory scientifically respectable.

When it comes to energy, somebody was saying that energy is really physical. Energy is really bookkeeping. Even in physics, there is no such thing as energy. What you have is bookkeeping, and the essence of the bookkeeping is, the amount of energy is constant, so you manipulate formulas, you manipulate movements, masses, accelerations; and the key is that you're doing energy bookkeeping. And in that bookkeeping system, the amount of energy remains constant.

But energy is not per se a physical phenomenon. It's not a phenomenon at all. You don't observe energy. Energy is not a thing. Energy is part of a way of describing movements of objects, etc. You have the same kind of bookkeeping here [Freud]. It's not that you're really doing physics in talking about organisms this way. You're simply doing that kind of bookkeeping.

The same kind of bookkeeping appears in the maxims when we're talking about reasons. It's a logical set of operations, not physics, not physiology, not any particular content. You'll have the same kind of logic in all kinds of places. So you don't need to think of this as really physiological, as really physics, just because we're talking about energy.

Your exams are due today, so let's turn them in now.

SESSION 17
August 4, 1976

Peter: Yesterday we spent most of the time talking about displacement and object cathexis. Are there any questions about that material?

Q. *### the function of energy of the Source to the Object. What you're saying is that you are not using it, you're never using energy.*

P. Right.

Q. *It's just the amount of energy you use in order to get to that.*

P. Right. The rest of the energy stays there.

Q. *Cathexis is with the psychic Object?*

P. The only time you use the word 'cathexis' is when you're dealing with a psychic Object. You don't have other things being cathected. You do speak of energy in various places in the system, but with cathexis, it's always that Object.

Q. *The system can have external input, like eating?*

P. It has to have, because there's no built-in source of energy in it.

Q. *If the Result can reduce the energy in the Source, does Freud say anything about where that energy goes, or—*

P. No. That energy has been used up in doing the Behavior. It's like completing an electric circuit. If you do complete it, you've discharged through it. If you don't complete it, it doesn't.

Q. *But you can't make ### on an electric circuit, but you can with this one.*

P. Yeah, but see, something that increases your psychic energy, the increase comes from the outside. In effect, you do something, that has some

effect on something beyond you, that something beyond you then acts on you to either increase or decrease your energy. That's why you need the real object, is that that other thing is what acts on you to increase or decrease.

By the way, there's a corresponding thing in Lewin, and there you get his solution, is that all that ever happens is that you move from one place to another, and that saves you from having to have internal energy manipulations.

Okay, now with the addition of displacement, the addition of object cathexis, you also generate individual differences, because, in general, people's Objects will be different because they are the result of different learning histories, different histories of satisfaction of instinctual aims. So by virtue of the process of displacement over time, people will in general have different psychic Objects and will have a different set of psychic Objects. And even for the psychic Objects that they have in common, they will, in general, have different amounts of cathexis and countercahexis associated with them.

By the way, last time we were talking about the Object drawing energy from the Sources, and that created some problems. Use as a clue what I said at the very end, that the whole notion of energy is a bookkeeping notion, and that the psychic Object is not in one place drawing energy from something in another place. The amount of energy in the Object simply corresponds to that proportion of energy in the Sources, but there is not some way that the energy gets from the one to the other.

The next thing we want to look at is two sets of concepts that are parallel, and (as far as I can see) are the same concept, namely, on the one hand, id and ego; and on the other hand primary and secondary process.




FIGURE 1

Now come back to that primary notion of instinct [Fig. 1]. Think about that first time round, before any learning has taken place. We said that there is no guarantee whatever that the psychic Object that comes to mind is in

any way related to actual objects that may be around there. So if we discount for a minute the fact that there are other people in the vicinity making sure about these things, you would say it would be simply a coincidence if the Object that came to mind had any relation—and any useful relation—to what was out there; therefore, it would be simply a coincidence, a matter of chance, whether the Behavior engaged in succeeded in satisfying the Aim.

In fact, the primary notion of instinct is such that any success is completely accidental, is completely a matter of coincidence because there's nothing about that notion that gives you any guarantee or even presumption of success. Now think back to our development of Intentional Action, where I said *if the success is not attributable to the person, that's not his behavior, it's just something that happens*.

You remember the example of stumbling as you walk in the room. I said *if that success at falling on your face is not an expression of your learned competence, then it's not a behavior, it's just something that happened*. You get that issue here, and it appears in these concepts [Fig. 2]. After you have displacement and learning, then your successes are not simply a matter of luck, chance, accidents, or coincidence. They reflect your learning.

id functioning	primary process
ego functioning	secondary process
super-ego functioning	

FIGURE 2

Now, if you take any behavior of anybody, and adopt the role of the Critic, you'll find that there's no behavior that you could imagine that is immune from criticism. There's no behavior that you could image that you couldn't find something wrong with it.

Now, whenever you find something wrong with a behavior, you can always put it in the form of either distorted perception, inaccurate perception, or poor judgment.

To the extent that a behavior is a matter of inaccurate perception or bad judgment, it resembles the operation of this original instinct. Namely, it's something that could only succeed by chance.

On the other hand, to the extent that a behavior represents accurate perception and sound judgment, its success is not a matter of chance. Those are the dimensions that separate these two notions [primary and secondary process]. For Freud, in so far as behavior represented something that could succeed by chance, it was a matter of primary process or id functioning. To

the extent that it was a reflection of displacement; and that learning was relevant; and there was accurate perception and good judgment; and it wasn't successful just by accident; to that extent, it was a matter of secondary process or ego functioning.

So for Freud, all behavior was to some extent—that is, in some proportion—an expression of primary process and to some proportion an expression of secondary process. Or, all behavior represents some proportion of id functioning and some proportion of ego functioning.

Q. *Then there's no behavior that could be based completely on bad judgment or poor perception?*

P. No. Remember, there's always an achievement, so there's always some way in which the behavior was successful.

Q. *But it may be ### unintentionally.*

P. It doesn't matter. There's nothing here about intention.

Q. *I thought that was supposed to be the distinction.*

P. No, a behavior can be successful even if it's unintentionally successful. That's partly why even with no competence, you might succeed just by accident. And even a behavior that's completely unsuccessful from somebody's point of view will be successful from somebody else's. There's always something about it you can find to call "success". And you can see that you'd have to really get clever even to get close to 100% either way.

Q. *But you've already said that that negative, you could develop anticathexis. It implies kind of a negative success, doesn't it?*

P. You can take your choice as to whether you call those successes or failures, but even if you called it a failure, there'd be some other description under which it was a success. Even behavior that results in anticathexis may be secondary process at work. When the kid reaches and touches that stove, it probably represents a fair amount of secondary process, and yet he gets burned and gets an anticathexis. There's no presumption of a connection that way, then.

Q. *Would you explain how with instinct, there's just a chance that they succeed in a behavior? Once more, why that is?*

P. Because there's no connection between the psychic Object and the real objects outside here. Whatever it is you have in your head, you might be in a place where there was no such thing, so the relation between those is

sheer coincidence—unless, it represents your prior learning, in which case it isn't sheer coincidence.

Q. *### the genes, though?*

P. That's the origin problem.

Q. *Yeah, but since we're assuming, as Freud did, that it's genetic, he solved it in a genetic manner—*

P. Well, he didn't really assume it's genetic. He just assumed it's physiological.

Q. *There has to be some kind of connection between the genes and the outside world in order for those genes to adapt in some way.*

P. All you have to have is an organism. The organism is what's connected to the outside world. The organism responds to the outside world.

Q. *The genes are part of that organism.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *So that it's like the genes are responding to the outside world—*

P. The organism responds. Genes don't respond.

Q. *Over a period of time, though—okay.*

P. Genes may be selected through a process of natural selection, but that's not a response.

Incidentally, on that origin problem there, it turns out that it needn't be there.

In order for the learning to take place, this original Object doesn't at all have to resemble the outside object. All that has to be there is that the Object is displaceable toward the actual objects around. It's displaceable toward them, and if it succeeds, it doesn't matter what that original object was. But we've noticed that this notion that all it has to do is be displaceable is the Freudian equivalent of the 'merely able' analysis that we worked out. It just has to be merely able to be displaced.

Q. *It still seems to me that you could—that a behavior could exist that was entirely primary process. ### the first behavior would be entirely primary process? It seems like somewhere you could have a behavior that is entirely chance, and that that would—*

P. The only candidate would be that first behavior, again, a different version of that origin.

Q. *Although you could get up to 99%. You do it all the time.*

P. How could you do 99% just by accident?

Q. *That's right.*

P. Okay, everybody clear about the distinction, what's involved? Ego functioning reflects learning. The criterion for that is accurate perception and sound judgment. To the extent that your perception is inaccurate, to the extent that your judgment is bad, you're distorting reality, you've got primary process at work.

Q. *What is the criterion for accurate perception and sound judgment? Is that 'success'?*

P. Yeah. If it's accurate, it succeeds in giving you a correct perception. If you said, "There's a microphone there," I'd say, "Yeah, that's accurate perception."

Q. *Where's the place for perception and judgment in the scheme?*

P. There isn't, and there isn't in the Freudian theory. He just incorporates that informally, just takes it for granted that people perceive and judge. With respect to judgment, you can draw a diagram of intra-psychic processes, but just as he and all of them ignored physiology in general, they ignored the physiology of sense perception.

Q. ###

P. And the kind of perception that we're talking about, you could just as well call 'judgment'. If he says there's an elephant there, you could say it's inaccurate perception, but you could equally well say it's bad judgment.

Q. ### *corresponds to the psychic Object.*

P. The way you would find out is what a person says and how he treats it. You don't have to have a special notion of perception there, to think in terms of his having inaccurate perception. If you recall, in your books, what the descriptions are of these two processes [primary and secondary], you'll find an interesting thing. Secondary process is described as learned, as logical, as preserving causal relations, as being coherent, as hanging together, etc. Primary process is described as something that doesn't preserve causal relations, doesn't preserve logical relations, doesn't preserve time sequences, doesn't exhibit coherence.

And the interesting thing is that there are no positive descriptions of primary process. All of the descriptions of primary process are negative,

what it doesn't have. The relation between the two is that what it doesn't have, is what secondary process does have. If you look at the features of secondary process, then primary process is defined by the absence of those features.

Q. *It seems as though primary process is necessary for displacement to occur. It's necessary for the optimum effect of displacement.*

Q. *Why?*

Q. *If you don't occasionally do something by chance or by mistake or bad judgment or something, you probably aren't going to find—if you continually do—I guess not, because you could end up doing something bad and ### something else through a secondary process.*

P. There's something in that, because just imagine an infant starting out with very quickly acquiring a large array of behaviors, and then doing most things deliberately. One of the things you'd predict is that they'd have a harder time learning, because they'd be so busy doing their thing that the world wouldn't impinge on them that strongly. They'd have says of sloughing it off. And so, in fact, they might very well learn slower.

At the same time, keep in mind that one can engage in trial and error deliberately. Basically, it's the virtue of random variation that I think you're talking about, that it's nice to have that just to get new things into the system.

Q. *Are you saying that primary process is defined in terms of only what it doesn't have?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *What about things that it does have? Doesn't it serve purposes like reducing certain drives, things like that?*

P. No. Reducing drives is an achievement, that's the Aim, and if this way of doing it brings that about, it's just accident. Besides which, the result of the primary process is not a feature of the process itself.

Q. *What's it a feature of?*

P. That's the outcome, that's some other sort of fact. Think of running a 100 yard race and winning it. The winning is not part of the process of running; it's something else, the outcome. So you can look at outcomes of processes, but if you just look at the process, the way this is described is that it's the absence of the things that go with secondary process.

And the main things that are absent are causality, time, and logic. Temporal relations, like in a dream, you just jump from here to another time. Things happen in sequences that are non-causal.

Q. *Okay, but in any definition, isn't the absence of something, something?*

P. Suppose I said, "There's not an elephant on my desk. Furthermore, there's not a dragon on that desk. Furthermore, there's not a flowerpot on that desk," and three days later I'm still telling you what there isn't on that desk. So I haven't characterized the desk by telling you there's no elephant on it, that it's not painted pink, and that it's not a car, and so on.

Q. *Is that a good analogy? Because—*

P. It's not an analogy. Check the description and you'll see that the descriptions of primary process are negative descriptions.

Q. *But is the absence of the process the same as the absence of some material thing? Because is a process a material thing?*

P. No. It's hard to have processes without objects. If I throw the chalk up in the air, there is a process of its going up and down. If there were no object, you could have processes like the room getting warmer or something like that. But with this kind of process, there's very little by way of objects to run that process. That's a different issue, about these processes.

The conclusion that I think you're seeing and not liking is that you could get by without primary process, because in terms of what you're told, you have one process—secondary process—and its absence, not two distinct processes. And indeed, you could work it that way.

Q. *If you did have only secondary process, it would seem that you would continually be narrowing down the kinds of behavior possible, because you're going to be gaining the anticathexis toward some Sources, and that would reduce the range of behaviors available to you. Is that accurate or not?*

P. No. Remember, I said you could do trial and error things on purpose. You can explore on purpose. But the thing is that the notion of a completely secondary process thing is fictitious, because there's no behavior that couldn't be criticized some way. But when you criticize, you criticize for its deficits, what's missing, what it doesn't have that it ought to have. And that's a feature of Critics' language, is that they're mainly pointing out things that are missing that should be there, things it doesn't have that it ought to have.

And this kind of Critic language is no different. When you're criticizing somebody's behavior, you're pointing out its defects; what it's missing; what

it should have been instead of what it is.

And that's how you get this kind of thing, that you have the normative descriptions that are built in here [secondary process], and then you have your categories of deficiencies, what's wrong, things going bad. So you get a second kind of language.

I'm not saying there is no primary process. What I'm saying is: that *the way that that's described, you could get along without it, and say everything that you say about primary process by simply saying "the absence of secondary process"*.

But, clearly, Freud talked about two processes, primary and secondary. When you appreciate that talking about secondary process and its absence is the same as talking about secondary process and primary process, you're much less likely to reify primary process as a thing.

One of the things that's happened with psychoanalytic theory is that primary process becomes a grab-bag of all kinds of magical and strange things simply because it contrasts with those things that we're familiar with that are systematic and organized. So any time you have a contrast like that, you can pull out all kinds of things from here, and people have.

Now, in this pair [id and ego functioning], you have a third, namely, superego functioning. So we need to see how this comes into the picture. To do that, we come back to ego functioning and how that works. And ego functioning essentially is displacement.

Now, what goes on when the Result satisfies the Aim is that, in some sense, you've succeeded in treating the objects in your environment successfully, effectively; not just in this sense [Fig. 1, p. 216, impetus-aim-source triangle], but in some other sense, in their own terms.

For example, think of the difference between eating a banana and sucking on a lollipop. If you tried to eat the lollipop the way you eat the banana, you'd have a hard time, and vice versa. You just can't treat them the same way and get the value there is in them. Likewise, if you try to eat the cup of coffee the way you do the banana, you would have a hard time ahead. Again, you can't just treat it the same way as you treat other things.

To interact with it successfully, you've got to meet its terms, in some sense. You've got to treat it in the ways that it can be treated successfully, and that, in general, is not just any old way. So what happens in displacement is that you are learning to deal effectively with the objects in your environment, and by 'effectively', in this theory, it is in just such ways as succeed in

satisfying your Aim. So you have to learn to treat them in some ways and not others.

When it comes to simple objects, like nipples or bananas or balls, or any material object, it's fairly easy to see what you have to do to treat it properly. As I say, the difference between how you deal with this cup of coffee and how you deal with a microphone are pretty obvious, and children pick up that sort of thing very easily and quickly.

There's a different sort of problem, namely, how do you deal with an object that is the source of most of your satisfactions, when this object is of a very peculiar sort, namely, that it behaves this way [Fig. 3], and demands that you do, too? What does it take to deal effectively with an object like that?

Q. *That behaves in what way?*




FIGURE 3

P. An object that engages in deliberate action, that chooses behaviors on these bases [HPEE]. In general, a mother or a parent will be an individual who engages in deliberate action, chooses behaviors in this way, and begins to require that of the child. As long as no demands are made on the child, it will just continue to function instinctually. But one of the functions of the parent is to start making these demands on the child. And that makes the parent an object that it's especially important for that child to learn to deal with effectively.

Q. *Certain behaviors that are appropriate as far as the mother is concerned would have a positive cathecting value of some sort, whereas behaviors that weren't would be punished?*

P. Yeah, and how is the child to tell the difference?

Q. *By whether the Aim is satisfied, whether the Aim is achieved by the*

Behavior.

P. Unfortunately, parents won't let you get away with that. They don't let the child just engage in random behavior and then reinforce the good ones. They demand that that child start doing it right without finding out ahead of time. It's the whole issue of socialization—you want the child to pick the right behaviors without somebody having to stand around and monitor whether it's right or not.

Q. *You say we're expecting first time learning on every behavior, or—*

P. No, but we're expecting that kind of learning, we're not saying about how fast this occurs; we're asking what it is that the child needs to acquire, what it takes to interact with that object effectively. That object is requiring that you do it right on your own. Then you're not going to get by by just doing anything and waiting to see what pays off. You can't treat mothers like slot-machines.

Q. *You have to internalize the mother's value system.*

P. Internalization is how it's talked about, but let's just stick with the question of what does it take in order to understand what's involved in this notion of identification or internalization.

Q. *It takes cathecting cooperation.*

P. No. The general answer is fairly simple: in order to choose the behaviors that the mother would have wanted you do, you've got to learn to choose behaviors the way mother chooses behaviors. If she's choosing on these bases [HPPEE], you've got to learn to choose on those bases. Otherwise it would just be an accident if you made the same choice that she would. So you've got to acquire her system for choosing behaviors. That's what it takes to interact with her effectively.

The big difference between learning to interact effectively with mother, and learning to interact effectively with material objects, is that when you learn to interact effectively with mother, that is the same thing as becoming more like her. If she operates this way, learning to operate this way is what you need to do in order to interact effectively with her.

But in that case, what has happened is that you have become like her in this respect. This is no different from the situation of learning arithmetic. If I'm the teacher, and I'm teaching you to do arithmetic, what I require of you is that you get the same answer that I do; and I require that you do it on your own, although, initially, I'm willing to correct your errors. But I don't

count you as successful unless you can get the same answers on your own that I would get.

What that amounts to is: you have to learn to do arithmetic. You're not just learning answers from me; you're learning how to do it. When you learn how to do it, you will get the same answers.

But then you become like me, because when we started out, I could do arithmetic, and you couldn't; now both of us can. So in that respect, you become like me.

Q. *I thought that the superego is developed before that identification takes place. Isn't the child still acting in a prudential manner? At least, he still has to meet his mother's demands in certain ways. Like, he can't go on breaking the dishes; or the Terrible Two's are into everything, looking at everything; and they're doing it or not doing it according to those accompanied by a smack; or there's no reaction. One of those two things. If there's no reaction, it's okay; and if there is, it's bad. That's happening before identification—I'm getting confused, because—*

P. Look, when you talk about getting smacked, there's the mother again.

Q. *Let's say he plays before this identification—*

P. To the extent that it does, the child is already like the mother in that respect and doesn't need new learning. Then all he needs to learn is not *what*, but *when*, *where*, *with whom*.

But clearly the child isn't going to start from scratch if this starts at age three or something like that. He's already got some ego functioning—that starts right away. So at whatever point the pressure starts coming, you do not just engage in instinctual behavior. You're drawing on the learning that has already taken place, and it may well be of that sort.

Q. *What if a child never learns to choose the way the mother does to a great enough extent? Does that make a pathology in that child?*

P. In this sense [HPEE], yeah. A mentally retarded child, for example, will have a hard time with this kind of thing [P] and this kind [Esthetic]. And will have a hard time getting beyond some fairly simple ones here [Ethical], and will be limited in the kind of pleasures [H].

Q. *I'm talking more about a normal child who just doesn't like the way mother chooses and just rejects it to an extent. You can't reject it totally, or you wouldn't have any interaction.*

P. It's hard to really imagine a case like that, unless you go to autistic children or something like that. Because to object to the mother, you have to have picked up at least some social appropriateness things or prudential things, and in that respect you have learned. Remember, I said *in learning arithmetic, you're not just learning answers. What you're doing is learning how to do it.*

Now, you might wind up better at arithmetic than me and recognize that, in the learning process, I gave you some wrong answers; and you'd had to compensate for those in your learning. Likewise, a child who learns this kind of competence from a parent may generate different answers.

The primary value is not the specific answers, but rather the competence to make that kind of judgment. So a child disagreeing with his parent is using the kind of competence that he learned from the parent.

As a matter of fact, that's one of the prime evidences that he didn't just learn answers, that he learned the competence.

Since this kind of learning results in the child becoming more like the parent, you have a special name that hinges on that fact. The name is 'identification' or 'incorporation', and less formally, 'internalization'. All of these carry the same imagery, namely, that you take the parent or something about the parent and bring it inside of you.

That notion presents much the same kind of problem as the notion of the psychic Object drawing energy from a Source. As soon as you take it too literally, you start wondering how it does it. And the answer is: *there's no way it could. At least, no plausible way.*

The same goes with incorporation or identification. If you take it too literally, you start wondering how it is done, and there is no way to do it.

But in a theory, you can always manage that kind of problem by introducing something in the theory whose function is merely to accomplish exactly that, and that's where you have a mechanism of incorporation. The one thing that that mechanism does in the theory is to provide an explanation of how you get the parent inside. You get it through the operation of that mechanism.

You see that the similarity comes about simply from what you've learned and the fact that that is similar to the parent. You'll see that there isn't really a problem of how to get the parent inside. If there isn't really that problem, you don't really need that mechanism either.

Q. *Would you say that again?*

P. The similarity between the child and the parent is simply a result of the kind of learning that's required; therefore, the similarity is accounted for without having to talk in terms of bringing the parent inside in any other sense. And if there's no problem of 'bringing the parent inside,' there's no need for a mechanism that does that.

Q. *Then the mechanism, if there is one, would be displacement?*

P. Incorporation. There's a special mechanism with a special name whose function is to account for that. That phenomenon in general, not just with your parent, but with any other person, that works that way.

Q. *Wouldn't that mechanism always be there? You wouldn't just use it to describe that you couldn't do it? It's like your saying that the mechanisms are sometimes there, and sometimes they're not.*

P. No. I'm saying that in this theory, you wouldn't really need a mechanism of that sort, because you wouldn't have to talk about it in terms of the parent being brought inside. You could develop it directly from ego functioning as simply a special kind of learning and account for exactly the same result. And since you wouldn't need to talk about 'bringing the parent inside,' you also wouldn't need to have in the theory a mechanism for bringing the parent inside.

Q. *If the child, as a baby, is an id functioning, self-serving—is it going to be resistant to doing that, to incorporating the parent? Why would it want to?*

P. That's one of the problems. If you think in terms of incorporating the parent, one of the questions is *why would it want to?* That's why you need a mechanism. Mechanisms are unmotivated. In Freudian theory, when something happens as a result of a mechanism, that change is not motivated; it just happens. That's the point of calling it a mechanism.

Q. ###

P. Well, theories come in different styles, and that's the style of this theory. It's built on the notion of mental mechanisms, of the operation of mental machinery. And this notion of instinct is a prime example of the mental machinery.

Q. *So despite the id functioning, a mechanism comes in to take over the process of identification?*

P. As you can see, if you use the mechanism of displacement, as we developed it here, you could generate that result within the theory without

calling on a special mechanism of incorporation. But it would still be a mechanism doing the job, because displacement is a mechanism.

Q. It would be essential, then, for the child to be competent and able to meet the mother's demand or what the mother expects the child to do. We're assuming that the child is competent to do that. Do you think the example of the autistic child—

P. No, we're not assuming anything. We're just saying what a child would have to learn in order to deal effectively with his parent. If he doesn't learn that, he's not going to be successful.

Q. Could we take ###, the parent take the attitude whatever level the child is on—maybe the child couldn't make the transition, couldn't come up to level. I wonder if the parent didn't come down to where the child was.

P. It wouldn't matter all that much. Remember that our patterns of child-rearing are based on a lot of informal, inductive knowledge about what children can learn, how they learn, and when is the right time to start. Socialization patterns are not at all accidental. There's a lot of background experience on that.

Now, if you decide that the child can't learn certain things, you just don't try to get him to learn those things. But he's going to be handicapped if he doesn't.

For example, if you decide that this kid is never going to learn to talk, you might stop trying to get him to talk, but he's going to be handicapped by being unable to talk. So usually, with something like that, you'd try your darnedest, and you'd adapt your methods to the peculiarities of this child, because what you found is that normal ways of doing it that work with most children, don't work with this one. So you try special methods.

But when it's something that important, you don't just say, "Well. I guess he'll never learn to talk, so what? That's John."

Q. I was thinking about some research reports that I read on this ### process, that they're using now with autistic children, and I was trying to translate that and trying to put it in there, and wondering—you know, by coming down to the level of the autistic child, then seeing the results for the child on his own. Apparently, it is being more able to adapt to the standards we expect of a child of that age.

P. You don't have to put it in terms of 'coming down to the child's level', because you'd have the same problem with adults or anybody else. The

limitation, or the constraining question, is Maxim 5, that the child can't do what he can't do; and if, to get along effectively with you, he'd have to do what he in fact can't do, it's a hopeless thing.

So part of your task as the socializer is to not put the child in a position where he has to do something that he can't do. And if you have to find that out by hard experience, that this child can't do what most children can do, it's still up to you to set tasks for him that he can do. And there's a lot that we don't know about that sort of thing, about children.

Q. *Would something like teaching a handicapped child to speak—where you've got to modify what you normally do—*

P. Yeah, the whole field of special education is based on that. Remember that maxim that says, "If you've got a thing, you've got it in one of the ways it can be gotten," [Maxim 8] Well, most kids will get it in the usual ways, but special education—the whole point of it is to provide alternate ways for children to acquire the same thing. But there's no finite and complete list of those alternate ways. That's why we're always looking for other ways, so that children who now, even with all of the things we know, still can't learn, maybe with still other ways, they can learn.

Q. *Would that still be considered identification?*

P. Sure. Because when he learns, he's become more like you, the teacher.

Q. *There's not quite as much the process but the result, that—*

P. It's the result. That's the only way you recognize what has gone on. If the learning doesn't take place, visibly, you'd never say that the process of incorporation had operated.

Any questions about superego, how it relates to ego functioning? or about the issue of incorporation?

Q. *### the superego, the connection to all this in actual terms. I was wondering how exactly it fits in, in terms of everything you've said.*

P. In Freud's terms, what's most familiar to us is the conscience, the ethical type of 'ought'. But in fact, he had a more general notion, that all of the notions of 'ought' were ###. If you think in terms of Actor/Observer/Critic, ego-functioning is much more like simply observing, being realistic, being accurate, etc. Those look like Observer. Superego clearly belongs under Critic. You say, "I ought to do this, it ought to be that way," etc.—you're doing the Critic role.

Now, learning to be a Critic is learning. That's why you can derive superego functioning from ego functioning—it's simply a special kind of thing that you learn to do, so it ought to be derivable from the general principle of learning, and it is.

Q. *So then when we talk about choices and this kind of learning, we say they will learn through the ego; but something is internalized, we'd just say, "No, it wasn't learned through the ego, but was learned by somehow incorporating parental values." We say the learning that occurs through the superego—*

P. You don't speak of learning occurring through either ego or superego. You speak of it as occurring through primary or secondary process, mainly. And then it's behavior that you speak of as id functioning, ego functioning, etc.

So if you see somebody being a good Critic and saying, "I ought to do this even though I'd rather do that," you'd say that's superego functioning, in part. It's also ego functioning, in part, and it's also id functioning, in part.

Again, these don't stand in one-to-one relation to behaviors. Most behaviors will be not merely some proportion id and ego, but some proportion superego functioning. There are very few behaviors that you do completely uncritically. So you might say that these are aspects of behavior. Or at least they correspond to aspects of behavior.

Q. *When you're being critical in choosing between—like in the Want parameter, choosing for those reasons, your choosing is critical, so that's a super-ego function esthetic within the behavior, like—?*

id = Hedonic
ego - Prudential
superego - Ethical
 - Esthetic

FIGURE 4

P. Yeah, it's a lot easier to think of superego in connection with these two [E and E] than it is with these two [H and P]. As a matter of fact, if you counted references in the literature, if you did content analyses of how psychoanalysts and other people talk, it would be very easy to set up this kind of correspondence.

Having the full range of development of id, ego, and superego, as you can see from the development here [Fig. 3, p. 220], is going to enable you to talk about the kinds of things that we would talk about with this. We're going to be able to talk about a normal adult making the kind of choices, the kind of judgments, the kind of critical judgments that we recognize normal adults as making.

So with this kind of development from displacement [id to superego], by the time we reach superego functioning, it's hard to imagine any behavior of either an adult or an infant or anything in between, that we can't now talk about directly with this kind of apparatus [diamond] available.

The critical anchoring point is this [diamond]. If you can deal with this, then you can certainly deal with any of its parts or aspects. We saw that the instinct notion itself in this part gives you most of Intentional Action. The displacement, the learning process, the development of ego functioning and superego functioning, will now get you the equivalent of being able to make these discriminations [HPEE] and act on them.

So you at least have something to say about all behavior. Anybody's behavior, any kind of behavior, you've got something that applies.

Q. *So in your view, superego functioning is actually just a special case of learning via the ego style.*

P. No. Superego functioning is a way of functioning. It's an aspect of behavior. It is the result of learning. It is the result of displacement.

Q. *Then this learning takes place—could take place, according to displacement.*

P. Yeah. It has to, because that's the only learning principle in the system [Freud's].

Q. *Why does Freud start to talk about Oedipal—that identification takes place through resolution of the Oedipal complex?*

P. That's simply getting into the gory details of what the actual situation or what the general situation is of a child interacting with the parents; and what kind of demands and what kind of constraints there are on that parent or on that child; or both. In effect, what is it that the parents are demanding of the child?

One of the things that they're demanding is a limitation in the sexual activity of that child, and if that child has sexual inclinations of various sorts, mainly self-manipulation, which violate the parents' standards, that's going

to become one of those issues between them. Just like toilet training: if the child is not inclined to control it in the way that the parents want, that's going to become an issue between them.

Q. *But the way I understand it, it's that this resolution doesn't come from the parents, because if the child, in his incestuous need for his mother or her father doesn't act on any direct input from the parents, but acts on what he or she supposes—or how he or she supposes the parents would act like—and resolves it by identification with the parent of the same sex—he sort of joins the other side—there's no input going on. This is all happening within the kid.*

P. Freud doesn't say it, and it's not true. The only interesting thing is—conceivably you could have a child who did it all on his own, who figured it out that that's the way they would feel, and then acted accordingly. But that would be a very exceptional child, to figure that out with no clues whatever.

In point of fact, most parents will do some guiding, they will do some reacting, and that helps the child to figure it out. They're not just blank screens. The child picks up from them that certain things are forbidden.

But you're right—the child also does some of the figuring out, because it's clear that parents do not go around and say to the male child, "You cut that out, or I'll castrate you."

Q. *They don't say that the way to resolve this is to identify with the parent of the same sex.*

P. No. What they say is, "Do right. Don't play with yourself. Don't do that. Don't do that."

But that's exactly what we're talking about here [HPEE], that the child has to choose his behaviors in terms of those standards, because that's what they're requiring. And the Oedipus complex is simply one of the particular issues that may rise between parents and children. That's where he has to learn to apply these standards, is precisely because he initially—the kind of things he would do on his own fail to meet those standards. In that case, he's got some learning to do, and they've got an issue between them.

Q. *What is the logical reasoning behind making a special case out of this whole issue—out of the development of the superego? Why is it differentiated from just other kinds of learning?*

P. Why do we distinguish observation and criticism? It's an important distinction; we act on it all the time.

Now, somebody who didn't have that distinction available would be incompetent as a normal adult. Add to that, historically, the kind of clients that Freud dealt with. A lot of what was going on was guilt, or at least, that's what he saw there. Given that in a whole series of clients, why would he not develop his theory in such a way as to specifically account for that sort of thing, since that was one of the main things that he saw at work in his clients? He wants his theory to account for it.

Q. *If I understand you, you're saying you could account for that without splitting off the superego functioning, that it could be incorporated into—*

P. It could be derived as a special case of ego function, but you would want to derive it as a special case of ego function. You wouldn't want to just talk about ego function. All I said was that you don't need a special mechanism for it, because you can derive it from ego functioning. All that means is that, as it was formulated by Freud, the theory isn't as parsimonious as it could have been.

But that's typical of theories, because theorists—unlike philosophers of science—are not that interested in having an absolutely pure system of having it as parsimonious as they could possibly be. They want it convenient, and mostly 'convenience' means that you have redundancy, you have extra things in there, and that makes it handy. So this particular redundancy I'm pointing out, but it doesn't mean that it's a bad theory because it has it, or that if Freud had thought of it, that he wouldn't still have gone ahead and had that special mechanism. Because it's a lot easier to say, "Well, I see identification has occurred," than to retrace in more detailed form the ego functioning derivation.

So, even when it's redundant, sometimes it's nice to have a name for a specific sort of pattern that comes up over and over, and you want to be able to talk about directly. But in terms of understanding his view of the mind and of behavior, a part of what you need to see is that that [superego] was dispensable.

Q. *This may be kind of a trite association, but just looking to this—in use in schools now is a technique called TA for Tots. Transactional Analysis for children. Isn't this, in layman's language, in children's language, something where they can work at discussing the three different areas, the parent, the child, and the adult?*

P. Yeah. Transactional Analysis is a thinly disguised version of this [id, ego, super-ego] plus a lot of social concepts that would be hard to incorporate

into psychoanalytic theory.

You see, one place that psychoanalytic theory is weak is in dealing with social interactions, social patterns, and things of that sort, because it's mainly geared to an individual, with a basically solipsistic view of the world. So it's hard, given that primary structure, to deal with a number of individuals, with patterns of individuals, with patterns of interaction.

Now in TA, you have these kinds of notions in parent-adult-child, but by putting it in terms of parent and adult and child, which are public, visible, instead of intra-psychic, it's easy to incorporate those notions into a lot of interaction patterns. And a lot of the value you get out of TA is because you learn those kinds of interaction patterns—and the notion of parent-adult-child is easy to grasp.

So in one sense, it's a thinly disguised version, but it isn't just that. It has its own features and its own value.

Q. *Are we starting to answer the question of how people get to be what they are?*

P. Yeah, the learning principle of displacement is going to be the primary answer. People start out with basically the same constitutional factors, although with some individual differences, but the most general and the most interesting individual differences come from learning, from displacements.

Now we need to address ourselves to that third question: *how do people get the way they are?* We talked about why people do what they do—it's all a matter of instinctual satisfactions and displacement. We've touched on differences among people, namely, by virtue of different histories of displacement, people will have different psychic Objects and different cathexes and anticathexes. Now we need to look at the question *how do people get the way they are at a given time?*, and that's the developmental aspect.




FIGURE 5

You think of our life history diagram of that sort [Fig. 5]. What we do in Freudian theory is to work this formula $[C + H \rightarrow PC]$, using the notion that personal characteristics at any given time are what give you the capacity to acquire new personal characteristics. And what's distinctively Freudian is which personal characteristics he emphasizes here and how the history contributes. So what we have is, again, this kind of thing: that the characteristics that are developed in the oral phase, in the oral stage, will make a difference in the child's behavior and interaction with other people; and that that history plus these characteristics are going to make a difference at a later time at the anal stage; and what happens there and the personal characteristics that are acquired in those interactions will make a difference in his later behavior; and that behavior plus those characteristics will make a difference at the later stage of the phallic stage. So that's the way the sequence of development goes, crudely speaking.

Now we need to set up a table of correspondences here:

		A	B
Oral	incorporative aggressive	sucking, swallowing biting, chewing	receiving taking
Anal	expulsive retentive	voiding retaining	giving withholding
Phallic		self-stimulation	succeeding

FIGURE 2

The stages, the psychosexual stages, the first two are commonly divided into two parts: oral-incorporative, oral-aggressive; anal-expulsive, anal-retentive. So you have five stages rather than three.

To each stage, there corresponds a primary kind of behavior [A], and a secondary kind of behavior [B].

Oral, anal, and phallic are Freud's closest guesses about the locations, the actual bodily locations of those Sources. You have at least three Sources identified there.

Furthermore, he says there is a sequence in which first this one [oral] is of primary importance, then later this one [anal] is of primary importance, and then later this one [phallic] is of primary importance, and that's how you get this sequence of stages.

Since this is the first one that has primary importance, the issues involved in it are the first issues that that child encounters and deals with.

Q. *Do they also go through both expulsive and retentive, then?*

P. Right. These are the kinds of behaviors that, in general, succeed in satisfying the Aim when this is the Source in question.

If we look at our two lists of behaviors [A and B], compare the two lists and ask what's the relation between them.

Q. *You do one by doing the other?*

P. Say some more about that.

Q. *One's more specific cases than the other.*

P. Okay. These [A] are more specific cases of these [B]. Sucking and swallowing are cases of receiving; biting, chewing are cases of taking, and so on. And it's because of that logical inclusion that you're doing this [B] by doing this [A]. There's a second—if not relationally—comparison between the two columns, namely, these behaviors [A] are behaviors that will be plausible on a purely physiological or organismic basis. They're the kind of behaviors that you could use in describing a wide variety of organisms. Any mammal, for example, you can talk in this way about. So these are the kind of behaviors that simply depend on having a mammalian type organism; it doesn't at all have to be a human being, just an organism.

So these are ambiguous or equivocal. They're the kind of thing that could be simply reflexive non-behavior, but they're also the kind of things that if you wanted to, you could do on purpose. So they could be behaviors of the Intentional Action or Deliberate Action sort. They could also simply be organismic movement, reflexive movement.

In contrast, these [B], it's hard to think of in physiological terms. So these are more clearly psychological, whereas these [A] are equivocal and they would do equally well both ways.

I guess it's time to quit. Tomorrow we'll pick up here. Review that section of Freud and then study Allport, because Allport is the next person we'll take up.

Q. *Before we begin, can I ask you a question? I want your opinion and Freud's opinion on the strength of the need for survival. A person gets really down mentally, how much can you count on a basic survival instinct to carry him?*

P. Freud never talked about basic survival. The closest he came was when he introduced a death instinct, and then opposed life instincts and death instincts. But life instincts are instincts which have to do with living. They are not instincts to live. You might say: *as long as you have motivation*

to do something that living things do, you've got a motivation not to die. Remember, we developed that you never completely lost all of that psychic energy. He explicitly says that either you literally never do it, or it would be extraordinary if that ever happened, and he would never expect it to happen. Because the actual objects that we get to interact with simply are not the same as the fantasied Objects, so they don't satisfy us completely.

Q. *Now ### from your point of view. In dealing with people, do you ever think they lose their desire to live? I mean, that there is no point at which you can—*

P. No, but sometimes something else counts for more.

One of the other cases in the case-book, the case of Shirley, is called "Death in the Attic", and one of the two main characters hanged himself in the attic. If you read that, you can analyze his suicide as a case of Maxim 5, namely, there was nothing else he could do *and* be himself. Well, that counted for more, apparently.

Indeed, any case of suicide, you figure that that's the case. You simply look for what the motivation was; and from the bare fact of suicide, you take it that was stronger. In the same way as if you see somebody choose A over B, your only problem is what the motivation was, because the motivation for the one he chose was clearly the stronger. So you simply worry about which one it was.

Incidentally, that sort of pattern again you can put in terms of opposing forces, and for a while, Freud did with the life instinct and death instinct. But I, along with—I think—most other commentators on Freud, put the death instinct aside, say that was a temporary thing he tried out, he was discouraged with it, it doesn't really add anything to the theory that you can't get without it, and you might as well just forget it. A few people make a big thing out of the death instinct.

SESSION 18

August 5, 1976

Okay, let's pick up here:

		A	B
Oral	incorporative aggressive	sucking, swallowing biting, chewing	receiving taking
Anal	expulsive retentive	voiding retaining	giving withholding
Phallic		self-stimulation	succeeding

FIGURE 1

We developed the notion of stages of development, and there are three major ones and a couple of sub-stages. What we did was associate with each stage two sets of characteristic behavior. These are characteristic in that this kind of behavior [A] would satisfy this kind of need [B], this kind of instinct, or this kind of Source. This column [B] is a generalized version of this [A], or this column [A] is a special case of the corresponding one in that column.

The general principle for this whole developmental schema is this: that you engage in behaviors of this sort [A] more or less successfully. To the extent that they are successful, what you learn and what you gain, the Object cathected, the behavior pattern cathected, is not merely this [A] but this [B]. So that if you do these things successfully, you become not merely a person who sucks and swallows, but somebody who is geared to receive; and there are many other forms of receiving other than sucking and swallowing.

And the same goes for biting and chewing. You learn not merely to do that, but to be a person who has a propensity for taking.

Q. *Is it a propensity or a capacity?*

P. Propensity. Freud did not have real good ways of representing powers. Cathected Objects will give you dispositions.

Q. *So you don't cathect the behavior. You have a propensity for the behavior.*

P. Yeah, you cathect the Object, remember, and the psychic Object includes the behavior pattern. So, in that sense, you cathect the behavior pattern. That's simply part of the psychic representation.

The second major principle is that you can have too much and you can have too little. When it comes to learning to feed, when it comes to doing these kinds of things—sucking, swallowing, biting, chewing—in the context of feeding, you can do too much or too little. But according to Freud, you will do whatever it takes to satisfy your Aim—or try.

One of the things that may happen to the child is that he gets too much into sucking or swallowing, or not enough. In that case, he will acquire this general tendency [receiving] too much or not enough.

Q. *What determines too much?*

P. You mean, causally or judgmentally?

Q. *Judgmentally.*

P. Just the clinician's judgment, anybody's judgment.

Q. *### the effect on the secondary behavior, more than the—it has to be determined through viewing the secondary thing.*

P. Yeah, you very seldom make the judgment directly on these kinds of behavior [A]. What you do is, you look over here [B].

What I've just described is a case of fixation. The child acquires too strong a tendency of this sort [receiving, taking], or too weak a tendency of that sort, that's fixation at that stage. In turn, a fixation at a given stage may be caused by either too much instinctual satisfaction or too little.

Q. *Would you repeat that, please?*

P. A fixation at a given stage may be caused either by too much instinctual satisfaction or too little.

Q. *What causes fixation? Just that too much or too little isn't cathected?*

P. No. It's the cause.

Now, this kind of arrangement where you have too much, too little—it can be caused by too much or too little—is the kind of thing that people who criticize Freud often pick on. They say, "Gee, with that kind of arrangement, you can explain anything."

In fact, it does make some sense. It isn't just a way of trying to cover all of your bets. To see that, you just work out why having too much satisfaction results in the development of too much or too little of this [B]. Why would too much satisfaction do that?

Q. *Because you wouldn't ###. You might perceive the next stage as being threatened, or you might not perceive a need ### at the next stage, because all your needs are being met ###.*

P. Okay, roughly that's the idea. Remember, we said initially that if the child's instinctual needs are met immediately, he never learns anything. There's no reason for him to. If his instinctual needs are immediately gratified, he doesn't do any displacing. If certain needs are gratified and gratified strongly, he'll have a strong cathexis for that kind of Object, and is not going to have much psychic energy left for any other kind of Object.

Or if you put it then in phenomenological terms: why give up a good thing for a bad thing? If he's getting a lot of satisfaction, he's got a good thing going. The learning of the other one, anything else, is not going to be an easy, comfortable thing. So why give up a good thing in favor of this other thing? Why give up more need satisfaction in favor of less?

So the explanation from over-satisfaction is. Why give up a good thing? Let's look at lack of satisfaction, at deprivation.

Q. *Would you just repeat the amount of energy explanation?*

P. Yeah. If you have a lot of satisfaction of that need, you have a lot of energy cathected to the Objects that satisfy that need, which means including the behavior pattern that satisfies that need. You don't have much energy tied up anywhere else. So somebody who's trying to get you to change is going to have a hard time getting you to do anything else, because your energy is tied up in those oral-type objects.

Now the deprivation explanation—remember, we said that if your effort to satisfy the Aim fails, probably the amount of energy in that Source is still the largest and you will simply try again. If nothing has happened to increase the energy in one of the other Sources, that one will still be pre-dominant, and you'll just keep trying.

Also, you won't be getting much satisfaction of any other need except by accident. So when you have deprivation, particularly of the early need, what you get is a preoccupation or interest pattern, because the person is caught up in trying to get the satisfaction that he never has got enough of, is energy is tied up in those efforts; and once more, he doesn't have much

energy, he hasn't had much experience with anything else. So he wouldn't be at all inclined to pick up on any other sort of behavior.

Q. *Is this sequence of stages supposed to be mentally developmental? Are they kind of automatically—do the Sources develop their own predominance at a certain stage, maturational stage, or—*

P. Freud was never convinced or convincing about that. He suggested the possibility that it was a maturational thing. Other people have suggested that this is simply the sequence in which socialization, in fact, generally takes place. Other people have suggested that it's a combination of both, that there is something maturational: that, indeed, in a maturational sense you mature from your head to your feet. This one [oral] might very well come first. And also, if you can't get the child to eat immediately, you don't have any of the other problems.

So it's a combination both of the kind of concern that the socializer has, and the maturational sequence.

Q. *It would seem that especially for the anal stage, that socialization ### because our society's insistence on toilet training.*

P. Yeah, but notice that we don't start in three months. We have some sense that if you start at three months, it's hopeless, so you might as well wait. But then we try pushing the limits.

Q. *It's just that our culture insists that that has to be learned, whereas a lot of cultures don't ever try to teach a kid to do that—*

P. I doubt if there's any culture that doesn't think it has to be learned. They vary mainly in whether they think it has to be taught. There's a lot of things that children learn that nobody teaches, but if somebody doesn't learn, you focus on it. In fact, language is one of the prime examples.

Q. *I would disagree with you that our society forces you to do that, because if you read about it nowadays ### a child is physically able to, so I think you're generalizing a little bit too much.*

Q. *People have learned—the fact is, we live in nice houses and can't have things all over the floor. Cultures that live ### it's not so much an issue.*

P. Also, since there's individual differences in when the child is ready, you have to make some guesses, and children don't tell you when they're ready. They would go happily on doing whatever they're doing. Children almost never come in on their own and suggest it's time to change. It's the

parents who have to make that decision.

Q. *They ### other children, and they want—*

P. They want to be like them. You can't trust that, either, because children are notorious for wanting to be older than they are.

Q. *I'm confused on this incorporation business, as it refers to particularly Maxim 8, which is socialization. You said yesterday it's something that just happens, and I'm wondering: if a child is in an environment where it's not being shaped, where there's no shaping going on at all, and also like what you're talking about now, if it's getting too much of something. Is that incorporation just going to still automatically happen?*

P. It'll happen, but it'll happen in distorted form, and the distortion is what you're getting at when you say 'fixation'.

Q. *It just seems like incorporation is too mechanical a description for what happens, because if it doesn't happen right, it doesn't—*

P. No, it's not that it happens automatically. It's that when it happens, it happens automatically. It's not that you always have incorporation; it's that incorporation is a process that's a one-stage process, so there's no issue of once it starts, will it finish? In a one-stage process, if it starts, it will finish. And that's the essence of both incorporation and all of the ego-defense mechanisms: they are one-stage processes, so when they come into play, when the conditions for their coming into play are met, they will go to completion, whereas with most processes, there is an issue: if something starts, will it continue to the end? Because things can happen to interrupt it because it has stages.

Q. *So it does have to be forced, in a way. I mean, a child does have to go through shaping.*

P. Shaping is another way of talking about it, but notice: the same thing would hold for reinforcing. Things aren't always reinforcing, but when something is reinforcing, there is no process of reinforcement. It's just that when that condition is met, the probability has changed, and Freud would call that a mental mechanism.

Recall I mentioned the embarrassment of asking *how do these things happen—how does the Object draw energy?* If you don't want to answer the How question, you can invent the mechanism that does it. Since it's a one-stage mechanism, you have no question about it, and the mechanism will give you the causal version of simple correspondence.

So you do can your big bookkeeping that way, and have a causal explanation by plugging in mechanisms whenever there is a correspondence. It works out nicely.

By the way, it is a good orienting device to think of all theories, but especially personality theories, as bookkeeping systems for keeping track of what people do and what kind of people they are.

One of the things this will do will get you out of the notion that theories are true or that they're not true. There are better or worse bookkeeping systems for keeping track of what we know or believe about people.

And naturally, any bookkeeping system will introduce a certain kind of language; and so any theory will introduce a certain kind of language in which we talk about people. That's no different from a businessman talking about assets and liquid assets, and liquidated debts—all of that comes from the system of bookkeeping. It's not a basic fact about business.

So think of these things as simply bookkeeping systems. And one of the features about bookkeeping systems is that everything has to come out even. That's why you get conservation of energy, that's why you get energy transactions. In energy transactions, everything has to come out even. In probability transactions, everything has to come out even. The probability of all of the alternatives has to sum up to one.

So we have devices available for doing various kinds of bookkeeping, and those you will find incorporated into our theories.

Back to fixations. The way that learning can go wrong here is acquiring too much or too little of the corresponding general tendencies. These general tendencies will be the character traits of the person. And it was through these that we acquire the notion of the character structure, and where we can describe a person as an oral character or an anal character or a phallic character.

An oral character is somebody who has too much or too little of the oral characteristics. Behind that, behind the expression of those characteristics, an oral person is one who is too much concerned with oral things. You can give a descriptive characterization that an oral person is one who shows too much or too little of these oral characteristics. Behind that, you can give an explanatory characterization that an oral person is one who is too much concerned with oral things, whether in terms of cathexis or countercahexis. Somebody who shows too little is somebody who's avoiding doing oral things, somebody who has anticathexis on it.

Q. *What do you call that?*

P. It's still oral.

Just for exercise, think of how many things that a person can do that would fall under the heading of receiving. For example, eating clearly is the same thing, you would say is receiving. Listening, hearing, reading, breathing—anything that in any sense whatever is a taking in, you can classify under that heading.

Q. *You mean there's such a thing as reading too much? [laughter, general conversation]*

Q. *### about giving up other things also. If they just read a lot, but if that takes over their whole behavior—*

P. No, the idea is: if somebody reads a lot, and he's an oral character, he probably does a lot of these other things, too.

Q. *How about if he's forced to do it in a class? [laughter]*

P. Well, then it's a lingering Oedipus complex. [laughter] You're finally evolving your sense of social responsibility and just need this last piece of reinforcement to really settle it in.

Q. *That's ### the anal person who likes to give a lot.*

Q. Yeah, then what?

P. Well, reading isn't giving.

Q. *No, assigning reading assignments—[laughter]*

P. Yeah, that's really nurture.

Since we're on it, ask yourself: *can you think of any behavior whatever that couldn't be classified in at least one of these ways?* We were starting the survey: how many could be classified under 'receiving'? Now just go through the whole thing. Can you think of any behavior whatever that couldn't be classified somewhere under at least one of the ones on this list [B]?

Q. *Are you including 'succeeding'?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *How about committing suicide?*

Q. *If you say that he's succeeding, then you're going back to his idea of the death instinct.*

P. No, you don't know what he's succeeding at, but you have a partial description of it, so you know there's something he's succeeding at. He's succeeded in killing himself for whatever reason.

Q. *So the guy that hung himself in the attic is a success?*

P. Well, no. He just succeeded. One swallow doesn't make a summer, and one success doesn't make a man a success.

Q. *How about day-dreaming?*

P. Day-dreaming—you want to ask *is that behavior*? If I'm standing here walking up and down and noticing the clock, is noticing the clock a behavior? No. If I sit and look at the clock, the looking is the behavior, but noticing or experiencing is simply an aspect of the behavior [K parameter on the diamond].

Q. *How about crashing your car?*

P. Well, either you give this kind of description, or it wasn't behavior.

Q. *Because it wasn't intentional.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *That follows in this system, too, then.*

P. Yeah. Look: even for Freud—who said *the unconscious is destiny*—if lightning struck you, I doubt very much whether he would have asked, “What did you do to bring that about?” He, too, knew about there are such things as accidents; and even though he pushed it a lot, to try to make it motivational whenever he could, he wouldn't go that far.

There is a case where you'd have to guess. You might say, “Well, if somebody crashes his car, indeed there may be some unconscious motivation, but I wouldn't have the slightest idea what; therefore, I can't tell you which.” But if it was of that sort, I'd be able to put it in here.

Q. *I have a question either for now or later: what's the special connection between self-stimulation and succeeding? You can succeed in any of these, but what is the particular, general way of connecting these?*

P. You have to expand the notion. This [self-stimulation] is shorthand for what goes on with young children when they stimulate themselves genitally. It's a pleasurable thing; as pleasure, it's worth doing; as worth doing, it's a success, it's an accomplishment. And it's an accomplishment that is a self-accomplishment. It's not attributable to anybody else.

So the issue of being a worthwhile person, of doing something worthwhile, appears here [in self-stimulation]; where up here [receiving, withholding, etc.], the issue is doing it at all. Because with feeding, the issue is succeeding in getting fed; with anal, the issue is doing it right: doing it in the right place, at the right time, in the right way. Here, it's doing something worthwhile, and that's why success is—as far as I can see—the best single word to indicate the kind of thing that is going on here.

Q. *You mean if self-stimulation were a basically an intrusion for—*

P. Intrusion accomplishes stimulation.

P. What you move is from self-stimulation to stimulation of the other person. So it's because it has that feature that this is not fudging particularly.

Q. *Can sucking and swallowing be considered succeeding, too?*

P. Well, you wouldn't need to, because you have it up here, but yeah. You see, this [self-stimulation] is the catchall. If you can't put it anywhere else, you can put it here.

Q. *Is there some design in choosing those traits, the character traits, or did somehow they evolve?*

P. They evolved out of his practice. There's no basis anywhere in the literature for just specifically those. There is some basis for this and some for this, but not for that. And not for the particular combination.

Q. *A lot of the theorists—they specifically started developing characteristics, rather than starting somewhere else and saying, "What characteristics evolve?"*

P. That's right. The instinct theorists that we were talking about started over here [B column] and they had their own classifications. But remember what I said was wrong with just classifying: it loses its explanatory power. So Freud introduced the whole tradition of going back to history, and from the nature of the history developed the character typologies. Nobody else agrees with his, but I think he was the first one to approach it in this way.

Q. *How do you describe the phallic person?*

P. The phallic person, you get aggressive, boastful, vain, flirtatious; and then all of the opposites: shy, modest, retiring, self-conscious, those kinds.

Q. *Either/or.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *Why?*

P. Because you always have the two opposites. Either too much or too little will reflect the same kind of concern. Somebody who's excessively un-aggressive, according to Freud, is somebody who's working at not being aggressive. And so he's just as concerned with aggressiveness as somebody who's being overly aggressive.

Q. *Why is aggressive ###?*

Q. *Sexually oriented.*

P. Again, think of what I said here [self-stimulation], that the success here is one that you've initiated, one that you've done, one that you're responsible for. And that's why 'aggressive' assimilates to this [phallic]. Aggressive is something where you initiate, you follow through, you succeed. But if you look at the contrast between these two [receiving and taking], you can say, "Yeah, this [taking] is more aggressive than that [receiving]." And that's why it's called the 'oral-aggressive stage'. But aggressiveness generally is not attributed to here [oral or anal], it's primarily attributed to phallic.

If it's clear that any behavior whatever can be classified under one—at least one—of these character terms, now imagine that you have the ability to say, "A behavior expresses to some extent this [receiving], to some extent that [taking], to some extent this [giving], etc.,"—that these character characteristics contribute to behavior in different proportions, so that a given behavior doesn't have to be just the expression of one. In general, it's the expression of some amount of all of them.

That's an even further guarantee that not merely is there no behavior that you couldn't explain by reference to these, but by giving yourself the flexibility of having a profile and having differential contributions, you can give a more refined and, therefore, more plausible explanation of a given behavior. You don't just have five general explanations. Now you have a million of them because you can quantify and have profiles of various sorts. So you can tailor the combination to the behavior that you're trying to explain.

Q. *Could that basically describe the normal functioning?*

P. No, not yet. So far, we've been talking mainly about fixations, because it's the fixation that will give you too much or too little. If you don't have either too much or too little, one generally doesn't say anything. Somebody who is neither extra-friendly or unfriendly, you don't say *he's average friendly*; you just don't say anything. Because if you did, you'd have to go

through a million personal characteristics and say, “He’s average, he’s average, he’s average.” And that’s very inefficient, and you can’t do it.

In fact, if there’s nothing remarkable about a person, we just don’t say anything. We only mention those things in which the person is significantly different from that baseline.

So these are the kinds of things that give us those significant differences, is the degree of fixation. Otherwise you have non-traits.

You may wonder why I left out the last two [latency and genital] in developing this, and it wasn’t just that I didn’t have enough room on the board. The fact is, these two are different, and one of the ways in which they are different is that you can’t have fixations of either sort. You do not have latency fixations, and you do not have genital fixations.

There’s two reasons for this. For latency, latency was a kind of honorific in Freud’s theory, that he didn’t do much at all with. He simply says, “During this period in his life, a child is out getting socialized, mainly with his contacts with other people.” From his point of view, that child’s basic character was already formed by the time he got through here [oral-anal-phallic]. So the latency period was simply a matter of working out that character structure in a public setting.

In contrast, the reason why there is not such a thing as a genital fixation is that the genital fixation is like the primary process, namely, it’s defined completely by negatives. A person who has a genital character is simply one who has not got an oral, anal, or phallic fixation.

Q. *Do you mean he’s fixated at either one of the three?*

P. No, he doesn’t have any fixations. Now once you quantify the degree of fixation, it’s impossible for anybody not to have any fixation at all, so again you have to then quantify this [genital]. A genital character is somebody who doesn’t have enough of any of these fixations to be worth talking about.

Q. *What kind of person would that be?*

P. Well, somebody who has no traits. Somebody who isn’t too much or too little of anything.

Q. *Couldn’t you just have a normal person who had very little frustrations and ###?*

P. That’s why the crucial thing is the quantification. When you say “not enough fixation to be worth bothering about”, that allows you to bring in

somebody with a certain range of traits or a certain number of them. He doesn't have to have zero traits.

In principle, if you took this literally and pushed it to the extreme, it would be somebody with no traits, and there aren't any. So if there's going to be actual genital people, genital characters, you've got to quantify and say, "I'll exclude the little bit of variance. If somebody has a little bit, I won't count that, "

Q. *Can you give a specific example of a person like that? If you're just trying to say they're not worth bothering with, then I'd like to know what kind of person is not worth bothering with.*

P. No, no, the traits are not worth bothering with. It's that—if somebody's exceptionally hostile, if you're telling somebody about him, you'll mention that he's exceptionally hostile, because that's worth bothering about. But if he's just a little bit more irritable sometimes than most people, you don't comment on that. It's not worth bothering about. That's the sense that Freud meant.

Q. *Then a completely genital person would be like our completely average person?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *Or you could see him as particularly healthy in some way. For example, with physical health you have the same problem, somebody that is not remarkable in any way.*

P. Yeah, somebody who has nothing wrong with him, you say *he's healthy*, but what else do you say?

Q. *That's all.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *That's not necessarily considered good health, the average—there can be better health than that.*

P. Now you need to call to mind what these theories are all about, and what personality descriptions are all about. We use personality differences to mark how this person is different from what you might expect just on general grounds.

You remember I said *you don't reconstruct a person from scratch*. You already start off knowing he's a person of a certain general kind. Then you pick up information that says, "Here's how he's significantly different from

just what you might expect, from this general kind of person,” and that’s how you start developing your personal characteristics.

Well, somebody who is not significantly different, you’re just going to have very few descriptions of that sort. But instead, you’ll be carrying the norm.

You said, “This is a normal American adult in 1977.” That itself carries a whole lot of things. It’s just—if you had ten of them, and that’s all you could say about each one of them, how do you distinguish among them? So we’re very rarely in that position.

For some purposes, you can say, “Yeah, he’s just a normal, healthy. American adult.” For other purposes, certain things stand out as important, and then you mention those, even for somebody who is a normal, healthy. American adult. So depending on your purposes, you may mention certain dimensions, and this person is different on that dimension. For other purposes, you ignore that dimension.

Now given that these descriptions—you remember, I said that *personality theories were primarily constructed either by psychotherapists or for psychotherapists*, and I said in our reconstruction of Veronica, *there was a lot of her life that we did not touch upon*. What we touched upon was the kind of thing that would explain the peculiar behavior that we noticed, that presented a problem. Likewise, this theory is designed to account for people’s peculiar behaviors. Since that’s the general thrust of it, don’t be surprised that it has very little to say about somebody who isn’t peculiar, other than to say that there’s nothing wrong with them.

Q. You say any behavior can be placed under those categories? ###

P. If nowhere else, it’s going to be here [succeeding].

Q. —any trait—anything that one uses a trait description for will necessarily fit? Unless you take in certain dispositions, a lot of descriptions would use things like capacities or powers that wouldn’t fit there at all. You say somebody’s good or bad, or he plays chess well, or ###, and these are things that you notice about him and are important about him, but I wouldn’t want to say somebody is good or bad with the implication that—

P. No, no. I said that these will give you dispositions, and that Freud’s theory does not have a good way of representing powers. In fact, the way that you have to represent powers is to talk about the whole psychic economy, and the whole set of Objects with their cathexis and countercahexis. That

will give you then the limits of what a person has available or how difficult it would be. And that's a very unhandy way to have to think about powers.

Q. *It doesn't seem to want to say that the person has no fixations, if they don't have those traits. Because Freud wouldn't want to talk about powers as traits?*

P. That's right. No more than we wanted to talk about powers as traits. Powers are different from dispositions. When I say 'character traits', I really mean 'traits', and that's as much as Freud talked about. Freud didn't really particularly distinguish attitudes from traits. In clinical work, he talked about relations to particular people, but relationships did not appear in a significant way in the theory, as a theoretical notion. It's primarily geared to talking about *an* individual. It will give you a picture of *an* individual. It is poor as a picture of social facts, social organizations, social interactions.

Any other trait can be expressed as some combination of these kinds of background traits [B column], so you're not limited to just these traits. You can incorporate now any trait you want, and you'll be able to fit it in. [change tape]

Now, the fact that these things will fit anybody is one of the things people have picked on, namely, "Gee, if it fits anybody, then how are you ever going to falsify it?" And the answer is: *that's not the point. When you're dealing with people, you need a system that will apply to anybody and everybody and anything that you might see.*

Just think of what a fix you would be in if you were working with a system that didn't apply at all in some cases, and what if you encountered one of those cases? You'd be in a kind of impossible position.

So one of the major virtues of theories is not that they're falsifiable because they only apply to some of the things we might observe, and not others; but rather that they're not falsifiable precisely because they do apply. No matter what we encounter, they give us a description in terms of which we can then deal with the phenomenon. If you hadn't that description, you wouldn't know how to deal with it.

So Freud's theory, as other theories, it is a virtue that it will apply to anything you observe, because it is intended to be used; and to be usable in a free-flowing context where you're not guaranteed that only certain things will happen, you need something that will apply no matter what you encounter. Freud's has this virtue.

Clearly, with these kinds of things [B], we're back to not merely how do people get the way they are? but also, what are the differences among people? Earlier, we said *differences among people reflect the process of displacement*, and since personal histories are different, the displacements are going to be different; and, therefore, in general, people will have different psychic Objects.

Now, this is a way of organizing that sort of notion, and not merely will people have different psychic Objects. Those differences are analyzable in these terms and can be categorized in these terms. So these are the terms, then, that you use for actually describing people—oral, anal, phallic—for describing people in Freudian terms. But back of those is the explanation via displacement and the cathexis of Objects.

Because of that, we have the phenomenon of regression working at this level [oral, anal, phallic], too. Part of the notion of fixation is that if at a later time the person runs into difficulty, and his behaviors no longer are satisfying, or if they are actively painful, the person will regress to earlier and more primitive ways of behaving—and he will regress to those stages with the strongest fixations. Why?

Because those are the ones that have most energy tied up in them.

Q. *### with energy. If is there a—like in dealing with a child with a learning disability, they speak about the energy not making the proper connection. Does this energy just simply go around and try again and keep trying again, or—?*

P. Here's the thing: if you just keep trying, and you keep failing, you start building up a countercahexis. That's how a Freudian would explain why a kid who has a hard time reading, and he just gets criticized for not succeeding, after a while he doesn't feel like reading. He's building up a countercahexis. The behavior is increasing the energy instead of reducing it.

Q. *And in all your children in that situation, you'd have to set up something where he—*

P. Where he doesn't already have a countercahexis, so you can get him to do it and discharge energy successfully. And learn to read. You can let him do other things, and he'll be happier, but unless they're the right kind of things, he still won't learn to read. So you try to accomplish both things.

Q. *Is one of those things, teaching him read a different sort of system, and then he can take what he learned there back into ###.*

P. In a case like that, almost any change is a change for the better, because any change is something he hasn't built up a resistance to. And even if, in general, it's only equally good, it's still better for him because he hasn't got the resistance.

Q. *You said that if—at a given time, a person will regress to the stage where there's the most energy, if he can't handle those things; but you said before that a person will fixate at a stage and not leave it. Which one is—*

P. No. It's not that you don't leave it. You have to go through the whole sequence of learning, but depending on your history, you will have more or less these preoccupations [B] and these [B] characteristics. And if you have a slight fixation here [oral], but you run into serious trouble later, you're liable to go back to oral behavior. You're more likely to go back to that than you are to some of these others that you have less fixation on.

A good many of Freud's explanations of psychopathology involve that kind of thing. He draws a picture of a person in a frustrating situation, an impossible bind where his normal behavior will not succeed, and then he describes the pathological behavior as a regression, as something that the person got into because he had gone through his normal repertoire and had regressed back to some earlier, more primitive, and less realistic ways of behaving.

Any questions on this material on individual differences and how the individual differences connect to the developmental theory? In general, individual differences will simply be those differences that reflect the course of individual development.

Q. *A little more on regression. You go back to the stage that has the greatest energy tied up in it?*

P. Not to the stage, to the kind of behavior.

Q. *That being secondary behavior?*

P. Mainly here [B].

Q. *Then that can be—the energy tied up in it could be either positive or anticathexis, or the product of that? If I'm an oral person, if I regress, I'm likely to go back to an oral behavior. And that oral behavior can be either—like you're talking about with succeeding, the success behavior could be aggressive or shy, so it could be either side of that behavior for oral or any of the other stages.*

P. For a fast example of regression of that sort, think of a businessman who starts a business and is out there promoting, is very aggressive, etc. And, lo and behold, he's not making money. And if you look back at his history, his major fixation is here [phallic], and that's why he's such a go-getter. But his secondary fixation is here [oral], so at some point, when the failure gets to him, he goes to another businessman and says, "Hey, what'll I do?" and then becomes very credulous, believes everything he tells him, and does whatever the other person tells him.

A Freudian would look at that and say, "Ha, it's clearly a regression back to the passive oral stage." And it fits the notion that when his later developed behaviors that had been succeeding for him stopped succeeding, he goes back to what else he has available and that it isn't just a matter of chance.

Q. *So that ties into the positive cathexis. How would it tie into a negative cathexis?*

P. How do you mean?

Q. *That's what I'm asking. Would it? Could it? Would that be the 'too little'?*

P. That sounds more plausible for somebody who had been reinforced extra, who had had a lot of satisfaction that way. But it needn't. Somebody who had little satisfaction would still be preoccupied with getting that kind of satisfaction, and he might still go to the other businessman and just be very credulous. Because he's trying once more what he has tried before.

Q. *### Okay, anticathexis is a frustration.*

P. Right.

Q. *So if a person had too much of some behavior because he was frustrated during the oral stage, would you say that that came from a—the regression was tied up with an anticathexis some way?*

P. Look: if the anticathexis predominated, you would see not somebody who was credulous, but somebody who was suspicious, who was cynical and disbelieving. Remember, it's the dominance of positive cathexis that gives you your explicit behavior. So in a case like that, you might say, that would show up in the case where that was clearly what he ought to do. After having failed all of these ways, it's obvious that he ought to go get advice, and he refuses to.

Q. *Or he gets it and just doesn't use it.*

P. Or something.

Q. *So refusing the advice, in this example, is regression.*

P. Yeah. You see, up to now he's been exercising more or less sound business judgment. Now, he goes out of his way to reject some advice, and in doing so, it's poor business judgment.

Q. *Do you see—not just not asking for advice, but going to a source of advice and refusing it—*

P. Either way. Either somebody comes and gives him good advice, and he doesn't follow it; or he goes and gets advice and doesn't follow it.

Q. *It seems like one of the things is ### try to imagine all the possibilities. There's a certain range of cathexis, and countercahexis leads to ### in relation to the next kinds of behaviors, and no particular problems connected with this stage. You can have too much cathexis with or without too much anticathexis, and you can have too much of both, and so depending on the different kinds of histories—or at least—*

P. Yeah, there's a limit to how much you can do with the thing. You can work it out some, conceptually, but since you can't measure those things independently, you have a hard time using them.

Q. *I guess you'd have a hard time using them in terms of behavior. I mean, if somebody really is satisfied every other time, and really gets smashed every other time, you could imagine that he has a lot of cathexis and a lot of anticathexis, but not necessarily. It depends on how often—*

P. That's right. He might develop a strong anticathexis for getting into that situation. ###.

Q. *But any of these things are possible, and it seems—*

P. That's why I say that no matter what you observe, there is a pattern formulatable in theoretical terms that will fit.

Q. *The trouble is that no matter what you observe, there are seven patterns fitting in—*

P. That will always be the case for any theory, as we will see. That's part of what I've discussed before as the uncertainty. The ambiguity of behavior is that there will always be some number of descriptions that apply and that you can't falsify. And this holds within a theory as well as across theories, as well as if you're dealing with behavior without any theories at all.

Q. *Can regression happen in degrees, then? Can he be somewhat unsuccessful in his job and there ought to be some—*

P. Yeah. All of these things eventually get quantified. Degree of fixation, degree of regression, the channel of the regression—he may regress in some respects and not others—all of that gets quantified. Like proportion of this [B] also gets—it's eventually all quantified.

Q. *When you're looking at the anticathexis, when you go back, and you regress because you haven't gotten enough satisfaction at that stage, then you try an action, and that does not give you success, then you keep trying the same receiving behaviors in a variety of situations?*

P. Well, not the same ones necessarily, and that's part of the key. You don't try the same receiving behaviors; you just try receiving behaviors.

Q. *Receiving behaviors in a wide variety of situations, always switching them because none enables you to get satisfaction.*

P. Right. But you keep trying, and so you keep developing—

Q. *And receiving becomes a—I don't know if you can say it, but a growing trait, it characterizes more and more of your actions.*

P. It's a preoccupation, and a preoccupation is just a clinical version of what we developed as Interest.

You remember the notion of Interest is an ID characteristic. The preoccupation is simply an Interest, but it's described by somebody who decides that it's too much. I can talk about somebody having an interest in chess, but if I think he's really spending too much time on chess and that's to the detriment of his other things, then I'll say *he's preoccupied with chess*. So in the clinical literature and thinking, it's the term 'preoccupation' or 'concern' is what you will hear. But the logic of it is the same as that of Interest.

Q. *Isn't part of the problem that there can never be—the person can never get enough? In other words, if someone said, "I'll play chess with you 24 hours a day if that will make you happy," it still wouldn't be enough?*

P. I don't think Freud ever said anything about that. Some of the neo-Freudians did. Karen Horney, for example, clearly made that point: that for a neurotic, it's never enough. But I can't recall anywhere that Freud dealt with that at all.

Q. *So a fixation could be satisfying.*

P. What do you mean, a fixation could be satisfying?

Q. *If you regressed back to an oral stage of receiving, you could receive enough to satisfy.*

P. Yeah. I think that possibility you'd have to admit within Freudian theory.

Q. *In therapy, how does—*

P. I was just going to say: because that's one of the obvious avenues to therapy, is to go back and meet that need.

Q. *Is that where the therapy comes in where they make—like they were doing in Lansing, the prison in Lansing, Kansas, where they were taking that criminal way back and having him crawl on the floor and lay down with a bottle and—*

P. The general thrust of that kind of therapy is not to meet the need that wasn't satisfied then, in the sense of now providing enough satisfaction. To the contrary, that one is designed to enable the mature ego to now handle in an effective way the issue back then that wasn't handled in an effective way. So this kind of treatment is not geared to meeting the infantile need and thereby removing the fixation. It's geared to replacing the fixation with more realistic ego functioning by putting the person back in the situation and letting him handle it with his present level of ego functioning. And that's very different from just saying, "Well, we'll go back and satisfy the need." It's almost the opposite sort of notion.

Well, there you have another pair of opposites. Either one may do the job. And there are techniques for both. There are techniques for going back and getting the person to express, or there is this kind for getting the person to replace his old way of handling it with a new way of handling it.

That's, I think, about as much as we want to say about Freud. Are there any other questions, either about what we've talked about or some part of Freud that you think is important that we haven't?

Q. *On congenital ###*

P. Did you notice that Freudian slip? He said 'congenital'?

Q. *At any rate, on just a ### responsible for describing other kinds of things like defense mechanisms and such relative to—*

P. Remember, I said that Freud's theory of personality does not at all exhaust all of the many things that he wrote, that you have to work to extract a theory of personality from all of the stuff he wrote. And one of the

major other things was the theory of psychopathology, and the ego-defense mechanisms belong there. And we haven't talked about them here, and I won't ask about them on the exam.

Q. *Will you give us a percentage of lecture-to-book? [laughter]*

P. The trouble is that there are multiple descriptions of that sort, all of which will be correct. [laughter] No, it would be pretty hard to do it in those terms. Basically, for the final exam it will be cumulative, but the emphasis will be on the material ###, so the emphasis will be on the theories and their comparisons.

Q. *What theories do you intend to—*

P. Remember, I gave you a list initially of Freud, Allport, Skinner, and the existentialists. I may ask you some questions on the chapters that I said to re-read: Jung, Rogers, and Lewin, and so forth. But the major emphasis will be on these four that I've said to study.

Q. *I've wondered about the situation where you have one particular Object that has a large cathexis at a particular time, and something that has lesser cathexis but is more available in the immediate environment. How is that kind of situation described? I was expecting that when ego development came around, somehow that situation would be connected to—*

P. In psychoanalytic theory, you wait and see what happens, and then you describe it, and that's true for anything. You couldn't possibly predict what would happen there. But what you can see is that there is some combination of the goodness of the opportunity versus the value of the other that is a trade-off.

Q. ###

P. Only at the extreme; but at the middle, it's a trade-off, and you don't know how that trade-off is going to work until you see what he does.

Q. *But how do you describe the trade-off in the theory?*

P. In the same way that we developed for Maxim 4—

Q. *The highest, the most energy was definitely going to be the one that was acted on.*

P. No, but that's what we worked out in principle with Maxim 4. You just translate that back into psychoanalytic terms, is that "First A, then B, or else both A and B," and if you can see the opportunity for that, if you've got

enough ego strength to see that possibility, then that will be the Object with the most cathexis.

Q. *What about you can never get—you know that you can never get the one which has—*

P. Then you have no ###.

Q. *So that's an ego thing—*

P. It takes the ego to see the opportunity. Then you have the motivation. Seeing the opportunity, in effect, is to have that psychic Object with a cathexis, and the cathexis will be stronger for one such Object than for the other.

Q. *If you don't see the opportunity—*

P. Then you don't have that Object, then you don't have that psychic Object.

Q. *That's the part that I don't understand.*

P. The psychic Object is here [K on the diamond]. If you don't see the opportunity for that combination, you simply will not have that kind of psychic Object.

Q. *The way it seemed before, everything has a certain amount of cathexis, and—the person is in the world, he'll still be the same person with the same psychic Objects and the same cathexis. Do you see my difficulty?*

P. I'm not sure. You're saying that so far, in terms of what we've said about the theory, if you pluck me out in the middle of the North Sea, I ought to have exactly the same Objects with exactly the same cathexis as I have here now?

Q. *Something like that. If I told you that that ice cream cone that you've been hankering for wasn't really an ice cream cone, then you'd probably start trying to figure out how to get an ice cream cone, or something like that, rather than just forget it.*

P. Let's talk after class, because I'm not sure I catch on to what the issue is, and I do want to get started on Allport this morning.

With Allport as with Freud, we're going to proceed by asking *what are Allport's answers to those three questions: (1) why do people do what they do? (2) what are the differences among people? and (3) how do people get the way they are?*

The first one is: *why do people do what they do?* And remember, we're looking for the general principle, the universal principle, and for Freud, the answer was, "People do what they do because their behavior is instinctual behavior." For Allport, what?

For Allport, the answer is, "People do what they do because they have traits, and their behavior is the expression of the traits they have." So we need to ask, like we did about instinct, *what is this thing called 'trait'?* And one of the simple characterizations by Allport is that a trait is something and does something:




FIGURE 2

That was Allport's way of saying, "Traits are real." When we talk about traits, it's not just a way of talking; there really is something there; and it really does do something.

Q. *You mean, physical sense? A trait is something?*

P. You might ask *why would anybody bother to say that?* And *why would anybody be concerned about that?* And the answer again is given historically: at the time when Allport was writing, one of the things that was prominent—or back for the decade previously—was a philosophical position called Nominalism, which says that things like tables and chairs don't really exist. We merely make up those names and talk that way, but there really isn't any such thing. And that's not so easy to carry off with tables and chairs, but it's very easy to carry off with person descriptions.

You see, there's no such thing as hostility; we just talk that way.

So because that philosophical position was creating issues there, Allport wanted to be opposed to that, so he said, "No, by God, I'm not just talking. We're not just talking. Traits really are something, and they are something, and they do something." So that's what was going on.

Q. *Is that the argument about the empty self?*

P. Yeah, that all of this language is simply ways of talking, and that there's nothing real that corresponds to it. So that was one of his concerns, and it shows up in his formulation.

Clearly, then, the next thing we want to ask is *what is it and what does it do?* And what it is, is a psychophysiological structure or organization.

Right away, we're getting some clues. For Freud, the physiology came first and was more fundamental, and the psychological was derivative, causally. Right off the bat, Allport is telling us, "No, the psychology and the physiology are on a par, and they go together. There is no conflict between them because what we are dealing with are psychophysiological organizations." So there is no in-principle conflict between the psychology and the physiology.

Again you can see the same kind of concern for that traditional mind-body problem. How do the goings-on in the body relate to what goes on in your mind? For psychologists, they're not primarily interested in that question. They're primarily interested in avoiding the problems that that question brings with it.

So typically, you will find psychologists simply saying that there is a solution, it's not a problem, and they go on. This is Allport's way of saying it's not a problem.

What does a trait do? Several things, [Fig. 2 above] That's what a trait does: it renders many stimuli functionally equivalent, and it initiates and guides equivalent forms of adaptive or expressive behavior.

Unlike the Freudian concept of instinct, it's not at all obvious what you can do with a notion like this. With instinct, once you see the cycle, you get an intuitive sense of what you can do with a cycle that works like that.




FIGURE 3

With a definition of this kind, it's not that easy to see what you can do with a notion like this. So let's make the comparison, the same comparison

we did for instinct: pair it with Intentional Action. Where, in this definition, do we have something of this sort [K]? It's clearly going to be here, the stimuli.

You remember I said about the behavior discrimination, that *it includes what psychologists call stimuli, but it includes more*. So the stimuli will be here. Where do we have something of the W sort? Initiates. Where do we have something of the KH sort? Guides. Where we have the P is behavior as usual.

If you look for points of non-correspondence, you find these places: there's nothing over here about anything being equivalent—functionally equivalent or equivalent forms. So these two are things that appear in the notion of trait that don't appear over here in Intentional Action. Yet for the time being, we ignore these, and we'll come back to them in a minute.

What we see is, again, that the notion of a trait is a way of making the same kinds of distinctions that we carried over here in the notion of Intentional Action. With some limitations, as usual. For example, stimuli isn't as general a notion as discrimination or distinction, but it is the same kind of notion.

Q. *'Adaptive' is Achievement?*

P. Yeah. You don't speak of behavior as 'adaptive' except by reference to some criterion of success.

Q. *How about 'expressive'?*

P. 'Expressive' connects to Performance, which is why I put it here. Allport was particularly interested in studying styles and expression, and because of his particular interest, that appears in his definition.

Q. *Couldn't you say 'expression' would be a success, would be an achievement, a successful expression of—*

P. You could say that. You could also say that Performance is an achievement, since to succeed in doing a particular performance is, itself, a kind of success. It is an achievement. But as I say, he is probably the central figure in psychology for studying expressive behavior, which in our terms is Style. So it's not surprising to find it appearing in his definition, even though it's sort of idiosyncratic, since he's the guy who had that predominant interest.

As you can see, the five parameters here are represented somewhere, by something of that same kind, in this definition. Given that, then you can expect that if you really knew what you were doing with the notion

of trait, you could use it pretty much the way we use this [diamond], with some limitations, because (in one or another) you're carrying the same set of distinctions.

SESSION 19

August 8, 1976

Peter: I forgot to assign an exercise on Friday. What I want you to do is to take the Fritz and Gloria transcript, go through the first six responses, and describe them in Freudian terms. Describe that interaction the way Freud would have.




FIGURE 1

This is as far as we got. Last time we started in on Allport. We asked, what is his answer to that first question, “Why do people do what they do?” The answer was, “They do what they do because they have traits, and their behavior is an expression of those traits.”

We then looked at the notion of trait and found that it was described this way, namely, that it is something and does something. I said *this is Allport’s way of saying it really is there, there’s something real there, it’s not just a way of talking.*

As to what it is, it’s a psychophysiological or a neuropsychic—depending on which one you read—organization. If that’s what it is, then this is what gives you the in-principle guarantee that mind and body work together, that the one is not incompatible with the other. Because what everybody has is an organization of both: psychophysiological, neuropsychic. Either way, it’s an organization of mind and body.

I commented, I think, that *with respect to the mind-body problem, psychologists in general are not interested in solving it, they're just interested in not being bothered by it*. This is a way of not being bothered by it.

Then we came back to what does it do? and this is what it does, and this the definition of a trait.

Q. *Both of them, or just 'renders stimuli'—?*

P. Basically this is the definition. This [trait is something, does something] is what you might call a commentary about traits: they are something, they do something, and this is the definition [cf. Fig. 1].

Now let me take that back. Formally, this is part of the definition: the definition is, "A trait is a neuropsychic structure which—" and then comes this.




FIGURE 2

The next thing we did, and I think that was the last thing we did, is to look at this and say, "That's a strange sort of definition, and it's not easy to see what's there and what you can do with it," so rather than elaborate it directly, the way that we did with the Freudian instinct, we immediately compared it to the notion of Intentional Action, and there found that this definition here has the same stimuli elements of Intentional Action; that you're carrying distinctions of each expressive of these sorts.

A trait, then, is a way of bringing together distinctions of all of those sorts. Since it does have those kinds of distinctions in it, you could take it that one could talk about ordinary behavior, using the notion of trait, in a way parallel to the way we talk about it with Intentional Action. Since we're carrying the same sorts of distinction in the notion of trait as in the notion of Intentional Action, then you ought to be able to use this in a comparable way.

By the way, your next exercise, as soon as we finish Allport, is to do the same thing with Allport, that is, describe those six interactions between

Fritz and Gloria the way that Allport would have described them. Okay, any questions about this material on Allport, so far?

Q. *### further specify on traits anything like common traits, and then ###?*

P. Yeah, that's something else about traits, so far. That's the use of trait as an individual difference sort of notion which says that everybody has different traits. The general character of a trait is given by the definition.

Q. *I'm confused about the exercise. Do you want us just to describe, not using any—*

P. Do it the way Freud would have done it.

Q. *Just say what he would have said.*

P. Yeah.

P. If in doubt, ask Freud.

Q. *Do we have to hand it in?*

P. You have to hand it in. Tomorrow. Six responses, it shouldn't take that long to tick that off. The idea is to do it as soon as you finish the particular theorist, so we finished Freud Friday. I should have assigned it Friday. As soon as we finish Allport, you do the Allport one. As soon as we finish Skinner, you do it with Skinner. [discussion of the assignment] Do it today. Never postpone until tomorrow an exercise you can do today.

Q. *That's not one of the Maxims. [laughter]*

Q. *You want Freud's comment on each line?*

P. No, his description of what goes on, response by response. We did it response by response. It is possible to describe it response by response. Just do that in Freudian terms.

Remember that theories of the sort that you have all the way through the book are supposed to help us understand behavior. So there's a common set of behaviors that you can practice on and compare. What does each theory help you with when it comes to understand that behavior? Ideally, you would do a lot longer, like about 20 responses, but that would make it burdensome. So I shorten it to six just to give you enough to give you the flavor of the kind of thing that Freud would have said.

Q. *Do you think we could do just one line here?*

P. No. If we started doing one line, we'd be all hour on it. [laughter] See, if you're doing it by yourself, you can whip it right off. As soon as you hear

what other people say and start disagreeing with them, that's what takes the hour.

Okay, back to traits. Any question about this notion of traits so far?

Among the theorists. Allport is unique in this one respect at least. He used the notion of trait both as his primary concept for behavior and as his primary concept for individual differences. I don't think you'll find that in any other theorist. Most theorists have one notion for the general notion of behavior, and a different notion for individual differences. Allport uses trait for both.




FIGURE 3

The expression of a cardinal trait is a certain distinguishable kind of behavior. The primary general expression of a trait is a distinguishable kind of behavior. A person has a variety of traits. Any one behavior, in general, is the expression of more than one trait. Traits are classified in terms of how many of the person's behaviors are expressions of that trait. Traits that have only a few expressions are called 'specific traits'. These are what are diagrammed at the bottom line in this hierarchy [Fig. 3]. The ones at the bottom are the ones that have few expressions. Those that have more expressions are diagrammed up here, and you can have some number of layers of more and more general traits. At the top you have cardinal traits. Cardinal traits are those that are expressed by most or all of a person's behavior.

Q. ### disposition ###?

P. Using 'trait' as Allport has described it, as it turns out, Allport's notion of trait is the notion of a disposition, but he didn't call it a disposition.

Q. Would you say what cardinal traits are?

P. Cardinal traits are the ones that are most general, so they are the ones that are expressed by much of your behavior, most of your behavior, or all of your behavior. There's no guarantee in the system that there's any trait

that is expressed by all of your behavior. On the other hand, there's nothing in the system that would make that impossible.

Q. *How about a trait of intentional action?*

P. Not a trait. It's simply not the kind of thing that Allport would count as a trait. Remember, I said a trait corresponds to a distinguishable type of behavior. So just being able to behave intentionally would not be counted as a trait.

For Allport, that would be the same as being alive. Being alive isn't a trait. We can distinguish being alive from being dead, or being conscious from being alive, but in terms of traits and Allport's notion, you can't do it. He just kind of takes that for granted that you're dealing with a living person.

Q. *Taking this back to the exercise—the Allport exercise, I mean—by looking at six discrete sentences, how can you tell if those would be cardinal traits or specific traits?*

P. You probably can't. That just means, don't describe them as cardinal traits. You're safe describing them as traits of some kind, but probably not as cardinal traits.

Q. *Okay, well, any behavior can be a specific—what I'm saying is that looking at those six discrete sentences, they would all look—offhand, at least—like specific traits. What are you saying when you say that, in terms of—?*

P. Remember, in those six responses, we picked up some regularities, so you have a basis for saying that some descriptions are more general than others.

Q. *So that's what we're looking for, though.*

P. That's one of the things you can do with it. Since behavior is the expression of traits, this interaction—since it is behavior—in one way or another is going to be the expression of traits. And most of the action will come in terms of which traits, how do they relate to one another.

Q. *I was thinking that it seems the most efficient way to do it would be using that life history paradigm or something—not life history, necessarily, but that history paradigm, just see how they tie into—something is expressed.*

P. If the emphasis was on individual differences, on personal characteristics, yeah, you'd want in effect a life-history deal. Since the emphasis is on describing behavior, you use the trait primarily in the way that's used to describe behavior, and less emphasis on the trait as it is used to describe

personal characteristics. As I said, it's just an accident—or not quite an accident—but Allport is the only one where you have the same concept for both. So if it isn't all that handy for describing personal characteristics, don't let that bother you, because it will be usable in describing behavior. Okay, any questions about the hierarchy of traits?

People have certain characteristics which are shown broadly throughout their behaviors, others that show broadly but not that broadly, and others that show just occasionally and specifically.

Q. *I don't understand 'cardinal'. Can you give me an example of it?*

P. Think of the case of Veronica. One of her cardinal traits would be dependency. Because most of what she did, you could say was an expression of her dependency.

Q. *Most of what she did in that case history. Most of what she did every day wasn't, so can you use 'cardinal' for that, both ways?*

P. You want to be careful on those autonomous things to say they were not an expression of that trait. Just because she's off doing something by herself doesn't mean that's not an expression of the dependency. It is an expression of the dependency insofar as she's only doing it because it's okay with her mother. So it's not just totally divorced from that.

Q. *It's a little ambiguous as to how you choose to describe those particular behaviors ###.*

P. Allport makes the point that traits do not express themselves in pure behavior. That is, there's not a one-to-one relation between the trait and the behavior. Rather, he emphasizes that every behavior is the expression of a number of different traits, and, therefore, you don't detect a trait by simply seeing a certain behavior appearing over and over again. Instead, you see a stream of behavior and you detect certain aspects of that behavior that appear over and over again.

As you might guess, that raises technical problems as to how you detect the presence of a trait. If it doesn't show up in pure form, if it's always mixed in with the expression of other traits; and the evidence for it is that you find it over and over again; then you might expect that different people are going to disagree in the traits that they attribute to a given person. And that is the case, and Allport recognizes that. He says, "Well, it will be up to different investigators how much regularity they want to require in order to say that there's a trait there." And characteristically, he goes on to add, "But even so,

we're not making it all up. It really is there. It's just a matter of how much you want to see before you're willing to say it's that."

This kind of arrangement will give you a typology. The typology is given here [cardinal, general, specific]. You describe a person primarily in terms of his cardinal traits, then follow up with his general traits. Somewhere along the line, mention a bunch of specific traits.

Q. *What you're saying is that the dividing line between specific and general, and general and cardinal is arbitrary?*

P. It may not be arbitrary, but certainly there is no foolproof way to draw that line. People will differ. What happens is that you get a given behavior, and then you get a list of traits, and say *this behavior is to some extent an expression of this trait, to some extent an expression of this trait, to some extent an expression of that trait*, and so on.




FIGURE 4

So a given behavior, then, is the simultaneous expression of some number of traits and in some different degree.

That should touch off something. You recall, with Freud, the notion of Object cathexis. We had a very similar arrangement: drawing from some number of motivational sources, each in some degree. And you have a single behavior doing that. In Freud, it was a single psychic Object, but that psychic Object corresponds to a behavior.

So here once more you have an arrangement whereby a single behavior can be responsive to a number of different motivations or behavior tendencies simultaneously.

Q. *But with Allport we wouldn't go back into the past because he completely avoids that, so—*

P. Not entirely, but he has the right idea. He says if you have a trait, it works now. It's not something in your past that makes you do something. You do what you do because of what you have now.

Q. *But he says, if you're a mature person, that you've grown out of these childish connections.*

P. Even if you're not a mature person, it's the traits that you have now that account for your behavior. If you're not a mature person, you have the same traits now that you had then. It's just to say that you haven't changed.

But as I say, in any case, he makes the point that you account for behavior in terms of what the person has now, not in terms of his past.

Now, you would give individual difference descriptions by mentioning the person's traits: which traits he has, how cardinal, how general they are.

In that sense, this is how the notion of trait is Allport's answer to *what are the differences among people?* Differences among people are the different traits that they have, and the degree of generality that those traits have for them.

Any question about this hierarchy approach to traits, and how they're used to account for individual differences?

Q. *Is there any significance in putting it into just three levels?*

P. No. I said that there's some number of levels of increasing generality, and you never know how many levels you're going to get. Different people describing the same person will get you a different number of levels.

Q. *So we start out with the specific and then we're going to move up to the general, in our exercise, then, that's what you want us to do?*

P. As I said before, you'll have some difficulty in saying whether a given trait that you describe there is specific or general, since you only have a small sample of behavior. So I wouldn't put too much emphasis on whether it's specific or general. I would be satisfied if you distinguished among them as to which were more general and which were less general. That's about as much as you can honestly do. You can detect that some are more general

than others, but I don't think that you've got some ground for saying either it's a specific or a cardinal or a very general one.

Q. *And you can also do it on frequency?*

P. That's why I said *with six behaviors, you're not going to get much of a frequency count*. That's why you don't have a good basis. But as I said, the exercise is not for individual differences. The exercise is to describe behavior. So when it comes to behavior, it's not that much of an issue of how general the trait is. The issue is: which trait is it an expression of?

Q. *I was just wondering, on that diagram, the way I'm seeing it, which I don't think fits in with Allport's theory, is that the specific traits feed into and determine general traits.*

P. No. General traits organize specific traits. Actually, there isn't any influence. You simply have these patterns of more or less generality. They don't influence one another.

As we saw with Freud, if you get a good set of traits, you can express any behavior as a combination of those kinds. You remember, we said receiving, taking, giving, withholding, and succeeding—any behavior can be expressed as some function of these five. Allport does even better. He doesn't give you a list of traits. He just says plug in whatever traits you see. So there's a guarantee there that whatever behavior you describe will be expressible as some function of a list of traits.

Q. *What happens with opposing traits?*

P. One thing you can bet, they can't be very general, at least not if they're about equal in importance.

Q. *I was thinking about love-hate.*

P. Love-hate is not a trait. It's an attitude, and Allport distinguishes trait from attitude and then says very little about attitudes. You'll find the definition in your book, and the definition is almost identical to the one that we gave for attitude, namely, it's like a trait but it has an object. But then he does very little with it, and the general lines of the theory are couched in terms of traits.

Q. *How about a loving versus a hostile person?*

P. Either they're not incompatible and they can both be general; or they are incompatible, in which case you can account for maybe half each. That's why I say, if they really are incompatible, they probably are not very general.

Or the person is primarily one, which is general; and then to some extent the other, and that's specific.

So you can account for all behavior—there's no behavior that you couldn't give this kind of description of.

Q. *The specific traits could be under different general traits?*

P. Yeah. Or on a given—

Q. ###

P. No. Conceivably, depending on what kind. But more important, the same specific trait may connect to a behavior—on different occasions, the same behavior connects to different general traits.

For example, think of a trait of cautiousness, and then on one occasion you're behaving primarily in a hostile way, but cautious. On a different occasion, you're behaving in a friendly way, but cautious.

Q. ### *I could be cautious for two different reasons, and those reasons would be specific—if they are traits, those reasons would ###.*

P. The reasons would probably correspond to other traits.

Q. *Are the general traits determined by the cardinal traits?*

P. Not determined. They simply fall under them.

Q. *So are organized, or—?*

P. The relation is one of class inclusion. Remember, in the list of behaviors we said that *receiving is a more general notion than sucking and swallowing*, that if you're sucking and swallowing, that is an example of receiving. Similarly, the specific traits are examples of the more general ones; the more general ones are examples of the cardinal ones.

I want to make the point again that there is no behavior that you can't describe that way. The reason I want to make that point is that I want to raise now a different kind of question, which we didn't raise with Freud, namely, *it's all very well to be able to talk about all behavior that way, but how much can you say about it?* It turns out that there's a certain general kind of behavior that you don't do very well with if you approach it in this trait way.

To see that, take an example of a chess game. A chess game is one that we're all very familiar with—most of us are relatively familiar with it. It is not a strange idea. We know in general how it goes: you have a board, and you have alternating moves. Imagine that we're just going to talk about chess behavior, and we have a move P-Q4, which says that a person moves the pawn

to the queen's 4th. Now we're going to describe it in terms of that behavior is an expression of certain traits. What kind of descriptions will we have available?

- (1) **aggressive-defensive**
- (2) **pawn move**
- (3) **opening up the center**

FIGURE 5

Certainly, you could say it was an aggressive or a defensive move, so you could say it's an expression of one or another kind of trait. You could call it a pawn move, which means it's to be described as an expression of the trait of moving pawns. You could call it 'opening up the center', so you can have a corresponding trait. Well about that point you start having trouble; but if you get clever, you can put in about twelve that are not implausible.

And now ask yourself: *how much do we understand of this move [P-Q4] if this is how we're going to describe it?* Here's the behavior; we're going to say *well, it is to some extent an aggressive move, to some extent an expression of this kind of trait* [Fig. 4, p. nnn N_1 , N_2 , etc.], *to some extent an expression of this kind of trait, to some extent an expression of that kind of trait*, and so on down the line. You're going to be missing something, and the missing something is something that Allport wanted to get, and that missing something is consistency.

One of Allport's primary interests in theorizing was the notion that people's behavior is consistent, that people are consistent in their behavior, that they show some kind of important unity.

The reason that this is a problem is that I think most of us would agree with that, that people are consistent, that the behaviors of a single person hang together in some important way, and they hang together in a way that the behaviors of different people don't hang together.

However, if somebody says, "Well, what *is* that consistency?", then we're stuck. It isn't easy to look at a single person's behavior, and look at them all, and say *what's the consistency?* Consistency means that, in some sense, the person is doing the same thing all the time—in some sense or other.

Now, Allport's scheme of traits and generality is one way of approaching that problem, of in some sense the person is doing the same thing. If you approach it this way, by 'the same thing' you mean the same kind of behavior—

like in the case of Veronica, dependent behavior. That's the cardinal trait. It's the same kind in that sense. And then you can account for the lack of consistency down at the bottom [Fig. 3], that on different occasions when this one is being expressed, you get different other ones being expressed.

So that is an approach to getting at the consistency in a person's behavior. That's why it's important when it comes to the chess game to ask, "Does that kind of description get at the consistency we already know is there?" Because a chess game and chess behavior hang together, and we know how it hangs together. Will this description give us that?

The answer is no, that this will give us a certain kind of consistency, but there is a more fundamental kind of consistency at work there, namely, they're following the rules of chess. That's what makes it a chess game, that they're following the rules. This kind of description will never get you that.

Q. *Watching a chess game, like you've never learned how to play chess and you watch it for a few months, watch a couple of other people play, you could figure out what the rules were. I bet.*

P. Sure, but you couldn't express them this way. You couldn't express the fact that the whole game consisted of people who were following the rules. You couldn't express that by giving these kinds of descriptions.

Q. *It seems like that they're all just expressions of a trait of playing chess. I mean, you can't have an aggressive move or a pawn move or opening center without depending on the rules of chess,*

P. Yeah. Somehow chess-playing doesn't sound like a trait.

Q. *A pawn move doesn't either, for that matter.*

P. That's right. I was reaching when I made that.

Q. *So where does this tie in?*

P. This was an attempt to get at consistency in behavior. It does get at consistency in a certain way, but there are consistencies, and important consistencies that we know of, that it doesn't get.

Q. *So how does he answer that?*

P. He doesn't.

Q. *He just ignores it?*

P. He ignores it. There is a way in what we're going to talk about next, namely, self-actualization, functional autonomy, etc., to get back some of

that.

Q. *What about his idea of creating—where we actively create the stimuli—if we have a specific trait, a cardinal trait or general trait, and we actively create the situation to produce the stimuli so we can carry forth in that?*

P. That's the self-actualization line.

Q. *I was thinking that if a person has a trait of being being very dependent and they're playing chess, that that trait may show through in the way that they're playing.*

P. Indeed it will. So will this [aggressiveness].

Q. *Or any trait. I see what you're saying about the game, but other traits would show through in the way in which you played it.*

P. That's right. If a person generally behaves in an aggressive way or in a timid way, you could probably expect him to play chess that way. What you won't get is that he's playing chess.

So, in general, it's patterns that this kind of consistency will not get at. This [Fig. 2, p. 242] is consistency of kind, and consistency of kind is not the only kind of consistency that people's behavior shows. You also get the consistency of pattern.

I said that consistency was one of Allport's major interests as a theorist, to account for—to give some account of—the consistency within persons' behaviors, the unity that a given person shows.

A different interest—and this, too, is a primary interest—is the issue of: do people's motivations really change over time? Or do the motivations stay constant, and only the means of satisfying them change? The reason for this is that a lot of Allport's theorizing is a reaction against Freud.

To a large extent, after Freud, almost all of these theories are a reaction to Freud, or a reaction against Freud, or in some sense relate to Freud. Allport's theory was definitely and explicitly a reaction against Freud, a reaction against what Allport saw as the deficiencies of psychoanalytic theory.

One of those deficiencies was that little black box picture [p. 198]—you remember, I drew the little black box and said if you flicked the switch, the top opens and an arm comes out and turns it off and goes back in.

This is Freud's view of human nature: that the function of behavior, the function of learning, and everything else that people do, is simply to achieve satisfaction of those bodily needs. So for Freud, the basic motivation of people is constant; not merely for a given person all his life, but across the whole

species; and all you ever have are changes in the ways of satisfying them. But the motivations remain the same.

Well, if you're a red-blooded American theorist, you will not like the picture of yourself as simply an elaborate way of turning that switch back off. You will react as Allport did, and say, "Baloney, there's a different story about this."

And one of the points is: does motivation really change? That theory depends on the notion that motivation never changes, that all that changes are the means of satisfying them. So one of Allport's points that he wants to make, and insists on making, is, "No. Motivation really does change over time."

Q. *Wouldn't Freud say that the means of achieving—of reducing the energy would basically stay the same but those styles, if you're the normal type of personality, that there's really not a lot of change in the way that—in the motivation?*

P. There may not be a lot of stylistic change, but there will be change in the Objects that you acquire. There will be change in your visible behaviors, because an adult behaves very differently from a child.

When you get out and drive your car home, you're doing something that you would never see in an infant, and nothing that the infant does looks at all like that. So something has changed drastically, and for Freud, what changed is simply the means of satisfying your instinctual aim but not your motivation. [change tape] So Allport wants to insist that motivations genuinely do change.

Secondly, the response to this species-wide universality is this notion of uniqueness, that everybody has a unique set of traits, so that everybody is importantly different, not just accidentally different. And the notion of consistency goes with the uniqueness. It wouldn't be worth much to have uniqueness if you didn't have consistency. If you just had a unique but random selection of behaviors for a given person, that uniqueness wouldn't be the kind that we think of it as. So the uniqueness and consistency are part of Allport's reaction against Freud.

The notion of genuine changes in motivation is another one. The notion of a genuine change in motivation comes under the heading of the Principle of Functional Autonomy of Motives. It's one of the primary features of the theory.

The example that Allport gives to explain the notion of functional autonomy is the example of an insurance salesman who goes and joins the golf club and learns to play golf for the sake of doing a better job of selling insurance. After doing that for a while, he finds that he enjoys it, and lo and behold, he goes out there and plays just for the sake of playing golf.

You have the same behavior over time, namely, playing golf, but the motivation has changed over time. Where earlier, the motivation was to play golf in order to sell insurance, later the motivation is to play golf for its own sake. So what used to be merely a means to satisfying an old motivation, now corresponds to a genuinely new motivation—namely, playing golf for its own sake.

So this is Allport's model of how motivations change, and genuinely change, is that you engage in behaviors for the sake of satisfying motivations that you already have, and with some of those behaviors, you find that you like it. And from that point, you have a new motivation, namely, to engage in that behavior for its own sake.

Part of the example of playing golf for its own sake—in some ways that's a strange example, because that's not the kind of thing you normally think of when you think of children growing up and acquiring new motivations. The example has one virtue, namely, that playing golf for its own sake is a motivation that you can guarantee is new. If it's there at all, it's new. The reason is that you couldn't be motivated to play golf for its own sake before you ever played golf. So there's an example of intrinsic behavior there. Participating in an intrinsic social practice that is one that you can guarantee that if a person ever has that motivation, he acquired it, because he certainly wasn't born with the motivation to play golf for its own sake.

Q. *Couldn't you say, though, that if a person's acting out of a certain general trait in playing golf—say that the person is competitive, has that general trait that permeates his life—couldn't you say that there was some connection there? I know what Allport's saying with functional autonomy, but couldn't you argue that there would be, even through his theory, that there would be some link with something else, namely, the aggressive trait or the competitive trait, that would make it so it wouldn't be functionally autonomous because it would be hooked up with something else?*

P. No. Look: connecting to other things is one thing; being genuinely new is another. And certainly you would want it connected to other things, otherwise you have a fragmented person. The expression of that trait, the

doing of that behavior has to be connected to other behaviors, or you don't have consistency; however, just the fact that it connects to other things does not mean that it isn't genuinely new.

Q. *The way he describes it, it's as if it's by itself, it's just because you like it.*

P. Yeah, and that's true.

Q. *And nothing else, so he's not talking about any other traits or any other—*

P. Yeah, but neither is he denying that it could have other connections.

That's why I'm emphasizing that the point of having intrinsic behavior is not that it has no connections and that it couldn't express other motivation. It's that that's the one that you can guarantee is novel, if it's there at all. And that's important in making *his* point, is to demonstrate an example, or to show you an example, of genuinely novel motivation, motivation that you had to acquire, that you couldn't have had all the way along. And that's all he's interested in, is showing that it is new, and it is genuine. And both of those are accomplished by giving you an example of intrinsic practices.

As we'll see, it works almost the other way around, that the trait—a person develops those traits that are compatible with self-actualization and not the other way around. But we still have self-actualization as a major line of development, and it is essentially—Allport's developmental theory is the notion of self-actualization and how that creates unity over time.

Q. *How would Freud explain playing golf, in his terms?*

P. How about 'success'?

If nothing else, that's always available. What he'd probably say is, different people would do it for different reasons, intermediate reasons, but fundamentally, it's always going to be discharge of instinctual energy. There's no way to—

Q. *I'm having a hard time with those, too. It seems like you could learn to play golf because you're aggressive or because you want success or go back to those.*

P. Yeah. Again, the issue is not whether you have reasons for learning to play golf. In the example, he did have a reason for learning. The issue is, does he eventually do it for its own sake?

Q. *And not to let out all those aggressions?*

P. Right. Is it something other than merely a means of expressing

aggression? If he's playing for its own sake, it's not just a means of expressing aggression; and it isn't just a means of selling insurance; and it isn't just a means of anything else; because if it is, he's not playing it for its own sake. So unless you wanted to say, "People never play golf for its own sake,"—which Freud would say—then you'd have to grant that there are such cases of genuinely new motivation. And that's what Allport is focusing on.

Q. *Didn't you say that Allport says there's no pure behavior, that there's no behavior that's just the expression of only one trait?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *Then you can't play anything just for its own sake.*

P. Yeah, but now he's not talking the language of traits, he's talking the language of motivation. Keep in mind that the test of *is it intrinsic?* is not *does it serve other purposes?* but rather *would he be doing it anyhow if none of those purposes were there?* Certainly, it's conceivable that, in the end, the guy does it for both reasons—that he does it because he enjoys golf, and even if he weren't selling insurance, he'd still be playing golf that way; but also, he does sell insurance, so he plays to sell insurance. There's nothing to keep him from having both motivations.

Q. *Why for its own sake? Why is it necessary to assume that he enjoys doing it?*

P. As I said, an intrinsic behavior is one that is guaranteed to be new. You couldn't have had that motivation before doing it. Any other behavior that isn't an intrinsic practice—

Q. *I can see that, but I don't see why that means he enjoys it, why it follows that he enjoys it just because he's doing it for its own sake.*

P. That's one of the ways one talks about things that one does for its own sake. If somebody asks you way, one of your standard answers is, "Because I enjoy it."

Q. *Maybe somebody challenges it.*

P. I still say, "I enjoy it."

Q. *He seems to be lumping a whole lot of things into one term.*

P. No, it's the difference between something you enjoy and something you don't. If it's merely a way of responding to a challenge, and it's not at all enjoyable, one wants to know why you're responding to the challenge.

Whereas if you say, “Because I enjoy it,” there are no further questions to be asked.

Q. *If anyone asks why ###, like, “Because it’s challenging,”*

P. The answer to *why do you enjoy it* is no longer a reason but a personal characteristic, and it amounts to, “I’m the kind of person who does enjoy that sort of thing.”

Q. *You call that a reason?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *The confusion is in the research that they present, having substantiated the notion of functional autonomy, they talk about a rat that scratched his ear, and that implies kind of something on his ear, and he kept scratching, and they stopped him, and he kept scratching. So they say, it didn’t have any attachment at all with anything, he just kept scratching. He explained it as a non-adaptive behavior that persists to the detriment of the organism. So it doesn’t have any connection with anything.*

P. What happened was that Allport—everybody gave Allport a hard time about this principle in two ways. In one, they said *that’s nonsense, how could it possibly happen?*; and the other is *where’s your empirical evidence? how does it come about?*

And he struggled with that and never came up with a satisfactory answer. But along the way he distinguished two kinds of motivational change. The one is what he called ‘perseverative behavior’ and gave that as one of the examples; and he says *that’s not the kind I’m interested in*. That, indeed, would be maladaptive if a person did it.

He said there’s another kind of functional autonomy that is guided by self-actualization. That’s the kind, he says, that’s important, and that’s the kind I’m mainly talking about, and that’s the kind we haven’t yet come to.

The other thing he said, “I don’t know how it happens. I just know it does, and we all know it does, and I leave it up to you guys to find out how it happens, and any of the mechanisms that you guys can think of, those may be at work.” A very democratic guy.

Q. *Would you be able to give an example of a baby and his mother, coinciding with his mother’s behavior? Could you apply this to Allport’s theory?*

P. I’m not sure what that question is.

Q. *Say, using an insurance salesman, you can apply it to anything.*

P. Think of an infant's sucking a nipple and think of him sucking his thumb. When he sucks a nipple, he gets fed. When he sucks his thumb, he doesn't. Sucking looks like something that he may have found out that he enjoys. And Freud would say, "Yeah, yeah, that's oral behavior." Allport would say, "There's a primitive example of functional autonomy." However, it's primitive because he hasn't yet developed a self that will guide the direction of this. But there it is, in primitive form.

Q. *Do people think there is no ### motives to anything people do ### as the person matures, that they won't continually get new motives, and that's what makes them—?*

P. That's a little bit too positive. Saying we continually acquire new motives is putting it a little too strongly. Try putting it in the negative: for Allport, there is no place where we necessarily stop acquiring motives. He would agree that no matter at what age, there is that possibility; and that for some people, they are, in fact, acquiring a lot of new motives.

But he wouldn't give any generalizations like "we all are", or how much we are all doing. He's just leaving room for that, and leaving it up to observation to decide who is acquiring how much.

Q. *But doesn't he contend that we don't have any pre-existing—going back to the small infants, aren't we—*

P. I think he'd be very noncommittal about that. He makes statements on the order of, "Well, an infant is pretty much an organism, it's pretty much a bundle of reflexes, and that's what you have to start with. But the way that people operate, those aren't just instincts. There's already this neuropsychic organization at work, and you see its operation over time because you see that bundle of impulses start developing into a bona fide human being. So even back there, it wasn't *just* a bundle of impulses. But if you stop there and just describe what you observe, that's indeed the way you would describe it, as a bundle of impulses."

Now, that you might redescribe as some kind of built-in motivation, or you could just say, "No, it's unmotivated, reflexive behavior, "—either one. And he wasn't that interested in making judgments or making decisions about that. He was interested basically in adults and in normal adults. And since infants are so much unlike normal adults, he simply sort of waved his hand at that and said, "You guys find out about those things. I'll pick up as soon as that infant starts looking like a person." Basically, that's the way his theory works.

Q. *So his development ###, in terms of how functionally autonomous a person's behavior is, or how much their behavior is characterized by that, how long a road in development they are—?*

P. That, too, is too strong. There's no premium on quantity when it comes to functional autonomy. There's no premium on constantly achieving a lot of new motivation. Why would there be? If you push that to the extreme, again you've got fragmentation, you've got somebody who's changing from moment to moment, always with new motivations.

Q. *Someone who's engaging in a behavior just for the sake of that behavior, more than another person, would you say that they're more developed than the other person?*

P. No.

Q. *So it's not really related to maturity.*

P. Well, yeah, it is, but not in that simple way, not in a quantitative way that the more the better, or the more, the more mature. Rather, a limiting case that the transition from infancy to adulthood requires the development of autonomous motivation, but not that more maturity requires more.

The last major thread in the theory is the notion of self-actualization and self. This is the developmental aspect. The self-actualization is a different sort of unity principle, and it's a principle of unity in development over time.

Again, he comes up with an anecdotal example by way of explaining the kind of thing he has in mind. The explanation is: somebody who decides to be a physician, and thereupon sets out to do all of the things that are going to get him his degree. He goes to school, attends classes, passes the classes, goes on to the next one, goes through medical school, gets his internship, etc., and eventually is out there practicing as a physician. And he says, "You could talk about all kind of influences, and you can talk about this as expressions of traits, etc., but the most important thing that was at work there is the intention and the resolve that this man formed way back there, to become a physician. That does more to account for that sequence of events than all of these other things." Secondly, he says, "The traits, the autonomous motivation that were acquired by this person over that period of time were the ones that fit in with this pattern of self-actualization, so that the issue of which ones are acquired—it's not a random selection procedure." To the extent that a given trait, a given autonomous motivation fits in with this life plan, with

this sequence of self-development, of self-actualization, it is more likely to become functionally autonomous. The trait is more likely to be acquired.

Q. *That's where that maxim would fit in, where if you couldn't do it with that present ability, then you would go and do it—you'd keep trying something until you accomplished that. So you could just put that it, if it was that important to you. Yes?*

P. No. You've got the same phenomenon, but you're working it at different ends, and that's important. If you already have something in mind, you'll try different things in order to accomplish it. That's one thing.

On the other hand, if you are going in a certain direction, you will acquire those characteristics that fit in with the direction you're going. It isn't that you have those in mind as something to acquire. And it isn't that they necessarily help you in an instrumental way to get where you are going. It's just that they fit. They fit with being the kind of person who is going that way. Since you were already that kind of person when you decided to be a physician, you're simply actualizing the potential when you acquire the learning, the knowledge, the skill, etc., as you go along.

That's why it's called 'self-actualization'. The potential was already there earlier. It gets actualized in your life history. And the direction is what exercises the selection on the traits acquired, the motivations that become autonomous. The ones that fit in with your self-actualizing thrust are the ones that are most likely to be acquired.

You can see that that does some of the job of making up for the consistency that the trait hierarchy did not give us. It does give you consistency in a person's life over time, and it gives you a different view of the consistency of a person's different traits that he has at a given time. Those traits now are not just a hierarchy of similarities; they are a set of traits that fit a certain kind of person, namely, one who is living the kind of life that this person is living. However, it still will not get you the chess game or patterns of a more specific sort.

We want to quit now and find out what are good times for office hours. Since we're very nearly through with Allport, start in on the exercise for Allport, also. It might help you to do both Freud and Allport more or less simultaneously. Study the chapter on Skinner for tomorrow.

SESSION 20
August 9, 1976

Peter: Did anybody have problems with the two exercises? What kind of problems did you have?

Q. *Every kind. [general conversation]*

Q. *Could you read something in the ### that you can't possibly—like the very first sentence, "Now we're going to have an interview." What would Freud say?*

P. What kind of descriptions do we have? What kind of description did somebody give for that?

Q. *I gave, "Giving of information, so since it's giving, it's anal expulsion." [laughter] Remember, the unconscious has its own logic. [general conversation]*

Q. *At one level, I thought he was giving reassurance to her, and there was certainly at least some measure of altruism in giving in not a selfish sense, so I thought at least on one level, it was genital.*

P. Remember, I said, "Don't try to emphasize the individual difference aspects. This is a description of behavior." Both of you had tried to emphasize which stage of character fixation this is ###. That belongs to individual differences. What about the behavior?

Q. *I said, "Fritz is engaging in authoritative pattern of behavior towards Gloria and ### the ego of the client in circumstances of a therapeutic interview."*

P. That's safe, and it is putting it in the framework of ego-functioning and the general situation. If you stop there, you haven't said all you might.

Q. *I didn't stop there, but that's—*

P. Fine. What did somebody else have here?

Q. *I didn't say anything directly about his behavior, but ### by saying, "Gloria must incorporate this restriction into her personality." It is a kind of restriction—*

P. Remember, we saw that Gloria didn't accept that restriction, so she doesn't have to incorporate it.

Q. *I didn't say she did; I said she must.*

P. You mean, she must but she didn't?

Q. *Right.*

P. A strange way—

Q. *I know.*

P. Interaction things you don't have to incorporate into your personality. You just do them.

Q. *Am I wrong?*

P. Yeah. You see, when you have instinctual discharges of energy, they may not change your personality much. They may not change your structure of Object cathexis particularly. So you're not guaranteed a change every time you behave.

Q. *So by analyzing the behavior and trying to place it—to classify it as certain secondary behavior, that is a wrong procedure in analyzing the interaction?*

P. By doing what?

Q. *For example, by taking one of the behaviors that they made as very aggressive, as trying to control—trying to lead the situation, and you would say, "Okay, this is primarily aggressive behavior so it would be phallic behavior." Would the behavior belong to the phallic stage, or—?*

P. Again, remember, referring it to a developmental stage is an individual difference description. It detracts from the description of the behavior.

Keep in mind that the general answer to "Why do people do what they do?", the general concept of behavior, is instinctual behavior, so that all behavior, each and every one of those responses by Fritz or Gloria, is going to be a case of instinctual behavior. The only question is which instinctual behavior is it? But every one of them will have all of the characteristics of that instinctual behavior. So if you're going to work at it the way Freud did, you

have to start looking at it as each time one of them does something, that is a discharge of instinctual energy, and that is instinctual behavior.

The differences among them are going to be some of the specific differences among possible instinctual behaviors. As Fritz saying, “We’re going to have an interview for half an hour” is instinctual behavior. The question is which instinctual behavior?

And keep in mind, within the pattern of instinctual behavior, what distinguishes one from another. What distinguishes one from another is which Object, which psychic Object is being acted on; how much Impetus you have; how much psychic energy is associated with that Object; what kind of overt behavior that was; and whether that succeeded in satisfying the Aim. Those are the things that distinguish one behavior from another.

You can see that primarily, from a descriptive—if you’re trying to describe it, the major thing that you’re going to describe is the difference in the psychic Object. What psychic Object is being acted on here?

Q. *Any idea of how the interview would go, the structure of the interview?*

P. That’s where you have your choice. Anyhow, that’s the main framework that you get from the theory that you’re going to use in describing actual behavior. You might get sensitized to a certain kind of problem, here.

In fact, that’s one of the reasons for the exercise, that what you find in psychoanalytic theory, and Allport’s theory, and Operant Conditioning theory, and in every theory, is a universal formula for all behavior. That’s what they’re trying to arrive at, is a universal formula that does apply to all behavior.

Given that, you can foresee certain problems in describing particular behaviors. Because since the formula will apply to all behaviors, the formula alone will not distinguish one behavior from another. So something else is going to have to come into the picture if you’re going to be able to distinguish one behavior from another in terms of that theory. And what’s going to have to come into play is two things: one, *what is there in the theory that formally distinguishes one behavior from another?* We just went through that for Freud, and we saw it was primarily the psychic Object. Even that will not do the job, since that still falls within that universal formula, that all behavior will have a psychic Object. So just knowing that it’s psychic Objects that distinguish one behavior from another will still not get you a description of the behavior.

The other thing that comes into play is your own observational capability. That’s what provides the material that you put into this form. It’s

your own observational capability that supplies the answer, “Well, which psychic Object is involved here?”

And you can see that that has to be the case, because no theorist could possibly know what somebody is going to do on a given occasion. The most the theorist can do is to provide you with some universal formulas and some features that distinguish particulars, one from another. But he has no way of knowing what behaviors actually occur. That has to be supplied by observation and the competence of the Observer.

That set of considerations is part of why I say, “Think of the theory as a bookkeeping system.” Bookkeeping systems do not tell you facts. They simply give you an organization for keeping track of facts. They don’t tell you any facts. The problem with theories is that they sound as though they do. When you read Freud’s theory, it certainly sounds as though he’s telling you facts about behavior and facts about people. And one of the reactions to it has been, “Well, since he’s telling us facts, there ought to be some way of checking on whether these are true facts.” And there has been a lot of hassle in the literature about the fact that you can’t really test psychoanalytic theories. Why? Because no matter what you observe, it’s compatible with the theory. We saw that that was a virtue. Here we’re seeing first-hand a different aspect of the fact that the theory is not a body of true statements that tell you something about people and their behavior.

That gets borne upon you heavily when you try to use it to talk about people, and you ask yourself, “What does this theory tell me about people?” You find it doesn’t tell you anything. It gives you a form in which to put your information, but it doesn’t tell you any facts. Since it doesn’t tell you any facts, it can’t be tested as to whether these are true facts.

So when you put the facts that you observe in this form, some of them get highlighted. Some kinds of facts get emphasized and others get de-emphasized. So one of the values of the theory is, does it highlight, does it bring out, does it make it easy to see certain kinds of facts? If those kinds of facts are important to see, then it’s a valuable theory.

This will hold for all of these theories. As you can see, a theory is going to have to be couched in terms of a universal formula, and you will have this trouble with every single theory. But every single theory is a different bookkeeping system, and it will bring out different things. That’s part of the experience that it’s good to have if you’re at all into the field of personality or psychopathology.

So keep that in mind—I guess particularly with Operant Conditioning theory, since of the theories that we now have, that's the one in which you most commonly hear that *that* you can use to make predictions with. You commonly hear that the theory predicts certain things. In fact, there's a sentence in Hall and Lindzey that says that. That's the analysis of the soldier with the paralyzed arm. At the end of the analysis they say, "And this is exactly what would be predicted by the theory."

Okay, let's come back to where we left off yesterday. We pretty well covered all the major topics involved with Allport's theory. Let me go over those very briefly.

The first is, the general concept of behavior is given by the notion of a trait. Remember, the trait is a neuropsychic organization that renders many stimuli functionally equivalent; and initiates and guides equivalent forms of adaptive and expressive behavior. What we saw there is that that carries with it the same distinctions, the same kinds of distinction, as Intentional Action and as the Freudian notion of instinct; therefore, you could expect that it would have the same general kind of use in describing behavior and in distinguishing among behaviors.

Secondly, the notion of trait was used as the central individual difference notion in the form of the hierarchy of traits, a hierarchy of generality. I commented that Allport is the only theorist who uses the same notion both as the primary concept of behavior and as the primary individual difference concept. He's able to do that—you recall the way we developed Dispositions in terms of a type of behavior and a pattern of occurrence. In effect, Allport has the same thing.

You recall that a given behavior corresponds to a type of trait, and the generality of the trait has to do with the frequency of occurrence. So Allport's hierarchy is built on the same ingredients that we used to start off generating the Individual Difference notions, namely, a type of behavior and a pattern of occurrence. What Allport has is the frequency patterns; he doesn't have the Powers or States or Comparatives. But he does have the Dispositions.

The third element, the developmental aspect, is given by two principles, (1) self-actualization, and (2) functional autonomy. It's these two principles jointly that give you the unity and the consistency in people's behavior.

Q. *What's the other one beside functional autonomy?*

P. Self-actualization. That's both the developmental aspect of Allport's theory, and what accounts for unity and consistency. Any questions about those three main features of Allport's theory?

Q. *Is his self-actualization the same as Rogers'?*

P. Not—it's very similar. Allport was the forerunner of Rogers and all of the other phenomenologists in psychology and many of the humanist and existentialists. Allport happened to be a generation or two ahead of most of them, and in his day he was about the only person talking the way he talked. So when other people came in the early 50's and 60's and had different notions than a behavioristic approach to people, Allport was the one that they could point to and try to modify to try to fit their particular outlooks. And Rogers was one of the first of the ones who came later and did something like Allport.

So you might figure that all of the later phenomenologists and humanistic existential psychologists, most of them are standing on Allport's shoulders.

Allport is a good example—I think it's worth going through this a little—of the historical aspect of theory construction. Because Allport is a prime example of writing a theory to order, writing a theory to meet certain requirements. It's clearly the case that Allport's theory did not just arise spontaneously out of his contacts with people. He deliberately set out to do something theoretical and to do something theoretical that had certain features.

scientific		subject-matter
old	Freud	Allport
new	Skinner	Existentialists

FIGURE 1

Recall that I drew these contrasts and said that's why these are the four people we're going to study. Part of what I mean by being subject-matter oriented is very well illustrated by Allport. Allport's stance was, "We already know certain fundamental things about people, and it's up to our theories to bring these out. And if we can't establish those features of people in a

scientific way, we'll put them in anyhow because we already know them, and let the scientific methodology catch up with the subject-matter." So with the principle of functional autonomy, he said, "We know that people's motivations change. It's up to any good scientific theory to show that and to show how, and if we can't already do it, we're going to say so anyhow and let the methods and theories and knowledge about brain processes, etc., catch up with that."

So his theory had the principle of functional autonomy even though he could never explain how it could possibly happen. Why? Because for him, that was a requirement for any good theory about people. He says, "We already know that motivations change, so it's up to us to give an account of it." That's what I mean by subject-matter oriented,

In contrast, Freud and Skinner say, "We've got a method, we've got an approach, and that defines what can be handled scientifically, and so we'll handle whatever can be handled that way, and we have that guarantee that our results will be scientific. And if there's something about people that we can't handle that way, too bad, we'll ignore it."

That's the difference between the method emphasis and the subject-matter emphasis.

So functional autonomy was one of the points of subject-matter emphasis for Allport. A second one is uniqueness. For Allport, it was a given that everybody is unique. And third, that everybody's behavior hangs together. He didn't have good ways of explaining how come everybody's unique—again, he just said, "Everybody has a unique set of traits, and that guarantees that everybody's unique."

Q. *I'm trying to figure out how instinct—how Freud's notion of instinct and its relevance to behavior, fits into the scientific model, in the sense that—*

P. It was a physiologically-based, causal sort of explanation, and that's what it took to be scientific.

Q. *### it seems more of a subject-matter because it hasn't been explained how, for example, even ### genes would affect—if there is aggression in our genes, or if there is a sex instinct in our genes, and it seems as though Freudians are saying, "We'll wait for science to catch up, "*

P. The difference is: Freud said, "We'll put it in scientific form and let our knowledge catch up." Allport says, "We'll put in what we know about the facts and let our methods catch up."

Uniqueness and consistency, again, are central features of people that Allport wanted to say were there, and he said they were there but without much in the way of explanation. He just flatly, in effect, said, “People are unique, people are consistent,” and incorporated that into the notion of trait and self-actualization.

At the same time, there is a third feature which is also subject-matter oriented, and which illustrates something else of a fairly general sort.

Come back to that definition of trait. You remember, he says that the trait is a neuropsychic organization which (1) renders many stimuli functionally equivalent. Now, the functional equivalent is something that has no corresponding feature in Intentional Action. You remember, when we compared them, the only thing that was in that trait definition that didn’t have a corresponding feature in Intentional Action were the two references to ‘equivalent’: ‘rendering stimuli functionally equivalent’, and ‘equivalent forms of adaptive and expressive behavior’. If you ask how come those things were in that trait, how come Allport said that traits render many stimuli functionally equivalent, you could put it in contact with a classic problem, namely, that psychologists take it for granted, mostly, that when you see something, you are responding to a pattern of stimuli, ‘Pattern of stimuli’ is the specific pattern of light, dark, and color and shape, that you have, for example, when you look at a chair or when you look at this thing. They said, “That’s what you really see, that’s what you really are responding to.”

Now, they’re faced with this kind of problem: that as I look around at the chairs, (1) I don’t see a complete chair because there’s too many people sitting in them; (2) the stimulus patterns of the different chairs are fairly different even when they’re the same kind of chair, because I’m looking at them from different angles; (3) As I walk around, the stimulus pattern for any given chair changes, and of course, the stimulus pattern for that kind of chair is markedly different from the pattern of this kind of chair or that kind back there. So the question is *how come we can package all of the stimulus patterns that go with this chair—how can we tell that all of those stimulus patterns correspond to one chair? How can we tell that the very different stimulus patterns for that chair and this chair are both stimulus pattern for chairs?* The answer is *somehow those stimulus patterns that correspond to the same thing or the same kind of thing are equivalent*. Why? Because we know that we do not see stimulus patterns, we see chairs. So you’ve got to bridge the gap between this background notion that what you really see is stimulus patterns, and the observable fact that what we see are chairs, and that we easily

distinguish one chair from another or the same chair from different angles. So if you really see stimulus patterns, and you know you see chairs, you're going to have to bridge that gap.

And that's what the trait does. Just sort of by magic, the trait is something that bridges that gap, that turns a whole bunch of stimulus patterns into a single notion of chair which you then distinguish.

Since in Intentional Action, there is no such postulation about that you really see stimulus patterns, you also don't need something to render those stimulus patterns functionally equivalent in order that we should see what we do see. But if you start from that point, if you start from the notion that stimulus patterns are what you really see, or that movements are what you really do by way of behavior, then you're going to need something to collect all of the right movements that constitute the same behavior on different occasions, or all of the right stimulus patterns that correspond to distinguishing the same thing. Since that's a job that had to be done by the theory, again, putting in this feature of trait is writing the theory to order, of putting in the theory something that you have to have in order to account for what's there. And if you have the wrong presuppositions about what's there, then you're going to have a lot of extra apparatus in your theory.

It's one thing to say that we know that people's motivations changed and so we're going to have to put that in our theory. That's something, I think, most of us could go along with because on the face of it, that's what happens. In contrast, this other one about *you really see stimuli* and *what you really produce are movements*, those are not something which on the face of it, that's what happens, and so pretty much everybody can go along with. Those simply reflect a peculiar philosophical theory that Allport had accepted ahead of time.

Having accepted it, that puts him in a hole with respect to describing behavior, and he's got to have something in the theory to get him out of that hole and back even. And so some of that apparatus in that theory is simply for the sake of getting back even again, after getting behind the eight ball with some of these philosophical suppositions.

You'll find this, again, in most theories, because most psychological theories take certain things for granted about people that basically represent a philosophical theory. And many of those have the same feature as the stimulus patterns, namely, they present you with insoluble problems, and then you have to put something in the theory to solve that problem before you can then continue.

So much for general comments about Allport writing theories to order. Many similar things, as I say, will apply to any theorist, because any theorist is a person at a particular point in history, and if he writes a theory, he has some ideas about what will qualify as a theory—what a theory has to be like to be a good theory—and he will write his theory in such a way as to meet those requirements as best he can.

So part of understanding the theories we have in psychology is understanding the history of ideas over time, as to what qualified as a good psychological theory. Then you'll find theorists creating theories of that very sort because their effort is to create good psychological theories. So whatever they thought it took to do that, that's what you'll find formally in their theories.

That's part of why we talk about 'old' and 'new'. Times change, and our notion of what it takes to have a good theory changes, and you'll see some characteristic differences between Allport and Freud on the one hand, and Skinner and the Existentialists on the other.

Let's turn our attention to Skinner's theory, and again ask what's Skinner's general formula for behavior?

**Respondent, Operant
Reinforcement
Contingency
Generalization - stimulus, response
Conditioning
Controlling Variable
Conditioned Operant
Extinction
Shaping
Discrimination**

FIGURE 2

At this point, though, we're going to need to do something new. Both Freud and Allport had a single notion that was of a more or less complex sort, and so it was easy to pick out the notion, and then we had to examine to see what's in it. With Skinner, it's the other way around, that we need to look at some of the notions that he uses, and then sort of pull them together to see how he deals with behavior generally. So I'll write down a few concepts from Skinner's theory on the board, and then we'll just talk about them one

by one, relate them to each other, and finally pull them together to see what that looks like.

Okay, that'll give us enough to start with. We may even be able to get by on no more than that. Has everybody got these down? The first one is the notion of Operant, and the contrasting term of Respondent. An Operant is defined as a response that has an effect on the environment. A Respondent is a response that is naturally elicited by a given stimulus. In effect, a Respondent is a stimulus-response connection that is unlearned. If there's already a stimulus that regularly elicits that response, that's a Respondent, and that's a contrast term for Operant. An Operant is not a Respondent. A Respondent is defined in terms of what brings it on, an Operant is defined in terms of its having an effect. So one points backward, the other points forward.

This [Operant] is the building-block, the germ, that Skinner uses. The next notion to bring in is Reinforcement. A Reinforcement is a state of affairs that changes the probability of a response. It changes the probability of the occurrence of an Operant.

Incidentally, since this theory was developed in the context of a certain kind of laboratory paradigm, you might as well have that paradigm in mind, because it helps fit in all of these. If we take a later version of that paradigm, think of a cage with a pigeon in it, and the pigeon's responses, the Operants, include pecking around here and there, walking around, doing various things of that sort, what you would normally call 'free behavior'. Pecking is not regularly elicited by anything. Walking around is not regularly elicited by anything. Stretching, fluttering your wings, any of these things would fall under the heading of Operant.




FIGURE 3

For Reinforcement, imagine what happens when you throw some grain down here: all of a sudden, the pigeon's behavior changes. He starts eating the grain. A reinforcement is any state of affairs, any set of circumstances, that changes the probability of a response. Specifically, the Reinforcement is one of the effects of that behavior, or could be, in the sense that it follows the behavior, the Operant.

Q. *How does it follow the behavior?*

P. Remember, an Operant is a behavior that has an effect. One of the possible effects is a reinforcing state of affairs, and that reinforcing state of affairs changes the likelihood of that behavior on a later occasion. Formally, a Reinforcement can change the likelihood in any way.

Reinforcements in general are classified as positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, and punishment. Positive reinforcement increases the likelihood of that behavior. Negative reinforcement is a case where the termination of that condition increases the likelihood of the behavior. If you've got a pigeon, and you're giving him shock, and if he pecks a red circle you stop the shock, that will be negative reinforcement. Stopping the shock will increase the likelihood that he'll peck that circle. Punishment is a reinforcement which reduces the likelihood of behavior. If a pigeon pecks that circle and you shock him, that reduces the likelihood that he'll peck that circle again.

Q. *The condition in the negative reinforcement is that the button is associated with the shock?*

P. No, that the termination of the condition is what is reinforcing, that is what increases the likelihood. If you have an aversive condition like shock, and you terminate it, it's the termination that is reinforcing. Whereas grain, it's the introducing of the reinforcement that changes the likelihood.

Again, Reinforcement is defined by Skinner as a condition that changes the likelihood. It's very easy to use Reinforcement in the way that we use the word 'reward'. It's very easy to interpret Reinforcement as either rewarding or punishing, or as something pleasant or unpleasant. The reason is that, in general, a reward is something we can understand that would increase the likelihood of behavior, that something pleasant is something we can understand as increasing the likelihood of behavior. So when we talk about Reinforcers as pleasant or as rewarding, in effect, we're combining an explanation with the bare notion of the change in likelihood.

It turns out that most of the time that will work, but sometimes it won't.

One of the examples we thought up is walking up to somebody and slapping him in the face is positively reinforcing, in that that increases the likelihood that he's going to do it and that he's going to do it. Why? Because you're likely to get into a fight. So doing that increases the likelihood that both of you are going to engage in face-slapping or similar behavior, but it's not what you would normally call rewarding.

So the technical notion is simply in terms of the change in likelihood, and has nothing to do with reward, with pleasure, or any other explanation. It's simply the change in likelihood.

Q. *Then one condition of reinforcement could be finding more than one option.*

P. Say that again?

Q. *Okay, the slap in the face. I might be more likely to slap other people in the face, but also I might be more likely to avoid people, to avoid a situation like I could be slapped in the face.*

Q. *You mean, slapping and ducking? [laughter]*

P. Wait till we get through talking about conditioning before we think in terms of learning or stringing behaviors together. Basically, we're just building up the logic of how these things connect, and we're not yet in a position to use them to describe anything.

Okay. Contingency. Again, come back to the cage with the red dot here [Fig. 3, p. 259] and say, a light up here. Suppose that when the pigeon pecks the red dot, out here some grain falls into the cage, and the pigeon eats. The grain is a positive Reinforcer. The pecking here is the Operant. Eating the grain—that is, taking the grain up—is a second operant that's involved. Now imagine this possibility, that the light can be either on or off, and when the pigeon pecks the red circle he gets the grain *but* only if he does it when the light is on; and if he pecks it when the light is not on, then he doesn't get the grain. The on-off here is the Contingency. It's a condition which must be met in order for the behavior to be reinforced. Or conversely, you have a contingency of reinforcement when there is a condition such that the reinforcement of that operant occurs only under that condition.

In the example, the condition is that the light is on. The reinforcement of the operant of pecking that circle occurs only when the light is on, and not when the light is off. Under those conditions, the increase in the likelihood of behavior will occur, but only in the presence of that contingency. But

when you have that kind of arrangement, the pigeon will indeed be more likely to peck that circle, but only when the light is on. So you've increased the likelihood with the reinforcement, but since the reinforcement only occurs under the certain condition, the likelihood is greater only under that condition.

Any questions about what a Contingency is? It's a state of affairs that determines whether or not a reinforcement is going to be forthcoming.

Now to Generalization. We've talked about the increase in the likelihood of that response. We need to fuzz it in two directions. One is, on the response side, the increase is an increase not only in the likelihood of the specific response that got reinforced, but also of any similar response, and to the extent that it is similar. What increases in likelihood is not merely the specific response that got reinforced. What also increases in likelihood is any similar response, and the more similar the response, the greater the increase in likelihood.

So if the response in question is pecking the red dot, what becomes more likely is not merely pecking the red dot, but also pecking in the general area of the red dot. And pecking close to the dot is more likely than pecking far away from it. And pecking becomes more likely.

So what you get, then, is an increase in the likelihood not merely of the single, specific behavior that got reinforced, but of anything similar to it, and to the degree that it's similar. So the more similar, the greater the increase or decrease of likelihood.

Secondly, the likelihood is increased not merely in the specific circumstance in which the reinforcement occurred but in any similar circumstance; and to the extent that it is similar. So for example, if you're shining the light and reinforcing for pecking the red dot, if you shine the light dimmer than before, he'll still peck the red dot; and you can dim it down, and he'll still peck; but the dimmer it becomes, the less likely he is to peck.

Likewise, if you put an orange dot there, he'll peck the orange dot. So any condition that is similar to the conditions of the reinforcement will be associated with a greater likelihood of that behavior.

Q. *Are there any occurrences that give the theory any trouble with for example, if you made the light brighter, is the likelihood increased? Or is that—*

P. Yeah, you can increase the brightness of the light, you can do all kinds of things. As long as it's similar, you'll get much the same effect.

Q. *If you increase it, though, according to this theory just the way it is, you should get a decrease.*

P. No.

Q. *You shouldn't get as big an increase, that's what I mean.*

P. No. What happens is: if you have a certain brightness on the original occasion, and this is the dimension of brightness, you get a distribution like that. If you increase the brightness or decrease the brightness, you will still get the effect, but not as much, and the further away the brightness from the original in either direction, the less the effect.




FIGURE 4

Q. *And empirically, that works that way.*

P. Roughly. This is an effect that is observed to happen. Nobody knows how it happens, and it's easy enough when you're dealing with dimensions like brightness or distance or size, because those are readily classified along a dimension. It's much harder when you're extending this theory to talk about general life circumstances, to talk about similarity in that case. It's hard to know what's more similar to what, there.

You'll find that the notion of Generalization is crucial in the use of any learning theory, any conditioning theory. Why? Because people are constantly doing things they never learned to do. You can't point to any place in the person's history where he learned to do that. This gives us a wastebasket for explanation. We say, "Well, even if he didn't learn to do that, his doing it now represents a generalization from some other things he did learn." In that way, you bridge that important gap between what a person does that's new, and the fact that one way or another, you want it to depend on his learning history. Generalization is *the* key term for explaining that.

Q. *Could you say that the simplest generalization is somewhat similar to traits, in the sense that they render stimuli functionally equivalent, so you react in—*

P. Yeah, except not entirely equivalent.

Q. *No, but it's not entirely equivalent in the case of the trait, either. I mean, there are certain limits to—*

P. The trait, every view of that chair is just as good as any other view of that chair. They are entirely equivalent in that sense. I'll treat it as a chair no matter what angle I see it from.

Q. *Right, but I may have a trait of treating women under five feet tall in a certain manner, and at five feet three I may treat them like five feet, but as they get up to six feet, they may—*

P. That would be an attitude. [laughter]

Q. *I didn't mean anything personal.*

P. Well, while you're at it, just think of the Freudian displacement. You have an object in mind; if the object you have in mind is women under 5'3" and you get one at 5'4", you can almost treat somebody 5'4" the way you treat somebody 5'3"—not quite. But you can make some minimal adjustments, and here you would say, "Well, you generalized from your reaction tendencies to the 5'3" and under, you generalized to a stimulus that's close." So that notion of displacement carries with it some of the same kind of slack that you have here under the heading of Generalization.

And the kind of slack is what I described initially as the flexibility and creativity of people, that we don't just continue to do the same thing over and over, we don't continue just to repeat the particular things we've learned. As I say, we're constantly doing new things, recognizing new things; and somewhere, a theory has to account for that. In Freud's, it's in the process of displacement. In this theory, it's at least in large part on this notion of generalization at both ends, both in the stimulus and the response.

Now think of repeated cycles of reinforcement of an operant, under some contingency like here: repeated cycles of reinforcing the pecking of that red dot when the light is on. Each time you get an increase in the likelihood of that response under that condition. Eventually you reach a certain operating level where the light being on will regularly and reliably get the pigeon to peck the red dot.

At that point, you say, "Conditioning has occurred." The pigeon has been conditioned to peck the red dot, and what you previously called the contingency is now the Controlling Variable. The reason you speak of that in those terms is that in order to control the pigeon's behavior, all you've got to

do is manipulate the contingency. You turn the light on, the pigeon will peck the red dot. You control his behavior by controlling that stimulus. So you call it the Controlling Variable. It doesn't become the Controlling Variable until you have enough conditioning to give you reliable results.

Up to that time, it's merely a Contingency of Reinforcement.

Q. *Is the increase in pecking frequency or accuracy, is that considered reinforcement or generalization?*

P. Well, we probably need another one—Discrimination—and we need to talk about Extinction before we talk about Discrimination.

Q. *Could we produce an increase by a process of reinforcement?*

P. Right.

Q. *Is that Controlling Variable now the conditioned stimulus? So that red light now will be what makes him peck?*

P. No. 'Conditioned Stimulus' is part of the terminology for dealing with the other kind of conditioning. Skinner's terminology is different. He doesn't talk about a conditioned stimulus. He talks about Controlling Variables. He defines Controlling Variables that way, as the end-product. Once you get these things going in a certain pattern, the end-product is a Conditioned Operant, but in the process of conditioning is a contingency which, once the conditioning is finished, becomes a controlling variable.

Q. *But is it the same thing as a conditioned stimulus?*

P. Well, in some ways. Remember, the whole situation is different for this kind of conditioning from what it is over here [Respondent, Operant]. So it's hard to say that one thing is comparable to the other because the paradigms are different.

Q. *So in this one, you start with a behavior and then you do things.*

Q. *Couldn't you just say that controlling variable is just a stimulus that behavior comes under the control of?*

P. Yeah, through a process of conditioning. That's exactly right.

Q. *Is it the experimenter who decides what levels of abilities are required before one says that conditioning has occurred?*

P. Yeah. No. It's anybody, any observer. If you were watching somebody else running a conditioning experiment, you can decide yourself when

conditioning has occurred. If he disagrees with you, that's up to him, but as far as you're concerned, conditioning has occurred.

Q. *The criteria for conditioning are relatively arbitrary?*

P. Yeah. It mostly depends on your purpose, how much reliability you want. If you want tremendous reliability, you just let go a long time before you say that conditioning has occurred. Or you say *conditioning starts occurring as soon as you get a differential effect of reinforcement*, and *conditioning is going on all along, but it doesn't end until you reach some kind of stable rate*. Or, you say *it's never going to reach a stable rate, it's going to always keep fluctuating*. What you have at any given time is a degree of conditioning. The degree of conditioning is expressed primarily in the probability of the response. So if the probability of this pecking when you put on the light is .97, that's a lot of conditioning. If it's .6, that's not much. So if you just take it whatever it is at a given time, you speak of the degree of conditioning.

And, at least in his earlier writings, Skinner spoke of 'habit strength' to get at just that—the probability of the response. The greater the habit strength, the greater the probability of the response. I think that in his later writings, he doesn't talk about habit strength, he just talks about probability of response.

Let's see, we've got all the way down to here [Extinction. Fig. 2, p. 259].

Q. *What's a Conditioned Operant?*

P. A Conditioned Operant is an Operant that has been conditioned to some contingency, to some controlling variable.

Q. *I thought that was a conditioned controlling variable?*

P. The controlling variable is the stimulus; the operant is the response; and the combination—when an operant has been conditioned to a controlling variable—that's a conditioned operant.

When an operant has been conditioned to a controlling variable through differential reinforcement—consider repeated cycles of this kind of thing—if, at a given time, the reinforcement stops, so that you get the controlling variable presented but not reinforcement, the probability of that response under that contingency will start going down.

So this is the reverse of the conditioning process; it's the de-conditioning process. When the controlling variable is presented and the behavior occurs, but no reinforcement follows, then you get Extinction. Extinction is the lowering of the probability of the response back down to zero. So you get

a process of lowering, a process of extinguishing, and that is complete when the probability is back down to zero or whatever it was initially. So you can both condition and de-condition.

Q. *How does he account for spontaneous recovery ### extinction ###?*

P. I don't think he needs to.

Q. *It seems to violate that, because if, say, you had a probability of a given behavior .10, and your conditions, you had a probably of .95—*

P. Remember, he's not dealing with the kind of response set-ups that the notion of spontaneous recovery originally was developed on. It's true that if you have a conditioned operant and you get a certain level of occurrence, and it's .9; and then you just let it go for a while; and later on you give a new set of trials, and it's .93, you can say, "How come it went up?" The answer is very easy: it's a matter of generalizing from other stimuli.

Q. I'm talking about during the extinguishing process. If it goes back down from .9 to .1, and then all of a sudden it goes up to .3—

P. Yeah, there's been generalization from other stimuli, other controlling variables. Something has changed. The fact is that Skinner doesn't put that much emphasis on the specific probabilities, so he's not as embarrassed if the probability changes all of a sudden like that.

In contrast, the people who are working with operants put a great deal of emphasis on the numerical values of those trials and probabilities. For them, it was much more embarrassing if you got a shift like that.

So it's not that Skinner does a good job of accounting for it. It's that in his approach, it's not as serious a problem, so he can just kind of ignore it.

Q. *There isn't anything there in that definition, is there, that says that extinction has to occur in a straight line? It could definitely go down, up, down, up, but the assumption is that sometime it would occur, and there's no time frame given.*

P. Right. Or you can say *it must have been reinforced in the meantime*. And in effect, that's a variation on the explanation that the other sort of conditioners generally give. So if you say it's been reinforced in the meantime, you've got a standard explanation.

Q. *Yeah, but they can't do that in a controlled lab situation.*

P. They can.

Q. *How can they explain it that way when they have—*

P. Because there is no way to guarantee that a given behavior is not reinforced via generalization of some kind.

Q. *If maze-running behavior can only be reinforced by being fed at the end of the maze, how could that be generalized?*

P. No, it can be reinforced in any way that it can be reinforced, and there is no limit to how a behavior can be reinforced, because anything that changes the likelihood of response is a reinforcement. You're thinking of rewards.

Q. *Not necessarily, but that's kind of just a wastebasket.*

P. Of course, that's what I said. This is characteristic of learning theories, they have one or two wastebaskets. This is one of them. I don't know if that's disillusioning—[laughter] but yeah, in that sense, learning theories are sloppier than any other sort of theory I know, in that they have more of these sort of wastebasket things that you can do anything with. At least, they're sloppier when you just apply them to real-life situations. If you're back in the pigeon-pecking situation, you're in good shape.

But if you're talking about people and their behavior in these terms, they you find you're putting a tremendous amount of weight on these kinds of things [generalization, controlling variables]; and on controlling variables that you have no knowledge of what they are, but you say, "Yeah, there must have been some."

Or here's an example, and it appears in a review of Skinner by Chomsky. Over here, it's very easy to say, "The red light is the contingency, it's the controlling variable." It's very easy to repeat and show that when the red light is on, the pigeon pecks, and when it isn't, he doesn't.

Now suppose that we're talking about verbal behavior, and you say, "That boy's brother runs the grocery store." And then as a Skinnerian. I say, "Well, that's a verbal operant, and there is some controlling variable that accounts for that verbal behavior." Somebody says, "What is the controlling variable?" And I say, "Well, it's a complex set of circumstances that's involved in the boy's brother running the store."

Well, if you're going to call *the boy's brother running the store* a controlling variable, you've really stretched that term from this [pigeon], where it's a simple, visible, observable thing. Because *the boy's brother running the store*, if it can affect me now—when I'm not in the presence of the store, the boy, or anything—that no longer sounds like a stimulus, even. But you can certainly

call it a controlling variable, and Skinner does.

So you can stretch that notion of the controlling variable as far as you want, and you need to when you're talking about people, because you don't know. You don't have simple things like red lights, and whenever the red light is on, I say this or I say that.

Q. *What mechanism would account for that, according to Skinner?*

P. Operant conditioning.

Q. *But I mean, the fact that you weren't in the presence of the—*

P. There is something in my presence that has elicited, in conjunction with that, and guess what something is? An internal response.

Q. *He would say that?*

P. He did say that.

Okay, let's start tomorrow and just continue. Study the Existentialists, because we'll spend most of tomorrow and Thursday on them. The other thing is: do the Fritz and Gloria six responses the way Skinner would do them. If you can't do it now in terms of what we've done, wait till tomorrow.

SESSION 21

August 10, 1976

Peter: Are there any questions about the material that we covered yesterday?

Q. *I have a question clear back at Allport. May I ask it? What's the difference between expressive behavior and stylistic behavior?*

P. None.

Q. *Okay. Thank you.*

P. Allport studied both styles and emotional expression, and they cover the same range of things.

Q. *Do punishment and extinction arrive at the same conclusion by a decrease in behavior probability?*

P. No. According to some of the more refined notions, punishment never succeeds in reducing the likelihood down to baseline. It reduces it; whereas extinction, you can get it down to baseline. So punishment is looked upon as a suppressor rather than a remover of behaviors. It's like an anticathexis. And indeed, any time that a behavior modifier would say 'punishment', a Freudian would say 'a little bit of anticathexis getting developed there'.

Any other questions on these concepts up to here?

Now this notion here, the conditioned operant, is the closest that Skinner comes to having a universal formula for all behavior. It's not universal, because he recognizes behavior of that sort [respondent]. It's not universal because he recognizes operants that are not yet conditioned—at least in principle. There's some question about that. He has been known to say, "Well, an operant is simply an operant that you don't know what the controlling variables are, but it's really a conditioned operant. "

Q. *Would you say that again?*

P. Remember, we defined an operant as simply *a behavior that has an effect on the environment* and didn't say that it was keyed to any stimulus. You call behavior an operant when you can't see that there's anything in the environment that regularly brings it on. What Skinner has been known to say is, "Yeah, but it's just that you don't know what it is, but there is something, and it really is a conditioned operant."

At the same time, you can see that the logic of the process of conditioning says that it begins unconditioned, and only through a process of learning becomes conditioned. So in principle, conditioned operants don't cover all behavior.

But Skinner would say, "Look, any human being, any behavior of any human being that is of any real interest to us, is going to be one of these. It is not going to be one of these [respondent], and it is not going to be merely an operant." So for practical purposes, this is a universal thing.




FIGURE 1

In certain respects, it's easier to compare; and in others, it's harder. To begin with, the operant clearly takes care of that part [P-A]: a behavior that has a result, an effect, on the environment. Notice, as usual, it doesn't quite fit, that is, Achievement includes more than effects on the environment, but it does include conditioning effects on the environment. So you've got these two kinds of notion already in the picture as soon as you talk about an operant.

This notion [K] you have in the controlling variable or the stimulus. The KH is the history of conditioning. So the only one that's questionable is this: W. One reason it's questionable is that Skinner says we have no motivational concepts in the system—that is, in his system; then secondly, he says you can use motivational terms, you can use emotional terms for motivation, but

they are dispensable. So that for example when you say, “The rat is hungry, and that’s why he eats the food.” Skinner would say, “This talk about hunger is just a way of talking about any one of a set of different circumstances like not having eaten for eight hours. Any one of a number of those things which lead to any one of a number of certain behaviors that we call hunger behaviors.” So what he says is, the mid-point is dispensable, that under any one of a number of these conditions, you’ll get any one of a number of these behaviors, and you don’t need a middle term.

Q. *So you’re saying you can just dispense with that like calling it a controlling variable?*

P. Yeah. You can have some set of possible controlling variables. On a given occasion when you would say he’s hungry, it’s simply that one or more of those controlling variables is present. And talking about ‘hunger’ is just a way of being non-committal as to which one of those it is. Likewise, talking about hunger behaviors is just a way of being non-committal about which of this set of behaviors occurs. And so for him, he would say there is no such thing as hunger, it’s just a fiction, it’s just a way of talking. And so there’s no motivation there in the picture.




FIGURE 2

Q. *Is he being non-committal about the variables and behaviors?*

P. Again, you can see that the word ‘hunger’ is doing quite a bit of work if it substitutes for a whole lot of things out here [controlling variables] and a whole lot of things out here [hunger behaviors], and connects them together.

Secondly, let me introduce you, or remind you, of the problem of the open-ended list. It sounds reasonable to say that *we have a set of conditions, any one of which would lead to any one of this set of behaviors*. However, nobody can give you that list. Referring to that list is like getting an IOU that

says *someday, somehow, somebody knows, even though I don't*. Nobody can give you a list of all of the conditions that would lead to all of or any of the hunger behaviors. Nobody can give you a list of the hunger behaviors, neither Skinner nor anyone else. So it isn't as though you really had a list here [Fig. 2] which, if you really wanted to dispense with 'hunger', you could just substitute the list. There is no such list—at least there's no complete list.

So the open-ended list is one of the ways of getting more slack in the system, to allow you to use the language of 'controlling variable' and 'response', even though you don't know what the controlling variable is, and you don't necessarily know what the response is.

Now let's consider W. Consider the example in the book of the child asking the adult for candy, and that's the behavior, that's the Operant. And the adult gives the child the candy, and the child eats the candy; and that's positively reinforcing, so the next time that child sees that adult, or even some other adult, he's more likely to ask for candy. The adult has become like that red light: in the presence of that, the child will engage in that behavior since he's been reinforced for engaging in that behavior under those circumstances.

And if the second time around, the adult gives him candy again, he's even more likely the next time around to ask for candy. Under those conditions, it's common to speak of the candy as a reinforcer. That's commonly done, and it's the ordinary way of talking.

However, if you recall the definition—a reinforcer is a state of affairs that changes the likelihood of the response—that means the candy can't be a reinforcer. Nothing can be [a] reinforcer unless it is. Candy on one occasion can be a reinforcer and on another occasion not. Candy can be reinforcing to one individual and to another individual not.

That means that it's not candy, as such, that is reinforcing—candy is not a reinforcer. What you have are reinforcements that are tied to occasions. Only on a given occasion can you say that reinforcement occurred. Only on an occasion can you say that a given thing was reinforcing. On the next occasion, it may not be. The candy is a good example.

Suppose you just kept giving the kid candy and, he just kept eating it. Guess what? At some point, that candy is going to shift from a positive reinforcer, to a neutral one, to a punishment type. The same thing will change its reinforcing value over time.

What distinguishes the conditions under which that candy will be reinforcing, and when it won't be, that's what we normally call 'being hungry'. Eating is reinforcing, food is reinforcing, if you're hungry. Generally speaking, it's not reinforcing if you're not. Or at least, there are plenty of occasions when it's not reinforcing, and those occasions will be when you're not hungry. So this condition that we call 'hunger' is one of the contingencies of reinforcement, because a given thing like candy will not be reinforcing unless this kind of condition [hunger] is also present. This kind of condition is exactly the kind that we normally refer to as motivation.

Q. *Don't you run into that problem more with primary reinforcing than you would with secondary reinforcements?*

P. No, it's more of a secondary reinforcement.

Q. *You can come up to somebody and give him a dollar bill, any time—*

P. It's not always positively reinforcing.

Q. *Not always. I'll agree. Nothing is absolute. But—*

P. That's the point, that it's not the dollar bill that's a reinforcement. Reinforcement has occurred using the dollar bill, but dollar bills are not something called reinforcers, any more than they are something called stimuli. A dollar bill is a stimulus only when in fact it serves as a stimulus. You can have a dollar bill lying around in the next room and isn't a stimulus—until it is.

So when it comes to plugging in visible particulars like dollar bills and candy as either stimuli, reinforcers, or psychic Objects, or expressions of traits, you've got to watch out, because they may be on some occasions and on other occasions not.

So, as I said, a condition of this sort [hunger] is normally one of the contingencies of reinforcement, not one that has been manipulated by the experimenter except insofar as he starves you or does other things like that. But unless that condition is present, that candy is not going to be reinforcing. So that is something that is in the picture, and the fact that it's in the picture is derivable from the general principles here, and so we do, after all, have something of this sort [W] in the picture.

Even though, as Skinner says, you can get by without talking about motivation, you can't get by without dealing with facts of that relevant sort. So if you accept that as acceptable fudging, or non-fudging, again, we have a concept here [conditioned operant], a general concept of behavior that carries with it the kind of distinctions that we're carrying over here [Fig. 1, p. 266].

There is one exception, or one difference, namely [adding to Fig. 1, “cause-effect”], it’s that kind of description. To describe a behavior as a conditioned operant is to give a cause-effect description. You recall, our last two forms of description were cause-effect descriptions. So this has the relevant distinctions, but they are put in a cause and effect form.

Recall what I said about cause-effect descriptions: *their value is in the way that they connect to somebody’s deliberate action*. You have cause-effect connections, and you can observe here [W] and expect something over here [P-A] if you don’t intervene. If you have cause-effect connections, you can achieve something here [W] and achieve something else over here [P-A]. The language of operant conditioning is geared to that, and has that value—that is it geared to a person who is producing effects on another person. It says, in effect, that *if you can achieve these certain conditions [K, W, KH], you can get this visible behavior [P-A]*. So you wouldn’t be all that surprised to find that in a lot of applied contexts, like special education, like working with mentally retarded people, like working with autistic children. Operant conditioning language has become one of the favorites and one of the staples, because it is geared to somebody doing something to accomplish some result.

At the same time, the comparison brings home the fact that you’re not getting any new kinds of facts. We are still dealing with the same kinds of facts as we dealt with in the trait and in the Freudian instinct, as well as in Intentional Action. So it’s not that there’s new information, or that it opens up new insights. We’re still bookkeeping with the same set of facts, but in this form, it has the particular utility that I mentioned in connection with cause-effect descriptions.




FIGURE 3

We have one more—we have two more things. One is Discrimination and the other is Shaping. You recall in the example of generalization, I said

that if you shine the light of this brightness or this wavelength and reinforce it, you also get increased probabilities of responding in the presence of lights that are similar, and the more similar, the more they're reinforced. Now you can do what is called 'discrimination training' by combining extinction and reinforcement. Namely, you reinforce only the exact wavelength, and you extinguish the responses in the presence of slightly different wavelengths.


The more you do that, the more you will get a curve that looks like this [Fig. 3, dotted line]. Where normally you would get something like this [solid line], these responses [arrows] have been extinguished, you have a very fine discrimination on the part of the individual—fine discrimination of a given wavelength, a given sound, a given brightness, or whatever it is that this dimension is. By pushing this to the extreme, you can, for practical purposes, find out how fine a discrimination that individual can make. Just by continuing this, when you reach a point where there's no further improvement, you say, "Well, I guess that's as fine a discrimination as that individual can make."

Ordinary learning is thought of in terms of this kind of process, that when you learn something, you do generalize a lot, but unless the generalization falls within the range of acceptability, it's going to get extinguished because it's not going to be reinforced. So it's the process of discrimination-learning, of selective reinforcements, that accounts for how people can learn very refined distinctions and complicated series. It's not the kind of thing you could learn all at once, it's not the kind of thing you could get by simple generalization, but by combining extinction and reinforcement, you can get much more refined ###.

If you think of starting from scratch in something like learning arithmetic, as soon as that kid writes down a number, you give some sign of approval—"that's the kind of thing we want you to do" when he puts down a 4 and a 3, and even if he puts down an 8, you get across that he's still in the right ballpark. After a while, you stop doing that and start saying, "No, that's the wrong answer, it should be a 7," but only at the point where he's already putting down numbers and has the general idea. In effect, once he has some kind of generalization, then you can start extinguishing to get the more refined learning.

So in general, in beginning learning, you do whatever you can to get the person to do it at all. At a later stage, you concentrate on telling him what not to do. So in general, in beginning learning, you do whatever you can to get the person to do, i.e., how not to do it wrong.

The last thing is Shaping. Before that, we come back to our prime example here of the pigeon in the box with a red circle. If you just put a pigeon in a box like that with a red circle up here, the pigeon will not peck the red circle. What he'll do is peck the floor, because that's what pigeons do—pigeons peck the ground, so if you put them in a box, they'll peck the floor of the box. If you want him to peck the circle, you go through a process called Shaping.



Basically, it amounts to this: you take those of his responses that are closest to the one you want, and you reinforce those. You take the ones that are the furthest from what you want, and you extinguish those by not reinforcing them. So you reinforce the pigeon for whenever he pecks out here [to the left], and don't reinforce whenever he pecks out here [to the right].

An interesting thing happens. If you were tuned in to the principles of extinction and reinforcement, you would probably expect that what happens is simply that he stops pecking here [on the right], and continues pecking here [left] with an increased frequency. In fact, that's not what happens. What happens is: you get a whole new distribution, and the center of the distribution is further out that way [to the left]. But you don't just get the remainder of the old responses that got reinforced.

How would you explain that? You have generalization out here [farther to the left]. Where you didn't have it before, now you have it. Now you do the same thing all over again. You take that new pattern and you reinforce the ones that are closest to what you want and extinguish the ones that are farther away, and you get a new pattern. And once more, you reinforce the ones that are closest to what you want and extinguish the ones that are further away, and you get a new pattern.

Eventually, you get the pigeon to peck the red dot. Once he pecks it, then you're back to this: you reinforce the pecking of the dot. So that eventually you've got the pigeon pecking that dot the way you want it, even though the way it started out, he wasn't about to do that at any time. This whole set of maneuvers was for the sake of getting him to peck the dot at all so that you could then reinforce it.

That procedure of gradually moving the reinforcement and the extinction in the direction of the desired response is called Shaping.

This is one of the central notions for operant conditioners when it comes to socialization. An infant is not engaging any of the behaviors that you would want as an adult, but as socializers, we begin to reinforce those behaviors that are more like what we want. We accept a lower level of performance from a one-year-old, from a two-year-old, from a three-year-old, but all the time, we're requiring something more and more like what we require of a normal adult. And what we reinforce for a child of one, we don't reinforce for a child of five. So the whole process of socialization is thought of along the lines of shaping. And most of the particular things that are learned, since as a child you don't start out already doing those, again are thought of in terms of shaping, that you get differentially reinforced by people in your environment until you start doing some of those things, and then you get directly reinforced for that.

So the notion of shaping, then, is the closest you have to a developmental theory in operant conditioning. Shaping—and then the general principle of conditioning.

Remember, conditioning or learning is a process of acquiring something over time. The something that you acquire over time, we normally speak of as personal characteristics. Skinner makes a big point of the fact that he's not going to talk about personal characteristics. He says he just wants to talk about behavior. The closest he comes to personal characteristics are the habit strength or the likelihood of response, of a given sort of behavior. You can see that that would be—depending on how you describe the behavior—that's going to be one of the Dispositions. It will be a trait, an attitude, or an interest, or a style.

One of the things to note, though, is that there is a personal characteristic, and that's represented by the mid-point of that distribution. That mid-point shifts. That mid-point is something that characterizes this individual [pigeon] here.

Q. *Would you explain more about that?*

P. You remember we started out with a pattern here [Fig. 4, p. 269], and we said it has a mid-point [arrow A], and if you reinforce only these [left] and not those [right], these [right] will drop out, except that what you get is now a new distribution with a new mid-point [arrow B], and the mid-point represents the overall tendency of where he's going to peck, and that's what shifts over time [to arrow C, arrow N, finally red dot]. That central tendency is a characteristic of that individual, and it's the kind of thing that we would call a 'trait'.

Q. *So it's that narrowness with which somebody can ### something is also—*

P. The 'discrimination' we would call 'an ability', because the individual has the ability to discriminate, that in fact he makes mistakes only within this range [Fig. 5, next page, R] and not within this range [S].




FIGURE 5

Now the reason that Skinner objects to personal characteristics is, again, tied back to the history of psychology and philosophy. Namely, that in that history, one of the common interpretations of personal characteristics (like traits of hostility or generosity) is that they are inner causes of behavior. So one of the interpretations is that when we say that a person did something because he's a hostile person, saying he's a hostile person is mentioning something inside of him that causes him to behave in that hostile way.

That's a kind of 19th century notion, but it's one that Skinner is concerned to reject, and so he rejects it by saying, "We don't need to talk about any inner causes. It's enough to talk about outer causes." So he talks about the outer causes, the controlling variables, and says we can dispense with any inner causes. There are other arguments for not regarding personal characteristics as inner causes or any kind of cause, so in that respect, you might

say that Skinner's concern is legitimate. But if that kind of interpretation of personal characteristics is a mistake, then so also is the rejection of them on that ground.

So, you can see that there are things in the system that correspond to individual differences. We'll say more about that later, when we deal with the existentialists, because the existentialists provide, in certain respects, a mirror image to the Skinnerians. The Skinnerians want a completely causal account of behavior with no individual difference notions. The existentialists want a completely individual-difference account of behavior with no causal notion.

And it's interesting to see that they can both carry that off. Operant conditioners can describe behavior in completely causal terms, existentialists can describe behavior in completely non-causal terms. And as soon as you see that, you wonder how they could both do it, since those seem to be contradictory positions. Well, we'll see how they can both do it.

I think that that covers what Skinner's answer is to those three questions of *why do people do what they do?*—their behavior is a conditioned operant; *what are the differences among people?*—the differences among people are simply given by the repertoire of behaviors that have been conditioned, namely, the repertoire of conditioned operants and their likelihood of response or their likelihood of occurrence under various conditions. Thirdly, *how do people get the way they are?*—their behavior has been shaped, their behaviors have been learned. Okay, any questions on the whole of operant conditioning theory?

Q. *Back to cause and effect: other than existentialism, is there any other theory that we're studying that is not cause and effect?*

P. Only the original one. The Descriptive approach is not causal. It's not a noncausal one, but neither is it a causal one. It has a place for both.

Being-in-the-World
 Umwelt
 Mitwelt
 Eigenwelt
 Being-beyond-the-World
 Motivated Behavior
 Thrownness, Ground of Existence
 Authenticity
 Existential Guilt

FIGURE 6

Let's start with this set of notions from the existential approach. By all odds, the most distinctive and central notion is the notion of Being-in-the-World—with hyphens.

Q. *We don't need to learn the German terms?*

P. If you haven't by now, you're hopeless. It's a lot easier to remember those than to remember the definitions. Now what is this notion of Being-in-the-World with hyphens? What it contrasts with is something that probably all of us take for granted, that's taken for granted by scientists generally, by most people generally, and (for want of a better term) I call it the Spectator view of people.

The Spectator view includes this kind of notion: that the world is out there, it was there before people came on the scene; it will be there after people disappear from the scene; and during the time that we are on the scene, we are spectators, in that even during the time we are on the scene, it operates according to its own principles that have nothing to do with us, nothing fundamental to do with us. In fact, we're simply part of that operation, and our contribution to it is completely non-essential. And so our position in the scheme of things is temporary Spectators. We have nothing to do with the real action, we're not here for long, we're just in that kind of position.

Now, it's that whole way of thinking about people that is being denied here [in Being-in-the-World]. And the line on which it's denied is something along this line, namely, that there is no disembodied knowledge. Somebody who talks about the world being here before we were and being here after we're gone is expressing his knowledge of the world. But knowledge does not exist in disembodied form. There has to be, for every piece of knowledge—true or false, mistaken or correct, presumptive or proved—every piece of knowledge is somebody's knowledge. There can't be any such knowledge unless there is a person whose knowledge it is.

And nothing whatever lies outside of the range of what somebody knows. Any attempt to describe how the world is in the absence of people is going to fail, because that description will merely represent somebody's knowledge, so it does not lie beyond people, and will probably be mistaken knowledge since it's not provable.

So the notion of Being-in-the-World is the notion that every world, every view of the world, every experience of the world, is somebody's, and that you can't have knowledge, belief, experience of the world except if you have somebody like a person. On those grounds, then, people are not Spectators,

people are completely essential to there being a world at all.

Q. *Is that similar to something like saying that table wouldn't exist unless it was perceived by somebody?*

P. No, it's similar to similar to saying, "If there were no people, there wouldn't be pieces of chalk," because we distinguish pieces of chalk from other things. And we distinguish tables, and we distinguish atoms, and we distinguish organisms, and we distinguish everything that we think of as 'the world'.

Q. *So it is a matter of perception, then.*

P. No. Pawns are not a matter of perception. If there's a pawn in the next room, it will be there even if nobody is perceiving it. But if there were no people who played chess, nothing anywhere would qualify as a pawn. There's be no such thing. That's the kind of connection. If there is no game of chess, there are no pawns, and what we now count as a pawn isn't a pawn because it's a piece of ivory and has been there for two thousand years. It's only a pawn—

Q. *Would it be something, then?*

P. Well, you can peel that off one by one. You can say, "Look, this pawn here is, say, 10,000 years old. Five thousand years ago, there was no such game as chess, so at that time, this object might have been a piece of ivory, but it wasn't a pawn because there were no pawns."

Q. *But it wouldn't be considered a piece of ivory unless it was perceived as such.*

P. No, it wouldn't be a piece of ivory unless there were a form of social practice of people that involved distinguishing ivory from other things.

And there was a time before people distinguished ivory from other things, so before that time, there might have been an object, but it couldn't have been either a pawn or a piece of ivory.

Then you peel off another one and say, "Well, there was a time before people distinguished objects from other things, so before that time there couldn't have been an object there, even."

And at that point, you run out of things to say what it could have been before people distinguishing objects. At that point, we're into unknowable, unsayable things. So any time somebody wants to describe what the world would be like without people, he's susceptible to this kind of argument, that

it's only a pretense of saying what it would be like without people, that really everything he says depends upon people, logically, in the way that pawns depend on chess and chess depends on people who play chess.

So using that line of thinking, you can say, "Nothing that we might be tempted to describe as having been here before we got here"—you just can't do it. It's like saying that pawns were here before we got here.

Q. *Were you just saying that some people have a Spectator view of the world, but Being-in-the-World means that you—that every piece of knowledge is somebody's?*

P. Yeah.

Q. *You didn't really say ### the Spectator view?*

P. Most people do. Sometimes. A lot of people believe it straight out. A lot of people believe it, but they're ambivalent about it. And one reason they're ambivalent about it is: there doesn't seem to be any alternative. And one of the accomplishments of the existentialists is to bring out and develop an alternative. And because it is an alternative that fundamental, it sounds strange, and when you hear existentialists talk, they talk strangely. This is only a sample.

You see, the way operant conditioners talk, it's ordinary English with a few technical terms thrown in. But the way existentialists talk is not. They have a whole new set of ideas that are dealt with in a distinctive way, and you pick that out just listening.

Q. *How does existentialism account for getting a piece of knowledge, for increases in knowledge?*

P. There's no problem of increases in knowledge. Why would there be?

Q. *On one level it doesn't seem there should, yet on another, it seems as though you're getting into a thing where ### if every piece of knowledge is somebody's knowledge—or if there's nothing that lies outside of what people know, they're denying the existence of anything you don't know.*

P. At any given time, there's nothing that lies outside of what people know, but clearly, at a later time you might include something that you didn't have at an earlier time. It will still be the case that nothing lies outside. Again, think of the chess example. At any given time, there are only certain games that people play, and that's all there is, and there isn't some hypothetical other one. But as soon as somebody invents another game, then the set of games that people play has changed. It's not as though that new one already

existed in some ghostly realm before it got invented.

Q. *What about atoms and electrons?*

P. The same with them.

Q. *Electrons didn't exist—?*

P. Sure, just like pawns didn't exist. Keep in mind that physics is a game people play [laughter]—physics consists of there being people who have distinctive social practices, distinctive ways of talking, and distinctive ways of acting. Were there not those people and those ways of talking and those ways of acting, what would be the basis for saying there's such a thing as an atom? So it's quite parallel to saying, "What would be the basis of saying there's such a thing as a pawn, if there were nobody who did that sort of thing and talked that way and acted on it?" [change tape] So when it comes to atoms, you can argue that there really are atoms on that basis.

Q. *What do the existentialists say about nobody being in the world or a time when nobody was in the world? How would they describe things like mountains and so forth? There just wasn't anything? There wasn't a world? If there were no atoms when nobody was around, how could there be a world when nobody was around?*

P. They would deny that. They would say, that's right, there wasn't a world.

Q. *Is the archaeological evidence mistaken?*

P. No.

Q. *That's just a way of talking.*

P. No, remember Move 2. Remember that principle that says *once you make the second move, it's awfully hard for the first move not to have already taken place*. Think of certain kinds of ideas having that effect, that once you introduce that idea, it becomes the case that something was already so.

And that's how you deal with archaeological knowledge. Once you introduce that sort of idea, and use it, then you have a basis for assigning things to a position on a time-sequence, and some of those positions are indeed in the past relative to us. But it wasn't already the case. Before there were people, it wasn't already the case that those things were in the past. Before people, there was no such thing as 'past'.

Q. *Are you saying that all these things existed before, so our job is just naming—*

P. No, that's exactly what the existentialists are denying. That's the Spectator view, that all of these things were already there, we just came on the scene and make up names for whatever we find. That's the Spectator.

Recall, I think in the initial session of this class, I asked a question, and somebody said, "Everybody lives in his own world." I said, "You can't start with that, because if you start with that as a premise, you'll never be able to connect to another person." And then we saw later on how you can provide a basis for saying that everybody is his own frame of reference, and we dealt with that kind of relativity. We said *individual difference notions are exactly how we handle that kind of difference systematically*.

Now you're getting something similar here, in the notion of Being-in-the-World, but it doesn't just come in as an initial postulate with no backing. I've picked it to discuss first, but existential theory is not arranged in a logical sequence beginning with this. This is simply its most general and distinctive feature.

And you see, it doesn't say, "Everybody lives in his own world, separate from other people." It just says, "Without people, there wouldn't be worlds."

Now drop that notion for a minute. Recall the relationship formula that we went through—that a person's potential for behavior depends on his relation to the things around him. And the heuristic example is the geometric relations between my being here and things in other locations in the room.

Then we extended it to not merely geometric relations but human relations, that things are possible if you have a friend than if you don't have a friend. Things that are possible with a friend may not be possible with a stranger, or vice versa. Things that are possible if you mistrust somebody will not be possible if you don't. So all of the kinds of relationships you have with the people in your life will provide you the opportunities and give you the reasons for anything that you might do.

Except, of course, we have to include not merely people, but non-human objects. I commented that *dealing with things in terms of relations can get very, very tedious, in fact unmanageably tedious*. I gave the example of all of the things in this room, and all of my relations to every single one of them, and then all of the relations of any one of them to any one of the others. I said *we have ways of handling that kind of thing, namely, we have what amounts to a map*. In this room, we place different objects in different places, and once we do that, their relations to each other are determined, and we don't have to go through this long, long, long list of my relations to everything in the

room; and then its relation to everything in the room; and then its and its and its and its and its. Instead, we have a very parsimonious way of getting at that whole set of things simultaneously, simply by talking about the location, the place of a given thing in a given domain. I said *that notion of place, if you extend from geometry to human relations, is the Descriptive notion of status. A person's status is simply his location, his place, within some domain, and if there's no specification, that domain is simply the whole world.*

That notion of status is what corresponds to Being-in-the-World. It's simply your place in the world, where place is considered not as geometry but as the network of relations, of opportunities, of possibilities, of pushes, pulls, etc., that come from being related to the world and the things in it in just the way that you are.

That's where your behavioral potential comes from. So that brings us to the mirror image. The polemic in Being-in-the-World is: you don't have worlds without people.

But there's a converse: that you don't have people without worlds. Why? Because behavior does not take place in the absence of anything else. Behaviors don't occur in the abstract, either; and for a person to behave, there has to be some circumstance, some environment, some arena within which he behaves, something toward which he behaves.

So you can't have people independently of worlds, either. Worlds are the stage on which people behave. "All the world's a stage." He had the right idea.

So that connection of person and world, then, works both ways. You can't have one without the other, each requires the other. In particular, for a person to have any behavior potential, there's got to be a world and a set of relationships that give him that potential.

Q. *I'm confused—you said the world will be here after people?*

P. That's the Spectator view, and that's denied in this whole existential approach.

Q. *I see. Okay.*

Q. *Can you extend this to the universe, the whole universe?*

P. Yeah. When I say 'the world', I don't mean 'the earth'. That's something invented by the physicists and the Spectator people. When an existentialist says 'the world', he does not mean the planet Earth. He means the whole world. It's just a parochialism to equate "world" with the planet Earth.

They come from two very divergent traditions, and we just fall into the habit; but if you look back, they're quite distinct notions.

Q. *Will you please repeat—behavior potential is related to—?*

P. It comes from the relations we have with the whole world and with the various things in it, and from their relation to one another.

Try imagining the world as a very different place than it is. Try to imagine that, right now, you find yourself bobbing up and down on a raft in the North Sea. Think of what that does to your behavior potential.

Then imagine that for the next ten years, you move here and there and never encounter anybody, nobody to have a conversation with, nobody to enjoy, nobody to mistrust, nobody to ask questions from—again, your behavior potential would be very different.

Or think of moving to a totally foreign land in which they have a totally different set of customs from ours, and you acquire those customs—now there's all kinds of things that you can do that none of us can do, because you have a different set of relations, and they have different relations among themselves. And being plugged into that whole network gives you very different behavioral possibilities.

You can divide up the world into various different domains. We can talk about not merely my place in the world, but my place in the room, my place in the university, my place in the city of Boulder—we can divide it up any way we want, as long as I'm in it. This set of distinctions [Umwelt, Mitwelt, Eigenwelt] is a way of dividing up the whole world into three domains, and you have a place in each.

Umwelt is the physical world 'out there,' your surroundings. Mitwelt is the social world, the world of people and human relations. And Eigenwelt is the world of yourself, namely, your relation to yourself.

Clearly, the reason for dividing Being-in-the World into these three domains is that things might operate differently in the one from the others, otherwise there'd be no point in dividing it up. Particularly, one of the traditional distinctions that we know of as clinicians, independently of existentialism, is the contrast between one's relation to the social world and one's relation to oneself.

Part of the folklore in clinical work is the person who is completely well-adjusted socially and extraordinarily unhappy on the inside. That's the cliché example of the difference between your place in the world and your standing relative to yourself. You may be completely dissatisfied with

yourself, and everybody else thinks you're great because you're doing things, you're into things, you're doing okay socially.

Or conversely, you may be completely at one with yourself, quite satisfied and happy with your own relation with yourself, and everybody else thinks you're a psychopath. And you may be.

So there are clearly contrasts possible in how you stand, where you stand, in this domain [Mitwelt] as against this domain [Eigenwelt]. This one [Umwelt] has not been of much interest to psychologists, as you might guess.

Being-beyond-the-World depends on certain potentialities of behavior, so we need to look at the notion of Motivated Behavior. In your book, the notion of motivated behavior is presented by means of an example. The example is opening the window—or closing the window because it's raining outside and you don't want the rain to come in. And the contrast—this is a quoted example—the contrast is between motivated behavior and mere cause and effect.

So, right from the very beginning, in this notion, you pick up the existentialists' rejection of cause-effect descriptions as being fundamental when it comes to human behavior. The contrast is between the case where you close the window because it's raining and you don't want to get wet; and the case where the wind blows the window shut. The case of the wind blowing the window shut is a straight cause and effect sequence. In contrast, the case of closing the window so as not to get wet requires that you have knowledge about that window. It requires that you want not to be wet, that you'd rather be dry than wet. And even though, when you press the window and that does cause it to close, that's a cause and effect sequence, just that simple act of pressing reflects the fact that you know about pressing on things, and you know where and how to press on that thing so as to close it. So the causal part—namely, that the pressure on the window causes it to close—is an inadequate description of the behavior because it doesn't do justice to all of these other things, of which the visible pressing is merely the end-point or the expression. That's the example of motivated behavior, and the contrast between motivated behavior and cause-effect happenings.

Q. *So are they saying these distinctions are necessary to be able to distinguish—to not want to be wet, to pressing, all those are necessary for motivational behavior?*

P. No, for motivated behavior.

Q. *To spot motivated behavior.*

P. I'm not sure they'd say that's how you would spot motivated behavior. They'd say that's what's essential, that's what it has to have to *be* a motivated behavior, and that is characteristic of human behavior. When a human being does something, it is not like the wind blowing the thing shut. And it's not just like just happening to put your hand on the window and its going down.

Q. *Okay, how about reflexive, in terms of pain points? You stick your hand on the stove, you have to distinguish that you'd rather not be burned than being burned.*

P. Well, if it's a motivated behavior, yeah. If it's a reflex, no.

Q. *They seem to be saying that a person is an individual with a history of intentional action.*




FIGURE 7

P. Well, that example really is almost straightforwardly an example, in these terms—if you look at the actual dialogue, it is almost an explication of these three notions. You have to distinguish the window [K]. You have to know the difference between getting wet and not getting wet. And you have want to not get wet. And you have to know about pressing, and you have to know where and how to exert the pressure. And then the pressure, the actual occasion of putting the pressure on, is simply the expression of all of these [circle], and it has a causal effect. So what we have here is the second kind of cause-effect form that we developed, namely, the person as agent who causes effects on the environment. That's what's described in that existential notion of motivated behavior.

Q. *Are you saying that motivated behavior is a special kind of cause and effect?*

P. No. One aspect of motivated behavior—namely, this aspect—is cause and effect, but that's all. And it isn't motivated behavior unless you have these other things in the picture, of which this [Performance] is merely the final expression.

Q. *Yeah, but the example of the wind blowing the window closed, that's a different kind of cause and effect?*

P. In here [Fig. 7], you can make the connection between this [P] and this [A], or since this [P] is merely the final outcome of all of this [K, W, KH], you can lump the whole thing together as the cause of this effect [A].

Q. *Called motivated behavior?*

P. Yeah, the whole thing is motivated behavior. What I'm saying is *if you make use of the fact that this is a causal link, then you have the notion of the human as the cause, the human as agent.*

Q. *What would be the KH in that example?*

P. You have to know about pressing, and you have to know where and how to press.

Q. *That would be just the learning history?*

P. Yeah. That makes this an exercise of competence.

One example: the notion of motivated behavior shows very little difference from the notion of Intentional Action. There's nothing left over in the notion of motivated behavior that isn't one of these. There isn't something funny like the 'stimuli functionally equivalent' that we found in the trait. There isn't anything physiological left over, the way there was in both the trait and the instinct; and it's causal but not fundamentally causal, because, for the existentialist, the whole thing is motivated.

So, the existential notion of motivated behavior as the universal form of human behavior, at least, is the closest, even though we've had essential similarity all the way through with trait, with instinct, with conditioned operant, this one is even closer. It shows the closest correspondence. Partly because it's not physiological, partly because it's not really causal. And it doesn't have extraneous things in the picture. So the correspondence is about as good as you can get.




FIGURE 8

Consider that W now [Fig. 8]. The W is a distinguishable state of affairs that isn't there yet. Whatever it is you want, it's something you don't yet have. So in this form of behavior, there is something up here [W] and something down here [W] that is not actual, at least not yet. And yet it operates now in your behavior, and if that behavior is successful, it will be actual. You will have brought about what you wanted.

That's the kind of feature of a motivated behavior that gets you in touch with this notion of Being-beyond-the-World. Because one of the major themes in existential literature that is most likely to sound crazy is this notion of Being-beyond-the-World, because it just happens stylistically. Existentialists like to write in paradox form, and you get statements like, "A person is what he isn't, and isn't what he is." You listen to that and you do a double-take and pretty soon you go away, because you have no way of handling that kind of talk.

Well, think of how it works here. Since these $[W_1, W_2]$ are not yet actual, that behavior is pointing to something that isn't. At the same time, it has to have an effect now, because the behavior wouldn't be the behavior it is without that discrimination and that state of affairs being wanted.

So you have this peculiar juxtaposition: that you have something actually—namely, the behavior—that depends on something that is not yet actual—namely, what is wanted. In that sense, the behavior is what it isn't, because that $[W_2]$ isn't actual.

Q. *Isn't it actual because you want it, though?*

P. No.

Q. *Wouldn't it just be part of the ###?*

P. Wishing will not make it so. Just because you want it doesn't mean you have it. It's not yet there if you merely want it. If you already have it, you don't want it. You just enjoy it.

Q. *Okay, if you want a chess piece ###.*

P. You go get it, but you don't yet have it.

Q. *What I mean is that the rules of chess—if you want them, they're not there, but you can make them up, so that they're like—do you follow what I'm saying?*

P. You sound like an existentialist. [laughter]

Q. *Would you be able to give an example of a large, universal thing?*

P. Think of that famous drink of water out there—if I go out in the hall and take a drink of water, I don't yet have it. It's non-existent. The faucet is there, the water is there, but the drink isn't. And yet my behavior now depends on that drink, because that's what I want; and that's what I'm distinguishing; so I'm acting on it now. And yet it's non-existent.

That's the sense in which what is actual—namely, my behavior now—depends on something non-actual—namely, what I may succeed at.

Q. *But that doesn't go against what we learned—the way we learned the Behavior Diagram in the past.*

P. No, it doesn't. That's what I'm saying: that you read this in paradox form, and then you have to decode it. What could somebody be saying if he says, "Behavior isn't what it is, and is what it isn't."? Once you recognize that here $[W_1]$ and here $[W_2]$, you are dealing with things that are not actual, you begin to make sense out of the notion of juxtaposing what is and what isn't in that way.

Q. *But you know about drinking water. You're not wanting it because you're thinking about it.*

P. That's right, but it isn't real yet because you haven't drunk yet.

Q. *So the only thing you can say is that the Performance depends on—*

P. That's right. The Performance is the point where you say "what it is, is what it isn't", because it depends on these things that aren't so.

Q. *I got it!*

Q. *If you look at it in terms like the Freudian way with the psychic Object occurring before the behavior—*

P. Yeah, you'd say the same thing.

Q. *Do they deny that there's—*

P. No, that's what they're making use of, that that psychic Object, before you behave, isn't real, it's only in your head.

Q. *They're totally denying its existence, even though wouldn't they say that it was in the Umwelt that that—there's a psychological reality as opposed to the external in-the-world reality?*

P. No, there isn't that division for them. There isn't the psychological reality and an external in-the-world reality, there is only *this* reality [Being-in-the-World].

Q. *Then I don't understand the distinction, then, between Umwelt and Mitwelt and Eigenwelt—Mitwelt and Eigenwelt together, as distinguishable from Umwelt. Because isn't that a psychological world? Isn't that a phenomenological world?*

P. Yeah, the building is part of the Umwelt. The ground out there is part of the Umwelt. All of you are part of the Mitwelt.

Q. *I'm sorry. I meant the Eigenwelt—Umwelt and Mitwelt as opposed to the Eigenwelt. Isn't that the phenomenological part of it? And I can be, too, because it sounds as if you're saying something doesn't exist until you act on it, but then you're saying that the phenomenological experience of being—of visualizing the water through psychic Objects or however you would do it, they're denying that, and it sounds contradictory.*

P. No, existentialism is not per se phenomenology. Here's a close relation in that almost every phenomenologist is an existentialist, and vice versa, but one doesn't imply the other. And here it's better not to introduce phenomenology. Just stay with the logic of it, that the behavior, instead of saying *you wouldn't have the experience*, you'd say *the behavior wouldn't be that behavior if you weren't acting on that distinction* [W_1] and *wanting that thing* [W_2]. And whatever it is you want is something that you don't yet have; in that sense, it's unreal. What's unreal is not the object, but your having it, because your having it is what you want.

When I go out there to take a drink of water, it's not water I want, it's having drunk the water. The water out there will not do me any good. It's drinking the water, it's having drunk it, that's what I want. And that's what's not yet real, because I haven't yet drunk it. I haven't yet achieved that. And yet that unreal thing is part of my behavior now.

It's hard even to make it sound paradoxical when you do it in this form. You have to work at making it sound paradoxical, and we wouldn't be doing that if there were not stuff in the literature like the "behavior is what it isn't and isn't what it is".

Q. *That's not exactly the way they talk about Being-in-the-World in the text. At least, it's not the way I understood it. They were talking more about authenticity and man's striving to reach his highest limits, or something like that.*

P. Yeah, it depends on the motivation, of where you're going that you don't yet have.

Q. *It can be reduced to that level, to—*

P. It's not reduced to that level, it's that whenever you have self-actualization over the long haul, you've got this kind of thing [Fig. 8, p. 277] going on in the short haul, and the problem is the same.

Q. *So it's just a matter of goals and ###?*

P. The difference between that and this is simply the size of the unit that you're talking about. If you're talking about a year or ten years, you do it that way. If you're talking about a single behavior, you focus on this [Fig. 8]. For realizing my potentialities is already occurring right here in this behavior, and it's easier to see the logic of it. I think, in one behavior.

The emphasis on "it is not what it is" is a way of denying that behavior is merely performance. You remember, I said *the performance is all there at the time when the behavior occurs*. If I'm walking like this, my performance is there, and it is what it is, in contrast to the Intentional Action that depends on these things that are not yet the case. Performance is the very kind of thing of which you could say "it is what it is", because the performance is the very kind of thing in which there is no distinction between a behavior and a non-behavior—a mere movement. So if behavior were simply like movement, you'd have none of these things, and you could say, "It merely is what it is."

One of the famous slogans for existentialists is, "Existence comes before essence," and one of the variations on that is, "Man has no essence; what he has is a history." Denying the essence is the same thing as denying that the behavior is simply the thing you saw there. Why? Because it connects to the whole world, it connects to things as yet unreal, and that makes it a very different kind of thing from something you can point to and say, "It has the characteristics it has, and it has to have this kind of thing in order to be a table." Tables have essences.

But you cannot point to a human being and say, "It has to be this way, this way, or this way, or it's not a human being." In fact, this formulation [the diamond] is the closest you can come to, to pointing and saying, "Here's what the thing has to be like to be a human being." And this is not something that was available to the existentialists for comparison.

So again, the existentialists are very concerned to contrast people with material objects, and talking about Being-beyond-the-world, and talking about not having an essence, are ways of doing that.

I think we'll be able to finish tomorrow.

SESSION 22
August 11, 1976

Peter: Yesterday, we talked about Being-in-the-World, about motivated behavior, something about Being-beyond-the-World, a little about self-actualization. Any questions about those?

Being-in-the-World
Being-beyond-the-World
Self-actualization
Mode of Existence, World Design
Motivated Behavior
Mood, Pitch, Attunement
Existential Guilt
Thrownness
Authenticity

	fat	thin
Tuesday		7
Wednesday	8	

FIGURE 1

Okay, for these [Fig. 1] let me do a quick experiment. If you had to pick, which of these is fat and which is thin, which would you pick [Tuesday or Wednesday]? How many would say Tuesday is fat? How many would Tuesday is thin?

Q. *I don't understand.*

P. Let me see the hands. How many would say Wednesday is fat? How many would say Wednesday is thin? [laughter] You don't understand?

Now the interesting thing is that with experiment, you get essentially 100% agreement, and it's unusual enough to get 100% agreement, let alone on a crazy question like that. The reason it's a crazy question is that fat and thin are simply not the kind of characteristic that we normally attribute to days of the week, and yet there is something about these days, and our notions of them, which enables us, when forced to put it in one or another of these terms, we do it very easily.

Now something of this is going on in the existentialists' descriptions of world designs, modes of existence, etc. You find strange kinds of language used here in describing mode of existence and world design. And yet, they do the same job for us—they do distinguish for us, even though they are in terms which you might think of as metaphors, or poetic, artistic, or unscientific. They do give us different ideas about different people and how they live.

The notion of mode of existence and world design ties back into Being-in-the-World. This is one of the places where you get a set of individual difference concepts. Those concepts are concepts of how a person is living his life, and the difference between how one person is living and another person is living.

So, for example, in the example in your book where this one woman is described as living a constricted life, just the one word 'constricted' operates like this [fat-thin]. If you describe somebody's life as constricted, immediately you get a separation, and if you think of the people that you know, you could probably classify their lives as more or less constricted, even without being able to say what's 'constricted' about it. All you can do is give more examples of what distinguishes this kind of life from some other. And, in the book, you're given several examples of a dream, of the kind of things that create anxiety, of the kind of imagery she uses—there are several points of contact where you could use the word 'constricted'.

This [mode of existence, world design] is such a wide-open category that the existentialists are free to use any kind of language they want. The kind of category it is, is individual differences and how a person is living his life.

Of the four theories that we've looked at, this is the only one that has that kind of concept in it. The other theories are dealing with concepts of a much narrower focus, like a single behavior, like a single sequence of learning. This one is the notion of a person's whole life and what it's like, as

compared with other lives or other possible lives.

One of the motivations for this kind of description is that a lot of the existentialists are also therapists. They want to be able to characterize people's lives in such a way that they can say of some of them, "There's something wrong with living that way, and something needs to be done." So it's in the description of modes of existence or world design that you primarily get portrayals of people and their lives; and the portrayal of deficiencies in how people are living. In the course of those descriptions, we come across some of these other terms that we haven't talked about yet.

Let's come back to this one now, and talk more about self-actualization.

In contrast to this notion of mode of existence, which is a qualitative or categorical way of distinguishing lives, self-actualization is the historical, developmental notion, that a person's life, as it unfolds through time, is a process of self-actualization. We found that notion already in Allport; it is much more strongly developed in existential theories, more explicit, more strong, more emphasis on the notion of self-actualization.

Q. *Who was the first one to actually describe self-actualization? Was it Allport or was it Maslow?*

P. Certainly Allport came before Maslow, but I can't recall for sure. I think it was one or two of the European philosophers who first used a term like that. Because Allport himself was strongly influenced by two German philosophers, ### and Dilthey, and they had sort of semi-phenomenological theories. Without remembering specifically. I think he picked up the notion of self-actualization—in fact, the notion of self—from either one or both of them. At any rate, the notion of self has been around a lot longer than Allport. Other people were talking about 'self'. Self-actualization is a little more technical a term.

Self-actualization is the alternative to causality. In other theories, it's your circumstances that cause your behaviors through your life. It's your past learning and circumstances that cause your behavior. You find this in Skinner's theory. You remember, I said *Skinner's theory is a completely causal account, and existentialism is a completely non-causal account*. So the biographical course is a process of self-actualization.

What's involved in the notion of self-actualization is very simple. It's simply the idea of making the potential, actual, that a person is an individual characterized by his potentials; and living consists of making some of those potentials actual. The notion that a person is essentially a set of possibilities

corresponds to that slogan I said yesterday, that *man has no essence*. He has no essence in a set of characteristics. If there's anything you could call an essence, it's his possibilities.

So the selection from those possibilities is the biographical course of development, and that one is self-actualization.

Q. *Is this basically the same notion of self-actualization that Allport has, although he may not use it as strongly?*

P. You could say that. In both cases, you would say that the person is of a certain sort, and it is because he is the person he is that he develops along the lines that he does. It's because you are who you are that you do the things you do, and change the way you do, and develop the ways you do.

That central statement, both of them would affirm. Their differences, I think, would be in what they say about the self, not what they say about self-actualization.

Remember, with Allport, he had seven functions, seven propiarte functions, and he said, "When I talk about the self, I don't mean an inner thing. I mean just these ways of operating." Whereas when the existentialist says 'self', he is not talking about anything like seven propiarte functions. He is talking about you.

It's one thing to say that living your life is a selection from a set of possibilities. That's an incomplete formulation. It raises two kinds of questions. One is: *why does it happen at all?* And the other is: *what's the selective principle?* How do you choose the possibilities you do choose as against the ones you turn down? The first of those, *why does it happen at all?*, brings up the notion of existential guilt.

Existential guilt is based on a premise, a postulate, or a fundamental principle that says that *people are motivated to actualize all of their possibilities*, and there is no restriction on that word. And the unfortunate fact is that they can't, and they cannot possibly. They can't possibly because people have contradictory possibilities, and if they actualize one, the other is impossible.

In general, every case of actualizing one possibility is a case of giving up a whole lot of others, all of the other things you could have done instead. Since you're motivated to actualize all your possibilities, and it's impossible, and basically you're giving up more than you're actualizing since there's many more things you don't do at a given time than there are that you do do at a given time; the result is a condition of existence known as "existential guilt". It's a fundamental condition, and it's a universal condition. Everybody

is in that dilemma of being unable to actualize all of his possibilities, and yet he's motivated to. In that sense, he has failed—failed as a person.

If you think of the theory as machinery and ask what this piece of machinery is doing here, what the notion of this universal motivation to actualize all your possibilities, the answer is: *it's what gets this [self-actualization] started*. It provides the answer to *why does the person do anything at all?* If behavior is not caused, why does a person do anything at all? And the answer is: *because he's motivated to do everything; that's why he does something*.

Once you guarantee that he does something, now the second question arises: *why this rather than that?* It's to this question that self-actualization is the answer. Why this rather than that? Because he's him and not somebody else. This is a different way of saying that a person chooses his behaviors, those behaviors are not determined. Therefore the choices reflect him and not merely same set of external conditions.

Now, a person will change over time. Depending on how he has lived up to that time, he will change. Since what he has done is an expression of himself at an earlier time, himself at a later time is also an expression of himself at an earlier time. If you follow that sequence through forwardly, it turns out that yourself at a later time is always a function of—a result of—yourself at an earlier time; and that, in turn, is the result of yourself at a still earlier time. If you take the whole sequence, it is a sequence of the unfolding of the self, or self-actualization.

So it's not a random or arbitrary sequence. It's the unfolding of a unique set of possibilities.

Q. *I've got two questions. First, there isn't anything in there about pre-determinism?*

P. Absolutely not.

Q. *The second is, ### motivation, the existential guilt, you're motivated to fulfill all of your possibilities. Is there any explanation about the origin of motivation, or is that just part of the—*

P. There's no origin there. It's simply, that's the way people are.

Q. *Kind of genetic?*

P. Not at all genetic.

Q. *If the existentialists don't believe in anything like cause and effect, isn't that going back to what you were sort of a cause of what you are?*

P. No, it's not a cause. It does the same job as a cause, that's why they use it. It accounts for the later as a result of the earlier.

Let me give you an example of the difference between a causal explanation and a non-causal one. Suppose there's a hole in the wall right here, like that, and I grab this chalk, and I hold it here. Then I tap it, and it goes into the hole.

You could ask, "Why did the chalk go in the hole?" and the answer is, "Because I tapped it." That's a historical and causal explanation: my tapping it caused it to go into the hole.

Now you could ask another question, and you would get a non-causal answer, namely, "Why did it go in the hole when I tapped it?"—considering that if I had the cup here, it wouldn't have gone in the hole when I tapped it. So just the tapping doesn't explain everything there is to be understood here, and what's left out is brought out by the question, "Why did it go in the hole when tapped it?" There, the answer is, "Because the chalk is round, and the chalk is smaller than the hole. That's why it went in when I tapped it."

That kind of explanation is a non-causal one. Its being round didn't cause it to go in. The tap caused it to go in. But had it not been round, it wouldn't have gone in. Had it not been round, that tap would not have the connection of its being round to its going in is a non-causal connection. It's a personal characteristic connection.

The same goes with people. You use personal characteristics to explain why *this* person in *these* circumstances did something that somebody else wouldn't. And the answer is because he is *that* kind of person, because he is the person he is.

For the existentialists, the entire explanation is of that sort, and it's a non-causal one. And formally, you can do that.

Q. *But why does anybody do anything different?*

P. Because they are different, they are different people. Remember Allport's notion that everybody is unique. You have no problem explaining why people do different things: they are different people and they are living different kinds of lives.

Q. *Do you mean by ### what you are at a later time is an expression of what you were in earlier times—*

P. That you would have been different at a later time had you been different at the earlier time. 'An expression of', 'a function of'—any such term.

It's a dependency relation.

Q. *### historical—it sounds as if—*

P. It is a historical relation: yourself at a later time and yourself at an earlier time.

Q. *What elements in your history transmute the self at the earlier time to a later time?*

P. Nothing. That's just the way it happens. You won't find a causal thread going through there. Be very clear about that: it's not that there is something there that brings about the later one.

Q. *Right, but they don't talk about any kind of historical interaction of any sort—not necessarily in a causal sense, but—*

P. Any other historical accident is easily assimilated to the process of self-actualization, because that's simply a laying out of the sequence of what happens; and any sort of interaction is simply part of the sequence of what happens, which is a sequence of self-actualization.

Q. *Whatever you do, you're self-actualizing in one way or another, even if you're going psychotic.*

P. Yeah, except there's limitations, stemming from these two notions [thrownness and authenticity], and above all here. It's not an accident that they have these kinds of notions here, because that question indeed does arise: "Gee, in that case, everything you do is self-actualizing;" and, indeed, it is; but self-actualization isn't all there is to it.

There are also differences that are gotten at with these [thrownness and authenticity], and these differences are what we more normally think of as self-actualizing. The notion of really being yourself is gotten at here, not with the notion of self-actualizing.

Q. *That threw me—'really being yourself', there.*

P. Well, that's what we have to develop with these other notions.

Remember, I said that *a lot of the work has to do with being able to say of a person that he's living in a way that there's something wrong with*. One of the notions of living in a way that there's something wrong with is living an inauthentic life.

Q. *Yeah. I'm just having problems with "If I'm not really myself, whom am I really?"*

P. When we talk about your not really being yourself, we don't mean that you're being somebody else. It's a way of talking that gets at something, but you don't want to push it too far. It's a little bit like this [Fig. 1, p. 80].

Q. *You said that they don't say—you said that every person starts out with a unique set of possibilities, right? Then they don't say that there's any genetic reason. I don't understand how they bridge that gap.*

P. There isn't a gap. Remember, when we were talking about the origin problem, I said that basically *you have a complete explanation in the absence of any reference to either reincarnation or genetics or anything else*, that those are explanations of something else, but they are not explanations of development. That's the line the existentialists take.

Now consider this one [thrownness]. If we say that a person is not caused to do anything, but chooses; and that what he becomes is a result of his choices; then we raise the question—and I think that Hall and Lindzey do raise the question—is it then the case that a person can be any way he wants? Because it sounds like that. If there are no limits, then it sounds as though a person could just be any way he wants.

At this point, you bring in the concept of thrownness. The word 'thrownness' was chosen because of the image that is used to explain it, namely, we don't choose to come in the world; we find ourselves thrown into it. And indeed that's true. We don't choose to be born. We don't choose to become alive. So we start with something that we don't choose.

What we start with sets some limits. The limits are simply who we are, rather than somebody else. The crucial place where that shows up is not simply in what we can do, but rather, in what we can do and how we can live *and* be satisfied.

Think of Allport's example of functional autonomy. Think of the man who goes and learns to play golf for the sake of selling insurance, and who then learns to enjoy it. Imagine a second person who learns to play golf for the sake of selling insurance and never does enjoy golf. The only reason he plays golf is to sell insurance.

Now imagine that he goes out and plays golf and doesn't sell insurance—lo and behold, he's not enjoying himself. He can do that, but he can't do that and enjoy himself. He can't do that and be satisfied. Why? Because he's different from somebody who could do that and enjoy himself. Those personal characteristics of values, knowledge, and skill, that distinguish the one person from another, also show up in what he can do and find satisfying.

Clinically, that's the test of authenticity, is whether somebody is living the kind of life that is satisfying to him. If a person's life is not satisfying, then no matter what he does, the first thing that the existentialist will think of is, "He's being inauthentic in some way or another."

Being inauthentic, you could paraphrase as "Trying to be somebody else other than who you are"—trying to be somebody who enjoys golf when in fact you're somebody who doesn't enjoy golf. Trying to be somebody who's gregarious when in fact you're somebody who's not gregarious. You can do those things, but you can't do them and be satisfied. That's the price you pay, and that's where the difference shows up.

That combination of notions is how we got out of the difficulty posed by this [self-actualization] being too broad and generating the conclusion that you can be anybody you want, and anything you do is self-actualizing. Indeed, anything you do is self-actualizing, but it needn't be authentic. And since you're free to choose, you're free to make inauthentic choices as well as authentic ones, and that's why some people, indeed, are living inauthentic lives. There's nothing that guarantees that you make the right decisions for your life.

Q. *Can ways you are satisfied change over time?*

P. The things that satisfy you can change over time, as in the functional autonomy example. Playing golf at one time isn't satisfying; at a later time, it is.

Q. *But I have to be the kind of person that could be satisfied by playing golf to be satisfied by playing golf later.*

P. Remember Capacity versus others. You already, before you ever learned, had to be the kind of person who could learn to enjoy golf. That's the crucial change that has taken place—from being somebody who could, you have become somebody who does. But it had to be the case that you could, otherwise at a later time it wouldn't be the case that you do.

Q. *But if I presently could enjoy playing golf—and I don't [laughter]—I don't even play it—as an infant, could—I mean, was that a characteristic—*

P. Yeah. As an infant, you had the capacity to learn to enjoy golf for its own sake. Otherwise you never would. The principle is very simple: whatever is actual must at an earlier time have already been possible. That's why I said that in analyzing life histories, basically you work it backward from the actual to the potential.

Q. *You said, if a person is authentic, he's satisfied?*

P. Yes and no. You can say he's satisfied, you can't say he's happy.

Q. *What's the distinction?*

P. Think of somebody doing his duty and living in very rigorous conditions—you could hardly say he was happy, but he might be satisfied with living that way—satisfied in the sense that he wouldn't be off trying to change his way of living.

Q. *But if a person is trying to reach his potentials and, say, not taking another course, like, being a banker when in fact he'd rather live in the woods, or something like that, even though he's not necessarily satisfied with that, he's still being authentic. Even though he may not be satisfied with the process of his development, he'd still be following an authentic process of development.*

P. Remember I spoke of the wastebasket terms in the several theories. 'Authenticity' is one of the wastebasket terms, in certain respects, in existential theory, because there is no criterion. There is no way to tell for sure whether what somebody does on a given occasion is authentic or not. So when you choose it, you might see it as authentic, and later change your mind and say 'no, it wasn't'. When you do it, somebody else looking at you might say 'no, it isn't', and you say 'yes, it is'. When you do it, you might not be thinking of authenticity at all—that's the usual—then later, in retrospect, decide that it was or wasn't.

Q. *Okay, but I mean like you may be doing some things that are authentic but not doing other things that—you may be doing some things that are authentic but there may be parts of your life that are not inauthentic but are just not being actualized at the moment, and that makes you unsatisfied. In other words, if you were living in the woods, you'd be maybe doing something that's authentic that way, but you might be lonely there or something. So it wouldn't necessarily have to be satisfying.*

P. No, that's why I say you wouldn't be happy. I'm using the term 'happy' to get at that kind of thing. You wouldn't be happy living alone in the woods because you are lonely; but you'd be satisfied in the sense that you wouldn't be lamenting the fact that you were there, and you wouldn't be trying to change it. You would simply recognize that that's part of what goes with living in the woods, and that that was what you chose. Then you could say, "Yeah. I'm being authentic—at least it looks that way—even though there's a lot of suffering there."

Q. *In that example, actually what is happening is that he has some existential guilt because he's choosing something, but he's denying other things because he chose that. Is that the kind of guilt?*

P. When you think of that notion of existential guilt, connect it to the diagram of reasons pro and con. Whenever you do something that you have reasons to do, you also have reasons not to do it; and you have reasons to do other things. All of those reasons to do other things will appear as existential guilt. They are things that were possible for you; that you're motivated to do; that you could have done; and you didn't. And in the case of living in the woods, being out there among people is one of the things that you could have elected and didn't; and that's part of what shows up in being lonely. That's what you gave up.

Q. *Can authenticity be ### to apply to life as a whole and to individual behaviors?*

P. Right. Because, remember, your life as a whole simply consists of your behaviors—"A person is an individual whose history is a history of intentional actions."

Q. *So your life would be partially authentic?*

P. Yeah, more or less authentic. For purposes of authenticity and world design, etc., you don't divide up Being-in-the-World. It's your whole life that is either more or less authentic.

Q. *Having been born with certain possibilities or potential, doesn't that in some way determine your way of life, and in some way—what I'm getting to is that there's no—you're not totally free to choose whatever you want.*

P. According to the existentialists, you are. But the limit shows not in that if you have certain capacities at birth, that you can't do certain things or have to do certain things. The limit shows up in what you can do and be satisfied. If you're a certain kind of person, that doesn't mean that you can't do the same things other people do. It just means that if you do certain things you will be satisfied, and if you do others you won't. That's the key notion.

At a gross level, at a practical level, it's obviously true. There's nothing to keep you from doing a lot of things that you wouldn't be satisfied with. There's nothing to keep you from going to movies that you wouldn't enjoy, from taking classes that you wouldn't enjoy, from reading books that you wouldn't enjoy, from having a date with somebody whose company you don't enjoy—there's nothing to keep you from that. You could do those

things. You have all of the abilities, you have the opportunities, you have the occasions, etc. And you really could do them. But you couldn't do them and be satisfied with them.

Q. *Hence the notion of thrownness.*

P. No, the notion of thrownness is at a more fundamental level—overall constraints on your existence. The classic example is being born male versus female, that you have certain possibilities one way or the other, but that if you're a man and try to live as a woman, that won't be satisfying; if you're a woman and try to live as a man, that won't be satisfying.

Q. *Then that means you are determined.*

P. No. The only thing that's determined is what you can do and be satisfied, not just what you can do.

Q. *[male] I don't have the choice of having a child, and a woman does.*

P. Wait a while. There's nothing in the notion of self-actualization that says you're omnipotent. [laughter] There's nothing that says you have unlimited choices. It just says that the opportunities you have, you are not constrained within.

Q. *So some people can have different choices?*

P. Sure. Again, at a crude practical level this is obviously true. If I have a skill that you don't, I have choices to do things that you don't have a choice to do, because I can do them and you can't. If I know certain things, then I have choices that you don't have, because it would take that knowledge to do it.

Q. *But presumably I could choose to acquire that skill or acquire that knowledge.*

P. Yeah, and again, within limits you could, and that would use up part of your life, and that part might or might not be authentic.

Q. *Or be satisfying.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *You are limited to the choices you can have, but you're limited to the satisfaction?*

P. You are limited in your choices. Like I say, you're not omnipotent, you don't have every logical possibility open to you, but within that range of choices, you're not limited in the sense of being forced to choose one over

the other. The limitation there lies in that choices may be more or less satisfying. And that's not something you choose. That's a boundary condition of your behavior.

So you can choose your behavior, but you can't choose how satisfying it's going to be. That, you take what you get.

Q. *Maybe I see those boundaries as determining me.*

P. If you say that, you're not an existentialist. Existentialists would be more likely to say, "You have those boundaries because you are you," not that the boundaries determine you. Your being you is the crucial thing. Were you somebody else, those boundaries would be different. So the limitations are not a limitation that something is limiting you. The limitation is who you are.

Q. *The boundaries make me.*

P. No, that is you.

Q. *I'm still ### that psychotic fellow example, because I can see how someone could go either way as far as judging whether a psychotic's behavior is authentic or inauthentic. And who's to say whether that psychotic is being satisfied or not by his behavior? And I'm wondering how this would fit into the—*

P. Two general sorts of ways. In a crazy world, an authentic person might have to be crazy, or look crazy to other people. Secondly, in unbearable circumstances, you do what you can or have to. And if you want to erase certain possibilities wholesale, you may distort reality. You may treat the world as not having those possibilities.

Q. *But the psychotic makes the choice to do that, out of all the other choices that he or she had.*

P. You say he makes the choice, but I don't think that anybody would say that he thinks it over. He makes the choice without thinking. And again, most of your choices every day are made without thinking.

Q. *So it means it's just in that same category of choices.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *But what I'm saying is, it seems to just blow apart any kind of therapeutic intervention.*

P. On the contrary. If you describe it in a way that makes sense, you have avenues of communication to that psychotic client, and the whole

point of this kind of description of modes of existence is to see a person's life in a way that makes sense. Even if it's a psychotic way of life, your descriptions give you some coherence to it. The woman who's terribly constricted eventually committed suicide. The other one, the one with the burning the hand, she was psychotic, and yet the portrayal of the mode of existence gives you ideas of how to treat this client, gives you an idea of what sense the client is making. Even when she's looking crazy and acting crazy, she is making a certain kind of sense. Therefore you have some avenues of communication, and you have ideas of what's wrong and what would need to be changed.

Q. *I realize you have the modes of communication, and you can make some statements concerning the mode of existence and the world design and such, but who are you to judge that person's decisions? That's why I'm saying. Who are you to judge that person's authenticity, to judge that person's—that's a question that comes up because it seems to be built into the theory that is a very non-value kind of thing, and that if you're not satisfying yourself, if that's the ultimate question as to whether someone's healthy or mentally ill or whatever, pathological. It seems you're out in left field because it's very hard to tap into whether a behavior is satisfying to a person.*

P. It may or may not, but look: there's nothing in self-actualization or mode of existence, or anything else, that says you don't judge other people. On the contrary, you have to.

Q. *But in this type of therapy. I see the therapist can become more of a judge.*

P. You're always a judge. Any type of appraisal puts you in the position of a judge. When you judge something to be dangerous, you're in the position of a judge. When you judge this person to be sick, you're in the position of a judge.

Q. *Yeah, but it's a Catch-22. At least in the other theories, they say here's the criteria you judge on. This theory just says that the only criteria are being authentic and being satisfied, and so you have to make that judgment just based on some—whatever random—*

P. There is no theory that gives you a criterion. You think of Freudian theory, you have a conceptual specification in terms of ego-defenses and distortions of reality, but how do you tell when somebody is distorting reality? It's the same kind of difficulty as 'how do you tell when somebody is engaging in inauthentic behavior?'

Q. *There's more social interaction element. If a person is unable to interact with other people—*

P. It doesn't mean he's distorting reality. Neither does it mean he's being inauthentic.

Q. *Say an Adlerian kind of theory—it comes right out and says it: if a person—that the personality is social interaction, and if you're not interacting, then there's something wrong. So at least the therapist at that point has a chance to examine some aspect of your life and make a decision as to whether your social interactions are adequate or inadequate. With this, it's just totally random as to how you're going to decide something, and since his choices are going to carry different significance, different satisfaction, and different authenticity to that person than it would to me, how can I make that decision?*

P. Let's see if I can take those one at a time. With respect to the Adlerians, there is a trade-off. You can get more definite guidelines for making the decision, but the price of that is to be wrong.

On the business of social interaction, almost none of our cases of pathology are absence of social interaction. Most cases of pathology, the vast majority, are the wrong kind of social interaction. So if all you have to go by is that somebody isn't interacting socially, (1) you're going to be wrong, because some cases of not interacting will not be pathology, (2) you won't have any guideline for the vast majority of cases, which do involve interaction. [change tape] And there is no place where we will find from anybody ###. What's involved is competence, and competence can't be reduced to knowledge. Being able to see can't be reduced to some set of facts. I can't tell you how to see, and there isn't a way to see; but if you can see, you don't need to be told, and your judgments are by and large accurate.

The same thing when it comes to judging people and their behavior. There is no way we can be told how to do it. We can give guidelines, we can educate, etc., but it's like seeing. Either you see it, or you don't. The better you are, the more you see and the less often you will be wrong.

The other thing is the relativity. People do have different points of view, and if you simply stop there, you will reach an impasse that says, "How could I possibly understand somebody who's different from me? Since he is different, how could I possibly understand him?" Secondly, "How could I possibly interact with him, since he has standards and values different from mine? Am I not then laying my thing on him?" And then finally, "How could I possibly help him other than laying my thing on him and trying to make

him more like me?” All of those questions, *all of those relativity questions*, remember, I said, *are the central core of personality theory and personality characteristics, because it's precisely personal characteristics that enable us to make those bridges between us and somebody else who is different.*

That's the whole thrust of individual difference notions, is to give us access to people who are different. But that requires competence, too. Some people are better at it, some people are worse; but in principle, that's the solution; and in practice, most people are fairly competent at that.

So there isn't a big issue, there isn't an in-principle issue of, “My God, you can't deal with somebody, he's different from you,” even when it comes to judging psychopathology.

Q. *It was more the case of me laying my values on that person that I was concerned over. Since there's such a wide variety of things that can be attached to any given act of your life, in terms of if it's authentic—all of those things—I just feel that you can't tap into that. So no matter what you do, in effect, you're going to be laying your trip on your client, you're going to be telling your client, “Do you perceive it as being inauthentic?” whereas you can't really tap into it.*

P. If you're an Adlerian, you're going to tell your client that you perceive him as being asocial. If you're a Freudian, you're going to—

Q. ### At least ### social relationships. How do we tap in authenticity, how do we tap in—

P. The same way, the same way. Where does authenticity show itself? Primarily in social relationships. Not in the way you sit in a corner by yourself, but in the way you interact with people.

Q. ###

P. The existentialists have gone one step further, and they've recognized that kind of difficulty, and they simply meet it head on. They say that part of the human condition is to act under uncertainty, and that's why you have free choice. So, indeed, it is an expression of faith, or “a leap into faith”—that's the term—*any* behavior is that. It isn't that this particular behavior of making judgments about people is risky. Every behavior is just as risky, they say. And it's the nature of people to do that.

That's part of being free and responsible, they say, and there is nothing that will relieve you of the responsibility of making choices. There is no guideline, there is no criterion, there is nothing that will relieve you of that responsibility, and you're living inauthentically if you pretend there is.

Q. *Okay, so I may be being responsible to myself by laying my values on my client, but I'm not being responsible to my client.*

P. You're not being competent. You're responsible in both cases. You're just doing a bad job of it one time, not a bad job the other.

The same thing about laying your thing on your clients holds in any kind of interaction. If you're buying a loaf of bread, you still have only your viewpoint and you're laying that on the other person. So you get no mileage out of that kind of reservation in principle.

We do have personal characteristic notions that do bridge the gap, and they are not foolproof, but neither are we at all in that kind of quandary, and laying that trip on people is just as much laying a trip on people as sitting back and saying, "I'm not going to be judgmental." Saying, "None of us are sure," etc., is a trip in itself. And to refuse to participate on those grounds is laying your trip on people. There's no way out. That isn't the way out.

Q. *### the Rogerians, following a client-centered approach, trying to—*

P. Have you ever heard clients talk about Rogerian therapists? It comes across to them as somebody laying a trip on them. And yet over here, the Rogerian is saying, "I'm doing all this precisely not to." So as I say, there is no way out by going to a non-committal, hands-off, who-am-I-to-say sort of posture. That's just one of the many postures among what's available.

Q. *Also in this theory, don't they stress the responsibility for—it isn't just like "I'm going to go do everything ###. If I do this. I will be an authentic person." ### responsibility, that that was something that always came—I was always aware of this theory that ### you can't leave the theory here and say, "Go do anything as long as you feel authentic about it," because it really comes down heavy on the responsibility, and also even bringing up the word God, and where does all this—?*

P. As I said, there's no limit to the language you can use for characterizing modes of existence. You can use religious language, you can use moral language, you can use any language.

Q. *But no other theory does.*

P. That's right.

Think of why these are called 'existential' theories. Think of why they accepted and chose that kind of name for themselves. The implication is, they're dealing directly with the real world—'existential' in that sense. They're dealing directly with what's real and what isn't, with being and nothingness,

with living and dying, in contrast to dealing with a hypothetical world of theoretical objects like ids, egos, and super-egos; or stimuli and responses and reinforcements. So it's because they are dealing in this way with the real world that *any* language anywhere in the world is available to them.

Q. *Wouldn't it be a different approach to your client if you take on this idea that, "Yes, you are responsible for your actions; yes, it is not just because of something that happened, or some innate ###"*

P. Indeed, it would change your approach to your clients, and it does.

Q. *A world of difference.*

P. Yeah.

Here's another one [Mood, Pitch, Attunement]. One of the challenges is along the lines of, "Well, if you can choose your behaviors freely, how come you get hungry and then you look for food? That sure looks like something causing you to behave."

The answer to that one is given by these sorts of concepts. You can think of these in either one of two ways. You can think of these as having to do with the channels of communication between you and the world. Or you can think of them as sensitization, a selectivity of what you're sensitive to, what you respond to. When you're hungry, you're attuned differently to the world. When you're hungry, things related to food stand out. They look different, they sound different, you think of them differently. And so you react to them differently. When you're hungry, certain things look attractive that don't look attractive when you're not hungry.

And since they are attractive to you, your going after them is a case of self-actualization, not of being made to do something, not of being driven by a hunger drive, not of being manipulated by a stimulus. It's self-actualization because you are following your own attunement. The difference that hunger makes is that you're attuned differently. If you're afraid, you're looking for dangers, you're attuned to threatening things in your environment. Those stand out, and so you treat them accordingly. You treat them now as more important than they were before. You treat them now as being there because now you see them where before you didn't. And so, yes, your behavior is different.

In this way, the existentialists account for some of the kind of situations where you might say, "No, there it's not a matter of free choice; your behavior is constrained." That's the way out.

This type of explanation you can recognize as a State explanation. You recall when we were developing the different sorts of person characteristics, we had Dispositions, Powers, and Comparatives; and the first Comparative was a State. A State, as we defined it there—and we did define it—has exactly the characteristics of these notions. You remember, if you're in a particular state, there's a systematic difference in your Powers and/or Dispositions. In a motivational state like hunger, there is a systematic difference in your Powers and/or Dispositions, and those are what are being acted on when you go eat or do whatever you do.

States, like other Person characteristics, operate in a non-causal way. A State doesn't cause you to do something. Neither does a trait cause you to do something. Neither does an Ability. So all of the Person characteristics operate in a non-causal way. And this is simply one of them: a State.

Yesterday, I said *it's an interesting juxtaposition to compare operant conditioning theory and existential theory, because the one gives you a completely causal approach, the other gives you a completely non-causal approach, and they are both successful*. You can do it, and that raises questions: *since they seem to be contradictory, how come you can use both of them on all behaviors?*

Recall the first unit of explaining behavior is Personal Characteristics plus Circumstances. In these circumstances, it would take that kind of person to engage in that sort of behavior [Fig. 2, triangle at right]




FIGURE 2

Secondly, the acquisition of personal characteristics comes from the history of behavior, which in turn reflects the prior capacity, which in turn depends on the prior personal characteristics. So for any of these behaviors that constitute this intervening history, that behavior is an expression of those personal characteristics that give you the capacity for acquiring these [PC_i].

At the same time, it is the history that brings these things about. The history is what actualizes this potential into this actuality. These personal

characteristics, in turn, were acquired via a prior history; and those behaviors there [diamonds] reflected your still earlier personal characteristics.

What happens in a reconstruction? If you take this personal characteristic [PC₁], you say *in part it's due to the occurrence of this behavior* [diamond A]. This is a causal connection here: this behavior, this history, causes that personal characteristic. However, that behavior depended on—was an expression of—this earlier personal characteristic [PC₂], so it's not just a starting point; you could trace it back to here. Since you can, you can drop this one out and just go directly and say that the acquisition of this personal characteristic [PC₁] is a consequence of this personal characteristic [PC₂]. So you leap-frog the intervening stage and go directly from here to here [PC₂ to PC₁].

Likewise, for this one [PC₂], it was acquired causally here [diamond B], but that behavior depended on this personal characteristic [PC₃], so you can leap-frog this and go directly from here to there [PC₃ to PC₂]. You can see that what you set up, then, is a sequence in which you simply go from the personal characteristic at this time to the personal characteristic at that time, at that time, at that time, at that time [PC₅₋₁], and all of those connections are non-causal [straight arrows between PCs].

In contrast, you can start with a behavior here [diamond A] and say *it's true that this behavior depends on that personal characteristic, but that personal characteristic depends causally on this prior behavior* [diamond B] *and circumstance*; therefore, you can leap-frog that personal characteristic and go directly from this past behavior and the past circumstances to this one [diamond B to A], and that's a causal connection. What you leap-frog is the non-causal connection to the personal characteristic.

Likewise, this behavior [diamond B] reflected this personal characteristic [PC₃], but that one, in turn, was causally connected back here; so you can leap-frog that personal characteristic and draw a direct causal link between this and the past, and continue on backward. And down here [curved arrows below time line], you have nothing but causal connections. The behavior is always caused by the past history and the present circumstances, and those are causal connections.

So, by picking off different aspects of the diagram, you can generate a completely non-causal description or a completely causal description. And you can do that because wherever you might want to substitute the other one, you simply trace it back in the sequence and you can dispense with it. If you're tempted to put in a personal characteristic, you can trace that back to

a cause back here, and so you can dispense with it. If you're tempted to put in a cause here, you can trace that back to a personal characteristic and therefore dispense with the cause. So by leap-frogging here, you can dispense either with the non-causal part and leave yourself with a causal description, or you can dispense with the causal part and leave yourself a non-causal description. That's how you can get away with either one.

Q. *It sort of seems like we've been getting away with calling ### it seems like that's just another way of saying causality is no longer direct, that just because it's no longer direct going from one step to another—*

P. No, it's not that it's no longer direct. It's dispensable because the causal component is traced back to a non-causal one. Since it is, the causality is unanchored; it's anchored instead in a non-causal one, and that then is taken to be fundamental. That's why I talk about leap-frogging. You don't deny it's there; you just skip over it because you're going to trace it back to here [some PC] anyhow. You remember, the arrows go this way [pointing to the right], so you can trace this one [PC₁] back to here [PC₂] by going through here [intervening history], but you can trace his one [diamond A] back to here [diamond B] by going through here [PC₂]. So if you skip every other one, you're left either with a completely causal or a completely non-causal one.

This is the sequence of self-actualization. This is an expression, diagrammatically, of how the way you are at a later time is simply a function of how you were at an earlier time, and so on back. So the non-causal one is also a self-actualization sequence, and that's what we have here.

Q. *Would the bottom be Skinnerian?*

P. The bottom part would give you the Skinnerian approach. The top part gives you the existential approach.

In the few minutes we have left, let's make one more move. Let me tell you about Aristotle [laughter]—in ten minutes.

Aristotle is known for his syllogism—you know: All A is B; this is an A; therefore, it's a B. All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. That's the one that Aristotle is famous for.

As it happens, he had a second syllogism that he's not famous for. This one [All A is B] is known as the theoretical syllogism. The other one is the practical syllogism. The practical syllogism was Aristotle's theory of behavior, and he explained it in this way: he said, "What happens in behavior can be put in the form of a syllogism, and here is an example."

I need a cow.
There are cows in the market.

So I'll go there and get one.

I need a covering.
A cloak is a covering.


So I'll make one and then I'll have one.

FIGURE 3

Major premise, minor premise, and the conclusion. Here's another one [Blackboard]. The key is that the conclusion of this syllogism is not a verbal thing here; it is the actual behavior of going to the market and getting the cow. The conclusion of this syllogism is not this sentence; it is the making of the cloak. So the behavior of going to the market and getting the cow, the behavior of making the cloak, is formulated as a syllogism, of which these are the conclusions.

Q. Will you repeat that once more?

P. Yeah. The behaviors—these are formulated as the conclusion of a syllogism, where the other parts of the syllogism are these two premises.



n

FIGURE 4

If we compare the practical cows-in-the-market syllogism with the notion of intentional action and ask *where in the syllogism do we have any of these kinds of things?*, what you find is that the major premise is here [W].

The minor premise is here [K]. And the conclusion is here [P-A]. The major premise is the Want: I need a cow. The minor premise is the discrimination: there are cows in the market. The conclusion has two parts. The first one is the Performance: so I'll go there; and the second one is the Achievement: and get one.

Likewise here. The major premise is the Want: I need a covering. The minor premise is the discrimination: a cloak is a covering. The conclusion has two parts. The first is the Performance: so I'll make one; and the Achievement is: and then I'll have one.

So what you find in the practical syllogism are the four of the five aspects of Intentional Action, and there are other parts in Aristotle's writing where he says, "Of course, you have to have learned how to do these things." After all, he was no slouch. He knew you had to learn how to do these things. So he also included this [KH].

Notice, he's got this kind of structure—the premises and the conclusion. And he even called that a cause and effect; except for Aristotle, he distinguished four different kinds of causes, and this one is not the kind of cause that physicists talk about. He said this is the *formal* cause. The formal cause is contrasted to the efficient cause. The *efficient* cause is like the tap that causes the chalk to go in. That's the efficient cause, what brings it about. The formal cause is what accounts for its being what it is, and it's these considerations [K, W, KH] that account for this [P-A] being what it is. It's the knowledge, the motivation, and the competence that accounts for the performance and achievement being what they are. So the relation between these was *formal* cause and effect, not efficient cause and effect.

Q. *The what cause?*

P. The efficient cause. The efficient cause is what brings it about. The formal cause is what accounts for its being what it is.

Q. *The formal cause, then, would be the chalk being round and smaller than the hole?*

P. Yeah.

Part of the point, in our survey of theories, of always comparing them to at least this notion [Intentional Action] is to bring out certain things common to those theories. As you saw, we had very little trouble in finding in each theory something that had these different features and a way of pulling them all together.

Now what we find is that we have—extending all the way back to Aristotle—that same sort of notion, that the notion of human behavior as something having these features all in one package is not a recent scientific discovery. It is not something that psychological theorists or personality theorists have invented. It's something that has been known that far back, and at different points in between.

This should raise some questions in your minds. How come? *How come (1) it was known that far back, and (2) how come we haven't made any progress, that we're still using the same notion?* The most obvious answer is *because it's not an empirical fact*. Saying that human behavior is of this sort is like saying that circles are round. Once Euclid said it explicitly, we haven't changed our mind about it since, nor is there any kind of experiment that would lead us to conclude otherwise, because it's not an empirical sort of notion. So I would suggest that the fact that we have, in all of our theories, the same kind of distinctions carried, and that that goes back through history as far back as we have recorded history—it appears in clear form as far back as Aristotle—ought to suggest that that is not an empirical finding, it is not something that you can do scientific experiments to find out whether it's so or not, that it is on the order of “circles are round”: this [the diamond] is what human behavior is like.

In some ways, that may be discouraging, in that we haven't made any progress. On the other hand, it may be encouraging, namely, that you're not going to find out anything different tomorrow.

This is not subject to fads and fashions. The fads and fashions appear in the language that you use, the terminology and the imagery. You can use phenomenological imagery, you can use physiological imagery, you can use mechanical imagery, you can use all kinds of imagery; but as long as you make these kinds of distinctions, you will have a bookkeeping system for keeping track of the behavior of people and organisms. And that's what you will find in psychological theories and personality theories: bookkeeping for keeping track of the behavior of persons.

So we have, then, a very strong generalization, and I'm suggesting the basis for the generalization is that it isn't empirical; but in any case, what you find in all—even the ones that we haven't dealt with explicitly—this is what you'll find in all of those theories. So you can use it with confidence, and you can adopt any one of the theories that feels good, because you will be making the same kinds of distinctions.

Tomorrow, we have the exam, and it will be an open book exam. It will be here, at this time. Notes, books, anything. You'll have the hour and a half—that's what's scheduled. And I'll design it as an hour exam, and you'll have an hour and half to do it.

Informal after-class discussion:

Q. *Is this why—all these discussions of ties—that we say that really psychology cannot be considered a science?*

P. Yeah, not that kind. That's part of the answer. Here's the thing: neither is it true that if psychology were like physics, that would make it a science. So I think people have the wrong idea of what it would take to make psychology a science.

Q. *If I study this some more, will this give me a clearer idea of why I can't understand why personal characteristics really do not—are not causal?*

P. Yeah, look: you don't say that these two [All men are mortal + Socrates is a man] *cause* this [Socrates is mortal]. You say that these two *account for* why the conclusion is this conclusion and not some other one. These are the formal causes for this [the conclusion].

For a person, if this is his behavior and these are his personal characteristics, these account for why his behavior is the behavior it is. They don't cause it. It's just that if these [PCs] were different, this [B] would be different in general. If your personal characteristics were different, your behavior would be different. The connection is not that of cause and effect.

Q. *How would it be if the connection was of cause and effect? How would it look different?*

P. How would it be if the connection of these two [major and minor premise] to this [conclusion] was that kind of cause? It's just impossible to imagine.

Q. *Usually cause and effect means something in the past influences something in the present.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *In this case, who you are does influence what you do, right?*

P. Not 'influences'. It just accounts for it. Being round doesn't influence the chalk's going in. It simply accounts for it.

Q. *Okay, so it's not a matter of the time sequence—*

P. No.

Q. *—it's—he's expressing that, but that's not what made him do it.*

P. Right.

Q. *It's like when we are studying behavior, and we see that certain people are aggressive, and you're not saying that there's a relationship that ### that this is a causal thing.*

P. Yeah. See, if he hadn't been the aggressive person he is, he probably wouldn't be behaving here now *in this* aggressive way. But it's not that his being an aggressive person causes him to do this, although it maybe explains.

Q. *It's a state of being.*

P. Remember, I said if you have a frequency pattern and this aggressive behavior is occurring a lot, the fact that it occurs often is what you're talking about in saying that *he's* aggressive. You use that to explain how come he's behaving aggressively now. Suppose you think of a paraphrase: he's behaving aggressively here, now, because that's what he does frequently, and this is one of those times.

Q. *It doesn't sound very logical, but I see what you're saying.*

P. Because that, then, is like saying the reason this is curved is that it's part of a circle, and a circle is curved. The reason this is aggressive is because it's part of a sequence of aggressive behaviors, and that's what a member of that sequence is like.

Q. *So you can have a lot of predictive power and yet not be causal.*

P. Yeah.

Q. *The causal part is almost like "since it happened before, and we know there's the capacity, it can happen again". It's almost like the causal—*

P. That's not causal. If there's a lot of members in a sequence, and you pick one, that's statistics. If you have a jar with 50 black balls and 2 white ones, you're not surprised to pick out a black one. If you have a life history with a bunch of black ones, a lot more than there is in somebody else's life—

Q. *That's a personal characteristic.*

P. Yeah. Then you're not surprised to find a black one.

Q. *Okay, then, how does the causal go again?*

P. The causal goes that you have an earlier cause and a later effect. And if I shoot a gun off right behind you, and you go like that [gesture], we say that the sound caused you to do that.

Q. *Yeah, but let's go back to the aggressive behavior. The cause of my—*

P. Okay, the cause of your aggressive behavior is the sight of him and the way he looks and what he says. That's why you hauled off and slugged him, is that that was the stimulus that caused you to behave that way. Notice, if you had been her, exactly the same sight wouldn't have caused her to get him that way. But that's ignored in the explanation that says his looking that way and acting that way is what caused you to do that.

Q. *So when you do that personal characteristic, you don't necessarily have to worry at all about him.*

P. That's the point of saying it's *your* characteristic, whereas the other is your interaction with your environment. The sight of him as a stimulus that makes your behavior a function of what's out there.

Q. *Is one a better or worse explanation, or are they just—*

P. No, they're both incomplete. Remember the thing that says, "In these circumstances, it would take this kind—" You need both. You need to know what's out there, but you need to know what kind of person he is, because a different person—

Q. *What do we call that, again?*

P. Unit 1: In these circumstances, it would take this kind of person to engage in that behavior. In these circumstances, it would take an aggressive person to just haul off and slug him; whereas a different kind of person in the same circumstances wouldn't. That's why you need the personal characteristics as part of the explanation.

But at the same time, even if you're an aggressive person, if you're in the room by yourself, you're not going to haul off and slug somebody. So you need the circumstances. And you put them together, and you've got an intelligible unit.

UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVATION

Empiricist principle

You have to find out about the real world by observation.

Paraphrases

For a given observer the real world is the one that includes him an observer.

For no observer is the real world one that does not include him as observer.

For no observer is the real world one that has no place for him.

For no observer is the real world one that would leave him in an impossible position.

Maxim 5

If a situation calls for a person to do something he can't do, he will do something he can do.

Conclusions

If, for a given observer the real world is such that it would leave him in an impossible position, he will not see it that way. Instead, he will see it as a world that does have a place for him, and he will act accordingly.

A second observer, P, who sees the world differently from O and knows it, can count that difference as O's distortion of reality and account for that distortion of reality by reference to some real condition that O would find unthinkable (because it would leave him in an impossible position) and therefore be unable to behave with respect to it.

Interpretations

1) Among such unthinkable real conditions would be that

O's behavior was a particular behavior or that it had a particular motivation or significance (hence unconscious motivation).

2) Because the derivation above is a statement of logical constraints, the conclusion and the phenomenon is non-voluntary and automatic (hence one could speak of mental mechanisms).

3) Because the effect of the logical constraints is that the person continues to function still more or less realistically when otherwise he would be unable to function, one could speak of the mechanisms as preserving realistic functioning or as a defense.

4). The second observer, P, might set up a taxonomy of the kinds of distortions O was engaging in. If the distortions were explained by the operation of mechanisms, the taxonomy could be identical to that for ego defense mechanisms.

EMOTION FORMULAS CHART

Emotion	Discrimination	Relationship	Behavior	Attitude	Perception	Belief	Feeling	State
fear	danger	is a danger to	escape	fear	danger	danger	fear	fear
anger	provocation	provokes	hostile	anger	provocation	provocation	anger	anger
guilt ₁	wrongdoing before the fact	temptation	avoidance	guilt ₁	wrongdoing before the fact	wrongdoing before the fact	guilt ₁	guilt ₁
guilt ₂	wrongdoing after the fact	wrongdoing	penance restitution	guilt ₂	wrongdoing after the fact	wrongdoing after the fact	guilt ₂	guilt ₂
shame	transgression of social norm	transgression	face-saving	shame	transgression of social norm	transgression of social norm	shame	shame
despair	hopelessness	hopeless	none	despair	hopelessness	hopelessness	despair	despair
envy	inequity	unequal	equalization	envy	inequity	inequity	envy	envy
jealousy	possession	jealous	equity	jealousy	possession	possession	jealousy	jealousy
sadness	bad fortune	loss	lament	sadness	bad fortune	bad fortune	sadness	sadness
joy	good fortune	gain	celebration	joy	good fortune	good fortune	joy	joy
etc.								

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