

Praise for *The Behavior of Persons*

“Reading and re-reading *The Behavior of Persons* is a rare, life-changing event. As your understanding of it grows, your place in the world changes: You see an integrated conceptual system that shows how persons, their behavior and their worlds are connected. Ossorio brings conceptual light to the darkness of a purely empirical world.”

– Keith E. Davis, Ph.D. Distinguished Professor Emeritus of
Psychology University of South Carolina

“Here, finally, we have a serviceable common ground for systematic behavioral science. Peter Ossorio has articulated the conceptual framework for describing the varied and irregular lives of persons and their nuanced world. Wittgenstein recognized that ‘essence is expressed by grammar.’ Here is the grammar of behavior – an extraordinary claim, yes, but *The Behavior of Persons* is an extraordinary work.”

– Wynn Schwartz, Ph.D. The Massachusetts School of Professional
Psychology and Harvard University

“Few thinkers can so profoundly bring coherence to professional practice as well as personal understanding as Peter Ossorio. *The Behavior of Persons* allows the practitioner to reconstruct and create a coherent and eminently practical approach to our work as therapists, as well as ways to illuminate aspects of our own lives.”

– Richard Heinrich, MD Medical Director for Hospice and
Palliative Care HealthPartners

“I believe Ossorio will prove to be the Beethoven of behavioral science. Once you have read *The Behavior of Persons*, you will never again see the tasks or substance of behavioral science in the light you see it now – nor will you be able to ignore his example.”

– Anthony O. Putman, Ph.D. *From the Preface*

“Peter Ossorio’s *The Behavior of Persons*, if it achieves sufficient attention, will be the most important book in the history of psychology. Psychology is at present a largely failed science. *The Behavior of Persons* offers us a very different fundamental approach to our entire discipline, one that is far more scientifically and intellectually sound.”

– Raymond M. Bergner, Ph.D. Professor of Clinical Psychology,
Illinois State University

“People are complicated. We’re influenced by conflicting wants, needs, relationships, and all the many facets of who we are. But our lives make sense and what we do makes sense – not in some mystical way, but in the everyday, down-to-earth, here’s-how-it-works way. This book is what psychology has been promising since it began: a clear, precise, systematic formulation of how people and their actions make sense.”

– H. Joel Jeffrey, Ph.D. Professor of Computing Science, Northern
Illinois University

“Descriptive Psychology has greatly benefited my work to clarify complex and emerging subject matters in healthcare. In *The Behavior of Persons* Peter Ossorio unfolds ideas of ‘behavior’ and ‘persons’ in a clear, unified, and systematic way, bringing out ways of thinking with practical applications to many complex subject matters. A healthcare colleague once remarked from the speaker’s podium, ‘Descriptive Psychologists help you be much clearer about what you are looking at.’ To me this is high praise.”

– C.J. Peek, Ph.D. Department of Family Medicine and Community
Health, University of Minnesota Medical School

The Behavior of Persons



PETER G. OSSORIO

DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY PRESS
ANN ARBOR

© 2006, 2013 by Peter G. Ossorio

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored on a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, filming, recording or otherwise without prior permission in writing from the publisher.

First Printing 2013

Previously published as *The Behavior of Persons: The Collected Works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. V*, 2006. Descriptive Psychology Press, Ann Arbor MI.

Published in Ann Arbor, MI
by Descriptive Psychology Press
3110 Bolgos Circle
Ann Arbor, MI 48105

ISBN: 978-1-891700-08-8

Manufactured in the United States of America.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	vii
List Of Figures.....	xiii
List Of Tables	xiii

I: INTRODUCTION

1. The Task and the Approach	2
2. Some Conceptual-Notational Devices.....	22

II: BASIC CONCEPTS

3. The Concept of Behavior Per Se.....	44
4. Individual Persons	69
5. Reality Concepts	90
6. Verbal Behavior.....	131
7. Commentary on the Four Component Concepts	155

III: A WORLD OF PERSONS AND THEIR WAYS

8. Social Reality as the Real World Context of Behavior	169
9. Understanding Actual Behavior.....	212
10. Engaging in Actual Behavior: The Dramaturgical Model.....	259

IV: ORDINARY MYSTERIES: TOUCHSTONES OF ADEQUACY

11. Emotion 311

12. Personal Identity: Being Me and Being Myself 370

13. Pathology..... 403

Editor’s Note..... 457

Appendix A 458

References..... 459

Peter G. Ossorio Sole-Authored Publications..... 460

Index.....466

Preface

You hold in your hands that rarity: a true work of genius.

The Behavior of Persons is the capstone of an extraordinary construction, the summary of a life's work devoted to a single task. What that task is, why it is worth accomplishing, and how it has been, in fact, accomplished are all matters explored at length in the book itself. This Preface is intended, not to summarize or preview the book, but rather to help the reader begin reading the book with some initial appreciation of its scope and its merit.

Peter G. Ossorio in his life's work accomplished a monumental undertaking: he articulated the complex and fundamental conceptual structure known as the Person concept. Ossorio's work has made it possible to talk clearly and accurately about matters of great significance: persons, behavior, community, language, and the real world within which all these have their place. All these, and more, are parts of this single conceptual structure. By articulating the Person concept in detail and with great rigor, Ossorio has laid the foundation for both a genuinely scientific study of behavior, and powerfully effective practical methods of functioning in these realms. Both of these claims are amply exemplified in this book.

Who, then, is Peter G. Ossorio? What has he contributed? How did he accomplish this monumental work? What is actually meant in calling it "a true work of genius?" And – perhaps the most obvious question – why have you never heard of Ossorio or his work before? Let us attempt to create some understanding of these contextual questions before inviting you to begin the remarkable journey contained in *The Behavior of Persons*.

Peter G. Ossorio (1926-2007) was Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Colorado in Boulder. After receiving his Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from UCLA in 1961, he joined the clinical psychology faculty in Boulder where he taught, supervised, mentored, wrote and conducted research for his entire academic career, and where

he founded a discipline that came to be known as Descriptive Psychology.

What is Descriptive Psychology? The short and most accurate answer is, read *The Behavior of Persons* and find out. But a longer and less exact answer seems called for here. To begin with, the term “Descriptive Psychology” is a somewhat infelicitous compromise, which stuck only because no more useful or informative term could be found. Each word is both informative and misleading, to wit:

- **Descriptive.** In his ground-breaking 1966 monograph, *Persons*, Ossorio found it necessary to address a prevailing misconception of the time, that “it’s all theory.” That is, anything anyone said about persons or behavior *must* be theoretical assertions. Ossorio vigorously pointed out that language in fact does not work that way, and further, that to make a theoretical assertion about any “something” you must first have a *description* of that “something” that reliably discriminates the “something” from other things it might be but is not. In other words, the task of describing accurately is a necessary precursor to theorizing – and “behavioral science” of the time had no place or method for describing behavior. Ossorio proceeded to articulate the conceptual structure within which descriptions of persons and behavior could be given, and in doing so demonstrated that, as Wittgenstein put it: “If you describe something well enough, there is often little left to explain.” So there is a point to the “Descriptive” term. But it can also be misleading. Descriptive Psychology is not essentially about giving descriptions of people and behavior (although that is done, and to good practical effect); it is more commonly and powerfully about articulating the conceptual structure and the methods available for describing accurately and in depth.

- **Psychology:** If you were to tell someone at a holiday party that you were studying people and their behavior, chances are good they will say something like, “Oh, you mean psychology, right?” This ordinary language, common sense usage of the term is congruent with Ossorio’s approach. But the term “psychology,” as used in academic circles, carries with it a set of assumptions and commitments which are irrelevant or even antithetical to the Descriptive Psychology approach. Thus, many

members of the Descriptive Psychology community find themselves in the awkward position of practicing Descriptive Psychology while at the same time needing to assert that they are not, in fact, psychologists at all.

Descriptive Psychology is an intellectual discipline, and a community of practitioners of that discipline. The discipline consists of a rigorous approach (1) to articulating the conceptual framework within which persons, behavior, language, communities and the real world can be described and understood, (2) to using that framework to in fact describe and understand, and (3) to using such descriptions and understanding to increase effectiveness in dealing within these realms.

Let us pause and reflect momentarily on the scope and import of the above statement. The actual and potential impact of Peter Ossorio's work, as found in this book, are indeed remarkable.

The community of practitioners of Descriptive Psychology consists of a hundred or so individuals, ranging from beginners to acknowledged masters. Ossorio founded the discipline and articulated its initial core, but many others have contributed, and continue to contribute, substantially to the substance and practice of Descriptive Psychology. This includes significant work in the fields of psychotherapy, clinical case formulation and diagnosis, the psychology of relationships, teaching of moral judgment, virtues, theology, spirituality, multicultural psychology, artistic and literary analysis, economics, business management, marketing, organization theory and practice, artificial intelligence, and automatic document retrieval – and the list continues to grow.

How can one discipline – no matter how broad its conceptual scope – be useful in such a variety of realms? Understanding this requires us to dig a bit deeper into exactly how Ossorio approached his undertaking, and what his accomplishment amounts to.

Peter Ossorio did not invent the Person concept; he did not create it, nor did he discover it in any usual sense of that term. Ossorio has often used the example of language and grammar to illustrate what he was up

to. The English language was not invented, created or discovered by grammarians – it existed in full long before anyone attempted to formulate or write down a grammar for it. Similarly, the Person concept has existed literally as long as there have been persons, and long before anyone tried to articulate it. In both cases, what observably and inarguably existed was *competence*: the competence of native speakers in speaking the language and recognizing both correct and incorrect usage, and the competence of persons *being* persons in a world of persons and their ways.

What Ossorio set out to do – and accomplished – was to *articulate* the conceptual structure implicit in this competence of persons. His consistent appeal in doing this work was *not* to authority or tradition or aesthetic standards or accepted methodology. His constant appeal was to our *shared competence* as persons ourselves, and from this he built the extraordinary structure contained in *The Behavior of Persons*. And it is within his choice of approach that Ossorio's true genius lies.

I want to make very clear the sense in which I am using the term “genius” to assess Ossorio and his work. I do not use that term lightly. Current usage of the term “genius” has become debased over time through progressive inflation. Like the dollar, which once got you a complete meal and which will now not even buy a cup of coffee, the term we once reserved for the likes of Bach and DaVinci and Einstein is currently applied to football coaches who discover a new wrinkle in pass coverage or any musician whose second CD goes platinum. In assessing *The Behavior of Persons* as a work of true genius, I am using the term in its older, more significant usage.

Let me be more exact. In music, composers were traditionally called “genius” in one of two circumstances. Either their work was accomplished within the forms and conventions they inherited, within which they created masterworks – J.S. Bach is an example of this type of genius – or else they reinvented the forms they received, shattering conventions and creating works unlike any heard before, and once heard, impossible to ignore. Beethoven is the classic example of this type of genius.

I believe Ossorio will prove to be the Beethoven of behavioral science.

Once you have read *The Behavior of Persons*, you will never again see the tasks or substance of behavioral science in the light you see it now – nor will you be able to ignore his example. That is a mark of true genius.

We are left with one last question: if this is such revolutionary stuff, why have you never heard of it before now? The answer to that question says very little about Descriptive Psychology and a great deal about the state of academic behavioral science over the past fifty years. Ossorio himself addressed this issue in detail on a number of occasions, particularly in his seminal work “*What Actually Happens*”: *The Representation of Real World Phenomena*. It would be tedious and essentially pointless to reiterate those arguments here. For our purposes, let the following metaphor suffice.

The American composer Phillip Glass as a student became enamored of Ravi Shankar’s Indian classical music. This music was performed, not written, so Glass attempted to write it down using the centuries-old Western notational devices. He found that he could not do it – somehow, the music didn’t fit. He consulted Shankar himself about his dilemma; the Indian master suggested that he write down the music without using the traditional lines on the score breaking the music into measures. This was *literally* nonsense to Glass: all the music he had ever seen was written down in measures. Everyone knew that without measures there was no music. He tried, failed, and abandoned the attempt.

Years later, when Glass broke with the compositional traditions in which he had been trained and began to compose in a new form, he found that the only effective way to notate the music he was composing was to eliminate the lines between measures.

Peter Ossorio began, metaphorically, by eliminating the lines between the measures. To academics of his time, this was literally nonsense – *everybody* knew that you can’t do behavioral science without measures. To which we can now simply reply: actually, you can. Here it is.

“*What Actually Happens*” begins with the intentionally provocative line: “Sometimes it is better just to make a fresh start.” In that and other

works Ossorio made that fresh start. In *The Behavior of Persons*, we have his report of the completed undertaking. Ossorio has done his work. It is now up to the rest of us to build on it.

I invite you to join us in doing so. The book in your hands is a great place to start.

Anthony O. Putman, Ph.D.
Ann Arbor, Michigan
April, 2013

Acknowledgements

Publication of *The Behavior of Persons* is the culmination of a decades-long labor of love, first by Peter G. Ossorio in its writing, and then by a number of individuals: Lisa Putman, who served as Production Editor for this and all prior volumes in the Collected Works series; Jennifer Vivekanand, who designed and produced the final printed version of the Collected Works edition; C.J. Stone, who provided an extraordinarily thorough Index for this stand-alone edition and Anthony Putman, who edited and published both volumes.

All of us who care about *The Behavior of Persons* also owe a great debt of gratitude to Mary Kathleen Roberts. Without her steadfast dedication, hard work and effort on the volume, we could not have published it during Dr. Ossorio's lifetime. Thanks on behalf of all Descriptive Psychologists to these truly dedicated individuals.

List Of Figures

Reflexive PCF	33
Recursive PC Formula.....	84
Social Practice Schema	171
Social Practice Schema	219
PC-C Model.....	214
Judgment Diagram	228
The A-O-C Loop	243
The A-O-C Learning Loop	244
The Diamond Notation	316
“I ran out the door because I was afraid of the lion.”	316
“I ran out the door because I was afraid of the lion.”	321
Redescription of 9 and 10.....	322
The General Case of Fear Behavior.....	325
The General Case of Emotional Behavior	326
Loss and Behavior Potential.....	343
Significance/Implementation.....	443

List Of Tables

Calculational System for Behavior Description.....	55
Products generated by the Calculational System.....	56
Dispositions	72
SOA Transition Rules	93
Process Representation.....	125
Parameters of Culture.....	181

I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Task and the Approach

In “An Overview of Descriptive Psychology” (1985) I attempted to reconstruct and portray the spirit in which the initial work in Descriptive Psychology was undertaken twenty years earlier. In doing so, I offered the following four slogans, noting that slogans are apt for saying what you live by, and that that is quite different from saying what you happen to believe or what happens to be true.

- (1) *The world makes sense, and so do people. They make sense now.*
- (2) *It's one world.* Everything fits together. Everything is related to everything else.
- (3) *Things are what they are and not something else instead.*
- (4) *Don't count on the world being simpler than it has to be.*

The present volume may be regarded in the same light, with some emphasis on the first slogan. The latter reflected some years of experience at making sense of people and the world both with and without the help of scientific theories and findings, psychological theories and findings, philosophical theories, psychological tests and measurements, and the use of various clinical techniques. It appeared that although the various theories, findings, measurements, and techniques were of some value, there was some important way, as yet unspecified, in which they were, if anything, a handicap or a liability rather than an asset. “They make sense *now*” is an affirmation of that. (Perhaps I should have said, “They already make sense *to begin with*.”)

People make sense? *Of course.* One of the closest things to a brute fact that we have is that people are not inherently mysterious to people. Though there is much that we in fact don't know about a given person or group of persons, still, meeting a stranger on the street is not like coming face to face with a little green man from Mars, nor is it like chancing upon a complex mobile artifact without having the slightest idea of what might ensue. And having lunch with my Uncle Ben is not like meeting a stranger on the street. With persons, one might say, it is I and Thou.

That people understand people is surely one of the fundamental things about people. And though that is hardly open to question, there are questions one might ask. The most natural question, perhaps, is “How come? How is it that people are not inherently mysterious to people?”

A couple of mundane considerations are helpful in limiting the range of possible answers.

1. Infants are not born with the characteristics that are paradigmatic for humans, and our experience with feral children shows that becoming human is not just a matter of the maturation of the organism. Rather, as we know, these characteristics are learned as the infant grows up. Being human in the sense of having paradigmatic human characteristics, is something that is acquired. It is acquired as a result of participating as a person among persons in a world of persons and their ways.

What is acquired in this way is primarily a general ability, not, e.g., some kind of knowledge. Operating as a person among persons is something one *learns how* to do. It is what one comes to have the ability to do. It is what one *knows how* to do. Among the various powers that persons have, this is the most fundamental.

To be sure, in order to *be* a person, more is required than the ability to operate as a person among persons. What is also required is (a) that the individual has a history of actually doing that (operating as a person among persons) and (b) that actually doing that is what the individual does directly, which is to say that actually doing that is not the result of actually operating in some other way. (More colloquially, one could say here that operating as a person in a world of persons and their ways is spontaneous and comes naturally.)

What does *not* happen is that we first (somehow) acquire a theory or a definition concerning persons and then apply it to certain individuals whom we (somehow) pick out as appropriate subjects. If it happened that way then what we would primarily acquire would be knowledge about persons.

2. It is a truism that what is fundamental to persons is common to (all) persons.

- (a) We shall later see what it takes to keep this truism honest. (The reference above to “being human in the sense of having human characteristics...” reflects the fact that we have not dealt with this issue yet.)
- (b) No doubt this truism accounts in large part for the near universal tendency among psychologists (and others) to define human beings as organisms: “There may not be anything else in common across all human beings, but *at least* they’re all organisms.”

What is definitely not common across all persons is matters of fact. People are known to disagree about matters of fact from the most trivial to the most profound. (And, of course, they disagree about what is trivial and what is profound.) There is no body of statements that we know of that would literally draw universal assent.

If we ask, “How can they do that?” (rather than, e.g., “What are the grounds of the possibility that...”) one answer is quite clear. We can disagree about facts only if we share the concepts in terms of which those facts are formulated. We could not, for example, disagree about whether the cat is on the mat if we did not share the concepts of “cat,” “mat,” “on,” etc. If we did not share those concepts, we could only fail to understand each other, but we could not disagree about whether the cat is on the mat.

Although misunderstanding is far from uncommon, we do routinely take it that our apparent disagreements really are disagreements and not merely failures to understand. After all, the concepts that are involved in the various facts that I disagree with you about are, by and large, the very same concepts that are involved in the various other facts that I do agree with you about. Thus, if apparent disagreements were illusory because we didn’t share the relevant concepts, apparent agreements would be equally illusory. Sharing concepts is equally necessary for either agreement or disagreement about matters of fact. Given that, concepts emerge as the kind of thing that might, after all, be common to (all) persons.

How do these two considerations help? We may agree that people's understanding of people is primarily a matter of ability rather than knowledge, but what we want, perhaps not entirely legitimately, is knowledge about that state of affairs. *What is it* for people to find people "not inherently mysterious"? *What* ability is involved? *How* is it exercised? And so on.

Because we are so truth-oriented and knowledge-focused we are tempted to ask, "What is it that people know about people that makes them non-mysterious?" But the answer to that question would have to be "Nothing. There is nothing that everyone knows about everyone that makes them not inherently mysterious." The universality consideration prevents us from pursuing various fruitless courses along those lines. Moreover, if there were things that everyone knew about everyone, we could expect that it would be easy to say what those things were. But there isn't anything of that sort, and whatever there is to say is not easy. Things are more complex than that.

The two considerations, concerning acquisition and universality, do, however, suggest a formally viable alternative which can be outlined as follows.

- A. The ability that people have that enables them to understand people is the ability to use, or act on, a certain concept. This concept is designated as "the Person concept" or, interchangeably, "the concept of the Person."
- B. Mastery and use of this concept is what is universal among persons (subject to the resolution of the universality issue, which is dealt with in the discussion of the Paradigm Case Formulation in Chapter 2).
- C. It is universal among persons because mastery of that concept and the routine spontaneous exercise of that mastery are what make a person a person.
- D. The concept of the Person can be articulated as a structure of interrelated component concepts (and their components, etc). If that is done, then, correspondingly, the ability to act on the

concept of the Person will have been articulated as a structure of the interrelated abilities to act on the component concepts.

- E. The structure of interrelated component concepts is the “cognitive content” of the Person concept. This is as close as there is to being a “knowledge” aspect of people’s general understanding of people.
- F. A delineation of this cognitive content will provide a ground level elucidation of what there is to understand about people and what it is to be a person.

Of these several points, perhaps the only one that needs elaboration is the third one. In this connection we can make use of the “game” analogy. Consider: Mastery of the concept of baseball is universal among baseball players. That is so because mastery of that concept and the exercise of that mastery is what makes a baseball player a baseball player. A baseball player, as such, is not inherently mysterious to another baseball player. Although his actual baseball behaviors may not be predictable and their rationale may be opaque, they were already systematic possibilities within the game. They were systematic possibilities because the conceptual structure of baseball *creates* (out of nothing) a logically self-contained universe of possible actions, interactions, relationships, and states of affairs all of which hang together and make a certain kind of sense – baseball sense.

Similarly: Mastery of the Person concept is universal among persons. That is so because mastery of the Person concept and the routine spontaneous exercise of that mastery is what makes a person a person. An individual person, as such, is not inherently mysterious to another person. Although his actual behaviors may not be predictable and their rationales may be opaque, they were already systematic possibilities within the Person concept. They were systematic possibilities for the life of a person. They were systematic possibilities because the structure of the Person concept creates a logically self-contained universe of possible actions, interactions, relationships, and states of affairs all of which hang together and make a certain kind of sense – human sense. Common sense. This self-contained universe is what we commonly call “the real world,” and there is nothing that lies outside its scope.

(Such a comment may seem to be excessively sweeping. However, not only is it not grandiose, it isn't even original. Intuitions of this kind have been expressed down through recorded history, from the Greek "Man is the measure of all things," to Kant's thesis that we know things only in relation to ourselves, not how they are in themselves, to Santayana's observation that "Human life is a peculiar reality in that every other reality, effective or presumptive, must, in one way or another, find a place within it.")

Delineating the structure of a concept of such breadth is neither simple nor easy, but neither is it impossible. The major part of the present work is devoted to the report of such an effort as the primary task of Descriptive Psychology. Four primary components of the Person concept are identified and articulated in Section II. These components are the concepts of (a) Behavior, (b) Individual Person, (c) Reality, and (d) Language. Additional and derivative concepts are introduced in Section III to address "the world of persons and their ways."

Too many cooks spoil the broth, and too many preliminaries spoil the telling. In the present case, however, I expect that more than the usual amount of preparation is called for. By way of preparation, therefore, we shall consider the following.

- I. Clarifying the distinctions/relationships among "Person," "Human Being," "Alien," and "Robot."
- II. A comparison with a familiar, related enterprise so as to clarify the nature of the present task.
- III. A characterization of a certain genre of "speaking with authority" so as to clarify the nature of the presentation here.
- IV. A review of some of the peculiarities and difficulties associated with dealing with concepts rather than purported facts.
- V. (In the following chapter) some methodological resources needed for the task at hand.

I. Persons and Human Beings et al.

There is an old Spanish saying to the effect that before the Spaniards

discovered the Fulanese, the Fulanese didn't know they were speaking Fulanese – they thought they were just *speaking*. Such sayings are not necessarily historically accurate, of course, but they do have a point to make. In the present case, the saying directs our attention to an important phenomenon, i.e., that when we have empirically available only one kind of example within a general category of things, we may well fail to make the relevant distinctions between the generic and the specific. Much may hinge on how we succeed or fail at this.

In 1915 (so the legend goes) all the airplanes that we knew of consisted of a wooden frame covered with cloth, held together with wires, and with a motor-driven propeller in front. We did not at that time define an airplane in those terms. Had we done so, progress in aeronautics would very likely have consisted of researching, designing, and building bigger and better machines consisting of wooden frames covered with cloth, held together with wires, and with a motor-driven propeller in front.

In 1947 every computer we knew of consisted of a supportive frame hung with vacuum tubes, relays, and an overlay of control structures. We did not at that time define a computer in those terms. Had we done so, progress in computer construction would very likely have consisted of building bigger and better machines consisting of vacuum tubes, relays, and control structures.

In the year 2002 all the persons of whom we have public record are individuals who are specimens of *Homo sapiens*. In contrast to the case of computers and airplanes, in general, psychologists and others almost universally do at this time define persons in these terms. The conceptual frameworks and conceptual fragments which currently support most of the efforts of clinical and research practitioners in psychology either (a) 'define' persons as organisms or (b) make the a priori assumption that persons are organisms or (c) simply address "organisms" as their subject matter. On this basis, one could expect that progress in the field will consist of more extensive and detailed assimilations of the activities of human beings to the processes that are characteristic of organisms.

As in the case of airplanes and computers (and just about anything else we can think of) there are good reasons for not confounding persons and organisms. As it happens, the alternative is exceptionally easy. For this purpose we can introduce the following definitions and distinctions immediately, and without preamble, since the logic is perfectly straightforward, though the substance of the first definition as presented is elliptical and is developed at length only later, in Chapter 4.

1. A Person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action in a dramaturgical pattern.
2. A Human Being is an individual who is both a Person and a specimen of *Homo sapiens*.
3. An Alien Being is an individual who is a Person and has a biological embodiment other than that of *Homo sapiens*.
4. A Robot is an individual who is a Person and has a non-biological embodiment.

These are straightforward because it is clear that our concept of a Person allows for at least these subcategories and that this doesn't depend at all on whether there actually are any robots or aliens or on whether we ever actually encounter any. A generation raised on science fiction portrayals of human-like robots and aliens can have no illusions about that. "Sure. What's the big deal?" say our *fin de siècle* teenagers.

Of the four concepts defined above, it is clear that the fundamental concept is that of a Person, since that is what is common to human beings, alien beings, and robots. The definitions provide the basic guidelines for not confusing persons with human beings and not confusing human beings with organisms.

II. "The Grammar of Operating as a Person among Persons"

In clarifying the nature of the enterprise of articulating the Person concept we can make use of the familiar and relatively transparent notion of the grammar of a natural language. (I will use English as the example.) In doing so, it is instructive to review the state of affairs that obtains there.

Infants are not born speaking English. Rather, speaking English is

something they acquire the ability to do. Speaking English is something they *learn how* to do, and they acquire that ability by learning to operate as English speakers among English speakers in a world of English speakers and their ways.

This much is undeniable, but we are not content to leave it at that. For we ask, “*What* is it that they (all) learn? *What* is it that they now have that constitutes their being able to speak English? *What* is it that they know how to do when they know how to speak English? What was there for them *to* learn?” And so on.

Prompted by such concerns we have generally distinguished the grammar and the lexicon of a language as constituting the language. Then, the operative principle is that to say something in English is to speak in accordance with the grammar and the lexicon of the language at the time in question.

In this context, it is the grammar of English which is the most problematic, and it is the notion most closely associated with the idea of what English *is*. The complexity and difficulty of the task of formulating the grammar of English is perhaps shown most clearly by the fact that an entire academic discipline has not yet succeeded completely in this task, though it has nearly done so, and for many purposes we can say “Yes, we know what the grammar of English is.”

Of course, the absence of a finally definitive grammar has never prevented us from teaching the grammar of English to school children who are native English speakers, using such devices as diagramming sentences, distinguishing parts of speech, etc. It is instructive that some speakers who routinely speak in accordance with the grammar of English have an extremely difficult time learning to say what the grammar of English is.

These aspects of language are most important and informative in the present context because there is a thoroughgoing parallel between them (individually and on the whole) and the issues noted above in connection with the Person concept. In both cases the central task is that of moving

from simply knowing how, to an articulation of what it is that one knows or knows how to do when one knows how (knows how to speak English, knows how to operate as a person among persons), and that transition is hazardous.

There is a reason why we raise those questions so insistently in regard to language and persons, whereas we are not much inclined to do so in connection with knowing how to throw a ball or knowing how to draw a circle. We raise the questions because there is clearly something systematic involved. This is shown in such features as the following.

- (a) The various achievements which result from the exercise of the know how have significant logical (conceptual) relationships to one another.
- (b) The number of distinct possible achievements which are attributable to the same competence is indefinitely large or literally infinite.

The most attractive conclusion in such cases is that what we learned when we learned how is how to work some kind of system. This explains why from a finite set of learning experiences we acquire an ability that accounts for an unlimited number of distinct achievements. Thus, the task quickly resolves itself into the task of delineating the system involved. Delineating a system can be done in a variety of forms.

An explicit grammar for a natural language is a set of rules or conceptual procedures for “doing it” or, equally, for “doing it right,” where “it” is speaking the language. In a similar vein, we can think of a “grammar” of the Person or equally, of operating as a Person among Persons. This would be a set of rules for “doing it” or “doing it right.” Articulating the Person concept is essentially that kind of enterprise. It is done in terms of concepts rather than rules for reasons that are surveyed below.

It will not have escaped notice that there is a continuity, and not merely a parallel or similarity, between the tasks of specifying what it is that one “knows” when one knows how in regard to persons and in regard

to language, since, as noted above, the concept of language is one of the four major components of the concept of the Person.

The notions of a grammar or a grammar plus lexicon or a grammatical-lexical combination are all admittedly incomplete. They are lacking an essential connection to the real world. Traditionally, this connection is provided by verbal performances which are historically situated and context dependent. Thus, we have the language, represented as grammar and lexicon, and we have the historically situated act of speaking that language, or speaking in that language. Correspondingly, linguists speak of a “theory of competence” and a “theory of performance.”

For linguists, a theory of linguistic performance is a very different sort of thing from a theory of linguistic competence. Whereas the latter is a matter of delineating a logical structure, their theories of performance have leaned heavily on the notion of persons as organisms and of linguistic competence as being partially “wired in.”

The concept of language is a conceptual fragment that is inherently unintelligible except as a fragment of a more comprehensive conceptual structure. Very briefly:

- (a) It is a truism that verbal behavior is a form of behavior (a special case of behavior). Without behavior, there is no linguistic behavior either. Thus, to speak of language is to presuppose the more general concept of behavior.
- (b) It is too obvious even to be a truism that every behavior is someone's behavior. *A fortiori*, every linguistic behavior is someone's linguistic behavior. Without speakers, there is no language; language *conceptually* requires speakers who have something to say. It requires the concept of individuals who engage in both verbal and non-verbal behavior. Thus, there is a conceptual structure which extends across persons, behavior and language.
- (c) We noted above that acts of speaking (like all behaviors) are historically situated within a real world context and that it is this connection which makes language real. Thus, the conceptual

structure which extends across persons, behavior, and language encompasses the real world as well.

This conceptual structure is designated here as “the Person concept,” and it is the primary task of the present volume to delineate that conceptual structure recursively (though not mechanically so) as a structure of interrelated component concepts. The latter leads us to their component concepts and the corresponding relationships among components, etc.

The contrast between the linguists’ strategy and the present approach is illuminating. The linguists develop grammars as “theories of linguistic competence” and then switch to separate, qualitatively different, empirically-oriented “theories of performance” to deal with the conceptual requirements concerning speakers, behavior, and real world context. In contrast, the present approach retains a single, non-empirical, ‘grammatical’ (conceptual) treatment of competence with respect to the entire domain that encompasses persons, behavior, language, and the real world. It is essentially the same kind of thing as a grammar or the “rules of the game,” but it has a much broader scope.

III. Speaking With Authority

If I am a competent player of a game I probably will not be able to sit down and write out a set of rules which are the rules of that game (unless, of course, I learned the game by first learning the rules). After all, knowing how to play the game is different from knowing that these are its rules.

But then again, I might be able to sit down and do just that. After all, who should know better than me? What we can say is that setting down the rules calls for some other competence in addition to just knowing how to play the game. One can also say that in setting down the rules, knowing how to play the game is a fundamental and irreplaceable asset.

What could confidently be expected of me as a competent player of the game is that given a hypothetical action in the context of that game, I

would be able to say that it was in accordance with the rules or that it was not. Why should I be able to do that? Because that is the kind of judgment I have to exercise in order to play the game. When I take an action in the course of playing the game I have to be confident that the action falls within the rules; correspondingly I have to be able to recognize and challenge rule violations when they occur. If I cannot do that, I am not a competent player of the game.

The rules of a game are something we assent to and accept the responsibility of enforcing, as a condition of there being such a game at all. They are not facts independent of us or antecedent to us that could be established independently of us, e.g., through divination or systematic observation, scientific or otherwise. They are normative, not empirical, and its being the case that they are normative is also not empirical. What is empirical here is that particular people do certain things and not others.

Thus, when as *a baseball player* I say that "It's three strikes and you're out," I speak with authority, and I speak for *us* (us baseball players). I do not offer it as a personal opinion, or as a guess, or as a highly probable hypothesis, or as part of a theory, nor yet as the outcome of an investigation. Rather, I speak with authority as one who knows how to play the game: "*This* is how you do it." Who should know better than me?

Any competent baseball player, speaking as such, would speak with the same authority. Each of us is in a position to speak for all of us.

Similarly, it is a well-accepted conclusion in linguistics that the ultimate criterion for whether a given expression is a sentence in English is "native speaker intuition," i.e., the judgments made by competent speakers of the language. And, of course, the ultimate criterion for whether an individual is a person would be the judgments made by full-fledged persons.

This is the basic state of affairs, which is complicated by, but should not be obscured by, certain auxiliary considerations.

A. Here, as in any human enterprise, people differ in their degree

of mastery, in their level of competence, and so their judgments often differ. However, partly because people also learn to appraise their own level of capability, the absence of dead-level agreement in judgment does not fatally undermine the viability of the enterprise. It is no accident that we have Webster's Dictionary, Hoyle's Book of Rules, Roget's Thesaurus, and other trusted repositories of judgment and competence.

- B. I can be wrong. If I say "In baseball, it's four strikes and you're out," my judgment can be readily impeached, for there will be no "us" who play the game that way. If the error is egregious, as in "four strikes and you're out," not only my judgment but also my standing as a competent baseball player may be impeached. How could I really play baseball if I think that way?
- C. There can be genuine disagreements, and these can be negotiated. If the negotiation ends in a stand-off, the likely conclusion would be "It looks like you learned (play) a different game (or a different variation of the same game)." "I guess we speak different dialects (or idiolects) of English." "Obviously, your concept of 'x' is different from mine (ours)." And so on. Appropriate adjustments are generally fairly easy to make.

If the negotiation ends in agreement, we will not have resolved a question of observational fact. We will not have *discovered* the answer. What we will have done is to settle the question of how we are to proceed.

In short, speaking authoritatively in this way, speaking for *us*, is not the same sort of enterprise as reporting an observation or other factual discovery. Nor is it the same sort of thing as arguing for a philosophical theory or a psychological one. It has its own hazards and reality constraints, and treating it as observational or theoretical would be as egregious as saying "In baseball, it's four strikes and you're out" and would have the same consequences.

Maxim: If a situation calls for a person to do something he can't do,

he will do something he can do.

IV. The Trouble with Concepts

Both games and grammars are defined by distinctive sets of rules, and heuristic reference has been made to both in clarifying the nature of the problem that arises when we try to say what we know when we know how to do something like playing baseball or speaking English. Yet, as indicated above, in the present effort to say what it is we know when we know how to operate as a person among persons, the primary idiom will be that of concepts, acting on concepts, and mastering concepts. The latter involves some mix of (a) the ability to identify instances, (b) the ability to relate the concept to other concepts, and (c) the ability to act on the concept (use the concept) in some normative ways.

The fact is that the two idioms are conceptually so highly overlapping that they are highly interchangeable and convertible into each other.

Consider the notion that she knows the meaning of an expression (has the concept) if she knows how to use that expression (correctly) in the language games in which it has a place. Compare that to the notion that she knows the meaning of an expression if she knows the rules that govern its use in the various language games in which it has a use. Both idioms direct our attention to a certain kind of selectivity, a certain principle of selection or rejection in regard to various cases, instances, actions, etc. It is the kind of selectivity that we saw earlier is necessarily exercised by a competent player of a game.

Some of the convertibility between the two idioms stems from the fact that (a) mastery of a concept involves, in part, the ability to act on that concept in some normative ways, and (b) acting in any one of those ways can be described as following a rule (e.g., the rule of “doing” whatever the action in question is). Conversely, following a rule (e.g., writing down the positive integers in order, or driving on the left side of the road) can be described as acting on a concept (e.g., the concept of generating the series of positive integers, or driving on the left side of the road).

Because the correspondence is not that one of the idioms is a simple mirror of the other, the two idioms, in practice, show a difference in range of convenience. When a single, isolated rule is in question (e.g., driving on the left side of the road) stating the rule is clean, quick, and generally preferable. Conversely, many of the concepts we use, perhaps the great majority of them, are cases where we can't specify all the rules that we follow when we act competently on these concepts though we don't doubt it's a rule-following kind of situation. (Recall the case of the grammar of English.) In such cases talking in terms of concepts and acting on concepts is clean, quick, and indispensable.

(A variant on the idiom of acting on concepts is that of acting on distinctions. If I act on concept X, I act on the distinction between X and some set of alternative non-X's (which may be lumped together as "not X"). Because of this equivalence, "Acting on the concept X" will be used interchangeably with "Acting on the distinction X vs. non-X.")

Note that in such cases as "generate the series of positive integers" and "drive on the left side of the road," the phrase not only specifies the rule that I follow and the concept I act on, but it also is a straightforward ordinary language specification of my behavior. It is what I actually *do*. There is a strong link in ordinary language between acting on a concept and simply acting. This will be borne out in the formulation of behavior in Chapter 3.

There is another consideration which, by itself, is probably decisive for the choice of concepts rather than rules as the preferred idiom for the present effort.

Wittgenstein once commented substantially as follows. "A game is not everywhere demarcated by the rules. For example, there is no rule in tennis concerning how high I have to throw the ball when I serve."

This implies that there is more to mastering the concept of tennis (etc.) than learning to follow all the rules, and that there is more to the

concept than is encompassed by the rules. The tennis example brings out why acquiring concepts is fundamentally a matter of practice and experience. (After observing and participating in a few games of tennis, how high to throw the ball is probably not a real question.)

It is fortunate that the several considerations above give some antecedent credibility to the idea that (a) the Person concept, as we have mastered it, is what we 'know' when we know how to operate as a person among persons, and (b) the way to elucidate the Person concept is as a complex conceptual structure which is to be articulated by reference to a number of interrelated subsidiary concepts. It is fortunate because there is a variety of problems, not merely in actually presenting the concepts, but also with the idea of presenting concepts, and, indeed, with the idea of "a concept."

A brief review on the matter of concepts here may make for easier going later on.

1. What is a concept? That is a natural question, but it is a bad one. To paraphrase a well known architect and teacher, "If a concept were a something it would have to be a very *peculiar* something." But a concept is not a something, nor is it something peculiar. The basic contextual frame for making "concept" intelligible is the following. "P uses concept C in engaging in behavior B" or, equivalently, "P acts on concept C in engaging in behavior B." Concepts are an aspect of behavior.

Concepts do not come in singletons. They come in pairs or larger sets. Thus, "P acts on concept C" is the same thing as "P acts on the distinction of C vs. some set of alternatives, C1, C2, C3..." Information theory makes clear why this would be so. If there were no contrast, no information would be carried by 'distinguishing' C (distinguishing it from what?). In that case, no basis for acting in one way or another would be provided, and we would say that no real distinction was being made.

Maxim: A person needs the world to be one way rather than another in order to have a reason to act in one way rather than another.

Note that speaking of acting on a concept is thriftier than speaking of acting on a distinction, because it requires less knowledge on our part. For example, we can say that he acted on the concepts “cat” and “mat” without having to know what the contrasting concepts were. (To be sure, we may then be missing something important.)

2. Concepts can’t be told. I can tell you a fact, but I can’t tell you a concept, nor can I draw you a picture of one, which makes the notion of presenting a concept strongly problematic. I can tell you that the cat is on the mat, but if I say “cat” or “mat” or “behavior” I haven’t told you anything.

I tell you a fact or purported fact by making a statement. Statements require concepts. (So do beliefs). If I make the statement that the cat is on the mat, there are at least three concepts involved, i.e., “cat,” “mat,” and “on.” Concepts don’t require statements (or beliefs).

Acquiring concepts is associated fundamentally with practice and experience (and secondarily with teaching and learning) rather than with showing and telling. (In contrast, facts are acquired by observation and thought.)

3. Statements (and theories and beliefs) have truth value. Concepts do not. If I tell you that “The pigs are rooting for truffles,” what I say may be true and it may be false. If I say “pigs” what I say couldn’t possibly be true or false, nor could the concept “pigs” be true or false. Because concepts have no truth value, they can’t have any assumptions, either, nor any presuppositions. Nor could there be any evidence or argument for or against them, nor could they be believed or doubted. In short, concepts have none of the familiar truth-oriented features that we are so sensitized to and that we spend roughly *all* of our time dealing with.

4. Concepts are acquired by practice and experience. The relevant practice and experience is participating in some of the social practices that involve using the concept in question. Historically, our criteria for

having acquired a concept include the following.

- (a) Having the ability to recognize instances of the concept (if it is the kind of concept that has recognizable instances).
- (b) Having the ability to relate the concepts to other concepts appropriately. (This includes reasoning involving the concept.)
- (c) Having the ability to act appropriately on the concept in some paradigmatic ways.

The salience of particular criteria will vary from concept to concept because concepts, including conceptual structures, vary among themselves. For some complex concepts, e.g., “arithmetic,” “science,” “chess,” “cure,” and the like, the third criterion is salient. The paradigmatic way of acting on the concept of “arithmetic” is to do some arithmetic. Someone who can’t do arithmetic but recognizes when someone else is doing it or who merely has a general description of it or a definition, will be judged to be seriously lacking in respect to mastery of the concept. In contrast, for other concepts such as “red,” recognizing instances is salient, perhaps because the others are then not particularly problematic.

The Person concept is much more like “arithmetic” than it is like “red” in this regard.

5. Concepts are related to other concepts. When multiple relationships are involved we speak of conceptual structures or conceptual systems. Patterns of conceptual interrelationships can be presented by means of:

- (a) Schemas, diagrams, etc.
- (b) The logical forms discussed in Chapter 2.
- (c) Discourse which connects concepts.

The presentation below makes use of all of these, including the “etc.” A key consideration here is that although concepts can’t in general be shown pictorially, connections or relationships among them can be indicated pictorially, and since conceptual structures involve interrelationships among concepts, portraying conceptual structures is not entirely hopeless.

When conceptual relationships are portrayed by means of discourse,

pragmatically the most natural discursive form is that of prescription, injunction, instruction, and the like. One says “Notice this ... feature.” “Look at the difference between this one and that one.” “Use the concept in this way, i.e., ...” “Consider a structure of the following sort.” “Use ... as the conceptual frame for understanding ‘P’.” Etc.

Equally pragmatically, however, this works only in short stretches, for the most part. Extended discourse in these forms is almost certain to be forced and unnatural and consequently, ineffective. In contrast, the discourse flows naturally when declarative sentences predominate. The danger is that the declarative sentences are likely to be taken as statements of fact when they are not. Fortunately (since declarative sentences predominate in this presentation) such an error is not inevitable, and advance notice should help. (A student recently commented, “Now I see why it’s not a theory. Everything you’ve been telling us for the last six weeks is like one long definition instead of a lot of different statements that may or may not be true!” Just so.)

2. Some Conceptual-Notational Devices

Subsequent chapters present the Person concept at some length and detail. These formulations are accomplished by means of a number of notational devices with accompanying commentaries or illustrations.

Because notational devices of verbal and other sorts are public and communicable, they play an essential part in the public and communicable character of concepts. Because of this essential connection the notational devices used in the formulation of the Person concept are designated as “conceptual-notational devices.”

We also distinguish between particular conceptual-notational devices and the general types of which they are instances. Where the context does not clearly indicate which of the two is involved, the latter are designated as “conceptual-notational device types.”

Our present concern is with four related device types. These are (1) Definition, (2) Paradigm Case Formulation, (3) Parametric Analysis, and (4) Calculational System. Particular devices of these sorts appear throughout and from the very beginning with the presentation of the concept of behavior by means of a parametric analysis, a formula, and a calculational system.

One reason for considering these four as a group is that each has some relevance to the problem of introducing a subject matter without any essential reference to any other subject matter. (Since the Person concept is all-inclusive the formulation cannot depend on any existing science, philosophy, or discipline. These are not possible resources.)

A second reason for considering the four device types as a group is that they have a variety of systematic connections and relationships. Because of this, each may contribute to the understanding of the others, and that argues for a collective presentation rather than a piecemeal one. (The domain within which these relationships have a place is a special topic in its own right and will call for further elucidation at a later time.)

DEFINITION

Traditionally, to define a term, “Q,” is to specify the necessary and sufficient condition(s), Z, for the correct use of the term. Certain additional requirements are involved:

1. The satisfaction of condition(s) Z must be what makes the use of the term correct. (Consider that having an angular sum of 180 degrees is a necessary and sufficient condition for a plane polygon to be a triangle, but it is having three sides that makes it a triangle, and that is the defining condition. One might put it that its being a triangle *is* its having three sides, whereas its being a triangle is only logically equivalent to its having an angular sum of 180 degrees.)
2. The term “Q” is to be used to refer to the states of affairs which consist of the satisfaction of the necessary and sufficient conditions. (Thus, even if one could specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of the term “Aha!” that wouldn’t be a definition because “Aha!” is not used to refer to those conditions. Here, “correct use” paraphrases as “appropriate” rather than “true.”)
3. The term “Q” does not appear essentially in the specification of the condition(s) Z. (If it does, the definition is “circular,” and one would normally say that it wasn’t *really* [didn’t do the proper job of] a definition, but rather, only had the form of a definition.).

Reflection on the last qualification provides a couple of reminders. First, it pays to distinguish between (a) cases where the term being defined is introduced into the discourse by means of that definition and (b) cases where the term being defined already has a current use and the definition is designed to preserve and clarify that use. The most important cases in the following chapters are of this latter kind.

Second, in cases of the latter kind, for any term “Q,” for which a necessary and sufficient condition for applicability is relevant, there is a simple, direct, and rigorous way of specifying that condition in the absence of a definition, namely “Q.” For example, the necessary and sufficient condi-

tion for the correct application of the term “blue” to something is that it be blue; the necessary and sufficient condition for the application of the term “angry” to a person is that the person be angry; and so on.

For such cases, therefore, a traditional definition is not *the* way of specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of the term “Q.” Rather, it is a second way of doing so. Not too surprisingly, a second way is usually not available. (Just as one may argue that no two words are *really* synonymous, so one may argue plausibly that no terms designating real world phenomena are *really* definable except those which are, in effect, created by a definition, i.e., the first case, above. It is instructive to try to formulate a really rigorous definition of something like a chair, a lemon, or a mountain, just as it is often instructive to give a set of directions for a simple behavior, such as tying one’s shoelaces, such that if only those directions are complied with the behavior *must* be successful. Just as a game is not everywhere bounded by the rules, actions taken in conformity to a set of instructions are not in every respect determined by the instructions. Such exercises can do much to clarify the distinctive contributions of knowledge and competence.)

Thus, we are led to the following in regard to terms which already have a current use.

- (a) Definitions are given for the sake of a listener who is not already clear enough about the way “Q” is used or is to be used. They are not in principle necessary for specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of “Q,” nor are they necessary for picking out cases of Q.
- (b) The clarification attempted by recourse to a definition may not be successful. In that case, some definition of the terms used in the first definition may help. But this procedure cannot be carried out *ad infinitum*. Definitions can be given in this recursive fashion, but the success of a definition depends ultimately on the successful use of terms which do not need further clarification for the task at hand. Either the original term “Q” or any further definition is ultimately an appeal to the competence of the listener,

not a device for creating something out of nothing. Thus, any general ‘requirement’ that all terms be given a definition (or even that they be capable of being defined) is futile and misguided.

- (c) For a term “Q,” which is already in use, unless one already understands “Q,” there is no way to tell whether the necessary and sufficient conditions specified by a definition are the same as the necessary and sufficient conditions specified by “Q.” (One couldn’t distinguish a good definition of “Q” from a bad one.) As noted above, we may expect that in general there is a difference, and it is then a matter of practical judgment in a given case as to whether the difference vitiates the definition.

In connection with this last point, it should be noted that there is a class of cases where the definition gives us something that is clearly and radically different from the original term. Social scientists are notorious for engaging in this practice. One can survey the literature and quickly come across examples such as (a) pleasure is ‘defined’ as “the diffuse experience of reward mechanisms in the brain”; (b) verbal behavior is defined as “behavior the reinforcement of which is mediated by another person”; and (c) love is defined as “the reciprocal satisfaction of dependency needs.” Since one is always free to introduce the corresponding theory or hypothesis, e.g., the *hypothesis* that pleasure is (nothing but) the diffuse experience of reward mechanisms in the brain (but then the issue of testing it arises), it seems evident that the motivation here is polemic and ideological rather than intellectual or scientific.

The definition of human beings as organisms is in this class.

PARADIGM CASE FORMULATION

A definition can be understood as a response to the problem of conceptually picking out a set of cases (a “domain”) that we want to refer to and distinguishing members of that set from any other cases. A paradigm case formulation (PCF) can be understood as an alternative response to the same problem.

In a definition, both tasks are accomplished in one move, i.e., giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for the applicability of “X.” In a

PCF the cases are picked out in groups in accordance with the following two-stage schema.

Stage 1. Introduce a Paradigm Case specification for X.

Stage 2. Introduce one or more transformations of the paradigm case.

The paradigm case specification will directly identify a subgroup of the cases of X. Each transformation will pick out an additional group of cases. (If there is more than one transformation, a necessary housekeeping task is to specify which combinations of transformations are to be effected.)

If the PCF is successful, the combination of the paradigm case specification and the transformations will pick out all and only the cases of X. Each transformation may be understood as an instruction and a criterion: “Start with *this* (the paradigm case of X), change it in *this* way (the instruction), and the result will still (also) be a case of X (the criterion).” Thus, a PCF can accomplish the identification of a subject matter (cases of X) no less effectively than would a definition.

A classic example of a paradigm case formulation is the following PCF for “a family.”

1. Paradigm Case: A husband and his wife living with their natural children, who are a seventeen-year-old son and a ten-year-old daughter.
2. Transformations:
 - T1. Eliminate one parent but not both.
 - T2. Change the number of children to N, $N > 0$.
 - T3. Change the sex distribution of children to any distribution other than zero boys and zero girls.
 - T4. Change the ages of the children to any values compatible with the ages of the parents.
 - (T5.) Any combination from T1, T2, T3, and T4.
 - T6. Add any number of additional parents.
 - T7. Add adopted and other legally defined sons and/or

daughters.

T8. Eliminate the requirement of living together.

T9. Change the number of children to zero if husband and wife are living together.

Note that constructing a PCF has a good deal in common with constructing a definition. For example, it calls for careful decisions and the exercise of judgment in regard to which cases to include or exclude. In both cases, disagreement may arise among different persons. For example, T6-T9 seem much more likely to elicit objections (“I wouldn’t call that a family!”) than T1-T5.

There are important differences.

1. A definition can be regarded as a degenerate case of PCF, i.e., one in which there is only a paradigm case specification but no transformations. In this case, all the cases of X are picked out by the paradigm case specification, and the latter gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a case of X.

2. We tend to think of a definition as a standard way to introduce a concept or a subject matter. Ironically, it is one of the easiest ways to lose a subject matter at the first step. Nor does it have to be a flagrant scam such as the cases of “pleasure,” “verbal behavior,” “love,” and “human being” noted above. For, consider that a definition of X, if it is not to be circular, must be given in some other terms, Y and Z. Almost inevitably, one loses the X in favor of Y and Z because (a) that is what X really is, per the definition, and (2) after all, if one gives a definition of X in terms of Y and Z, that sends a strong signal that “X” was not a good enough way of saying what X really is. If one is not prepared to sacrifice X in this way, one normally does not give a definition of “X,” but merely uses “X” to refer to X. In contrast to these problematic aspects of definition, a PCF presents no such problems. Since a PCF begins with genuine cases of X (the paradigm case specification) and each transformation generates something that is still (also) a case of X, we are in little danger of replacing X’s with Y’s and Z’s.

3. A PCF has a formal structure, whereas a definition does not. In most PCF's the transformations reflect differences among cases, and these differences are at face value relevant for the task at hand or in other contexts. (Two-parent families are importantly different from one-parent families, and so on.) One can always raise the question of why, if the range of cases includes importantly different ones and there is nothing common to all of them, we use the same term, e.g., "family" for all of them. By virtue of its structure the PCF will often help to make clear why, in spite of the differences, and in spite of our being unable to give a second specification of what they all have in common, we are not grouping cases arbitrarily. (A family's a family, for a' that!)

Thus, a paradigm case formulation will, paradigmatically, have some illuminating and explanatory power that makes it not less akin to a theory or conceptual analysis than to the classic form of stipulative definition. (PCF's can be used in theories or conceptual analyses.)

Indeed, in the example of the family PCF, a consideration of the ramifications of e.g., being legally married or of being adopted or of having parents who themselves have parents, would take us naturally into the whole area of kinship, kinship theory, and social systems.

4. The structure of the PCF has some implications for research design. Since each of the transformations both picks out a group of cases and reflects a possibly important difference among cases it would be a sensible move generally to study the groups separately in order to decide whether the empirical regularities that were characteristic of one group were equally characteristic of the others. (This is the PCF stratified sampling design).

People will disagree, and disagreement is likely to arise around some of the transformations in a PCF (recall T6-T9 in the family PCF). If the PCF stratified sampling design is used and results are reported in that form, someone who, for example, objects to T6, can simply drop the results for T6 from consideration and still find the remaining results infor-

mative about families as he takes them to be. This design thus facilitates communication and sharing of research results in spite of disagreements about the subject matter.

Other PCF Features

1. It may already be clear from the family example that in general, in a PCF any specifiable subset of X's could be used for the paradigm case specification. Depending on that choice, the transformations would be different. (Thus, multiple PCF's for the same domain are possible.) In that sense, the choice of paradigm case is conceptually arbitrary. However, in general, it will make a difference, sometimes a crucial difference, which choice one makes for the paradigm case.

There are some reasonable rules of thumb which provide a basis for the advantageous choice of paradigm case.

- a. Choose the most complex case.

The reason for this choice is that there is a good chance that the transformations are then relatively simple, being perhaps no more than a set of deletions. When no simplification is afforded, there is no great advantage in this choice. In contrast, starting with the simplest case is almost certain to be a poor choice for the paradigm case. Under these conditions the more complex cases can seldom be generated as simply specifiable transformations. Instead genuinely new concepts will be required at various points and each substantive addition is likely to present many of the same decision problems as the initial choice of paradigm case.

- b. Start with an indubitable case.

This was the operative rule of thumb in the family PCF. "If ever there was a case of X, this is one" is the essence of the choice. This rule of thumb is directly relevant to the issue of communication in the face of disagreement. Someone who objects to one of the transformations in a PCF can drop the data corresponding to that transformation and still make good use of the remainder. In contrast, someone who disagrees that

the paradigm case is a case at all is unlikely to be able to (a) communicate readily about that subject matter or (b) use any of the data.

- c. Choose the primary, or archetypal case.

This rule is applicable only if there is a primary, or archetypal case. Here, the relevant consideration is that one wants to give formal, as well as substantive recognition to the fact that there is an asymmetry here in that the other cases are cases because of their relation to the primary case, and usually it is specifically because of the way they resemble the primary case. (This coin is a counterfeit because of the way it resembles a genuine coin, but not vice versa; this machine is intelligent because of the way it resembles people, but not vice versa; a family with members living apart is a family because of the way it resembles a family with members living together, but not vice versa.)

2. A PCF allows us to focus on what is conceptually necessary rather than on what is empirically universal in regard to things being what they are. For example, consider the case of an airplane. Someone who does not understand that an airplane is a machine that flies through the air under its own power simply and flatly doesn't understand what an airplane is.

On the other hand, if we just defined an airplane like that we would crash and burn on the fact that all the airplanes we know of would fail to meet those necessary and sufficient conditions: (a) A real airplane isn't always flying. Does it become something else when it lands? (b) Not all airplanes fly at all. Some are destroyed or put into museums or private collections without ever getting into the air. (c) Not all airplanes are capable of flying at any given time. An airplane in the hangar in the midst of having its turbine overhauled is incapable of flight.

Any necessary and sufficient conditions for being a case of X will necessarily be empirically universal among cases of X. Most of the real world doesn't fit that mold.

In contrast, consider a PCF that begins with a Paradigm Case consisting of an airplane that always flies (see T2 in Figure 1). Successive trans-

formations will get us the cases of airplanes (1) which sometimes don't fly, (2) which never fly but could, or could have, (3) which can't fly now but could or did previously or which will or will be able to in the future, (4) and so on. In this way we are able to make explicit the essentials even though there is no way other than "airplane" to say what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for being an airplane.

We can even accommodate toy airplanes, imaginary airplanes, model airplanes, and so on, though in these cases the adjective is more or less obligatory. A toy airplane is not just another case of an airplane, and in terms of the essential condition it is generally not an airplane at all. Yet it is also not at all arbitrary to call it a toy *airplane*.

In our initial entry into the question of why people are not inherently mysterious to people, we encountered the issue of universality in the form of the truism that what is fundamental to persons holds for all persons. In fact, it does not, and it requires a Paradigm Case Formulation to keep the truism honest. In accordance with the four definitions given in Chapter 1, the archetypal person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action in a dramaturgical pattern. (The latter will be presented systematically in Chapter 3. In the vernacular, Deliberate Action is a case of behavior in which we know what we're doing and are doing it on purpose.) Yet this is not empirically universal. Obviously, no one is always engaged in Deliberate Action – we sleep away perhaps a third of our lives. We pass out from exhaustion, intoxications, illness, injury, etc.; we have periods of delirium or confusion where we don't know what we're doing; and so on. Further, very young children have no history of Deliberate Action at all. Yet we have no real qualms (only, occasionally, academic ones or ideological ones) in considering them to be persons.

Note, however, that it's not a 50-50 proposition – it's not that a person might be engaging in Deliberate Action, but then again, he might not. Recall that one of the rules of thumb for selecting a Paradigm Case is to choose the archetypal case if there is one. In general, this simplifies the PCF and it gives formal recognition to a conceptual asymmetry – the

other cases are cases because of the way they resemble the Paradigm Case or the way they are related to it, but not vice versa. Both of these cases are found in connection with persons. A history with periods in which no Deliberate Action is engaged in is sufficiently similar to a history of Deliberate Action to be assimilated to it (and note that the terms used to identify those gaps, i.e., “asleep,” “intoxicated,” “exhausted,” etc. function as explanations of *why* the person is not engaged in Deliberate Action). With infants it isn’t so much a matter of brute resemblance as the fact that an infant can be expected to become a normal adult in the ordinary course of events without anyone having to *see to it* that this happens. That relation is one which makes it intelligible to count the infant as already being a person.

Thus, we can say, “Change the archetypal person in any of *these* ways, and you’ll still have a person.” Clearly, the situation fits the logic of a Paradigm Case Formulation.

The issue of what is conceptually necessary versus what is empirically universal arises in a variety of contexts and not merely in connection with explicit representation or the introduction of subject matter. (Recall this issue in the example of airplanes, computers, and persons in Chapter 1.) This is reflected in some stylistic features of the present discourse, chiefly the use of the term “paradigmatically” as a signal that what is, on the face of it, a simple declarative sentence is to be taken as a stand-in for a PCF. Thus, a person is an individual whose history is, *paradigmatically*, a history of Deliberate Action in a dramaturgical pattern. And what is conceptually necessary to being a person is not literally found universally in persons.

Maxim: Don’t count on the world being any simpler than it has to be.

3. As the last example should suggest, there’s more to the PCF than meets the eye. In contrast to a definition, which may be regarded as a vehicle for classifying based on uniformities, the PCF may be regarded as a vehicle for mapping both similarities and differences.

To help articulate this general picture, we may note that the PCF, as a formal device type, has a reflexive logic, not merely a recursive one.

The specification of the PCF given above is accurate and correct, but it is not merely the specification of a single conceptual-notational device type. Rather, it is also the point of entry into a whole domain of different conceptual-notational device types.

Consider Figure 1, the case of a PCF, i.e., PCF2, which has a PCF, i.e., PCF1, as the Paradigm Case. (Both PCF2 and PCF1 conform to the definition of PCF given above.)

Figure 1. Reflexive PCF

PCF2

I. Paradigm Case:

PCF1

1. Introduce a Paradigm Case of X.
2. Introduce one or more transformations of the Paradigm Case.

II. Transformations:

- T1. Change the number of Paradigm Cases to > 1 .
- T2. Eliminate the requirement that the Paradigm Case is a case of X. (It is enough if the transformations generate cases of X.)
- T3. Replace “transformation” with any functional equivalent thereof.
- T4. Allow transformations not only of the Paradigm Case, but also of the results of a previous transformation.

From a purely formal standpoint we note the following.

(a) T4 allows us to generate “family resemblance” structures, which are just a little bit looser than the original PCF in that one generates the family by moving from member to member rather than always returning to the paradigm case.

(b) T2, T3, and T4 allow us to generate the classic “rewrite” systems for generative grammars. An arbitrary rewrite rule, e.g., “P may be rewrit-

ten as Q” will in general not correspond to any independently specifiable transformation. However, by anchoring in this way on P and Q, we can define a new transformation ad hoc, i.e. “the P-Q transformation.” Thus, the rewrite is the “functional equivalent of a transformation,” hence fits T3. (It is also the functional equivalent of an Operation in a calculational system (see below) together with the eligibility constraint that the Operation can only be performed on the Element P.) In such systems, T4 is what would permit a derivation (rewriting the results of a rewrite) and T2 is what would permit sentences to be derived from “deep structures.”

(c) Transformation T3 will generate any mathematical function. For example, “the square root of X” is generated by “Transform X in such a way that the result has the relation ‘square root of’ to X.” What transformation is this? The “square root transformation” – what else? “Square root” is equally the name of a function, a relation, a transformation, and an “operation.”

From an empirical standpoint, the reflexive PCF generates forms of representation of phenomena and, correspondingly, generates research designs for studying the phenomena. I think, for example, of a certain study of masculine-feminine relationships: the representation of the phenomenon involves T1 since it involves as paradigm cases a set of distinct archetypes of masculine-feminine relationships. It also involves T2, since the archetypes are not themselves actual masculine-feminine relationships. Actual relations are mapped into this picture in terms of the degree to which they resemble each of the archetypes. This exemplifies T3 (and the use of numerical scales for collecting data reflects “the non-mathematical use of mathematics”).

In sum, the PCF is a conceptually simple and pragmatically powerful device with many aspects, many points of application, and much unexplored territory.

PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS

Like a definition and a Paradigm Case Formulation, a parametric analysis is a notational device type for introducing or identifying a conceptual domain, or range of cases.

To give a parametric analysis of a given domain of cases is to specify the ways in which one of those cases could, as such, be the same as another of those cases or different from it.

The ways in which two such cases, as such, could be different from one another is exactly the same as the ways in which they could be the same as one another (except, of course, for those ways in which they are necessarily all alike rather than different, i.e., whatever it is that makes them elements in the domain at all).

Each such way is designated as a parameter of the domain and of each case. Because each parameter corresponds to a set of possibilities, each parameter has associated with it a set of values representing that set of possibilities. One specifies (more or less precisely) which of these possibilities is the case for a given element of the domain by specifying (more or less precisely), which value the parameter has for that case. Thus, one picks out cases more or less uniquely within the domain by specifying, more or less uniquely, the values for each parameter. Correspondingly, one picks out kinds of cases by giving partial, imprecise or incomplete specifications of parametric values.

A familiar example of a parametric analysis is the three-dimensional arrangement of visible colors, e.g., the Munsell color chart or the “Color Pyramid” which appears in classic textbooks on general psychology. The three dimensions for most such schemes are as follows.

- (1) From lighter colors to darker ones (from white to black). This is the “Brightness” dimension.
- (2) From gray colors to intense colors. This is the “Saturation” or “Intensity” dimension.
- (3) From red through orange, yellow, green, blue, violet, and back to red. This is the “Hue” dimension.

Brightness, Hue, and Saturation are parameters of colors, and the

three-dimensional arrangement corresponds to a parametric analysis. Brightness, Hue, and Saturation are the ways in which one color, as such, can be the same as another color or different from it.

It is convenient at times to represent a parametric analysis by means of a formula. For color, the formula would be as follows.

$\langle \text{Color} \rangle = \langle \text{Brightness, Hue, Saturation} \rangle$

$\langle C \rangle = \langle B, H, S \rangle$

Such a formula could be read in a number of different ways.

- (a) As a reference to a general procedure: "To specify something about one of these (C's) you have to specify something about one or more of these (the parameters)."
- (b) As a structure of facts: "Whenever something of this sort (C) is the case, something of each of these sorts (the parameters) is the case."
- (c) As a reference to an occurrence: "Whenever something like this happens, something of each of these sorts is the case."
- (d) As a statement about sets: "The set of C's is the set of triples $\langle B, H, S \rangle$."

Although none of these is wrong, the first two are the preferred forms, and the formulas which appear later are to be read in these ways. The actual notation, e.g., $\langle C \rangle = \langle B, H, S \rangle$ is sometimes used in set theory. It is used here because it is perspicuous, not because it is used in set theory.

Because a parametric analysis as such is a purely formal conceptual device, there is no general restriction on, or prescription for, the kind of values that a parameter can have. For example, some parameters have numbers as their values (in some color schemes, Brightness, Hue, and Saturation have numerical values). Some have letters as their values; others have facts; some have concepts; and so on. The only restriction is that all of the values of a given parameter are of the same kind. (If it appeared that we had more than one kind of value for a given parameter, we would conclude that we were really dealing with more than one parameter or

else that we needed to make the choice of which set of values we wanted.) Different parameters in the same parametric analysis may have different kinds of values.

Other Aspects

1. Like a paradigm case formulation and a definition, a parametric analysis is a way of introducing a subject matter or presenting a concept. Like the former, it is *essentially* a non-reductive procedure. The specification of how one color may resemble another color or be different from it is, as such, not a reduction of color to something else.

2. Like both a definition and a paradigm case formulation, a parametric analysis has a recursive logic. The values of a given parameter in a parametric analysis may themselves be given by a different parametric analysis. Indeed, our color example was just such a case. Color is one of the parameters of material objects and it is the values of that parameter which were given by the $\langle C \rangle = \langle B, H, S \rangle$ analysis.

3. A parametric analysis has an interesting connection to the question of possible changes. A parametric analysis of the domain of X's shows the ways that X's can be different from one another, and, by virtue of the associated parametric values, it shows all the ways an X can be. If we start with a particular X, the parametric analysis shows all the ways that that X could change and still be an X. This consideration is captured by the "Parameter Principle," which states that the only things that can change about a thing are the values of its parameters. Any other changes will be a case of X ceasing to exist, not a case of X changing.

For example, a sow's ear is unlikely to change into a silk purse, but since they are both material objects, it could happen. (In this case, we would say that the material object had changed from having the characteristics of a sow's ear to having the characteristics of a silk purse.) In contrast, a mechanism could not become a motive, nor could an internalized parent become a conscience or become the ability to do arithmetic (neither could a history of reinforcement become either one), and a flowerpot

could not become the number 17. The general principle is that if X is in one logical category it cannot change into something of a different logical category. The flowerpot example brings this out most clearly. You can't get there from there.

4. Because a parametric analysis of X codifies all the different cases of being a case of X, it is convertible into a "loose" definition, i.e., one that has the form of a definition but isn't really. For example, "A color is anything that has brightness, hue, and saturation." There are two sorts of deficiencies to be aware of here.

a. Having brightness, hue, and saturation may be a necessary and sufficient condition for being a color, but it is not what makes a color a color. (Recall the case of defining a triangle as having an angular sum of 180 degrees.)

b. In other cases the "necessary and sufficient condition" condition would not be met. For example, a parametric analysis of tables and a parametric analysis of benches would probably give us the same set of parameters P1, P2 ... In that case it would be simply mistaken to define a table as "anything that has P1, P2, ...".

5. A parametric analysis can be converted into a PCF and vice versa. Consider the following PCF for color.

I Paradigm Case: A light grayish green.

II Transformations:

T1. Change its brightness.

T2. Change its hue.

T3. Change its saturation.

Conversely, consider the following parametric analysis of families.

$\langle F \rangle = \langle P, NS, ND, LP, LC, A, AS, AD \rangle$

where F = family; P = parents; values = M, F, M+F; NS = sons; values = N, $N \geq 0$; ND = daughters; values = N ≥ 0 ; LP = legal status of parents; values = M, C, U; LC = legal status of children; values = N, A, O; A = living arrangements; values = T, A; AS = age of sons; AD = age of daughters, etc.

6. It was specified above that "To give a parametric analysis of a given

domain of cases is to specify the ways in which one of those cases could, *as such*, be the same as another of those cases or different from it.” The reference to “as such” restricts the parameters to those which are essential or defining characteristics. For particular purposes we may wish to include non-essential characteristics (e.g., cost aspects or dates) as parameters. There is no procedural difficulty to prevent us from doing that. Thus we may speak of an extended parametric analysis to cover such cases. (We could also think in terms of a PCF in which the Paradigm Case was the one with essential characteristics and the extended case was arrived at via a transformation.)

Practically and aesthetically, paradigm case formulations and parametric analyses are in general not interchangeable, for all that there is a formal convertibility. A paradigm case formulation is, paradigmatically, suited to a situation where a certain general structure, including interrelationships among elements, is of interest. In contrast, a parametric analysis is more suited to a situation in which the range of possibilities and the range of variation among cases is of primary interest. Thus, a PCF is the method of choice where it is important to preserve the unity of a complex case (e.g., the whole person, the whole organization, etc.). A parametric analysis is the method of choice where it is important to have a systematic laying out of the logical possibilities.

CALCULATIONAL SYSTEM

The following is conventionally designated as the “Element-Operation-Product” model of a calculational system. (“Model” because there are other ways of representing a calculational system.)

One constructs a calculational system by specifying explicitly a finite set of Elements and a finite set of Operations. (An Element is something to perform Operations on, and an Operation is something to perform on an Element or a set of Elements.) If there are constraints on which Operations can be performed on which Elements, those constraints are specified.

When an Operation is performed on an Element, the result is a Product. Whatever is a Product is also an Element, hence something upon which an Operation can be performed. Paradigmatically, the construction of a calculational system will include a distinctive notation (a canonical form) for an Element as such and a different notation for a Product as such (i.e., as an Element-Operation combination).

A simple example of a calculational system as described above involves a single initial Element, i.e., the number zero, and a single Operation, i.e., “Add One.” By performing the Operation on the initial Element and on the subsequent products we generate the positive integers.

Another heuristic example is the game of chess. For our initial Element, we specify the entire initial board position, distinguishing all the pieces. For Operations, we specify the rules governing the movement of each piece. (Specifying that Operations are performed on pieces is a convenience in form. More precisely, the rules for moving pieces are rules for generating one board position from another by changing it in a particular way, i.e., moving a piece.)

Calculational systems have certain characteristic or distinctive features. Probably the most important is that they give us a finite working grasp of infinite collections of things. To be sure, not every calculational system generates an infinite set of products. (The “Add One” system above does; the chess game doesn’t generate an infinite set of board positions, but it does generate infinite sequences of board position changes.) However, of all the devices we know, only a calculational system or its equivalent gives us systematic access to the members of an infinite collection.

Thus, our understanding and systematic representation of limitless sets of numbers, sets, sentences, descriptions, forms of behavior description, real world configurations, and so on reflect the mastery of calculational systems. Note that our mastery and understanding, such as it is, does not come from actually generating an endless set of products (for how could we?) and inspecting the set empirically. Rather, it comes from our being competent to generate *any* of the products, not all of them. (Recall the

emphasis on competence in connection with “mastering the concept of” arithmetic.)

In connection with the Paradigm Case Formulation, we noted that by virtue of its reflexive logic, we could generate a variety of distinct device types, such as family resemblance systems and rewrite rule systems, as special cases of the PCF. We can now include calculational systems in this category.

The initial Element(s) in the calculational system correspond to the Paradigm Case(s) in the Paradigm Case Formulation. The Operation(s) in the calculational system correspond to the Transformation(s) in the PCF. We have already seen, in the family resemblance system that we can have a PCF in which the transformations can operate on the results of a previous transformation. All that is needed now is to specify that this is in principle, not ad hoc, and that will correspond to Products being Elements.

The difference between “in principle” and “ad hoc” can be illustrated by the family PCF presented above. In that PCF, we allowed the deletion of one parent but not both. From a purely procedural standpoint, we might have taken the result of that transformation, i.e., a one-parent family, and allowed the same transformation again. However, we could not allow this transformation to continue indefinitely (i.e., “in principle”) or, indeed, even one more time. Thus, “Delete one parent” must be done in an ad hoc way, rather than in principle. (Among other things, this is why it makes sense to represent the family by a PCF which is *not* a calculational system.)

Note, however, that we could begin with the normal kind of calculational system and transform it into one in which at least one of the Operations on at least one of the Elements was ad hoc. The latter kind is, in fact, used below. We may designate this kind of device merely as a “modified calculational system,” at least until the need for further distinctions arises.

In order to avoid confusion, since it appears that all of our conceptual-notational devices are versions of the PCF, we will distinguish between a “simple PCF” and a “reflexive PCF.” Unless otherwise indicated, “PCF” will mean “simple PCF.” The simple PCF is the two-stage schema as originally presented, elaborated by T1 (allow more than one paradigm case) and T2 (allow a paradigm case which is not an actual case). “Reflexive PCF” will refer to any of the other device types generated by the reflexive use of the PCF as in Figure 1.

II

BASIC CONCEPTS

3. The Concept of Behavior Per Se

Currently the terms “behavior” and “action” are used so variously and ambiguously that anything that moves or changes in any way can be said to behave or to act in one fashion or another. Particles, chemicals, material objects, organisms, and persons all “act” or “behave,” and it is not the same thing in each case.

In the present chapter we demarcate and delineate a common sense concept of behavior that is relevant to persons as such.

The concept of behavior is presented in two stages. In the first stage, we identify a primitive, general concept of behavior, designated as Intentional Action. This concept of behavior is given in the form of a parametric analysis and a corresponding behavior formula. In the second stage, that behavior formula is elaborated as a calculational system which generates infinite sets of behavior formulas.

- (a) Every individual behavior formula constitutes, or corresponds to, a form of behavior description.
- (b) In some of the infinite sets, each behavior formula corresponds to a form of behavior, which it can be used to distinguish and describe.
- (c) In others of the infinite sets the behavior formulas are systematically incomplete forms of description. Because of this, there is *not* a form of behavior that corresponds to a given behavior formula. The value of such formulas is precisely that they allow us to give *systematically* incomplete descriptions of behavior.

Thus, the concept of human behavior is much like the concept of language: At a certain level of description we can certainly refer to English as one thing or as one sort of thing. But implicitly, that one thing is a generative system which produces an infinity of systematically distinguishable possible English sentence structures. Similarly, we can

conveniently and legitimately refer to “behavior” as one sort of thing. But implicitly, that one thing is a generative system which produces an infinity of systematically distinguishable possible distinct forms of behavior (not merely an infinity of possible instances of “behavior,” which would be trivial).

With hindsight, one might even ask, “How could it be otherwise? Given that speaking English is a form of behavior (as is doing arithmetic, calculus, logic, etc.) how could the general case have a less rich logical structure than these special cases?”

*“God has not been so sparing of man as to make him merely
two-legged and left it to Aristotle to make him rational.”*

John Locke

INTENTIONAL ACTION

In what ways can one behavior, as such, be the same as another behavior or different from it? Formula (1) represents a parametric analysis of the domain of behavior.

(1) $\langle B \rangle = \langle IA \rangle = \langle I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S \rangle$

where

B	=	Behavior
IA	=	Intentional Action
I	=	Identity
W	=	Want
K	=	Know
KH	=	Know How
P	=	Performance
A	=	Achievement
PC	=	Person Characteristic
S	=	Significance

These are characterized briefly as follows.

1. Identity

One of the basic ways that behaviors can be the same or different has to do with whose behavior it is. Every behavior is someone's behavior, and this parameter of behavior provides a place to specify that.

2. Want

This is the "motivation" aspect of behavior. Behavior is in part distinguished by (and oriented toward) a wanted state of affairs, and the Want parameter provides a place to specify what that state of affairs is.

3. Know

This is the "cognitive" aspect of behavior. Here, we specify which distinctions (concepts) are being acted on in the given behavior.

4. Know How

This parameter represents the "competence" aspect of the behavior in question, which in turn reflects the learning history of the person whose behavior is in question. The person's competence rules out the possibility that the occurrence of a given behavior is simply a matter of luck, chance, accident, or coincidence.

5. Performance

This parameter represents the process, or procedural, aspect of behavior. Process aspects include (a) having a beginning, end, and duration, (b) being interruptable, (c) occurring in some specific context of time and place, and (d) starting with one state of affairs and ending with a different one (see below).

6. Achievement

This parameter represents the outcome aspect of behavior. It refers to whatever is different in the world by virtue of the occurrence of the behavior in question. Although some outcomes may be quite trivial, a behavior, being historically unique, always makes some kind of difference.

7. Person Characteristic

Every behavior reflects some of the characteristics of the person whose behavior it is. Which is to say that if the person had had certain characteristics other than the actual ones, the behavior would have been some behavior other than the actual one. This parameter codifies that aspect of behavior. The values of this parameter specify which person characteristics the behavior is an expression of.

Person characteristics are parameters of persons and are formulated systematically below in connection with the concept of an individual person.

8. Significance

This parameter codifies the “meaningful” and/or the “ulterior” aspects of behavior. In general, behavior has a multilevel structure involving (a) the behavior which is “what the person is up to” or “what the person’s really doing” and (b) one or more “implementation” behaviors, which is what observation reports of behavior generally describe.

A heuristic example is the correspondence between (a) “He’s playing chess” and (b) “He moved his Queen’s pawn to Queen 4.” Similarly, (a) “He warned them what to expect” and (b) “He said, ‘The pigs are digging for truffles.’” In each case the person does (a) by doing (b). This is because in these circumstances, doing (b) is a case of doing (a). The reference to “in these circumstances” reflects the universal context dependence of behavior.

In cases where the person does X by doing Y, doing Y is the implementation of doing X and doing X is the significance of doing Y. In a specification of behavior X, behavior Y will appear in the value of the Performance parameter. Conversely, in a specification of behavior Y, behavior X will appear in the value of the Significance parameter.

The recommended reading of the foregoing parametric analysis is “Whenever one of these (i.e., an Intentional Action) is the case, something of *each of these* kinds (i.e., the parameters) is the case.” Whenever there is

a case of Intentional Action, then something is the case concerning whose action it was, something is the case concerning what state of affairs was wanted, and about which concepts were used, and so on. As might be expected from the “something is the case” locution, the values of each of the parameters are, effectively, states of affairs. The concept of Intentional Action is a complex concept, and the occurrence of an Intentional Action is a complex state of affairs.

Conceptual Connections

In the parametric analysis the various parameters and their values are not simply independent of one another. Rather, there are some conceptual connections. For example:

1. The value of the Want parameter is necessarily also part of the value of the Know parameter, but not vice versa. Whatever it is that is wanted must be something that is distinguished. It would be nonsensical to suppose that an individual could want something which he could not or did not distinguish from anything else (so that, among other things, he would be unable to detect whether he had it or not). In contrast, it is easy to think of his distinguishing something he didn't want.

2. It is by virtue of the values of the Know, Want, Know How, and Significance parameters that the values of the Performance and Achievement are, necessarily, *not* due *merely* to luck, chance, accident, or coincidence. (The necessity is conceptual, not causal. All that follows is that if the necessity is violated, then what occurred wasn't *that* behavior, and possibly wasn't a behavior at all.)

3. Similarly, it is by virtue of the values of P, K, W, KH, and S that the values of A are not merely a matter of luck, chance, accident, or coincidence.

4. We might summarize the relationships of P, A, W, K, and KH by saying that, archetypally, the performance (P) is designed for (is non-accidentally suitable for) the achievement (A) of the wanted state of affairs

(W) given (in light of) the state of affairs being distinguished (K), and that the performance (P) is an expression of the individual's acquired behavioral competence (KH). Alternatively, we might say that the individual brings his acquired competence (KH) to bear on the task of creating (enacting, performing) a behavioral attempt (P) to bring about a wanted state of affairs (W) beginning from the distinguished existing state of affairs (K). And we should add that, paradigmatically (indeed, archetypally), he succeeds (A).

5. Since the value of the Achievement parameter consists of the states of affairs which are achieved, the relation between the values of A and W reflects the difference between successful and unsuccessful behavior. Clearly, a behavior is successful if the state of affairs W is included in the states of affairs A. Successful behavior consists of achieving the wanted state of affairs.

In turn, the concept of successful behavior provides the basis for a "unit of behavior" which is conceptually non-arbitrary and empirically defensible. Since behavior is describable as an attempt to effect a change from one state of affairs (K) to another (W, A), the unit of behavior extends from the initiation of the attempt (P) to the success (hence termination) of the attempt (or to its abandonment).

This is to say no more than that the unit of behavior is a single behavior (Intentional Action). That may sound peculiar, but then, the 'problem' for which it is a 'solution' is peculiar. The problem is classically described as that of non-arbitrarily segmenting into behavioral units what is observationally "a continuous stream of behavior."

In point of fact, the problem has always been overdone, for the sequence of normal human behavior is, more often than not, observationally *highly* segmented. The problem is created if (a) we assume that behavior is really just movement (P), (b) that only one behavior is going on at a given time, so that the problem is one of simple temporal segmentation, and (c) that visible segmentation is of no help at all because we need an empirically universal *criterion*. None of these assumptions should be

taken seriously.

6. States of affairs which are values of the Performance parameter are necessarily included in the value of the Achievement parameter. For example, if the Intentional Action is telephoning for a dentist's appointment, and that involves the performance (process, procedure) of picking up the receiver, then to be picking up the receiver and to have picked up the receiver are accomplishments in their own right (Achievements). They are states of affairs which are part of the difference it made to telephone for a dentist's appointment.

7. The values of the K, W, KH, P, A, and S parameters are connected in a number of ways to the values of the PC (Person Characteristic) parameter. Because these ways are various and do not lend themselves readily to summarization, they are dealt with below in connection with the formulation of Person Characteristics in the following chapter.

Other Aspects

1. The connections noted above, leading to the informal characterization of Intentional Action as, paradigmatically, bringing about a wanted state of affairs show how the K, W, KH, P, and A parameters of Intentional Action give us access to (enable us to think of or represent) behavior as purposive, goal-oriented, instrumental.

However, the purposive, or instrumental, paradigm of human behavior is derivative rather than fundamental. Consider the following argument.

If one can describe a behavior, B, as having a goal, G, external to the behavior, then one can describe a behavior B' which consists of accomplishing G by means of B. If one postulates that all behavior is instrumental, then B' is instrumental, and then there must be another goal G', external to B', for the sake of which B' is engaged in. But then a successful B' can be redescribed as a different behavior B'', with another goal, G'', for the sake of which B'' is engaged in. And so on, and on. The result is an infinite regress which can be ended only formally (but not

substantively) by postulating a transcendental universal motive (which is, of course, arbitrary). The history of science and psychology includes such transcendental motives as pleasure, self-interest, self-actualization, freedom from cognitive dissonance, power, self esteem, honor, freedom from anxiety, and many others. Predictably, these formulations have been exercises in futility.

In contrast, ultimate and behaviorally complete descriptions can in principle be given by reference to intrinsically intelligible (hence social, public, and tautological) patterns of behavior. (It is not to be supposed, of course, that there are behavior patterns which are universally intrinsically intelligible, though, of course, there might be.) This aspect of behavior is codified by the Significance parameter and by the formulations, below, of “intrinsic social practice,” “social institution,” and “way of life.”

2. An individual who engages in a given intentional action need not thereby be discriminating either (a) *that* action as the one he is engaging in or (b) his engaging in intentional action at all. The parametric analysis of behavior has no such requirement built in. On the other hand, neither does it exclude such possibilities. This formal consideration ultimately gives us access to a certain range of possible, and possibly interesting, facts about persons and their behavior including those which, historically, have been referred to under the general category of “the unconscious.”

3. There is no substantive limit to the range, type or scope of the concepts which may appear in the value of the “Know” parameter. Among other things, we are not restricted to concepts of [believed to be] “actual” states of affairs. Hypothetical, imaginary, fictitious, or theoretical states of affairs are not excluded. *A fortiori*, we are not restricted to actual states of affairs that are here-now observable (the traditional psychologist’s notion of “stimulus”). The state of affairs concepts involved in Intentional Action may be as extensive and complex as the past, present, and future history of the universe in all its detail and under any number of conceptualizations or as narrow as the present moment of an isolated particle. They may be as pragmatic as the benefit to be gained from taking the medicine or as transcendental as the hope of salvation or a psychologist’s

account of an alternative to common sense.

Although, empirically, individual persons are limited in their knowledge, their conceptual repertoire, and their imagination, they are not conceptually so limited. Thus, the logical domain of Intentional Action is the domain of all conceivable states of affairs, including those we take to be “actual.” That domain, as we noted above is simply the real world. This is one version of why the Person concept is all-inclusive.

Behavior is not unique in this respect. We will find that the logical domain of individual Persons, the logical domain of language, the logical domain of Reality are all, equally, the logical domain of all conceivable states of affairs. Each of the four primary components of the Person concept provides a distinctive kind of access to the logical domain of all conceivable states of affairs. This consideration should lead us to be suspicious of the notion that the relation of Behavior, Individual Person, Language and Reality to the Person concept is a simple part-whole relation. It might well be that they are better regarded as perspectives on the Person concept rather than as straightforward components. Since both are merely heuristics for understanding the notion of articulating a concept, either or both can be used for their heuristic value at any time.

4. Intentional Action is formally the general case of behavior in that all the further varieties of behavior generated by the calculational system below are special cases of Intentional Action. On the other hand, there is good reason to say that one of those special cases, i.e., Deliberate Action, is the fundamental concept of behavior in that if there were no cases of this kind there would be no cases of any kind.

Our Concept of Behavior?

There is an obvious way of testing how well the concept of behavior presented by means of the parametric analysis corresponds to what we already understand by “behavior.” That is to try it. However, trying it out will probably be more effective if it is preceded by the following exercise, which is designed to test each of the eight parameters in regard to whether it is essential to behavior as we already understand it.

The first step is to identify some indubitable cases of an ordinary behavior such as taking a drink of coffee, driving to the grocery store, making a date on the telephone, tying one's shoe, and so on. Of such examples, indeed, it may be said "If ever there was a case of human behavior, this is one." It is a general characteristic of such behaviors that they are not mysterious. For example, if you had asked someone "What's she doing?" and the answer was "Taking a drink of coffee" or "Calling for a dentist's appointment," etc., you would normally take it that you understood what she was doing. (In an actual case there might, of course, be more to it than just that, but insofar as the behavior was the one described we would normally have no questions about it.) Step two is to pick one of those behaviors, real or imaginary, which is in this way unmysterious to you.

The test is as follows. Imagine that you have asked the question "What is she doing?" and have received that answer (the behavior you picked as non-problematical, e.g., "She's drinking water from the fountain."), and that you understood it in the normal way. *Then*, imagine that your informant adds a disclaimer which, in effect, implies that one of the parameters above is inapplicable (i.e., that that one isn't an aspect of the behavior). Do this for each parameter in turn.

To the extent that that parameter is essential to the concept of that behavior, your understanding of the behavior will become problematic and the behavior will become mysterious, perhaps completely mysterious.

For example, imagine being told "He's drinking water from the fountain – *but* there isn't anyone there doing that." With the addition of the latter clause, which amounts to a disavowal of the Identity parameter (and the principle that every behavior is someone's behavior), understanding vanishes. Or, consider "He's making a dinner date with his girlfriend over the telephone, but ..."

(a) K Parameter:

He can't distinguish his girlfriend from anyone else.

He can't distinguish a telephone from other objects.

He can't distinguish speech from other sounds.

He can't distinguish dinner from lunch, breakfast, etc.

(b) KH Parameter:

He doesn't know how to talk – the sounds he makes just happen to emerge.

He doesn't know how to use the telephone.

(c) W Parameter:

He doesn't want to make a dinner date with his girlfriend (and doesn't want anything else, either).

(d) P Parameter:

What he does takes no time at all, doesn't occur at any particular time or place, and couldn't possibly be only partially completed.

(e) A Parameter:

What he's doing has no outcome at all; absolutely nothing is any different by virtue of his having made the dinner date. For example, it's not the case that (1) now he has a dinner date where before he hadn't; (2) now he has spoken to her recently where before he hadn't; (3) now he has used the telephone recently where before he hadn't; etc.

(f) PC Parameter:

His calling her has no connection to any of his characteristics, e.g., (1) his interest in her, (2) his affectionate attitude toward her, (3) the high value he places on her company, (4) his ability to speak English, (5) his mastery of social conventions, (6) etc.

(g) S Parameter:

His making the dinner date has no significance beyond itself. In particular, (1) it has no connection to the social practice of dining out; (2) it doesn't express anything about the relationship they have or might have, etc.

For most persons, any of these disclaimers, which amount to denying that the parameter in question is relevant to the behavior, do change the

“behavior” from something familiar and well understood to something murky, impossible, absurd, etc. Thus, this exercise serves as some assurance, if any were needed, that the parametric analysis has not, so far, failed to capture a public, common sense concept of behavior that we do have.

A CALCULATIONAL SYSTEM FOR BEHAVIOR

It is easy to use the parametric analysis to characterize and distinguish behaviors. Merely doing this, however, would fail to do justice to the logical depth or to the surface complexity and variety of the behavioral concepts and forms of description inherent in the concept of Intentional Action. Toward that end, we shall revisit the concept, using the behavior formula as the initial Element in a modified calculational system.

The calculational system is responsive to two related phenomena. The first is behavioral concepts; the second is the forms of description for behaviors. The calculational system is explicitly a system for generating forms of behavior description. Forms of behavior will be an easily recognizable subset of these. (The pragmatics of the description of something require that in general there be more ways of talking about behavior than of conceiving it, if only because it is important to be able to give descriptions which are selectively and deliberately incomplete and therefore do not correspond to a kind of behavior.)

Table 1. Calculational System for Behavioral Description

Element:	< I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S >
Operations:	Substitution
	Deletion
	Identity

Recall that (a) in a calculational system, an Operation is performed on an Element and the result is a Product, and (b) every Product is an

Element. The system shown in Table 1 is a modified calculational system, since there are certain limits on some Products serving as Elements. Of the three Operations, Substitution and Deletion are primary (substantively, methodologically, conceptually) and the third is merely a “housekeeping” formality.

Table 2. Products Generated by the Calculational System

Element	Operation	Product
<I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S>	Substitution	< I, W, , KH, P, A, PC, S > Cognizant Action formula
“	Substitution	< I, , , KH, P, A, PC, S > Deliberate Action formula
“	Substitution	< I, W, K, KH, P, , PC, S > Social Practice formula
“	Substitution	< I, W, K, KH, , A, PC, S > Symbolic Behavior formula
“	Deletion	< θ, W, K, KH, P, A, θ, θ > Agency Description
“	Deletion	<θ, θ, K, KH, P, A, θ, θ > Activity Description
“	Deletion	<θ, θ, θ, θ, P, A, θ, θ > Performance Description
“	Deletion	<θ, θ, θ, θ, θ, A, θ, θ > Achievement Description
“	Deletion	< θ, W, K, KH, P, θ, θ, θ > Performative Description
“	Deletion	< θ, θ, K, θ, P, θ, θ, θ > < θ, θ, K, θ, θ, A, θ, θ > < θ, θ, K, θ, P, A, θ, θ > Stimulus-Response Descriptions
“	Identity	< I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S > Intentional Action

Table 2 shows some of the Products generated by the calculational system in a first pass. (Note that each of these can, in general, be operated on to generate new Products, etc.) The Products shown have substantial existing use or special historical or conceptual interest. The Operations and the Products resulting from their use are presented briefly below.

A. The Substitution Operation

Performing the Substitution operation consists of using the IA formula as a partial specification of the value of one of the parameters of that formula either in its initial form or a previously transformed form. This operation codifies recursive and reflexive aspects of the concept of behavior.

1. The Cognizant Action formula:

< I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S >

Here, we perform the Substitution operation in the cognitive parameter, K. To perform the operation there is to give a partial specification of the value of the Know parameter. What we specify formally thereby is that the value of K includes the concept of an Intentional Action. What we specify substantively is that the set of concepts being acted on (in the behavior represented by the formula) includes the concept of Intentional Action. (The formula above illustrates a convention in this regard, i.e., using as a partial specification of K is indicated by showing above K in the formula. An alternative is to use in place of K in the formula.)

Note that this specification defines a general kind of behavior, which is here designated as Cognizant Action. In Cognizant Action the concept of behavior (or of a particular behavior or kind of behavior) is among the concepts being acted on. As a form of behavior description, a Cognizant Action description is suitable for systematically representing a given behavior as being of this kind.

In Cognizant Action the concept of behavior appears twice. The first is the behavior that is engaged in (represented by the entire formula); the second is the behavior that is distinguished, represented by the in the K parameter. Note that is a stand-in for <I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S>.

Two important cases of behavior are generated, depending on whether the behavior engaged in is the same as the behavior distinguished. Where the two are different the Cognizant Action is a case of an individual who distinguishes an Intentional Action, generally on the part of someone else, and treats it accordingly. Where the two are the same the Cognizant Action is a case of an individual who engages in an Intentional Action knowing that that is what he is doing. The first case is a requirement for any observer-describer of behavior. The second case is a requirement for a normal adult human being. (In both cases, however, more is required than merely this [see below].)

2. The Deliberate Action formula:

< I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S >

In generating a Deliberate Action formula, we perform the substitution operation in the motivational parameter, W. Since, as noted above, values of the Want parameter are necessarily also values of the Know parameter, we perform the substitution in K also. The result of performing these operations is to give a partial specification of the values of the W and K parameters. What we specify is that the values of both the K and W parameters include an intentional action concept. In the present case, all three intentional actions are the same (the IA represented by the formula, the IA specified in W, and the IA specified in K).

As a form of representation, the Deliberate Action formula is suitable for representing a form of behavior in which the individual behaving not merely knows that that is what he is doing, but also chooses to do it. In this formula, the wanted state of affairs (the value of W) includes the doing of that behavior (or having done it). Thus, to bring about that

state of affairs is, at least in part, to engage in that behavior or to have engaged in that behavior. Of such behavior, in common parlance, we say that the individual “did it on purpose.”

A brief comment is in order here for later reference. Deliberate Action is archetypal for human behavior. Its fundamental character is probably best exhibited by its close relationship to our past and current legal definitions of “insanity.” At the same time, this is a *minimum* requirement (being sane is a minimum requirement, too). Human behavior as we know it also exemplifies the Significance Description and the Social Practice Description and the Dramaturgical Model (see below).

3. The Social Practice formula:

< I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S >

In generating the Social Practice formula we perform the Substitution operation in the Achievement parameter. The result is to give a partial specification of the value of A. What we specify is that the value of A includes , which is to say that the outcome of the first behavior includes the occurrence of another behavior. The two behaviors will be different as behaviors, and they need not be behaviors of the same individual (values of the Identity parameter of the two behaviors may be different).

If we elaborate this formula recursively with Achievement substitutions, we generate a variety of cases including (a) sequences of behaviors of whatever length, (b) cases where a given behavior has more than one other behavior as its direct outcome, and (c) cases where several behaviors have a single behavior as an outcome.

As a form of representation, the Social Practice formula gives us access to various patterns of behavior and to the part-whole relations between a given behavior and the pattern of which it is a part. The technical implementation of behavior pattern representation is provided by the Social Practice form of the Process Description (see below), which incorporates the features noted above and which provides the logical structure for the

level of detail needed for real world applications.

4. The Symbolic Behavior formula (Significance Description):

< I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S >

In generating this form of description, we perform a Substitution operation in the Performance parameter. The result of performing this operation is to give a partial specification of the value of the Performance parameter, i.e., we specify that it includes a behavior. Since, as in all the preceding cases, the Substitution operation may be performed recursively, we may generate a third behavior, and a fourth, and so on, *all occurring simultaneously* and sharing a common component of Performance.

Substantively, the substitution specifies that the performance of the behavior in question includes (and most commonly, it consists of) a second behavior. For example, I may warn him (the first behavior) *by* saying “Hold on to the rope” (the second behavior), or, I may slake my thirst (the first behavior) *by* taking a drink of coffee (the second behavior).

What holds the two behaviors (or three, or four, etc., together) is an empirical identity which depends on the context: In *these* circumstances, to say “Hold the rope” is also to give a warning, even though in general (i.e., in most circumstances) it is not.

The phenomenon of significance in behavior, and the multilevel structure of behavior, is sufficiently complex to warrant a separate discussion in Chapter 8.

5. Aspects of the Substitution Operation

Formally, the effect of performing the substitution operation is to create more complex formulas for representing behavior. Since there is no inherent limit to the recursiveness of this Operation, there is no limit to the extent to which we can elaborate the IA formula in the ways indicated above by means of repeated substitutions.

Substantively, the use of the Substitution operation extends the scope of the original formula in several ways. (a) We extend the scope from individual behaviors to behavior patterns which are not limited in complexity, in spatio-temporal extent, or in the number of participants. (b) We extend the depth from a single "See Jack run!" linear sequence of behaviors to a multilevel structure which allows for the simultaneous participation in (an unlimited number of) multiple behavior patterns. (c) We begin with a formula which is already unlimited in regard to the concepts that may be acted on, and we extend this specifically to an unlimited scope and depth of self-knowledge.

The substitution operation generates forms of description which correspond to forms of behavior. In contrast, the Deletion operation generates forms of description for which there are not corresponding forms of behavior.

B. The Deletion Operation

Deletion is an operation which is performed on a given parameter in the IA formula, either in its original form or a previously modified form. The effect of the Deletion operation is to remove that parameter from consideration; nothing is said and nothing is implied regarding the value of that parameter.

The forms of description which result from the use of Deletion thus provide ways of giving behavior descriptions which are *explicitly* noncommittal in regard to certain aspects (parameters) of the behavior. In effect, they are forms of incomplete description where the incompleteness is systematically specified.

Notationally, Deletion is indicated by putting a theta (θ) in the behavior formula in place of the deleted parameter. For example, to indicate the deletion of the Identity parameter we would write $\langle \theta, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S \rangle$.

Formally, one can delete parameters singly or in groups. Thus, one

could delete any one of the eight parameters; one could delete any two of them, and any three ... and all eight of them. (One would then be left with only the name of the behavior, but no description.) This holds for the original IA formula and for any of the Substitution-generated components in expanded behavior formulas.

There are a number of reasons for giving incomplete descriptions of behavior. Chief among these, of course, is lack of knowledge. If I look out the window and see a person running down the street, and I want to tell you about it, I will probably be willing to make some commitment about the Know, Know How, and Performance aspects and I will probably want to be noncommittal about the remainder.

What I will probably say in this case is, "There's someone running down the street." If I am particularly concerned to disclaim knowledge about the motivational aspects, I may well add "but I don't know why," which is a vernacular way of performing a Deletion. There is not in the vernacular, however, any systematic way to specify what one wants to be noncommittal about in a behavior description. Ordinarily we begin with a baseline of Deliberate Action description and we modify that discursively as best we can.

A second general reason for giving systematically incomplete behavior descriptions is lack of interest. Just as we sometimes want to consider the weight of some pieces of furniture without regard to any of their other characteristics, we may, with respect to behaviors, be interested only in the motivational aspects, or only in the Know How aspects, and so on. The Deletion operation enables us to represent something about behavior without having to represent everything about behavior.

A third general reason for giving systematically incomplete descriptions of behavior is that there are occasions when the description is correct *only as* the incomplete description and would not be correct if the corresponding complete description were given. (A "complete description" here is a Deliberate Action description with commitment with respect to all parameters.)

In the case of behavioral self-knowledge (knowing what one is doing) the simple fact is that the person may know some things about his behavior but not others. (Similarly for what he wants to do.)

There are endless possibilities of behavioral formulas elaborated by Substitution operations, and punctuated by Deletion operations. As in grammar, however, it is the simple constructions that get the heavy use. Several of these are presented below.

1. The Agency Description:

$\langle \theta, W, K, KH, P, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$

In this form of description we delete the Identity, Person Characteristic, and Significance parameters. By doing so we arrive at a form of description which is suitable for representing behavior as a simply instrumental, purposive, or goal-oriented phenomenon.

This form of description severs almost all of the inherent contextual grounding of the behavior, i.e., that involving (a) the historical individual whose behavior (in a particular time and setting) it is, (b) the person characteristics of the individual, without which the behavior would not have occurred, and (c) the more comprehensive behavior patterns which the behavior in question is an implementation of and sometimes also is a part of (and the specific context by virtue of which the behavior qualifies as an implementation).

Clearly, this form of description would be one of the most attractive ones to use in trying to formulate the “universal laws of behavior” (psychologists) or the “underlying concept of human behavior” as “agency” (philosophers). Ironically, in everyday interactions, this decontextualized concept also has a significant use precisely because behavior is contextually anchored, for in those cases the contextual aspects are taken for granted and it is the other aspects which are at issue.

2. The Activity Description:

$\langle \theta, \theta, K, KH, P, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$

In this form of description we delete all except the Know, Know How, Performance, and Achievement parameters. Its major uses, described above, are (a) to allow for lack of knowledge concerning the motivational aspects of behavior, (b) to formulate behavioral regularities which do not involve motivation, and (c) to represent behavioral simulation such as that which is involved in many cases of ulteriorly motivated behavior.

For example, consider Gordon Allport's example of an insurance salesman who joins the country club and plays golf in order to further his insurance sales. Initially, at least, his golfing behaviors are simulations. They are cases of "going through the motions" without having the requisite motivation that would make them genuine (i.e., normative) golfing behaviors. Thus, to describe his behavior as "playing golf" would be correct only if one disclaimed any commitment in regard to his motivation and to the significance of his behavior. "Going through the motions" of playing golf or "pretending" to play golf are vernacular resources for accomplishing just such disclaimers. In a systematic discourse one could give an Activity Description to disclaim the motivational aspect of the behavior, and a corresponding disclaimer with respect to significance would be implied. Or, one could just explicitly disclaim with respect to motivation and significance (we could call that a "Simulation Description").

Note, too, that if I am pretending to play golf, the specified as part of the value of the W and the K parameters of my behavior would need to be noncommittal with respect to W and S.

3. The Performance Description:

$$\langle \theta, \theta, \theta, \theta, P, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$$

In this formula only the Performance and Achievement parameters are not deleted. Thus, it is suitable for representing the procedural and outcome aspects of behavior. If one thinks of behavior as being, in some sense, what a person "does," then a Performance Description represents one of the most limited concepts (along with Performance alone and Achievement alone) that is intelligible as "what a person does."

It is minimal enough so that the merely procedural aspects of behavior will not distinguish behavioral processes from such non-behavioral processes as geographic or postural displacement (movement) or physiological, chemical or physical processes. Under a Performance Description, for example, there is no difference between the behavioral process of my blinking my eye when so instructed and my eye blinking when a pencil approaches it rapidly. Similarly, there is no difference between my knee jerking and my jerking my knee. From a purely process point of view these are, or could be, indistinguishable.

4. The Achievement Description:

$\langle \theta, \theta, \theta, \theta, \theta, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$

In this form of description we delete all but the Achievement parameter; hence it is suitable for representing achievements. Very often, the Achievement is all we are interested in either relative to a single behavior or an extended behavior (see the discussion of Social Practice in the latter connection). Test scores, artistic products, and accomplished goal states are among the most prominent cases of this kind.

It should be noted that in general the outcome aspect of a behavior will include some states of affairs which are neither known to the behavior nor wanted by the behavior.

4a. Achievement-anchored Descriptions

Closely related to the Achievement description but also importantly different from it, is the Achievement-anchored Description. There are three features which are essential to an achievement-anchored description. The first is that it involves reference to a designated achievement ("took a drink," "hit the ball," etc.). The second is that the description is withheld if the achievement in question is not in fact attained (hence the designation "achievement-anchored"). The third is that the description refers to more of the behavior than just the Achievement aspect (hence it is not merely an Achievement Description).

The primary cases of achievement-anchored descriptions lie in everyday descriptions of behavior. Here the description usually refers to the entire behavior, which is often thought of as the process of bringing about the Achievement. (Recall the instrumental thrust of the Agency Description and the function of W and A in defining the “unit of behavior.”)

Consider, for example, the following achievements, i.e., (a) buying a loaf of bread, (b) taking a drink of coffee, and (c) telling him the answer to a problem. And consider the corresponding behavior descriptions, i.e., (a) “She’s buying a loaf of bread,” (b) “She took a drink of coffee,” and (c) “She told him the answer to the problem.” The behavior descriptions would be withdrawn (in the case of (a)) or withheld (in the case of (b) and (c)) if the corresponding outcome didn’t occur. If she succeeded in buying the bread, then *whatever* she did was the process of buying the bread (on that occasion). If she succeeded in drinking the coffee, then *whatever* she did was the process of taking a drink of coffee, and so on.

In contrast, if she did not succeed in buying the loaf of bread, *nothing* that occurred there was the process of buying a loaf of bread; if she did not succeed in drinking the coffee, nothing that went on there was the process of drinking the coffee; and so on. We can even think of two cases where the process is exactly the same but, because of external factors, the outcome is different (for example, in one case there was coffee in the cup, and in the other case it was tea). In the one case the process is the process of taking a drink of coffee; in the other case, what we would naturally call the identical process is *not* the process of taking a drink of coffee.

What makes achievement-anchored descriptions feasible is that they are given after the fact. Once the behavior is completed, the outcome is available for use as the criterion for a given description, and so such descriptions as “she took a drink of coffee” are generally not risky.

5. The Performative Description (alternatively, Attempt Description):

$\langle \theta, W, K, KH, P, \theta, \theta, \theta \rangle$

Here we have, in effect, an Agency Description with the Achievement parameter deleted. The major use for this form of description is precisely to be noncommittal with respect to the result aspect of the behavior. In the vernacular we generally use some version of “try” or “attempt” to accomplish this aim. (Consider: “She’s *trying* to encourage them.”)

The “performative” designation, in contrast, reflects a connection to the notion of a “Performative” as it appears in the literature of analytic philosophy. This is a case where, given the right context, engaging in the appropriate verbal performance (e.g., “I now pronounce you man and wife” or “I dub thee Sir Edward”), the desired outcome is guaranteed, so that it need not be specified independently in addition.

6. Stimulus-Response Descriptions:

(6a) $\langle \theta, \theta, K, \theta, P, \theta, \theta, \theta \rangle$

(6b) $\langle \theta, \theta, K, \theta, \theta, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$

(6c) $\langle \theta, \theta, K, \theta, P, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$

In these forms of description, the Know parameter remains undeleted, along with P or A or both. If the value of the K parameter is restricted to states of affairs which are here-now observable by the behavior and an external observer, that will correspond closely to the traditional psychological notion of a “stimulus” (thus, the designation of these formulas as stimulus-response descriptions.) Correspondingly, the values of P and A, particularly if we restrict them to states of affairs which are here-now observable to an external observer-describer-manipulator, will correspond closely to traditional psychological notions of a “response” or an “operant.”

In the traditional conditioning literature, such locutions as “presses the bar,” “turns left,” “pecks at the red dot,” “jumps to the blue triangle,” and so on are commonly used to designate “responses.” These references are generally to be understood as Achievement Descriptions or, more commonly, achievement-anchored descriptions; occasionally, they appear to refer only to Performance. Occasionally, some awareness of

such distinctions appears in the literature, e.g., in the distinction between “topographical response” (P parameter) and “functional response” (A parameter).

C. The Identity Operation

This operation contributes nothing substantive, being, rather a house-keeping operation. The Identity operation transforms an Element into a Product with no change in form. In particular, it transforms the original Element, the IA formula, into an “Intentional Action Description,” with the formula remaining the same, i.e., $\langle I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S \rangle$. This allows us to say simply that the system generates the forms of behavior description as products, without having any exceptions or loose ends.

Aspects of the Calculational System

It requires a calculational system to bring out the logical depth and richness of the common sense concept of behavior. In terms of scope and sophistication it far exceeds theories of human behavior generated by philosophers and psychologists. Rather than being on a par with such theories, the concept of behavior creates a realm of possible individuals who are capable of inventing such theories and criticizing such theories in responsible ways. How else could such theories come about? Unfortunately, the theories we now have exhibit the human limitations of their authors rather than a deep understanding of behavior or persons. To be sure, the Academy is not noted for such understanding.

4. Individual Persons

The concepts of Person and Behavior are so closely connected that it appears that a basic exposition of either one would serve to introduce the other. Had we begun with an exposition of “Person” we could define “behavior” as being, in the relevant sense, what a Person *does*. Having begun with an exposition of the relevant concept of Behavior, we can define a Person as an individual who, in the relevant sense, does *that*. Accordingly, the present systematic definition of a Person is as follows.

A Person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action in a Dramaturgical pattern.

Recall that Deliberate Action is a form of behavior in which the person (a) engages in an Intentional Action, (b) knows that that is what he is doing, and (c) has chosen to do that. The form of the definition tells us that engaging in Deliberate Action is conceptually necessary but not necessarily empirically universal in regard to being a person (recall the parallel situation with an airplane as something which flies through the air under its own power) and that a paradigm case formulation is implicitly involved.

Just as we grow up to speak a particular language, not a language in general, we grow up to be a particular kind of person, not a person in general. We distinguish one person from another not merely as separate historical individuals (corresponding to the Identity parameter of behavior) but under various specifications of their personal characteristics (the Person Characteristic parameter of behavior).

At face value, such person descriptions reflect a parametric analysis. And, indeed, there is a parametric analysis at the bottom of it all. However, there is more to it than that.

To give a parametric analysis of the domain of X's is to specify how one X, as such, could be the same as another X or different from it.

If the X's in question are persons, as given by the definition, a parametric analysis will amount to asking, "How can one such history, as such, be the same as another such history or different from it?"

This analysis gives us four parameters. One such life history can resemble another or differ from it in regard to (a) which types of behaviors occur, (b) their temporal patterns of occurrence, (c) which heterogeneous behavior patterns occur, and (d) their temporal patterns of occurrence.

As it happens, the number of life histories which would be distinguished on the basis of type of behavior and pattern of occurrence is impossibly large and indefinitely large. (The number involves $N!$ where N is the number, on the order of several million, of behaviors in the average life history.) In its pristine form the parametric analysis is unmanageable.

Clearly, the situation calls for some strategy of grouping the possibilities. And we do that. We make use of some relatively simple strategies for collapsing and categorizing the possibilities and others for introducing more refined distinctions or more elaborate conceptual structures. These strategies have as their products the traditional forms, or categories, of person characteristics, and each of these is exemplified by some number of particular person characteristics. If we consider only the first two parameters, we find the following categories of Person Characteristics.

Dispositions

Traits

Attitudes

Interests

Styles

Powers

Abilities

Knowledge

Values

Derivatives

States

Capacities
Embodiment

These are described briefly as follows.

A. Dispositions

One of the simplest and primary strategies is to reduce the pattern of occurrence to merely its frequency aspect. We then characterize a history as having a high frequency of occurrence of a given type of behavior or a low frequency of occurrence. (Both of these will be referred to as “frequency patterns.”) Another is to specify a type of behavior by specifying some aspect (e.g., some parametric value) of it. Table 3 is generated almost entirely by these two strategies.

1. Trait Description

In Table 3 we see how a particular specification of a type of behavior and a pattern of occurrence leads to a familiar form of person description, i.e., a trait description. To have a given trait is to be disposed to engage in a certain kind of behavior. Any behavior may be the basis for a trait description. And, in general, given a type of behavior, either a low frequency pattern of occurrence or a high frequency pattern of occurrence will generate trait descriptions. They will be different traits, of course.

For example, a brave, generous, or hostile person is one in whose life history brave, generous, or hostile behaviors (respectively) occur with greater frequency than in the lives of other persons, other things being equal. Here, too, however, it’s not that simple. There are at least two kinds of issues that arise.

(a) How much is enough? How great does the frequency have to be before we say “brave,” “generous,” etc.? The answer is twofold, i.e., (1) more than you would expect from just anyone in those various circumstances and (2) enough more to be worth commenting on.

(b) The life history directly in question is a conceptual life history, and the extent to which it corresponds to the actual history is subject to

qualifications. Obviously, circumstances or contrary motivations might prevent or reduce the behavioral expressions of a given trait, hence the references above to “other things being equal” and “more than you would expect from just anyone.”

Likewise, the reference to the life history is conceptual, not empirical in that it is a device for saying what the person is like now. He is *now* the kind of person who, if nothing extraneous interfered, would have that kind of life history. Obviously, person characteristics change over time, if only because they had to be acquired to begin with.

A Trait Description is a global characterization of a person that distinguishes that person from “just anyone.” (And we may use quantifying adjectives such as “very,” “somewhat,” “extremely,” and so on in connection with traits.)

Table 3. Dispositions

1.	PC Category: Type of Behavior: Pattern of Occurrence:	Trait Any type <θ, W, K, KH, P, A, θ, θ > Frequency
2.	PC Category: Type of Behavior: Pattern of Occurrence:	Attitude Any type, with specified Object < θ, W, OBJ, KH, P, A, θ, θ > Frequency
3.	PC Category: Type of Behavior: Pattern of Occurrence:	Interest Members of a set; specify object; specify intrinsic < θ, θ, OBJ, θ, θ, θ, θ, θ > Frequency
4.	PC Category: Type of Behavior: Pattern of Occurrence:	Style Any set; specify performance < θ, θ, θ, θ, P, θ, θ, θ > Frequency

2. Attitude Description

Table 3 shows that any type of behavior may be used as the basis for an Attitude Description. The additional specification, and the way an Attitude Description differs from a Trait Description, is that there is a certain “object” which is part of the value of the K parameter of the type of behavior that is involved. Traditionally, Attitudes are said to be “directed toward” an “object.” The “object” can, in fact, be anything. For example, it may be an object, e.g., Mount McKinley, or a type of object, e.g., the Concorde, or a class of persons, e.g., scientists, or a state of affairs, e.g., the current economic downturn, or a person, e.g., Mary, and so on.

As with the Trait Description, the force of an Attitude description is that we expect to see more (or less) of that kind of behavior among the behaviors involving that “object,” and here again, “more” means “more than we would expect from just anybody.”

Because of its narrower focus, an Attitude description can be used to qualify the broad brush characterization given by a Trait description. Thus, “He’s a miserly person (the trait), but he’s pretty generous with his children (the attitude).”

3. Interest Description

An interest is always an interest *in* something. Thus, as with attitudes, we speak of the “object” of an interest. As with attitudes, there is no obvious limit to what it is that one might have an interest in. Common examples include an interest in chess, in skiing, in art, in the current recession, in the age of dinosaurs, in the question of whether global warming is a genuine phenomenon, in a given person or class of persons, and so on.

Table 3 shows that in regard to Type of behavior, we specify that the “object” is part of the value of the K parameter. There is no single type of behavior specified, partly because an interest in something is generally shown through a variety of different behaviors involving the object of interest, and partly because the set of such behaviors will differ with different objects. (For example, an interest in golf can be shown by playing

golf, by joining the golf association, by reading books on golf, by designing ideal golf courses, by reading biographies of famous golfers, and so on.) The additional specification, i.e., that the behavior is intrinsic, is to say that the behavior isn't merely instrumental and isn't merely in the service of an ulterior motive. Allport's example of the salesman who joined the country club and played golf in order to sell more insurance is a case in point here. We would say that the salesman didn't really have an interest in golf (it was only simulated) because his golfing behaviors were ulteriorly motivated and merely instrumental (his real interest was in selling insurance).

Thus, the force of saying that Wil has an interest in politics is that when it comes to his behaviors involving politics we can expect to find more of those which are expressions of that interest (more than we would expect from just anybody). (See the discussion of the Relationship Formula in Chapter 9 for a more extensive discussion of behaviors that "express" a relationship.)

4. Style Description

Traditionally, style is said to deal not with what you do, but how you do it. The notion of style is used within limited domains or as a general person description. For example, we speak of a formal or informal style of speech; we speak of a sophisticated style of dress, of a devious or straightforward interpersonal style, of a graceful or awkward or delicate style of movement, and so on.

"How you do it" refers to implementation, which corresponds to the Performance parameter. Table 3 shows that in respect to type of behavior, we specify the domain (this is the force of "any set") and specify that the Performance is of a certain kind. In giving a Style Description, we are saying that among the behaviors defined by the domain we would expect to find more of those behaviors characterized by performances of the specified kind (more than we would expect from just anybody). This holds equally for Performances that are merely Performances and those which are themselves Deliberate Actions.

B. Powers

What is common to the various categories of Dispositions is that they are all based on frequency patterns of occurrence. Thus, they are concerned with what people have a tendency to do; they have to do with what one might expect from a given person. In contrast, Powers have to do with behaviors being possible or not possible for a given person.

One could view the move from what does happen to what could or couldn't happen as a transformation in a Paradigm Case Formulation framework, and that is the approach taken here. Three types of Powers, i.e., Abilities, Knowledge, and Values, are distinguished.

1. Abilities

Just as an Attitude is always an attitude *toward* something and an Interest is always an interest *in* something, an ability is always the ability *to accomplish* something. We identify an ability by reference to a kind of achievement and we distinguish one ability from another by reference to their corresponding achievements.

Type of Behavior:	All; specify A
	$\langle \theta, \theta, \theta, \theta, \theta, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$
Pattern of Occurrence:	Possible

Thus, for example, we commonly speak of the ability to speak English, add numbers, walk, make edible dinners, tell funny jokes, lecture amusingly, calculate trajectories, keep one's balance, walk a tightrope, drive a car, and so on.

To say that a person can (is able to) speak English is to imply that a certain kind of behavioral (i.e., non-accidental) achievement of this kind is possible rather than impossible. "Possible," however, covers a lot of ground, and we have an array of competence terms ("is merely able to..."; "is capable of ..."; "is liable to ..."; "has a talent for ..."; "has the ability to ..."; "is a genius at ..."; "could do ... in the middle of an

earthquake”; and so on) to cover that ground. “Has the ability to” is here taken as paradigmatic.

To say that a person *has the ability to* speak English is to say that under normal conditions he may be expected to succeed in speaking English if that is what he sets out to do. In contrast, for example, to say that “on any given Sunday any NFL team *is capable of* beating any other NFL team” is to say (a) that for any given team on any given Sunday, winning over its opponent is not out of the question, and (b) if it does win, that isn’t just luck, chance, or accident; (c) nevertheless, the expectation that they will win requires something more than that they try to do that (they need a little bit of luck). Or, again, to say that a quarterback has exceptional passing ability is to say either (a) that under normal circumstances he could be expected not only to succeed but to accomplish more than most quarterbacks, or (b) that he may be expected to succeed not merely under normal circumstances but even under unfavorable circumstances where most quarterbacks would fail, or (c) both of these.

What is mainly at issue in the choice of these various competence locutions is the expected success and the extent to which the success can be attributed straightforwardly to the person rather than to favorable or accidental circumstances (but still short of complete chance or accident). Thus, it is not surprising that (a) we do not expect a person to retain all his abilities under various extraordinary circumstances (e.g., under excruciating pain) and (b) we sometimes relativize ability descriptions explicitly, e.g., “He has the ability to make effective presentations if...” (if he knows he’s right; if no one challenges him; if he’s thoroughly prepared; and so on).

One subcategory of Ability is sensitivity – the ability to detect something that is there. This is a broad range and runs parallel to knowledge, for any knowledge that I acquire directly or indirectly, by observation and/or thought, reflects my abilities to detect these things. (We can call it an ability, but in fact we distinguish many different abilities of this general sort.) Another, related subcategory is judgment – the ability to make good decisions or good appraisals in this or that domain.

Finally, corresponding to Ability descriptions, we have Disability descriptions, which imply more or less deficiency with respect to the corresponding ability and expected achievement. Here again, the point of reference is what one might expect from just anyone. Thus, we say, “He’s a poor chess player,” “He isn’t very good at coping with aggression,” “He’s got no arithmetic ability at all,” and “He just doesn’t know how to do arithmetic at all.” The latter two descriptions imply that the non-accidental occurrence of arithmetic successes in the person’s life history is impossible.

For our purposes, four “competence” concepts are of special interest. These are “ability,” “skill,” “competence” and “know how.”

- (a) As noted above, an ability is defined in terms of a type of achievement or a class of achievements that I can be expected to succeed at under normal circumstances if I try.
- (b) Having a skill refers to the mastery of a procedure, process, or technique for accomplishing a given type of achievement. “Skill” and “ability” are differently related to the notion of an achievement. “Ability” is conceptually anchored on what I can accomplish, whereas “skill” is anchored on what I have to work with.
- (c) “Competence” is the generic term, which encompasses primarily both skills and abilities, but also any point on the “non-accidental” dimension referred to above (from “barely able” to “can do it in his sleep with one hand tied behind his back”).
- (d) “Know How” is used as a technical term in connection with Intentional Action. Rather than being anchored on a type of achievement, Know How is anchored on a specific achievement, i.e., the value of the Performance parameter. Rather than identifying a kind of competence, which accounts for a certain kind of success, “Know How” is an indefinite reference to a learning history, and the corresponding competence, by virtue of which the occurrence of *that* performance was not a matter of luck, chance, accident, or coincidence.

2. Knowledge

A person’s knowledge is the set of facts and concepts that he has the competence to act on. It is his cognitive repertoire. In terms of the two parameters, we have the following.

Type of Behavior:	All; specify K < θ , θ , K, θ , θ , θ , θ >
Pattern of Occurrence:	Possible

3. Values

A person’s Value structure is the set of motivational priorities that he is routinely able to act on.

Type of Behavior:	All; specify W < θ , W, θ , θ , θ , θ , θ >
Pattern of Occurrence:	Possible

The reason for speaking of motivational priorities rather than motivations per se is clarified in the discussions of the “Judgment Diagram” and of “Choice Principles” below. Here, we may simply point out that we have no way of assessing values in an absolute way. Rather, we do it in a relative way based on preferences and choices.

4. General Aspects of Powers

If we consider the five parameters of behavior corresponding to the Agency Description, i.e., Want, Know, Know How, Performance and Achievement, we find that the first three are “standing conditions,” at least in comparison to the last two, which are clearly “happenings.” In reviewing the relationships among parameters, one of the things we noted was that by virtue of the values of W, K, and KH, the values of P and A (in its success-related aspects) were non-accidental. This was in the context of taking the behavior as a given. If we do not take the behavior as a given, we find a different and stronger connection.

Consider a hypothetical behavior, B, with all its values (especially those five) specified to the point where they distinguish that behavior from any other behavior. Consider the values of the W, K, and KH parameters, and let us designate them as BW, BK, and BKH. Now we can make the following three statements.

- (a) If B requires knowledge BK that a person doesn't have, that person cannot engage in B.
- (b) If B requires motivation BW that that person doesn't have, that person cannot engage in B.
- (c) If B requires skills BKH that that person doesn't have, that person cannot engage in B.

In effect, the three Powers codify the possible values of the K, W, and KH parameters of the behaviors of a given person. Because of this they codify possibilities and impossibilities of engaging in particular behaviors. Any behaviors for which the K, W, or KH values are not available are not possible for that person; it will not be in the person's behavioral repertoire; it will not be part of the person's behavior potential. All of this is at a given time, of course. These things change.

It should be clear that when we speak of Knowledge, Values, and Abilities as Powers and as governing what behaviors are possible or not possible for a person, we are not talking about occult forces or structures or processes which make something happen or prevent something from happening. (This holds for the Dispositions as well.) Rather, we are talking about the logical structure of the concept of an individual Person.

C. Derivatives

The several Dispositions and Powers are defined by their direct connection to behavior. In contrast, there are three additional categories of person characteristics, which are defined by their direct connection to powers and/or dispositions and have only indirect connections to behavior. This is clearly true for States and Capacities. The third, Embodiment, is more of an intermediate case.

1. States

The Powers and Dispositions, which we commonly distinguish and refer to routinely, are persistent, and they are generally acquired slowly and lost or altered slowly if at all. Thus, there is a place in the grammar of Person description for a category of person characteristics dealing with the kind of change that may be quick, non-persistent, and readily reversible. Such a category is that of a “State,” which is explicated as follows.

When a person is in a particular state, there is a systematic difference in his powers and/or dispositions.

Some of the states which we commonly distinguish are being tired, sleepy, asleep, in pain, intoxicated, anxious, angry, overjoyed, excited, sick, euphoric, in shock, depersonalized, confused, dizzy, weak, unconscious, exhausted, depressed, and so on.

The consequences of being in such states is not directly behavioral, but behavioral, if at all, only by virtue of the differences in powers and/or dispositions. Thus, for example, if I am tired, that in no way suggests that there is a certain kind of behavior I am likely to engage in (if there is, that will be a reaction to it, not an expression of it). Rather, if I am tired, things which I can normally do quickly, easily, and accurately I can now do less quickly, less easily, and less accurately (by virtue of a difference in abilities). Likewise, my trait of generosity, my attitude of enthusiastic appreciation of certain kinds of music, my interest in chess, and my energetic style are not unlikely to be affected. The more tired I am, the more likely they are to be affected, and the more they are likely to be affected. Some of these differences may in turn be expressed in what I do or don't do or in how I do what I do, but they need not be.

Powers and Dispositions may be thought of as in principle involving a comparison of different persons as to their likeness and difference. In contrast, the concept of a state may be thought of as in principle corresponding to a comparison between a person as he is now, when he is tired or overjoyed, etc., and the way he would be (his powers and/or dispositions) if he weren't in that state. (Since differences in powers and

dispositions are involved in both sorts of comparison, it is easy to see why being in certain states is “like becoming another person.”)

One kind of state, which is of some special interest, is that of being sick, i.e., being in a pathological state. This is discussed as a separate topic in Section IV.

States are proximately caused, not motivated. I can’t become tired just by deciding to be tired. Nor can I become drunk, angry, etc., just by deciding. I can, if I want, drink six cognacs in a row, and that will make me drunk. Likewise, I can think about the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune and work myself into a rage, and so on. All this means is that I have some knowledge of the causal conditions for some of these states, and knowing that, can use that leverage to get myself into a state. That doesn’t make them voluntary.

Another point of interest regarding states is their relation to the definition of a Person: A person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action, in a dramaturgical pattern.

There is a Paradigm Case Formulation implicit in the definition. It would proceed along these lines.

Paradigm Case:

An individual whose history is a history of Deliberate Action in a dramaturgical pattern.

Transformations:

T1: Change the individual to one who is sometimes unconscious.

T2: Change the individual to one who is sometimes asleep.

etc.

There are various reasons why the persons we know are not always engaging in Deliberate Action. The reasons have to do with incapacities of various sorts, mostly states of unconsciousness. Thus, once we have developed the concept of a State as a class of person characteristics we

are in a position to explicate the definition more fully. Note, too, that reference to such states functions as an explanation of why the person is not engaging in Deliberate Action.

2. Capacities

How do people get to be the way they are? How do infants grow up to be adults? How are Powers and Dispositions acquired? The primary concept for constructing answers to such questions is the concept of Capacity. Capacity may be informally characterized as the power to acquire person characteristics. It is defined by the following formula.

PC Formula: Capacity + History \rightarrow Person Characteristic

How does a person acquire a given Person Characteristic? By having the prior capacity and the relevant intervening history. The logic of this explanatory formula is simple, compelling, and Aristotelian in spirit. Whatever is now actual must already previously have been possible (potential) and needed only the proper circumstances (history) to make it actual. Thus, if she now knows how to do arithmetic and didn't know how at a previous time, she nevertheless must have had the potential for knowing how to do arithmetic at a previous time (indeed, at all previous times in her history), and her actual history between then and now must have been one of the histories that would make that potential actual.

Capacities work in pairs, with histories as the second members of the pairs. She has the capacity to become a generous person only under certain, "relevant," histories, not just any old set of circumstances.

We may distinguish behavioral histories from non-behavioral histories in this respect. As social scientists, for example, we have a more central interest in the fact that he now has the ability to do arithmetic because he attended a certain class in 5th grade than we have in the fact that he can't grasp anything with his left hand because someone dropped an anvil on it two years ago. Likewise, we have a more central interest in the fact that she is now a punctual person because her father always required it of the

children than we have in the fact that she has difficulty speaking because she has a small lesion in the left temporal lobe or that she has the ability to speak “in the human style” because she has a mouth, larynx, lungs and associated nervous system.

In contrast, as an authentic robot who studies human beings, or as a human being whose aim is to create robots, one is likely to be equally interested in both. (To speak of “acquiring” person characteristics, allows for both; to speak of “learning” person characteristics would only fit the behavioral history.)

Just as an Ability is always the ability to accomplish something, a Capacity is always the capacity to acquire some Person Characteristic. Accordingly, Capacities are individuated by reference to the PC that would be the actualization of that potential and the relevant history by means of which the potential could be actualized. (Often we make elliptical reference only to the first of these.) Thus, a child who has the capacity to acquire the ability to do arithmetic as a result of individual tutoring over a two-year period might not have the capacity to acquire that ability as a result of a single semester in a class in an urban public school. And a child who has the capacity to become a punctual person because her father always required it might well not have the capacity to become a punctual person on the basis of the example provided by her mother (but she might also have the capacity to acquire that trait as a result of both parents *not* being punctual, etc.).

The capacity for acquiring a given person characteristic is the potential for acquiring that person characteristic. What makes the difference between a person merely having the potential for a given person characteristic at a given time, $T(N)$ and his actually having that characteristic at a later time, $T(N+K)$ is his having the right kind of history in the interval between $T(N)$ and $T(N+K)$. (What qualifies as the right kind of history must in principle be established by observation.)


But now we have another systematic question: What is it at $T(N)$ which gives the person his capacity to acquire the characteristics at (by)

T(N+K), given the relevant history? The answer is, “His other person characteristics at T(N).”

A person’s PC’s facilitate or hinder the acquisition of other PC’s and set some limits to the histories whereby the latter may be acquired. Limiting cases would be those where a present set of PC’s makes the acquisition of certain other PC’s either inevitable or impossible.

The PC formula thus operates recursively as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Recursive PC Formula



In its recursive use, the PC Formula lends itself to the reconstruction and representation of historical development of PC’s. The Developmental Schema shown in Appendix A is so designated not because this form of representation is restricted to the period from birth to adulthood, but because it finds a special use in showing the essential conceptual structure of developmental accounts and developmental theories.

The recursive use of the PC Formula calls our attention to a limiting case phenomenon, i.e., “Original Capacity.” Reconstructing a developmental history using the logic of Figure 2 (irrespective of what idiom we use) presents us with the problem of the original point of development and its connection to the remainder of the life history. The problem arises no matter what point one picks as the original point of development, but it is particularly salient if we assume that (essentially) all PC’s are acquired, for that raises the question of what it’s like (No PC’s?) at the point of origin and how development ever gets started from such a point

if it takes existing PC's to acquire new PC's.

If we approach the problem of Original Capacity simply as a limiting case of developmental reconstruction, it appears that the minimum requirement for making intelligible the acquisition of the familiar PC's is that there be at least one set of circumstances in which the successful participation in the pattern of behavior which results in the acquisition of a PC is not accidental. This condition is designated as the individual's being "merely able" (we might also have said "barely able") to participate in that form of behavior. This is the (lower) limiting case in the competence dimension referred to in connection with Ability, i.e., the degree to which success is purely and simply attributed to the individual rather than to the circumstances.

This minimum requirement amounts to saying that the participation is not impossible and that when it occurs it need not be accidental. To be sure, with such a minimal PC, it might appear highly unlikely that the person would find himself in one of those (presumably few) circumstances in which PC development was not accidental. However, for human infants it is, in a sense, never just accidental, because the relevant patterns of behavior involve both an infant who contributes minimally in this way and an adult who provides almost all of the knowledge, skills, and other PC's needed to carry off a successful joint effort under normal circumstances. Successful development is a joint success on the part of an infant and some adult(s).

This way of handling the matter can be adopted within almost any theoretical framework. All that is required is (a) some change principle and (b) the stipulation (usually implicit) that the individual's initial condition does not rule out the operation of the change principle. Thus, for example, in a learning theory framework no innate adaptive behaviors need to be postulated so long as the individual's initial state is such that adaptive behaviors can be "conditioned." Likewise, in psychoanalytic theory, the initial psychic representations need not be realistic or adaptive; it is enough if they can serve as starting points for displacement to eventually produce realistic or adaptive behavior. Even Jung's "Collective Unconscious" and the associated "Archetypes" are of this sort, though

initially they appear to be appeals to physiology. Jung is concerned to point out that the Collective Unconscious is a potential, not a thing; the nature of the potential is such that when the individual experiences the world on the model of one or another of the Archetypes, that is not just accidental.

3. Embodiment

Some people are six feet tall; some have long blonde hair and blue eyes; some weigh between 140 and 160 pounds; some are beautiful and some are ordinary-looking; some are one-legged. Embedded in ordinary language is the notion that, in addition to having bodies, people have bodily characteristics directly as people. Thus, we normally say, "He is six feet tall," not, "His body is six feet tall."

Certainly, such characteristics are ways in which one person can be the same as other persons or different from them. Thus, there are grounds for treating them straightforwardly as person characteristics. However, as soon as we abandon the parochialism of identifying persons with specimens of *Homo sapiens* we encounter problems. (We didn't know we were only talking about human beings – we thought we were talking about persons.)

It appears that as soon as we recognize the possibility of different sorts of embodiment for persons, simple, direct reference to body characteristics as person characteristics generates nonsense. For example, consider a person whose embodiment is similar to what would appear to us as a three-foot-across amoeba. Reference to this person's height as a person characteristic would be nonsensical in most contexts, as would reference to this person's hair color, etc.

Thus, it seems that in order to formulate body characteristics as person characteristics we require a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we specify a paradigmatic body type and its parameters, i.e., the ways in which individuals with that body type could, as such, be the same as one another or different from one another. In the second stage, we specify

values of one or more of these parameters. (Alternately, we could first specify an archetypal body as a paradigm case and then specify how the person in question differs bodily from the archetype. Ordinary usage legitimizes both approaches: “has blonde hair” reflects the first; “has a fever” reflects the second.)

Embodiment is clearly related to the Performance parameter of behavior and the PC of Style, which has to do with Performance. What we make of that is complicated by several considerations.

- (a) Because deliberate actions characteristically are cases of doing X by doing Y (recall the Significance/Implementation structure), many Performances are themselves behaviors rather than postures/movements. Correspondingly, many Styles, e.g., “devious,” have nothing to do with the kind of movements and postures generated by the person.
- (b) Even without considerations of significance, Performance involves more than body movements and postures. For example, if I split some firewood with a seven-pound maul, the Performance of that behavior involves swinging the ax, not just my own movements. What I know how to do is swing the ax effectively. What I don’t at all know how to do is make just that set of movements such that if there happened to be a properly oriented ax in my grasp, the ax would split the firewood.
- (c) On the other hand, it would be difficult to consider my Performance of swinging the ax as something quite independent of the fact that I have the hands, arms, etc., that I do. Reference to body parts and body structures will typically appear in or be implicit in the description of the Performance.

In a Dramaturgical Pattern

The preceding categories of Person Characteristics were developed by considering the first two of the four parameters which were generated by a parametric analysis of the definition of a person as an individual

whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action in a dramaturgical pattern. The four parameters were:

- (a) Type of individual behavior
- (b) Pattern of occurrence of individual behaviors
- (c) Type of behavior pattern
- (d) Pattern of occurrence of behavior patterns

Complexity/duplication occurs because we have a choice of two different units of behavior. Certainly, individual Deliberate Actions are a sensible choice for the units of behavior, and we have developed some of the immediate consequences of that choice.

However, a person's life does not consist of a random sequence of disparate Deliberate Actions. Such a life would not be a human life, nor would it make any sense. Nor would such an individual long survive if left to his own devices.

A more fundamental unit of behavior is a social pattern of behavior, here designated as a "Social Practice." This pattern involves a heterogeneous sequence of behaviors and more often than not involves more than one person.

Confusion may arise from the fact that a social practice is a pattern involving the occurrence of individual behaviors, and yet we have already identified "pattern of occurrence" of individual behaviors as the second parameter in the parametric analysis of persons. It should be clear, however, that in the latter case, we are talking about a single kind (broadly or narrowly defined) of behavior and the pattern of occurrence of that kind of behavior in the life history of a person. In contrast, with social practices, we are dealing with a (paradigmatically unbroken) sequence of heterogeneous behaviors that constitutes a historical episode in the life history of one or more participants.

Conceptually, a social practice is the smallest unit of social behavior.

However, social practices may be more or less extensive, and, for example, a social practice may have one or more other social practices as components.

A larger pattern of social behavior, here designated as an “Institution,” consists of an organized set of social practices. Thus, one institution may have other institutions, as well as social practices, as components.

The ultimate unit of social behavior is a culture, or way of life. Ways of life are not built up out of institutions, social practices, and Deliberate Actions. Rather, these latter are differentiated out from ways of living. (A game is not everywhere demarcated by its rules – or by its descriptions.)

Thus, while the first two parameters of the domain of persons leads to a taxonomy of aspects of individual persons, traditionally called “personality variables” and here designated as “Person Characteristics,” the second two parameters lead to the notion of personal histories and of functioning as a person among persons in a world of persons and their ways. (Note the similarity between this contrast and the contrast between a Parametric Analysis and a Paradigm Case Formulation.) Because the latter topics are complex and require resources which are not yet at hand, they are dealt with below in connection with (a) social behavior, (b) the Dramaturgical Model, and (c) personal identity.

5. Reality Concepts

The real world is what you see when you look around you.

It is the world of rivers, mountains, trees, lightning flashes, hurricanes, oceans, meadows, earthquakes, sunsets, and starry nights. It is the world of people and their buildings, roads, automobiles, games, gas stations, combats, atom bombs, farms, universities, clubs, customs, sacraments, families, and friends.

It is the world of common sense, and there is much that could be said about it. The task at hand is to articulate the concept of “the real world” and its relation to “reality.”

The first thing to be said, since “reality” and “the real world” are almost universally used interchangeably, both in the vernacular and in technical contexts, is that in the present report, the two locutions are used to mark two concepts which are fundamentally and categorically different, though they are strongly related. Reality is *not* what you see when you look around you.

In connection with “the real world,” we begin by introducing four basic “reality concepts,” i.e., “object,” “process,” “event,” and “state of affairs,” by means of a calculational system, designated as the State of Affairs System (SA System). This calculational system provides the generative power for constructing abstract representations (formulas) of unlimited complexity, granularity, and scope. In this domain, we find the possibility of a logically bounded, observationally/behaviorally anchored, empirically open-ended type of construction which corresponds to our notion of “the real world” or simply “the world.”

The connecting link between “reality” and “the real world” is the notion of our behavioral possibilities and impossibilities. Whatever else they do, our representations of “the real world” codify our possibilities/impossibilities for behavior; in contrast, the notion of “reality” is directly the notion of those possibilities/impossibilities as such, with emphasis on the latter (“reality constraints”).

Finally, we make use of parametric analysis methodology to formulate a systematic notation (“Descriptive Formats”) for distinguishing, or describing or representing, particular kinds of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs or, equally, historically particular objects, processes, events, and states of affairs. The primary value of the Descriptive Formats is to serve as canonical forms for what there is to be represented when we speak of this or that object, process, etc. Partly because they are canonical forms, they also have a direct practical value for representing real world phenomena, particularly in some computer implementations.

I. Basic Reality Concepts

In a preliminary way, we may note that “object,” “process,” “event,” and “state of affairs” are not merely invented or stipulated technical terms, but rather are common sense concepts that already have a significant use. They are used straightforwardly as concepts relating to the real world, and a paradigmatic use of these concepts is as the ultimate substantive categories of what there is in the world.

Not coincidentally, the four reality concepts are also observation concepts. We observe exemplars of each kind. Anything we see when we look around us, whatever it may be specifically, will, ultimately, be an object, a process, an event, or a state of affairs.

For example, I observe an object when I smell the fish, see the automobile, taste the orange, or hear the pencil fall to the floor. I observe a process when I hear the automobile coming down the road, feel the water turning hot, or see the baby bouncing up and down in her crib or working herself into a rage. I observe an event when I hear the motor start, feel the wire snap, see the car park, or see the flash in the sky. I observe a state of affairs when I hear that the singer is off key, feel that the coat is threadbare, taste the difference between Brand X and Brand Y, or see that he is overjoyed, that there is blue sky overhead, that they didn’t understand, that the cat is on the mat, etc.

We do not observe these four very different kinds of things and then manage to pull them together somehow. Rather, we observe a single

world articulated in these four ways and further. For example, when my automobile is in operation, the motor is an object that's part of another object (the automobile). Some of the parts (objects) of the motor are moving in specifiable ways with respect to each other and the motor as a whole. Thus, there are processes involved. Each time the spark plug ignites the fuel, an event and a process occur. That the motor is running is a state of affairs. The automobile's having a motor, the motor's having cylinders, pistons, etc., are also states of affairs. And so on.

It is hardly conceivable that objects, processes, events, and states of affairs could be as intricately bound together as they are, in fact, without there being any conceptual relationships among them. But we need not strain at such a task. There are, in fact, fundamental interrelationships among the four reality concepts. These are codified in Table 4.

Table 4, the "Transition Rules," provides a calculational system which codifies logical relationships among the concepts of "object," "process," "event," and "state of affairs."

The identity statements have the form "X is Y." This implies that what is described as being a case of X can be redescribed as being a case of Y. It also implies that the same thing can be described or identified as X and also as Y.

Thus, the identities could be called "Redescription Rules" or, *pace* generative grammars, "Rewrite Rules." Historically, they have been called "Transition Rules" because each rule corresponds to a transition from one way of understanding to another. What remains invariant across such transitions is real world identity. What changes is the form of representation. There is no privileged form of representation here. (Compare describing a given motion in different frames of reference.)

Some elaboration will be needed for the proper positioning of the Transition Rules. The following sections deal with (1) construing the rules, (2) the Transition Rules as a formal system, (3) SA System "products": replacement vs. elaboration and descriptive formulas vs. descriptions, and (4) SA formulas and the real world.

Table 4. State of Affairs System Transition Rules

1. A state of affairs is a totality of related objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs.
2. A process is a state of affairs which is a constituent of some other state of affairs.
- 2a. So also is an object; so also is an event; and so also is a state of affairs.
3. An object is a state of affairs which has other, related objects as immediate constituents. (An object divides into related, smaller objects.)
4. A process is a sequential change from one state of affairs to another.
5. A process is a state of affairs which has other, related processes as immediate constituents. (A process divides into related, smaller processes.)
6. An event is a direct change from one state of affairs to another.
7. An event is a state of affairs having two states of affairs (“before” and “after”) as immediate constituents.
8. That an object and/or a process and/or event and/or a state of affairs has a given relation to another object and/or process and/or event and/or state of affairs is a state of affairs.
9. That an object or a process or an event or a state of affairs is of a given kind is a state of affairs.
10. That a process begins is an event and that it ends is a different event.
11. That an object comes to exist is an event and that it ceases to exist is a different event.

1. Construing the Rules

Table 4 shows the “State of Affairs System,” which is a set of transition rules, or redescription rules, each of which states an identity having the form “X is Y.” Collectively, these rules form a certain kind of calculational system which codifies logical relationships among the concepts of “object,” “process,” “event,” and “state of affairs.”

As with grammars, and unlike most of the well known kinds of formal systems, the thrust of the transition rules is not in the direction of computation or derivation and proof, but rather, is in the direction of construction, representation, and use.

Unlike most other formal systems, including grammars, the transition rules are stated in the vernacular. In part, this is done to preserve the psychological reality of the set, the “native speaker intuition” aspect of the matter. (One of the most salient aspects of the real world is its psychological reality.)

The problem with the vernacular is not that we cannot say precisely what we mean here. We can, and the transition rules do. What is difficult or impossible is to say what we mean in such a way as to effectively discourage all possible ways of misunderstanding or even the most important ways of misunderstanding. In the absence of that magically unambiguous set of statements, some guidelines may help.

The primary guideline is that each transition rule is an identity statement oriented toward dealing with actual particulars rather than concepts, generalities, or descriptions, though one could approach them from each of these other points of view. Here, “X is Y” is to be understood as “X is the same thing as Y.”

Thus, for example, “A state of affairs is a totality of interrelated objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs” (i.e., Rule 1) says that for any particular state of affairs, there is a corresponding particular totality (of objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs) which it is the same thing as. It does not, for example, say that a given particular state of affairs is the same thing as *any* totality of objects and/or processes, etc., or that it is the same thing as some arbitrarily chosen totality of this kind. Neither, by the way, does the rule say that there is only one such totality that it is the same thing as. (If a given state of affairs is the same thing as P and also the same thing as Q, then P is the same thing as Q.)

Consider the case of “process,” where we have both

Rule 4: A process is [the same thing as] as a sequential change from one state of affairs to another.

and

Rule 5: A process is [the same thing as] a state of affairs having related processes as immediate constituents. (A process divides into processes.)

Rule 4 establishes that a process involves a duration (in contrast to Rule 6 for events). The force of “sequential change” is that there are at least two changes involved. If SAb is the beginning state of affairs and SAf is the final state of affairs, then the change $SAb - SAf$ consists of at least two changes, i.e. $SAb - SAc$ and $SAc - SAf$, where SAc is some intermediate state of affairs. Rule 5 tells us that if $SAb - SAf$ is a process, then there is some intermediate state of affairs, SAm such that $SAb - SAm$ and $SAm - SAf$ are processes. And now Rule 4 tells us that each of these processes is a sequential change from one state of affairs to another and therefore there is at least one intermediate state of affairs in each of these processes, and so on and on. Although there are two rules, they give us a single picture of what a process is.

Put more colloquially, a process begins with a state of affairs, which is a totality of interrelated objects and/or processes, etc.; these interrelationships change over time, and the occurrence of that sequence of changes is the same thing as the occurrence of that process.

What Rules 4 and 5 give us is the conceptual machinery for constructing representations of either discrete or continuous processes of any kind whatever. Thus, a second guideline: The transition rules are not per se axioms or truths about objects, processes, etc. or about the real world or representations of it. Rather, they codify cognitive capabilities which can be applied to the task of constructing the kind of representations which could straightforwardly qualify as representations of the real world. This will become clearer as we see what else is required for or is involved in generating real world representations.

2. A Formal System

In the earlier section on conceptual-notational devices, the Element-Operation-Product model of a calculational system was presented. The Transition Rules fit this model.

Note that the structure of each Transition Rule is “X is the same thing as Y.” In this structure, “X” designates an Element, “Y” designates a Product, and “is the same thing as” designates an Operation which it seems reasonable to call “identity coordination.”

The only items that appear substantively in the Element clause are objects, processes, events, or states of affairs. The only items that appear substantively in the Product clause are objects, processes, events, or states of affairs. Thus, the convertibility of Products into Elements is guaranteed. (A quick inspection will confirm that all of the rules could have been written with a state of affairs as the Product and, by Rule 1, that state of affairs would be a totality of related objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs, so that we arrive at the same conclusion.)

With respect to the Operation of identity coordination, perhaps little needs to be said. The locution “is the same thing as” is used here in order to avoid confusion with the categorizing and predicative uses of “is” in the vernacular.

This rose is red (the predicative use), but the rose is not the same thing as red and being a rose is not the same thing as being the color red or being colored red. A rose is a flower (the categorizing use), but a rose is not the same thing as a flower and being a rose is not the same thing as being a flower. A rose is the same thing as a specimen of a certain type of flower and being a rose *is* the same thing as being a specimen of that certain type of flower.

There may be some discomfort at having as undefined terms not merely “object,” “process,” “event,” and “state of affairs” but also “related,” “sequential,” “immediate constituent,” “totality,” “direct change,” etc. These

are not the kind of undefined terms we have come to expect in formal systems. But, of course, this is not just any old formal system. Recalling the discussion of definitions in Chapter 2, we can say here that undefined terms are for those who can use them without needing a definition (and there is no formal system anywhere that does not depend on undefined terms). Since all of the terms in question are common sense terms, there is no question but that most people can use them without definitions. (Indeed, there is a real question as to whether anyone has ever formulated an adequate definition of any of these terms, i.e., one that matches our understanding and passes the “native speaker intuition” test.) The Transition Rules do “implicitly define” the four basic reality concepts in the sense that they select out certain of the existing uses of those terms.

In summary, nothing hinges on whether the Transition Rules fit some other notion of a formal system other than the Element-Operation-Product model described above. The latter is sufficient for our purposes. (We are addressing a fundamental human capability, not the niceties of current practitioners in logic, mathematics, or philosophy; and it is not to be supposed that there is universal agreement there as to what constitutes a formal system.)

3a. SA System “Products”: Replacement and Elaboration

Given the characterization of something as an object, process, event, or state of affairs, the Transition Rules provide resources for reidentification or redescription, but there is no requirement for doing so (where would it end?). In this sense, the Transition Rules are entirely permissive and not at all obligatory.

However, without the possibility of Transition Rule types of redescription there would be no point or utility in characterizing something as an object or a process or event or state of affairs, and these descriptions would not then provide the kind of understanding that they now do.

Merely being able to distinguish one object, process, event, or state of affairs from another is not enough. It is easy to see why if we imagine the same situation with respect to numbers or sentences. For merely

distinguishing numbers or sentences, it would be enough if (a) we could in fact distinguish each one and (b) we had a unique name for each one (let us ignore the issue of having enough names available). What we would be missing is the systematic relationships among them. But it is the systematic relationships that are of the essence here – without them we cannot understand at all what a number is or what a sentence is. Presumably that is why we in fact use the systematic relationships to identify and distinguish them. Likewise, it is our mastery of the systematic relationships that enable us to recognize or produce novel instances of sentences or numbers as the situation calls for without having to have learned each one per se independently. (“They were already systematic possibilities within the game.”)

Similarly, if it were merely a case of distinguishing one object from another, one process from another, etc., or distinguishing an object from a process, etc., and that was all, we would have no notion of the systematic relations among them. We would be unable to think or say such things as (a) the table has a top supported by four legs, (b) the dance involves two people and a certain sequence of steps, (c) the automobile I drove home last night is the one I bought two years ago, (d) being able to give a name to something is very different from understanding it, and (e) etc., etc., etc.

Here again, it is the systematic relationships that are of the essence.

In this connection, we should distinguish between replacement and elaboration as the result of operating in formal systems. In the most familiar systems of logic, mathematics, and generative grammars the name of the game is derivation, and we proceed by means of replacement. Thus, “S” is replaced by “NP + VP” and then “NP” is replaced by “...” and so on until we reach a “surface structure.” Similarly, in doing algebra, we successively replace expressions with other expressions that they are equal to until we reach a canonical form, e.g., “ $X=12$.”

In contrast, with the State of Affairs System, representation is the name of the game, and, paradigmatically, we proceed by means of elabo-

ration. Thus, when I say that this table consists of a flat top supported by four legs, I do not replace the description of something as a table with a description of something as a state of affairs consisting of a flat top being supported by four legs. Rather, I have kept both and I have elaborated, or enriched, the description of something as that table by saying that that table is that state of affairs.

Although either replacement or elaboration is permitted, a real world redescription will, paradigmatically, enrich an initial description rather than replace it. For a simple and familiar example of enrichment of description by successive elaborations we may turn to the nursery:

This is a house.

This is the house that Jack built.

This is the table that stood in the house that Jack built.

This is the cheese that lay on the table that stood in the house that Jack built.

--

--

--

This is the horse that kicked the dog that chased the cat that ate the rat that nibbled the cheese that lay on the table that stood in the house that Jack built.

And compare, for general interest and possible future reference:

- (1) This is the object that's part of the object ... that's part of the object that Jack observed.
- (2) This is the object that's part of the state of affairs that's the same as the process that resulted in the state of affairs that's the same as the state of affairs that Jack observed.

The first is a way of introducing objects (etc.) that are too small to be observed. The second is a way of introducing unobservable (hypothetical or theoretical) entities (structures, processes, events, and states of affairs) to explain observed states of affairs. (Thus, the initial "object" in (2)

could be a cognitive structure in a hypothetical cognitive process which “explains” an observable achievement. There will be countless variations on this theme, of course.)

3b. SA System “Products”: Descriptive Formulas, Not Descriptions

It should be clear from the preceding examples that the products of the SA System are not particular descriptions of particular objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, but rather logical formulas involving objects, processes, etc., as such. To have a description of a particular object or process, etc., would, paradigmatically, require in addition some specification of which object, process, etc., and what kind it is. These requirements are addressed below.

It should also be clear that, because SA formulas can be recursively elaborated and extended, the range of formulas generated by the system is unlimited in variety, complexity, and scope and not merely in number. As with Tinkertoys, the number of ways of assembling the concepts of object, process, event, and state of affairs has no limit. Correspondingly, there is no logical limit to the complexity or detail of a scene that observation might provide us or that the world might consist of.

The following concepts and terminology are of value in dealing with the topics of SA System formulas and representation of the real world: (a) observation-anchored formula, (b) reality formula, (c) composition and decomposition.

a. Observation-anchored formulas

The logic of an observation-anchored formula is essentially the same as that of an “Achievement-anchored” behavior description as presented in Chapter 3, and it is well illustrated by the two examples above:

- (1) This is the object that’s part of the object that’s part of the object...that’s part of the object that Jack observed.

- (2) This is the object that's part of the state of affairs that's the same as the process that resulted in a state of affairs that's the same as the state of affairs that Jack observed.

A description of what is observed may be extended to include what is not observed. A reality formula only part of which corresponds to what is observed is designated as an "observation-anchored" formula.

b. Reality formula

A reality formula is any SA System formula that is used or, by extension, can be used, to represent some part or aspect of the real world. Thus, an observation-anchored formula is a special case of a reality formula. The portion of an observation-anchored formula that does not correspond to observation may correspond to what is not observable or it may correspond to what is observable but not observed, or it may do the former in one place and the latter in another.

c. Composition and decomposition

In decomposition, a single something, which may be an object or process or state of affairs, is redescribed as a structure of related constituents of the same sort. Objects divide into related objects (Rule 3); processes divide into related processes (Rule 5); and states of affairs divide into related states of affairs (Rule 1).

The recursive procedure of dividing wholes into related parts of the same sort is designated as "decomposition" and a part-whole structure which results from that procedure is designated as a decomposition.

Composition is, of course, the inverse procedure. Related objects are redescribed as a state of affairs which is the same thing as a new single object. Related processes are redescribed as a state of affairs which is the same thing as a new single process. And related states of affairs are redescribed as a new, single state of affairs that includes both.

The recursive procedure of assembling related objects, processes, or states of affairs into a new single one of the same kind is designated as “composition” and a part-whole structure which results from this procedure is designated as a composition.

Both composition and decomposition involve part-whole relationships and both involve progressive enrichment from some starting point (typically from what we observe). Composition increases the scope of a reality formula and decomposition increases the level of detail and also the amount of detail.

Both composition and decomposition can be carried out indefinitely. Thus, it should not strain the imagination to recognize that from a single observation we can generate a redescription formula that covers the past, present, and future history of the universe. (We can, indeed, “see the universe in a grain of sand.”) Likewise, we could articulate that description down to the level of subatomic particles and beyond. However, there are some additional aspects of the matter to be dealt with in the following section.

4. State of Affairs Formulas and the Real World

From the Window

As I look out the window, I can see an adjacent building against the backdrop of the mountains. Behind the building is an expressway with automobiles, trucks, and other vehicles moving rapidly in both directions. One of the automobiles stands out. Whatever is going on under the hood is producing clouds of bluish exhaust. The building is surrounded by parking lots which are almost full, and an automobile has just parked in one of the designated spaces. There is a strip of grass immediately surrounding the building, and in this strip, there are several small trees with their leaves rustling in the cold

wind of a fall afternoon. Because the sunlight coming in through the window has become uncomfortable, I get up and lower the blinds.

For any given person, the real world is the one that includes him or her as an actor, an observer, and a critic. (Which is to say, as a person. Actor, Observer, and Critic are the topic of a later section. It is because “observer” is one of the three elements in this set that “the real world is what you see when you look around you.” It is also why the real world is the one you have to find out about by observation; thus, the conceptual connection is the non-empirical basis for empiricism.) The description above illustrates all three. It also illustrates a real world representation in which objects, processes, events, and states of affairs (1) are seamlessly related and (2) are specified as to which and what kind they are.

In order to understand the example more fully, we shall want to consider (a) multiple observations; (b) identifying what and which one a given object, process, etc., is; (c) world formulas; and (d) limiting cases for the Transition Rules.

a. Multiple Observations

An observation-anchored formula is one which is more extensive than the observation on which it is anchored – only part of it corresponds to the observation. The objects, processes, events, and states of affairs in the non-corresponding part of the formula may also be observable. For example, the description of the episode of looking out the window implies (1) the back side of the building, (2) the part of the expressway hidden by the building, (3) what was going on under the hood of the automobile, and (4) the whole scene an hour earlier or an hour later. These were all observable though they were not observed. This is a general feature of reality formulas and real world description.

Since we commonly do make observations which correspond to previously non-observational parts of an observation-anchored reality formula, we shall need a variation on the latter notion to accommodate

these cases. Let us designate as a “thick reality formula” an observationally anchored formula that is anchored on multiple observations. Paradigmatically, the representation will still be more extensive than the observational portion. Not only is there going to be unexplored territory around the edges (so to speak), but also there will be an additional state of affairs, namely my (or your, their) having made the observation. I do not observe myself making observations, but I know about it (because that’s what I produced it as).

b. Which one?

The real world consists, at least in part, of many historical particulars – objects, processes, etc. Thus, one of the basic questions in dealing with any part of the real world is “Which one – which object, process, etc. – is this one?” Thus, we speak of “individuating” or “identifying” objects, processes, etc.

Individuation of objects, processes, etc., is based on relationships (to other objects, processes, etc.) and identities.

(1) A simple example of both is provided by the house that Jack built. Consider:

This is a horse.

Which horse? The horse that kicked a dog.

Which dog? The same dog as the dog that chased a cat.

Which cat? The same cat as the cat that ate a rat.

Which rat? The same rat as the rat that nibbled some cheese.

Which cheese? ...

--

--

--

Which house? The same house as the house that Jack built.

Note that we have here a string alternating between relationships and identities, e.g., “the horse that kicked a dog” and “the same dog as the one

that chased a cat.” Note, too, that the whole string is a more powerful individuator than any single link. There may well be multiple instances of a horse kicking a dog that is one that chases a cat, but by the time we arrive at the house that Jack built, it is doubtful that any ambiguity remains as to which one we are talking about, and this holds for all the elements in the string (the horse, the dog, the cat, ... the house). A locution that succeeds in picking out “which one” on a given occasion is designated as an “individuating expression” or “individuating description.”

Note that in the example, the elements in the string are individuated relative to each other, but if I don’t know who (which one) “Jack” is, there will be some uncertainty about all the others. In this context, the final individuation is accomplished through the relation to the speaker, listener, or observer. If Jack is the person I talked to an hour ago or if he is the person I went through high school with, then there is no ambiguity about Jack and therefore any of the others.

(Of course, one can always suppose that there was more than one house that Jack built or more than one cat that chased the rat, etc. That is why the issue of whether a locution succeeds in individuating is on a case by case basis.)

The buck stops here. Unless I suffer from a serious pathology, I can have no such uncertainty about who or which one I am as I can have about someone else.

(2) In the episode of looking out the window, it is also a matter of identities and relationships. The expressway that the automobiles are moving on is the same one as the one that is partly hidden by the building. That building is the same building as the one surrounded by parking lots and the strip of grass. That automobile that is moving along the expressway is the same automobile as the one that is blowing bluish exhaust. And so on. The items in the scene are individuated by their relations to one another and by the identities between the elements in various relationships. Ultimately, the entire scene is individuated by its relation to me. It is what *I* see when I look out the window.

c. World Formulas

We extended the notion of an observation-anchored formula and arrived at a “thick reality formula.” Now we can extend the latter to arrive at the concept of a “world formula.” A world formula is one in which all our observations and all our knowledge fit. That is, it comprises everything we take to be the case and everything else that is the case, the latter being included by means of placeholders (see below).

Qualitatively, there is one major difference between a thick reality formula and a world formula. We noted that with reality formulas the objects, processes, etc., are individuated relative to each other (and relative to the ensemble) by virtue of their interrelationships and are individuated absolutely for a given person by virtue of the relation of the ensemble, or some part of it, to that person.

That can continue to be the case with the elements of a world formula. (“Every world is somebody’s world.”) However, there is a new possibility that comes to the fore as feasible, valuable, perhaps inescapable. That is, that instead of the objects, processes, etc., being individuated relative to a single point of reference, they are individuated by their relation to (i.e., by their place in) a frame of reference provided by the entire ensemble. The reason this new possibility is valuable and perhaps inescapable is that it is representationally much more economical, and because of that, it may be the only form of world representation that is manageable within the limited capabilities of persons.

As I look around the room, there are a variety of objects. There are the two doors and six windows. There are about 30 acoustical tiles. There are three chairs, one bench, two loudspeakers, two telephones, over a hundred books, three filing cabinets, etc., etc. For N items there is a minimum of $N(N-1)/2$ relationships between pairs of items. There is a corresponding minimum number of relationships among trios of items. And there are 4-place relationships, 5-place relationships – and at least one N -place relationship. This is an impossible number of relationships

to keep track of in any way, much less manage effectively. We don't even try. Instead, we use the ensemble (here, the room) as a single frame of reference and give each item a single place in that framework. For N items, there are N places, and that is a much more workable arrangement that still leaves us free to focus on particular relationships that may be of interest.

This paradigm works most clearly and precisely for the spatial relationships among objects. As soon as we introduce persons into the picture the number of dimensions required to accommodate all the interrelationships goes up dramatically, but we manage, though it's not neat. Indeed, it appears that the most fundamental way we have of understanding something is in terms of "where it fits in the scheme of things."

It appears that in large part this is because world formulas are all-inclusive, so that when we operate in terms of "where it fits in the scheme of things" (or, in an older idiom, "under the aspect of eternity"), we no longer have a context problem. To review this implication, consider the following heuristic taken from a long forgotten part of the academic literature.

The Old Farmhouse

Imagine that you're standing on a lonely heath in England. The only interesting thing in sight is an old farmhouse nearby and a man standing at a short distance from it. You can see that he is moving his arm up and down. The question for you is, what is the man doing.

"He's moving his arm up and down" is your first description. This would qualify as an ordinary observation report. Since I am privy to some facts that you are not, I tell you that, as it happens, his hand is grasping a pump handle. Now you have a second description.

"He's moving the pump handle up and down."

Now, as it happens, the pump handle is part of a pump that's in good operating condition. Thus, you have a third description.

“He’s operating the pump.”

Now, as it happens, there’s water in the pump, and the pump is connected to the house. Thus, you have a fourth description.

“He’s pumping water to the house.”

Now, as it happens, there are people in the house who are drinking the water. Thus, you have a fifth description of his behavior.

“He’s pumping water to the people in the house.”

Now, as it happens, there’s poison in the water (and he knows it because he put it there). Thus, you have a sixth description of his behavior.

“He’s poisoning the people.”

Now, as it happens, the people in the house are a group of foreign conspirators who are planning to take over the government by force and it seems likely that they will succeed. Thus, you have a new description of his behavior.

“He’s saving the country.”

The key to the multiplicity of descriptions is that in each case we have expanded the context within which the behavior is to be understood. That changes our understanding of the behavior in ways that were unforeseeable in the narrower context, and the changes may be dramatic (from “He’s poisoning the people” to “He’s saving the country”). In a pragmatic context, this puts us in the constant tension between not having all the facts (so we may be radically mistaken in our present understanding) and having to act *now*. In contrast, when we appeal to “the place it has in the scheme of things” there is no further context that could change our understanding. This is only a formal consequence, of course. We are still not guaranteed to have all the relevant facts, and our judgments about the scheme of things and where things fit in the scheme of things are not guaranteed to be correct. New facts and/or new ideas may lead us to change our minds. However, since the judgment reflects everything we have available, it represents the best we can do and so we don’t have to keep trying – we can go on from there.

d. Placeholders

We achieve representational scope at the expense of depth or detail. In understanding how we carry this off, the concept of a “placeholder” is a primary resource, and the central background phenomenon is that of parts and wholes.

There are three closely related concepts here each of which could be rendered as “placeholders.” First, consider a reality formula that meets the following conditions. (1) The representation is sufficiently coherent to represent a certain whole both as being that whole and as being missing a certain part. (2) What the missing part is is determined by its place in that scheme of things. And (3) the missing part is not purely and simply missing but rather is represented *as* a missing something. The latter representation is designated as a “representational placeholder” because it holds a place explicitly for the missing piece. (In contrast, the representation of the whole holds a place implicitly for the missing piece.)

In the episode of looking out the window, there was one representational placeholder, namely, “whatever is going on under the hood” of the automobile that was sending out clouds of bluish exhaust. The placeholder indicates the scope and character of the missing specification.

The representation of what I described as the scene from my window has many other missing pieces that were left implicit. For example, there is the part of the mountains and the part of the expressway hidden by the building; there is the backside of the building and of all the other objects mentioned; there is the inside of the building and the inside of the bricks that form its outside; there is whatever was going on under the hoods of all the other automobiles and trucks on the expressway (and whatever was going on in the heads of their drivers). And there was the rest of the scene, since I didn’t really cover it all from one end to the other.

Note that the last is something new here. Unlike the others, it is not a missing part of what I described. Rather, what I described is the

specified part of “what I saw when I looked out the window,” which is another placeholder within a more extensive representation and ultimately a world formula. (If I had ended the description by saying “the rest of the scene was uninteresting” that would have been a placeholder within the original representation of the scene.)

The notion of a representational placeholder is closely matched by the notion of a “verbal placeholder,” since portions of our world representations are usually communicated by verbal means. There are a couple of locutions that are characteristically used to indicate placeholders. These are “namely, ...” and “whatever that may be”. The first is used when the missing piece is supplied, e.g., “Hannah’s problem, namely, her ambivalence about her job, is keeping her from doing a good job.” The second is used when the missing piece is not supplied, e.g., “Hannah’s problem, whatever it may be, is keeping her from doing a good job.” In each case “Hannah’s problem” is the verbal placeholder and the “namely, ...” and “whatever” clauses indicate that that’s what it is.

But there are other ways as well. For example, the nefarious “is” in English also does the job, e.g., “Hannah’s problem is that she is ambivalent about her job.” This is because supplying the missing piece identified by a placeholder closely tracks the substantive subject-predicate relation in English statements. There is an easy equation here: the “subject” locution identifies what the “topic” is, i.e., where it fits in the scheme of things and the “predicate” locution supplies the missing piece or part of it. However, because of the protean nature of language, there seems little point in trying to pin down the concept of a verbal placeholder in grammatical terms. Rather, let us locate it in the domain of language usage. A verbal placeholder, then, is a locution that is used to provide a representational placeholder on a given occasion.

Let us return to the case of “the rest of the scene” for our third “placeholder” concept. A representational placeholder is anchored (its place is fixed) within some representational scheme. A “reality placeholder” is a representational placeholder that is fully anchored, i.e., it is anchored in a world formula; it is identified by its place in *the* scheme

of things. It follows that a representational placeholder that is anchored within a representational scheme that is itself fully anchored will qualify as a reality placeholder. For example, the description of the view from my window is anchored in “the view from my window,” which is itself fully anchored in the scheme of things.

Consider now (a) what I know of the world by observation, thought, and hearsay and (b) “the rest of the world,” i.e., whatever other objects, processes, events, and states of affairs there may be that I don’t now know about. “The rest of the world” is the same sort of placeholder as “the rest of the scene.” However, it may raise a question. Since it is anchored directly on “the scheme of things” it may be unclear whether it needs an anchor. For this issue we move to the notion of limiting cases in connection with world formulas.

e. Limiting Cases

I burn the candle at both ends. My world is anchored (a) on myself and (b) on everything. We have seen that the view from my window is anchored on myself, and this holds for any extension of it, including an extension broad enough to cover the whole world. This consideration is summarized in the two maxims noted above.

- (1) The real world is what you see when you look around you.
- (2) For any given person, the real world [as against merely possible worlds] is the one that includes that person as an actor, observer, and critic.

It is less straightforward when we consider the other anchor. Unlike a transformational grammar, which begins with “S” and ends with a surface structure, the State of Affairs System defined by the Transition Rules has no beginning and no end. Because of this, it is less than ideal for providing the in-principle completeness and coherence of a world. These characteristics are secured by introducing some limiting cases.

Among the most familiar and important limiting cases are the following.

LC-I The state of affairs which includes all other states of affairs.

LC-II An object that is not a state of affairs (i.e., it has no constituents and so is an ultimate object).

There is a variety of others. For example:

LC-III A process that is not a state of affairs (i.e., it has no constituents, hence no beginning that is distinct from its end, making it the effective equivalent of an event).

LC-IV A state of affairs that has no state of affairs constituents (i.e., an atomic fact).

The significance of the limiting cases is that they are ways of putting an end to the elaboration (LC-I) and detail (LC-II, III, IV) of world formulas by setting limits to composition or decomposition. The result of introducing either of the first two limiting cases is a type of formula which does give us the coherence and completeness required for a world formula. In the case of LC-I, the formula represents a single, boundaryless historical particular of indefinite extent. In the case of LC-II, it represents a single, unbounded, and indefinite set consisting of historical particulars and having indefinite extent.

The limiting cases are not part of the State of Affairs System. Indeed, any of the limiting cases is, formally, a violation of the SA System. Thus, any limiting case must be introduced “from the outside” and “arbitrarily,” by a person.

This kind of “violation” is not a matter of concern. To be sure, once we have introduced a limiting case, we no longer have a formal system, but rather, at best, a “modified calculational system” as described above in the discussion of conceptual-notational devices. But the real world is not a formal system, so it should not be surprising that the kind of conceptual structure needed to represent a real world per se is not a formal system. To repeat: the SA System has no truth value and does not contain or generate representations of a real world; rather, it is a piece of cognitive

machinery (which codifies [imprecisely and incompletely] some of the abilities that human beings have) that a person could make use of (in connection with a choice of limiting case, among other things) in generating representations of a real world.

LC-I

The type of formula that reflects LC-I is the type that corresponds to the common sense notion of “the real world.” It is the only one that, at face value, does the job of encompassing all the objects, processes, events, and states of affairs (a) that we observe; (b) that we create; and (c) that there are, were, will be, or could be. This is the world codified by the Person concept.

LC-II

The ultimate objects or processes resulting from LC-II, etc., cannot merely be specified as being ultimate. They must be specified as being of one general sort or another, for without this specification, we would have only an empty SA System formula and not the representation of a world. What distinguishes one sort of ultimate object from another (and this holds for any sort of object, not just ultimate objects) is the set of attributes (properties and relationships) such an object can have. For example, material objects per se can have only [ultimately] spatial, temporal, and part-whole/part-part relationships with one another.

Thus, the kind of object (or process) that is specified as ultimate will set limits to the kinds of relationships those objects and their composites could enter into. Correspondingly, the states of affairs that could obtain in a world which simply consisted of such constituents would be limited in kind (recall Rules 8,9). So also would the totality of such states of affairs be limited in kind or range. In short, the choice of an ultimate object sets strong limits to what there can be in the world that corresponds to that choice.

This limitation holds even though the situation is, in fact, somewhat more complex. Ultimate objects (or processes) need not be of just a single kind. They may simply be the various kinds of primitive objects or processes defined by a conceptual system. Any one of a large variety

of conceptual systems can be used thus in selecting ultimate constituents. Each selection determines a kind of world. Some selections are more familiar than others and some are often taken to be more fundamental than others. Thus, we have not only “the baseball world,” “the world of fashion,” and “the academic world” but also “the world of physics,” “the world of nature,” “the world of religion,” and so on.

Not only is any particular choice of ultimate constituent arbitrary in that its choice cannot be certified, either *a priori* or empirically, as being a simple reflection of how the world is, but also, restricting one’s choice to a single limit setting (whether in terms of a single kind of ultimate or a single conceptual system) is a further arbitrary choice, and it is one that can obviously be rejected.

There is no reason why different kinds of objects (processes, etc.) should not be identified as ultimate relative to a certain range of possible facts (possible states of affairs). Indeed, this is what the hard facts of the matter have always required of us in order to span the entire range of facts with which we are acquainted by observation. This is how we have been able to mark “the world of baseball,” “the world of physics,” etc., and segregate them from one another in terms of their places in the scheme of things.

Only if the set of ultimate constituents is open ended do we have any kind of guarantee that we can conceptually encompass every real phenomenon. The world of LC-I has this feature precisely because it was not created by a commitment to a given kind (or set) of ultimate constituent, and this is why it is the only one which, at face value, could encompass all actual objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, no matter what they might be. The worlds of LC-II, etc., do not have this feature.

To turn the screw a final notch: the arbitrariness of limit setting through the commitment to ultimate constituents is not restricted to picking a particular kind of object, process, etc. It also appears in the choice of which of these four reality concepts is selected for specifying the ultimate constituents and the consequent nature of the totality. The

mutual convertibility and implication of the basic reality concepts as forms of representation has the consequence that “the real world” may equally well be conceived as (1) an all-encompassing state of affairs, (2) an all-encompassing object, (3) an all-encompassing process, or (4) an all-encompassing sequence of events. Historically, each of these conceptions of “what there is” has had its proponents, and they have long agreed that any one of the four will do the job, so that it’s a case of “you pays your money and you takes your choice.”

The formulation of the Transition Rules renders these historical facts entirely intelligible and unsurprising. (The search for foundations has always led to the postulation of ultimates.) However, it provides no motivation for making such a choice or for seeing it as a matter of “you pays your money and you takes your choice.”

There is no such choice to be made. All four categories are indispensable. As is illustrated by the heuristic, “From the Window,” in any given chunk of the real world we can begin by picking out an object or a process or an event or a state of affairs, but any fuller account will bring in some of the other three (and usually all of them). More precisely:

- (1) We distinguish any particular object from other objects by reference to the processes and/or events and/or states of affairs which
 - (a) it involves and/or (b) it is involved in and/or (c) it is the same thing as.
- (2) We distinguish any particular process from other processes by reference to the objects and/or events and/or states of affairs which
 - (a) it involves and/or (b) it is involved in and/or (c) it is the same thing as.
- (3) We distinguish any particular event from other events by reference to the objects and/or processes and/or states of affairs which
 - (a) it involves and/or (b) it is involved in and/or (c) it is the same thing as.
- (4) And similarly for states of affairs.
- (5) And similarly for *kinds* of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs.

There is no basis for privileging any of the four basic reality categories over the others. These issues are discussed in “What There Is, How Things Are” (1997).

Taking the view that “you pays your money and you takes your choice” is comparable to thinking that since every integer can be expressed as a sum, as a difference, as a product, and as a quotient, when it comes to integers you pays your money and you takes your choice among addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. But the function of arithmetic operations is not to provide a catalogue of what there is in the way of numbers. Rather, their prime function is to generate numbers from numbers and to connect numbers to numbers. Those functions have a human value in comparison to which a catalogue of “what there is” in the way of numbers is completely trivial.

Likewise, the primary function of the reality concepts is not to provide us with the most parsimonious account of “what there is” in the world. Rather, it is to generate representations from representations and to connect representations to representations. Those functions have a human value in comparison to which a catalogue of “what there is” is completely trivial.

II. Beyond the Real World: Reality Constraints

Our representations of a real world have their normal human value when they correspond to what we observe or what we otherwise take to be the case. However, the primary value of such representations is not that they constitute knowledge but rather that they constitute a basis for behavior.

Down through history it has been observed by various thoughtful persons (including George Santayana, for example) that the world can be thought of as being composed of what hinders or facilitates our behavior. In this connection, the “Desert Island” heuristic is relevant.

The Desert Island

Imagine that you’re stranded on a desert island, and it

really is a desert island – there's nothing there but you and a few hundred yards of sand. What can you do there?

You can dig holes or trenches with your hands. You can build sand castles. You can move sand from one place to another. Or you can run, jump, assume various postures, etc. – things which only depend on you and on having enough space to do it in. Not much, is it?

Now imagine that there's a rocky hill on the island. What else can you do? Well, you can climb the hill. You can break off some of the pieces (maybe). You can toss some loose rocks down on the sand. You can use some of the rocks to help you dig and you can bury a rock in the sand or throw it off over the water. Still not much, but more than before.

Now imagine that there are some trees on the island. What else can you do then? Well, you can climb up some of the trees and you can look around from up there. You can break off branches or leaves and you can bury them in the sand. You can use a branch to make marks in the sand or to swish around in the air. You can pour sand on the tree. Still not a whole lot, but more than before.

Now imagine that there is a dog on the island with you. What else can you do?

Now imagine a five year old child.

Now an adult.

Now an adult of the opposite sex.

Now an adult who likes your company.

Now a group of adults.

Now various groups with different languages, customs, values, political organization, occupations, and ultimates.

The moral of the story is that with every object and set of objects there are things you can do and things you can't do, and what you can do you can do only by acting in certain ways and not others. Every behavioral possibility requires something, if only one's own person characteristics

(including embodiment) and a stage to act on.

This introduces the notion of a person's behavioral possibilities as a consideration in its own right. The technical term is "behavior potential." In the present context, we will restrict it to the bare notion of a person's behavioral possibilities (the "thin" sense of the term). (At a later time we shall want to include in this concept the value of each possibility (the "thick" sense of the term), because behavioral choices hinge on that. For example, a *small* portion of my behavior potential right now consists of an unlimited set of possibilities in that I can count to one, I can count to two, ... and I can count to any number I live long enough to reach, but I will forego all of that in favor of a single jug of wine and a loaf of bread. When it comes to acting, simple numbers do not carry the day, and not every possibility carries the same weight.)

The correlative of "behavior potential" is "reality constraints," defined as "the boundary condition on possible behaviors." "Boundary condition" is selected as probably the most noncommittal placeholder to refer to whatever might account for or systematize the limits on our individual and group behavioral possibilities. The concept of a real world in all its empirical detail does this, of course, but it does it only implicitly and imprecisely. More charitably, we could say it only carries us part of the way – it does not do the whole job, nor could it.

There are both technical and methodological difficulties with the notion that our specific behavioral possibilities could be definitively given by any description, calculational system, or other form of representation of the real world. Some of these difficulties are surveyed below.

(a) In what terms?

Of course, we can say that there being the reality constraints that there is a state of affairs and, as such, is part of the real world. To be sure. However, that is merely our placeholder. The question is, how to supply the content.

In what form and in what terms could one specify our behavioral possibilities and impossibilities? A simple list is out of the question since

various calculational systems give us unlimited possibilities (I can count to one, I can count to two, etc., *ad infinitum*). Is there a set of categories, then, that would delimit all and only our possible behaviors? Categories may be had for the asking but, like definitions of real world items, they always say too much or too little or both. We already have a set of categories specially designed for this purpose. They are the “Powers” concepts, which are parameters of Person, “Person Characteristics.” But even though such descriptions are empirically tailored, they still say too much and too little. They say too much because there can be exceptions (we can fail at something we have the ability to do, and we can succeed at something we lack the ability to do). Exceptions call for explanations, which may include being wrong about our ascriptions of powers. There is a world of practicality here but no foolproof way of saying what our possibilities and impossibilities are. Neither is there a definitive way of discovering what they are. For one thing, life is too short. (“If I had nine lives I would spend the first one discovering what the possibilities were for the other eight.”)

(b) Circumstances are endless.

Then there is the contribution of circumstances, and this relates to the specificity of behavioral possibilities. If I make a wisecrack that is humorous because it fits the conversational context so well, could that behavior have been anticipated as one of my behavioral possibilities? Not without anticipating that particular context (which appears as a value of the Know parameter of my behavior). There is no known way to classify, generate, or describe all possible circumstances in the specific ways that would be needed.

(c) Novelty is unanticipatable.

There is also the issue of novel or creative behaviors. What mode of classifying or describing behavioral possibilities would have picked out Mozart’s possibility of writing the Jupiter Symphony and eliminated many others that he couldn’t have written? None that we can imagine. It appears that to do so we would have to anticipate all possible capacities, learning histories, inventions, discoveries, theories, creations, and ways of living *now*.

(d) Different possibilities at different times

A person's possibilities change over time, reflecting, among other things, changes in person characteristics. There are no differential equations to tell us how those characteristics change over time and no field equations to tell us how they interact. Life is not that simple.

(e) Groups are part of the picture.

Groups have possibilities that individual persons don't. Because of this, individuals have behavioral possibilities within a group that they wouldn't otherwise have. For example, no single person can build a commercial airliner or an atom bomb (from scratch) or a skyscraper or a lunar lander, or play a symphony on the instruments it is written for, or play a football game, etc. Groups can, and by virtue of that, individual members of the group have the behavior potential to help or participate (in various ways) in the building of an airliner, the performance of a symphony, the playing of a game, etc. To anticipate or evaluate these possibilities, we would have to anticipate *all* social developments and cultural innovations and their interactions. We can't do that.

In short, it appears that wherever we turn there are insurmountable problems with the idea of actually generating a definitive description or, correspondingly, of having definitive knowledge, of our behavioral possibilities and limitations. It would seem that giving such a description is not one of our behavioral possibilities.

More generally, it appears that behavior is more fundamental than knowledge in that whatever we are capable of knowing folds neatly and without remainder into whatever we are capable of doing, whereas a full catalog of what we are capable of doing is something beyond what we can know. "Know," after all, is merely one of the aspects (parameters) of behavior.

Correspondingly, reality is more fundamental than a real world, since a world of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs encodes some of our behavioral possibilities and limitations but not all, and that encoding itself may result in unnecessary constraints. This limitation holds

even more for any given world comprising a specific selection of specific objects, processes, etc. (“Reality” and “reality constraints” are here used interchangeably in contrast to “the real world” or “a real world”; “reality constraints” is most commonly used here because in the vernacular “reality” is used interchangeably with “the real world” and it is important to avoid confounding the two.)

At the same time, there should be no undue mystification about the matter. If we avoid the many temptations of cognitive imperialism, there is much that we can and do describe.

a. There is an obvious difference between what is actual now and what is possible now. There is a telephone on my desk. There could be a cup of coffee there, but in fact there isn’t. (There may be one there in the next five minutes.) It is possible now for me to reach for the telephone. I am not now actually reaching for the telephone. And so on. The difference is a categorical one. As the boundary condition on behavioral possibilities, reality in no way *resembles* what we see when we look around us.

b. There is a traditional kind of connection between the two, as is brought out by the Desert Island heuristic. Having the dog on the island opens up certain behavioral possibilities because (1) I am already someone who could engage in those behaviors (I have the requisite knowledge, competence, and values) and those behaviors require a second individual of that sort in addition to myself (and an appropriate setting, which the Desert Island already provides – you can’t put on the drama without the actors, props, and stage). When the dog appears, all the necessary ingredients are present. Therefore, all the behaviors for which the dog was the last missing ingredient are now possible. (We should be talking about social practices rather than individual behaviors, but the difference is not an issue here.)

c. There are contingent possibilities. Before the dog appeared, I could be said to have the possibility of chasing a dog along the beach (etc.) if... (if I had a dog; if I acquired the taste for it; etc.). The limiting

case here is conjuring the possibility out of nothing, as in the classic “If we had some ham, we could have ham and eggs, if we had some eggs.”

d. It should be clear why possibilities are the very stuff of behavior and decision making. In selecting a behavior to engage in, my selection is not from anything that is happening now or that has happened. The only candidates are those behaviors that are *possible now*.

e. There are default possibilities. Saying that it is possible for me to invent a new game may not imply that there is a set of enabling conditions that have been satisfied. It may be no more than to say that inventing new games is something some people do and that there is nothing known about me that disqualifies me from being one of them. “Possible” may mean no more than “not known to be impossible.”

f. There are possibilities that go beyond my powers. It is possible to get myself elected president (or solve the problem, etc.) but only “with a little bit of luck...” since my powers are insufficient for a practical guarantee of success. (There is an old Portuguese saying to the effect that of the worthwhile things that get done in the world, 99% of them are done by people who didn’t know how to do them.) Depending on how decisive my person characteristics are (as against circumstances), we will move from flatly saying “he did it” to “he managed to do it” to “he somehow did it” to “it happened” (and points in between). These possibilities are a special case of contingent possibilities.

g. Some things are impossible for me to do because it is impossible for them to be done. Thus, I can’t draw a round square; I can’t trisect an angle with a straight edge and a compass; etc.

h. Some things are impossible for me to do now because I lack the opportunity – the required enabling conditions are not met (without the dog, I couldn’t...).

i. Some things are impossible for me to do now because I am me and not someone else. For example, I can’t jump over tall buildings (I’m not Superman). I can’t continue up the mountain (I’ve reached the end

of my endurance; I don't have the required level of motivation; etc.). I can't cope with having been responsible for the deaths of three thousand people. And so on. These are overtly psychological impossibilities, which don't reduce to some other kind. At the same time, they are often logical impossibilities also. Being me, i.e., one who lacks the *required* characteristics, etc., it is logically impossible for me to do those things. And if it turns out that I can do one of those things, that merely implies either that circumstances changed in relevant ways or that a mistake was made, either about which characteristics were *required* or about my not having them. That does not undermine the general notion of a logical impossibility here; it only illustrates the fact that we sometimes have trouble recognizing instances.

III. Real World Description

The Transition Rules deal generally with the concepts of object, process, event, and state of affairs. Because of this, they hold equally for every object, every process, etc. What they do not do is to distinguish one object from another, one process from another, etc. Nor do they distinguish one kind of object (etc.) from another.

Either of these can be accomplished by giving a parametric analysis of the domain of, e.g., "processes" (etc.) and then specifying values of the parameters. If we incorporate these parameters into a representational schema, we will have a canonical form for representing particular processes (etc.) or kinds of process (etc.)

This approach results in four canonical representational schemas, designated as "descriptive formats" or "representational formats," corresponding to the four basic reality concepts. In addition, there are several derivative schemas. The schema for representing processes is presented below. (Other representational schemas are presented in "*What Actually Happens.*")

Process Representation

The schema for a process representation is a unit which corresponds

to the concept of “a process.” In accordance with the Transition Rules, the schema can be used recursively to accomplish composition or decomposition and thus arrive at representations of any degree of scope or complexity.

The primary basis for the schema is, as might be expected, Rule 4 and Rule 5.

Rule 4. A process is the same thing as a sequential change from one state of affairs to another.

Rule 5. A process is the same thing as a state of affairs which has as immediate constituents other, related processes.

What is involved in the notion of a sequential change is the following.

- a. The process begins with some state of affairs, A, and ends with a different state of affairs, B.
- b. The change from A to B consists of at least two sequential changes, e.g., from A to Q and from Q to B.
- c. This implies that a process has duration.
- d. By Rule 5, both AQ and QB are themselves processes. Therefore each of them is a sequential change from one state of affairs to another. Therefore each has some duration and consists of components that have duration, etc.

These considerations are codified in the Process Representation schema in Table 5. The schema has a characteristic structure, i.e., first a Name and then a Description. The Name (a list of names, which may include individuating descriptions) serves to identify which process is being represented. The Description provides a representation of that process per se by providing relevant information about it. The schema specifies what information is relevant.

Table 5. Process Representation

Name: PNameA, AnyName, OtherName ...

Description:

Paradigm 1

Name: PParadigmA, etc.

Description:

Stages: A1, A2, ... AN

Options: A11, A12, A13 ... A1K

A21, A22, ... A2M

:

:

AN1, AN2, AN3, ... ANR

End Points: SA0, SA1, SA2, ... SAN

Elements: A, B, C, D, ...

Formal Individuals: p, q, r, s, ...

Eligibilities: p : A, B

q : B

r : C

s : C, D, E

Contingencies:

Co-occurrence

Attributional

Relational

Factual

Versions

Paradigm 2: etc.

The Process Representation schema specifies several different types of information. For convenience these may be collected into the following three groups.

- (1) Gross Structure: Paradigms, Stages, Options
- (2) State of Affairs Structure (ingredients): Elements, Individuals, Eligibilities, End Points
- (3) Fine Structure: Contingencies

Data of these various kinds is shown in purely nominal form in Table 5.

(1) Gross Structure

The Stages correspond to the division of the overall process into sequential process components. If the process is a sequential change from state of affairs A to state of affairs B, then A and B are the end points. However, since each of the stages is itself a process, each stage will have end points, and in the canonical form, the end point of one stage will be the same as the beginning point of the next stage. Each end point is a state of affairs.

For each Stage in the process there are some number of Options. These reflect the fact that in general there is more than one way to get from a given beginning point to the corresponding end point. Each of these ways is an Option. (If the number of ways that a given Stage can occur is too large to manage, one can reduce the number to something manageable either by categorizing or by introducing a number of paradigm cases.)

Thus, the gross structure of the process is that it begins with A, goes through these stages, and ends in B. And since each of the stages can occur in various ways, the whole process can occur in various ways. (These will be Versions – see below.) The Paradigm structure is also discussed below.

(2) State of Affairs Structure

The beginning state of affairs is a totality of related objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs. These are the ingredients, or Elements of the process. If there are M Elements, there is an M -place relation that holds among them. What that relation is changes over time. Whatever it is at A is the beginning state of affairs. Whatever it is at B is the end state of affairs. Whatever it is at the end of each Stage is the end state of affairs for that Stage. The changing of that relation over time is the occurrence of the process.

In principle, the Elements may be of any kind (objects, processes, events, and states of affairs). However, for most of the processes we might want to describe, the Elements will be objects.

The model of drama can be used to good effect in understanding the State of Affairs structure of a process. Polonius, Hamlet, the skull, and the castle are all formal Elements in the drama. They are “roles” or “characters.” For an actual performance to take place, normatively, each character is played by a historical individual. Polonius and Hamlet are played by two actors, James Mason and Jerome Woodward. The skull is played by one of the props that looks like a skull. The castle is played by the various stage sets and the stage.

Paradigmatically, there is a one to one relation between the formal Elements and the historical individuals that play those parts on a given occasion. Because there are interesting possible exceptions, two other specifications are needed. The first is a set of Formal Individuals and the second is a set of Eligibilities which allows various kinds of mapping of Individuals onto Elements rather than just one to one. For example, the Individual that plays Polonius is eligible to play other characters in scenes where Polonius doesn’t appear. Or, again, in driving an automobile from A to B , the individual that plays the part of “left front tire” at the beginning is eligible to play the part of “right front tire,” “spare tire,” etc., later in the trip.

The specification of Elements and, more particularly, Formal Individuals, may be regarded as providing placeholders for historical individuals. (The places are, of course, places in that dramatic scheme of things.) Given the more elaborate mapping of Formal Individuals onto Elements, there is a one to one mapping of historical individuals onto Formal Individuals.

Eligibility statements are also a convenient vehicle for specifying certain attributional constraints (see below). Such statements say that in order for a given Formal Individual to be eligible to play the part of a given Element, the Formal Individual must have (or lack, etc.) certain characteristics or be of a certain kind. Thus, for example, to be eligible to play Polonius, the Formal Individual must be a human being; in contrast, to be eligible to play the part of the skull or of the castle, the Formal Individual cannot be a human being. Such constraints hold for the corresponding historical individuals.

(3) Fine Structure

The gross structure of the process is given by the fact that the process divides into sequential stages and each stage can occur in a number of different ways (Options). Further, the process involves a set of Elements whose interrelationships change over time.

Moreover, it is the case that whenever the process occurs, that is by virtue of the fact that one of the Stage 1 Options has occurred followed by one of the Stage 2 Options, ... followed by one of the Stage N Options. From this it might appear that the process could occur in any of the following ways: any one of the Stage 1 Options followed by any one of the Stage 2 Options followed by ... any one of the Stage N Options.

However, it is seldom as simple as that. In general, there will be constraints on the availability of certain of the Options. These constraints are given by Contingency statements. Four types of Contingencies are distinguished.

(a) Co-occurrence Contingencies

In this type of Contingency, the availability of a given Option in a given Stage depends on the occurrence (non-occurrence) of one or more Options in other Stages of the process. For example, if the process is a chess game, the Options for white on the second move depend on which Option was selected as the first move. Or again, if the process is a software development project, certain testing Options depend on certain Options having been taken in writing the software.

(b) Attributional Contingencies

In this type of Contingency, a given Option in a given Stage is available (not available) only if the Formal Individual playing the part of an Element in that Stage has (has not) certain characteristics. For example, a football team on its own goal line formally has the Option of throwing a 70-yard pass, but in fact it has the Option only if the quarterback has a strong enough arm. The airplane pilot has the Option of doing a 3G loop, but only if the airplane frame has the structural strength. In general, the fact that things don't go properly if the ingredients don't have the right characteristics is a pervasive reality that lies behind organizational management and design and testing of structure, instruments, and machinery.

The attributional Eligibility constraints noted above amount to a Contingency statement that says that none of the Options are open unless the formal and historical Individuals have certain characteristics.

(c) Relational Contingencies

In this type of Contingency, a given Option is available (not available) only if the Formal Individual playing the part of an Element in the given Stage has (has not) a given relationship with other individuals or groups. This is an extension of the notion of an Attributional Contingency, and many examples would work equally well for both.

(d) Factual Contingencies

In this type of Contingency, a given Option is available only under

certain circumstances, e.g., only during daylight hours, only with official permission, only if you signal first, only if they shoot first, only if your losses don't exceed your profits, only if you have been convicted of a crime. Factual Contingencies serve as a wastebasket category since there is no restriction on the range of possible states of affairs that can enter into such contingencies.

(4) Versions

In general, a process can occur in different ways. A Version of a process is one of those ways. That is, it consists of one of the Stage 1 Options followed by one of the Stage 2 Options followed by one of the Stage 3 Options, ... followed by one of the Options for the last Stage. A Version of a process reflects all of the constraints provided by the specifications of the gross structure, the state of affairs structure, and the fine structure. The occurrence of the process on a given occasion is by virtue of the occurrence of one of its Versions on that occasion. (If the process occurs, it occurs in one of the ways that it can occur.)

(5) Paradigms

The concept of a process Paradigm is a technical convenience when the Versions of a process divide into two or more relatively homogeneous subsets which are also highly different from each other (e.g., playing chess in the normal way and playing chess without a visible board or pieces). In this case, the process representation is greatly simplified by taking advantage of the Paradigm format, since that generally avoids numerous contingency statements whose only function is to manage the heterogeneity of Options and Versions.

Where there is no need for multiple Paradigms, the process has only one paradigm, and the process representation is the same as the paradigm representation.

6. Verbal Behavior

It is a commonplace that verbal behavior (a) is behavior, no more and no less, and (b) is a very special kind of behavior, quite unlike non-verbal behaviors such as splitting wood or running down the street. This pair of facts about verbal behavior has provided a dilemma for theory and research in psychology and linguistics.

Without significant exception, general theories of behavior endorse the first point, i.e., that verbal behavior is behavior. However, there is nothing in such theories to make that claim plausible and no way to deal with the second point.

Two kinds of deficiency are salient. First, within such theories, there is no way to represent either calculational systems (grammars, logics, mathematics, etc.) or the forms of behaviors which consist of implementing such systems. Second, there is in these theories no way to represent the general-specific relationship between behavior and verbal behavior. That is, there are no resources within such theories to say what it is, in addition to being a case of behavior, that needs to be the case in order to have a case specifically of *verbal* behavior.

Let us address these tasks.

1. Calculational Aspects

The concept of behavior introduced in a previous chapter has a calculational structure, and the concept of an individual Person includes the concept of Abilities as a category of Person Characteristics. Further, performing any operation in a formal or calculational system will qualify formally as a possible behavior.

Thus, there is nothing merely ad hoc about representing the mastery of a formal system as an ability or about representing the use of a formal system as behavior.

2. A Formula for Verbal Behavior

Recall Morris's classic division of the study of language into three parts, i.e., syntactics ("the relation of signs to signs"), semantics ("the relation of signs to things"), and pragmatics ("the relations of signs to users of signs"). It is clear that a systematic formulation of verbal behavior per se will fall under the heading of "pragmatic."

The paradigmatic phenomenon of verbal behavior is found in the case where P says "Q" to R. What could provide formal access to such a phenomenon?

$$(2) \langle V \rangle = \langle C, L, B \rangle$$

Formula (2) provides a conceptual unit for understanding verbal behavior. The elements of the formula are as follows.

a. The first element represents a concept, C, and, equivalently, a conceptual distinction, C versus C', where C' is a set of alternatives to C. It is because C represents a selection from a set of known, logically contrasting, complementary alternatives that verbal behavior can be informative in a way that splitting wood and running down the street are not.

Paradigmatically, C is a state of affairs concept. State of affairs concepts are individuated by means of concepts of objects, processes, events, relationships, and states of affairs. (Recall Transition Rule 1.) For example, the state of affairs concept of "the cat being on the mat" is distinguished from other state of affairs concepts by virtue of its conceptual components, i.e., the concepts (a) of those two objects or kinds of object and (b) of the relationship "A being on B."

By extension, therefore, C is completely general. It represents any concept. Formula (2) holds both for state of affairs concepts and for their constituent concepts. If there is a behavior which qualifies as acting on the SA concept of the cat being on the mat, that same behavior will

qualify as acting on the concept “cat,” etc.

b. The second element in the verbal formula is L, a locution. (A locution is a word, phrase, or sentence.) The locution L stands in one-to-one relation to C, and it contrasts with L', a set of locutionary alternatives. (See below on synonymy and homonymy.)

c. The third element, B, represents a set of behaviors, Bc, each of which qualifies as acting on the concept C.

- (1) Recall that Intentional Action (and Deliberate Action) can be described as acting on the concept Q, where Q is the value of the K (Know) parameter or a conceptual component of that value. (And recall that the values of K are state of affairs concepts.)
- (2) In general, C will be a partial specification of the value of K in some Deliberate Action, Bc.

3. Verbal Behavior and Behavior

The relation between behavior and verbal behavior is indicated by the juxtaposition of formulas (1) and (2):

(1) $\langle IA \rangle = \langle I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S \rangle$

(2) $\langle V \rangle = \langle \quad C, \quad L, \quad B \rangle$

What is shown here is that not only is C a partial specification of K, but also, L is a partial specification of the Performance parameter, P. To say that a person said “checkmate” or “there’s a cat on the mat” is, among other things, to say something about the Performance aspect of his behavior. (There will be other aspects of the Performance, e.g., tone of voice, pitch, rhythm, posture, and facial expression. Very often these are of little interest unless they are unusual.)

Likewise, specification of the concept C, to which the locution corresponds, will inevitably provide only a partial specification of the value of

the Know parameter. For example, the value of K will, in general, include some representation of the circumstances in which the behavior occurs. In verbalization, these circumstances appear, if at all, only in limited or indirect ways, e.g., through ellipses or through special locutions such as “this,” “here,” “my,” “now,” and so on.

The sense in which verbal behavior is straightforwardly behavior is shown in Formula (3).

$$(3) \quad \begin{array}{cc} C & L \\ \langle IA \rangle = \langle I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S \rangle \end{array}$$

This shows explicitly that C is a partial specification of K and that L is a partial specification of P.

What is also shown is that there is not a genus-species relationship between behavior and verbal behavior. Verbal behavior is not a species of behavior in the way that the Stutz Bearcat is a species of automobile. Rather, verbal behavior is a kind of behavior in the way that an automobile with a six-cylinder engine and fourteen inch tires is a kind of automobile.

To say that a behavior is a verbal behavior is to give an explicitly incomplete description of behavior rather than merely a vague one, since it makes a commitment to only two of the eight parameters of behavior. Recalling the use of the Deletion operation to generate systematically incomplete forms of behavior description, we could include “Verbal Behavior Description” in that category and represent it as follows.

$$(4) \quad \begin{array}{cc} C & L \\ \langle IA \rangle = \langle \theta, \theta, K, \theta, P, \theta, \theta, \theta \rangle \end{array}$$

Still, an automobile with a six-cylinder engine and fourteen-inch tires is straightforwardly an automobile. Similarly, a verbal behavior is straightforwardly a behavior.

Formula (4) makes clear that any behavior that is correctly described

as a particular verbal behavior will also qualify for a second, different description as a particular Deliberate Action. The systematically incomplete description implies that there is another description of the behavior that is not systematically incomplete.

Thus, the multilevel structure of behavior appears in an essential way in the understanding of verbal behavior:

H engages in some Deliberate Action by saying “Q.”

H says “Q” by uttering ‘Q’ (‘Q’ = L).

Since verbal behavior is a kind of behavior, we can use verbal behavior and its subvarieties in the logical framework of Dispositions, Powers, and Derivatives discussed above. Thus, we can define verbal traits, styles, abilities, capabilities, and so on. And, of course, we do.

4. Meaning and Significance in Verbal Behavior

It is a truism that verbal behavior is special because it “has meaning” in a way that throwing a ball and chasing butterflies do not.

Recall that an element of the real world is anchored therein (a) by its relation to me, the actor, observer, and appraiser, and (b) by its place in the scheme of things. From these two perspectives, verbal behavior has a different appearance.

From the individual’s perspective, “meaning” refers to a peculiar property of locutions which enables speakers to use those locutions to say something. (For the individual, it’s a *fait accompli* that ‘Q’ means Q. I can say something with ‘cat’; I can’t with ‘grk’.)

From the perspective of the domain of persons and behavior, it is quite otherwise. Here, “meaning” does not refer to a peculiar property of locutions which somehow enables speakers to use those locutions to say something. In particular, it is not the peculiar property of having been produced by internal happenings such as “mediating responses,” “psychic

representations,” neural states of affairs, or “intentions”; or by external happenings which we can speak of as “controlling variables.” Rather, there is a social structure of concepts and practices such that:

- (a) A given locution, L, has meaning if it can be used to say something.
- (b) L is used in its meaning (or meaningfully) on a given occasion if on that occasion it is used to say something.
- (c) ‘Q’ means Q.
(L is the same thing as ‘Q’.)
- (d) H says “Q” by uttering ‘Q’.
- (e) H tells R that Q is the case by saying “Q.”
- (f) If H tells R that Q is the case then ‘Q’ identifies a state of affairs.
(Q is a state of affairs concept.)

These are pragmatic tautologies. They exhibit part of the conceptual structure of language in relation to behavior.

Of the three conceptual elements of V in Formula (2), only one, the uttering of the locution L, is traditionally identified as verbal behavior. And, to be sure, uttering L is something that does occur at the time and place of the verbal behavior. C, being a concept, does not occur at all, and the members of B will all or almost all occur, if at all, at other times and places. Why, then, one might ask, are C and B involved at all? Why include them in the specification of verbal behavior?

The short answer is that verbal behavior is a logical aspect of the domain of behavior, not the name of a vocal or physiological production, so there is no reason at all why C and B should not be involved. More concretely, we can say the following.

- (a) Without C, the locution L would have no meaning, and uttering L would be merely vocal behavior, not verbal behavior.
- (b) Without B, the locution L would be pointless. Uttering L would have no significance.

The first of these is obvious. It is of the essence of language that it carries conceptual distinctions. As we noted above in connection with conceptual-notational devices, it is because notational devices of verbal and other sorts are public and communicable that they play an essential part in securing the public and communicable character of concepts.

With respect to the second, we may begin by noting that saying "C" is a special case of acting on the concept C. It is, however, a degenerate case in that if it were the only case of acting on the concept C, it would be pointless, and the category of B (behaviors which qualify as acting on the concept C) could be dispensed with.

Fortunately, there is a familiar methodological paradigm which brings out some important relationships among C, L, and B and also makes clear why a 1-1 relation between C and L is required. Formula (2) resembles the classic definition of a cardinal number, say, five, as the class of all classes having the same cardinal number as an explicitly defined class which by definition has that cardinality. Likewise, it resembles the well-known definition of a length of one meter as the length of anything having the same length as an explicitly identified object which, by definition, has that length.

Since concepts do not appear in the real world except insofar as they individuate values of the K parameter of Intentional Actions, we may say, in a similar vein, that the concept C is the class of all behaviors, B_c, having in their K values the same concept as an explicitly identified behavior (saying "C" by uttering L) which, by definition, has that concept in its K value.

But also, this is why without B the verbal formula would be pointless. That would be like establishing the definition of a term, e.g., "one meter" and then never again using that concept to do anything. Defining a term is not an end in itself (not an intrinsic social practice) and if we aren't going to use the concept ever again the definition is pointless; the term will have meaning (of a sort), but it will lack significance.

Note, too, that in this set of considerations we have come close to reconstructing the classic division of the study of language into (a) syntactics, (b) semantics, and (c) pragmatics. These correspond to the three terms of the Verbal Formula. Syntactics clearly has to do with the structure of locutions, L. Semantics clearly has to do with meanings, C, in relation to locutions. And pragmatics clearly has to do with behaviors, Bc, the Deliberate Actions which are implemented by meaningful locutions. What the classic formulation leaves out is that non-verbal behaviors, Bc, are an essential part of the picture.

5. Synonymy and Homonymy in Verbal Behavior

The one-to-one relation between locutions and concepts may give the appearance of being incompatible with possibilities for different locutions to have the same meaning or for the same locution to have different meanings. This appearance will be generated primarily if Formula (2) is thought of as a simple description of verbal behavior rather than what it overtly is, i.e., a conceptual structure which can be used to understand verbal behavior. The case here is similar to that of the State of Affairs System, which is not itself a representation of the real world but rather a cognitive apparatus which a person can use in generating real world representations.

Given the development, above, of the idea of L being the conventionally definitive way of distinguishing a concept C from C', a set of alternatives, we can derive the possibility of there being other forms of behavior, including other locutions, which serve the same purpose. All that is required is that this state of affairs, e.g., that L and L' are synonyms, be in accordance with Formula (2). That is, we need to have the SA concept of the two locutions designating the same concept (this exemplifies C in Formula (2)); we need to have a way of saying that the two locutions have the same meaning (this exemplifies L in Formula (2)); and we need to have a set of behaviors which qualify as treating the two locutions as having the same meaning (this exemplifies B in Formula (2)). None of these requirements is at all problematic.

Likewise, in the case where a locution, L1, is sometimes used to mean one thing and sometimes to mean another thing, what we require is that this state of affairs be in accordance with Formula (2). First, we need two exemplars of Formula (2) to distinguish the two meanings in question, C1 and C2. Then we need the state of affairs concept of L1 being capable of being used to mean C1 or to mean C2 (this exemplifies C in Formula (2)); we need a locution with which to say that L1 is capable of being used to mean C1 or to mean C2 (this exemplifies L in Formula (2)); and we need a set of behaviors which consist of treating L1 as being capable of being used to mean C1 or to mean C2 (this exemplifies B in Formula (2)). None of these requirements is at all problematic.

Both 'derivations' are straightforward. Formula (2), which involves a 1-1 relation between locution and concept gives us formal access to possibilities of there not being a 1-1 relation. In these cases, too, the formula holds. To that extent, these derivations anticipate aspects of (2) which are discussed below.

6. Systematic Aspects of the Verbal Formula

Let us consider again the Verbal Formula.

$$(2) \quad \langle V \rangle = \langle C, L, B \rangle$$

There is more to Formula (2) than leaps to the eye. Because C is completely general, it encompasses the concepts of V, L, and B as instances. As a result, the Verbal Formula is recursive in V, L, and B.

Let us begin with a particular exemplar of Formula (2), which might be our old friend, "The cat is on the mat."

$$(5) \quad \langle V1 \rangle = \langle C1, L1, B1 \rangle$$

Consider now the concept of the locution L1. Since it is a concept, it is an instance of C in Formula (2). But, for that instance, there must be a corresponding verbal behavior V2 and a corresponding locution L2 which stands in one-to-one relation to the concept of the locution L1. And there must be a set of behaviors B which consist of acting on the

concept of L1. Thus,

$$(6) \langle V2 \rangle = \langle L1, L2, B2 \rangle$$

But then,

$$\langle V3 \rangle = \langle L2, L3, B3 \rangle$$

and

$$\langle V4 \rangle = \langle L3, L4, B4 \rangle$$

etc.

Similarly, consider B1i, any one of the set of behaviors B1, and consider the concept of that behavior. Being a concept, it is an instance of C in Formula (2). But, for that instance, there must be a corresponding locution L2 standing in one-to-one relation with that concept; and there must be a set of behaviors that consist of acting on the concept of the behavior B1; and there must be a corresponding verbal behavior. Thus,

$$(7) \langle V2 \rangle = \langle B1, L2, B2 \rangle$$

and

$$\langle V3 \rangle = \langle B2, L3, B3 \rangle$$

$$\langle V4 \rangle = \langle B3, L4, B4 \rangle$$

etc.

And similarly, if we focus on the concept of the verbal behavior V1, we have

$$(8) \langle V2 \rangle = \langle V1, L2, B2 \rangle$$

and

$$\langle V3 \rangle = \langle V2, L3, B3 \rangle$$

$$\langle V4 \rangle = \langle V3, L4, B4 \rangle$$

etc.

Also, since verbal behaviors are behaviors, we have the following.

$$(9) \langle V1 \rangle = \langle C1, L1, V2 \rangle$$

$$(10) \langle V1 \rangle = \langle V3, L1, V2 \rangle$$

Formula (9) represents the case where the behaviors which qualify as acting on the concept C1 are themselves verbal behaviors. And, naturally, there are parallel cases where some of the behaviors which qualify as acting on the concept C1 are verbal behaviors and some are not. Indeed, the

latter is the only actual case since every verbal behavior is also the implementation of a Deliberate Action which is not per se verbal; therefore, whenever we have a verbal behavior in the picture we have a non-verbal behavior in the picture as well.

An example of (9) would be the following.

- V1 = saying "The cat is on the mat."
- L1 = "The cat is on the mat."
- V2 = saying "Well, chase her off."
saying "I don't see her."
saying "You really spoil the cat."

Formula (10) represents the case where C1, the concept, is the concept of a verbal behavior; and B1, the behaviors which qualify as acting on the concept C1, are verbal behaviors. An example of (10) would be the following.

- V1 = saying "He said he forgot the onions."
- L1 = "He said he forgot the onions."
- V2 = saying "Don't believe him."
saying "Isn't that just like him to make excuses!"
etc.

Note that the following cases are ambiguous.

- V2 = saying "Did he offer to go back?"
saying "Was that all?"

If they are taken as responses to V1, his saying what he said, then they fit formula (10). However, they may be taken not as responses to V1 per se but as responses to the state of affairs communicated by V1, i.e., his forgetting the onions, in which case they would fit formula (9), not formula (10).

Returning to formulas (6), (7), and (8), each of these shows that

any instance of the Verbal Formula generates an endless string of systematically-related other instances (and the treatment of synonymy and homonymy above shows that relationships among concepts, locutions, or behaviors will all generate instances of Formula (2)). These aspects of the Verbal Formula provide yet another version of a familiar notion, i.e., the domain of persons and behavior as a single, coherent, conceptually-structured domain and not a simple, accidental aggregate or happenstance collection of items called “persons” or “behaviors.”

Everything, one might say, corresponds to an instance of Formula (2). Anything we are capable of distinguishing would be an instance of C in Formula (2), and anything we do distinguish is an instance of C. But C only exists by virtue of B, since the use of a concept is an aspect of behavior. And C only exists in public, objective, paradigmatically unambiguous, communicable form by virtue of L, which is another aspect of B.

Conversely, B only exists by virtue of V (cf. Formula (7)). What distinguishes one behavior, B1, from other behaviors? First, that we do distinguish it, i.e., we have the concept of B1. Second, that there is a locution that uniquely identifies that behavior. Third, that there are other behaviors, verbal or otherwise, which consist of distinguishing B1 from other behaviors and acting on that distinction.

What holds for behaviors holds for anything else as well. For example, what distinguishes one object or type of object from another? First, that we do distinguish it, i.e., we have the concept of object Obj1 or type of object Obj1. Second, that there is a locution which designates that object or kind of object. Third, that there is a set of behaviors which qualify as distinguishing Obj1 from other objects or types of object and acting on that distinction.

7. Infinite Regress Issues

It was noted above that, given a substitution instance of either L or B in the Verbal Formula, we generate an endless string of other instances. The form of the generating process can be given as follows.

- (1) If there is this [V1], then there must be these [C1, L1, B1].
- (2) If there are these [L1, B1], then there must be these [L2, B2].
- (3) And if there are these [L2, B2], then there must be these [L3, B3].
- (4) And so on.

This has the appearance of an infinite regress problem.

In this regard, let us consider L and B separately. It appears that L is not a problem because L1, L2, ... LN are the same locution, so that the appropriate locution is always available. That is "C1" is the locution, L1, for C1; but "C1" is also the locution L2 for the concept L1; and "C1" is also the locution L3 for the concept L2; and so on. For example, "chair" is the locution L1 for the concept "chair," but "chair" is also the locution L2 for the locution L1 for the concept "chair," and so on.

The case is different with B. In general, B1, B2, B3 ... BN are each a different set of behaviors. The threatened regress with respect to B is of a particular kind. Consider the classic case where one has to infer a conclusion S from premises P, but one has to infer premises P from other premises P1; and one has to infer premises P1 from other premises P2; and so on. There are two kinds of difficulty here. (1) The first is that we don't and couldn't have all those premises available. (2) The second is that we couldn't go through an endless series of inferences in order to arrive at S. The present issue with B is of the first kind only; there is not an endless series of operations in the picture, only a seemingly endless list of things that there must be.

The regress problem will be avoided if (1) there are ways to bring those "endless" series to an end and (2) those ways are available to us. Having this in mind, what we find are (a) a number of considerations that mitigate the problem and (b) an in-principle resolution.

The in-principle resolution is found in the limiting case where the set B consists of L, i.e., where we have a way, L, of saying what something is and no other ways of treating something as being that. Formally, this is a vehicle for stopping the proliferation of required B's.

Substantively, our assurance that the required L will be available reflects the following features of a natural language such as English. (1) The calculational structure of the grammar of the language ensures that there is no limit to the number of locutions available. (2) The lexicon of the language embodies the substantive distinctions that we do make, which ensures the availability of relevant locutions. (3) The open-ended character of the language ensures that if we need a new locution, we can create one.

This kind of solution is built into the descriptive formats presented in the preceding chapter. There, the problem was setting limits to decomposition. The Name/Description format allows us to do this by giving the Name, but not the Description, of the components at the level at which we wish to stop. (And note that whenever we do this we have, in a practical sense, created ultimate objects, since the absence of a Description corresponds to the absence of constituent objects, and that corresponds to LC-II.)

Three mitigating considerations are the following.

(1) Formula (7), i.e., $\langle V2 \rangle = \langle B1, L2, B2 \rangle$, does not imply that B1 and B2 are accomplished by, or even available to, the same individual. All that is required is that both are in the domain of behavior. In this way, for example, paradigmatic human beings can describe the behavior of infants, dogs, cats, chimpanzees, etc., meaningfully as intentional actions. Thus, there is no paradox stemming from the fact that non-verbal individuals can be said to engage in intentional action even though intentional actions stand in one-to-one relation with verbal behavior. That such non-verbal individuals behave intentionally is, however, a fact for us, not for them, since those are our descriptions, not theirs; and so it is in our behavior that those conceptualizations have a place, not theirs. (And it is because of that that we think of animals as engaging in Intentional Action but not Deliberate Action.)

(2) The sets of behaviors B1, B2, ... B_N will show various degrees of overlap, so that the behavioral repertoire required to carry the whole

thing off is not as extensive as the notation might make it appear.

(3) Also, there is an important and familiar sense in which I do the same thing when I treat something as a case of X and when I treat something as a case of Y. For example, I treat something as a loaf of bread by buying it; I treat something as a can of soup (or an automobile, or a house, or a book, etc., etc.) by buying it. We generally think of my behavioral repertoire as having one item, namely buying Q, and not as having as many separate items as there are things I can buy.

8. Verbal Behavior and Grammars

Grammatical theories, e.g., of English as a natural language, are here regarded as being conceptually embedded in the concept of behavior. Since L is a partial specification of the value of Performance as an IA parameter, a grammatical theory is primarily a theory of verbal Performance. That is, it systematically identifies which forms of utterance qualify as locutions, and it distinguishes them from one another and relates them to one another systematically.

A natural language grammar is primarily a normative theory of performance in that its most important contribution to the understanding of verbal behavior is to identify, distinguish, and relate locutions. It is not an empirical theory of performance in that, as linguists point out, there are important extra-linguistic factors which enter into how people actually talk.

Ability is a Person Characteristic category with many specific instances, not a specifically linguistic concept. Since speaking in accordance with a given grammar is a kind of achievement, and abilities are defined and individuated in terms of achievement, we can speak readily about the ability to speak in accordance with a given grammar, and then we can think of grammatical theories as theories of grammatical competence.

On the other hand, we are on more tenuous ground if we want to say that, e.g., a native English speaker knows how to speak in accordance with

a given grammar, for that implies a much closer correspondence between the speaker's learning history and the operations of the grammar, and that correspondence will be open to doubt. (Recall the difference between Ability as a PC category and Know How as a parameter of behavior.)

Generative grammars have made us generally familiar with the notion of "deep structure" versus "surface structure" for sentences. In a similar vein, without pushing the analogy too hard, there is something to be said for the notion that Formula (2), together with the behavioral concepts of Deliberate Action and Social Practice, give us the "deep structure" of discourse and verbal behavior.

9. Verbal Behavior and Deliberate Action

What is involved in the phenomenon of P doing something (enacting a behavior) by saying "Q" to R? Clearly, more than the occurrence of locutions. I can play a recorded speech on my cassette player, and I will hear a proper body of utterances and locutions. Nevertheless, my cassette player is not engaged in speaking, and it isn't telling me anything, though I am getting something from it. Human cases comparable to the cassette player are, e.g., cases of "channeling" or of demonic possession, where someone else speaks through the person involved. Clearly, these are not what we have in mind when we say that the person said something.

What is missing in these cases may include that the person (or the cassette player) knows what is being said (but it may not). What is certainly missing in these cases is that neither the person nor the cassette player has selected the behavior of saying P as the behavior to engage in, nor is either motivated to do so.

Straightforwardly, unless P distinguishes saying "Q" from other forms of behavior and chooses saying "Q" as the behavior to engage in, we do not have a case of P saying "Q" either to R or to anyone else. Thus, straightforwardly, verbal behavior is a case of Deliberate Action.

10. Folk Talk

One of the academic characterizations of “Folk Psychology” is that it involves, in a fundamental way, “attributing propositional attitudes to people.” In turn, the notion of propositional attitudes, which has a long history among learned folk, is tied to the concept of language, since it is only, or archetypally, in language that propositions are expressed.

Consider the following.

- (A) P says to Q, “The cat is on the mat.”
- (B) P says to Q, “Is the cat on the mat?”
- (C) P says to Q, “Put the cat on the mat.”
- (D) P says to Q, “I wish the cat were on the mat.”
- (E) P says to Q, “Suppose the cat is on the mat.”

The notion of propositional attitudes has three key ingredients.

First, there is, in some sense, a common content to a set of examples like (A) to (E) above. The common content is a proposition. In the examples above, the common proposition is the notion of the cat being on the mat.

Second, one can take different attitudes toward a given proposition. The examples above represent, respectively, “assertional,” “interrogative,” “imperative,” “optative,” and “hypothetical” attitudes toward the proposition of the cat being on the mat.

Third, a small set of categories such as the five above exhausts the kinds of verbal behavior there are. Thus, one would say, all verbal behavior (or at least, all verbal behavior that has conceptual content, [in contrast, e.g., to examples such as “Aha!”]) is either a statement, a question, a command, a wish, or a supposition (etc.). (This may be phrasing it too baldly. However, propositional attitudes correspond to characteristic sentence structures, and it is difficult to see how the latter could be only partly known.)

In the present context, several comments are to the point.

- (a) If we ignore some of the more convoluted prose surrounding the notion of a proposition, propositions appear to paraphrase exactly as state of affairs concepts. In the examples (A) to (E), above, the state of affairs concept in question is the concept of the cat being on the mat.
- (b) It may be only an aesthetic qualm, but the notion of propositional attitudes strikes a false note, and that suggests that there is something importantly wrong with the whole idea. It would seem much more straightforward to speak of propositional uses. To be sure, this might require a clearer view of the relation between verbal and non-verbal behavior than is to be found in contemporary studies.
- (c) Lists of propositional attitudes in the literature seem to top out at about 5 - 7 items. Yet, to the five above, one could quickly add the categories of:

Exclamations: "Isn't that just like him to make excuses!"; "How wonderful that the cat is on the mat!"; etc.

Disclaimers: "It may be only an aesthetic qualm, but ..."; "In my opinion, the cat is on the mat."; "I have a feeling that the cat is on the mat."; etc. (If the last two sound like statements, compare, "What makes you think the cat is on the mat?" with, "What makes you think you have a feeling that the cat is on the mat?")

Evaluations (judgments, appraisals, etc.): "A perfect 10 on the balance beam!"

Avowals (confessions, admissions, etc.): "I can't go any further."; "I wouldn't know."; etc.

Performatives: "I now pronounce you man and wife."; "I dub thee Sir Cat on the Mat."; "Thirty dollars or thirty days."; etc.

Promises (commitments, contracts, undertakings): "I promise to put the cat on the mat."; "I agree to come back next week."; "I'll try to be brief."; etc.

Stipulations: "Let's agree that he was guilty – then what?"; "Let's stipulate that the cat is on the mat." (Note that a stipulation is neither a

flat statement of fact nor a mere supposition.)

Announcements

Quotations

Etc.

(d) Propositional attitudes do not appear to have the degree of psychological reality that is implied by saying that us folks attribute them to one another. Consider the following example.

- (1) Wil utters the locution "Look out for the lion."

By doing this,

- (2) Wil says to Gil "Look out for the lion!"

By doing this,

- (3) Wil warns Gil of danger from the lion.

By doing this,

- (4) Etc.

Note that no matter how we continue the sequence, there is going to be no place to mention a propositional attitude in describing Wil's behavior. To be sure, one could say that in (2), Wil had adopted an imperative attitude toward the proposition of Gil looking out for the lion. However, that would not be an accurate description of what Wil did. It would not be an accurate description of a Deliberate Action (or even an Intentional Action) on Wil's part. Rather, it would be merely an observer's classification of what kind of behavior it was. Thus, it would be a correct description of Wil's behavior only if it were offered as an Achievement Description and nothing else. (Recall the earlier discussion of forms of behavior description and the notion that some descriptions are correct only as incomplete descriptions and not as full Deliberate Action or Intentional Action descriptions. Such descriptions only tell us about certain aspects of the behavior [in the present case, the Achievement parameter]; they do not tell us what behavior it was.)

(e) To be sure, it is a genuine insight to recognize that various verbal behaviors can all involve the same state of affairs concept. This is captured by Formula (2) and (9) and (10). And it is not surprising that

most verbal behaviors involve state of affairs concepts; after all, most non-verbal behaviors do also.

However, once we see the relation between verbal behavior and Deliberate Action, there seems to be little use for ad hoc classifications of verbal behaviors, be they propositional attitudes, speech acts, or whatever. When it comes to classifying the uses to which verbal behavior can be put (what one is doing by saying that), we have the whole domain of Deliberate Actions and social practices available.

One might say that what us folk attribute to one another is not propositional attitudes, but Deliberate Actions and Person Characteristics. However, to speak of “attributing” here gives away too much to philosophical and scientific pretension. We do not “attribute” Deliberate Actions to persons any more than we “attribute” home runs to baseball players, checkmates to chess players, symmetry to Normal Distributions, or additivity to numbers. There is a logical connection involved which does not warrant the kind of studied neutrality regarding fact or legitimacy connoted by the disclaimer term “attributing.”

(f) The primary value of the notion of propositional attitudes appears to be as a behavioral surrogate for grammatical purposes. Consider the following elaboration of the example in (d), above.

- (1) Wil utters the locution “Look out for the lion.”
By doing this,
- (2) Wil says to Gil, “Look out for the lion!”
By doing this,
- (2a) Wil urges Gil to look out for the lion.
By doing this,
- (3) Wil warns Gil of danger from the lion.
By doing this,
- (4) Etc.

Consider the sequence (1), (2), (3), (4) as a model for verbal behavior.

The suggestion here is that for most verbal behavior, perhaps all, one can introduce a “propositional attitude” description after (2), i.e., at the point of connection between the verbal behavior descriptions and the non-verbal behavior descriptions. The “propositional attitude” is an umbrella term for a certain set of more particular kinds of behaviors. Thus, for example, the “imperative” propositional attitude covers orders, instructions, advice, prayers, pleas, exhortations, urgings, requests, and so on.

The primary implication of (2a) is in regard to (1), the locution. If you’re going to urge someone to do X, the standard way to do that is to talk this way (use this sentence structure, etc.). Whereas, if you’re going to tell someone that X is the case, the standard way of doing that is to talk this other way. Etc. At the level of (1), talking this way or that way refers to sentence structure, to grammatical structure.

Thus, the “propositional attitudes” may be understood as a set of quasi-behavioral categories for which distinctive, purely locutionary, conventional implementations are generated in the grammar of the language. The arrangement is effective because the quasi-behavioral categories in effect serve as placeholders or surrogates for the non-verbal part in sequences of the form (1) - (4). The non-verbal behaviors are “stubbed off” rather than being simply ignored. The language can thus have its own context-free formal (grammatical) integrity without losing its continuity with the behavioral domain that gives it significance.

Note that this analysis does not require that the propositional attitude categories be jointly exhaustive for verbal behaviors. Nor does it require that either (2a) or the corresponding propositional attitude description have psychological reality for the speaker. It is enough if it doesn’t violate the (2), (3), (4) sequence; and if it is the conventional significance of (1) and, therefore, (2), so much the better.

Note also that having these conventional ways of doing things is entirely compatible with our having other ways of doing the same things. And, of course, we have lots of those. More, the conventional ways may facilitate other ways of doing things. For example, “Isn’t that just like

him to make excuses!" is an exclamation, but it makes use of a conventional form for asking a question, and its doing so is essential to its being the exclamation it is, for it differs significantly from "That's just like him to make excuses!" And both of these differ significantly from "Excuses, excuses! Always excuses!"

The fact that there are non-standard verbal ways of doing things is one of the reasons for using the neutral "P says to Q ..." in the sequence (1) - (4) above rather than "P tells Q ...," "P asks Q ...," etc. To do the latter would be to confound (2) with (2a) or to substitute (2a) for (2). That is often not a correct statement of what the behavior is. Using (2), one can go directly to (3), the next correct behavioral description, without stopping at (2a). Where (2a) is correct, it can appear in its own right as (3) rather than being imposed by a "propositional attitude" framework. The latter is, after all, merely a term of art in some learned circles; it is only "Baseball Talk," not folk talk.

11. Behavior and Verbal Behavior

There is a significant complementarity between behavior and verbal behavior. Deliberate Action is fundamentally context sensitive and context dependent; paradigmatically, it is initiated in light of circumstances, and it requires situational support for its execution. In contrast, verbal behavior is as context-free as possible, being conventional and performative; to accomplish it requires only a certain kind of bodily performance, and such performances are, practically speaking, always available.

We acquire concepts and skills the old-fashioned way; we learn them, by practice and experience. Because each such acquisition takes up a significant amount of time, there are strong limits to how many we can accomplish in a lifetime and how many are available at any given time. However, the combinatorial and calculational aspects of language leverage this very finite repertoire into an indefinitely large set of conceptual distinctions and conceptual structures. (Recall that state of affairs concepts are individuated by their component object, process, event, state of affairs, and relationship or attribute concepts.) These latter are then available for behavioral uses.

Thus, although the complementarity of Deliberate Action and Verbal Behavior is relatively neat and simple from a categorical standpoint, in real life it works out more dialectically.

(a) Although Deliberate Action is context sensitive, a large part of the actual sensitivity reflects the structuring and resolving power of our verbally amplified and transformed conceptual structures. Our ability to give definition and structure to our circumstances depends on that. Our ability to distinguish what those things are (so as to treat them accordingly) or even to distinguish them as things depends on that. Our ability to distinguish where things are and what characteristics and relationships they have depends on that. Likewise our ability to distinguish our own actual or potential behavior (and that of others) depends on that.

(b) Conversely, although verbal behavior per se is context-free, in discourse, it is not. Since the occurrence of a verbal behavior on a given occasion is ultimately the occurrence of a Deliberate Action, the context sensitivity of the latter appears in the selectivity of what we say. The sentences within a given discourse are grammatically independent of one another, but what is said in one sentence is not independent of what is said in other sentences or independent of the context of the discourse.

We routinely recognize the significance of a given behavior by paying attention to the choices represented by the behavior. This holds equally for behavior generally (see “Dinner at 8:30” below) and for spoken or written discourse. When we ask, “What’s she doing by saying that?”, the answers are likely to apply also to other things she says, and the answers from different points in the discourse had better hang together in a person/behavior account, or we will normally and with good reason reject them. (There needn’t have been a separate discipline called Hermeneutics.)

There is more involved in the contribution of language than just numbers, of course. We noted above that because the performance of uttering a locution is public and, in that sense, objective, our concepts are correspondingly public and objective and communicable. The calculational and combinatorial structure of language together with the calculational

and combinatorial structure of the reality concepts creates a systematic structure of concepts rather than merely extending the number we have available.

It is because of those systematic aspects that I can draw on my conceptual repertoire and construct a representation not only of what I observe now, but equally, of what I don't observe or what I am now observing for the very first time or what I might observe, etc. Thus, I can deal with what is the case and what is not the case on an equal footing. Likewise, I can deal on an equal footing with what is here now present, what is real but not here now present, what is not real, and what is possible, probable, impossible, certain, etc., in the future and past. At the level of conceptual formulation, it is all the same thing.

In general, language is essential to my achieving the conceptual repertoire to construct and personally maintain a real world as the arena which includes my behaviors and interactions with others. It is because of the central part that language plays in the domain of persons and behavior that it constitutes one of the four major conceptual components of the Person concept.

Parenthetically, although it takes language to make concepts public, objective, and communicable, in the end they are public, objective, and communicable. We may suspect that it is because of this that it is easy to think of them as separate existents dwelling in a Platonic realm. This is particularly true of those concepts that are part of a formal system, for the place of a concept within a system carries with it reality constraints on what we can do with it and in relation to it, and thus it can easily have the "feel" of something real. It is real, of course. Concepts are real. What it takes for a concept to be real is that it is an instance of C in an instance of Formula (2). However, concepts are not somethings, and we don't have to make them into peculiar kinds of somethings in order to guarantee their reality. (Compare, "A concept is something real," "There really are concepts," and "People really do act on distinctions." States of affairs are no less real than objects.)

7. Commentary on the Four Component Concepts

The general strategy in the “grammatical” approach to the Person concept is to formulate complex concepts as conceptual structures involving component concepts and their interrelationships. At present we have completed primary sketches of the four major Person concept components, namely, Behavior, Individual Person, Real World, and Language. It seems appropriate, therefore to review some of the explicit connections between component concepts and to consider the result in connection with our initial entrée, the maxim that “The world makes sense, and so do people. They make sense *now*.”

A. Simple Connections

Behavior

- (1) The notion that every behavior is someone’s behavior is captured by the Identity parameter of behavior. Values of this parameter are specifications of the Individual Person whose behavior it is.
- (2) Another parameter of behavior, the Know parameter, takes concepts, including state of affairs concepts (paradigmatically, concepts relating to what is the case in the Real World), as values.
- (3) Verbal behavior was found to be a special case of Deliberate Action. The special case was generated by specifying values for the Performance and Know parameters of behavior.

Individual Person

- (1) A person was defined within the system as “an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action in a dramaturgical pattern.” Not only is every behavior someone’s behavior, but, conversely, every someone is *essentially* the doer of his deeds.
- (2) One of the parameters of persons is the Knowledge parameter, values of which are concepts, including state of affairs concepts (paradigmatically, concepts of how things are or could be in the real world), which are available to act on. The person’s Real World serves as a systematization of such knowledge or lack of knowledge.

- (3) Another parameter of persons is the Ability parameter, values of which refer to what the person can or could accomplish in the real world. The State of Affairs System would appear in the specifications of both the Ability parameter and the Knowledge parameter. Persons have the capacity to acquire the Ability to construct a world and act on that construction. They also have abilities to bring about certain states of affairs in the real world.
- (4) Archetypally, persons have the capacity to acquire the ability to speak.

Language

- (1) As noted above, verbal behavior is a special case of behavior and, specifically, of Deliberate Action. Every case of verbal behavior is also a case of non-verbal Deliberate Action.
- (2) In the formula which defines verbal behavior, a locution stands in 1-1 relationship to a concept. Thus, there is verbal behavior which stands in 1-1 relationship to concepts and, therefore, to (a) behaviors, (b) verbal behaviors, (c) persons, and (d) states of affairs. There is nothing that is, in principle, beyond the reach of language, though the language is not a substitute for what it puts within our reach.

Real World/States of Affairs

- (1) The State of Affairs System transition rules, dealing with objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, provide the essential ingredients for constructing a real world which includes persons, their behaviors, and their verbal behaviors.
- (2) The real world codifies a person's possibilities and impossibilities of behaving.

Maxim: A person requires a world in order to have the possibility of behaving at all.

Maxim: A person needs the world to be one way rather than another in order to have a reason (and an opportunity) to behave in one way rather than another.

B. The Initial Entrée and the Systematic Formulation

In following up the thought that people are not inherently mysterious to people, we arrived at the conclusion that there is a single conceptual structure extending across persons, behavior, language, and the real world. The conclusion was easily reached on the basis that (a) language requires speech; and (b) speech requires a speaker, and it requires the general case of behavior, which is not verbal behavior; and (c) episodes of speech by a speaker are historically situated in the real world.

That initial informal conclusion is now grounded in the technical detail of a systematic formulation, as illustrated by the specific connections noted above. Not surprisingly, the systematic formulation has some features that were not anticipated in the initial formulation.

One is the recognition that if one begins with something like the Transition Rules, the construction of a real world requires the introduction of a limiting case, and the choice of a particular limiting case determines the overall character of the world. For the systematic formulation, Limiting Case I was chosen on intuitive grounds, buttressed by the argument that only this choice guarantees that there is a logical place in the world for everything that one might encounter. LC-I is a holistic formulation and contrasts with the atomistic formulation of LC-II, which is the preferred choice for scientific theories.

An intermediate case stems from the existing notion that the world may be thought of as being composed of things which hinder or facilitate behavior. In the systematic formulation, this is no longer a figure of speech. Not only is the real world literally a way of codifying my possibilities and impossibilities in regard to behavior; it is *primarily* and *essentially* that. That is the point of having a real world.

Maxim: What a person acts on successfully tends to become real for him.

It is also something of a surprise to realize that Person, Behavior, Language, and Real World all have the same conceptual scope, or reach,

namely, all possible states of affairs.

In the case of the Real World, it is a matter of definition. If the Real World is the state of affairs that includes all other states of affairs (LC-I), its conceptual reach extends to merely possible states of affairs as well as to actual states of affairs. (If a given state of affairs is possible but not actual, the fact that it is possible is an actual state of affairs.)

In the case of Persons, Behavior, and Language, when these are formulated as parametric analyses, there is at least one parameter of each where (a) parametric values are states of affairs or state of affairs concepts, and (b) there is no formal basis for setting limits to the range of states of affairs or state of affairs concepts which appear as values. In the absence of such limits, the range is, in principle, unlimited, i.e., all possible states of affairs. For Behavior, these parameters are Know, Achievement, and Want. For Persons, the parameters are Knowledge and Ability. For Language, the parameter is Concept in the verbal formula $\langle V \rangle = \langle C, L, B \rangle$.

To paraphrase, there is nothing that could possibly be known (or thought) that a person *necessarily* cannot know. There is nothing that could possibly be accomplished that a person necessarily cannot accomplish. There is nothing that could possibly be wanted that a person necessarily could not want. And there is nothing that could possibly be said that a person necessarily could not say.

The fact that there are no necessary limits of these kinds makes it all the more poignant that all the persons we know of, or can imagine, are not only limited but strongly limited in all of these respects, and our knowledge of these limits (and the converse, the possibilities) is limited.

The contrast between the lack of limitations in principle and the presence of heavy limitations in fact, together with a variety of uncertainties about those limitations, forms the basis for the unique importance of the real world as a way of codifying a person's possibilities and impossibilities (and uncertainties) with respect to behavior (with respect to acting in the world). For an individual who is essentially the doer of his deeds, what could be more fundamental than that?

C. Philosophers, Facts, and States of Affairs

Given the centrality of the concept of a state of affairs in the systematic formulation of the Person concept, it is of some interest to take note of how this concept is treated in the academic literature. What we find is that “state of affairs” seldom appears in the current literature and, apparently, never in a systematic way. “Fact,” however, does, and it appears to be commonly used synonymously with “state of affairs.” I believe that *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* adequately reflects the current literature in this connection.

In characteristically urbane fashion, the entry under “fact” begins as follows:

“Wittgenstein wrote that the world was the totality of facts, not of things. But although facts have the nice solid ring about them that opposes them to such things as values or theories, they prove to be slippery items out of which to build anything. Facts seem to be shaped just like sentences: it is a fact that dogs bark and stones sink. It may also be a fact that children have rights or that sun and rain make rainbows. Modern thought has been sympathetic to a minimalist view of the notion. On this account, it is first pointed out that ‘it is a fact that p ’ is the same as ‘it is true that p ’, and that both reduce to simply: p . But if we want to know what makes it the case that p , it may be that there is no general answer...

“The last well-known systematic philosophy of facts was the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* of Wittgenstein, which depended heavily on a conception of atomic or basic facts ... But Wittgenstein repudiated the metaphysic in his later work.”

There are several respects in which this exposition is at variance with the present approach.

(1) “...they prove to be slippery items out of which to build anything.” To see facts as building blocks reveals an atomistic approach, and that runs contrary to the nature of facts, which fit naturally in a holistic approach.

Wittgenstein's systematic formulation was overtly atomistic and was ultimately unsuccessful, but many of his bold first moves can be read as expressing an intuitive holistic conception. The *Tractatus* begins:

- 1.0 The world is everything that is the case.
- 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- 1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being *all* the facts.
- 1.12...
- 1.13...
- 1.2 The world divides into [sic] facts.

We can agree with each of these statements except the third. In its place we should want to say:

- 1.11x The world is determined by the facts and by these *not* being all the facts.

As we noted earlier, it is a mistake to think of the totality of facts or possible facts as a definite collection of items, either finite or infinite.

- (2) "Facts seem to be shaped just like sentences."

Presumably this is an implicit appeal to a standard argument to the effect that since sentences are clearly manmade stuff, there is no reason to believe that the real world would mirror them in its structure – after all, the world was there long before, and independently of, the sentences.

(b) In passing, we may note that those who express this kind of reservation show no reservations about the fact that the world of physics seems to be shaped just like those very peculiar sentences which we call mathematical equations. Is this because the world of physics is also clearly manmade stuff? Probably not.

(c) The case of those mathematical equations provides a clue to another 180° inversion here. It is not that it is a suspicious, purported fact that, inscrutably, facts match sentences readily. Rather, it is a mundane,

but fundamental cultural achievement to have evolved a social institution, language, that allows us readily to match sentences to possible facts.

It is possible facts, not facts, which are “shaped just like sentences.” Sentences carry no presumptions as to what the facts are. Rather, the speakers of the language carry the burden and responsibility of selecting or composing sentences which represent actual facts as against merely possible facts. Is any of this dubious? Hardly.

(3) *Are* facts shaped like sentences? And does ‘it is a fact that *p*’ reduce to simply: *p*?

Consider the following sentences, where *p* = “the cat is on the mat.”

- S1 *p*
- S2 It is a fact that *p*.
- S3 I hope that *p*.
- S4 Make it the case that *p*.
- S5 Suppose that *p*.
- S6 Would that *p*.

In discussions of propositional attitudes, *p* is a possible component of different kinds of sentences, exemplified by S2-S6, each expressing a characteristic attitude toward *p*. Such discussions leave no room for S1, and that should make us suspicious of the notion that S2 reduces to S1. There is no room for S1 because the rest of the sentence in S2-S6 gives *p* a place in the scheme of things, and that is required in order to make the sense that we do of *p*.

Communication systems and signaling systems are well-studied phenomena. In this context, it is a commonplace that within a signaling system, the ‘absence’ of a signal may be a signal. In general, such arrangements are conducive to greater efficiency. Thus, for example, the blank spaces between words on a printed page are not the absence of a character – they are a special character called “blank” or “space.” Similarly, “one if by land and two if by sea” could just as easily have been “none if by land and one if by sea” (well, almost as easily).

At face value, the case of S1 is this kind of phenomenon. There is a linguistic convention that the signal for “it is a fact that” in S2 can be a non-signal, so that a way to say “it is a fact that *p*” is to say “*p*.” The same convention could have been used with any of S3 - S6 (etc.) instead. Since expressions of type S1 are the most frequently used or among the most frequently used, the choice of S2 for ellipsis presumably reflects considerations of economy or efficiency.

In summary, it is only typographically that ‘it is a fact that *p*’ reduces to ‘*p*’.

Now consider the locution L1, where L1 = “the cat’s being on the mat.” Since L1 is not a sentence, the fact of the cat’s being on the mat is not “shaped like a sentence.” So, not all facts are shaped like sentences, but rather, some are shaped like noun clauses? Well, the fact that the cat is on the mat is the same fact as the fact of the cat’s being on the mat. So that fact either is not shaped like either a sentence or a noun clause, or it is shaped like both simultaneously.

At this point we are well advised to drop the whole matter until and unless some new life can be breathed into the notion that facts are “shaped like sentences.”

D. Facts, Situations, and States of Affairs

One can ask what exists, or “what there is” in the world. One can also ask how it goes in the world. And one can ask how things are in the world. These are fundamental questions about the world, reflecting fundamentally different perspectives on it.

Through the concepts of Object, Event, Process, and State of Affairs, respectively, the State of Affairs System allows us to ask and answer questions of these kinds. To say that *P* is a state of affairs is to say something about how things are in the world.

To say that P is a fact or that the situation is P, is, in each case, to say something about how things are in the world. A state of affairs is not quite the same thing as a fact or a situation, although a fact is a state of affairs, and a situation is a state of affairs. (Indeed, “fact” and “situation” have proved to be the most informative paraphrases in response to the inevitable question, “Just what is a state of affairs, anyway?”)

Consider the difference between a fact and a situation. When we have a single item of information, particularly when context is not a significant factor, we think and talk in terms of fact. It is a fact that the moon is round, that dogs bark, that stones sink, that the cat is on the mat, that the stock market was down 20%, or that the bread costs USD 1.25. None of these would normally be referred to as a situation.

Note how context could make a difference. (a) “Gentlemen, we are in a grave situation. The stock market was down 20% today.” (b) “Here’s the situation. The bread costs only USD 1.25 a loaf, so we can have as much as we want.” “Houston, we have a problem. The situation is that ...” If the context gives a special importance to a fact, we are likely to speak of a situation. The context, of course, is given by other facts.

Current usage takes us beyond such overtly interest-centered ways of talking and closer to a pure “how things are” scenario. “What’s the situation in Rwanda this year?” “What was the situation in the Colonies in 1776?” “What’s the situation in this room right now?”

Facts, though they are often implicitly complex, are overtly simple. A fact is a single item of information. (“The motor is running” is a single item of information and corresponds to a single fact. It involves or implies a variety of other facts and so is implicitly complex.) In contrast, a situation is overtly complex. The questions above concerning the situation in Rwanda, in the Colonies, and in this room cannot be answered responsively by giving a single item of information. (One might suggest that a question about the situation, e.g., in Rwanda, is a question about what the *entire* situation is, not merely what some fact about the situation

is.)

Note, however, that if we try to describe a situation, we are back to facts. Consider the situation in this room: the room has a walnut writing table in the middle. Along the north wall are eight filing cabinets. The first cabinet contains... (etc., etc.). Wil is seated in a blue leather chair in the northwest corner. Jil is seated in a matching chair in the southwest corner. They are having a perfectly ridiculous argument about how to fit a fractal to a decimal point. In the northeast corner, the cat is stretched out asleep on the mat. On the south wall is a walnut bookcase with the following books on the top shelf... On the second shelf... (etc.) The first book on the top shelf was written by Donaldo Espinoza, who...(etc.) The room is cooled by an air-conditioning unit located on the roof of the building. Gil is seated at the writing table, ignoring Wil and Jil. Jil is the person who...(etc.). The cat is the cat that ate the rat... (etc.). Etc., etc., etc.

A fact is a single item of information, and a situation is complex, often very complex. But there is a deeper difference. In identifying a situation, e.g., “the situation in Rwanda this year,” we demarcate a portion of the real world and are faced with the task of describing that portion (“the situation in Rwanda this year” is a state of affairs placeholder, as discussed in Chapter 5). In stating a fact, we are doing no such thing.

In stating a fact, we are dividing the set of all possible worlds into two groups, i.e., those in which what the fact states is the case and those in which what the fact states is not the case (or those that fit the description and those that don’t), and we are saying that the real world belongs to the first group and not the second. (Recall that whether we deal with persons, behavior, language, or the real world, we are, in principle, dealing with all possible states of affairs; hence, also, all possible worlds.)

We describe a situation by multiplying the facts that distinguish this situation (and this world) from others. But, of course, there is no complete description. One reason for this is that a complete description of the situation in this room (or in Rwanda, etc.) would be a complete description of the real world. We can demarcate a portion of the real

world as “the situation in this room,” but that portion is continuous with the rest of the world, and what’s in the room or goes on in the room is connected to what is beyond the room by a network of relationships and identities following the logic of “The House that Jack Built.” A complete description would have to trace those connections, and there is no end to where they would land. And they lead into an unknown future, not merely outward, inward, and into the past.

When we speak of “the place of a person (or anything else) in the scheme of things” we are speaking of the place determined by this network of relationships and identities. From a dynamic, or dramaturgical, perspective, we speak correspondingly of “the part a person (or anything else) plays in the scheme of things.” Ordinarily we restrict the scope of reference and speak of the part this person (etc.) plays *in this situation* or *in that group* or *in that undertaking*, etc.

One of the less appreciated triumphs of language is that it enables us to say something without having to say everything. It enables us to know something without having to know everything. This is because language enables us to state facts, to say and think that *something* is the case, to say how things are *in some respect*.

In practice, our descriptions of situations are highly selective, and the selection reflects what we are up to and what is of interest to us. Thus, I might have said that the situation in this room is that Wil and Jil are having a stupid argument. Or, I might have said that the situation in this room is that it looks strange because the computer is missing from its usual position against the east wall. (On the other hand, there are a few million items whose absence from a spot near the east wall I would *not* be likely to comment on.)

What I select as “what the situation is” depends on what is of interest to me, and what is of interest to me is what makes a difference in what I am up to, in what I do, or in what I am inclined to do or not do.

Maxim: A person needs the world to be one way rather than another in order to have a reason (and an opportunity) to act in one way rather than another.

This is a closer view, from a certain angle of how the real world codifies a person's possibilities and non-possibilities of behavior. Every fact, every state of affairs, is potentially a Contingency in the systematic description of a behavioral process (a social practice).

III

A WORLD OF PERSONS AND THEIR WAYS

Our initial formulations dealt individually with the concepts of behavior, individual persons, the real world, and language, and we have reviewed the most obvious connections among them. We are now in a position to move to some finer-grained elaborations. In the present section we will deal with the following.

- (1) Social reality as the infrastructure of behavior
- (2) The problem of (and models for) understanding someone else's behavior
- (3) Personal self-regulation and its derivative phenomena
- (4) A first-person model of behavior, personal identity, and human lives in a world of persons and their ways.

8. Social Reality as the Real World Context of Behavior

We can talk about an individual behavior without having to talk about anything else. But no behavior is an island. Hitting a home run on a given occasion is not a freestanding entity that would be what it is if nothing else existed. Rather, its being a home run depends on there being other behaviors such as pitching the ball, hitting a ground ball to left field, sliding into second base, and so on.

What holds for home runs holds for buying a loaf of bread, telling a child not to be afraid, signaling for a left turn, jumping into the lake, and so on. Individual behaviors are embedded in a system of behaviors and occur (are produced) *as* realizations of that system.

In tracing the system, we will move from smaller units to larger ones. Although individual behaviors could be described as the smallest units, we will begin with social practices and their relation to individual behaviors.

A. Social Practices

A social practice is a social pattern of behavior. In general, the pattern includes more than one behavior, and most social practices involve behaviors on the part of more than one person.

For technical purposes, social practices are represented in accordance with the descriptive format for processes presented above in Chapter 5. A conventional schema for indicating such a representation is shown in Figure 3. The diamond notation is the alternate notation for the Agency Description presented above in Chapter 3.

Figure 3 schematically exhibits the Stage/Option structure of a social practice, and it indicates that the basic elements of the social practice are individual behaviors. Because the process representation is relatively computer implementable, this is the method of choice for simulating social processes.

As social patterns of behavior, social practices are learnable, teachable, do-able, and paradigmatically, done. Every society at a given time has an organized set of social practices which constitute what there is to do for the members of the society. A member's behavioral history is the history of participating in these social practices.

Figure 3 is heuristic in bringing out two kinds of conceptual connection.

B. Social Practices and Deliberate Action

From the presentation of the Process Description, we may recall that a process representation portrays all the ways that the given process can occur. (It implicitly represents all the Versions of the process.) On the other hand, when the process occurs on some occasion, that is because one of its Versions has occurred (tautologically: the process has occurred in one of the ways that it can occur). In turn, this occurrence can be described as a case of one of the Options of Stage 1 occurring, followed by one of the Options of Stage 2, followed by one of the Options of Stage 3, and so on.

That is a spectator's view of the matter. From the viewpoint of a person engaging in a given social practice, it is often a matter of choosing a Version for enactment. Since the Version implies a set of Options, there need be no independent choice of the Stage 1 Option as against the other Options, or of the Stage 2 Option as against the other Options, and so on.

Figure 3. Social Practice Schema

The choice of one of the Stage N options as against the others fits the description of “the choice of one behavior as contrasted with a set of alternatives” as it occurs in Deliberate Action. There is no escape from choice here – if you’re going to engage in a given social practice, you’ve got to do it in *one* of the ways it can be done. This has two important consequences.

- (a) To engage in a Deliberate Action is to participate in a social practice. (One may participate in more than one social practice simultaneously.)
- (b) The common notion that human behavior involves choice is preserved. In contrast, this phenomenon of choice has nothing to do with any concept of freedom or of “free choice” or its absence. Those are philosophical intrusions that have no place in the basic understanding of behavior.

C. Social Practices and Person Characteristics

A person’s selections of Options in participating in a social practice are expressions of that person’s Person Characteristics. (Recall the Attributional Contingency in the Process Representation.)

Saying that in a given society there is a set of social practices which constitute what there is to do for the members of the society should in no way suggest a population in lock step with no room for individuality.

Just the combinatorial possibilities of the choice of which practices to engage in (recall the “type of behavior” in connection with Person Characteristics), when (recall the “pattern of occurrence”), with whom, and in what ways (all the Option choices within each social practice) constitute such an impossibly large number that the visions of a lock step society is absurd. (Of course, if we only describe what people do in terms of the social practices they engage in, they will sound much more alike than they are.)

It is much more realistic to think of a society’s social practices as the medium within which the members do their personal things. Consider the following heuristic image.

Dinner at 8:30

Suppose I tell you that last night I got through work at 5:30 and got home at 6:00, as usual. And we had dinner at 8:30 and it was steak, well done.

At this point you yawn inwardly and wonder “So, what else is new? Half the people in town could say pretty much the same thing.”

Then I add a few facts. I tell you that yesterday morning I had a big argument with my wife and we never got it resolved. Also, we usually have dinner at 7:30, not 8:30, and I like steak, but I like it rare – I hate it well done.

At this point, you have a very different picture of what was going on.

When presented to undergraduate classes, ordinarily about 40% of the class is smiling after hearing that “we usually have dinner at 7:30, not 8:30”; and by the end, 80% to 90% are smiling. The reason for the smiles is that, indeed, they see another picture, namely an expression of hostility on her part. It isn’t necessarily true (it doesn’t follow from the

facts given) but it is obvious – *it looks that way* – and people do see it.

This is an example of common sense judgment on the part of the students. Even those who might have reason to question whether it really was hostility had better be able to see that that's what it looks like, or they will be judged to be deficient in sensitivity (i.e., they have less sensitivity than you would expect from just anyone.) Clearly, too, there are significant talent or ability differences among people in regard to this kind of sensitivity.

Maxim: A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

Let us be clear about what is *not* going on in responding to “Dinner at 8:30.” There are no inferences and no generalizations involved here. For example, the probability that if someone serves steak well done for dinner at 8:30 that is an expression of hostility is completely unknown, but it's essentially zero. It almost never happens that way. Likewise, the probability that if someone expresses hostility, they do it by serving steak well done for dinner at 8:30 is also vanishingly small and completely unknown. As to the probability that steak well done at 8:30 is an expression of hostility, given all the facts mentioned in the heuristic, no one has ever collected the data, and we might possibly be surprised. What is certain is that the students making the judgment did not have any such data available and weren't thinking at all in those terms (as established by subsequent debriefing).

The “Dinner at 8:30” heuristic is also a good example of how people carry out their personal business by doing the usual, ordinary things – *in a particular way*, i.e., by enacting a particular Version. (Carrying out their personal business amounts to carrying out a second social practice in the circumstances that obtain, by carrying out the visible one in a particular way.)

The connection between Person Characteristics and Option selection in social practices is fruitful in both directions. If we know a person

well, we will be less surprised and less often surprised at what he does and the way he does it than if we knew nothing about him. And we could predict his everyday behavior as well as or better than most of those persons whose professional aspiration is to predict behavior. We could, but we don't. In real life, in most settings, prediction almost never occurs. (It has probably been several years since the last time I had occasion to predict someone's behavior.) What we operate with are expectations, which are something very different. (For example, a prediction involves an overt act and a verifiable specification of an outcome; an expectation involves neither.)

Conversely, the primary basis on which we make observational assessments of a person's person characteristics (and we do this routinely, "intuitively," if you will, with everyone) is the choice of Options in the social practices we see him engage in, with particular attention to those practices that we do or will engage in jointly with him. Those choices tell us something about his Person Characteristics ("What kind of person would do that that way?"), and our expectations concerning his choices reflect our current knowledge of his PC's.

There is a third fundamental aspect of social practices that the social practice schema barely hints at. Social practices are coherent (recall, these are social patterns of behavior) in a way that is almost never possible for individual behaviors. Compare, for example, the kind and degree of completeness and the level of closure that goes with having played a game of chess with the arbitrariness and complete pointlessness of moving the king's pawn to king 4, considered in isolation.

Such examples point up the basic limitations of decontextualized views of behavior, such as that represented by the Agency Description (which is itself much richer than the Performance/Achievement concepts of behavior found in various scientific and philosophic theories of behavior). We noted above that the Agency Description makes salient the purposive, instrumental aspect of behavior. And, indeed, behavior has that aspect. However, if we give that aspect theoretical primacy, trouble follows.

“All behavior is instrumental.” “All behavior has an ulterior motive.” These come to the same thing. Let us begin with the first. A behavior is instrumental when there is a goal of some kind external to the behavior itself for the sake of which the behavior is engaged in. If we take it literally and seriously that all behavior is instrumental, a “vicious” infinite regress ensues:

- (1) P engages in behavior B1.
- (2) Since B1 is instrumental, there is a goal G1 external to B1 for the sake of which B1 is done.
- (3) But then P’s behavior is not really B1. It’s really B2, getting G1 (or trying to get G1).
- (4) But since all behavior is instrumental, B2 is instrumental. This means that there is a goal G2 external to B2 for the sake of which B2 is engaged in.
- (5) But then P’s behavior is not really B2. It’s really B3, i.e., getting G2 (or trying).
- (6) But since all behavior is instrumental, B3 is instrumental. This means that there is a goal G3 external to B3 for the sake of which B3 is engaged in.
- (7) But then P’s behavior is not really B3. It’s really B4, i.e., getting G3 (or trying).
- (8) And so on and on and on.

If the development seems artificial, try it on our “ulterior motive” example, i.e., the salesman who plays golf in order to sell insurance.

- (1) P engages in Behavior B1 (playing golf).
- (2) Since all behavior is instrumental, there is some goal G1 external to playing golf, for the sake of which he plays golf. In fact, G1 is “selling insurance.”
- (3) But then P’s behavior is not really playing golf (he’s only going through the motions). What he’s really doing is selling insurance (or trying to).
- (4) But since all behavior is instrumental, selling insurance is instrumental. This means that there is a goal G2 external to selling

insurance for the sake of which the behavior of selling insurance is engaged in. What is G2? God only knows.

- (5) But then P's behavior is not really selling insurance. It's really B3, i.e., achieving G2, whatever that may be (or trying).
- (6) But since all behavior is instrumental, achieving G2 is instrumental. This means that ... [His behavior isn't really B3. It's really B4. Etc., etc., etc.]

There are two things to notice here. First, no matter how clever we are at supplying external goals or ulterior motives, we inevitably wind up in the position of (4), i.e., "God only knows." Second, we are always left knowing nothing about the real behavior, since all we ever observe or infer is merely deceitful appearance. It is deceitful because, in the series, B1 doesn't resemble B2. (On the contrary, in general, it is quite different from B2. Does playing golf resemble selling insurance? Is it an approximation? Not at all. Does playing a chess game resemble impressing your friends or feeling good about yourself? Not at all.) Likewise, B2 does not resemble B3, nor does B3 resemble B4. Thus, the final story, if there were one (or even the next story after "God only knows") is one about which we haven't the slightest inkling.

The principle that all behavior is instrumental or, equivalently, that all behavior is ulteriorly motivated, is one of the poisonous residues of philosophical and psychological theories. Not surprisingly, many of the theorists who advocate that all behavior is *simply* instrumental are happy to provide us with a transcendental universal motivation for all behavior. Ultimately, all behavior seeks to gain pleasure and/or avoid pain; ultimately, we always act out of self-interest; ultimately we seek to avoid/reduce anxiety or tension or cognitive dissonance or feelings of powerlessness, or ... or ... or ...

Such principles are transcendental because they violate our observational and inferential canons (in this regard they are like Revelations). There is already decisive empirical evidence against each and every one of these proposals since there are plenty of occasions when one says sincerely, "No, that's not what I was up to. That doesn't fit my experience." The mark of the transcendental is that evidence doesn't count. The response

will be, “*No matter how it seems to you or me, it really is a matter of pleasure (etc.) because that’s how things are.*”

A second transcendental aspect is that the transcendental motive is taken to bring the threatened regress to an end. That, too, is simple fiat. There is nothing about the concept of pleasure (etc.) that makes it exempt from the logic of the infinite regress. If all behavior is simply instrumental, then the behavior of achieving pleasure is instrumental and so there must be something beyond pleasure (etc.). And if it is not the case that all behavior is simply instrumental, there should be no temptation to supply a transcendental motive, either.

What is the alternative? Clearly, it is to reject the “All behavior is merely instrumental” ideology. This alternative is well represented in common sense and ordinary language. We speak of doing something “for its own sake”; we respond to “why?” questions with “no reason at all – I just felt like it” (or “I just like doing that,” or “it pleases me to do that,” or “for the intrinsic satisfaction” and so on.)

What is the notion of doing something for its own sake? That is simply a denial of the notion that the behavior is instrumental. Ironically, because the instrumental paradigm is a standard part of our conceptual apparatus, we use it in denying its applicability. In the case of, e.g., “I’m playing golf for its own sake,” it’s not that there is something external to playing golf for the sake of which I play golf, namely this peculiar something called “its own sake” or “playing golf.” We make the denial explicit when we say, “No reason at all. I’m just...”

In light of these considerations, the following definition is presented.

An intrinsic social practice is one that can be understood as being engaged in without an ulterior motive and without a further end in view.

In this connection, we may note the following.

1. Intrinsicness is an attribute of a social practice as such. It is not an attribute of any given enactment or “token” of a social practice.

2. Understood – by whom? By not specifying this, the definition implies that we should expect some individual and group differences in regard to which practices are intrinsic for whom.

3. Normative examples of social practices that most Spaniards understand as intrinsic include (a) games of all kinds; (b) avocations such as photography, collecting stamps, etc.; (c) vocations such as being an artist, being a teacher, etc.; and (d) sports, such as skiing, golf, hiking, etc., (Other examples, e.g., emotional behaviors and social institutions, are discussed separately below.) Examples of normatively non-intrinsic social practices include (a) rolling a length of string into a ball, (b) cleaning the chess pieces before playing, (c) driving around the block, (d) buying a carpenter's T-square, (e) etc. In the first set of cases, if we were told that P was doing one of those, we would have little tendency to ask, "Yes, but what is she really doing by doing that?" In contrast, with respect to the second set, if we were told that P was doing one of those we would generally (implicitly or explicitly) raise the question, "Yes, but why?"

4. Egocentrism in judgment in regard to intrinsic social practices is not implied (and it appears, in fact, to be relatively uncommon). Everyone takes to certain practices and not others. For example, baseball is my game; so is cooking; as for golf, you couldn't pay me to do that; I can't see what people see in it! Nevertheless, for me, golf is an intrinsic social practice because my experience with other people leaves me no doubt that they routinely do it for its own sake; thus, I can understand golf as being engaged in without an ulterior motive and without a further end in view.

5. The definition leaves open the possibility that, on a given occasion, a person participates in an intrinsic social practice but does so with an ulterior motive or a further end in view. (It even leaves open the possibility that there is, in fact, always an ulterior motive, but as we saw, there are other reasons for rejecting that.)

6. It also leaves open the possibility that, on a given occasion, a person participates in an intrinsic social practice without an ulterior motive

and without a further end in view. Consider the following definition.

A person's behavior is intrinsic when it is part of the person's participation in an intrinsic social practice and (a) the person is participating in that practice without an ulterior motive and without a further end in view, and (b) the particular behavior is engaged in without an ulterior motive and without a further end in view other than those which are part of the practice itself. (Thus, for example, moving P-K4 may be an intrinsic behavior even though it is part of a devious strategy to open up the left side of the board.)

In this sense, intrinsicness is an attribute of particular behaviors on particular occasions.

7. There is also a more complex possibility where the behavior is, in one sense, non-intrinsic and, in another sense, it is intrinsic. Part of the story of the insurance salesman who joined the club and played golf in order to sell insurance is that, eventually, he came to appreciate the game. Thus, we can imagine a given occasion where (a) he plays golf with a view toward selling insurance, but (b) he would be playing golf even if there were no connection to a further end in view. On the basis of (a), the behavior is straightforwardly instrumental and non-intrinsic; on the basis of (b) we would want to say that, in some sense, his behavior was intrinsic (and consider the virtue of a Paradigm Case Formulation for introducing this notion).

8. The definition does not preempt any properly empirical judgments as to whether P is acting intrinsically. Rather, it has the consequence that if an observer, Q, describes P as engaging in a social practice that is intrinsic, and also claims that nevertheless P does so with an ulterior motive or a further end in view, Q has the burden of proof and must establish a *prima facie* case or "probable cause." This rules out transcendental motive "explanations" and leaves us with our normal canons of evidence and justification.

9. An intrinsic social practice is like a tautology in that it needs nothing beyond itself in order to be coherent and intelligible. Particular behaviors and non-intrinsic practices acquire that coherence and intelli-

bility by virtue of occurring as parts of an enacted Version of an intrinsic social practice on a given occasion.

To anticipate the discussion of significance, below, consider the following dialogue.

Wil: What are you doing?

Gil: I'm moving KP-K4.

Wil: Why are you doing that? What are you doing by doing that?

Gil: I'm starting to open up the left side of the board.

Wil: What are you doing by doing that?

Gil: I hope to checkmate his king.

Wil: Why would you want to do that?

Gil: No reason at all. I'm playing chess, and that's how it's done.

Or,

I said I was playing *chess*, didn't I?

When we reach a reference to an intrinsic practice in the course of explaining a behavior, we have a candidate for stopping and saying "That's all. That's what is going on." Conversely, before we reach such a point we know we're missing something essential and so we ask "Why?", "What for?", "What are you doing by doing that?", and so on.

10. Thus, a behaviorally complete description of a behavior is given only by an intrinsic social practice description. This is grounds for saying that an intrinsic social practice is the real unit of behavior. Technically, this aspect of behavior is represented by the Significance parameter (see below). What's he doing by moving KP-K4? He's playing chess, and that's how it's done! If we want to question why this move and not some other move, the answer will ultimately be "He's playing chess, and that's his way of doing it (now)." Likewise, reference to the intrinsic practice he's engaging in is the only plausible candidate for the answer to "What's he really doing?" (He's playing chess.)

11. Perhaps it needs to be said that all behavior (all Intentional Action) *is* instrumental. One could even say that behavior is inherently and essentially instrumental. That follows from the fact that we can always

give an Agency Description of an intentional action, and an Agency Description is a description of intentional action as instrumental. But Intentional Action is not merely instrumental behavior, nor is it ultimately instrumental behavior. Rather, it is ultimately the doing of something that is intrinsic, something that is not instrumental. The relation between the instrumental and intrinsic aspects of behavior is codified in the “multilevel structure of behavior” (doing x by doing y, etc.) referred to above and elaborated below.

D. Culture and Society

A culture is a way of living. Archetypally, it is embodied in a society, i.e., a group of historical individuals who live that way; and, unless otherwise noted, reference to a culture will assume that it is embodied in a society.

How can one culture be the same as another culture or different from it? The following parametric analysis is closely related to A. O. Putman’s (1981) parametric analysis of communities.

Table 6. Parameters of Culture

1. World	4. Statuses
2. Members	5. Language
3. Social Practices	6. Choice principles

A culture defines a special kind of community marked by stand-alone viability and life scope. “Stand-alone viability” points to the fact a culture, archetypally, needs nothing beyond itself in order for it and its members to survive and flourish. “Life scope” points to the fact that, archetypally, a culture encompasses the entire lives of its members. (If intrinsic social practices are the primary units of behavior, cultures are, in a sense, the primary units of human lives.) Both of these features are missing in other sorts of communities. For example, the community of bankers could not survive on its own; it is dependent on the larger community. Similarly, the community of bankers does not encompass any one banker’s entire life; the banker is a member of other communities as well.

World

Every culture involves a set of beliefs, methodologies, ideologies, assumptions, presuppositions, and so on concerning “the whole world.” Included under this general heading are (1) the place of the community in the world and its relations to the parts of the world not included in the community; (2) the past and future history of the world; and (3) the history of the community, including its relations and interactions with other communities. For members of the culture, these are not their beliefs; rather, they are, objectively speaking, *how it is*.

Members

Every community is composed of some number of members. These are individual persons who may or may not also be members of other communities. In general, cultures outlive individuals, so that there is a historical totality of members as well as a totality of members at a given time. The members of a culture are persons who live in accordance with the culture as a result of a history of interacting with other members. The culture is embodied, or implemented, in the lives and actions of its members.

Social Practices

Every culture has a repertoire of behavior patterns which constitute what there is for its members to do. Social practices are ingredients of organized sets, or structures, of social practices. These larger units are designated as “institutions.” Raising a family, educating children, passing laws, farming, engaging in trade, and speaking a language are examples of institutions.

Most institutions are intrinsic in the same sense that some social practices are intrinsic, i.e., they can be understood as being engaged in without an ulterior motive and without a further end in view. In part, this is because they are so central to the way of life that no alternative is readily acceptable. In the Spanish culture, for example, speaking Spanish, taking up a vocation, getting married, and raising a family qualify as intrinsic. The pragmatic mark of the intrinsic is that one doesn't need a reason to do it – rather, one would need a reason, and a good enough reason, not

to do it. Thus, the ultimate answer to why a person does what he does has the form “I’m living the (Spanish) way of life, and this is how it’s done (this is how *I* do it).”

Statuses

Every society has some kind of social structure which involves the differentiation and meshing of activities, standards, and values among different sets of individuals. This structure can be delineated in terms of statuses. (See below on relationship and status.)

Language

Every society has a language that is spoken by its members. A language is most distinctively characterized by its concepts and its locutions.

Choice Principles

A culture is not the Garden of Eden. In general, the availability of social practices, options, partners, and scheduling routinely provides a member with many possible choices, and there is no way to constrain them so that they are all good (right) choices. The major part of social control is generally exercised in the form of constraints (i.e., behaving wrongly or badly is not permitted) rather than in the form of specific prescriptions for what to do. Since behaviors are not specifically prescribed, in light of the significantly varied Options available, some coherent set of principles is needed for choosing behaviors in such a way as to express and preserve the coherence of human lives and the stability of the social structure. Such principles appear to be found in all cultures, and they are here designated as “Choice Principles.”

In the Process Representation, Contingencies limit the actual possibilities beyond what is provided by the mechanical combination of any Stage 1 Option, followed by Stage 2 Option, etc., Similarly, Choice Principles limit the actual possibilities beyond what is provided by the mechanical combination of any Version of any social practice with any person under any circumstances, etc., The difference is that Contingencies are guaranteed limitations (but one can think of a Paradigm Case Formulation here) whereas Choice Principles are, one might say, merely advisory.

By virtue of these considerations, the choice principles that are characteristic of a given culture (or a status within the culture) serve to portray the culture and to distinguish it from others, and at times may serve better than any other analytic device to express the “essence” of a culture or of some of the major statuses in the culture. (Consider, e.g., the statuses of “Gentleman” or “Housewife.”)

Specifying Values

When it comes to specifying the values of these parameters of Culture, we find little difficulty, in principle, until we reach the Choice Principles.

(a) World

A culture’s World may be portrayed discursively, artistically, or systematically. Much of the literature on “cultural perspectives” consists of historical accounts of the experiences of a historical group or else of mythological or other portrayals of their “belief systems.” A systematic portrayal might make use of the reality concepts presented above (Objects, Processes, Events, States of Affairs).

(b) Members

In principle, members can be enumerated or identified by name. Questions about whether a given person is a member of a given culture are often settled by reference to the linguistic and other practices he engages in, the persons with whom he participates, and the persons and groups with whom he has historical continuity.

(c) Statuses, Social Practices

Statuses, Social Practices, and Social Institutions have been the subject of many efforts at delineation, and various methods of representation are available. For systematic portrayal, the Process Representation and Object Representation have been used effectively.

(d) Language

Some difficulties would be encountered in giving precise and technically detailed descriptions of Spanish or any other natural language. However, except for a few relatively specialized purposes, we don’t need

this – we merely need to identify which language it is.

(e) Choice Principles

It appears that there are a number of distinct ways to formulate choice principles.

(1) The most direct way of doing so is with a policy statement because a policy statement is a direct prescription for choosing behaviors (hence, it is explicitly a choice principle). For example, “Always play it safe,” is sufficient for guiding behavioral choices in a wide variety of situations. So is, “Guard your honor,” or “Never do anything you wouldn’t feel right about afterwards.” However, not all choice principles have the form of policies or could readily be put in that form.

(2) Reference to values is also a way of specifying choice principles. To be told that a given person values security, family ties, fame, salvation, peace of mind, courage, and so on, in general gives us some important indications concerning how choices will be made on a given occasion.

Indeed, the study of values is one of the traditional ways of studying cultures. In this tradition, cultures are characterized by their central values. Unfortunately, the historical fact is that such cultural studies were marked by a good deal of stereotyping and by an ambiguously explicit thesis of cultural determinism. (Thus, the cultural determinist would say or imply that it is not only that all Filipinos (with few exceptions) are characterized by the values of immediacy, physical prowess, and religiosity, but also that these values are what make them do what they do, including much that is maladaptive.) However, neither stereotyping nor cultural determinism is inherent in the use of values to characterize cultures.

(3) Slogans and mottoes are ways of identifying choice principles, since, in their relevant form, they are statements of what people live by and not merely what they believe. They show some overlap with policy and value statements. For example, “Never give a sucker an even break,” is a slogan, but it could just as easily be thought of as a policy. “Duty, Honor, Country” is a motto, but it could readily be used as a value state-

ment. On the other hand, “life is suffering” and “might makes right” are not easily interpreted as either policy or value statements but are just as informative with respect to a person’s behavioral choices.

(4) Maxims are often indistinguishable from slogans or mottoes or policy statements. For example, “life is suffering” could readily be taken as a maxim. On the other hand, “If the situation calls for a person to do something he can’t do, he will do something he can do,” is a maxim which cannot readily be taken as a motto, slogan, value statement, or policy statement. Pragmatically, maxims often have the general character of warnings or reminders, and perhaps that is sufficient to distinguish them from other forms of choice principle formulation. The relation of warnings and reminders to behavioral choices is readily apparent.

(5) Reference to strategies carries the connotation of a problem solving context. A strategy is always a strategy for accomplishing something or other. Otherwise, strategies are merely a subclass of policies.

(6) Finally, we may also use scenarios to portray choice principles. In clinical practice, “scenarios” are used in giving individualized formulations of psychopathology. Such explanations have the general form, “The degree of priority this person gives to the enactment of this scenario, in contrast with other forms of interaction, distorts his interpersonal interactions and restricts his behavior potential to such a degree that it qualifies as a case of pathology.” Here, the connection between the scenario and the behavioral choices is obvious.

In a cultural context, the most relevant scenarios correspond to myths or to the lives of historical or literary figures. These latter are often called “culture heroes.” A historical person can pattern his life on the life of such a cultural figure. Indeed, there is some speculation to the effect that a primary cultural function of myths is to provide just such patterns (and there is some current data to suggest that such patterns routinely influence masculine-feminine relations). If we know that a person is living the life of El Cid or Martin Luther King or Juliet or Cassandra, much of that person’s behavioral choice-making thereby is explained, and the dramatic

sense that they make of their lives is significantly revealed.

In connection with the Paradigm Case Formulation and the Parametric Analysis, we noted that the former is the method of choice where it is important to preserve the integrity of a complex particular, and the latter is the method of choice where it is important to lay out all the possibilities systematically. We find a similar contrast here between the scenario and all the other methods of identifying choice principles. The mythological approach preserves the integrity of the complex case, whereas the choice principles given by the other methods can be taken in various combinations.

E. Significance

We have had occasion previously to refer to the multilevel structure of behavior. It is this aspect of behavior that is codified by the Significance parameter. As an opening into this topic, let us return to the “Farmhouse” heuristic.

The Farmhouse

Imagine a farmhouse on a lonely heath in England. Standing nearby is a man. If we were there watching, we could give an observation report of his behavior. If we did that, we would probably say (1) “He’s moving his arm up and down.”

As it happens, his hand is grasping a pump handle. Thus, we have a second description of his behavior, i.e., (2) “He’s moving the pump handle.”

Now, as it happens, the pump is intact and in good operating condition. Thus, we have a third description of his behavior, i.e., (3) “He’s pumping the pump.”

As it happens, there’s water in the well, and it’s connected to the house. This gives us a fourth description of

his behavior, i.e., (4) “He’s pumping water to the house.”

As it happens, there are people in the house and they are drinking the water. This gives us a fifth description of his behavior, i.e., (5) “He’s pumping water to the people in the house.”

Now, it further happens that there’s a deadly poison in the water (and he knows about that, because he put it there). This gives us a sixth description of his behavior, namely, (6) “He’s poisoning the people in the house.”

Finally, as it happens, the people in the house are a group of conspirators with foreign sympathies; they are plotting to overthrow the government, and they have a good chance of succeeding. This gives us a seventh description of his behavior, i.e., (7) “He’s saving the country.”

1. There are several points to note in connection with the example.
 - a. Each of the descriptions is a correct description of “his behavior.” Thus, per the description, he was engaging in seven behaviors simultaneously.
 - b. We stop with “saving the country” because we do not have any serious questions as to why someone would do that, and there is no evidence to suggest an ulterior motive or a further end in view. In contrast, up to that point our behavior descriptions do raise the question, “Why? What’s he doing by doing that?”
 - c. The various behaviors are held together by empirical identities engendered by the circumstances: In these circumstances (though not generally), moving his arm up and down *is* pumping the pump; in these circumstances (but not generally), pumping the pump is pumping water to the house; in these circumstances (but not generally), pumping water to the people is poisoning them; and so on. This is why each additional set of facts (circumstances) generated a new description of what he was doing.

Further, not only do these identities not generally hold, they almost never hold.

d. In general, the new descriptions cannot be inferred from the combination of (a) the previous description(s) and (b) the new set of facts. The most decisive argument in this regard is that we never have any guarantee that we have all of the relevant facts. Just as we could not, from the original description (a) “He’s moving his arm up and down” anticipate the additional facts that led to “He’s operating the pump,” we also cannot anticipate what additional facts there might be which would negate the new description “He’s pumping the pump.” Neither deduction nor induction nor probabilities will generate the redescriptions.

e. The order of the descriptions must be preserved, or nonsense results. For example, he is poisoning the people in the house by pumping the pump; he is not pumping the pump by poisoning the people.

f. As long as the order is preserved, some of the descriptions can be dropped. For example, what he’s doing by moving his arm up and down is [dropping (2) and (3)] pumping water to the house. He’s saving the country by [dropping (6)] pumping water to the people in the house.

g. If we consider (1) - (7) in order as a series, we can make the following two statements.

(a) The relation of later-described behaviors to earlier-described behaviors is one of Significance. Thus, (7) “He’s saving the country” is the significance of (6) “He’s poisoning the people,” and it is the significance of (5) “He’s pumping water to the people,” and it is the significance of (4) and (3) and (2) and (1). Similarly, (6) “He’s poisoning the people” is the significance of (5) “He’s pumping water to the people,” and of (4) and (3) and (2) and (1). Likewise, (2) is the significance of (1).

(b) The relation of earlier-described behaviors to later-described behaviors is that of implementation. Thus, (6) “He’s poisoning the people in the house” is the implementation of (7) “He’s saving the country” and so is (5) and (4) and (3) and (2) and (1). Similarly, (5) “He’s pumping water to the people” is the implementation of (6) “He’s poisoning the people,” and it is the implementation of (7) “He’s saving the country.” Likewise, (4) is the implementation of (6) [and (5) and (7)] and so is (3) and (2) and (1).

h. Intuitively, the minimum number of descriptions would seem to be two.

(1) No human behavior is merely a performance in reaction to some circumstance – that would be a reflex, not a behavior. (Recall the case of my eye blinking versus my blinking eye.) Rather, there will always be an intrinsic social practice level of description which gets at what the person is really up to.

(2) No human behavior is completely context-independent – no human behavior makes the same kind of sense in every possible context. Thus, there will always be a description of behavior which makes sense in the particular context and which is an implementation of what the person is really up to.

(3) As we can see from the “Farmhouse” example, there may be a number of different implementation behaviors, all connected by empirical identities.

2. A related perspective on the requirement of multiple behaviors is provided by raising the question of whether one can simply enact a given behavior *per se*. Could the man by the farmhouse directly save the country *per se* without doing anything else? The answer in this and other cases is “No.” The intrinsically meaningful human behavior is the enactment of a behavior pattern on a given occasion *and in a particular way*; it is not *just* the enactment of the behavior pattern, just as it is not simply the particulars of what was done at a given time and place.

We have here a direct reflection of the logic of process representation: The process, P, occurs on a given occasion by virtue of the occurrence of one of its Versions on that occasion. Since the Version can always be described simply as a process in its own right, we will always have at least two descriptions available, i.e., that Process P occurred (He saved the country) and that one of the versions of P occurred (He poisoned the people in the house).

On the other hand, there will almost inevitably be more descriptions than there are behaviors. For example, the man standing outside the farmhouse might say, “I wasn’t thinking about pumping the water

to the people in the house – I was just trying to poison them” or, “I wasn’t thinking about moving my arm up and down – I was just pumping the pump.” The extraneous descriptions will be correct, but only as systematically incomplete behavior descriptions, not as full behavior descriptions (recall the Deletion operation).

3. What the person is “really doing” is given by the description with the highest level of significance (“He’s saving the country.”). The behaviors given by the other descriptions are there only as implementations, and if the circumstances were different they would be replaced by behaviors which were responsive to those other circumstances.

4. There is a limit to the number of levels of implementation. It could not be the case that everything I do, I do by doing something else as an implementation. That would generate an infinite regress of implementation and I would never actually do anything. This does not imply that there is some N which is the upper limit to the number of implementation levels. Rather, it means that there are some things which I can do directly without going to another implementation level, and that what brings the implementation problem to an end is that I reach an implementation which I can do directly. (Conversely, it also means that I can’t engage in the behavior that I have in mind if I can’t reach a direct implementation.)

5. Direct implementations consist of doing things I know how to do. In a direct implementation, I only have to decide to do it. I don’t have to make any decisions about how to do it. I just do it. Doing it will involve performance aspects having to do with body movements or posture and/or with sounds or speech. What is a direct implementation for one person need not be a direct implementation for another. People know how to do different things, and there is no inherent generality and no inherent uniqueness in this.

Nor is it to be supposed that going from action to implementation makes it easier. Sometimes that makes it impossible. Consider the following heuristic dialogue.

Choosing Your Movements

Wil and Gil are sitting in Wil's office having a conversation.

Wil: What are you going to do when you leave here?

Gil: I'm going to drive down to the Mall and do some shopping.

Wil: My God! How are you ever going to do that? Look at all the things you'd have to do to do that. Why, just to get out of that chair, you'd have to put both hands on the arm of the chair and push off with both legs and your hands. Furthermore, you'd have to push off with just the right force and acceleration, because if you push too hard you fall on your face and if you don't push hard enough you fall back in the chair. Moreover, you'd have to push differently with each arm because you're not sitting exactly straight. And if that weren't bad enough, you'd have to start turning almost immediately because if you didn't you'd hit the corner of the desk, and you'd have to get that turn just right or else you'd find yourself moving backwards because you'd be turned around, and all that means that you have to work each leg differently, and ... and ... and ...!

Gil: My goodness. You know, you're right. If I had to do all that I don't think I'd ever make it. I don't know how to do any of those things, and I don't believe anyone else does, either.

Wil: Well?

Gil: Fortunately, I don't have to do all that. Instead, I'm going to do something I do know how to do, namely, get up out of this chair, walk out the door and down the stairs to my car and drive down to the Mall. And you know something, if I do that right, then all of the things you described, I will have done all of them right, too.

In human behavior, carrying the implementation analysis even one step too far creates a worse than ever implementation problem all over again. In the example of "Choosing Your Movements" it makes a solution impossible.

This kind of problem is, so far, essentially nonexistent in technical

contexts. No matter what the desired achievement is, I can do a task analysis and arrive at a set of tasks, such that if I can accomplish those tasks I can accomplish the desired achievement. For example, if I want to build a machine that will compress a load of hay into a rectangular solid, I do a task analysis, emerge with a structured set of tasks, and construct a machine whose operations implement those tasks. (And I can do another task analysis where the desired achievement is the construction of that machine.) Here I may, indeed, be dealing with forces and accelerations and motions, etc., – in short, just the nitty gritty level of detail that Gil found impossible to handle. Similar considerations apply in programming a computer to accomplish a result that is meaningful to us.

The difference here between Gil and a hay baler or between Gil and a computer is, first, that there is a difference in what constitutes a direct implementation and, second, for the machines we know exactly what those direct implementations are, since we built them. What the hay baler or the computer can do directly is quite different from, and in some cases much more limited and specific than, what Gil can do directly. Consequently, there is the general possibility that what Gil can do directly, a mechanical or electronic contrivance can do through multilevel implementation. There is also the general possibility that they do some things better than Gil or that they accomplish things that Gil can't. Thus, a detailed task analysis like Wil's might be to the point for a human-like robot. But then again, it might not.

Direct implementation (or "basic action" if we want to refer to it independently of an implementation context) is a case of "You just do it! You don't do it by doing something else." However, it is not the only case. There are other, very different cases from which direct implementation is to be distinguished. Consider the following example.

Forgiveness

Gil: You really should forgive your mother-in-law; she meant well.

Wil: It's very difficult. How do I do that?

Gil: There is no question of "How?" There is no *way* to do it. You just do it – you don't do it by doing something else.

Wil: I've told myself I should, but I haven't been able to. I don't know how to do that.

Gil: It's not a matter of knowing how. We're not talking about the exercise of some arcane skill here. It's not a matter of skill at all. Mainly, it's a question of do you have it in you to forgive her.

Wil: I guess I don't.

Gil: You don't know that for sure. Try thinking of her as a mother who was concerned for her daughter and not as a meddler who broke up your marriage.

Wil: Is that how I do it?

Gil: No – but it might help.

Forgiving one's mother-in-law, as well as seeing the answer to a problem, remembering a long forgotten fact, appreciating Wil's perspective, etc., are all things we speak of a person "doing," but they are not forms of behavior and there is no corresponding know how at all. There isn't, in any of such cases, a way to do it, because the phenomenon is a change in the person (an event: the acquisition of a new person characteristic or the acquisition of a new position vis-à-vis the world or some part of it), not a behavior that is enacted. The most we can do here is to set up conditions in which the change is more likely to occur ("Think of her as a mother who was concerned...").

6. It is instructive to contrast the position of the actor with that of the observer in regard to significance/implementation. As an actor, significance is not a problem and it seldom enters the picture at all. I know what I am doing. I know what I want to do. The questions for me are implementation questions: how can I do what I want in these circumstances? Can I do it at all? (This helps us understand why the instrumental aspect of behavior is so salient.) I produce my behavior "top down," starting with the intrinsically meaningful and ending with a direct implementation involving a bodily or verbal performance.

In contrast, when I observe her behavior, I most often begin at the level of an observation report. (Recall "He's moving his arm up and down.") This will generally be at a fairly low level of significance and so

I will often have a real problem pursuing the tack of “What is she doing by doing that?”, and I may not succeed. The most significant description, “What she’s really doing,” is essentially always invisible to camera-type ‘objective’ observation either because (1) it implicates actions or events that occurred at some other time and place and are therefore not observable when I am observing the behavior in question and/or (2) it involves norms and other such considerations which are not per se visible (recall “Dinner at 8:30”) and/or (3) because enacting the behavior does not involve a distinctive performance, but only a distinctive choice within another behavior pattern (recall “Dinner at 8:30”).

As a participant, e.g., in a conversation or other joint activity, I am in the position of both actor and observer. As an observer/responder I usually don’t have time to pursue issues of “What is she doing by doing that?” Because of that, typically I am set to respond directly to higher levels of significance rather than working my way up to them from “observation report” descriptions. The major alternative is to treat the situation as one in which we merely participate (as generic social individuals) in the social practice(s) we are overtly engaged in. (It gets done in one of the ways it can get done, but that’s all – there’s nothing personal about it and it has no further significance.)

7. We noted above that the public and communicable character of locutions plays an essential part in securing the public and communicable character of concepts. In a similar vein, we may say that the public and objective character of the Performance and Achievement aspects of behavior plays an essential part in securing the public and objective character of behavior generally. (And note that verbal behavior is just a special case, not a separate sort of phenomenon, since the locution is part of the Performance and Achievement aspects of verbal behavior.)

As a result we run a gamut of relationships between behavior and Performance. At one extreme we have cases where the Performance is merely a matter of convention. At the other extreme we have cases where the reality constraints posed by the material conditions of the behavior leave little choice in regard to the Performance. For example, tic-tac-toe

can be played just as well with wedges and roses as it can with naughts and crosses; nodding to indicate assent could just as well have been shaking one's head. On the other hand, if I want to open this locked door, I have to do it in a very particular way. Either I kick it in or I use a key, and in the latter case the key I can use is highly restricted, and I have to turn it after I push it in.

In general, intrinsic social practices are determined by their internal logical structure rather than by external reality constraints, whereas low-level implementations are more likely to be subject to decisive situational reality constraints. This is another view of the multilevel structure of behavior. Consider the following heuristic exercise.

The Picture of Winston Churchill

Suppose I show you a glossy 8 x 10 photograph and ask, "Who is this a photograph of?" You take one look, smile, and say, "Winston Churchill, of course."

Then I give you a hard look and say, "Now, wait a while! How do you know it's a picture of Winston Churchill and not of someone else who looks just like this?" You think that over for a while and reflect on the fact that who it's a picture of depends on who it was that the camera was pointing at and the fact that there could be someone else who looked that much like Winston Churchill. And you shrug your shoulders and say, "All right, there's a chance it isn't a picture of Winston, but of someone else who looks just like him."

Then I hand you a pencil and a piece of paper and say, "How about drawing me a picture of Winston Churchill?" You look thoughtful for a moment, then pick up the pencil and begin. After about five minutes you lay the pencil down and announce, "OK. There's a picture of Winston Churchill."

Now I give you another hard look and say, "Now, wait a min-

ute. How do you know that that's a picture of Winston Churchill and not of someone else who looks just like what you've drawn?" You think that one over for a minute and then shake your head and say, "No. No question about it. That's for sure a picture of Winston Churchill." After some discussion you hit upon a succinct and decisive explanation. You say, "A picture of Winston Churchill is what I produced it as, and that *makes* it a picture of Winston Churchill. As to who does or doesn't look like what I've drawn, that only goes to how good a likeness of Winston it is, not who it's a picture of."

Then I say, "Close your eyes and conjure up a mental image of Winston Churchill." You close your eyes and after a while you announce, "I've got it. An image of Winston Churchill."

Again, I give you a hard look and say, "Wait a minute. How do you know it's an image of Winston Churchill and not of someone who looks just like your image?" You think that over for a bit and then announce with confidence, "No, this is like the drawing and not like the photograph. An image of Winston Churchill is what I produced it as, and that *makes* it an image of Winston."

What holds for drawings and images holds for thoughts, feelings and behaviors. Authorship counts. Whatever I produce my Deliberate Action as, that's what it really is. (In the corresponding linguistic case we would say, "That's what has psychological reality for the speaker." The alternative is that it has no psychological reality but is merely an observer's construction.)

Consider, for example, a case where at a social gathering I see an acquaintance and I walk over, tap him on the shoulder, and make a comment that has some plausibility as an insult and also as a friendly joke. If a friendly joke is what I produced the comment as, then my Deliberate Action was that of making a friendly joke. On the other hand, if an insult is what I produced it as, then insulting him is what my behavior was. Either way, it could be misunderstood. Such misunderstandings are not

ultra common, but they are common enough to drive us to observation reports as the 'objective' descriptions of behavior.

On the other hand, there is an end to plausibility also. There are reality constraints. Consider the following dialogue.

The Twenty Dollar Bill

Wil: (Handing Gil a one-dollar bill.) Gil, would you give me change for this \$20?

Gil: (Giving Wil a hard look.) What do you mean, change for this \$20? This is a one-dollar bill.

Wil: Oh, I'm using it as a \$20.

Gil: (With another hard look.) Sorry.

With dollar bills, as with words and other public matters, it is not simply up to me (and notice that there is no primary authorship here). It's not a matter of what I'm using it as but rather, what it is used as (what we use it as). The reality constraint is that my behavior is B because that's what I produced it as only if my implementation is one of the ways that B can be done. If I want to use a word in a new way, there is a way that that is done (announce it and give a definition). I know of no comparable device for using currency as having other than its face value. (Perhaps common consent would do the job.)

8. Symbolic Behavior

It is a *tour de force* to be able to address familiar phenomena with the wide-eyed innocence of a child or the invincible ignorance of a Martian. Fundamental aspects of the phenomenon may become visible thereby.

Or so we are told. What is probably much more common is that nonsense results. The literature on "symbolism" or "symbolic behavior" offers a primary case study.

"Symbolic behavior," like "higher mental processes," "thinking," and "problem solving," is a nominal characterization of an area of psycho-

logical investigation. In general, any behavior which is describable as a response to anything not then and there present or as a response involving reference to anything not then and there present is describable as symbolic behavior. (Presumably, whatever is not then and there present but nevertheless plays a part in the behavior must be represented by an external or internal “symbol” which is then and there present in order to play such a part.) Thus, the term would cover such diverse phenomena as a rat running an alternation problem, a chimpanzee showing a reinforcement effect under token reward, a housewife crying out, “But you forgot the onions,” a clinic patient reporting a dream of climbing a mountain, and a psychological investigator studying the physiological mechanisms underlying symbolic behavior. To be sure, “thinking” or any of the other nominal characterizations mentioned above could be applied to each of these examples also. (This alone should make us suspicious of the psychological reality of the “phenomenon.”)

In order to do justice to the diversity of instances of “symbolic behavior,” we shall examine several logical cases. As we shall see, there is, nevertheless, a unitary conceptual formulation.

Case I - Human Behavior as Essentially Symbolic

From a common sense standpoint, human behavior is whatever, in particular, it is. Thus, we drive to the supermarket and buy food, we engage in trade, attend schools, go skiing, hold down jobs, raise families, watch TV, and, in general, participate in the social practices and institutions of the culture. Since we do what there is to do, there is nothing inherently problematic about human behavior or about the fact that human behavior is different from phenomena that are other than human behavior.

In academic circles there is general agreement, at least among non-psychologists, that the essential difference between human behavior and other phenomena is that human behavior is essentially “symbolic.” Classically, this difference was expressed by reference to the “mind” or “soul” of the individuals who engage in symbolic behavior, and it has been related

in an essential way to language, consciousness and self-awareness.

In such contexts, “symbolic behavior” still has reference to the fact that human behavior typically is at least in part a reaction to, or involves some references to something not then and there present. In addition, however, “symbolic behavior” has a mystique and a mystery about it.

One way of formulating the mystery of symbolic behavior has been to ask, “How can the movements which constitute human behavior have the significance that they do when other movements in nature do not?” Or, conversely, “Other movements in nature occur in the presence of particular circumstances, whereas human behavior necessitates the transformation [sic] of circumstances into a meaningful situation. How is that possible?”

Such questions sound for all the world like “My God! How are you ever going to get out of that chair?” They also invite a Wittgensteinian reply: “Yes. If behavior is to be a kind of movement, it’s going to have to be a very peculiar kind of movement.”

From a methodological standpoint we can say the following. “Movement” as used above is a naturalistic notion (“Other movements in nature ...”). Naturalism is defined by the elimination and prohibition of the concept of anything distinctively human (e.g., mind, spirit, intention, knowledge, cognition). Thus, if we take something essentially human, like human behavior, and map it onto a naturalistic vocabulary and conceptual framework (“movement,” “cause,” etc.), it appears that in general there are only two possible outcomes. The first is that we lose the human phenomenon entirely because a naturalistic set of concepts will only allow us to see non-human phenomena. The second is that when we measure the human phenomenon by the standards of the non-human, the human takes on the quality of a magical, impossible phenomenon (like “symbolic behavior,” like getting up out of the chair, like “symbolic objects.”)

In general, ‘non-natural’ phenomena are problematic in principle only if we take a naturalistic framework for granted. In contrast, ‘natural’ phenomena are no more problematic (and no less) in a human framework

than they are in a naturalistic framework.

From a substantive standpoint we can say the following.

(a) Movements do not constitute behavior, so there is no such question to be asked as “How can the movements which constitute human behavior have the significance that they do...?” Neither is there such a question to be answered. (In introducing the concept of Intentional Action above, we also had reference to a practical test to establish that, indeed, each of the eight parameters was essential to the phenomenon of behavior. Such a test has always been available to anyone seriously interested in the phenomena, and it would quickly show that there is more to behavior than movement.)

(b) The relevant, and non-magical, contrast is between the Performance parameter of Intentional Action and Intentional Action itself. The significance of the performance is that it is the performance of that Intentional Action. Since we begin with the Intentional Action and the Performance emerges as the product of analysis, there is not a question of “How is it possible for this performance to have that significance?” (We might as well ask, “How is it possible for ‘how it was done’ to have the significance of being the way that something was done?”)

(c) An Intentional Action is a case of a person treating something as a case of Q, where Q is the state of affairs concept (or a specific component of it) which is the value of the Know parameter for that behavior. The Intentional Action cannot in principle be something that happens whenever Q since Q might be the case without the person knowing about it, and then that Intentional Action could not be what occurred. Since states of affairs may well include relationships among objects, processes, and events which are found at different times and different places, and since states of affairs do not occur (they are the case, or, they “obtain”) Intentional Action could not be the simple consequence of immediately preceding here-now stimuli.

In treating a situation as a case of Q, I am not, somehow, “trans-

forming circumstances into a meaningful situation.” (Rather, in taking a naturalistic approach, I am, obviously, transforming circumstances into a meaningless situation.) *Pace* Gil in the dialogue above, “If I had to do it that way, it would never get done. I don’t know how to do that, and I don’t believe anyone else does, either. Fortunately, I’m not going to do that. Instead, I’m going to do something I do know how to do, which is to act in a way that makes sense in the circumstances I’m aware of.”

(d) From a diagnostic standpoint, we may say the following.

We noted above that human behavior is a multilevel phenomenon with a minimum of two levels, i.e., the actual behavior and at least one (usually more than one) implementation level behaviors. These two levels are present in Intentional Action (and Deliberate Action) *per se*. The actual behavior is the Deliberate Action and the implementation is the Performance aspect of it. Both can be categorized as “what the person did.”

If we take a top down approach to the phenomenon, nothing could be more mundane. If I want to insult my friend at the party, of course I can’t just do that *per se*, but rather I have to do it in a particular way (in process terms, I have to create a Version of the Process).

It is when we take a bottom up approach that difficulties can arise. If we also take an atomistic, reductionistic approach to behavior (this is the rule, not the exception in academia) we will take it that the Performance is all there is and that it is what behavior really is. Since the significance is not visible in the way that the Performance is visible (though usually it is more easily recognized), suddenly the significance, i.e., the behavior as such, becomes murky and mysterious and we see it only through a glass, darkly. In effect, we have here a special case of the practical test, described above, for establishing that behavior as we understand it has the eight parameters, I, W, K, KH, P, A, PC, S. For to suppose that behavior is really P is to deny that the other seven are parameters of behavior. The effect of eliminating any parameter is to make behavior entirely mysterious. The effect of eliminating seven out of eight is to lose the notion of behavior entirely.

The present formulation of behavior as intentional action takes account, in a mundane way, of the basic features of human behavior, which can be so readily transformed into mystery and magic by placing behavior in a conceptual context within which it is impossible.

Case II - Conventional Gesture, Burlesque, Ritual, Affirmation, etc.

This range of symbolic behavior is perhaps best introduced by examples. Baptizing, saluting, breaking bread together, thumbing one's nose, and voting the straight Liberal ticket provide a reasonably representative set. A person, P, performs the baptismal rite by sprinkling holy water on the recipient; P expresses respect and recognition by saluting; P expresses defiance by thumbing P's nose; P expresses solidarity with Q by breaking bread together with Q; P affirms Liberal values by voting the straight Party ticket. And so on.

In examining such cases we find that they are clear-cut cases of the significance/implementation relationships. The contrast with Case I is simply that in the former case the implementation was a performance whereas in Case II the implementation is a behavior (which itself has a performance aspect).

Further, we can add verbal behavior to our list of Case II examples. We noted earlier that the conceptual-methodological anchor for understanding behavior is the existence of intrinsic social practices, i.e., those which are intelligible as being engaged in without an ulterior motive and without a further end in view, and, derivatively, deliberate actions which have this feature. Other actions are fully intelligible only as ways of engaging in intrinsic social practices or as efforts to do so. The characterization of a behavior as verbal behavior, we have noted, is a necessarily incomplete characterization since it tells us about only two of the parameters of the behavior. There must, therefore, be a further description of the behavior as a deliberate action and ultimately a description of the behavior as a way of engaging in an intrinsic social practice. These are what the person is doing by engaging in the verbal behavior.

We may note in passing that the contrast between a more concrete description and a more significant description is the basis for certain kinds of parody or burlesque. For a person who is to a normal degree sensitive to differences in significance, nothing could be easier than to burlesque a given behavior or social practice by describing it at a reduced level of significance. For example, playing golf can be burlesqued as “tramping around on grass and knocking little white balls into holes in the ground and then doing it all over again.” References to “pencil pushers,” “desk jockeys,” and “paper shufflers” are of the same genre.

To turn the screw another notch, to describe behavior at the level of an observation report will generally be to offer a similar burlesque if we take it, as psychologists mostly do, that that is, purely and simply, *the* behavior. (Recall the Farmhouse heuristic. Could we understand the behavior simply as “moving his arm up and down”?)

It appears that examples of Case II symbolic behavior are problematic only when (a) there is an essential conventional or traditional component and (b) we take a reductionistic view of things. For example, in the Farmhouse heuristic, saving the country by pumping the pump offers no difficulty because we can more or less follow the action in ordinary causal terms. We cannot do this in the case of breaking bread together, baptizing an infant, thumbing one’s nose, and so on. If causality is our only conceptual model here, then these cases will seem either mysterious or nonsensical. But conventions are no less real than pumps and persons, and if they had no efficacy there wouldn’t be any conventions.

Wil: Sticks and stones will break my bones but names will never hurt me!

Gil: Who steals my purse steals trash, but he who robs me of my good name enriches himself not and leaves me very poor indeed!

The fact that thumbing my nose is a conventional gesture of defiance doesn’t make it mysterious. (“This is how it’s done.” “This is one of the ways that one does that.”)

Case III - Symbolic Behavior as Substitution

The major difference between Case II and Case III is that in the latter instance a “substitution” formulation is plausible. Some examples include executing bearers of ill tidings, the Old World decor of a restaurant, washing one’s hands repeatedly after some transgression, and, of course, the case of the worker who is angry at his employer after a reprimand and comes home and kicks his dog.

The following is a “substitution” formulation for behavior.

- a. A person, P, is strongly motivated to enact a given behavior, B1. Enacting B1 is not open to P (for any of a variety of prudential, ethical, or other reasons or for lack of ability or opportunity).
- b. There is a behavior, B2, which is similar to B1 to a significant degree in some relevant way.
- c. Enacting B2 is open to P.
- d. Because of the resemblance of B2 to B1, P is motivated to enact B2.
- e. Because of this motivation, P enacts B2.

Under these conditions it would not be uncommon for an observer to say, “P enacts B2 because he can’t enact B1. B2 is a substitute for B1.”

There is more, here, however. It is only when the enactment of B2 is not P’s usual enactment that we are inclined to call it a substitute. Most commonly, this amounts to “When P did it on that occasion it was unrealistic; it didn’t just fit the circumstances.” Its being a non-standard occurrence is our primary, almost exclusive, evidence (1) that its enactment needs an explanation beyond P’s ordinary reasons for enacting B2 and (2) that the explanation is that B2 is a substitute for some B1.

However, a second look, if we needed one, will be enough to reveal that “substitution” does not provide an explanation here.

Consider the classic example of the worker who gets a severe reprimand from his employer over the quality of his work and becomes angry, but says nothing; however, when he later comes home he inexplicably kicks

his dog. If we stipulate that he doesn't usually kick his dog and that the dog did nothing unusual on the evening in question, and that he kicked the dog because he was angry at his employer, this fits a "substitution" formulation.

What is left unanswered is why he kicks the dog. Kicking the dog is not only unrealistic in the circumstances; it would also be unrealistic in the circumstances for B1.

What is B1 in this case? What did the worker really want to do when he was receiving the reprimand? Presumably it was some version of openly refuting the employer's charges or getting back at the employer for putting him down. (Had he agreed with the employer about the quality of his work there would have been no grounds for anger. Rather there would have been grounds for, e.g., shame or regret at being found out.) Certainly, it seems highly unlikely that B1 was, specifically, kicking the employer. Thus, kicking the dog apparently did not accomplish anything that B1 would have accomplished – it is unrealistic in that sense. (This would be even more clear if in the example he honked at other drivers on the way home, which is as plausible as kicking his dog. Supposing that he really wanted to honk at his employer would be absurd.) Why, then, would the similarity between kicking the dog and openly refuting the employer or getting back at the employer lead to the worker kicking the dog? In what sense would B2, kicking the dog, qualify as a substitute for B1, openly refuting the employer or getting back at him? Or, in what sense would the dog qualify as a substitute for the employer?

No answers to such questions seem to be forthcoming from a "substitution" formulation. Yet without such answers we do not have an explanation of why the worker kicked his dog.

If we give up hope for an explanation, one of the things we can do is to say that, precisely because B2 is unrealistic and irrational in the context of B1, it is not in fact a real substitute for B1 – it is only a *symbolic* substitute. Then we can introduce a 'mental mechanism' whose function is to accomplish the substitution. For folk who are uncomfortable with homunculus explanations, this will no doubt have the appearance of a

merely symbolic substitute for an explanation.

Let us return to the topic with no preconceptions about substitution, and let us begin with a heuristic example.

A Fine Piece of Machinery

Gil: Would you buy a Mercedes 400 if you could get one for a price you could afford?

Wil: Absolutely! It's a fine piece of machinery!

Gil: If you couldn't get a Mercedes, how about a Porsche 911?

Wil: Sure!

Gil: How about a Taurus SHO?

Wil: Yes.

Gil: How about a Cadillac STS?

Wil: Mmm. Maybe. Could well be.

Gil: How about a Trabant?

Wil: No way in hell!

Gil: How about a Cadillac Fleetwood?

Wil: Mmm. Actually, no. Not really.

What this example illustrates is that when we value something, that is not just because it is what it is (a mundane version of *dinge an sich*). Rather, we value it for some attribute or aspect ("It's a fine piece of machinery!").

More generally, we value it for the benefit that it contributes or would contribute to our lives. (Some folk would say, for what we get or would get out of it, but that is too vulgarly instrumental in spirit.) In the example, the joy of driving a fine piece of machinery, or perhaps the satisfaction of owning and driving a fine piece of machinery come to mind as *prima facie* specifications of what that benefit might be. (Although the example specifically mentions buying the automobiles, owning and driving them is clearly the issue.)

If I value a behavior, B1, for the benefit, Q, that it provides or would provide, it follows that I value Q. From that it follows, that I will value any behavior, be it B1 or some other behavior, B2, which provides or

would provide that benefit, and, other things being equal (this to be understood throughout this discussion), I will value either B1 or B2 to the extent that it provides or would provide Q.

This value analysis is quite general and not restricted to behaviors. It will hold for objects, processes, events, and states of affairs of any kind.

The primary way that I value a possible behavior of mine is to be motivated to enact it. If enacting a possible behavior had no value for me I would have no motivation to enact it; I would have no reason to select it as the behavior to enact.

Accordingly, we can give the value analysis in motivational form: If I am motivated to enact a given behavior, B1, for the benefit, Q, that it would provide, I will, other things being equal, also be motivated to engage in any other behavior, B2, which would provide Q, and I will be motivated to enact B2 to the extent that it would provide Q. (Compare Wil's "Sure!" for the Porsche with his "Mmm. Maybe. Could well be." for the STS.)

If we take B1 as the standard in regard to providing Q (e.g., if there is a tautological relationship between the two), it follows that I will be motivated to enact B2 to the extent that it resembles B1 in the relevant respect, i.e., providing Q.

If, in addition, the motivation for B1 is situationally grounded, so that the occurrence of B1 would remove or substantially reduce the motivation to achieve Q, the non-occurrence of B1 will be a prerequisite for the occurrence of B2.

If the motivation to enact B1 is sufficiently strong, the corresponding motivation to enact B2 may be strong enough so that B2 actually occurs. Moreover, because of this additional motivation, B2 may occur in spite of good and normally decisive reasons against it (e.g., it may overcome my normal reluctance to kick my loyal, friendly dog over a minor transgression). Indeed, with sufficiently strong or preemptive motivation for B1, the motivation for B2 may be more or less preemptive, not merely strong.

Note, however, that under these conditions, B2 will not in general be either unrealistic or irrational (those possibilities will be a small subclass under the preemptive possibility; see below on emotions and on pathology). Rather, B2 occurs for reasons that are comprehensible and sufficiently weighty. At most, the behavior is unreasonable relative to social norms which do not take account of the benefit, Q, or of the circumstances resulting in the motivation for B1.

If I don't take account of those circumstances and of that benefit when I kick my dog, do away with the bearer of ill tidings, or wash my hands, I, too, am likely to take it that I am behaving irrationally. I will have plenty of encouragement in this from academic and popular psychology folk who tend strongly to equate social reasonableness or blind prudential calculation with rationality and to equate passion with irrationality.

Turning now to the notion of substitute objects, we may note that the heuristic example can be understood equally as a case of substitute behavior or as a case of a substitute object. When a valued behavior, B1, requires an object, Obj1, having certain characteristics (e.g., being a fine piece of machinery), any object with relevantly similar characteristics is potentially Obj2, where Obj2 meets the following conditions.

- (a) There is a behavior, B2 which qualifies as treating Obj2 as having these characteristics.
- (b) B2 is a substitute for B1 or, (special case)
- (c) B2 is the same as B1 except that it involves Obj2 rather than Obj1.

Under these conditions, if B2 occurs, Obj2 may be said to be a substitute for Obj1. The Porsche, etc., in the heuristic example would qualify, as would the restaurant with the Old World decor.

In general, Obj2 can be considered as a substitute for Obj1 when, in addition to the conditions for behavioral substitution,

- (a) Treating something as Obj2 resembles treating something as Obj1 in relevant respects or

- (b) Having Obj2 resembles having Obj1 in relevant respects or
- (c) Reacting to Obj2 resembles reacting to Obj1 in relevant respects
(this is a special case of (a)).

In short, the possibility of one object being a 'symbolic substitute' for another is a derivative of the possibility of one behavior being a 'symbolic substitute' for another.

Is buying and driving the Porsche, etc., a substitute for buying and driving the Mercedes? In terms of the interaction between Wil and Gil, we'd probably say, "Yes" ("If you couldn't get a Mercedes 400, would you...?"). However, note that if, per the example, B2 did occur (i.e., if Wil bought the Porsche, or ...) that would not be because it was a substitute for the Mercedes, but rather, because Q (the satisfaction of driving a fine piece of machinery) was valued sufficiently highly and B2 provided Q to a sufficient degree and B2 was an open option.

These conditions explain the occurrence of B2 and they are also what makes B2 a real substitute for B1. Unless Wil enacted B2 *as* a substitute for B1 its being a substitute would be irrelevant, since B2 would occur whether it was a substitute or not. (And its being a substitute would lack psychological reality.)

If we are too liberal with the notion of substitution we will make the term useless, since roughly 98% of everyone's behavior would be a case of substitution. Hardly any behavior is ideal behavior in ideal circumstances, and yet if such behaviors were available we would probably choose them in preference to our current realistic and realistically satisfying ones. Does that make our actual behaviors merely symbolic substitutes? Affirming that may make good polemics but it does not reflect a good understanding of behavior.

What is missing in the classic 'symbolic substitute' accounts is an appreciation of the multilevel structure of behavior and, accordingly, an appreciation of the benefit, Q, and the behavior, B3, which consists of achieving Q. That represents a fundamental lack of understanding.

Once we see that the crucial similarity between B1 and the ‘substitute’ behavior, B2, is that both are possible implementations of B3, my coming home and kicking my dog is no more mysterious than my buying a Taurus SHO for a price I am willing to pay, and it will be irrational only to the extent that I really have sufficient reason not to do it. The class of such behaviors is significantly smaller than the psychodynamic literature would have us believe.

Case Summary: A Paradigm Case Formulation

The present formulation should be considered as the first steps in a Paradigm Case Formulation, with Case I serving as the Paradigm Case and Cases II and III as Transformations. There are additional, less central cases that would bear explicit formulation in an exhaustive treatment of “symbolism.” And, of course, there is the negative side. I have talked in terms of the benefit Q that a valued behavior, B1, provides or would provide. Clearly there is a mirror image set of considerations where a negative value rather than a positive value is involved.

Still, it seems clear that traditional way of speaking about “symbolic” relations between behaviors, objects, etc., is a limited and often misleading way of tapping into the significance/implementation relationship and the multilevel structure of behavior.

9. Understanding Actual Behavior

Mastering the rules of chess only gets you into the game. It does not make you an effective player. For that there are additional kinds of mastery that are needed. Likewise, having learned to be human only gets you into that game. It doesn't make you a successful human.

To act effectively and live an authentic life in the real world as a person among persons you need to be generally successful at (a) identifying another person's behavior on the basis of observation, (b) understanding the significance of that behavior, i.e., understanding the behavior in the real world context, and (c) understanding what behavior on the other person's part might be anticipated.

As it happens, such matters are not always clear, and when we miss something important, that is not always clear, either.

In this connection, much of the problem can be formulated in terms of significance and its converse, implementation. As we have noted earlier, the person who is acting doesn't, in general, have a problem with significance, because he begins with that. His problems lie mainly in creating implementations. In contrast, the observer of his behavior will begin with his implementations, since those are most readily observable, and then encounter the issues around "What is he doing by doing that?" These considerations are captured heuristically in the image of "Dinner at 8:30."

(Several recent empirical studies have shown that there are very substantial differences among people in their sensitivity and judgment in regard to significance and that a variety of important consequences follows from this difference.)

Parallel to the significance issues, and related to them, is the problem of person characteristics. What kind of person is it who does this here and here and now?

And there are questions of “Why here?”, “Why now?”, “Why me?”, “Why not me?”, and others.

We need to understand actual particular people and actual particular behavior in their historical, real world context. And yet, this need could be addressed only by means of some general schema or methodology which we apply (since we can’t count on some friendly spirit whispering the right answers in our ears on particular occasions).

What we find in fact is two distinct schemas which are models of behavior that guide our judgment on particular occasions. (They also serve as models for psychological theories.) These are designated as the Person Characteristics/Circumstances model (PC-C model) and the Relationship/Status model. In addition, we find a familiar common sense schema which overlaps them both. This schema deals with acting on the basis of reasons. A central portion of this schema is codified in the Judgment Diagram shown below in Figure 5. Finally, we also find a distinctive logical schema, the Actor-Observer-Critic (AOC) schema for understanding self regulation and for coping with failure, inaccuracy, and uncertainty.

A. Person Characteristics and Circumstances: Accounting for Variation

It has always been perfectly clear to just about everyone that human behavior is a function of the person and the circumstances. The logic of variation is inexorable:

- (1) In the same circumstances, different people engage in different behaviors. Therefore, circumstances alone will not explain why people do what they do; some reference to persons is necessary.
- (2) In different circumstances the same person will engage in different behaviors. Therefore, reference to the person alone will not explain behavior; some reference to circumstances is needed.

This line of thought is practical, not philosophical, and it has not been particularly vulnerable to doubt about, e.g., whether any two circumstances are *really* the same or whether any two historically distinct behaviors are *really* the same. And if the notion of “circumstances” is taken to include life histories, or “learning histories,” etc., that will be all the same.

One way of looking at all this is that we can divide the world into three parts, i.e., the behavior, the person, and the rest of the world, which we designate as “the circumstances.” Since the three are jointly exhaustive, under this procedure there is nothing left beyond person and circumstances to which we *could* appeal for an understanding of the behavior. Therefore these two must be sufficient.

Not surprisingly, all but a few of the multitude of psychological theories of behavior are elaborations of the pre-theoretical, common sense notion that behavior is a function of person and circumstances. This notion, which we designate as the PC-C (Person Characteristics and Circumstances) model of behavior is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. PC-C Model




Figure 4 shows behavior, circumstances, and person characteristics simply as three connected items because what is primarily involved is a set of conceptual relationships. What is involved is not merely PC + C

→ B. Rather, the three concepts are related in such a way that over a wide range of instances it is very nearly the case that if we know any two of the three we can tell what the third is.

Consider a particular example where PC = generous, C = Person has money; Person is approached by a beggar, and B = Person gives money to beggar. And consider the following pairwise analysis.

Q1: If a person is a generous person and if he has money in his pocket and is approached by a beggar, what would you expect him to do?

A1: Give the beggar some money.

Q2: If a person has money in his pocket and is approached by a beggar, and if he then gives the beggar some money, what kind of person would you expect him to be?

A2: A generous person.

Q3: If a person is a generous person and if he gave money to a beggar, under what circumstances would you expect him to do that?

A3: If he had the money and the beggar made his need known.

Note that there are no stainless steel connections here. The relationships will not support any deduction. In fact, of course, neither A1, A2, nor A3 is guaranteed to be correct. However, as in the case of “Dinner at 8:30,” such answers may be more or less obvious and more or less compelling. The burden of proof will, as usual, be on the person who would deny the obvious.

Much of our understanding of persons and human behavior is codified in Figure 4 and the associated Question-Answer pairs. In everyday contexts we use the model with everyday concepts, as we did above. In theoretical contexts, the PC or the behavior or the circumstances (or all three) will be given in theoretical terms, but Q1 will still get you A1, and Q2 will still get you A2, and so on. In technical contexts we may create special circumstances and require special kinds of behavior (and we may

impose the requirements of measurement theory as much as we can), but it will still be a case of “What kind of person would it take to do this in these circumstances?”

Two elaborations are appropriate here. The first deals with the contributions of PC's and Circumstances in Q1-A1. The second deals with Q2-A2 as the logic of observational assessment of personality in everyday life and in clinical practice.

1. PC's vs. Circumstances?

The schema shown in Figure 4 is quite sparse and thus leaves room for different kinds of further articulation. For example, we may ask “What is the nature of the contribution of Person Characteristics and Circumstances to behavior and to our understanding of it?” Here, we find that almost without exception, psychologists who have endorsed the PC-C model have taken the contributions to be of the same kind except that one is “outer” and the other is “inner.” For example, we have inner causes of behavior and outer causes. Or we have inner forces pushing toward certain behaviors and we have outer forces.

If PC's and circumstances make the same kind of contributions to behavior, then they are in principle direct competitors for the determination of behavior. This is a salient feature. For example, it leads some psychologists to reject PC's entirely on the grounds that since we have access to objective, outer forces governing behavior, we have no need for a competing set of inaccessible, subjective forces governing behavior. Conversely, there was a decade-long ‘controversy’ in the psychological literature over whether personality variables or situational variables play a greater part in determining behavior. The issue was sometimes couched in terms of whether personality variables play *any* significant part in determining behavior. At present there appears to be little interest in perpetuating the ‘issue’.

From the outset, however, there is something perverse and facile about the notion that PC's and circumstances are the same kind of thing and operate in the same way except that one is “inner” and the other is “outer.”

Consider the following thought experiment.

The Chalk

Imagine that I place an ordinary piece of blackboard chalk on the table. I tap the chalk with my finger. The chalk rolls a ways on the surface of the table.

In attempting to understand the behavior of the chalk, no doubt the first question you would ask is “Why did the chalk roll?” To this the answer would be “Because I tapped it.”

That would not be enough. The next question you would want to ask is “Why did it roll when you tapped it?” To this the answer would be “Because it’s round.”

Note that although the first question and answer are easy to think of in terms of forces and causes, the second pair is something else. The second question and answer deal with individual characteristics, of which Person Characteristics are a special case. Saying that the person is “honest” or “generous” or “good at arithmetic” is like saying that the chalk is “round.”

The two answers, i.e., “Because I tapped it,” and “Because it’s round,” are not competing accounts of the chalk’s behavior. Each sets the stage for the other, and without both our understanding is incomplete.

Part of understanding a particular behavior on a particular occasion is understanding why it occurred *then*. Generally, it is the reference to circumstances which provides the answer to “Why *now*?” (though the answer may be, “Because that’s when he had already decided to do it.”).

However, whatever it is about the circumstances that answers to “Why *now*?”, it is clear that that will hold only for certain kinds of persons, and our understanding of the behavior needs to take that into account. Thus:

- (1) Had the circumstances been relevantly different, the behavior

would not have occurred.

- (2) Had the person been relevantly different the behavior would not have occurred.

Put positively, it takes both circumstances of the right kind and a person of the right kind to account for why *this* behavior *now*.

This is the simple message of the PC-C model.

2. Observational Assessment of Personality

The PC-Behavior link, given by Q2-A2 above, is a two-way street. We have seen how knowledge of a person's PC's are part of understanding a given behavior on the part of that person. It is also the case that knowledge of a person's behaviors on a variety of occasions is our primary basis for attributing PC's to a person.

Recall the development of Person Characteristic categories in terms of a type of behavior and a pattern of occurrence. One of the missing pieces in that development is the notion of a social practice, which was introduced only later, and the principle that to engage in a Deliberate Action is to participate in a social practice.

The conceptual context for a review of Q2-A2 is the occurrence of a social practice. Social practices are notationally rendered as a special case of a Process Representation. To review, a Process Representation involves the following specification.

Name:

Description:

Paradigms

Stages

Options within Stages

Elements

Individuals

Eligibilities

Contingencies


Co-occurrence

Attributional

Relational
Factual

The gross structure of the social practice, i.e., Stages and Options within stages, is conventionally shown in Figure 3a, where the diamonds represent Deliberate Actions.

Figure 3a. Social Practice Schema



The occurrence of the process in question (the social practice) on a given occasion consists of the occurrence of one of the Options for Stage 1 followed by one of the Options for Stage 2 ... followed by one of the Options for Stage N. The sequence of Options constitutes a Version of the process. (The connecting lines in Figure 3a indicate one Version of the process.)

Although the social practice per se can occur in many different ways (Versions), its occurrence on a given occasion just *is* the occurrence of one of its Versions on that occasion.

Maxim: If you're going to do a thing you have to do it in one of the ways it can be done.

Consider now an Attributional Contingency. This denotes the condition where a given Option is empirically available only if the Individual who plays the part of a given Element has a given Attribute. It follows that the selection of that Option in a given occurrence of the social practice provides an indication that the individual in question has that attribute. (We may also use the selection of Versions in place of Options here.) Where the individual is a person, as is almost invariably the case in social practices, the Attribute will be one or more Person Characteristics. These PC's may be of any kind, i.e., traits, attitudes, interests, styles, values, knowledge, abilities, states, embodiments, or capacities.

There are three aspects of this situation that are worth noting explicitly.

a. The connection between the Person Characteristic and the behavioral choice is essentially conceptual rather than empirical. For example, it is not a merely empirical matter that the choice of a behavior which gives no weight to the interests of others is a selfish behavior or that it is an indication of selfishness on the behavior's part.

b. The attributional contingency is stated in clean deductive form – the Option is available *only if* the individual has a given attribute. This provides a good conceptual anchor but it is not simply the way the world works. If we begin in this way, i.e., “If a person engages in that behavior he is a selfish person,” we will have to consider that as a paradigm case and hedge it in with various “unless...” clauses referring to other PC's, circumstances, scenarios, etc. (In the familiar Paradigm Case Formulation the initial Paradigm Case specification is not inclusive enough and additional cases are added via Transformations. In the present variant,

the initial Paradigm Case specification is too inclusive and extraneous cases are subtracted via “unless...” clauses.) Thus the connection between the PC and the behavior is effectively empirical as well as being essentially conceptual.

c. Because the PC-Behavior connection is essentially conceptual we can often arrive at complex and accurate personality assessment on the basis of what is, from an empirical standpoint, an absurdly small sample of behavioral observation. But also, because the connection is effectively empirical we routinely require a substantial basis of behavioral observations in various social practices, settings, and relationships before we are confident in our assessments.

Maxim: Over time, a person shows his true colors.

Having noted these aspects, we can go on to some further elaboration.

a. People will differ, of course, in how they operate in the social practices of making observational assessments. Such differences do not create any special difficulties. They are simply part of the basis for the differential attribution of PC's. Thus, some persons will be intuitive and prone to errors; others will be sensitive and generally accurate; others will be hesitant and overly cautious; others will be almost completely insensitive; and so on. In general, these are PC's that we already distinguish independently of how people operate in making observational assessments, but they *are* PC's that we find relevant to how people operate in the social practice of making observational assessments.

b. This phenomenon holds on a large scale. The stock of PC concepts that have common sense currency at a given time reflects the collection of social practices that have currency at that time. The PC concepts are just those PC concepts that codify the importantly different ways that people operate (the different Options and Versions they select) in engaging in these social practices. Two consequences follow.

(1) Because different cultures have different collections of social prac-

tices, no two cultures will have the same stock of PC's in common use.

(2) The invention of new social practices or new variations on existing practices creates the possibility of new PC concepts. Thus, the common stock of PC's in a given culture will change over time, though some of them (e.g. "friendly," "clumsy," "talented") may last indefinitely and appear in most cultures.

c. Why do we care, why should we care about other people's person characteristics? Archetypally we are interested in the character and personality of those persons with whom we interact, i.e., those persons with whom we jointly enact the social practices of our culture and community. By extension, we are interested in the person characteristics of people with whom we interact peripherally or indirectly – people who are part of our behavioral milieu. By further extension, if only for the sake of having a common understanding, we may be interested in anybody's person characteristics.

The value of knowing the person characteristics of my partner(s) in a social practice is that (a) it keeps me from just being taken by surprise by what he does or doesn't do, and (b) it relieves me of the burden of having to give equal weight to every possibility of what might happen. Thus knowledge of PC's allows me to make sensible efforts to ensure that our joint activity has a satisfactory course and outcome (for me, for us, for all of us) rather than an unsatisfactory one.

To take a crude example, if I know that my partner is a hostile person (a) I may work at countering his sensitivity to provocation; (b) I may work at deflecting his hostility from myself; (c) I may work at directing expressions of hostility toward the accomplishment of our joint ends; (d) I may be prepared to compensate for the negative effects his hostility might have on others; (e) and so on. Or, again, if I have an exceptionally competent or talented partner (a) I may follow her lead and be prepared to follow up on her decisions; (b) I may encourage her decision making; (c) I may take opportunities to sit back and appreciate her virtuosity or conversely to support it as well as I can so that we can carry it off; (d) and so on. For ordinary common sense these examples are at the level of "See Jack run!".

B. Reasons: Accounting for Choice and Specificity

Notoriously, we ask one another “Why did you do that” and we hold one another responsible for what we say. In asking “why?” we may be asking for a justification or for an explanation. In what follows we deal only with explanations.

Q1: Why did you take a drink of that coffee?

A1: I was thirsty.

Q2: Why did you enroll in that computing class?

A2: I’m going to apply for a job next summer.

Q3: Why did you go to that movie?

A3: Oh, I thought I’d enjoy it.

Q4: Why did you leave your boyfriend?

A4: It served him right.

Q5: Why did you keep your 3:30 appointment?

A5: It would have been wrong not to.

Q6: Why did you tell him a recession was imminent?

A6: I’m flying to Australia on vacation tomorrow.

Q7: Why did you take that medicine?

A7: Do you think red or green suits me better?

Q1-Q7 exemplify the vernacular in this regard. When we ask, “Why did you do X?” there are some replies that we would take as (probably) true answers to the question. There are other replies that we would take as answers but not necessarily true answers. And there are replies which we would not count as answers at all, but rather as changing the subject. A6 and A7 are of this latter kind.

Replies may be more or less elliptical also. For example, A2, “I’m going to apply for a job next summer,” leaves out at least one connection (taking the class will help me get a job); so does A4, “It served him right.”

In principle, such ellipses are readily remedied, so that Q1-A1, Q3-A3, and Q5-A5 may be regarded as paradigmatic.

Paradigmatically, then, the question mentions a behavior and the answer mentions a state of affairs which is a reason for that behavior. *Reasons are states of affairs which have motivational relevance for behavior.*

There are also other paradigms in the vernacular involving “Why did you do X?” These are also commonly referred to as “giving reasons” and they are sufficiently closely related to make this assimilation unsurprising. They are also sufficiently different to provide a reason to distinguish them. Consider the following.

Q8: Why did you tell him how much it cost?

A8: I was trying to embarrass him.

Note that in this paradigm we get, not a behavior and a state of affairs which is a reason for the behavior, but rather, two behaviors of which the second is the significance of the first. Recall that when I do X by doing Y, doing X is the significance of doing Y. In the present case I am embarrassing him by telling him how much it cost. Both descriptions refer to *what* I was doing, not *why*, and the ‘reason’ refers to the aim of the behavior, not to its grounds.

Still, it is often more a difference merely in logical form that is involved, not a substantive difference. Consider the following.

Q1: Why did you take a drink of the coffee?

A1: I was thirsty.

Q1: Why did you take a drink of the coffee?

A1¹: I wanted to slake my thirst, and drinking the coffee was a way to do that.

Q8: Why did you tell him how much it cost?

A8: I wanted to embarrass him and telling him how much it cost was a way to do that.

Note that A1¹ is merely a paraphrase of A1, but now it has the same form as a slightly paraphrased A8. The moral here is that if I am up to some behavior, B, then I have reason to do whatever other behavior, B1, will implement B, and the fact that B1 will implement B will be a reason for doing B1. If I am up to embarrassing him, then the fact that telling him how much it cost will accomplish that is a reason to tell him how much it cost.

Although embarrassing him is the aim (significance) of telling him how much it cost, it also implies a certain reason for telling him how much it cost. Thus, given the complex and sophisticated nature of the vernacular, it is not unreasonable to let the hearer know about that reason by talking about the significance.

Because conversation about why P did B is at the level of the speakers' understanding and not at the level of a pedantic requirement for complete, unambiguous specification, it is often elliptical from the point of view of systematic exposition. Consider one of the previous examples.

Q2: Why are you taking the computer class?
A2: I'm going to apply for a job next summer.

Q: But why take the computer class?
A: It will help me get a job.

Q: Why do something that will help you get a job?
A: Because I need a job. It would go badly for me if I didn't get one.

Q: Why go after something you need?
A: I said I needed it, didn't I?

It is not a tautology that I have a reason to take a computer class. It is a tautology that I have a reason to get what I need. In the example, I have a reason to take the computer class because in *these* circumstances (it will help me get a job next summer) that is an instance of having a reason

to get what I take it I need.

Is it really a tautology that I have a reason to get what I take it I need? Well, it fits a familiar test (intrinsicness). My going after what I need is something I can be understood as doing without an ulterior motive and without a further end in view. In short, the answer is “Yes.” To see myself as needing X *is* to have a reason to get X, and it is to have *that* reason to get X. (See below on Appraisal.)

This connection between an accidental reason (helps me get a job) and a tautological reason (helps me get what I need) is reflected in the fact that we commonly refer to the kind of reason we have rather than to the actual reason. (“He did it on moral grounds.” “His reasons were purely prudential.” Etc.)

When we group the tautologous reasons empirically into family resemblance groups, we find four major groups, with one of them having three subgroups. The following are the kinds of reasons people ultimately have.

1. Hedonic
2. Prudential
3. Ethical
4. Esthetic
 - Artistic
 - Social
 - Intellectual

1. Hedonic reasons have to do with variations on pleasure, pain, noxiousness, disgustingness. If something would be pleasurable to do, that is ipso facto a reason to do it; if something would be painful to do, that is ipso facto a reason not to do it. If I take it that a certain behavior would be pleasurable to do, then ipso facto I have *that* reason to do it. If I take it that a certain behavior would be painful to engage in, I have *that* reason not to do it. A similar logic holds for each of the other categories.

2. Prudential reasons have to do with my self interest, with what is good for me (or bad for me), what is to my advantage (or disadvantage). If taking a computer class is to my advantage, then ipso facto that is a reason to do it. If I see that it is to my disadvantage then ipso facto I have that reason not to do it.

3. Ethical reasons have to do with what is right or wrong, good or bad, fair or unfair, just or unjust and with whether I have a duty or obligation. If some behavior is wrong or bad, then ipso facto that is a reason not to do it.

4. Esthetic reasons have to do with the primitive notion of fittingness. Since fittingness operates over a heterogeneous set of domains, it seems apt to carry some of the major distinctions as subcategories of fittingness. Thus, we distinguish artistic, social, and intellectual fittingness.

a. In all forms of art, a fundamental issue is how things fit together, and artistic effort is to a large extent guided by this consideration. Thus, within the domain of art, “Why did you put this part here?”; “Why did you make (do) this part that way?” will eventually elicit the criterion answer, i.e., “Because of the way it fits with the rest.”

b. Any social situation and setting has some kind of demand character and some appropriateness standards. Here, we commonly speak of “What the situation calls for” and recognize significant individual differences in sensitivity to this. This kind of answer to “Why did you do that?” will be along the lines of “because it was appropriate to the occasion,” “It was the thing to do,” “That’s just what one does in those circumstances,” and so on. This, too, is straightforwardly a case of fittingness, though social fittingness is not the same as artistic fittingness. They are not mutually exclusive, either.

c. If I tell you there’s a cat on the mat, it need not be for any of the kinds of reasons noted above. It may be because it fits the facts of the matter – there *is* a cat on the mat. Issues of being realistic, accurate, true, complete, rigorous, illuminating, and so on will revolve around what fits the facts of the matter.

It should be emphasized that the categorization of reasons as Hedonic, Prudential, Ethical, and Esthetic is an empirical one. Nothing hinges on whether this is all there is, though it does appear that this is all there is. What is important is the tautological character of these reasons.

The operation of reasons in the selection of a behavior as one to engage in or as one not to engage in is shown in Figure 5, conventionally designated as the Judgment Diagram.

Figure 5. The Judgment Diagram




Figure 5 is read as follows. A person evaluates his overall circumstances and identifies those particular circumstances that have motivational relevance for him. These latter are states of affairs which are reasons of a prudential, hedonic, ethical, or esthetic sort for or against engaging in behavior B. Each of these reasons carries a certain amount of weight

with him. The weight that each carries reflects one or more of his person characteristics (e.g., his values). Given all this, the person makes a decision for or against the behavior and acts on the decision.

It should be noted that the Judgment Diagram is not a schematic representation of the *process* of coming to a behavioral decision. (Among other things, there is no known principle adequate to the task of combining the pro weights or the con weights. Nor is it to be assumed that such weights are stable across time and circumstances.) Rather, it is a schema for reconstructing *what* decision it was, and to that extent, what behavior it was.

If we use the Judgment Diagram observationally, we will work from both ends toward the center. The reason is that we have in principle direct access to the person's circumstances and to his behavior. From the circumstances we can generally do a reasonable job of generating the relevant circumstances and the reasons. From the behavior, we can reconstruct the Decision. From the combination of the reasons and the decision we can more or less reconstruct the weights.

For most people in most life situations only the most rudimentary process of decision making occurs if, indeed, any does at all. This is because given the circumstances and the social practices in progress the thing to do is obvious and there is "no real decision to be made." However, to the extent that there are at least two alternatives that are about equally matched and to the extent that it is important to make the right decision the first time, people will tend to go through procedures visibly related to the Judgment Diagram, including making explicit lists of pros and cons and attempting to weigh them properly.

One of the important things to note about the Judgment Diagram is that it supplies the missing piece that the PC-C model does not provide. That is, it shows *how* Person Characteristics and Circumstances operate together to determine behavior. The use of the Judgment Diagram, however, is obviously not restricted to providing closure for the PC-C model.

C. Relationship and Status: Getting the Whole Picture in the Picture

It has been perfectly clear to most people most of the time that human behavior is a function of the person's relationships and of the person's place in the scheme of things.

It is easy to develop and illustrate the operative intuition on an observational basis. As I stand here in the room I have one or more relationships to every item in the room or nearby. My possible behaviors with respect to any such item depend on my relationship(s) to that item. For example, the door is ten feet to my left. By virtue of that, I can't just step outside the room; on the other hand, I can walk to the door and then step outside the room. Again, there is a cup of coffee within arm's reach. Thus, I have the option to simply reach over and take a drink; if I had almost any other relation to the cup of coffee I wouldn't have that behavioral possibility. (And, to anticipate, I have a second relationship to the coffee. I like its taste. That gives me a reason to drink it.) Because there are people in the room I have the behavioral possibility of asking one of them to take the coffee outside. If there were no one within earshot I would not have that behavioral possibility. And so on.

1. The Relationship Formula

From such obvious beginnings one can extend the relationships in question from simple geographic ones to the larger domains of personal and social relationships. The result is summarized in the following formula, here designated as the Relationship Formula:

If A has a given relationship, R, to P
Then The behavior of A with respect to P will be an expression of R
Unless

1. A is acting on another relationship which takes priority or
2. A doesn't recognize the relationship for what it is or
3. A is unable to act in a way that expresses R or
4. A mistakenly believes that his behavior is an expression of R or
5. A miscalculates or the behavior miscarries.

There are several points to make about the Relationship Formula.

1. This is neither empirical nor probabilistic in its use. It is entirely non-empirical. In this regard, it is instructive to compare it to a parallel case, which is a thought experiment, though it may for some be an unthinkable experiment.

The Elusive Force

Imagine a physicist, Wil, who works with one of Newton's laws of motion, i.e., "A mass will accelerate in the direction of an applied force." He sets up an experimental situation and invites Gil to witness.

Wil: You see, I apply exactly this force in this direction, and ... voila!

Gil: Wait a second. It went here. According to you it should have gone there!

Wil: Oh – yes! You're right. Obviously there must have been another force operating and, from the difference between what I predicted and what we saw, I can tell you what it could have been.

Gil: Oh – I see. When you stated the principle you should have said, "A mass will accelerate in the direction of an applied force – *unless* there's another force operating." That makes a difference. For example, it just kept you from falsifying the principle a minute ago.

Wil: Here we go again. I calculated what the other force could have been. If it is that and if I now apply this force (which, notice, is different from last time, so I'm not simply expecting the same result) it should move here!

Gil: Well, it's closer. I'll give you that. But it's still not there.

Wil: Well, obviously there must still be another force operating. Wait just a second and I'll calculate what force it could have been, and then we'll test that.

Gil: No amount of negative empirical results is going to shake your faith in that principle, is it?

Wil: Okay. Here we go.

Gil: By George! You got it right at last.

Wil: You see! I told you so!

Note that, indeed, no set of observed facts would force Wil to give up

the principle. On the other hand, if he were *never* in the position to say “You see, I told you so,” probably he would give it up. Now compare the parallel case.

The Elusive Relationship

Gil: If a person, A, has a given relationship, R, to Q, then the behavior of A with respect to Q will be an expression of that relationship. For example, if you look over there you’ll see Jim Kadouri. As you know, he’s a friend of Sam, who’s just now coming down the side street. Watch.

Wil: Fat chance. Kadouri saw Sam and ducked into the menswear store. Friend, huh!

Gil: Well! Obviously there must be some additional relationship between them. From the difference between what we expected and what we observed, I can tell you what that relationship might have been. And we can investigate whether in fact it’s there.

Wil: What other relationship would account for his avoiding Sam?

Gil: Actually, several. He could be angry at him. He might be jealous of him. He might owe him money. That’s for starters. Why don’t you go talk to Jim and see what you can find out.

(Later)

Wil: He owes him money.

Gil: You see, I told you so.

Wil: Actually, you gave me an incomplete statement of the principle. There should be some “Unless...” clauses, starting with “Unless A is acting on another relationship that takes priority.”

Gil: You’re right.

Indeed, Wil is right. Like Wil’s principle concerning forces, the Relationship Formula is more or less explicitly tautological and not merely functionally so. What we are dealing with here is the possibility that a given behavior, i.e., A’s actual behavior in regard to Q, is the same as another behavior, i.e., a behavior which is an expression of the relation-

ship R, or that A's behavior is different from that. Consider the behaviors under an Agency description:

$$B1 = \langle \theta, W, K, KH, P, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$$

$$B2 = \langle \theta, W, K, KH, P, A, \theta, \theta \rangle$$

The possibility of B1, the actual behavior, being different from B2, the expected behavior, is the same as the possibility that B2 has values of the W, K, KH, P, or A parameters that are different from the values of these parameters for B1. That is what is spelled out by the “unless...” clauses in the Relationship Formula:

1. “Unless A is acting on another relationship that takes priority” refers to differences in the W and K parameters.
2. “Unless A doesn't recognize the relationship for what it is” refers to the K parameter.
3. “Unless A is unable to act in ways that express the relationship” refers to the KH parameter.
4. “Unless A mistakenly believes that his behavior is an expression of R” refers to the K parameter specifically in regard to self-knowledge.
5. “Unless A miscalculates or the behavior miscarries” refers to the P and/or A parameters.

Given these specifications, the “unless...” clauses amount to saying “unless it's different in one of the ways it can be different.”

The utility of the Relationship Formula depends on two distinct states of affairs.

- A. Over a wide range of behaviors and relationships, we have the ability to evaluate a given behavior in regard to a given relationship, R, and classify the behavior as one which (1) is an expression of R, or (2) is neutral with respect to R, or (3) violates R.
- B. Often enough we are in a position to say, “You see – I told you so.” If we were never in this position it is doubtful whether we would continue to use the Relationship Formula in practice, though it

would be no less non-empirical than it is now. It may seem ironic that the virtue of a non-empirical formulation lies in its empirical applicability. But one could say that about mathematics, too.

2. The second general comment to be made concerning the Relationship Formula is that it provides a vehicle for bypassing an extremely strong professional bias favoring actuality over “mere possibility.” An example of the operation of this bias is as follows.

Imagine that I am introduced to a person at a formal gathering and that (a) I have no previous acquaintance with her – she is a stranger, and (b) there is a good possibility that in the near future we will be colleagues. If I deal with her in terms of the relationship we “actually” have, i.e., strangers, that will in general be judged to be simply realistic. In contrast, if I deal with her in terms of what might possibly be the case later, it will generally be said that some aspect of subjectivity has entered the picture. Kurt Lewin, a social psychologist and one of the few psychologists to operate primarily from the Relationship/Status model rather than the PC-C model, had the notion of “levels of reality” to cover such cases.

And yet, what would be more natural or realistic than to emphasize the “mere possibility” in my dealing with her. If, from one point of view, it would be more realistic to treat her merely as a stranger, from another point of view it would verge on pathology if I did that.

What the Relationship Formula reminds us is that although “colleague” is not a relationship I have with her now, since it is merely a future possibility, there is another, *corresponding* relationship which I do have with her now *by virtue of* that possibility. That actual relationship is that of possiblecolleague, and the notational convention for marking such relationships is to omit the space between the two terms. Thus, she is *right now*, my possiblecolleague, my possiblefriend, my possiblecompetitor, and so on.

Further, it should be clear that when I treat her as a possiblecolleague, that is exactly what I do, and that is *quite* different from treating her as

a colleague (it would verge on pathology if I did that). So the idea of treating her as a possiblethis or possiblethat is the notion of acting on an actual relationship that I have now; it is not a way of pretending that what is merely a possibility is a reality, and one does not have to suppose that I have somehow entered the realm of unreality when I do that.

2. The Relationship Change Formula

The Relationship Change Formula provides the change principle for the Relationship/Status model. The change formula is stated as follows.

If A has a given relationship, R, to P

And

The behavior of A with respect to P violates R, and the behavior of A with respect to P is an expression of another relationship, R1, which is incompatible with R

Then The relationship changes from being R toward being R1.

Of the many kinds of cases covered by the formula, two are worth noting immediately.

A. In the course of child development, many of the important changes in relationship take place by virtue of changes in the individual's person characteristics. For example, as the child grows older and more knowledgeable, relationships with information sources change. As the child becomes more self directed and acquires firm values, relations with counselors and models of various kinds change. Similarly for skills, strength, etc. These changed relationships will be expressed in changed interactions, from which further relationship changes will follow.

B. If I encounter a stranger who is also a possiblefriend and successfully treat him as possiblefriend rather than as a stranger, my relationship with him will move in the direction of "friend." If I am consistently successful in doing this, eventually, we are friends. Unlike the developmental kind noted above it is not easy to formulate this kind of relationship change as PC driven.

(Similarly, if I have a friend and begin to treat him as a creditor or as a

rival (etc.), eventually we will no longer be friends but will have a business relation or we will be rivals, etc.)

C. If I am his enemy and I act on that relationship by killing him, I am still his enemy – that has not changed. However, he is now a dead enemy, and that makes a difference in certain other relationships. For example, I am no longer afraid of him or suspicious of him.

The Relationship Change Formula codifies the way that I can change a relationship with someone by virtue of how I act. However, relationships are complex phenomena, and they can change from either end and in circumstantial ways as well as behavioral ways.

- A. My relationship with her has been that we are business competitors. Now she inherits six billion pesetas. Now we are no longer competitors – she is not in my league any more.
- B. My relationship with her has been that we are business competitors. Suddenly, she dies. Now she is a dead competitor, which is to say that she is no longer an active competitor. By virtue of that certain of my other relationships with her changed. For example, I am no longer afraid of what she might do and I am no longer suspicious of her.

3. Relationship, Status, and Behavior Potential

“A mass will accelerate in the direction of an applied force, unless there is also another force operating.”

A law having this form apparently runs too strongly counter to our requirements of universality and certitude in regard to scientific laws to be acceptable. We have seen that a physical law of this sort is implicitly a priori in that no amount of negative evidence will show that it is false.

Historically, we have moved to a more acceptable transformation of the law which has the twin virtues that (a) it makes the a priori more clearly visible and (b) it gets rid of the “unless” clause: “A mass will accelerate in the direction of the resultant of all of the forces operating on

it at a given time.”

The a priori character stands out because there is no way to establish what all the forces operating on a given mass at a given time are, hence no way to show that the statement is false.

Thus, in practice, it is still a case of “There must have been another force operating” or “You see, I told you so!”

There is a parallel move in connection with the Relationship Formula. Consider again the observational setting where it is clear that my behavioral possibilities with respect to the coffee, the people, the door, etc. depend on my relationships with each of these, and that leads to the original formula:

“If A has a given relationship, R, to Q, then the behavior of A with respect to Q will be an expression of that relationship, *unless...*”

It is a familiar fact that talking about the relationships between pairs of items in a given context can be replaced by talking about the *place* of each item in that context. From the place of each item we can derive the relationships among the items and vice versa.

Since our relationships to things give us reasons and opportunities for behaviors which express those relationships to those things, the generalized version of the Relationship Formula will take the following form.

“A person’s behavior potential (behavioral possibilities) within a given domain is an expression of his status (place) in that domain.” When no domain is specified, then we are talking about a person’s place in the general scheme of things. There is no broader context than that.

“If A has a certain place (status) in the scheme of things, his behavior will be an expression of his having that place.” A person has the behavioral possibilities (behavior potential) he has by virtue of his having the place he has in the scheme of things.

Thus the general principle is that a person's reasons and behavioral possibilities are an expression of that person's place relative to the places of other items in the scheme of things, where "is an expression of" is to be understood as a non-causal relation. (There is a strong parallel between this notion of status, which, in effect, is that of "being in the world," and the Existential notion of "Being-in-the-World." There are also significant differences.)

This transformation of the Relationship Formula has the twin virtues that (a) it makes the *a priori* more clearly visible, since we have no definitive way of establishing what position a person has in the entire scheme of things, and (b) it gets rid of the "unless" clauses.

The value of the status formulation does not stem from our ability to assess exhaustively a given person's status at a given time. Rather, the status framework allows us to think in terms of the overall differences that certain changes make to the individual person. In this way, we are able to bring to bear certain of our primary intuitions about people. For example, (a) some places and some kinds of places are valued over others; (b) the fact that a given behavior would leave the person in a better place constitutes a reason to do it; (c) the possibility that a given behavior would leave a person in a worse place is a reason not to engage in that behavior, (d) etc.

In working with status concepts we are primarily working with the effects of changes or possible changes on a person's overall place in the scheme of things and therefore we are dealing with the basis for the person's reactions to those changes or possible changes. Thus, we have here a general basis for understanding why people do what they do.

"Better" and "worse" places for a person correspond to having more and having less behavior potential. In turn, behavior potential is to be understood not merely in terms of which or how many behaviors are available, but also the value of each such behavior (which corresponds to how much better or worse a place would be if it offered the option

of engaging in such behavior). Thus, for example, the principle that “A person will not choose less behavior potential over more” emerges as a folk psychological, tautological, version of the classic academic notion of “the survival instinct.” (The “survival instinct” will be a limiting case of this principle; suicide will be merely a special case of the same principle. See Ossorio (1998) for an elaboration.)

4. Relative and Absolute Status

A person’s place is relative to the domain which defines the place. One has a certain place in one’s family of origin; one has a certain place within one’s circle of friends; one has a certain place within one’s occupational milieu, within one’s organizations of membership (church, professional associations, etc.), within the municipal geography and social system, and so on. These are limited statuses, since the domains which define them are limited. In contrast, one has a place in the scheme of things and that is one’s status, period (as contrasted with one’s status *in...*).

Heuristically, a status can be thought of on the model of an ordinary job – a carpenter, a professor, a computer programmer. In an organization, each defined position [status] is a job, and we are very familiar with jobs in this sense.

For every job there is such a thing as doing it better or doing it worse or not doing it at all. What goes with a job is a “job description” which specifies the responsibilities that go with the job and hence, implicitly, a set of standards for judging how well the job was done. Conversely, for every job there is a perspective on the world which makes salient those states of affairs which are relevant to occupying that position or to doing that job (recall the Judgment Diagram).

For example, if I am a banker and doing my job as a banker, I will be approaching the world from the perspective of a banker and I will, accordingly, be sensitive and responsive to those states of affairs that do, or, properly, would make a difference to bankers. Furthermore, if I am doing the job of a banker in an ideal way, I will respond *only* to those states of affairs, and I will automatically, i.e., without necessarily any thought or

decision, exclude from consideration any other states of affairs which are of interest only from the standpoint of another status (e.g., a mother, a Baptist, a Republican, a skier).

The ability to restrict the states of affairs one acts on is a basic human ability, since without it no consistent courses of action could in general be sensibly undertaken. And I may look like two different people if I have two different jobs which call for the exercise of sharply different abilities, attitudes, relationships, etc. (Thus the current penchant for talking about our many “selves” in different settings or in different relationships.)

Conversely, “being myself” is, paradigmatically, a matter of *not* restricting the states of affairs that I am sensitive to or could act on. I am being myself when I am not doing a job. (The “job” model for status breaks down somewhat in the limiting case of my place in the overall scheme of things. But only somewhat. My “job” in this case is to be the person I am and act as the person I am. In not restricting the states of affairs that I act on, I am operating directly in the overall scheme of things.)

Within a given domain (e.g., an organization, a social system, an ecology) a person will view events in light of the values and concerns that go with his position in the system. We take it for granted that in general, no two persons are *really* identically placed in the world, though they may be identically placed in a limited sense, e.g., that both are bankers (or Methodists, or mothers, etc.). Thus, we go from the idea that everyone has a unique status (in the scheme of things) to the idea that everyone has a unique perspective to the idea that ultimately, everyone lives in his own unique world.

We noted above that the Judgment Diagram may be regarded as a more complete version of the PC-C model since it shows how the combination of PC and C works in our understanding of behavior. Here, we may note that it also has relevance to the Relationship/Status model.

(a) It is my relationship(s) to a thing or person which give me reasons to engage in certain behaviors rather than others in regard to that thing or person.

(b) It is that relationship and other relationships which give me op-

portunities to engage in certain behaviors and not others in regard to that person or thing.

(c) If I am doing a job, i.e., acting in a certain status, only certain states of affairs (circumstances) will constitute reasons, and they will constitute reasons for status-relevant behaviors. (From a banker's perspective, only a certain set of states of affairs constitutes reasons and what they are reasons for or against are the behaviors which are options for bankers as bankers.)

(d) And one can say, as we did above, that the fact that a given behavior would improve my position in the world constitutes a reason to do it.

Thus, the logic of the Judgment Diagram applies whether we are using the PC-C or the Relationship/Status model. Because of this, the folk-psychological idiom of acting on reasons has a universal currency which particular theories and models lack. It can be seen, therefore, that the identification of "acting on reasons" as the core of folk psychology, though simplistic, is not totally off the mark.

D. Actor-Observer-Critic: Accounting for Self-regulation

1. Individual Behavior

One of the obvious characteristics of human beings is that they are “self directed,” or “self-controlled.” These descriptions are not references to mental faculties or mechanisms which accomplish self direction or self control. Rather, they are illuminating by contrast. For example, they contrast human beings with tools, e.g., a shovel or a knife, which have to be directed in detail to their tasks by a person. They also contrast human beings with machines such as automobiles, washing machines, or computers, which are operated by people (though we don’t have to *see to* everything) and designed by them.

In contrast to tools and machines, human beings are the authors and directors of their own activities, which are focused, directed, coherent. These activities are social in nature (social practices) and the control is social and practical in nature.

This general character of persons can be understood by reference to the acquisition of three distinctive statuses and the corresponding competencies for implementing these statuses. (Here we will use the ordinary notion of an occupation, or job, as a paradigm case of a status.)

Persons learn three jobs which are fundamental to their being persons. These are conventionally designated as the jobs of Actor, Observer, and Critic. Collectively, these three jobs exemplify a distinctive logical structure which is perhaps best described as being, paradigmatically, a negative-feedback loop. The specific character of this structure is best introduced by first giving the “job descriptions” for Actor, Observer, and Critic. (Recall that part of what goes with a given status is a set of standards for judging how well a given individual implements that status. That set of standards corresponds to a job description.)

(A) Actor

To do the job of an Actor is to “do one’s thing,” that is, to act on one’s impulses, desires, and inclinations. Characteristically, one does that spon-

taneously. And, one might say, part of the job is to *have* impulses, desires, inclinations. (There is more to be said later about impulses, desires, etc.) As an Actor, I assimilate the world to *my* doings and I am sensitive to what it offers (what it offers *me*) by way of facilitations and opportunities (or limitations and hindrances) in regard to those doings. As an Actor, I am the author of my behavior; I create the behavior out of nothing.

(B) Observer-Describer

As an Observer, I note (1) what is the case now, (2) what is happening now, (3) what has happened in the past and what happens generally, (4) what is the case generally, and (5) how things work. Since the results of observation are available to the person doing the Observer job, they are available to the person in doing the Critic and Actor jobs, and similarly for Actor and Critic.

(C) Critic

As a Critic, I first evaluate whether what is the case and what is happening now are satisfactory, making use of the Observer information. (1) If things are good enough or better than just good enough, that judgment is available to the Actor, and both Critic and Actor are free to enjoy that. (2) If things are not good enough, as a Critic I formulate a “diagnosis,” i.e., an account of what is wrong, and a “prescription,” i.e., a specification of what to do differently to try to help matters. The “prescription” is the primary feedback to the Actor.

Figure 6. The A-O-C Loop





Figure 7. The A-O-C Learning Loop



The negative-feedback loop is shown diagrammatically in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows the external support provided by other persons in the course of A-O-C learning.

There are several points to be noted here.

a. Figure 6 shows the paradigmatic feedback structure. As Actor, I initiate a behavior or, most likely, a behavioral sequence; once it is under way, as Observer I monitor its course and projected results; when that has progressed far enough, as Critic I evaluate it and the result of that evaluation is fed back to the Actor.

It is this structure which enables persons to act effectively in the face of uncertainty, insufficient information, and erroneous information. But then, the very notion of foolproof knowledge or complete information is an Observer's pipe dream. (And how would we know if we had it?) Behavior is *always* in the face of uncertainty and incomplete information. Presumably this structure is the original model for negative-feedback loop structures in automatic machinery.

b. The kind of self monitoring implied by the A-O-C loop is a precondition for "being in control of one's behavior" and making coherent behavioral choices. (It is not the only precondition. For example, competence in those jobs and a coherent social structure are also preconditions.)

c. Although the A-O-C sequence shown in Figure 6 is paradigmatic, a good part of human self direction and self control involves anticipated behavior rather than actual behavior. Given some relevant Observer learning in regard to how things work and what usually happens, one can anticipate how it would go *if* one did X in given circumstances (like now) and on that basis choose X or reject it as the thing to do.

d. Just the simple A-O-C structure gives us too spartan a picture of what goes on. For example, we do not simply switch from A to O to C to A as the diagram would suggest. Rather, we are routinely doing all three simultaneously and because of that we are doing those things that would appear in the simple A-O-C sequence. Having learned the jobs, we become Actors, Observers, and Critics and routinely operate from those perspectives even when what they put us in touch with has no direct connection to what we are doing now. (Recall the difference between being a banker and acting as a banker.)

e. There is nothing inherently primitive or organismic about the job of Actor. This needs to be emphasized because it is commonplace in psychology to introduce a tripartite psychic structure (Id-Ego-Superego; Parent-Adult-Child; etc.) in which one part is primitive and organismic, one part is socialized and evaluative, and one part is neutral and reality oriented. In such arrangements, conflict between the social and the organismic is inherent and essentially universal. (It would be nonsense to try to structure Id-Ego-Superego as a negative-feedback loop and only slightly less so for Parent-Adult-Child. These are conflict-resolution structures, not cooperative, synergistic structures.)

The job of Actor does not change over the life cycle, but the competencies, sensitivities, and judgment that would enable successful implementation of the job do change. For an adult, “What I feel like doing,” “What I want,” (or, especially, “What I really want”) or “What my thing is,” are often not a simple matter. Consequently, doing my thing (as against, e.g., acting out a mistaken notion of what “my thing” is) is, in a sense, a high level achievement that depends on a good deal of prior learning, prior freedom to do my thing, sensitivity to myself, etc. Of

course, it doesn't feel that way. It feels easy, even when I do the wrong thing. That is part of the difficulty.

There are two senses of "easy" that should not be confused here. For a normal adult, it is easy to "do my thing," "do what comes naturally," and pursue my impulses and desires. It is easy in the sense that one doesn't have to work at it; there's no real uncertainty about it; and it requires no special effort. It is not easy in the sense that it is something that everyone usually "gets right" and rarely is in a position of second guessing, "I guess I didn't really want that," or "I guess that wasn't my thing after all." People who are "out of touch with their feelings" or "out of touch with their real selves," etc., appreciate the difference. So also do those who are familiar with the Existential notion of "authenticity."

A distinctive area where the sophistication of Actor functioning can be readily appreciated is that of artistic creation. Artistic production is not Darwinian in nature. It does not proceed by a cycle of the random production of words, brush strokes, musical notes, etc., followed by an artistic pruning by a Critic, eventually resulting in an esthetically valuable product. Rather, the creative impulse is already structured (sometimes highly structured, and sometimes with absolute conviction). It is the impulse to create something of this sort, not a blind impulse to create something. Critical review contributes, but no critical review could do the job of the inspired impulse.

f. What holds for Actor holds for Observer and Critic also. The job descriptions don't change over the life span but the person characteristics required for implementing those jobs successfully do change. Doing the job of Actor, Observer, or Critic is not the exercise of a simple, unitary skill.

g. There is also some need for a mirror-image caveat. Just as there is nothing inherently primitive about the job of Actor, there is nothing about the jobs of Observer and Critic that inherently exempts them from the hazards of primitiveness. One can be every bit as egocentric, willful, stupid, ignorant, clumsy, or self-indulgent as an Observer or Critic as one

can be as an Actor. There is no fixed limit to how well or how badly a given person can do any of these necessary jobs.

We are not talking about mental mechanisms or metaphorical family members here. We are talking about having a job and doing a job. As Actor, persons learn. As Critic and Observer, persons learn. How they do those jobs depends on what they've learned and what they've become.

h. Among other things, Actors, Observers, and Critics learn from one another. Like members of a team who have played together for a long time, they adapt to one another and support one another with a resulting synergy that goes beyond what is inherent in the bare notion of the feedback loop. For example, an Actor is unlikely to continue to *have* the same simple impulse to do something that always winds up being diagnosed as too dangerous, too painful, etc. Similarly, an Observer is unlikely to continue to pay equal attention to those circumstances and patterns that are generally relevant to the Actor's projects and to those that are not. Likewise, a Critic is, e.g., likely to become sensitized to the characteristic misjudgments and vulnerabilities of the Actor or the characteristic quirks, clichés, and blind spots of the Observer.

By way of contrast: With Id-Ego-Superego and Parent-Adult-Child the picture is one of consistent conflict, frustration, compromise and more or less fortunate survival. With Actor-Observer-Critic the normative picture is one of adaptive synergy and greater or lesser success. For the normal adult, one might say, it's Tinker to Evers to Chance.

i. The Actor, Observer, and Critic jobs provide different perspectives on myself and my behavior. My Actor's knowledge of my own behavior is importantly different from my Observer's knowledge and my Critic's knowledge of that behavior.

As the Actor, I have an author's before-the-fact knowledge of my behavior. In this respect I am in a unique position, since no one else could have an author's knowledge of *my* behavior. As the Actor in question, I am an "insider" with respect to my behavior. As an insider, I have that

view of it which enables me to select and create the actual production (enactment) of *that* behavior, and that includes a knowledge of what behavior it was produced *as*. (Recall the “Picture of Winston Churchill” above.) Archetypally, to produce it at all, I have to produce it *as* the behavior it is and not some other behavior. (One might say, I have to produce it under a particular description.)

In contrast, my Observer and Critic knowledge of my behavior is a spectator’s after-the-fact knowledge. (You can’t observe it or appraise it until it’s already there, whereas you have to know about it before it’s there in order to produce it.) That is the same kind of knowledge that anyone else would have of my behavior and it is the same kind of knowledge that I have of someone else’s behavior.

j. Figure 7 suggests how the jobs of Observer and Critic are learned. That is, each of these tasks is initially accomplished by someone else who has already mastered the job. Over time, one or more such persons provides the coaching that enables the behavior to perform these tasks on his own. An essential aspect of successful coaching here is that Observer knowledge and Critic knowledge of one’s own behavior is not in principle different for the coach and for oneself.

This is not the case for Actor knowledge of one’s own behavior. Here it is not a matter of coaching so much as nurturing. That is, (a) one has to have a certain amount of freedom to do one’s thing; (b) one has to have available some set of distinctions for conceptualizing and expressing oneself; and (c) perhaps one needs some kind of social requirement that one *be* oneself and *do* one’s thing.

k. From the person’s perspective, Actor, Observer, and Critic are things the person *does*. They are forms of behavior. When it comes to overt behaviors, Actor, Observer, and Critic are not merely three logically distinct jobs. In addition to being functionally related jobs, they are also three logically related jobs, and the relation is that of genus-species. Specifically, the Observer-Describer task is a special case of the Actor task and the Critic task is a special case of the Observer-Describer task, hence

also of the Actor task.

To make an observation and describe what one observes is a piece of behavior, and to engage in that behavior requires that, as Actor, I produce it *as* making or describing an observation. What is distinctive about the Observer-Describer job is that it requires special sorts of behavior (observation, description) and correspondingly, distinctive skills/sensitivities/judgment to carry it off successfully. It is not a question of something other than behavior (e.g., a disembodied Ego), and if I had *no* inclination to do it, it wouldn't get done. Likewise, the Critic's appraisals are a special case of Observation-Description, one in which a special set of concepts (evaluative concepts) and locutions are used. As with Observation-Description, if I had *no* inclination or impulse to engage in Critic behaviors, they wouldn't get done.

The foregoing account in terms of overt behavior is an archetypal account. When we learn simple arithmetic, we usually learn to do it publicly "on paper," and as we master that we come to be able to do it "in our head." Even then, the model of doing it on paper is pretty much indispensable for understanding *what* it is we do "in our heads." Likewise, we learn Observer-Describer and Critic skills to a large extent by engaging in overt behavior and later come to be able to do it "in our heads," and finally we are able to do it in our heads while doing something else (while doing our thing as Actors).

1. A classic aphorism in literary circles has it that if anyone ever writes the Great American Novel, it won't be because he sat down to write the Great American Novel. That is about as close to a sure thing as one could want.

What it reflects is that Actor, Observer, and Critic correspond not only to different tasks and different perspectives, but also to relatively distinctive verbal and conceptual idioms. To call something "The Great American Novel" is to make a Critic's evaluative, after-the-fact judgment. It is a concept which is completely foreign to an Actor.

If somebody gives me the instruction to “go write the Great American Novel” (or if as a Critic I give myself that prescription), the only outcome to be expected is frustration. “That’s all very well, but what am I supposed to do?” will be my response as an Actor.

Note that the difficulty is not the lack of detail in the specification. After all, if the prescription is “somehow you have to get to the top of that hill” that is lacking in detail, too, but it’s a prescription that as an Actor I can address with gusto. The difficulty with “go write the Great American Novel” is that it doesn’t connect to anything I know how to do. This holds for a familiar genre of Critic prescriptions (“Always do the right thing”; “Do everything as well as you possibly can”; “Always choose the path to success”; “Always give people what they want”; “Always tell the truth”; etc.). As an Actor, it always comes down to “Yes, but what do I actually *do*?”

A mirror-image mismatch is found in the notorious, “I don’t know anything about art, but I know what I like,” and equally “I should get a good grade for this because I worked so hard on it.” Here it is the Critic that is being imposed upon.

Surmounting the difficulties posed by different sets of distinctions is one of the ways that the experience of A-O-C teamwork helps. As a Critic I have to understand something about Actor concepts generally and the favored concepts of *this* Actor in particular in order to make effective prescriptions. As an Observer-Describer, I have to understand something about Critic concepts and be sensitive to the kinds of facts that count with Critics generally and with *this* Critic in particular in order to contribute effectively to the feedback cycle. And so on.

m. Jean Piaget, in his work on the development of intelligence in children, distinguishes “assimilation” and “accommodation” as the two basic cognitive capabilities. “Assimilation” refers to the capability for assimilating the world to my own projects and activities. “Accommodation” refers to the capability for accommodating my projects and activities to the restraints imposed by “objective reality.” Adaptive behavior involves

some balance between assimilative and accommodative functioning.

These two notions clearly have a good deal of resemblance to the notions of Actor functioning and Observer functioning, but only if one separates both pairs from their systematic conceptual connections, which are quite different. (Piaget's background model is biological.) And, for example, evaluative functioning is clearly a derivative phenomenon for Piaget, rather than being coordinate with assimilation and accommodation, in contrast to Critic functioning, which is coordinate with Actor and Observer functioning in the A-O-C structure.

n. Given a cyclic process, A-O-C-A-O-C-A- etc., one can raise the question of where the cycle begins. Is it really A-O-C? Or is it O-C-A or C-A-O? These are very different phenomena. Another way of getting at some of the same issues is to ask, for a given person, which of the three jobs has significant priority.

In the paradigmatic account given above, the AOC cycle begins with the Actor, and the job of Actor has significant priority. The *raison d'être* for Observer and Critic is that they contribute to the effectiveness of action; it is incidental that they also offer alternative ways of being.

Empirically, however, we find all three possibilities exemplified (the other two are generally pathological). For example, there is a well-known possibility where it is the Critic that is primary and the other two are for the sake of the Critic. In this case the cycle of action begins with a prescription "I should..." (I should do X, I should do Y, I should be Z, etc.). The Actor task is limited to implementing the "I should..." (whether or not it is possible). The Observer-Describer task is focused on what the Actor accomplishes, and the basis for Critical evaluation is whether the prescription was implemented. Note that this represents a significant narrowing of function all the way around, and that the Actor is merely a tool in the hands of the Critic.

Similarly, there is the case where Observation is primary and Critic and Actor are for the sake of the Observer. In these cases, we commonly

talk of experiencing or knowing or understanding rather than observing. Paradigmatic cases include the following.

(1) The Spectator

Here the search is for “interesting” experience or for “variety” in experience. There is often the explicit ideal of sampling all possible experiences.

(2) The Thrill Seeker

Here the search is for thrilling, exhilarating, or exciting experiences. Sky diving, bungee jumping, motor or speedboat racing, skiing, kayaking, and surfing are a few of the vehicles modern civilization provides. The mark of the Thrill Seeker is not the simple enjoyment of such activities, but rather that they are what living is all about.

(3) The Bookworm

Here it is a matter of vicarious living – of having some of the experience of living without actually doing the things one has the ‘experience’ of doing.

(4) The True Believer

Here it is a matter of finding complete cognitive closure in a single overarching conceptual scheme and a single set of Truths. Just as thrill seeking is not a matter of simply enjoying those activities, here it is not a matter of simply enjoying conceptual activity or of having evolved a consistent outlook or of having an intellectual bent. Rather, the addiction is to the Godlike view and certainty and the position of righteousness that goes with it. True Believers are not noted for intellectual creativity.

It may seem paradoxical that a self-correcting system should be subject to pathology, but that is on too narrow a view of the matter. “Self-correcting,” after all, is a merely procedural feature, not one grounded in guaranteed Truth or Revelation. The fact that a system is a self-correcting one in this sense in no way guarantees that it is free of bias, error, or pathology. All that is guaranteed is that the biases, errors, or pathologies it has will be of the kind characteristic of self-correcting systems and not

of some other kind.

2. Actor, Observer, and Critic Frameworks

Maxim: In a social system a person views events in light of the values and concerns which go with his position in the system.

Each of the A-O-C jobs is a distinctive one and each has a distinctive place in the functional A-O-C system. Thus, we speak of a distinctive perspective corresponding to each one.

Generally speaking, to speak of different perspectives is to introduce a unity-and-diversity scheme in which you have different perspectives on the same thing. But even this scheme encompasses important differences. Different perspectives may

- (a) select different parts or aspects of “the same thing” to deal with, or merely
- (b) give different emphases to the parts or aspects of “the same thing” that they all deal with, or
- (c) be conceptually incommensurable “approaches” to the same thing and constitute different subject matters entirely.

Further, “the same thing” may have an independent description or it may be merely a placeholder (e.g., “reality” or “truth”).

These distinctions serve as conceptual anchors or paradigm cases. We shall find that the A-O-C perspectives don’t simply fit one of these descriptions, and probably, we would locate them roughly equidistant from all three.

All the sciences and the humanities deal with “the same thing,” i.e., the real world, but they are characterized by distinctive theories and conceptual frameworks which are, by and large, incommensurable and not merely different. Likewise, theories of personality all deal with the same thing, i.e., personality, but they constitute incommensurable conceptual frameworks.

Are there distinctive conceptual frameworks corresponding to the distinctive A-O-C perspectives? The answer is clearly, “Yes,” but that is not a great deal of help in giving a more substantive answer.

a. Actors: All the World’s a Stage

And all the things contained therein are merely players and props.

As an Actor I see the real world as the field of action, as the domain within which I live my life. In it are givens and possibilities, opportunities and non-opportunities, hindrances and facilitations for behavior. In it are reasons for acting one way rather than another. I am sensitized to behaviors that are available and ways of being that are available. There is no question of who or what I am – I am *me*. There is no question of my inclinations and proclivities; I do not need to *know* what they are, though I often do – what is primary is that I *have* them, and my having them is not something different from being me. In particular, they are not peculiar entities or forces that *cause* me to do what I do. Ideas come – I do not send for them nor do I receive them as information. Theories come. Visions and inklings of the future come, and their coming is not something different from *being* me. All of this is embodied in my actions and in the short term and long term structures of action and being that I compose, sometimes ad lib, sometimes without realizing it until later, and sometimes upon casual or serious reflection.

To a large extent, my possibilities are bound up in the objects, processes, events, and states of affairs in the world and in the human communities with their social practices and cultures, including, most importantly, my own community. However, the most important ingredient is me. (It’s my possibilities we’re talking about, after all.) No one, including me, could simply read off my possibilities merely by examining everything else. (Recall the earlier discussion of this topic in connection with the State of Affairs System.)

I have resources for viewing things, both descriptively and evaluatively, from a public perspective. Mostly this is an asset. Sometimes it’s a drag.

If we consider the foregoing as an elaboration of the Actor perspective, then it seems clear that the central categories in the Actor conceptual scheme include the following.

- (1) Behaviors, behavior patterns X
- (2) Reasons for doing or not doing X
- (3) The value of doing or not doing X
- (4) The possibility of doing X
- (5) The impossibility of doing X
- (6) The implementation of doing X
- (7) Hindrances and facilitations in regard to doing X
- (8) Me, my possibilities, my place in the scheme of things
- (9) Living, being

Second-tier concepts which begin to fill out this conceptual scheme include the following.

- (1) A world (a scheme of things, of objects, processes, events, states of affairs, and persons)
- (2) Human communities and cultures
- (3) Social practices and institutions
- (4) My person characteristics
- (5) The public view of things

In short, the Actor framework is an out and out behavioral framework. Of course. How could it be anything else?

b. Observers: A World of Beans to Count

As an Observer I am a passenger and a spectator. I do not choose where to go or what to do or even what to look at. (The person and the Actor do that.) I merely register how things are and how things go, both in general and in particular. I do this in relation to the action that is in progress and also, secondarily, in relation to the world at large. The world at large is a scheme of objects, processes, events, states of affairs, and persons and their behaviors.

I note regularities, including those processes and temporal sequences

which allow one to predict the future with better than chance (or other) baseline accuracy. I note relationships, differences, similarities, and attributes. I count and calculate and classify and name things. I overlay various things I observe with conceptual schemes that connect them in various ways. A special case is the conceptual scheme for the real world, which is a given; my observations *come* in that form. Knowing my place in that scheme helps me reconcile my observations.

I am not alone. (Spectators and passengers aren't, of course.) I receive my priorities for observation from an external source and I receive evaluations of my observations from an external source. These work together with my own criteria for when to stop, i.e., when my observational picture is complete enough, and when it is certain enough.

Given this much of an elaboration of the Observer perspective, it is clear that the central concepts of the Observer framework include the following.

- (1) The real world (the scheme of things)
- (2) Objects
- (3) Processes
- (4) Events
- (5) States of Affairs, including
- (6) Persons
- (7) The behavior of persons

Second-tier concepts include the following.

- (1) Classes and kinds
- (2) Functions, relationships, dependencies
- (3) Regularities, invariances, and identities
- (4) Patterns
- (5) The place an observation is made from
- (6) Other boundary conditions on observation (external and internal criteria)

This is not a behavioral scheme. Rather than comprising a field of action, the Observer framework gives us a *picture*. (Recall that “The real

world is what you see when you look around you.”)

This is an impersonal framework, not a personal one. Unlike the case of the Actor framework where all possibilities are dependent on *me* (though not only on me), in the Observer framework, very little depends on me. Here, one Observer is essentially interchangeable with any other. As an Observer, I speak for Us.

Although this is not a behavioral scheme, it is not a no-behavior or anti-behavioral scheme, since it has a place for persons and their behavior *as such*, even if only from a spectator viewpoint. Let us call it a behavior-neutral scheme.

In contrast to the Actor framework which deals primarily with *possibilities* of behavior, the Observer framework deals primarily with actualities and their projections. The only behavior I can choose is one which, at the time when I choose it, is only a possibility; I cannot choose a behavior which is an actuality, because by then it's too late. Conversely, I can't describe or draw a picture of a mere possibility; until there is an actuality, there is nothing there to be observed, described, or drawn.

c. Critics: The Measure of All Things

As a Critic, I embody the objective view of how things ought to be, both conditionally and unconditionally. More generally, I embody the objective view of how things ought to be treated. The “ought” here is a normative “ought,” not a specifically ethical or moral “ought.”

In particular cases, I decide. I pass judgment. I decide whether an action or course of action is proceeding as it ought to. If I decide it is not, I also decide in what way it falls short and how such a situation ought to be treated so as to correct matters.

I also decide whether the action chosen was the one that ought to have been chosen in the circumstances. I also decide whether a given description of the behavior and, more generally, of the world, is accurate, coherent, complete, relevant, etc., and how it is to be treated if it is not.

Like a traditional judge, I do not create the standards I apply. I am not inherently creative. The standards I apply are community standards. This is why the judgments I make are objective. I speak for Us.

From the foregoing we may reconstruct the following as central concepts of the Critic scheme.

- (1) The community
- (2) The social practices, institutions, norms, and choice principles of the community.

Second tier concepts include the following.

- (1) The world of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, including persons and their behavior.
- (2) A multitude of concepts and descriptions designating instances of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs.

Thus, the Critic scheme, like the Actor scheme and unlike the Observer scheme, is a behavioral scheme. Like the Observer scheme and unlike the Actor scheme, it is a public scheme. It is *our* behavioral scheme, whereas the Actor scheme is my behavioral scheme. The Observer scheme of things, as we noted above, is *our* behavior-neutral scheme.

Doing the jobs of Actor, Observer, and Critic involves placing things in the corresponding schemes, and that is a special case of assigning a status. This notion will be elaborated below following the introduction of the notion of status assignment.

10. Engaging in Actual Behavior: The Dramaturgical Model

The models presented above for understanding behavior are Observer models. As an Actor, I don't recognize myself in any of those models. They are of no great use to me except to anticipate how someone else might understand a given behavior.

That someone else might be one of Us, or might be one of Them, in which case it would be different. In either case, the anticipation will carry only whatever weight it does carry with me on a given occasion. There isn't any *proper* weight for it to carry – it all depends.

What is needed here is a model which elucidates, if only incompletely and imperfectly, the sense that my behavior and my status as an Actor make in real life. Thus, we shall require a new model if we are to lend artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.

There is such a model – the Dramaturgical Model. Like the Relationship/Status model, the Dramaturgical Model makes use of status and relationship concepts. It may be regarded as an extension of the Relationship/Status model or as an alternative formulation of such a model. The primary formal difference is that in the Relationship/Status model the statuses and relationships are taken as given, as simply being the case, whereas in the Dramaturgical Model they are not. Important other differences are associated with this difference.

In order to delineate the Dramaturgical Model we shall first need to consider three related concepts, (a) appraisal, (b) unthinkability, and (c) status assignment, and we shall need to revisit Actor, Observer, and Critic from the point of view of status assignment.

1.0 Appraisal

An appraisal is defined as “a discrimination which tautologically carries

motivational significance.” The primary contrast is with the notion of a “mere description.” The latter does not tautologically carry any motivational significance.

1.1 First Person

The first thing to be said is that appraisal is a first person concept. My judgment that the rattlesnake is a danger to *me* right now would probably (see the second restriction, below) qualify as an appraisal. My judgment that the rattlesnake is a danger to *him* right now *cannot* qualify as an appraisal.

My judgment that there is a telephone on the desk in front of me can only be a mere description, for although it might have some motivational significance (e.g., if I needed to call someone right now), that significance is not tautological, since it depends on some additional circumstance (e.g., I need to call someone right now).

My appraisals are relative to myself, but they are not “subjective” in any interesting sense. “The rattlesnake is a danger to me” is no more subjective than “The door is to my left,” or “The automobile is coming toward me.” These are all relative to me. They are also the kinds of states of affairs that we confidently expect observers to agree on. All that is required is to have the relevant concepts and sensitivities and to be in a position to make the judgment.

Appraisals are relative to myself because they are formulations of *my* relationship with some part of the real world. Those relationships are, both in principle and in brute fact, unique. My behavior depends on those states of affairs (it depends on those *being* the relationships I have), and it is *my* behavior that is at issue, which is why appraisal is a first person phenomenon. It is at issue for me in a way that it is not for anyone else.

There are many ways to illustrate the specificity of relationships. For example, the person walking next to me may be in no danger from the rattlesnake we encounter; similarly, it is I, not anyone around me in the

crowd, who am insulted or cheered by that remark; and it is the person at the next desk, not I, who has to hurry to finish by 5 o'clock; and so on. Even those things like earthquakes, war, inflation, or rush hour traffic, which affect many people simultaneously, will make a different difference to different persons.

General principles, if they are good ones, are a convenience for behavior. Judgment is more than a convenience. Behavior depends fundamentally on judgment because (a) behavior is context dependent and (b) everyone is differently situated in the world. Appraisal is a necessity, not a luxury – it is our primary contact with reality.

In this connection we may recall the Judgment Diagram presented above. One of the things that is reflected in the diagram is that I routinely evaluate my circumstances and thereby find some of them to be motivationally relevant, and it is these which are the basis (the reasons) on which I act.

Reasons, which are states of affairs (circumstances), are of two kinds, i.e., tautologically relevant and contingently relevant. "The rattlesnake is a danger to me now" is an example of the first kind. "There's a telephone on the desk" (and I need to make a call) and "There's an orange on the table" (and I'm hungry) are examples of the second kind. The definition of "appraisal" makes it the term to use for the kind of judgment that identifies a reason (a state of affairs) that belongs in the first category. "Contingent motivational judgment" may be used for the kind of judgment that identifies a reason that belongs in the second category. In the context of the Judgment Diagram, "evaluation" is used for the general screening activity which allows for three kinds of judgment, i.e., (1) not motivationally relevant, (2) tautologically motivationally relevant, and (3) contingently motivationally relevant.

1.2 Actor Perspective

With this terminological clarification we can consider the second requirement for appraisal (the first being that it is a first person judgment),

i.e., that an appraisal must be made from the Actor perspective. This is relevant to the issue of “tautological.”

It is well to be clear about where there are logical, and therefore empirical, gaps in appraisal situations and where there are not. For example, there is a logical and empirical gap between, A, finding myself two feet away from a rattlesnake which is poised to strike, and, B, being in danger from the rattlesnake. If I am impervious to rattlesnake bites or if I am immune to rattlesnake poison or if I can perceive/move ten times as fast as a rattlesnake can strike, or ..., then I am not in danger. There is no description of the circumstances from which it follows logically that I am in danger from the rattlesnake. What we are to look for here is an empirical identity, not a logical inference: in *these* circumstances, the rattlesnake being poised to strike from two feet away *is* my being in that danger. It is precisely because there is a general logical and empirical gap between A and B that there is a place for judging (in effect) that in *this* case there is no gap.

Why, as an Actor, would I be interested in such matters?

My job as an Actor is to act as the person I am. In this context, “act” means “act authentically,” just as in mathematics, “calculate” means “calculate correctly.”

In certain respects, “an Actor’s lot is not a happy one.” In the Person game, one might say, there is no warm-up or preparation or any intermission or time-outs, and there is no pregame or postgame – *everything* (everything I do) counts as a move in the game (as an action). As the Existentialists might say, we find ourselves *thrown* into a game already in progress. Thus, as an Actor, I don’t have a choice of whether to act or not. My choices and my options have to do with which actions to engage in.

Consequently, the Actor perspective is sensitized to grounds for acting in one way rather than another, to behaviors that are available, to opportunities for different behaviors, to facilitations and hindrances in relation to different behaviors, and to ways of being. It is from this perspective

that, as we noted earlier, everything in the world can be seen as merely facilitations or hindrances to behavior.

Just as the banker perspective involves a sensitivity to those things that do, or, properly, would, make a difference to bankers, the Actor perspective involves a sensitivity to those things that do, or, properly, would, make a difference to Actors. Where earlier we said that the *person* who is acting as a banker *screens out* other kinds of consideration, here, we can put it that for the Actor *per se* there are no other considerations.

Thus, as an Actor, I have no interest in rattlesnakes *per se*. I am interested in them only insofar as they may, on a given occasion constitute grounds for action or contribute to the field of action. If that rattlesnake is a danger to me, that does constitute grounds for action.

In the Actor perspective, the concept of danger is the concept of something to be escaped from. There is no logical or empirical gap between (a) my judging the rattlesnake to be a danger to me then and there and (b) my having a reason to escape the danger. Since my judgment is from the Actor perspective it is made *as* a basis for acting, and, as in the case of “The Picture of Winston Churchill,” that *makes* it a basis for acting. Thus, to make the appraisal that I am in danger *is* to be motivated (is to have a reason) to escape the danger. The reference to “tautological motivational significance” reflects this identity.

2.0 The Given and the Unthinkable

The Sure Thing

Gil: I’ve got a bet for you and I’ll give you 1,000-1 odds – ten dollars to a penny. And let me assure you that it’s a down-home genuinely empirical proposition – nothing philosophical like the sun rising tomorrow or the floor not giving way under you. And I’ll let you decide who wins.

Wil: I’m a sucker. I’ll take it. What’s the proposition?

Gil: I’ll bet you that when you came into the room, you did not con-

sider, and then reject, the possibility of coming in through the wall instead of the door. How about it?

Wil: You got me! Here's a penny, and no second thoughts.

It is a given that you can't walk through walls. What is given, in the present sense, is what is taken for granted and not subject to question, doubt, or uncertainty. And what is taken for granted does not come up for consideration one way or another. That is its virtue. It provides a limit within which the possibilities for action are conceived and saves our decision making from being swamped by an endless succession of fruitless 'possibilities'.

How does one develop Givens? Mostly through simple experience. Presumably, we all learned early on that there simply is no possibility of walking through a wall (or pushing a hand through it, etc.). We learn this not merely by direct trial and error (if at all) but by virtue of everything we learn, hear, and see about material objects and human beings. What we do learn about the matter from all of these sources is that there are no such behavioral possibilities, and so in that conceptual range of 'possibilities' there is nothing to consider and no choice to be made.

Where it is a Given that something is not so, we speak of the Unthinkable. Walking through walls is unthinkable, not in the sense that I can't call the possibility to mind or talk about it (I could do that from an Observer perspective) but rather that I can't – literally, can't, though that may change in time – take it seriously as a possibility for me. (It is as an Actor that I rule it out.) I can't act on that "possibility." I might make a show of walking resolutely to the wall, but I would not carry it so far as to bump my nose.

You Can Walk Through Walls

Imagine that a distinguished scientist approached me with compelling empirical findings showing that some people can walk through walls after chewing a certain kind of mushroom. The people who can do that are dis-

tinguished by an unusual, but easily recognizable neurological pattern. After making some instrument readings, he informs me that I have that pattern and invites me to contribute data to the research by chewing the mushroom and walking through the wall.

“No way! I’d bump my nose!”

“The data is unambiguous. You wouldn’t bump your nose.”

“If you say so, doctor, it must be true.”

“Then try it. You won’t bump your nose.”

“I know it isn’t so, but that’s the way I feel. I’m not walking through any goddamn wall!”

The scientist can be replaced by a therapist, a religious leader, a weight loss expert, a coach, and so on. Who has not heard some version of the infamous “If you say so, it must be true” or “I know it isn’t so, but that’s the way I feel”?

Psychologists and philosophers are prone to take this phenomenon as evidence of (a) the primacy of passion over cognition, of feeling over intellect, and (b) the basic irrationality of human beings. And, indeed, it appears to be those persons who are most steeped in philosophical or popular psychology ideas who are most likely to say, “I know it isn’t so, but that’s the way I feel.” Other folk are more likely to say, “I know I *should* believe that, but I *can’t really*.”

Some folk psychological reminders concerning the nature of the conflict here are the following.

- (1) A person takes the world to be as he’s found it to be.
- (2) What a person takes to be real is what he is prepared to act on.
- (3) What a person acts on successfully tends to become real for him.
- (4) Reality takes precedence over truth.
- (5) Status takes precedence over fact.

Recall that reality has to do directly with behavioral possibilities and

that the real world is a way of encoding such possibilities. Not surprisingly, we discover behavioral possibilities primarily by behaving. What is real for us primarily reflects first hand experience. In contrast, what we know about the world is primarily hearsay, though it mostly does fit in with our experience. Thus, the primary basis for accepting some statement as true is different from the primary basis for accepting some behavior as possible. The potential for conflict between the two is always present, though in fact for most of us most of the time there is no conflict.

Consider the following heuristic.

The Four Bridges

Everyone knows that a bridge of modern construction is about the safest place in the world to be. This is because engineers really know how to build them and they build them to withstand ten times as much stress as anyone thinks they will ever have to withstand. There are very few places where you have that kind of safety factor going for you.

Now imagine that you know all that, and as you're driving down the road approaching a bridge, you say to yourself comfortably, "A bridge is about the safest place in the world to be."

Now, as it happens, as you're driving over the bridge, the damned thing collapses right behind you so you barely make it over to the other side.

That's a sobering experience, but you know the statistics and the rationale, and you dismiss it as a highly unusual occurrence. Even so, as you approach the next bridge, you can't escape some qualms and twinges of uneasiness.

Now as it happens, as you're driving over the bridge,

the damned thing collapses right behind you so you barely make it over to the other side.

This time you're quite disturbed. You think about it, you talk it over with your friends, and you go back to your reference sources. The answer is still the same: A bridge is about the safest place in the world to be, and you've assured yourself of that. Even so, as you're driving down the road approaching a third bridge you break out into a cold sweat and your knuckles are white on the steering wheel.

Now as it happens, as you're driving over the bridge, the damned thing collapses only inches behind you so you just barely make it over to the other side.

As this point, you say "To hell with the statistics! The bridges I cross over are dangerous!"

Now as it happens, the statistics are correct, and a bridge is about the safest place in the world to be. However, you'll probably have to cross over a fourth bridge safely before you're ready to take that seriously again.

Note that neither experience nor hearsay is infallible as a guide to what to expect.

And what I take to be real doesn't, in general, reflect no more than experience, pure and simple – it is inevitably also buttressed by the various matches between my experience and what I learn second hand. Conversely, what I come to believe is inevitably reality-checked against my own experience. This is why for most of us most of the time there is no conflict.

When there is a conflict, then, by definition, what I act on is what is real for me.

3.0 Status Assignments

“A place for everything and everything in its place.”

This familiar slogan carries a heavy connotation of spic and span orderliness and efficiency. However, we can take it merely at face value, without the connotation.

If the world is the state of affairs that includes all other states of affairs, then it has a place for everything, even such untidy things as disasters, horrors, accidents, and tragedies, and episodes of ecstasy, transcendence, and revelation, as well as fifteen seconds of fame and peculiar statements by quantum physicists, Existentialists, and political commentators.

And of course, in that world, everything is in its place. However, what place any given thing has in the scheme of things is not, in general, a “given.” Objects, processes, events, states of affairs, and, above all, people do not come with transcendental labels on them which specify where they fit or what their place is. (And if they did, that would, of course merely change the question to one of where this-object-with-this-label fits, etc.)

The place that a thing has in the scheme of things is something that is decided, not merely discovered. This holds both for My scheme of things and for Our scheme of things. The concept of a “status assignment” is the concept of giving something a place in a scheme of things. We will approach it through the important special cases of degradation and accreditation. (Though there is not a great deal of visible resemblance, the inspiration for the following analysis was a paper by sociologist Harold Garfinkel on “Conditions for Successful Degradation Ceremonies.”)

3.1 Degradation Ceremonies

There are public ceremonies of various kinds for improving someone’s status (accreditation ceremonies) and there are public ceremonies of various kinds for reducing someone’s status (degradation ceremonies). In the latter case there is a common set of conditions which, if met, will qualify

as a successful degradation ceremony.

There are three background conditions.

- (1) There is a community of people having a set of values such that adherence to those values is a condition for being purely and simply "one of us."
- (2) Paradigmatically, there are three distinct participants, designated as the Perpetrator, the Denouncer, and the Witness.
- (3) The Denouncer and the Witness act as representatives of the community in two senses.
 - (a) Acting as Denouncer or Witness reflects a person's good standing in the community.
 - (b) The Denouncer and the Witness act in the interest of the community and not out of merely personal motivation.

There are two procedural conditions.

- (4) The Denouncer tells the Witness that the Perpetrator has committed a certain Act. The Denouncer redescribes the Act, if necessary, so that it is a tautology that the Act, as redescribed, is a violation of those community values.
- (5) The Denouncer makes whatever case needs to be made to the effect that the Act, as redescribed, is a genuine expression of the Perpetrator's character and is not to be explained away, e.g., by reference to extraordinary circumstances or an atypical state of mind.

Under these conditions, it follows that the Perpetrator is not purely and simply one of us. Instead, the Perpetrator's standing in the community is reduced (his behavior potential in the community is diminished). The extent of the reduction depends on the nature of the transgression and the norms of the community. The consequences may range from a mild and temporary reduction in status (e.g., losing a driver's license for thirty days) to expulsion from the community or even death.

The reduction in status is not seen by the community as merely a new fact. Rather, some historical revision is involved. In Garfinkel's terms, "What he is now is what, 'after all', he was all along."

Corresponding to degradation ceremonies where a person's status is reduced, there are accreditation ceremonies in which a person's status is enhanced.

3.1.1 A Paradigm Case Formulation

The formulation of degradation ceremonies lends itself to some further development. Consider the following Paradigm Case Formulation.

I. Paradigm Case: The preceding formulation of a public, explicit degradation ceremony.

II. Transformations:

- T1. There can be more than one Perpetrator, Denouncer, and Witness.
- T2. The Denouncer and Witness may be the same person. (When Wil leaves the neighborhood bar after an argument saying, "He's no friend of mine," he is performing such a degradation ceremony.)
- T3. The Denouncer, Perpetrator, and Witness may be the same person. (When Gil recalls the action he took yesterday and says, "How stupid can you get. I should have done P instead of Q!" he is performing just such a degradation ceremony.)
- T4. The overt, explicit ceremony may be replaced by a covert, explicit ceremony, i.e., doing it "in one's head." (When Wil leaves the neighborhood bar after an argument and thinks to himself, "He's no friend of mine," he is performing such a ceremony.)
- T5. The overt, explicit ceremony may be replaced by a covert, implicit ceremony. (If Wil neither says nor thinks anything about his "friend" when he leaves the bar but thereafter stops treating him as a friend, he has performed such a degradation ceremony. Likewise, if Gil neither says nor thinks anything to himself about his action yesterday, but thereafter is less confident in dealing with

such matters, we take it that he has performed just such a covert, implicit degradation ceremony.)

3.1.2 Successful and Unsuccessful Degradation Attempts

Degradation ceremonies are not always successful. The designated Perpetrator might in principle present a defense based on any of the five conditions in the paradigm case above:

- (1) “The community doesn’t have such a value.” Or “Adherence to this value is not a condition for being a member in good standing.”
- (2) “Who are you to talk? You’re an even worse offender!”
- (3) “You’re just saying that for your own personal advantage.”
- (4) “Nonsense! I did nothing of the sort!” Or “Yes, I did the Act, but the redescription doesn’t apply,” e.g., “Yes, I killed him, but it wasn’t murder.”
- (5) “Yes, I did the Act and it was a violation, but it wasn’t a genuine expression of my character.”

All of these ways of rejecting the attempted degradation may be done (a) overtly or in one’s head and (b) explicitly or implicitly.

3.1.3 There’s Life After Degradation

Degradations are not always final. The last form of defense, “... but it wasn’t a genuine expression of my character,” is of special interest because it provides a basis for rehabilitation (re-accreditation). A successful defense of this kind will generally require the following.

- (1) Repentance – a repudiation of the Act. (This is what “but it wasn’t a genuine expression of my character” amounts to.)
- (2) Willingness not to benefit from the Act. (This is generally evidenced by making restitution, if that is possible, or by willingly forfeiting any advantage stemming from the Act.)
- (3) Willingness to undergo temporary degradation.

- (4) Success in not repeating the Act over some lengthy probationary period in which opportunities to repeat the Act occur.
- (5) It helps if the violation is the first, or the first of its kind, for the Perpetrator. (Presumably the Perpetrator's previous history also offered opportunities for the violation.)

Together, these provide about as good a case as is possible for the thesis that the violated value really does count for the Perpetrator and that the Act was in fact not a genuine expression of his character.

These considerations provide a rationale for the administration of criminal justice and rehabilitation programs. They also appear repeatedly in the course of ordinary socialization:

Parent: That was naughty! Naughty, naughty! Give that back to your sister and go to your room.

Child: I'm sorry.

Parent: And don't do it again!

Child: I'll be good.

3.2 Degradation, Accreditation, and Status Assignment

"Degradation" and "accreditation" refer to changing the place a person has in my scheme of things or in our scheme of things, and the difference between the two is in whether the change is a change for the better or for the worse. These concepts are indispensable in a wide variety of contexts, since persons tend to be highly sensitive to degradation and accreditation. There is, however, an essential need for a more general concept which doesn't only apply to people and for a non-committal concept which does not imply that the change is either for the better or for the worse.

Thus we return to the notion of a status assignment, which is a case of giving something a place in the scheme of things. The "something" here is not restricted to persons, but may be *anything* (objects, processes, events, states of affairs: individuals, groups, heaps, sets, structures, hap-

penings, absences, statements, actions, achievements, etc.).

For example, I can assign this object the status of a chair, a missile, a resting place, fuel, and so on, limited only by my ingenuity and the kinds of social practices we have in which this thing could find a good fit (a reasonable fit, any kind of fit). Likewise, I can assign this patch of lawn the status of a resting place, a requirement for mowing, the arena where the fight will take place, saleable real estate, a place my grandfather would have liked and so on. And of course, I can assign this individual the status of a person and further, the status of a possible friend, a competitor, a mark, or a neutral, irrelevant somebody.

Similarly, I can assign this statement the status of true, The Truth, a piece of foolishness, a way of talking that has this utility, a hypothesis, a wild guess, an empirically confirmed generalization, and so on.

For persons, a status assignment may be an accreditation or a degradation or, most often, it may have elements of each. (Consider “She’s an actress,” “She’s a government employee,” “She’s a scientist,” “She’s the kind of person who would drive a BMW.”)

Except for persons, status assignments *per se*, paradigmatically, carry no implications of degradation or accreditation. To be sure, we can and do extend the notion somewhat. For example, when I say that this old chair is to be thrown out with the (rest of the) trash, that could, in a weak sense, be regarded as a degradation. It is a weak sense because it is entirely one-sided. Whether it’s trash or a favorite place of rest for me makes no difference at all to the chair. It is quite otherwise for persons. A person values some states of affairs over others and acts accordingly. Therefore, a person may find herself in a good place or a bad place and can recognize a change as being for the better or for the worse. Because of this, anything that puts a person in a better or worse place has a poignancy and a significance that is normally not to be found with other kinds of individuals.

The primary point of assigning a status to something is simple and fundamental: (a) I am going to treat it accordingly – it sets the terms of

my behavior concerning that something. And (b) I am going to demand from it accordingly and evaluate it accordingly.

For example, if I assign that object the status of a resting place, then treating it accordingly will have as its most obvious instances (a) resting there and (b) turning down the option to rest there. What will not be an option is to sell it or not sell it, etc., since I haven't assigned it the status of a disposable asset. On the other hand, I can assign it both statuses simultaneously (a resting place and a disposable asset), and then, on a given occasion, I will have the option to treat it as one or the other. So it comes back to which status I have assigned it on that occasion. (There is also no implication of permanence or impermanence in the notion of a status assignment.)

3.3 Appraisals, Givens, and Status Assignments

From the presentation of these three notions, it should be clear that both appraisals and Givens represent special cases of status assignment. Both "a danger to me" and "given" are statuses. They are places in my scheme of things and each place can be filled by some number of different particulars.

4.0 A-O-C as Status Assigning

Doing the job of an Actor involves giving things a place in the Actor scheme of things – I assign them statuses in the world defined by that scheme. Likewise, I do the job of an Observer by giving things a place in the Observer scheme of things – I assign them statuses in the world defined by that scheme. And similarly for the job of Critic.

Assigning them those statuses goes with treating them accordingly.

Treating them accordingly, however, comes to quite different things in the three cases. Only in the case of Actor does treating them accordingly involve actual behavior. The behavior I engage in as a person is the behavior I engage in as an Actor. (When I engage in overt behavior of observing or criticizing, I do that as a person and as an Actor. In

these cases, as in all others, I will be registering how things are going and evaluating whether they are going well enough, etc.)

In the case of Observer and Critic, treating them accordingly amounts to no more than that subsequently I continue to take it that things are as I have found them to be (until and unless...). This may be regarded as a limiting case or a degenerate case of treating something accordingly (comparable to the verbal case where we have a concept and a locution but no other ways of acting on the concept).

This feature is particularly noteworthy in connection with the Critic, since (a) the Critic scheme, like the Actor scheme and unlike the Observer scheme, is a behavioral scheme, and (b) the Critic has been characterized as “providing feedback to the Actor,” which is at least suggestive of behavior on the part of the Critic.

4.1 Actors

Doing the job of Actor involves assigning things to positions in my behavioral scheme and treating them accordingly. The scheme is one which carries the distinctions which would, inherently, make a difference to an individual whose nature it is to engage in Deliberate Action. The Actor scheme corresponds to an Actor world but it operates even at the level of individual behaviors. It is highly stable and does not change from one behavior to another.

Behavioral structures (e.g., social practices and, as we shall see, dramas) are also characterized by positions (roles) which are statuses and to which things are assigned (the casting of characters and props). In principle, these positions are unique to each social practice, and therefore they do not have the kind of uniform presence that the positions in the general Actor scheme do.

The question arises, “What is the relation between these two sets of statuses or between these two sorts of status assignment?”

In this connection we may recall the notion of contingent motivational relevance, for which the paradigmatic example was, “There’s a telephone on my desk (and I need to make a call).”

When I reach for the telephone in order to make the call, I do not, in general, formulate the fact that I need to make the call. For example, I do not think it or say it to myself. Rather, it is the case that if I have to make a call, that is part of how I am right now. That being the case I will operate differently in corresponding ways.

Thus, under these circumstances, the presence of the telephone just is motivationally relevant in much the same way that the presence of the rattlesnake just is motivationally relevant; and then the presence of the telephone constitutes a reason (that I would not have had otherwise) to make the call now, while I have the chance.

Included in the central concepts of the Actor scheme are “reasons to do X” and “reasons not to do X.” A social practice, whether it is a prospective one or one in progress, will supply content for this schema.

Contingent on the social practice I am enacting or preparing to enact, certain states of affairs will constitute reasons that I would not have had otherwise. Usually, there will be reasons for engaging in behaviors that I would otherwise not have significant reason to engage in. And I will treat certain things and certain persons in ways that I would not otherwise have reason to do. (Or, if I already have certain of these reasons on other grounds, now they will count differently with me – recall that in the Judgment Diagram the “weights” are not adequately represented by a set of stable numbers.)

Note that, both at the level of the social practice I am enacting and at the level of individual behavior, what I do is primarily a function of my competence and character and only secondarily a function of my knowledge about it (how I explicitly represent it). When I shave an eighth of an inch off the nose of the statue I am constructing, or when I select this comment to make rather than that one in the conversation after dinner,

it is not because I have a theory about it or an explanation or justification for it or even a clear formulation of what “it” is, though it’s not that I couldn’t have. And I don’t need to have a script or an internal rehearsal to improvise my way coherently and appropriately through the enterprise I am enacting, nor do I ever think about it. (Well, hardly ever.)

4.2 Observers

The world of the Observer is the real world of common sense. It is what you see when you look around you – the world of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, including persons and their behaviors. It is not “the natural world,” since it includes persons and their behaviors as such.

The real world, as we noted earlier, is a free-form construction utilizing the logic of the State of Affairs System. It provides placeholders for what we find out by observation. In general, the overall construction (the World Formula) is anchored both on me, the observer, and on “the whole world.” In either case, there is a systematic framework which has places for the observer, the observation, and the thing(s) observed.

The primary achievement of the Observer is to recognize the thing observed and to assign it to the appropriate placeholder.

Thus, when I look out my window and see an automobile parked in the parking lot of the building next door, I have recognized something as a “parked automobile” and something else as “the parking lot of the building next door.” The placeholder is, e.g., “What’s in the parking lot of the building next door” and what has that place is, or includes, “a parked automobile.” Because the placeholder is itself anchored in the Real World (i.e., the location of that place is not uncertain) to put the “parked automobile” in that place is to give it a place in the Real World.

As a person and as an Actor, I can look at something that is an automobile without recognizing it as an automobile. As an Observer, I can’t register the fact that it is an automobile if I don’t recognize it as an

automobile. Of course, I will see something I recognize, and so as an Observer I will always have a description of what I observe.

As an Observer, I can be appropriately noncommittal in order to report what I recognize and not what I don't recognize: "It was some kind of automobile." "It was a massive object of some sort." "It was some kind of plant like an herb with leaves that smelled like a combination of mint and lemon." "He gave a threatening look." "It was a crazy mishmash of colors that made no sense at all." "It was maybe a hundred yards away." "It was an indescribable feeling."

By way of clarification, "observe" is used here in a slightly extended sense that includes noticing as well as observing. When I notice that there is an automobile in the parking lot, that is straightforwardly an observation. When I notice that I am sad, that is not an observation in the vernacular sense, but it is an observation in the present sense.

When I observe that X is the case, I find out that X is the case without, on that occasion, having to find out anything else first. The important point about observation is that it is the starting point for knowledge. Indeed, it is knowledge, unless...

Maxim: A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

When I observe that there is an automobile in the parking lot, that is where I begin – I do not first recognize something else and then conclude that there is an automobile. And obviously, there is an infinite regress problem lying in wait if we suppose that I always have to recognize something else first.

It is straightforward observation that supplies the ingredients for the Real World of common sense, and observation comes in the form of knowledge about objects, processes, events, and states of affairs.

Once we have a Real World of the familiar sort based on observation

and SA construction, a variety of elaborations is possible. One of the most obvious is to identify patterns, particularly recurring patterns to arrive at generalizations about how things happen, how things usually go, what usually happens, etc. These are obviously of use in anticipating future events. They can mislead us, too.

Closely related to this option is another option, i.e., constructing an unobservable hypothetical domain of hypothetical objects and/or processes and/or events and/or states of affairs such that the observable world (or some of its patterns) are merely the outcomes, or the phenomenal appearances, or etc., of that unobservable domain. Thus, the world of theorizing. This holds equally for anthropomorphic theories, e.g., theistic ones, and for misanthropic theories, e.g., “naturalistic” ones. They, too, can mislead us.

Thus, the Observer task can be extended beyond that of assigning observables a place in the Real World to that of assigning them to places in various patterns of recurrence and various theoretical schemes. Probably there will always be True Believers for whom the imaginary scheme is more real than the Real World. This holds equally for anthropomorphic theories and for misanthropic theories.

4.3 Critics

As a Critic, my primary function is to evaluate, and, as we all know, that is quite different from describing.

On the other hand, it is also very similar since it, too, involves giving things a place in a scheme of things. The difference is in which scheme.

As a Critic, I place things into our behavioral scheme of things. This scheme is, essentially, our culture.

Recall the parametric analysis of culture that gave us as parameters World, Members, Social Practices, Language, Statuses, and Choice Principles. It is primarily in the social practices (and institutions) and Choice

principles that we find the normative phenomena and concepts that are most directly invoked by the Critic.

Because *our* behavioral scheme of things accommodates an indefinitely large number of persons with a correspondingly diverse set of sets of person characteristics and behavioral proclivities and possibilities, it does not function with the same immediacy and directness as *my* behavioral scheme.

Thus, recourse to it does not imply actual behavior or even actual motivation – it is all contingent.

To place something in our behavioral scheme as a Critic is to speak for Us in designating it as that kind of thing. Consequently, it is, in effect, also to speak for Us in saying how it would be appropriate to treat that thing. It is to say how one of Us would, properly, treat that thing, other things being equal.

Thus, if something is “good,” whether it is a behavior or a machine or a kind of cheese, then it is to be preferred (over those of a similar kind that are not good or are less good). If something is “beautiful,” then it is to be appreciated (and more to be appreciated in this respect than something else of the same kind that is not beautiful or is less beautiful). And if something is True, then it is to be relied upon (etc.). Further, if something is “efficient,” then it is good in a certain respect and is to be preferred in that respect. And so on.

This is the Critic’s version of appraisal. As a Critic, to see something as good (etc.) is to see it as something that one of Us would, *properly*, prefer over something of a similar kind that was less good or not good (etc.). I emphasize “properly” here to distinguish the present portrayal from an “emotive,” “behavioral,” or other reductive analysis of value.

In many cultures, including ours, some of a child’s earliest learning of Critic concepts involves applying those concepts to his or her behavior. The array of Critic concepts and the practice in making Critic judgments

in a variety of life contexts is all potentially applicable to making Critic judgments about behavior.

4.4 Critic - Actor Feedback

In general, the answer to how Actor, Observer, and Critic communicate with one another is “through the Person.” Since it is one person doing all three jobs, there is no need for explicit communication – knowledge and skills acquired in any of the three contexts will in principle be available in doing any of the three jobs. However, in connection with Critic-Actor feedback, we can say more than that.

Let us begin by reviewing the job description of the Critic.

The first part of the job is to decide whether the Actor’s behavioral project is proceeding acceptably (is it going the way it should, given that it is what it is). If it is, that is the feedback to the Actor. (In practice, Critic monitoring may be either continuous or episodic.) If it isn’t, the Critic generates a “diagnosis” of what’s wrong and a “prescription” for what to do about it for the Actor’s benefit.

It is the latter which is likely to sound rather too pat and suggestively homuncular.

However, let us revisit the notion of the Critic judgment as one which assigns something to a position in our behavioral scheme of things, with the implication that one of Us would, properly treat it accordingly (and therefore should), other things being equal. (Note that the “should” does not follow logically; it is only for one of Us that it follows at all. On the other hand, there is no intrinsic limit to the range of who “Us” comprises.)

As to there being such a thing as treating it accordingly, recall the B in the Verbal Formula, $\langle V \rangle = \langle C, L, B \rangle$.

Because there is such a thing as treating it accordingly, assigning it

that status effectively provides both a diagnosis and a prescription. In more overt form, the Critic judgment would read, “This is a case of P [the diagnosis] and is to be treated accordingly [the prescription].” Or, with a different emphasis, it would read, “Treat this thing, P, in the way that one of Us would, properly, treat something of that sort, namely, do Q.” Beyond this, the prescription may select one of the ways of treating it accordingly.

In sum, the analysis of the nature of the Critic judgment and the specification of the Critic job as part of the A-O-C triumvirate come to the same thing. Accomplishing the Critic job of providing feedback to the Actor is essentially a consequence of the nature of the Critic’s judgment. It is not, as might be suggested by the job description, a matter of some homuncular activity of scolding, accusing, remonstrating, or giving advice.

4.5 Critic - Actor Discrepancies

Critic judgments and Actor judgments do not always agree, and this is not just a consequence of the lack of perfect correspondence between my behavioral scheme and our behavioral scheme.

4.5.1 Some Critic - Actor discrepancies are merely the difference between there being a reason for me to do X and my having that reason to do X.

Consider the following example.

Intimations of Mortality

I am seated at my desk doing my work. (a) Unnoticed by me, a massive light fixture over my head begins to separate from the ceiling. (b) Two of my fellow workers notice this and shout, “Look out for the light!” (c) I look up and see the light fixture continue to tilt downward. (d) I run away from the immediate vicinity of the desk.

In this example, there is already at point (a) a reason for me to run away from the vicinity of the desk, the reason being that I am in danger from the light fixture. That is what one of us would, properly, do in those circumstances, other things being equal. However, since I know nothing about the relevant states of affairs, *I* don't have that reason at all – I am not at all motivated in that way. Because that is what one of us would (etc.) do in those circumstances, any one of us (roughly) can recognize the reason for me to do that, and so my fellow workers are in a position to warn me. It is not until point (c) that I make the observation and judgment that gives me that reason.

This gap between there being a reason and my having that reason as a result of not knowing the relevant state(s) of affairs may reflect a limited opportunity to acquire the knowledge, as in the example or as a consequence of the fact that, in general, our scheme of things is richer in some details and also more inclusive than my scheme of things. It may also reflect my person characteristics – I may be colorblind, deaf, insensitive, untrained, etc. In all such cases, if there is a reason to do X and I don't have that reason, then I'm missing something, for whatever that's worth.

What it's worth may be nothing. My job as an Actor is to work with what I have; my job description does not include being either omniscient or omnipotent. This does not prevent me from grumbling about that now and then, nor does it prevent me from occasionally taking action to command a closer or a broader view of things before I undertake a strategic action.

4.5.2 Simple dissent also accounts for some of the gap between a Critic judgment and an Actor judgment. Consider the following example.

Jury Duty

I am serving as a juror in a trial. I have paid careful attention to everything that has gone on and I have brought to bear my understanding of people and their behavior. I am fully convinced that the defendant is guilty and should hang. However, as a juror (as one of

Us) I am bound by the law, the rules of evidence, and the admissible evidence, and when the time comes, I vote “Innocent,” as do the other jurors. Officially he is innocent and that is how one of us ought, properly, to treat him. However, I know better, and if there is any question about having any dealing with him or concerning him, I know how I will act.

Similarly, there is the other kind of dissent, i.e., “I know it isn’t so, but that’s the way I feel” phenomena. “I know a bridge is about the safest place in the world to be.” “I know they meant well even though they ruined my business.” I know, I know, I know. *But...*

4.5.3 In sum there are two kinds of difference between Critic judgments and Actor judgments. The first is that my Critic judgments are general and conditional (how one of us would, properly, treat it, other things being equal) whereas my Actor judgments are particular and unconditional and connect directly to my behavior. The second is that the two judgments may be flatly incompatible. The man is innocent vs. he’s guilty. They mean well vs. they are hateful. The bridge is safe vs. the bridge is dangerous. And so on.

Because I am always engaging in one or another (or more) of the social practices of the community, my behavioral scheme of things in general fits well, but not perfectly, within our behavioral scheme of things. (Individual differences show up primarily in what gets put in what position, not in what positions there are.) Against this background, the disparity between Critic judgments and Actor judgments may seem like a piece of awkwardness or an unfortunate state of affairs. In fact, it is neither. Quite the opposite.

The discrepancy means that each kind of judgment can serve as a reality check on the other. We are all familiar with the ways in which the social can serve as a corrective to the individual view. We are less familiar with the fact that it can *and should* work the other way as well. “Us” does not refer to an all-knowing, impeccable group soul, but rather to a

group of individual “Me’s.” When I in good faith claim to speak for Us but in fact do not, that calls for some corrective. “That doesn’t speak to my condition” and “God help me, I can do no other” are classic phrases used to indicate such a state of affairs. Judgments about what one of us would, properly, do can be wrong and they will almost certainly become outdated at some time. And if they are, I can resist; I can go my own way; I can create new Options or Versions of existing practices, etc. What could be more natural? Or rational. Or proper.

4.6 Critics and Observers

The Critic assigns things a place in our behavioral scheme of things and the Observer assigns things a place in our behavior-neutral scheme of things. Is there a common ground beyond the first person plural? Indeed there is.

The Critic’s scheme is a behavioral scheme of social practices and institutions. The Observer’s scheme is a spectator’s view of the real world – a historically particular panorama of objects, processes, events, and states of affairs, and the regularities and principles that various parts or aspects of the real world exemplify. Some of the Observer’s regularities (which are formulated as states of affairs) are the social practices and institutions which are embodied in the observable occurrences of individual behaviors. The particular items that play a part in those practices and institutions are also part of the Observer scheme.

All of that is familiar to us. What is less commonly remarked is that the nomenclature (“a chair,” “a tornado,” “a typewriter,” “a sudden pain,” “a river,” etc., etc., etc.) for things in the Observer scheme is primarily the nomenclature for positions in the behavioral scheme of the Critic (and the Actor). We distinguish those things in our observation *because* they play different parts in our behavioral scheme.

Is there a basis for this “because”? Why not the other way around? Some reminders may help.

(A) To begin with the obvious, life as we know it would be impossible if observation gave us only distinctions that we could not, either by nature or merely as a matter of fact, act upon. Thus, there must be a fundamental commonality between our behavior-neutral Observer scheme and our behavioral Critic (and Actor) scheme. This is not yet an argument for asymmetry, but see below.

(B) Suppose the Observer distinctions were primary. Then it would be the case that we distinguished the things that are chairs, tornadoes, typewriters, shortstops, doorstops, mountains, etc., in terms of their distinguishing observable properties. In that case, it would be routinely easy to give definitions of such things by referring to their distinguishing (necessary and sufficient) properties.

However, it is notorious that such definitions are impossible or extremely difficult to give in practice, since they routinely include too much or too little, and we may well suspect that they are in principle impossible to give. (If one looks adequate, we just haven't been clever enough to think of the counterexamples.)

The reason for this is obvious. We don't learn about chairs, tornadoes, mountains, shortstops, persons, etc., by learning either theories, definitions, or distinguishing (necessary and sufficient) properties and then applying what we have learned. Instead, we learn about them by encountering and dealing with cases where some particular thing plays that part in our behavioral scheme, and we learn to treat them accordingly; we master that part of our behavioral scheme.

The plain fact is that the collection of particulars that do or, properly, could, play a given part, e.g., "chair" or "tornado," simply has no obligation to us to form a group neatly delimited by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. That is why Paradigm Case Formulations, Parametric Analyses, and other such devices are necessary for a perspicuous mapping of the empirical world. (Interestingly enough, a limited version of the Paradigm Case Formulation, i.e., the "Prototype" approach, has gained favor in experimental psychology as an approach to perceptual concept formation.)

(C) Recall the formula for verbal behavior:

$\langle V \rangle$	=	$\langle C, L, B \rangle$ where
V	=	verbal behavior
C	=	a concept
L	=	a locution
B	=	a set of behaviors which have C as part of the value of the Know parameter

The terms now under discussion (“chair,” “tornado,” etc.) correspond to L in the formula. In the context of verbal behavior it was sufficient to say (a) that the connection of the locution to the concept accounted for the “meaningfulness” of the locution, (b) that without the set of behaviors B, the locution would be idle and pointless, and (c) that uttering the locution is a degenerate case of B.

In the present context it is a small step to go further and say that (d) for anything we distinguish in the Observer scheme (any instance of C), e.g., a chair, a tornado, etc., there is set of behaviors (instances of members of B) which qualify as treating it accordingly, and (e) without such a set of behaviors it would be pointless and idle to use the term (the Locution) to ‘refer’ to that thing (chair, tornado, etc.). This amounts to saying that anything we distinguish is necessarily part of our behavioral scheme.

There is no corresponding argument for our Observer scheme. Indeed, there are important categories of unobservables (“mental” concepts, theoretical entities, hypothetical states of affairs, etc.) which, it is clear, would not be part of the Observer scheme if they were not part of the behavioral schemes of Actor and Critic.

(D) There is a place for Observer distinctions which are not part of our behavioral scheme, and it is not, in general, a particularly important or interesting one.

As I look at the surface of my desk, the grain of the wood shows a complex and varied pattern.

- (1) I have no name for that pattern
- (2) I have no way to describe it adequately, though hard effort would produce approximations that might be good enough for some purposes.
- (3) Nevertheless I do distinguish it observationally, and when I compare what the pattern is like at this corner and at that corner, the difference is obvious.
- (4) When I talk about it to someone, the locution I will normally use is “the pattern of the grain of the wood on my desk top,” which is a placeholder and not a description (by normal standards) of what I see here. “Placeholder” corresponds to “is a position in our behavioral scheme.”

Examples of this sort could be multiplied indefinitely (“the taste of the orange juice,” “the smell of the bacon,” “the color of irises,” “the way the full moon looks on a clear night,” “the way it is when you just realize that you made a terrible blunder,” “the way it felt on Unification Day in Berlin,” etc., etc., etc.).

All of these are ways of locating something within our behavioral scheme, and whatever observational details go beyond that level of specificity fall under the implicit placeholder proviso, i.e., “whatever it may be” (e.g., “the smell of bacon – whatever it may be”).

The behavioral scheme provides access to such phenomena by giving them a place. Either the details are a matter of indifference (“whatever it may be”) or the use of such locutions is an invitation to evoke or recreate the experience (whatever it might be) rather than attempt the hopeless task of describing it.

4.7 Actors, Observers, and Critics

In the earlier discussion of Actor, Observer, and Critic in the context of a single person we noted that, over time, functioning in each one of these three ways becomes adapted to the other two so that the trio is fine-tuned and synergistic beyond *simply* a negative feedback arrange-

ment. For example, the Observer becomes sensitized to those things that matter to the Actor or to the Critic; the Critic becomes sensitized to the strengths, vulnerabilities, blind spots, and inclinations of the Actor and of the Observer, and the Actor's inclinations come to reflect the Observer's findings and the Critic's judgments.

What we have just seen is the same phenomenon writ large. The same kind of dovetailing and synergism appears at the social level in terms of relationships on the whole and in detail between *our* Critic and Observer *schemes*, between our Critic and Actor schemes, and between our Actor and Observer schemes. What we distinguish as Observers we have collective ways of treating accordingly and we have individual ways of treating accordingly.

5.0 The Dramaturgical Model

The primary point of assigning a status to something is simple and fundamental: (a) I am going to treat it accordingly and (b) I am going to require of it accordingly and evaluate it accordingly (I am going to hold it to its job description).

But putting it this way, though accurate, is still somewhat misleading. It's not that I first, on some unknown basis, assign something the status of, e.g., a resting place and later I (somehow) find occasion to treat it (somehow) "accordingly." Rather, I first have in mind, if only roughly or intuitively, a behavior pattern, potentially as one to enact, and the statuses I assign are just those statuses that the behavior pattern calls for. To enact the behavior pattern, then, *is* to treat those things "accordingly."

In short, the prospective behavior pattern is the directly relevant scheme of things that I give something a place in. And the place is essentially a role (a status) and only sometimes and only in small part a geographic location. This is the essential connection between the notion of status assignment and the Dramaturgical Model.

(What is involved here is a departure from the familiar object-oriented kind of scheme to a process-oriented scheme. Recall that in a Process

Representation the Elements are the formal ingredients (statuses, roles) which are embodied by historical Individuals whenever an instance (Version) of the process takes place. The Dramaturgical Model is grounded in this fundamental form of representation of the real world.)

At a concrete level of description the behavior pattern in question is a sequence of Versions of multiply overlapping social practices (recall “The Farmhouse,” “Dinner at 8:30,” etc.). The larger scale structure will not be a social practice. It will, instead, have the ad hoc character of a drama or a scenario in a life history. Ultimately, it is a life history.

The term “drama” is used here to designate such behavior patterns, including social practices: a drama is a structured behavioral episode or series of episodes which makes sense to Us.

In the Dramaturgical Model, behavior is intrinsically and fundamentally a matter of creating and realizing personal and social dramas. Human lives are intrinsically and fundamentally dramatic in form.

5.1 The Choice of Model

The choice of drama as the model for human behavior and human life is, in one sense, not surprising at all. After all, dramas as we know them portray possible human lives or strategic portions thereof, and they are generally designed precisely to highlight the strategic nature of the episodes they deal with. It is therefore not surprising that the idiom of drama provides us with some terms and concepts that are suitable for elucidating the basic character of human behavior and human life.

Note, however, that the present formulation has been developed without reference to any traditional dramaturgical concepts. There is nothing that is merely metaphorical here. Neither is drama a metaphor for real life.

Indeed, when it comes to real life as such, a game such as chess, soccer, baseball, etc., is a better model than drama.

A game illustrates in a particularly clear and unambiguous way that twenty million people can play games that are each unique and yet are each distinctively of the same kind, e.g., they are all chess games and not soccer, baseball, etc. In a similar way, six billion persons can live six billion lives that are each unique and yet each is distinctively of the same kind, i.e., it is a human life and not, e.g., the “life” of an amoeba or a rabbit, a mountain or a star, or a civilization.

What makes all chess games chess games is that, for all their variety, they are in accordance with a certain structure. What makes the game a good model is that that structure can be given explicitly in a well-known set of rules. This contrasts with the Person concept, where the “rules of the game” are acquired as a matter of competence, not as an explicit structure or representation. The present formulation of the Person concept is, as noted earlier, an effort to move from competence to understanding. Thus, it makes sense to speak of the Person concept as the rules of “The Human Game,” but again, it should be noted that the formulation has been developed without reference to any analogy with games.

What makes games a good model for real life, i.e., the clarification of the unity-in-diversity issue, makes them a poor model for individual lives. Because the rules of chess allow for all the possibilities, they will not be of much help in understanding why a particular game goes the way it does.

In contrast, drama and narrative are designed precisely to deal with individual historical continuity and are not designed to deal with all the possibilities. As between drama and narrative, the former is closer to real life because, unlike the latter, it must be, literally, *enacted*. As a model for *doing*, as contrasted with merely understanding, therefore, drama seems to offer the best heuristic model available.

Since the present conceptual delineation has proceeded without any reference to either games or drama, why advert to *any* model?

Clearly, it isn't necessary, but presumably it helps. Because we have an

intuitive grasp of games and drama based on our experience, this intuitive grasp can help bridge the gap between competence and understanding with respect to persons. But of course, since the present formulation was not based on any analogy with games or drama or narrative, there is always the alternative of considering “the Dramaturgical Model” to be just a name with no connotations.

(In passing, we may note that the contrasting features of both (a) games vs. drama as models and (b) the Person concept vs. individual lives correspond to the contrasting features of (c) Parametric Analysis vs. Paradigm Case Formulation as conceptual-notational devices. Recall that although the latter two are formally equivalent since one can be transformed into the other, the Parametric Analysis is the method of choice when it is important to have systematic access to all the possibilities, whereas the Paradigm Case Formulation is the method of choice when it is important to preserve the integrity of the complex individual case.)

It was this complexity of real life that we encountered in connection with Person Characteristics, and particularly the Dispositions (Traits, Attitudes, Interests, Styles).

Recall that a parametric analysis based on the definition of Person in terms of Deliberate Action gave us two pairs of parameters for life histories, i.e., (a) types of behavior and pattern of occurrence and (b) types of behavior patterns and pattern of occurrence. It was in connection with the former that we encountered too much complexity in the sense that the number of patterns of occurrence is, for practical purposes, infinite, and therefore unmanageable. We noted that what people have done is to make use only of a very minimal aspect of the patterns of occurrence, namely the frequency of behavior of the type in question, and that the virtue of this simplification is that, in general, frequency can be readily established by observation.

Given this we were able to give a systematic reconstruction of the traditional psychologists’ “personality variables” as well as others not usually considered to be personality variables. These, in turn are part of the Person Characteristics/Circumstances model for understanding behavior.

The complexity which was unmanageable for a simple combinatorial approach was generated by considering the possible patterns of occurrence of a single type of behavior in the life history. Even this, however, is already an *enormous* oversimplification. The most distinctive, characteristic, and fundamental patterns of occurrence of behaviors in a life history are patterns which involve a variety of different types of behavior, not just a single type. These patterns include social practices.

To be sure, we don't have to just ignore such patterns in the PC/Circumstances model. What we often do is to identify the entire pattern as a single type of behavior (e.g., playing baseball, farming, fixing automobiles, "parenting," and so on) and then proceed as before. But there are two decisive limitations here.

(a) This device works primarily for patterns which are of brief duration and are well enough established to have a name (these two features are highly correlated), for then there is pretty much the same point in counting occurrences as there is for behaviors that are really of the same type. However, the larger the scope of the pattern, e.g., attending college, the less point there is in counting occurrences (what would it mean to attend college twice as against six times?) and the less plausible it is to count that as a single type of behavior. By the time we reach a lifelong pattern, the notion of counting occurrences in order to characterize life patterns is an absurdity.

(b) Dealing with heterogeneous behavior patterns as a single type of behavior does nothing toward elucidating the pattern. And yet the understanding of such full scale patterns in real life is essential for understanding the behavior of persons.

It is just such full scale patterns in real life that are exemplified by versions of social practices and by dramatic episodes or other segments of a person's life history. Thus, the Dramaturgical Model makes good a major deficit left by the kinds of models we have for understanding behavior from an Observer perspective.

The primary reality constraint in this domain is that of all the in-

numerable meaningful patterns that are possible, we know only the few that we do know or can imagine or create. We do not have a systematic grasp of all the possibilities.

But of course, that “limitation” has never been a burden in living our lives – we do that quite easily and naturally. To repeat – the Dramaturgical Model is a model for doing, not for knowing.

5.2 The World of the Dramaturgical Model

In the Dramaturgical Model, nothing is a priori, either “given” or “unthinkable.” Behavior and human life are a matter of creating scenarios, assigning statuses, and living out the drama. “Given” and “unthinkable” are themselves merely statuses which we may give or not give to various items or states of affairs in our worlds.

More generally, in the Dramaturgical Model, there is nothing external that could serve as a cause of behavior.

But how could one seriously entertain such a notion?

The latter question reflects a certain framework of ideas which most of us have absorbed by psychological osmosis in the course of getting a professional education. Naturally, it reflects naturalistic and materialistic viewpoints, but it also reflects some elements of common sense belief – old wives’ tales, to use the current jargon.

Consider the following credo.

I am the Very Model of a Modern Natural Scientist

1. What there is in the world is objects which are historical particulars.
2. These objects are the ultimate particles that physicists talk about in their theories.

3. Things in the world consist of ultimate objects of that sort in particular configurations and dynamic relationships.
4. Those configurations are of the kind that can be represented completely in a geometry of space-time.
5. Those relationships are of the sort mentioned by physicists in their theories.
6. Human beings are middle-sized configurations of these basic objects, as are all the things we see with the naked eye, with the exception of some astronomical objects, which are large configurations of these basic objects.
7. Relationships of other sorts (e.g., human relationships) are reducible to relationships of these basic sorts. Other sorts of relationships are nothing more than these basic relationships under a different description. Any reference to any other sort of relationship is just a way of talking about these physical relationships.
8. The presence of human beings in the world is a historical accident.
- 8a. Corollary: The principles on which the world operates and the constituents on which these principles operate in no way depends on the nature and activities of human beings or even on there being any. "It was there before we arrived on the scene, and it will be there after we're gone." It in no way depends on us.
- 8b. Corollary: Human beings as such are in the world as spectators. They have no part to play in the basic goings on that happen.
9. The presence of language in a world that contains human beings is a historical accident. It needn't have been the case, and needn't be the case.

- 9a. Corollary: The principles on which human beings operate and the constituents on which these principles operate in no way depends on human beings having a language and saying things to one another.
- 9b. Corollary: Human knowledge of the world is acquired first independently of language and only then transformed into or coded into verbal expression.
- 9c. Corollary: The relation of language to the world is entirely external. Therefore, a connection between the word and the pre-existing referent must be *made*, somehow, if linguistic expressions are to be applicable to the world.
- 9d. Corollary: The relation of language to concepts and relationships is entirely external. Therefore, a connection between the two must be *made*, somehow, if linguistic expressions are to be able to express concepts.
10. Although the foregoing tells how the world is, I (and that goes for all of us) can't operate with that literally, because none of the things I observe are in fact reducible in the way I said. All I have is a verbal formula which seems to say that it *could* be done, but I don't see it done, and I can't do it. Secondly, I can't separate my language from my knowledge of the world. I can't get outside myself to see what the world is like independent of me and my language so as to make a comparison between how it is and how I say it is. The very distinction between linguistic and nonlinguistic is a linguistic distinction. Etc. Etc. Etc.
11. In spite of all these difficulties, those nine statements must be accepted as the whole and real Truth about the world because that is what modern science has discovered.

A shorter, and classic, version of this credo is the following.

“The moving finger writes, and having writ

Moves on, nor all your piety nor wit

Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,

Nor all your tears wash out a word of it.”

The moving finger writes from left to right (so to speak). There is a simple progression of events through time. And it's unchangeable and has nothing to do with you and me. We can't change it – it's simply there – it happens. (Note that the simple progression of events through time is not restricted to a world of three spatial dimensions and events happening in time; it can also be found in a four-dimensional space-time world where nothing happens and everything merely is.)

One doesn't have to agree with everything in the credo to recognize that something of that general sort would be endorsed by the great majority of university-educated persons today. Indeed, in an informal data gathering procedure where computer scientists and physicists were shown the first nine items, the reaction was consistently “Well, of course! How else could it be?” Which is to say that for them it was a Given, not merely something believed.

How else could it be? For an entrée into an alternative let us consider the notion of an ex post facto law.

Here is an example of an ex post facto law and a normal law.

Suppose that the regional government today passes a law that makes it illegal to drive on the highway at speeds over 100km per hour. Here it is, 2002, and they pass that law. From now on, it's illegal to drive over 100km per hour. That's a normal law.

In contrast, suppose that now, in 2002, the regional government passes a law making it illegal to drive on the highway at speeds over 100km per hour beginning in 1992, ten years ago. This is an ex post facto law.

Imagine that prior to 2002 I routinely drove at speeds greater than 100km per hour. When the ex post facto law is passed it is now the case, in 2002, that I committed a crime back in 1992 (and 1993 and 1994...) even though in 1992 *at the time when I did it* I did not commit a crime.

The logic of an ex post facto phenomenon is this: at a given time, T2, something happens so that it becomes the case that a certain state of affairs, P, was so at an earlier time, T1, even though at T1 it was not already the case that P was so.

A world which contains ex post facto phenomena cannot be represented accurately as a simple case of the moving finger writes from left to right. And it would seem to be impossible to represent in a four-dimensional space-time world in which nothing ever happens and everything just is.

Where might we find such phenomena? Consider an innocent case:

The First Play of the Game

Wil and Gil are seated in Marley Stadium on a Saturday afternoon in the fall of 2002 waiting for the football game to begin. The teams come onto the field; the coin is tossed, and the whistle blows. On the first play the quarterback fades back and tosses a sideline pass to the wide receiver. It is 2:30.

Gil: What was that we just saw?

Wil: Huh? What do you mean? That was the first play of the game.

Gil: Now wait a while! You can't have the first play of the game unless you have a game, right?

Wil: What are you up to? Yes, that's right.

Gil: Well, you don't have a game until it's over, right? And so we don't yet have a game here. And if we don't have a game, we can't have the first play of the game, either. So what is this we're seeing?

Wil: Well, it's not your eyes that are deceiving you.

Gil: So what is it?

Wil: (Smiles and says nothing)

The game continues, and at 5:30 the final gun sounds. Wil turns to Gil and says, “You see – I told you! That was the first play of the game.”

In this exchange, both Wil and Gil are correct. In the vernacular, we would say, as soon as we saw it, that that was the first play of the game. But Gil’s argument is also correct – if there is no game, there is no first play of it, either, and there isn’t a game until it ends. Wil is correct in not arguing – only time will tell and he has confidence in what it will tell. Such confidence is generally justified. Nevertheless, had the game been called five minutes after it started, Gil would have been vindicated: there would not have been a game and what Wil and Gil saw could not have been the first play of it, either.

The football game meets the requirements for an *ex post facto* phenomenon: at 5:30 it became the case that what Wil and Gil saw at 2:30 was the first play of the game, even though at 2:30, when Wil and Gil saw it, it was not already the first play of the game.

Let us consider a parallel case where there is no issue of confidence in what is going to happen.

The Beginning of the Brawl

As Wil and Gil are leaving the stadium they notice that, a short distance away, a man wearing the Home Team colors bumps into another man wearing the Visiting Team colors and almost trips him up. They exchange some heated words and the Home Team fan begins to turn away when another Visitor fan pushes him. At that he turns and throws a punch. Other bystanders join in and within moments there is a full-fledged brawl going on.

What was the beginning of the brawl? As it turns out we would probably agree that it was the collision between the two spectators. However, at the time when it occurred, neither Wil nor Gil who saw it happen would have described it as “the beginning of a brawl.” After there was a brawl it became the case that the collision was the beginning of the brawl even though at the time the collision occurred it was not already the beginning of the brawl.

(Note that *ex post facto* phenomena have a bearing on origin problems. If I ‘believe’ in predestination, determinism, or certain other articles of faith, there will be no genuine beginnings of anything other than the beginning of everything. (Everything else will be merely a continuation, not a beginning.) The entire history of the universe will be prefigured in its first moment and its first moment will be a non-prefigured anomaly, like a large bang coming out of nowhere.)

Because these are familiar examples it is easy to discount them and to suppose that we are merely dealing in fictions or playing semantic games or talking about “mere interpretation” as opposed to “hard data.”

But there is nothing fictitious about a brawl or a football game (there is no data harder than that), and there is nothing fictitious about the beginning of a brawl or a football game. Without the beginning, we would have no brawl and no football game. So it’s not “just a matter of what we call it.” It’s a question of *it* and what it *is*. It’s a question of *what* it is.

This is perhaps more evident in a third kind of familiar example.

I Never Liked You Anyhow

Lorenzo and Miguel are seven-year-old boys who attend the same school and strike up a friendship on the playground. After a time their relationship becomes more conflictual and problem laden. Finally there comes a time when they get into a big argument and their friendship is ended. Lorenzo’s parting shot is, “I never liked you anyhow.”

Visibly, “I never liked you anyhow” is a degradation ceremony. And recall that one of the things the degradation ceremony achieves is that “what he is now is what, after all, he was all along,” which is a version of *ex post facto*. Adult parallels to “I never liked you anyhow” include “I never really loved you” and “you never really did fit in with the group,” “it never really had a chance to succeed,” and so on.

Let us consider a new kind of example.

The Elusive Pawn

Imagine that we are in a tapas bar and at one table a game of chess is going on. We walk over and look. The chess pieces are made of onyx in appropriate shapes. I point to one of the pieces, and it's a pawn. I say, “There it is, and it's a pawn – no hocus pocus about that.” And so it is.

Now I say, “Now, chess was invented around three-thousand years ago or so. Now, suppose that we or someone else had encountered this thing (pointing to the pawn) five thousand years ago. Was it a pawn?”

The answer here is clear. Until chess was invented, nothing was a pawn and nothing could possibly be a pawn. One virtue of this example is the stark clarity of this conclusion. There is no statement in logic, mathematics, or geometry that is more self evident or more certain than this one.

Let us also, for increased clarity, distinguish between a historical formulation and a categorical one.

In the relevant sense, a historical formulation is one which makes essential reference to historically particular persons, objects, dates, groups, processes, etc. Thus, if I say, “Wil and Gil at Marley Stadium on a Saturday afternoon,” that is a historical formulation. (One doesn't have to specify every historical particular, such as the date, in order to have a historical formulation.)

In contrast, a categorical formulation makes no essential reference to historical particulars.

There is a relation between the two. If a historical formulation is to be successful there will be a corresponding categorical formulation which it exemplifies. Thus, for the football game one would say that without the whole there are no parts of it, because there is no *it* there. This latter does not refer to any historical particulars.

From the latter, one can generate all manner of examples, including the football game. The football game is a process, a temporally extended whole, and a temporally extended process is not a whole until it's finished. An internal combustion engine with a carburetor is a whole, and without such engines there could be no such thing as a carburetor, but there is no temporal formulation here.

"Without the game of chess, nothing could be a pawn." This is the categorical formulation corresponding to "Before chess was invented, nothing could be a pawn." "Before chess was invented" happens to be a convincing stipulation of a state of affairs in which for sure there was no such thing as chess.

Nothing can be an element (like a pawn) in a conceptual system, or an instance of such an element (like *this* pawn), if the conceptual system doesn't exist. In a historical formulation the clause "if the conceptual system doesn't exist" is paraphrased as "before the conceptual system was invented." So: nothing can be an element in a given conceptual system, or an instance of such an element, before the conceptual system is invented.

Then what was this thing before it was a pawn? Before we invented the social practice (chess) that involved distinguishing pawns (etc.) from other things and treating them accordingly, what was this thing?

If we take the line of least resistance, we will say "a piece of onyx."
This is like being told that it's Atlas who holds the world up.

For now we ask, “Before we invented the social practice(s) of distinguishing onyx (etc.) from other things and treating them accordingly, this couldn’t have been onyx – so what was it?”

Now we learn that it is a giant elephant that holds Atlas up. But the elephant is not *just* a repeat of Atlas and the onyx is not *just* a repeat of the pawn.

As soon as we invented the social practices of distinguishing onyx (etc.) from other sorts of things and treating them accordingly (and this includes the practices involved in deciding whether something is a piece of onyx) it became the case that this thing was a piece of onyx. But also, it became the case that this thing had been a piece of onyx all along. “What it is now is what, after all, it was all along.” This is *ex post facto* again, and with a vengeance, for we can begin to see the end of the trail.

Different games, different roles, different entities. The role of a pawn in chess is categorically different from the role of the football in football, and both are categorically different from the role of the pitcher in baseball, and all of these are categorically different from the role of the bullet or the arrow in hunting game, and so on.

The role of being a pawn is different from the role of being a piece of onyx and one mark of that difference is that (a) when we invented our mineralogical taxonomy and practices it became the case that this thing had been a piece of onyx all along, whereas (b) when we invented chess it did not become the case that this thing had been a pawn all along.

This is why we would say, “Before it was a pawn, it was a piece of onyx.” And note that we would say this now even though we could not have said it a thousand years after chess was invented, because at that time, our mineralogical taxonomy and practices had yet to be invented. But now, a piece of onyx is what it already was even at the time chess was invented.

So what was this thing before it was a piece of onyx? If we take the line of least resistance, we will say, “It was a physical object.”

Here we learn that it is a giant tortoise that holds the elephant up.

And so we ask, “Before we invented the social practices that involve distinguishing physical objects from other things and treating them accordingly, this thing couldn’t have been a physical object, so what was it?”

Note that as soon as we did create those practices it became the case that this thing had been a physical object all along.

So what was it before it was a physical object? Here we may try “object” and then “thing,” and then – what? If we find ourselves thrashing around, it is because we have discovered that the tortoise is not held up by anything – it is “swimming in the eternal sea.”

And we have drawn the line roughly where Immanuel Kant drew it – empirically, there is no real world that in a logical sense is truly external to human lives. And the appropriate conclusion is not that there is a transcendental world of “things in themselves” that we are seeing through a glass darkly, but simply that there is no real world that is truly external to us. Since we have, in addition to the notion of the real world, the more fundamental notion of reality as the boundary condition on possible behaviors, we will not be overlooking anything.

Independent, Independent

Wil: But the world out there *is* independent of us. It was there before we arrived on the scene and it’ll be there after we’re gone. Surely you can’t deny that!

Gil: No, you’re right. It isn’t that there was no world before there were people.

Wil: You see!

Gil: It’s that there was no world before there were people before there were people.

Wil: Say that again?

Gil: And it's not that there's no world out there independent of people. It's that there's no world out there independent of people independent of people.

Wil: What? What?

Gil: And of course, it isn't that the world won't be there after we're gone. It's that the world won't be there after we're gone after we're gone.

Wil: Oh, my!

Gil: Try it this way: It wasn't until there were people that there was a world before there were people. And it's only while there are people that there will be a world out there after people are gone. And it's only *for* people and *while* there are people that there's a world out there independent of us.

Wil: It sounds like some of those crazy statements those quantum guys are always making.

Gil: There is some resemblance, and it's not accidental.

Wil: You're telling me that to be is to be perceived. I've heard *that* before, and I've heard some of *them* say that.

Gil: No! There really is a world out there independent of people. I already said that. It's just that its being really independent of people is not itself independent of people. That's one of *our* gigs. I feel a little uneasy about saying it this way, but you might put it that *its* only reality lies in being independent of *us*, and therefore we're essential to its existence but not in a way that challenges its real independence of us. It's only its transcendental independence of us that is challenged.

Wil: It almost sounds as if you're saying that we create it.

Gil: Creation is not the simple notion that it might seem. But no – it's more like we're two sides of the same coin. Remember, every world is somebody's world.

What holds for pawns and onyx holds for everything else, too. It should be clear that although the preceding was carried out in terms of objects, there are corresponding developments in terms of processes,

events, states of affairs, relations, attributes, and so on.

It's an ex post facto world.

That might sound as though we had superhuman powers, as though we could materialize a piece of onyx or a tree or an automobile by waving an arm and saying, "Shazam!" But of course, we can't. The only thing we can create out of nothing, as it were, is our own behavior.

There are reality constraints in the picture. To create the category of X's we have to create the social practices that involve distinguishing X's from Y's and Z's and treating them accordingly. It is the nature of those practices that determines the cash value of saying, "There really are X's."

There are other reality constraints on the creation of those social practices. We are limited, no less than we are empowered, by every Person Characteristic we have. We are limited by our traits, attitudes, interests, styles, values, knowledge, abilities, states, embodiments, and capacities. We are not endlessly inventive, either as individuals or as groups, and our abilities to invent new social practices that genuinely have a point are limited, though we cannot give a certain or complete account of what those limits are. (That is one of our limitations.)

And there's more. What holds for pawns and onyx holds for behaviors and social practices also. Before we invented the social practices that involve distinguishing between behavior P and behaviors Q and R and treating them accordingly, there couldn't be and weren't any behaviors P. You could have something there, but not behavior P.

Consider, for example, if Wil claims he has invented a new game, but tells Gil that the new game can't be taught, can't be recognized or described, and can't be demonstrated. There is no difference between there being such a game and there not being such a game, and a game is a form of behavior. Giving it a name and saying that there is such a game are degenerate cases of ways of treating 'it' as a case of X rather than Y or

Z. In the absence of more substantive practices, these alone will not give it any more than a degenerate sort of existence. In the case of normal games, however, giving it a name serves to jump-start its existence until the practices of teaching, playing, etc., can be developed.

Or, take a more clinical example. Consider the following.

Elephants, Pink and Gray

Wil and Gil are standing in a large office setting with multiple desks, files, and standard sorts of office equipment.

Wil: That's my pet elephant on the desk.

Gil: What elephant?

Wil: Right over here. See?

Gil: There's no elephant there. You're seeing things.

Wil: No, no! There's an elephant here. I'll show you. I'm going to feed him some fodder. (He picks up some paper, crumples it, and extends his arm, then drops the paper.) See how he takes it?

Gil: No way! You're not feeding anything to any elephant. All the paper you started with is still there.

In this case, Wil does not succeed in making a case for the elephant because he does not succeed in treating his own behavior as a case of treating something as an elephant. In contrast, if Gil had heard snuffling sounds and seen the paper jerked out of Wil's hand and gradually disappear, some amount of falling back and regrouping would be in order. Of course, there would be a variety of other tests possible.

In cases such as Wil's elephant, we would normally say that Wil was distorting reality and we would bring pressure to bear as Gil did, namely to challenge him to carry off his story and pointing out how it failed to measure up.

Experience with paranoid delusions shows us that such pressure can

work both ways. Wil might recant the elephant, but he might instead find an explanation as to why we were being so obtuse or perverse or deceptive. If he insisted on his own stories in the face of continued pressure he might indeed wind up “totally out of contact with reality.”

No behavior is an island. All behaviors belong to a single domain and their place in that domain – their interrelationships with other behaviors – is constitutive of their being the behaviors that they are. Every item in the ‘natural world’ and the natural world itself belongs to the same domain interlinked with the behaviors, and the place of each such item in that domain is constitutive of its being the thing it is.

In developing the concept of ex post facto phenomena, we have used the verbal formula, “Before we invented the social practices which involve distinguishing X’s from Y’s and Z’s and treating them accordingly, what was this thing?” It should be noted that this verbal formula is essentially the Verbal Formula presented earlier:

<V>	=	<C, L, B> where
V	is	verbal behavior
C	is	a concept
L	is	a locution
B	is	a set of behaviors which have C in their K value

For, in the present context, we can paraphrase B as the set of behaviors which qualify as treating something as a case of C.

We have also, independently, developed above the conclusion that anything that is in our observational scheme is in our behavioral scheme but not vice versa. Thus, we have a consistent picture – it’s an ex post facto world. This is the appropriate contrast to the picture evoked by “the moving finger writes...” and to the notion of a “naturalistic” world.

This is the world of the Dramaturgical Model.

IV

ORDINARY MYSTERIES: TOUCHSTONES OF ADEQUACY

Some aspects of human life are more transparent than others. We find, for example, little that is problematic in principle about baking apples, watching television, baling hay, driving an automobile to work, attending a wedding, negotiating a fandango, or calculating the cost of a real estate transaction.

In contrast, there are other phenomena which, in one way or another, seem inherently mysterious, puzzling, paradoxical, or otherwise intractable to ordinary understanding. Classically, such phenomena include emotions, dreams, psychopathology, consciousness, personal identity, imaginary companions, altered states of consciousness, humor, symbolism, language, art, science, and religion. And others.

These are ordinary mysteries, not exotic ones. That is, we encounter these phenomena in the course of daily life rather than only in exotic places or extraordinary circumstances. Thus, the extent of our understanding of persons and their behavior becomes tied to the extent of our understanding of these phenomena and their ordinariness.

A possible clue to this contrast may be found in the notion of persons as agents. That is, the transparent phenomena are transparent because we can understand them simply as activities carried out by human agents. In contrast, a scan of the list of mysterious phenomena shows them not to be evidently understandable in this way.

In the present section, formulations are given of several of these phenomena (and recall the previous treatment of language and symbolism). These are topics of interest in their own right. The formulations also serve as further evidence that the framework of common sense extends well beyond the "See Jack run!" level at which it is universally pictured for us by academic folk.

11. Emotion

1.0 What are we to count as emotions?

A standard college classroom exercise is to instruct the students to make a list of all the emotions they can think of. The results are perhaps surprising.

There are four emotions that appear on everyone's list and that no one voices objections against when the items on the lists are discussed. The four, unsurprisingly, are fear, anger, guilt, and joy.

A lower but still high degree of consensus is found for shame, envy, and jealousy. For these, too, essentially no one objects to their inclusion on a common list although only 60-80 percent include them on their individual lists.

Grief and despair appear substantially less often on individual lists but there is only moderate resistance to their inclusion on a common list.

Conversely, greed, lust, ambition, and revenge appear on almost no lists and, along with friendship, these are voted down by strong majorities (say, 70-90 percent).

Love and affection appear on few lists but most classes are about evenly split as to whether to include them once they are mentioned.

Happiness has never appeared on any list nor has disappointment.

Also noteworthy by their almost complete absence are "family member" terms which we distinguish primarily in terms of intensity. Thus, although fear appeared on essentially all lists, uneasiness, apprehension, dread and terror almost never appeared. Likewise, although anger appeared on almost all lists, irritation, annoyance, hatred, and rage almost never appeared. Nor did bitterness or resentment. None of the latter were objected to. Thus, it appears that the students were using the emo-

tion terms “fear,” “anger,” “guilt,” and “joy” both as specific emotions and as categories or paradigm cases for groups of related emotions.

These results were repeatable in various classes over a period of years. They represent a relatively consistent and apparently reasonable set of discriminations.

In contrast, responses to a request for a definition of emotion showed no consensus at all. Definitions referred to a kind of feeling, a kind of experience, a physiological pattern, a psychophysiological pattern, an instinctual response, an irrational episode, a state of mind, and a socio-cultural construction, to name a few. The obvious explanation here should by now be a familiar one: we don’t learn about emotions by learning a definition or a theory and then applying it. The students’ judgments were far more sensitive and sophisticated than their definitions.

Given the high degree of agreement on certain things being emotions and on certain other things not being emotions and given that there were significant intermediate cases, one thinks almost automatically of a Paradigm Case Formulation and of the need for a systematic framework for elucidating the various phenomena included under the term “emotion.”

2.0 Umbrella Terms

One of the significant problems with “emotions” and with emotion terms such as fear, anger, guilt, joy, shame, etc., is that we use them to refer to phenomena that are categorically different from one another and therefore have to be dealt with one by one, since what we say about one would be nonsense if we said it about others.

For example, we use the term “fear” or its cognates to refer to a kind of behavior, to a kind of motive, to a certain kind of “state of mind,” to a kind of attitude, and to both standing conditions and to certain kinds of episodes. If this is not merely equivocation, it provides a strong indication that there is a conceptual structure that provides places for the

various kinds of emotional phenomena.

The basic formulations presented earlier provide us with just such a conceptual structure. Recall that various categories of Person Characteristics were derived directly or indirectly from

- (a) a type of behavior and
- (b) a pattern of occurrence (of that type of behavior in the life history).

For any given type of behavior we derived the concepts of the corresponding dispositions (traits, attitudes, interests, and styles) and powers (abilities, knowledge, and values) and from these we derived states, capacities, and embodiments.

It follows that if the type of behavior is an emotional behavior, there will be corresponding emotional traits, attitudes, interests, and states and emotionally defined abilities, knowledge, values, capacities, and styles, as well as empirically linked embodiment characteristics. All of this will be the case for each and every kind of emotional behavior we distinguish.

Given the strategic place of the concept of behavior in deriving the range of Person Characteristics it will be appropriate to begin the consideration of “emotion” with a formulation of emotional behavior.

3.0 Fear Behavior

We will begin not with emotional behavior generally or even with fear behavior as such, but rather with a particular example of fear behavior where it is possible to exercise judgment and competence without relying on theory or definition.

3.1 A Paradigm Case

Consider the following vignette.

The Lion Walks In

Imagine that I am seated at the back of a large lecture hall and I am the only person there. All the doors are closed except that at the front end one of the doors is slightly ajar. I am glancing desultorily at some notes and thinking. Suddenly, the door at the front creaks. I look up and see a lion push his way into the room, sighing.

In a flash, I am out the back door, slamming it shut behind me. I run into the office across the hall, slamming the door behind me and quickly alert the relevant authorities.

You and a friend were in the projection booth and saw everything that happened in the lecture hall. After order is restored, you ask me “Why did you run out of the room?” I reply “Because I was afraid of the lion.”

In this example, everything fits – what you saw, what I did, and what I said about it. And there is no reason to doubt. Thus, we can say straightforwardly, “If there ever was a case of fear behavior, this is one.” And we have this kind of assurance that we are dealing with the right phenomenon.

3.2 Details of the Paradigm Case

Let us now examine this case of fear behavior using the behavior description procedure of supplying the values of the parameters of that behavior. Thus, if we begin with the K (Know) parameter, we ask, what must I have been discriminating if my behavior was that of running out of the room because I was afraid of the lion. Here, the answer will include the room, the lion, our respective places in the room, the door I ran through, being inside the room vs. being outside, and danger vs. safety. (Recall from the earlier example of the rattlesnake that if I did not see the lion as dangerous to me I would have no reason to run and I would not be afraid.)

We have, of course, no assurance of completeness, and in general it is a safe assumption that such specifications are incomplete. After all, who

knows what I might have been thinking or noticing in addition. What we can say is that if the behavior was as described then I must have been acting on *at least* those discriminations, for if we subtract any one of them we can no longer understand the behavior as being the one it was described as being. (In some contexts one might raise the question of whether, e.g., I really discriminated the door or whether I discriminated something else that happened to also be a door and that I happened to visibly treat as one would a door, but such exotic possibilities are not at issue here. Note, too, that even here we could no longer understand the behavior as being that of running *out the door* because I was afraid of the lion.)

If we move to the values of the W parameter (the wanted state of affairs, the criterion for the success of the behavior as such), we will not fail to mention (a) getting away from the lion and (b) getting out of danger, or escaping the danger. Given that anything wanted must also be discriminated, these serve as a reminder that they, too, should be included in the value of K. However, in the interest of simplicity, we will leave this “understood.”

Continuing in this vein, we summarize the results in Figure 9. Here, we use the “Diamond Notation” which was introduced earlier as an alternative to the “Set Notation.” The Diamond Notation explicitly represents only those five of the eight parameters of behavior that correspond to an “Agency Description,” i.e., W, K, KH, P, and A. Like the Set Notation, it allows us to generate forms of behavior description via the operations of Substitution, Deletion, and Identity.

In connection with Figure 9 we can make several comments.

3.2.1 Ordinarily it is not possible to specify the value of KH with any confidence. In part this is because we generally have no access to the learning history that is involved and in part it is because a given performance, since it does not have a one-to-one tie to any given skill, may be

Figure 8. The Diamond Notation





Figure 9. “I ran out the door because I was afraid of the lion.”



the expression of different skills or combinations of skills.

But again, it is almost never important to know which skill is involved. What is important is that the performance did constitute the exercise of some skill or set of skills.

In practice there is sometimes a point in substituting an ability description in a tautological way: “The performance of running out the door was an exercise of the competence to run out doors.” One can always do that if needed. Here we do not.

3.2.2 One of the noteworthy aspects of Figure 9 is that “fear” appears nowhere in the diagram. In particular, it does not appear as the value of W , the motivational parameter. This may be particularly surprising given that one generally thinks of “because I was afraid” as specifying the motivation. This issue will be addressed below in connection with motives. For the present, one might suggest that “fear” does not appear in the diagram in Figure 9 because it is the generic name for the entire diagram – generic in that it refers not only to this example but also to all others that are relevantly similar, i.e., to fear behaviors.

3.2.3 This consideration also serves as a reminder that I might well have answered differently to the question, “Why did you run out of the room?” I might have said, “It was a case of fear – I was trying to escape from the lion.” I might also have said, “I was trying to get away from the lion I was in danger from,” without mentioning the word “fear” and we would still recognize it as fear behavior. We shall encounter other versions below.

3.2.4 Returning to the vignette of The Lion, if, after asking, “Why did you run out of the room?”, you had asked, “Did you feel afraid?”, my response would have been, “Not at all – I was too busy getting out of there.”

Being afraid is not the same thing as feeling afraid. It is not the same thing as having a certain kind of experience. Consider the following parallel statements.

- (a) The experience of crossing a street is whatever experience I have when I do cross the street.
- (b) The feeling of climbing a mountain is whatever feeling I have when I do climb a mountain.
- (c) The experience of anger is whatever experience I have when I am angry.
- (d) The feeling of fear is whatever feeling I have when I am afraid.

3.2.4.1 What needs to be denied is that being afraid (or angry, etc.) *consists of* having a qualitatively distinctive experience or feeling. Being afraid is nothing at all like hearing a pure middle C tone or like seeing an expanse of blue, nor is it like having an itch.

Correspondingly, I don't in general have to *find out* that I'm afraid (and, on very rare occasions when I do, it is not like recognizing that what I'm hearing is a pure middle C or that what I'm seeing is blue, or that what I'm feeling is an itch). Rather, referring back to the discussion around "The Picture of Winston Churchill," I know that I acted out of fear, not because as an Observer I have noticed that it meets a criterion or that it appears that way, but rather because as the author of that behavior, as an Actor, I know what I produced it as. In the cases where I don't know that, that calls for an explanation.

3.2.4.2 Confusion and misunderstandings abound in this area, reflecting the notorious and septic multiplicity of meanings of "experience," "feelings," "awareness," "consciousness," and various related terms.

For example, "I feel angry at you," may be understood as a reference to a qualitatively distinctive experience. But alternatively, it may be understood as a testimonial to the psychological reality of my being angry at you. (Compare "I feel angry at you" with "I infer that I'm angry at you" or "I believe that I'm angry at you" or "If you say I'm angry at him, Doctor, I believe you, but that's not the way I feel.")

3.3 The Happy Pill

There is a moderately popular kind of explanation for fear behavior

(and for anger, guilt, and any other “negative” emotional behavior). Since the logic is on the model of scratching an itch, we can refer to it as the “Itchy Explanation.” It goes as follows (using The Lion example).

“The sight of the lion evoked anxiety in me. Anxiety is unpleasant. So I ran out the room as a way of reducing the anxiety.”

In order to bring out some relevant features of the Itchy Explanation, consider the following heuristic, which is an extension of the Lion vignette.

The Happy Pill

Imagine that one of the drug companies has invented a new wonder drug called the Happy Pill. It comes in the form of a small white pill that looks like an aspirin. Its specific value is that it removes anxiety and does it in a flash – just put it on your tongue and bang! Just like that, no anxiety! It has 100% effectiveness and no side effects.

Now imagine that when the lion walks in the room I happen to have a Happy Pill sitting on the seat next to me. Would I be well advised to solve my anxiety problem by taking the Happy Pill? After all, it’s quicker, easier, and more certain in its results. Would you expect me, as a normal person, to do that?

The deficiency in any form of Itchy Explanation, here and in connection with any straightforward emotional behavior, is obvious. It is the lion, not my ‘anxiety’ that is the problem, and it is the lion, not my ‘anxiety’ that my behavior is concerned with. And it had better be or I will not survive for long.

Now consider a further extension of the Lion example: when the lion walks in the room I have the Happy Pill and I am in such a panic that I am frozen in my seat. I manage to get the Happy Pill in my mouth, and then it is a simple matter to run out of the room, perhaps not out of fear, but on simple prudential grounds.

In this latter case I have two problems, i.e., the lion and my panic which makes me unable to deal with the lion. In this case I am indeed well advised to deal with my 'anxiety' by taking the Happy Pill, so that I can then deal with the lion.

This case is quite different from the preceding one in that there are two actual problems, not one. Nevertheless, there is an obvious sense in which even in this case, the lion is the real problem and my panic is an incidental one or a merely derivative one.

3.4 Reality Basis

The moral of The Lion, particularly in light of The Happy Pill, is that emotional behavior is not logically grounded in a subjective state of which the behavior is merely the outward "expression." Rather emotional behavior has a reality basis and the behavior is, paradigmatically, a rational response to it. Any corresponding subjective state is merely incidental.

3.5 Irrational Fear

Consider a variation on The Lion, namely that a kitten walks into the room instead of a lion, but everything else is as before – I run out of the room, etc., and when you ask me I say, "Because I was afraid of the kitten."

I can exercise bad judgment in regard to anything, including the reality basis for an emotional behavior. In the case of the kitten one would say that my behavior made sense given that I thought the kitten was dangerous. One would also say (a) that my thinking so was a distortion of reality and (b) that it called for an explanation.

3.6 The general case of fear behavior

We are ready to move from the example to the general case of fear behavior. As a preliminary measure we shall need a more perspicuous representation of the behavior of "running out the door because I was

afraid of the lion.”


The initial representation was shown in Figure 9. The present representation is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10 gives us a Significance Description of the behavior. This is the case where one behavior, in this case B1, is accomplished, or implemented, by engaging in another behavior, in this case, B2. This is shown schematically by showing the implementation behavior, B2, as included in the value of the Performance parameter of the primary behavior, B1.

Figure 10 differs from Figure 9 only in the structure, not in the content. The double arrow is introduced between “Danger,” the value of the K parameter, and “Escape the danger,” the value of the W parameter. This is to indicate that what is involved is an appraisal (discussed earlier using the rattlesnake example), which involves a tautological relation between cognition and motivation.

Figure 10.


“I ran out the door because I was afraid of the lion.”



to the question, “Why did you run out the door?” I could have said, “I ran out the door because I wanted to escape the danger from the lion and that was a way to do it.” Similarly, and perhaps more familiarly, I could have said, “I ran out the door because I wanted to escape from the lion and that was a way to do it.”

This leads us to a variation on Figure 10. This is shown in Figure 11. This corresponds to, “I ran out the door because I was trying to get out of danger by getting away from the lion by running out the door.”

Figure 11. Redescription of 9 and 10



Figures 10 and 11 are noteworthy because they allow us to distinguish cleanly between what is peculiar to this particular example and what is not. The implementation behaviors, B2 in Figure 10 and B2 and B3 in Figure 11, contain what is specific to the Lion example. The primary behavior, B1 in both cases, contains what is not specific to the particular example.

Thus, a diagram for the general case of fear behavior as such could be derived from Figure 10 by deleting all the content that is specific to the example of The Lion. The result is shown in Figure 12. This diagram assumes that the fear behavior is successful, hence the value of the Achievement parameter is specified.

Thus, fear behavior as such can be characterized as follows.

- (a) It involves the appraisal of something as being dangerous to me. (The something may be as definite as “that lion” or “that rattlesnake” or it may be as indefinite as “this situation” or “something.”)
- (b) It involves the motivation to escape from the danger.
- (c) It involves trying to escape from the danger.
- (d) It involves the selection and enactment of an implementation behavior (which may itself require implementation behaviors, as in Figure 11) designed to accomplish an escape from the danger.

In addition, there is a condition which does not lend itself to diagramming:

- (e) It involves a learned tendency to act without deliberation.

It has been pointed out (e.g., by Gosling [1962]) that without such a condition on fear behavior there would be no difference between fear behavior and simply prudential behavior (fear behavior is an instance of prudential behavior).

Note that (e), which we may call the “impulsivity condition” in no way implies that all emotional behavior is impulsive, i.e., that it is in fact enacted without deliberation. The learned tendency can be overridden (some persons routinely do so).

The impulsivity condition also sheds light on why emotional motivation may be preemptive and why emotional behavior is so often associated with “control problems.” (A motivation is preemptive, not when it merely outweighs other considerations, but rather when it becomes the only consideration.) The rest of that story (below) will involve considerations of status and behavior potential. If I have learned to act immediately on the appraisal of danger it will be easy, on a particular occasion, to act immediately and without any other consideration even though there are other considerations that I “should” (in some sense) be taking into account.

The impulsivity condition also helps us to understand why emotional

outbursts are touchstones of sincerity. If I act without thinking, it is unlikely that my actions are part of an ulterior program of impression management.

3.7 The Fear Formula

In light of the preceding formulation we may introduce the notion of an “Emotion Formula” here, the Fear Formula:

Danger elicits Escape,
Unless

- (a) I don't perceive the danger for what it is, or
- (b) I am acting on another motivation that takes priority, or
- (c) I am unable to engage in any such behavior, or
- (d) I mistakenly think that what I am doing is escaping, or
- (e) I miscalculate or my behavior miscarries.

Visibly, this is a special case of the Relationship Formula which was presented above in connection with the Relationship/Status model of human behavior. (Recall that something's being a danger to me is a relation between it and me.)

What the formula does is to emphasize the tautological relation between the reality basis, i.e., the danger, and the motivation to escape. At the same time, it provides, again tautologically, the categories of reasons why that motivation might in fact not be acted on or acted on successfully.

Maxim: If a person has a reason to do something, he will do it unless he has a stronger reason to do something else instead.

3.8 A Family of Fear Concepts

There is a familiar family of fear concepts, including at least uneasiness, apprehension, fear, terror, panic, and horror. The behavioral logic of all of these fits the Fear Formula and the general formulation of fear


behavior, above. They are distinguished from one another primarily by the seriousness of the danger. In addition, “panic” has some additional connotations of suddenness and disorder, and horror involves repugnance as well as fear.

4.0 Emotional Behavior: Anger, Guilt, Joy

Having moved from the heuristic example to the general case of fear behavior, we are in a position to move on to other kinds of emotional behavior and to the general case of emotional behavior.


The diagram in Figure 12 represents fear behavior generally. It was derived from the diagram in Figure 10 by deleting all content that was specific to the example of the Lion. If we begin with Figure 12 and delete all the content that is specific to fear we may expect that what is left will be what is common to emotional behavior generally. This is shown in Figure 13.

Figure 12. The general case of fear behavior



Not surprisingly, Figure 13 shows no content – only structure. The structure is that of a Significant Action (or Symbolic Behavior), i.e., where one behavior is accomplished by enacting another behavior, involving an appraisal (indicated by the double arrow between K and W) of a reality basis.

Figure 13. The general case of emotional behavior



Thus, the general picture of emotional behavior is as follows.

- (a) It involves the appraisal of a reality basis.
- (b) This tautologically involves a corresponding motivation.
- (c) The motivation is acted on (B1), and
- (d) It is implemented by enacting a behavior that is responsive to the specific circumstances (B2).
- (e) There is a learned tendency to act on the appraisal without deliberation.

Clearly, the primary difference between one kind of emotional behavior and another lies in the kind of reality basis that is appraised. And note that the consequence of (b) and (e) jointly is that once the appraisal

is made, the behavior *will* occur, *unless...*

4.1 Anger

Thus, we have the following.

4.1.1 Provocation elicits hostile counteraction,

Unless...

or, alternatively,

Provocation elicits Hostility,

Unless...

A more complete reading is that provocation of B by C elicits a correspondingly hostile counteraction by B.

The key notion here is “provocation.” A provocation is an attack, or attempt to injure me (recall that appraisals are made in first person). Thus, for example, an insult or a physical assault will at face value be a provocation.

What is the motivation that is tautologically related to an attempt to injure me? Naturally, to prevent the injury. And to punish the attacker with a counterattack (see below).

If the injury has occurred, the motivation is to undo it, if possible, or to compensate for it. And to punish the attacker with a counterattack.

Why the latter? Here we need to draw on some more fundamental resources.

To be injured is to have my behavior potential reduced. But behavior potential is a correlative of status. Thus, as an attack, or attempt to injure me, a provocation is an attempted degradation, i.e., an attempt to reduce my status. (Recall that the notion of status presented above has to do with one's place in a scheme of things and, correspondingly, to one's behavior potential within that scheme. It is not inherently a quantitative notion and does not refer specifically to one's place in the social prestige ladder.

Statuses can be described in terms of more and less because, equivalently, they can be described as better or worse – some places are better places to be than other places.)

As noted in connection with the degradation ceremony, attempted degradations can be contested, and usually they are.

Maxim: A person will not choose less behavior potential over more.

To fail to reject an attempted degradation is to acquiesce to it. (“Silence gives consent.”) If someone insults me and I do not respond, I have accepted the insult. If someone assaults me physically and I merely prevent injury, that signals that it’s all right to attack me. Thus, to attack me is a provocation whether or not it succeeds in injuring me. And a counterattack is indicated.

Motto: *Nemo me impune lassesit.*

No one assails me with impunity.

4.1.1.1 Anger, like dueling, is for peers, and from that stem some qualifications on the preceding picture.

- (a) A three-year-old child doesn’t have the status to qualify as a serious attacker. If a three-year-old attacks me I will not be angry at him and will merely try to ensure that there is no injury to myself or to him.
- (b) Attempted degradation by a superior may lead to defense in the sense of trying to prevent or limit injury. It will elicit resentment rather than anger. I will have a grievance if I consider it uncalled for, and I may seek redress, but I will not be motivated to counterattack. (If I am, I am not treating him as a superior.) Correspondingly, the superior will see it not as an attack, but as a matter of discipline or something on that order.
- (c) By virtue of these peer considerations, one way to counterattack is

not to counterattack. In such a scenario, I am treating the attacker as less than an equal, and that will often do the job if I can carry it off.

Correspondingly, responding to an attack in a “civilized” way rather than with anger may be taken as condescension, which will be a provocation. (Or it may be taken as the mark of a defective person.)

- (d) Conversely, sometimes the primary message conveyed by overt anger is that one is being treated as a peer.

4.1.1.2 The preceding considerations provide qualifications to the notion that attack calls for counterattack. In contrast, we can also foresee the possibility that “provocation elicits hostility” becomes an endless, self-perpetuating pattern.

The key notion here is that provocation by B elicits a *correspondingly* hostile counteraction by C. If B doesn’t regard his original behavior as a provocation to begin with, or if he regards the counterattack as excessive, the counterattack will itself be a new provocation and will lead to a new counterattack. If C continues to regard the original counterattack as appropriate, B’s counterattack will be a new provocation. Etc., etc. Such patterns are well known.

4.1.1.3 Recall that the background conditions for the paradigmatic degradation ceremony begin with, “There is a community of persons with a set of values such that adherence to those values is a condition for being purely and simply ‘one of us’.”

The violation of such a value may be regarded as a simple failure to live up to a norm, but it may also be taken as an attack on that norm and/or the community. And an attack on my community is an attack on me.

Consequently, I may become angry in situations where I am not ostensibly the object of an attack. Thus, if I see a parent abusing a child or see almost any injustice being committed, I may become angry and act accordingly.

All of which is to say that emotional behavior, including anger behav-

ior, is embedded in the general framework of human interaction with its multiplicity of logical possibilities, possible linkages, and possible ambiguities.

4.1.1.4 As with fear, there are a variety of types of anger behaviors, and, as with fear, these are distinguished primarily by the level of seriousness that is involved. In the case of anger, it is the seriousness of the counterattack and, by implication, the provocation.

Thus, at low levels of seriousness, we have annoyance and irritation. In the broad middle range we have anger, with qualifiers (somewhat, quite, very angry, etc.) and at the upper extremes we have hatred, rage, and fury.

Resentment, as we have noted, is not a matter of degree, since it may range from mild to extreme, but rather by the lack of tendency to counterattack. Righteous anger, as we have noted, involves the violation of a central ethical or moral value.

Of course, it could have been otherwise. These are distinctions we in fact have a point in making.

4.2 Guilt

The Degradation Ceremony analysis presented earlier is very nearly an analysis of guilt. All that is needed is to specify the following.

- (a) The value which is violated is an ethical value.
- (b) The Denouncer, Perpetrator, and Witness are the same person.
- (c) The denunciation is, paradigmatically, covert.
- (d) The defense against degradation is at stage 5, i.e., "Yes, I did it and it was a violation, but that wasn't a genuine expression of my character."

The first point makes it clear that we are dealing with wrongdoing and guilt in an ethical sense, not a legal sense, though it is related. Points (b) and (c) bring out that guilt is inherently an intrapersonal matter though it has a social basis; if it were merely a public matter, my only concern would be whether I was found guilty, not whether I was guilty. (Compare:

legal guilt.) Point (d) brings out the repentance aspect of guilt. If having violated the ethical value is per se acceptable to me, I will not find myself guilty, since I will not say, “It was wrong to do that.” In finding myself guilty I am upholding the value I violated. This is why it comes down to, “But it wasn’t a genuine expression of my character.”

As noted earlier, the classic ways of demonstrating that a transgression was not a genuine expression of my character are the following.

- (a) Restitution – to reject any advantages accruing from the violation and to make good, if possible, on any injury or losses inflicted on others as a result of the transgression.
- (b) Punishment – to willingly undergo pain or privation to demonstrate a high level of motivation to regain good standing in the community whose standard I violated.
- (c) Non-recidivism – to adhere to the violated standard for a significant period of time during which I had opportunities for new transgressions.

All such forms of demonstration are here categorized as “Penance.” In the case of guilt, the primary point of the penance is not to demonstrate, even to myself, that the violated standard really counts with me (demonstrations are for Observers) but is, rather, a matter of *ensuring* that it does (an Actor approach to the matter).

Thus, we have the following emotion formula.

Wrongdoing elicits penance,
Unless...

4.2.1 Note that repentance alone is not enough to imply guilt. I may repent a transgression even when at the time I did not accept the standard I violated. This implies a change of character on my part. *Now*, upholding that value is a genuine expression of my character; *then*, it wasn’t.

If I have seen the light or been born again I may speak of being guilty, since that is in accord with the vernacular, but this case is clearly different.

One mark of the difference is that I may or may not be motivated to do penance. (Non-recidivism in these circumstances may not be penance – it may be merely living in accordance with my new outlook and values.)

4.2.2 Unlike the case of fear or anger, the notion of guilt does not generate a family of guilt concepts. We have concepts of blame, fault, and responsibility, which are closely related to guilt but these are clearly not species of the genus guilt. Rather, they are notions that focus on various aspects of a transgression situation, but, for example, none of them imply that a specifically ethical transgression is involved.

There are at least two lines of explanation here. The first is that ethical transgressions are inherently already on the serious side, so that there is no ready distribution of cases along the dimension of seriousness. The second is that to the extent that there are differences in seriousness, they are carried by the description of the transgression – what I was guilty of rather than by quantifying a degree of guilt. I may be guilty of inconsiderateness (though that may be regarded as a merely “ceremonial” guilt – see below) and I may be guilty of betraying a high trust.

4.3 Joy

The emotion formula for joy is as follows.

Good fortune elicits celebration,
Unless...

I react with joy to good news. I react with joy when something unexpectedly or finally happens that significantly better my status and increases my behavior potential. When I win the lottery, when the baby is born healthy and normal, when I get the job, when I finally master the general theory of relativity, when my team wins, when I receive my degree from Salamanca – these are paradigmatic cases of good fortune.

Such a situation calls for me to act less as a Have Not and more as a Have. This is because I now *am* less of a Have Not and more of a Have.

The obvious way to do this is to drop, for the time being, my prudential and task oriented concerns. I do that when I jump for joy or shout with joy, etc. I do the same thing on a larger (and slower) scale when I throw a party to celebrate. The essence of such a party is to drop prudential and task oriented concerns and revel in what is good. I do the same thing when I engage in conspicuous consumption – when I buy that new car or take a trip to the Costa Brava to celebrate. I do the same thing when I act with new benevolence – when I give some of the lottery money to my friends, when I pay my daughter's entire first year college expenses instead of only half.

The two central themes of celebration are (a) I have it good and (b) I can *afford* to do this – I don't *have* to keep my nose to the grindstone, or be on my guard. Paradigmatically this is what celebration literally enacts.

Life is not *all* suffering.

5.0 Emotional Behavior and Status

As noted above, emotion formulas are special cases of the Relationship Formula. Thus, emotional behavior fits directly the Relationship/Status model of human behavior.

Note that each of the reality bases for the four paradigmatic emotional behaviors consists of a significant change of status.

The archetypal cases of emotion are not the trivial ones. Being faced with the prospect of losing my life is not like being faced with the prospect of losing my queen's pawn in a game of chess. Having my character impugned is not like being criticized harshly for the way I speak French. Finding my standing in my community in jeopardy as a result of a betrayal of trust is not like having to live down some occasional inconsiderateness. And learning that I have won the lottery is different from learning that I

scored two points higher on a test than I thought I deserved.

When important matters are at stake they take precedence over minor matters. This is another part of the story as to why emotional motivations are associated with “control problems,” why they can be preemptive, and why one would learn to act on them without deliberation (unless...).

To elaborate on the latter, in cases of fear and anger, immediate action is often the difference between success and failure, between life and death. Which is not to say that we act blindly – only quickly. This holds no less in the urban jungle than in the rain forest.

The negative emotions, including anger, fear, and guilt, but also shame, envy, and jealousy, involve a significant worsening of our lives. We find ourselves in a bad place. Correspondingly, we are motivated to move from that bad place to a better place, essentially, to our previous place. This is the logic of the various emotion formulas. Depending on what kind of bad place we find ourselves in, it takes a different kind of behavior to get out. It would in general be disastrous if, in the face of danger, I engaged in anger behavior or guilt behavior, shame behavior, etc.

5.1 This practical consideration provides an explanation for a generally overlooked fact about emotions, namely, that there are many more negative emotions than there are positive ones. Indeed one could make the case that there is only one positive emotion, namely, joy in its various forms (gladness, delight, pleasure, etc.). Certainly, the lists of emotions provided by the students as mentioned above are extremely heavily loaded in favor of the negative emotions.

The explanation is that each negative emotion calls for a distinctive type of behavior in order to recover lost ground, and we therefore have to distinguish the reality bases in order to bring to bear the appropriate behavioral resources. Roughly, you have to distinguish what kind of problem it is in order to bring forth a solution.

In contrast, good fortune does not present a problem that needs to be solved and so we don't need to distinguish among different sorts of

good fortune in order to do the appropriate thing. The appropriate thing in any case is to celebrate, and the celebration may take the same form whether I win the lottery or get a new job, etc.

5.2 The emotion formulas for fear, anger, and guilt are special cases of a more fundamental status dynamic formula:

Threatened degradation elicits Self-affirmation,
Unless...

This is most obvious in the case of anger. “No one assails me with impunity” is clearly a self-affirmation. In fear, it is different. Trying to escape from danger affirms that I am worth saving. If I had no value, why would I bother. In guilt, it is different again. With my social identity and corresponding behavior potential at issue, penance is a way of affirming that *this* is who I am in spite of some evidence to the contrary.

It is because, in one way or another, *I* am under threat that *self*-affirmation is, tautologically, called for. Things are different in the case of joy, since there is no such threat to be countered. One is tempted to say that the celebration is an affirmation of life rather than specifically of self. A given celebration may assimilate to one or the other of these two possibilities.

6.0 Emotional Behavior and Reasons

Given the previous discussion around the Judgment Diagram and the notion of appraisal as it is involved there, it should be clear that emotional behavior is a straightforward case of acting on reasons. Specifically, what in the present context is designated as the reality basis for the emotional behavior is the kind of state of affairs which, in the Judgment Diagram, is designated as a reason.

The only bar to *simply* equating reality bases with reasons is that the reality basis for an emotional behavior may qualify as more than one kind of reason. Angry behavior, for example, will, like fear, involve pru-

dential reasons, since injury is at stake. But angry behavior will also involve Social Appropriateness reasons, which are part of the motivation to counterattack irrespective of actual injury. And righteous anger will in general also involve ethical reasons, since one will in general have a duty to uphold the ethical standard that is violated.

7.0 “Displaced” Emotional Behavior

The fundamentals of emotional “displacement” were formulated above in the presentation of Significance and the analysis of “Symbolic behavior,” using the classic example of coming home and kicking my dog and the heuristic of “A Fine Piece of Machinery” as the vehicles. A summary of this formulation is as follows.

- (a) When we value something, that is not just because it is what it is. Rather we value it for some aspect or attribute. More generally put, we value it for the benefit that it contributes, or would contribute to our lives.
- (b) If I value a behavior, B1, for the benefit, Q, that it provides, it follows that I value Q. From that it follows that I will value any other behavior, B2, which provides or would provide that benefit and, other things being equal, I will value B1 or B2 to the extent that it provides, or would provide, Q.
- (c) The primary way that I value a possible behavior of mine is to be motivated to enact it. Thus, (b) can be stated in motivational form.
- (d) If I am motivated to enact a given behavior, B1, for the benefit, Q, that it would provide, I will, other things being equal, also be motivated to engage in any other behavior, B2, which I take it would provide Q, and I will be motivated to enact B2 to the extent that it would provide Q.
- (e) If we take B1 as the standard for providing Q, then it will be the case that I will be motivated to enact B2 to the extent that it resembles B1 in the relevant respect, i.e., in providing Q.
- (f) If, in addition, the motivation for B1 is situationally grounded,

so that enacting B1 would achieve Q and remove any further motivation to achieve Q, then the non-occurrence of B1 will be a prerequisite for the occurrence of B2.

- (g) Under these conditions one could say that B2 was a substitute for B1, which is the classic “displacement” formulation. However, that is an epiphenomenon. In general the reason B2 occurs is that it accomplishes Q; it does not occur *because* it is a substitute for B1. (Only if one is explicitly looking for a substitute does B2 occur because it is a substitute, and then its effectiveness with respect to Q is up for grabs.)

The conclusion was that when all the relevant considerations are brought into the picture, my coming home and kicking my dog is no more mysterious or irrational than is buying a Taurus SHO for a price I am willing to pay.

At this point we are in a position to carry the discussion one step further. It was noted earlier that “substitution” explanations fail to explain why I come home and kick my dog. After all, that behavior does not occur *because* it is a substitution even though, if the appropriate conditions are met it would not be incorrect to call it a substitution. And although the example of kicking my dog and the substitution explanation reflect the psychoanalytic tradition, a similar result would hold if we went to the learning theory tradition and explained it in terms of “generalization.” Both “displacement” and “generalization” provide merely pro forma explanations after the fact, but those conceptual frameworks have no resources for saying in advance what particular behavior or kind of behavior will take place or for saying in principle why such a behavior would do the job.

Let us return to the example of being verbally abused by my employer, saying nothing for prudential reasons, and later coming home and kicking my dog. Here, we can raise the question, “What sorts of things do people in fact do in such a situation that succeeds in assuaging their anger?”

Consider the following array.

- (a) I can cut in and out of traffic on the way home, or curse at other drivers who get in my way, and I can kick my dog when I get home. In short, I can find myself a provocation and engage in angry behavior toward individuals other than my employer.
- (b) I can think about what I would like to have said to my employer. I can also fantasize about that or daydream about that. In short, I can do “in my head” what I would like to have done overtly.
- (c) I can treat myself to an evening of my favorite records, or to a dinner out, etc.
- (d) I can confide in a friend who agrees with me that the employer is a son-of-a-bitch.
- (e) I can affirm to myself that I’m not the kind of person you can just talk to that way (“Nobody assails me with impunity.”) Generally associated with this is
- (f) I can remind myself that it was *my* choice to refrain from counterattacking and that I had good reasons for doing that and they were *my reasons and still are*.
- (g) I can disqualify the employer – “What the hell would he know about whether I was doing a good job or not?” (In doing that I am counting the employer as ineligible or incompetent to make that judgment (I assign him that status), so that his judgment is not something to be taken seriously. But that has to be real for me.)
- (h) I can go for a five mile run when I get home, or I can spend a couple of hours chopping wood.
- (i) I can get drunk or take a tranquilizer.

As we survey this list, two discontinuities stand out. The first is that (i) is a “Happy Pill” approach and the rest are not except that (h) is ambiguous. Going for a run could assimilate to the Happy Pill approach and chopping wood could also, but it could assimilate to (a). Thus, (h) and (i) are best considered in connection with emotional states.

The second is that only (a) and (b) involve hostile behaviors. Anyone who is familiar with the range of anger phenomena will recognize (1) that (c)-(g) do work, sometimes even better than (a) or (b) and (2) that when they work, it’s not accidental.

Thus, it is clear that the notion that displacement of anger is simply a matter of “directing it at” some other object is too narrow a notion. (Of course, one could define it that way, but that would still leave the problems of (1) accounting for (c)-(g) and (2) accounting for why both (a)-(b) and (c)-(g) occur in response to the same situation. One could, for example, say that (c) and (f) were produced by a different mental mechanism, namely, rationalization, but, of course, not just any rationalization would do the job, so why this particular one? Moreover, by hypothesis, (e) and (f) are true. If we call them rationalizations, we pathologize all behavior.)

In contrast to such convolutions, we can say simply, (c)-(g) work because they are self-affirming, and (a) and (b) also work because they are self-affirming. Further, we can say that any self-affirming behaviors should have some effect, other things being equal. There is no mystery about why this should be the case.

8.0 Other Emotions: Envy, Jealousy, Grief

Given the formulation of the paradigmatic emotions of anger, fear, guilt, and joy in mind, we can touch briefly on some other emotions.

8.1 One of the hallmarks of the paradigmatic emotions is that we have a term (danger, provocation, wrongdoing, good fortune) for the reality basis that tautologically motivates the emotional behavior. In the case of envy (and jealousy) this feature is missing. The reality basis for envy consists of the following conditions.

If P is envious of Q, then

- (a) Q has something, X, that P values and wants (X may be a person characteristic, a possession, a relationship, etc.); and
- (b) P can see no good reason why Q should have X and P not; the differential is seen as not legitimate.

The behavior which is motivated by this is anything that would eliminate the differential between P and Q in regard to X. Thus P has options

to (a) take X from Q, destroy X, destroy X's value for Q, acquire X independently of Q, or diminish Q's behavior potential so as to compensate for the value of X to Q.

8.2 In the case of jealousy the situation is somewhat more complicated. If P is jealous of Q, then, paradigmatically,

- (a) P has a relationship, R, with Q that P values highly.
- (b) Q has, or may acquire, a relationship with S which may supplant the relationship which Q has with P.
- (c) P fears that this will happen and would regard it as a betrayal by Q if it did happen.

Under these conditions

- (a) P is in a constant state of fear (see below on emotional states) and may actively work in a variety of ways to prevent the loss of the relationship with Q.
- (b) P is motivated to express and affirm the valued relationship with Q.
- (c) P is constantly on the verge of rage/hatred of Q for a betrayal which may already have happened, and at any given time, P may take it that it has happened and act accordingly.

What makes jealousy the "green-eyed monster" is the high level of emotionality and the high level of tension between the positive relation, usually love, between P and Q on the one hand and, on the other hand, the counterpoint of active fear and incipient or episodic rage and hatred.

(In regard to the old wives' tale that love can turn into hate we can say, more accurately, that the betrayal of love (a) will, paradigmatically, put an end to that love, and (b) constitutes a provocation which is grounds for hatred and not merely anger. This is only one possibility, since most love relationships end just because they are over, not by virtue of betrayal.

Also, recall, in connection with the Degradation Ceremony, that the ultimate degradation is to be expelled from the community or to be put

to death. In the two-person community constituted by a pair of lovers, the ultimate transgression is the betrayal of the relationship which is the basis for the community. And ultimate transgression has a tendency to draw the ultimate degradation. Thus, genuine “crimes of passion” are something different from the common notion that the perpetrator is simply out of control and operating in a purple haze of passion. They are much more rational than that.)

8.3 Parallel to the case of joy, we have

Bad fortune elicits lamentation,
Unless...

Of greater interest is the special case of grief. Here we have the following.

Personal loss elicits grieving,
Unless...

When the recession hits, that is bad fortune and I will lament the fact (and complain, etc.). I will not grieve.

If I lose a nickel, I may experience a passing moment of regret (a nickel's worth, perhaps). I will not grieve over that either.

If my old automobile which I am about to trade in is smashed beyond repair, I will regret that, but I will deal with it in a businesslike manner.

In contrast if the automobile is one that is the apple of my eye and one I would never part with willingly, I will grieve its loss. More commonly, if a lover, spouse, or other close family member dies, I will grieve. Or, to take a classic example, if I am a professional athlete and I lose a leg in an automobile accident, I will be hurt and I will grieve the loss.

One might put it that anything which, as far as I'm concerned, I can do without (this, in the vernacular sense, not in an absolute, legalistic or

philosophical sense) is something I will not grieve over if I lose it. This is independent of the publicly reckoned value of what I lose.

There are two indications here that we have moved away from the paradigm cases of emotional behavior. One is the difficulty in pinning down the reality basis for the emotion – clearly the common notion that it is simply loss as such is mistaken. The second is that the tautological connection between the reality basis and the motivation or the emotional behavior is not transparent. In addition, the nature of the behavior is also not entirely clear. What is grieving?

The first problem, i.e., pinning down the reality basis in the case of grief, could be solved in brute force fashion by referring to a “grievous loss.” (Recall that we can’t expect to achieve rigorous definitions of terms for real world phenomena, this, because they are behaviorally based rather than observationally based.) That would also settle any question of whether the connection was tautological:

Grievous loss elicits grieving,
Unless...

However, that would not solve the substantive problem of *what* the connection was, and that problem is partly reflected in the question about grieving.

What behavior is that? Well, people lament; they cry; they create memorials, either material or psychological; they walk about openly in pain or unhappy; they actively *endure* the loss.


All of this suggests the need for a more fundamental formulation. Here, we can take as our starting point the status formulations underlying anger, fear, guilt, and joy.

Grief is certainly a “negative” emotion. The formulation above was to the effect that anger, fear, and guilt all involved finding oneself in a bad position (a status change) and the motivated behavior was designed to get out of that bad position.

But grievous loss puts me in a bad position which, in an obvious sense, I can't get out of. That being the case, why am I motivated to do anything at all? Certainly, grieving is not an attempt to *compensate* for the loss or to *undo it*. Then why grieve?

There is a schema for paradigmatic reaction to serious loss. Although it is used primarily in connection with depression, it will be of use here. It is shown in Figure 14, which shows behavior potential over time from the viewpoint of the person involved. (The primary difference between grief and depression appears to be how low the curve drops at point C.)

Figure 14. Loss and Behavior Potential



A is the point at which the apparent loss occurs. What the apparent loss initially elicits is problem solving. The natural reaction is to try to work things around so that I am not really suffering a loss. Thus, for example, if I am a professional athlete who loses a leg I may say, "I'll get

one of those new prosthetics, and I'll be as good as ever."

Maxim: A person will not choose less behavior potential over more.

If the problem solving is successful, then there isn't really any loss, and then there's no grief, either. In this respect, grief is like anger, fear, and guilt – the initial reaction is to try to get out of a bad situation.

If the problem solving is unsuccessful, at some point I will recognize that. That point is represented as B in the schema. Now there is a different problem. In effect, I know it's so, but that's not how I feel. That is, it's true for me that I have suffered the loss, but it isn't real – I can't effectively act on the fact of the loss. Thus, the problem is to make real what I believe to be true.

Recall that what I take to be real is what I'm prepared to act on, and it reflects primarily my behavioral history. Thus, in the case of "I know it's so, but that's not how I feel," what it takes to make it real is to act on it.

Grieving consists of just such actions. If I am overcome by the loss, I *act* overcome and that helps to make the loss real, for I am behaviorally enacting the fact of the loss. If I lament ("Woe is me! To what miserable depths have I fallen! What a grievous loss have I suffered!") that is in part a degradation ceremony by which I assign myself the status of a diminished person. The more I memorialize the lost person ("She *was* so kind," "He *was* such a bright and innocent kid," etc.), the more it is the past tense that becomes operative and the more real it is for me that it's gone.

Observationally, making the loss real corresponds fairly closely to the popular psychology notion of "working through" the grief. There is even, in that literature, something corresponding to the initial reaction of problem solving. In characteristically pejorative fashion they call it "denial," and they characterize it as irrational. But if people were such as to roll over and play dead at the first sign of bad news, the human race would not have survived to nurture such ideas. (How many years was Penelope "in denial" before Odysseus returned?)

The net effect of grieving is that it is now real for me that I am now diminished in all those ways that are consequent on the loss. Qualitatively, quantitatively, I am a diminished person. That's me.

"... Any man's death diminishes me ... And therefore, never send to know for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee."

Now I have "bottomed out," and I can get on with my life. That point on the curve is identified as C. What it takes to move forward on the curve so that eventually I am not a diminished person is, not surprisingly, to engage in self-affirming behavior – behavior that affirms who I am *now*. As we saw above, self-affirming behavior may include angry behavior. ("The world has done me in. A pox on it and everything in it.")

Within this framework we can reconstruct the connection between the loss and the grieving more perspicuously.

- (a) A loss that doesn't diminish me is, variously, not a *real* loss, not a *personal* loss, not a *significant* loss, and a loss that doesn't diminish me is, ipso facto, the loss of something I can do without. This is why the reality basis for grief is a grievous loss and not just any old loss, not even just any old *big* loss.
- (b) A loss that does diminish me is one that I am not going to accept without a struggle, and it is one that will not be immediately real for me. (It will be initially "unthinkable" in the sense presented above.) Thus, some amount of grieving will be needed, and, predictably, the greater the loss here, the more it will take to make it real. It follows, therefore, that if the loss is a grievous one, then grieving will be called for.

With this, we have recouped the tautological connection between the reality basis for grief and the corresponding emotional behavior.

9.0 Emotion Formulas and Intrinsic Social Practices

A social practice is a social pattern of behavior that is learnable, do-able and done.

An intrinsic social practice is one that can be understood as being engaged in (a) without an ulterior motive and (b) without a further end in view.

Doing something to get out of danger, taking hostile counteraction in the face of provocation, doing something to restore one's status after a transgression, and celebrating good fortune are all social patterns of behavior that are learnable, do-able and done. They qualify as social practices.

By virtue of the appraisal aspect of emotional behavior, i.e., the tautological connection between reality basis and motivation, they qualify as intrinsic social practices. I certainly didn't need an ulterior motive or a further end in view in order for it to be understandable that I would try to escape the danger by getting away from the lion. And only a True Believer instrumentalist would ask "Yes, but what did he *gain* by jumping and shouting when he heard he won the lottery. Why did he *really* do that? What did he really have in mind?"

Recall that the primary importance of intrinsic social practices is that they give us a principled basis for considering a behavior description to be complete and bringing the Significance series (what was she doing by doing *that*?) to a close. The "all behavior has an ulterior motive" exercise showed us that unless we have such a principled stopping place we cannot understand *any* behavior or know what anyone's behavior really was.

It is because emotional behavior, formulated as the main clause of the emotion formulas, is an intrinsic social practice that emotion explanations often serve as our ultimate explanations for behavior. This is an important part of the mystique that "emotion" has for us.

It is also in part because emotional behavior patterns are intrinsic social practices that, on the whole, emotional behaviors are taken at face

value as sincere.

10.0 Emotional Behavior and Motives

Emotion terms such as fear, guilt, anger, joy, envy, etc., are used to designate “motives.” So are other terms such as vanity, greed, lust, and ambition, which are not emotion terms. Thus, there is in the vernacular a behavioral category, “motive,” of which emotional motives are a subcategory. We say, “She acted out of fear,” “She acted out of joy,” “She acted out of ambition,” and so on.

Two questions arise here. The first is, how are we to understand motives? What is a motive anyhow? The second is, is there anything which distinguishes emotional motives from others?

10.1 In connection with the first question, let us return to the vignette of The Lion. In that vignette, you ask me, “Why did you run out the door?” and I say, “Because I was afraid of the lion.” At that point, you might have said, “Oh! so your motive was fear. You were acting out of fear.”

In connection with the diagram of the behavior, we noted that “fear” did not appear in the diagram although if there ever was a case of fear behavior, that was one. In particular, “fear” was not the value of the motivational parameter, *W*. At that time, it seemed plausible that “fear” was, in effect, the name of the behavior pattern represented by the entire diagram. This notion calls for a critical review.

By way of background, let us consider a range of possibilities for questions and answers in connection with that behavior.

Q1: Why did you run?

A1: I had to move fast

A2: To get out the door

A3: Because I was afraid

A4: Because I was trying to get away from the lion

A5: I had to get out of the room

A6: To escape the danger

Q2: Why did you run out the door?

A7: To get out of the room

A8: To get away from the lion

A9: Because I was afraid

A10: Because I was trying to get to a safe place

A11: Because that's what I was trying to do

A12: To escape the danger

Q3: Why did you run out of the room?

A13: I had to act quickly

A14: I was trying to get away from there

A15: I was trying to get away from the lion

A16: Because I was afraid

A17: Because I was trying to escape

Q4: What was your motive for trying to get away from the lion?

A18: Fear! I was afraid of the lion and I was trying to get away.

It is very easy to assimilate “Why did you do X?” to the pattern of “Here’s the behavior – what’s the explanation?” However, reflection upon the preceding questions and answers, particularly in light of the diagram of the behavior in Figures 10 and 11, leads to a different view of the matter.

10.1.1 First, “why” questions concerning behavior are open-ended enough so that a motivational answer is not required. (For example, A1 is not a motivational answer to Q1, though it is a justification.)

10.1.2 More importantly, Q1-Q4 show that for a given behavior there are a variety of possibilities for what occupies the position of X in “Why did you do X?”

10.1.3 We are talking about discourse here, and what shows in the Q

and A is that one can ask about any aspect of behavior. The X in “Why did you do X?” may be a behavior but, as in Q1, it may be an aspect of behavior. What is asked about is, presumably, what is apparent to the questioner.

Thus, if the questioner is clear only about the fact that I ran, he will ask Q1. If he is clear that I ran out the door, he will ask Q2. If he takes it that I was getting out of the room, he will ask Q3. And so on.

An appropriate answer to any of the questions will supply additional information from the representations in Figure 10 or 11. Note that none of the answers supply all the detail though many of them would be satisfactory to a given questioner.

The key fact here is that unless the answer mentions the emotion in question (answers 3, 9, 16, and 18) there is no indication of the overall structure of the behavior. “Because I was afraid” and “Because I was afraid of the lion” carry this information because they imply the appraisal aspect and the impulsivity condition and because of the connection to intrinsic social practices.

Because of this connection, the use of the emotion term more or less implies (based on a conversational norm) that there is not a further story to be told beyond that. This is the primary value of “Because I was afraid” (A3, A9, A16) or “Fear!” (A18). The mention of the emotion does not in general provide all the details of the behavior – it implies only that what was asked about fits somewhere in the pattern shown in Figure 12, the schema for fear behavior in general.

10.1.4 Recall that in the discussion of Significance we noted that the author of a behavior has an implementation problem, not a significance problem, whereas an observer of that behavior has a significance problem, not an implementation problem. The problem arises for the observer because what is, in general, most open to observation of a behavior is its more concrete aspects (The Performance parameter), e.g., the fact that I ran or the fact that I ran out of the room. In contrast, the more signifi-

cant aspects of behavior (what was he doing by doing *that*) are likely to provide problems for observers because they involve objects or events that are not present at the time and place of the behavior observed (recall “Dinner at 8:30”).

Answers to “What was your motive for doing X?” are also answers to “Why did you do X?” but not vice versa. Answers to “What was your motive for doing X?” are simply specifications of the Significance parameter of X if X is a behavior (see A18). Where X is only an aspect of behavior (see Q1) the answer will be a specification of the Significance parameter of the behavior of which X is an aspect or a specification of the behavior of which X is an aspect.

But the value of the Significance parameter of the behavior of “doing X” is another behavior, B, which is implemented by doing X, and it is both behaviors, linked by the significance/implementation relationship that are *the* behavior. (For simplicity, we are assuming the minimum number of behaviors here, but recall, e.g., “The Farmhouse.”)

Thus, we can understand the concept of “the motive for doing X” as a way of getting at the significance of “doing X” and, importantly, a way of getting at the final significance description of the behavior of “doing X.” The final significance description is peculiarly important because it is the only serious candidate for being *what the person was really doing* in doing X. In turn, this is to be understood in light of the Observer’s Dilemma, i.e., that in general what is problematic for an observer is the significant behavior, not the implementation behavior.

10.2 In ordinary discourse, “motive” is also used in a sense in which it is equivalent to “reason.” “What was your motive for doing X?” is then interchangeable with “What was your reason for doing X?” (and both fall just short of being equivalent to “Why did you do X?”). Thus, an appropriate response to “What was your motive (reason) for running out of the room?” would be “To get away from the lion,” which only gives the intermediate significance, not the final significance. However, it is a conversational norm that when a “motive” term such as vanity, fear,

ambition, anger, etc., is used, that gives the final significance.

This brings us to the question of what distinguishes emotional motives from the general run of motives. To this we can give an answer which is clear and simple, though it calls for some minor elaboration: In emotional motives, the connection between the reality basis and the motivation is tautological; in other motives it is not.

In this connection recall the “circumstances” and “reasons” portion of the Judgment Diagram. A person routinely screens his circumstances for motivational relevance. Judgments of relevance fall into three categories, i.e., not relevant, tautologically relevant, and contingently relevant. An example of a “not relevant” judgment is “There’s a telephone on my desk.” An example of a “contingently relevant” judgment is “There’s a telephone on my desk (and I want to make a call).” The motivational relevance of the telephone in the latter case is contingent on the parenthetical clause.

Let us focus on the parenthetical clause and call that the contingency. The most familiar examples are those in which the contingency refers to an already existing motivation. The example above fits that and so does “There’s an orange on the table (and I’m hungry).”

In the case of non-emotional motive patterns such as vanity and ambition, the anchor is not so much an existing motivation as a character trait. If I am ambitious, I will seize this opportunity to get ahead, not because I already want to get ahead in *this* way, but because for me *any* opportunity to get ahead is something to be acted on, *unless*...

Both existing motivation and Person Characteristics are bases for contingent motivational relevance. One might say that *given the contingency*, the connection between the discrimination and the motivation is tautological. (In passing, we may note that the two components of the “contingently relevant” judgment correspond to the two premises of Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism, and they correspond to the Know and Want parameters of behavior.)

11.0 Emotional States

“When a person is in a particular state there is a systematic difference in his powers and/or dispositions.”

The span of emotional concepts ranges across states as well as behaviors. I can be in such states as apprehension, panic, fear, uneasiness, anxiety, irritation, anger, and rage. I can be conscience-stricken, repentant, guilty, joyful, exuberant, euphoric, and so on.

Unlike behavior, states are caused, not chosen, though I can choose to cause certain states. (I can get drunk deliberately by drinking wine; I can get tired and sleepy deliberately by staying up all night; and so on.)

In general, states are not characterized by any tendency to engage in a certain kind of behavior. Rather, any manifestation in behavior comes via a change in powers and/or dispositions.

States are, paradigmatically, temporary. At some point I enter into a state and at a later time I stop being in that state.

Emotional states are straightforwardly special cases of the general notion of a state. They are distinguished from other states by having a distinctive kind of cause and a distinctive behavioral manifestation.

11.1 What brings on an emotional state is a pair of conditions.

(a) First, there is the discrimination of the reality basis for the corresponding emotional behavior.

For example, to be in a state of fear I must have made the appraisal that I was in danger. To be in a state of anger I must have made the appraisal that I had been provoked. And so on.

(b) Second, there is an absence of successful emotional behavior of the kind motivated by the reality basis.

For example, to be in a state of fear, I must see myself as being in

danger *and* not yet have escaped the danger. To be in a state of anger, I must see myself as having been provoked *and* not yet have successfully countered the provocation. And so on.

In the present context, “successful emotional behavior” is defined as behavior which removes that motivation to act. This is simple enough with the negative emotions. With joy, the absence of the successful behavior may only amount to the fact that I am not done celebrating.

11.2 When I am in an emotional state, I have an increased tendency to engage in the corresponding emotional behaviors.

Thus, if I am in a state of fear, I will have an increased tendency to identify dangers and try to escape them. (I will also have a tendency to dwell on the original danger.) If I am in a state of anger, I will have an increased tendency to find provocations and to respond with hostile counteraction. (I will also have a tendency to dwell on the original provocation.) And so on.

11.3 Given the nature of the cause, the behavioral manifestation is not surprising. After all, danger *does* elicit escape, *unless...* Provocation *does* elicit hostile counteraction, *unless...* Note, too, that the conditions for being in an emotional state are also conditions for emotional displacement. Thus, if nothing else, one could understand the “increased tendency to engage in the corresponding emotional behavior” as a case of emotional displacement.

11.4 Emotions differ in the length of the typical delay between motivation and success. With fear and anger, the delay is often close to zero but there are cases of long delays. With envy, jealousy, and grief there is typically a long delay and perhaps no success, ever, so that with these there is typically an emotional state as well as the primary emotional motivation. Guilt and joy seem to be intermediate in this respect.

11.5 With emotional states there are often manifestations in addition to the increased tendency to engage in the corresponding emotional

behavior. I may flush with anger or go pale with fear. I may tremble with rage or be immobilized by panic. I may laugh or cry uncontrollably in joy, or I may go around smiling without realizing it.

Such manifestations are incidental and occasional, and although in the absence of emotional behavior they may provide clues as to the presence of the emotional state, they are not what makes the emotional state the state it is. And, of course, they are presumably restricted to *Homo sapiens*.

12.0 “Pent Up Feelings,” “Unfinished Business,” and “Catharsis”

One of our “old wives’ tales” both among psychologists and among the folk is the following.

- (a) We often carry our feelings (or a feeling) “bottled up inside,” and that’s bad.
- (b) That’s bad because it interferes with our on-going lives.
- (c) Talking about it is a way of unbottling our feelings (discharging the energy, etc.). That’s catharsis, and that’s good.

Although this is clearly only a metaphor, it serves as a good model in that it codifies some important facts. However, it does so at an intellectual cost in understanding and at a personal and social cost in trivializing the emotion.

Our preceding examination of emotional behavior and emotional states provides us with a basis for a more straightforward and more complete understanding of the matter.

First, emotional motivation, because it so often deals with humanly important matters and because it can so readily become preemptive can, indeed, interfere with other aspects of my life. That isn’t necessarily bad. Their being preemptive isn’t just accidental. On the other hand, the longer it goes on, the more likely it is that the price is too great, and that’s bad.

Second, we should note that the metaphor in fact deals only with

“negative” emotions, not with joy. Although I may keep my joy completely “bottled up,” e.g., for prudential reasons, that has no tendency to interface with my life a year from now or ten years from now. On the other hand, if I keep my fear of failure (or my anger at being abandoned, etc.) “bottled up,” that can interfere with my life over long periods of time.

Why the difference? If we stay with our paradigmatic emotions in order to avoid pedantic qualifications and keep in mind that these are merely paradigmatic and not universal models, we can see a clear and simple difference. In cases of significant anger, fear, and guilt, the reality basis puts my overall place in the scheme of things in doubt until I either succeed or fail in setting things to right. The potential loss is sufficiently important for such motivations to be decisive or preemptive.

The interference with the rest of my life is thus twofold.

(a) The uncertainty about my status interferes because it corresponds to an amorphousness in “where I’m coming from” in doing the things I do, which makes what I do more or less amorphous or equivocal. The only way to avoid this would be to make the uncertainty explicit and incorporate this uncertainty explicitly in my behavior (in my Judgment Diagram, so to speak.) Then the interference would be explicit and then I could be a definite someone. Few of us do this.

(b) The tendency to engage in the emotional behavior would interfere episodically with the rest of my life, most obviously if the emotional behavior occurred overtly; and less obviously if it occurred covertly through non-standard choices in the social practices I engaged in (recall “Dinner at 8:30”).

It is easy to see why the description of “having unfinished business” has application here.

Why would talking about it help?

(a) Talking about it makes it explicit, and that helps make the un-

certainty (see above) explicit, and that may help along the lines indicated above.

(b) Talking about it is conducive to taking a stand on the matter, and taking a stand will in general reduce the uncertainty problem. It will also serve as a displacement. (Recall, in connection with the displacement example, that one of the effective kinds of behavior is to confide in a friend who agrees that my employer is a son-of-a-bitch.)

Independently of the context of “unfinished business,” telling you my feelings is like making you a promise. If I say “Wil, I’m thoroughly angry at you for...” I am promising to act accordingly, *unless...* (And, to be sure, doing that may only be a negotiating move, etc.) Making you that promise is taking a stand on the matter.

(c) Drama is conducive to catharsis. Instead of coming home and kicking my dog, I may come home and tune in on a Slam-Bang-Shoot-em-up TV program. If my reactions are as though I were engaging in some of that violence, that will qualify as a combination of the first two “displacement” categories noted above, i.e., (a) engage in hostile behavior toward some other individual and (b) do “in my head” what I would like to have done in reality.

On this view of what we may call “long term emotionality,” two things stand out.

(a) A catharsis or displacement approach is a pure “happy pill” approach. Forget about lions – the emotion is the problem. It’s just the psychological equivalent of having a plugged sewer pipe – the problem is just to get rid of the stoppage. This is the approach that trivializes emotions. We trivialize the “problem” emotion at the cost of implicitly or potentially or explicitly trivializing all emotion, e.g., as something that just gets in the way of ‘rationality’.

If the latter seems far-fetched, consider the cultural icon of the intelligent robot who is completely rational *because he has no emotions*. That icon is alive and well today. But obviously, an authentic robot *will* have emotions.

An “unfinished business” approach will amount to a displacement or

catharsis approach if the emphasis is on finishing the business in whatever way you can. (Conversely, the common insistence that you have to actually confront the person you have the grievance against is a triumph of Performance over Significance.)

(b) Life is full of unfinished business. Many slights go unanswered; many fears are never acted on; many transgressions are regretted but repeated because other reasons properly take priority. Mostly, these do not cause “unfinished business” problems.

Why not? Crudely speaking, we outgrow the problems rather than solving them. I have a grievance with my parents, but over time it stops being so important because I have changed and they have stopped being the most important things in my life. My early status uncertainty stemming from being abandoned by my father at an early age disappears because the relationships that I establish subsequently are secure and it is those areas of my life that are key to being who I am – as to my father, well, that was unfortunate.

Surprisingly, perhaps, the notion of unfinished business here connects to the pattern of loss and grief.

One of the illuminating models for reactions to loss is the phenomenon of pruning a tree. (If there ever was a case of loss, that’s one.)

- (a) When we prune a tree, we do on purpose what often happens “naturally,” i.e., we remove one or more limbs of the tree. We do this with an end in view, because we know what to expect.
- (b) The first thing that happens when we prune a tree is that the tree goes into a state of “shock” in which the tree adapts to the loss and growth is inhibited. (This corresponds to the curve in Figure 14 up to point C.) It is a diminished tree.
- (c) Subsequently the tree begins to grow again, and it usually grows in ways that (1) are different from what it would have done without the pruning, and (2) some of which would not have been possible without the pruning.

- (d) Ultimately, the tree is simply the tree again, and not a wounded or diminished tree.

The tree provides a model for the folk maxim that “time heals all wounds,” which can be extremely valuable as a maxim and as a rationale and is a good empirical generalization though not an exceptionless one. “Time heals all wounds, *unless...*” will not be merely empirical.

If I don’t settle some important unfinished business, then very likely there is some part of my life that is no longer tenable and there is a path of growth that is no longer available to me. I’ve been pruned. Over time, the loss becomes less important, less of an issue, and eventually I’m neither defective nor diminished, but simply me. I’ve outgrown the loss.

The exceptions to the principle that time heals all wounds remind us that there are ways of keeping unfinished business a present issue instead of outgrowing it. Cases of interminable grief come to mind as the most obvious example. In this connection, consider the following heuristic.

Putting on Hamlet

Imagine that you’re a member of a summer repertory company that goes around putting on Shakespearean plays. *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *Twelfth Night*, *Macbeth*, *Much Ado About Nothing* – you do them all.

Now as it happens, there’s only one person in the company who plays Hamlet. On this sunny summer afternoon, on a day in which you are going to put on *Hamlet* in the evening, he disappears, unaccountably and unnoticed, never to be heard from again.

As the afternoon wears on it becomes more and more clear that he is gone. In the early evening you hold a meeting to decide what to do. What you decide is that the show must go on, and you’re going to put on *Hamlet*.

So you do. That evening you put on *Hamlet*, and everyone is in top form. Except that there’s nobody play-

ing Hamlet. But the show goes on.

Now there's two things I can guarantee you. First, it's a mighty peculiar performance. Second, Hamlet stood out more on that occasion than he ever did before.

Now – the moral of the story is this: If you don't want to be putting on a peculiar performance – put on *Macbeth*!

Indeed, it was a peculiar performance and indeed Hamlet stood out in a way that he never did before. The direct effect of that peculiar performance was to create a missing person.

Some version of Putting on Hamlet is a primary vehicle for prolonging grief, perhaps interminably. I do that by living my life in such a way that it creates a place for a person (or whatever it was) who isn't there *but ought to be*. If I live my life that way, that person (etc.) will always be missing *now*, and the loss will not fade into the past. Time will not heal a wound that is constantly recreated.

Note that there is no presumption that when I do that, I am trying to achieve that effect. Nor, it appears, does it often happen that way. Most often, it appears, I am simply memorializing the person (etc.) in what I take to be a normal way.

One version of Putting on Hamlet is to live my life *exactly* as I did before the loss. Within some limits of exactness, that is guaranteed to create a missing person. This provides an anchor for the notion of “denial” and the notion that if I don't do a lot of weeping and wailing, I've got an “unfinished business” problem. That is only an egregious exaggeration – it is not completely off the mark.

Similarly, I can live the life of Pablo, the Abandoned Child, and that will keep my grievance alive by constantly recreating it. And similarly if I live the life of Pablo the Transgressor, that will keep my guilt alive.

13.0 Other Emotionally Defined PC's

In developing the logic of Person Characteristics in Chapter 4 we began with the notion of (a) a type of behavior and (b) a pattern of occurrence. From that we derived the notions of traits, attitudes, interests, styles, abilities, values, knowledge, states, capacities, and embodiment.

From this it follows that if the type of behavior in question is one of the emotional types of behavior, as discussed above, there will be, for each such type of behavior a corresponding trait, a corresponding attitude, and so on.

For example, if the type of behavior is angry behavior, the corresponding trait will be hostility and we will speak of the person as being a hostile person. The corresponding attitude will be the attitude of hostility toward someone, some group, some act, or more generally, toward the "object" of the attitude. Likewise, I can be sensitive to expressions of anger, I can have the ability to express anger gracefully, I can have knowledge about provocations or of anger as a motive, I can value expressions of anger for their putative authenticity, and, of course, I can be in a state of anger.

Because each type of behavior as such logically generates this kind of spectrum of possible Person Characteristics, so does each type of emotional behavior.

14.0 Ceremonial Emotions

"I feel angry with you right now." That is the kind of thing we say when we are being open, honest, and sincere.

As noted above, the reference to feeling in this case is not a reference to an ineffable qualitative aspect of experience but rather is a testimonial to the psychological reality of *being* angry at you.

One of the empirical indicators that there is more to emotions than feelings or states of mind is the familiar phenomenon of expressions of feeling that are purely formal or ceremonial:

“I am sorry to inform you that you were not selected...”

“It gives me great pleasure to introduce to you a woman who...”

“I fear that they may be delayed...”

The cynical approach is to accuse anyone who speaks this way of being hypocritical. *Of course* she doesn't feel sorry. *Of course* he isn't afraid. And so on.

But we know better than that. The ceremonial way of talking is a way of giving overt recognition to something as a putative reality basis which then makes the corresponding emotional reaction formally appropriate.

Explicitly recognizing the connection to an emotional response is a way of aligning the speaker with the listener whose response is in question. We don't say “I'm sorry to inform you...” when it's good news we're talking about.

15.0 Emotional States and Moods

Emotional states are states. Moods are states. I can be in a sad mood or a euphoric mood or a jocular, quizzical, skeptical, grandiose, morose, preoccupied, combative, pensive, or expansive mood, among others.

Some moods are emotional moods. I can be in a fearful, apprehensive, anxious, irritated, angry, guilty, or joyful mood. Emotional moods such as these are not generally distinguished from the corresponding emotional states, since the manifestations are pretty much the same in either case.

Some emotional states are distinguished by the fact that there is no corresponding emotional mood. We would not, for example, speak of someone being in a mood of blind rage, murderous envy, hatred, overwhelming grief, blind panic, and so on.

15.1 Emotional states are distinguished from moods by the fact that

there is a reality basis in the picture.

Wil: Why is Jon so irritable this morning?

Gil: No reason at all that I can see. I guess he's just in a bad mood.

Jil: That's not true. He just paid a whopping big fine this morning for a traffic offense and the judge really reamed him out.

Wil: I see. He has good reason to be irritable.

In the classic terminology, states are "objectless." To be in a state of anger is not to be angry *at* someone.

To be sure. But emotional states are distinguished in part by a distinctive cause which includes the reality basis for the corresponding emotional behavior.

That cause is essential to understanding the increased tendency, in states of anger, to find someone's behavior to be a provocation and to respond with hostile action. Because angry behavior which reflects a state of anger can be understood as a displacement, it is easy then to speak of having a reason for being in that state, even though, strictly speaking, that is a category error.

Thus, a good rule of thumb for finding out whether I am in an emotional state or only in an emotional mood is to see if there is a reality basis in the picture: "What is there to be joyful *about*?" "What is there to be irritable about?" "What do you have to be anxious about?" "What is there to feel guilty about?"

If I have just paid a whopping fine and been taken to task, then there is something to be irritable about (or irritable over) even if there is not someone that I'm irritable at.

In contrast, the mark of being in an irritable mood is not only that there is no one I'm irritable at, but also that I have nothing to be irritable about. ("No reason at all that I can see. I guess he's just in a bad mood.")

Consider what might be thought of as a borderline case.

Wil: Why is he in such a sad mood today? After all, this is Christmas time and people should be happy. Most of them that I know are happy.

Gil: That's just it. Seeing all those happy people, and especially, seeing a lot of happy families reminded him of all the normal human things he doesn't have and never did. That's enough to make you sad.

Wil: No it isn't. If it were, why isn't he sad all the time? There are plenty of things that could remind a person of what he's missing. Why this? Why now? It looks like a pretext to me. Just a convenient peg to hang a sad mood on. But he must have already been inclined that way.

We are all familiar with the phenomenon of a mood being touched off by a chance event. The point here is that it *is* a chance event, in the sense that there is no tautological connection to a kind of response. We can think of the triggering event equally well as the cause of his becoming sad or as the occasion of his becoming sad.

The example is borderline because there is a potential reality basis in the picture, i.e., "all the normal things he doesn't have and never did." Without further detail we can't tell if indeed he has something to be sad about or whether, again, that was merely the form that his sadness took.

But I don't need a triggering incident to put me in a sad mood or an irritable mood, etc. I can just be in one without there being a definite way that I got there and without there being any good grounds for my being sad, irritable, etc.

15.2 The presence of a reality basis in emotional states also figures in understanding why there are no moods of blind rage, panic, etc. Emotional motivation may be extreme and preemptive, and therefore displaced emotional behavior can have these features. This is why one can be in "extreme" emotional states such as blind rage.

In contrast, moods merely moderate our approach to the world, and one loses that meaning when the psychological effect is extreme. Thus, a ‘mood’ of absolute fury in which I vented my rage in extreme form would not be a mere mood – it would be a state of temporary insanity.

15.3 What is it to be in an emotional mood, or in a mood generally? What are the central features of being in a particular mood?

15.3.1 One feature is that moods (and states generally) are understood as being relative to some baseline – they represent a change and a difference. The baseline for my being in a sad mood is what I would be like if I were not in any mood at all. Being in a sad mood represents a systematic difference from that baseline.

15.3.2 Another feature is that moods are temporary. I am sad this morning, but tomorrow I will be my old self, as I was yesterday.

This is not to say that I couldn’t be sad all my life or for the rest of my life beginning now. But if either of these were the case we would not say, except as a figure of speech, that I was in a permanent mood of sadness. Rather we would say that I had, or had acquired, a certain personality trait – gloominess, dysphoria, or whatever.

15.3.3 The kind of difference that goes with being in a particular mood spans the categories of thought, judgment, and action. When I am in a sad mood I am more likely to think sad or sorrowful thoughts about what was, is, will be, might have been, might be, or might yet be the case. I am also more likely to judge certain miseries to be irremediable, certain prospects to be hopeless, etc. And I am more likely to find some states of affairs lamentable and lament thereon; I am less likely to do anything adventurous, and so on.

It goes beyond such specifics, however. Moods are characterized by their pervasiveness. When I am in a sad mood the whole world is different, and I am different, and I am in a different relation to it. The world is more empty, less full of promise, less full of things to celebrate, etc. And I am more resigned, less moved to action, more circumscribed in my possibilities, etc.

15.3.4 Traditionally, moods are classified as “states of mind.” This classification is responsive to the pervasiveness of a mood. However, even when augmented by an account of the salient features of moods generally and the specific features of particular moods it is a relatively unilluminating approach to the matter. As a Critic, one might say that that is too shallowly and parochially *cognitive* a characterization.

Some existentialists bring out an additional dimension by talking about “attunement.” When I am in a sad mood I am attuned differently to the world and the attunement is such that certain things are now salient and others fade out and that is why I then think differently and act differently.

What is made salient by the notion of “attunement” is the correspondence between the talk about *my* state of mind and the talk about *my* world (or my being-in-*the*-world).

When I am in a sad mood, (a) my world is different and (b) my proclivities to act, think, and judge are different and (c) the two correspond. One could give primacy to (a) and say that if my world (somehow) became different, then (b) would be merely a natural consequence. Or one could give primacy to my proclivities and conclude that I had (somehow) restructured my world in such a way as to provide a more favorable arena for exercising those proclivities. Or one could focus on the correspondence and merely conclude that no matter how the change came about my proclivities would correspond to my world.

Maxim: A person needs a world in order to have the possibility of behaving at all (in order to have any behavior potential).

Maxim: A person needs the world to be one way rather than another in order to have a reason to act (and think, judge, etc.) in one way rather than another.

In part, what is at issue here is the difference between the Person

Characteristics/Circumstances model and the Relationship/Status model of human behavior presented earlier. The first two clearly fit the PC-C model, as will any “state of mind” formulation, since a given state of mind will be a PC. (Interestingly enough, the first provides a closer fit to moods, including emotional moods and the second provides a better fit to emotional states, where some definite behavioral proclivities are a central feature.) The third fits the Relationship/Status model.

When I am in a sad mood I am living my life differently, and there is more to life than cognition. Thus, it would be appropriate, in the PC idiom, to say that I was in a particular state of being rather than that I was in a particular state of mind. In the Relationship/Status idiom it would be appropriate to say that I was engaged in a different way of being (of being in the world and presumably also of being-in-the-world). Terminologically, “way of living” (“mode of existence”?) would be the most appropriate. However, that locution has been effectively preempted by its use in connection with culture (a culture is a way of living), and its applicability in both cases is not accidental.

Note that the problem with calling my sad mood a “state of mind” is not that it’s not true. Rather, it’s that it’s not *true to life*, and that is a worse offense against understanding.

15.3.5 Once the notion of my reconstructing my world is in the picture some interesting connections and lines of thought open up.

One of the connections is to ordinary problem solving.

(a) “I don’t have a problem with the problems we were assigned in class.” Let us rule out ‘problems’ which are merely of the second kind. Someone who zips through a set of ‘problems’ effortlessly is someone who is merely exercising a competence, not someone who has a problem or is solving problems.

If I have a problem in the relevant sense, then given what I take to be the relevant facts including facts about what I can do, I am at an impasse – I can’t see my way clear to a solution. This is why I have to work at it if

I am to reach that point. That work is “problem solving.”

(b) Under those conditions, achieving a solution involves reconstructing my world. I reconstruct my world by reconstructing some part or aspect of it. (Compare: I touch a building by touching some part of it.) If I solve the problem, *something* is different about what I take to be the case or what I take to be possible.

(c) It is a common experience that solving a given problem requires us to give up our habitual ways of looking at things or thinking about them.

(d) It is also a common experience that in our problem solving efforts we are able to use “the problem” as a placeholder rather than as a given. Thus, we are able to “come at it from different points of view” and that holds equally for formulating possible solutions for the problem as given and for reformulating what the problem is.

(Interestingly enough, Roger Penrose, in *The Emperor’s New Mind*, puts a heavy emphasis on this ability to shift frames of reference as something that distinguishes human beings from even the most sophisticated automaton, where an automaton is any individual that operates in accordance with a single formal system of the kind we are familiar with in set theory.)

If today I am in a sad mood and tomorrow morning I am in an optimistic mood and tomorrow evening I am in an irritable mood, etc., that could be described as my doing, for no particular reason, the very kind of thing I do for a particular reason when I am problem solving, i.e., I am successively looking at the world in different ways, I am approaching it from different angles, etc.

15.3.6 One might object to drawing a parallel between problem solving and being in a variety of moods on the ground that problem solving, and the activities that that involves, is something I do on purpose (it is a kind of behavior), whereas entering into a given mood is not only not

something I do on purpose – it is not something I do at all (it is not a kind of behavior), but rather is something that happens to me.

To be sure. After all, they are not the same thing. This particular difference can be overdone, however.

15.3.6.1 Although it's true that when I'm problem solving I almost necessarily am looking at the problem from one point of view and then another, we may note the following.

- (a) *More often than not, I'm not trying* to look at it from one point of view and then another – I'm trying to solve the problem.
- (b) More often than not the new way of looking at the problem just comes to me (it's something that happens to me) and I use it without thinking and without having decided to try looking at it that way. In this respect it is like entering a mood.
- (c) Problem solving is not always done on purpose. If I have a long lasting problem, I will tend to be preoccupied with it even when I have deliberately dropped it and am engaged in other activity, and I will often find myself thinking actively about the problem at unexpected times. (This is a paradigm case of "unfinished business.") One might say that in such cases I am in a problem solving mood or that I am in the mood to solve *that problem*.

15.3.6.2 Conversely, moods are not totally out of the range of things I do on purpose.

(a) It is a well recognized phenomenon that I can work myself into an angry state by dwelling on my grievances or that I can put myself into a gloomy mood by dwelling on all the bad things that happen and are seemingly unavoidable, and so on. In such cases I am accomplishing on purpose what normally is something that just happens to me.

(b) Consider the following vignette.

The Life of the Party

I am obligated to go to a political fund raiser where attendance is *de rigueur*. I don't at all want to go and I

strongly resent having to go. I decide to go and to “be friendly.”

With that temporary outlook, I go to the party and am able to carry it off. I am able to be spontaneous, in character, and treat people in a friendly way.

(1) Two decades ago what I did in regard to the party would have been described as “adopting a headset” or “taking on a mindset.” The relevant feature of the headset is its generality. By deciding to *be* friendly I create something very much like a friendly mood. (Recall that one of the possibilities of understanding moods is to suppose that I begin with some behavioral (etc.) proclivities and then reconstruct my world in a way that makes it a more favorable arena for exercising those proclivities. This is pretty much what occurs when I decide to *be* friendly.) Indeed, what happened at the party from either my point of view or an observer’s needn’t be different in any respect from what would have been the case had I unexpectedly entered into a friendly mood as I went to the party.

(2) In contrast, had I decided to go to the party and *act* friendly it is highly likely that I would only partially succeed at best and that my resentment would show through at times. This is because deciding on a given occasion what would be a friendly thing to do or say would require complex judgments in real time and the prospects for anything close to 100% success are pretty well nil.

(3) When I left the party I might actually be in a friendly mood. In part this would reflect the “pump priming” effect, comparable to the example above of dwelling on my grievances.

Maxim: What a person acts on successfully tends to become real for him.

There is, in addition, the fact that the success in carrying out my plan and the successful participation in friendly interactions could well be expected to leave me in a “good” mood, if not specifically a friendly mood.

12. Personal Identity: Being Me and Being Myself

1. The Trouble with Concepts

The self and the self concept are associated with mystery and paradox in the way they are dealt with either in psychological theorizing or in the philosophical tradition.

Consider the following.

- (a) Since I have self-knowledge (e.g., I know that I am writing this sentence right now) I am both a *Knower* of myself and *Known* to myself.
- (b) Let us catalog the facts about myself that are available to me by placing them in one of two categories: (1) myself as Knower, and (2) myself as Known.
- (c) Since all these facts are facts known about myself, they all belong to the second category, i.e., myself *as Known*.
- (d) Accordingly, I have no facts about myself *as Knower*.
- (e) Thus, I can have no knowledge of myself as Knower. Yet I know that I am a Knower.

Ways of dealing with this line of thought vary. In the hands of Buddhists and some philosophers it becomes an argument against the existence of a self. For some philosophers the attempt to pin down the elusive Knower has been the occasion for introducing transcendental notions (the transcendental ego or pure ego (vs. the empirical ego), the transcendental unity of apperception, etc.). Others bluster their way through: “*Of course* the eye doesn’t see itself”; “*Of course* the experiencer is not going to be just another item in the experiential field.” But on the positive side they have nothing to say, or nothing convincing to say, about the Knower.

In psychology the preferred route has been to invent peculiar something to serve as the real Knower. For example, self-theorists such as

Carl Rogers present us with *the organism* (or *its* experience) as the real Knower with the self being “a differentiated portion of the experiential field.” And the organism, or its experience, is what we (we organisms? we differentiated portions of *its* experiential field?) see only darkly through our experiential or cognitive glasses. There are some difficulties with such formulations.

The Person concept provides resources for a fresh approach to the matter.

2. Observer Bias

In a preliminary and diagnostic vein, let us note that the paradigm of the Knower and the Known is based on the model of observation (the observer and the observed). This is a minor instance of a pervasive Observer bias in our current and historical intellectual efforts. In contrast, we have already noted that my knowledge of my behavior (and mental images, etc.) is inherently an Actor’s knowledge (an author’s knowledge) rather than an Observer’s knowledge. This is because as the doer of the deed, I have to know about it before the fact in order to produce it (and I produce it as the behavior or the image that it is) whereas an observer can only observe what already exists that is observable. Whatever else may be the case, therefore, it seems clear that an observer perspective will not provide an understanding of self-knowledge.

3. A Compensatory Move

Again in a diagnostic vein, it appears that, in psychology at least, the notion of a self is introduced to provide artistic verisimilitude for a theory which begins with an inadequate definition of persons (e.g., persons are organisms) and needs to recapture some human characteristics. In that case, technical and conceptual difficulties of the kind suggested above are to be expected. (And, in justice to Rogers, although he is best known for a phenomenological theory, in his later years he had moved to a “person centered” conceptual stance.)

4. Self and Persons

Given the preceding diagnosis, the first positive step is clear and simple:

$$\textit{Self} = \textit{Person}$$

We do not need a separate notion of a self if we have an adequate concept of a person. Thus, the further formulation which follows deals almost exclusively with the self concept.

5. The Trouble with Data

In today's age of information processing, it will hardly be surprising that psychologists who have no prior theoretical commitments as to what a person's self concept is by and large simply take it for granted that a person's self concept is "the sum total of the information that one has about oneself" or some variant thereof.

This is one of many anomalies which involve treating psychological matters in ways that would be instantly recognized as patent nonsense in other contexts. Where else would there be *any* confusion between my having the *concept* of something (e.g., an automobile, a quark, a tornado, an insight) and my having *information* about it or an instance of it?

Some decades ago a body of data began to accumulate that indicated clearly that one's self concept is not just a set or summary of facts about oneself.

Consider an experimental paradigm having the following features.

- (a) A self concept measure is administered to all participants. This is the "pretest."
- (b) Participants are put through an experimental procedure, usually a set of tasks or problems.
- (c) The task is described in terms which participants have indicated is important to them, e.g., it is "a test of intelligence," where the

- participants are college students.
- (d) Participants are told how well they did.
 - (1) All participants are told that they did substantially worse than they actually did, or
 - (2) Half the participants are told this and the other half is given accurate information.
 - (e) As part of a debriefing procedure, the extent to which the participants accept the information is checked. With little exception the information was accepted.
 - (f) Shortly thereafter the self concept measure is administered again.
 - (g) No significant difference is found between pretest and posttest or between participants receiving accurate feedback and those receiving inaccurate feedback.
 - (h) The direct interpretation is that participants receiving the deceptive feedback should have changed their self concept although in fact they did not. (What would it do to your self concept, as a college student, to learn that your IQ was 99? One would think that it should make a difference.)

From both informal observation and experimental data, it seems clear that the folk are, on the whole, genuinely resistant to changing their self concepts for the worse, even in the face of new and substantially negative facts (which they accept as facts) about themselves.

The theoretical reaction was relatively predictable. It consisted of postulating a universal, built-in motivation, need, or system principle which causes people to be biased in their own favor at the cost of distorting the facts.

Thus, depending on theoretical persuasion, we had notions of *protecting* the self or the self concept or the self system or self esteem, or... And of course, there was the older notion of ego *defense* mechanisms, and there is the newer staple of "being in denial."

Naturally, this generated a corresponding set of notions (and exhorta-

tions) having to do with *not* protecting the self, etc. Thus, we had the notion of “having access to one’s experience,” “operating under the reality principle,” “ability to tolerate one’s unconscious,” “symbolizing one’s experience,” “being open to one’s experience,” and so on.

The spectacle of psychologists solemnly pronouncing, “Here’s how everyone inevitably is,” closely followed by, “Don’t *be* that way!” was edifying but not encouraging.

Sure enough, it was not long before a new kind of finding, this, too, in accordance with common observation, came to the fore. Some persons have self concepts which are remarkably resistant to *positive* information about themselves.

The obvious result was that any notion that people are just irrationally disposed to think well of themselves became untenable.

Theoretical repairs to the previous explanations, not surprisingly, merely added ad hoc convolutions which were and are obviously unsatisfactory. In general, they amount to no more than restatements, in the various theoretical idioms, of the fact that a person’s self concept is mysteriously resistant to change in the face of information which is at variance with the existing self concept and therefore, presumably, *should* change the latter.

6. Some Empirical and Other Clues

Consider the following experimental paradigm.

- (a) Go to a place where people are likely to be willing to answer questions from a stranger who says he’s doing an experiment (“and it will only take a couple of minutes of your time,” etc.). For example, a student cafeteria or lounge area, a local mall or supermarket.
- (b) Record refusals and agreements to participation.
- (c) For each participant, ask one of the following two questions,

randomly selected in advance.

- (1) Who are you?
- (2) What kind of person are you?
- (d) Compare the answers given to the two questions.

Data was collected informally in this way over a period of years using a number of locales and questioners. The major results are as follows.

- (a) Refusals run at about one out of three.
- (b) There is very little overlap in the answers to the two questions.
- (1) "What kind of person are you?" draws answers such as "I'm intelligent," "I like music," "I'm six feet tall," "I'm sensitive to criticism," and "I'm good at math." In short, it draws person characteristics.
- (2) "Who are you?" routinely draws answers such as "I'm Mary Jones," "I'm a woman," "I'm an executive for BBDO," "I'm a Republican," "I'm a Baptist," and "I'm a student." Occasionally it draws such answers as "I'm the daughter of X and Y," or, though rarely, "I'm someone who was born to X and Y in Los Angeles on June 24, 1970." Very occasionally it draws such answers as "I'm someone who could have been a better mother than I was," or "I'm someone who could be a great pianist some day."

In short, "Who are you?" elicits individuating characterizations, most of which are group membership specifications.

- (c) In passing: respondents are often visibly taken aback by the "Who are you?" question and experience initial difficulties in coming up with any answer. This has never happened with the "What kind of person are you?" question.

Also respondents not uncommonly express dissatisfaction with the adequacy of their answers to "Who are you?" or with the question itself. This has not been observed at all in connection with "What kind of person are you?"

Note that the answers to the two questions (and the questions themselves) correspond to the PC (Person Characteristic) and I (Identity) parameters of behavior. In a formal experiment the difference between the answers to the two questions would be predicted on that basis.

Given this background, we arrive at the following.

- (a) My self concept is essentially and primarily related to my answers to “Who are you?” and only secondarily, if at all, to my answers to “What kind of person are you?”
- (b) The ‘paradoxical’ resistance of the self concept to change involves information about what kind of person I am, e.g., that I have an IQ of 97.

In this regard, consider the following classic.

The Inferiority Complex

Wil and Gil are sitting at their customary stools at the neighborhood bar on a Friday afternoon. In the course of the conversation the following dialogue occurs.

Gil: You know, I think I have an inferiority complex.

Wil: [so amazed he falls off the stool and as he sits there looking up at Gil he says] “Inferiority complex? What the hell are you talking about? Here you just won the Nobel prize; your latest book is on everyone’s best seller list; your movie last year grossed \$120 million; six years ago you had offers from both professional football and professional soccer, [and more in this vein], and you’re talking about an inferiority complex?”

Gil: [Reflects on this for a couple of seconds] Well, you know, that just goes to show what some inferior people can do.

The logic of this piece of humor is unerring. Once Gil is an inferior person, anything he does is something done by an inferior person. Correspondingly, nothing he does, no matter how extraordinary, could show that he wasn’t an inferior person. Thus, we have here a model for the

mysterious resistance to change on the part of the self concept.

7. The Self Concept, Straight Up

My self concept is the same thing as my summary formulation of my status as a person.

My self concept is a matter of who I am. Who I am is a matter of which person I am, not of what kind of person I am.

Which person I am is a matter of where I fit, which place I have, which is to say, what part I have to play, in the general scheme of things. That place, that part, is my status, period.

Note that in the matter of individuation we may distinguish between purely nominal, or formal, individuation and descriptive, or qualitative, individuation.

When it comes to purely nominal individuation, any unique description will do the job, and often, in a given context, we don't even need that.

For example, the military tradition of giving my name, rank, and serial number will do the job. So, generally, is "I'm the person who is talking to you now" or "I was born to X and Y at the WR Hospital at 11:23 p.m. on July 23, 1970." Often, a simple "I'm Mary Jones" will do the job.

But most persons find such purely nominal individuation to be inadequate as a way of telling someone who *they* are: "Mary Jones could be *anybody*! I'm *me*! I'm the person who ..."

Giving my name, rank, and serial number, or any functional equivalent thereof, does not tell what my place in the scheme of things is. It only guarantees my uniqueness (if it does) by giving my unique place in a much more limited, but systematic, scheme. The humanly important things lie elsewhere.

On the other hand, no description is *sufficient* to tell you what my place in the scheme of things is. At best, I can give partial descriptions. (Presumably, this is why respondents have the trouble that they do with the question “Who are you?”)

Then what can I tell you about who I am? How can I tell you? Let us count some ways.

(a) I can tell you something about the places I have in some limited and mutually familiar domains. Specifying membership in a known group will do something along these lines: “I’m an executive at BBDO;” “I’m a Republican;” “I’m a Presbyterian;” “I’m a Rotarian.” (Occupational, religious, sexual, and political group memberships outnumber other answers to “Who are you?”)

(b) I can tell you where I’ve been and what I’ve done. Compare:

(1) I was born in Seville and grew up on a farm where my father was a foreman. I did well in soccer and the natural sciences. I eventually got a degree from the University of Salamanca and I’ve been teaching mathematics...

(2) I was born in a poor section of Cairo where my family ran a small leather shop. We all helped. I managed to complete eight years of school. I learned a little English from listening to the customers at the shop...

Such information gives you an idea of the cultural milieu, the pressures, necessities, and opportunities (and therefore some of my possibilities as well) that I encountered and my choices in the face of these.

Just as particular behaviors reflect, and therefore are informative about, my particular relationships and particular places in limited domains, my life history is an expression of my status, period.

(c) I can tell you about some of the important relationships I have: “I’m the mother of two lovely boys;” “I’ve been married to Brian for thirty years;” “I have a good friend that I spend time with and go shop-

ping with.”

(d) I can tell you about what my possibilities are or were. Behavioral choices are choices from a set of behavioral possibilities. Who I am is reflected no less in the possibilities (the behavior potential) I have and have had than it is in the choices I have made. Thus, “I could have been a better mother than I was.” Or “I have it in me to be a great composer.” Or, to take a famous line, the poignant “I could’ve been a contender!” Does anyone doubt that this possibility was central to the former boxer’s self concept?

8. The Trouble with Telling

No self respecting Observer would simply hold still for the notion that there is something I know that I can’t tell you. What is needed here is to clarify the nature of the claim and the nature of the difficulty.

A. In regard to the latter, a brief review of relevant concepts is indicated.

a. My place in the scheme of things is my status. My having that place, that status, is the same thing as my having the relationships I do with everything there is, singly and jointly. (The latter is intended to cover the relationships of other things to one another.)

b. My having that place and those relationships is the same thing as my having the behavioral possibilities (behavior potential) I do. These are the possibilities I select from when I act. (Recall that a Deliberate Action involves both distinguishing one behavior from a number of others and selecting it from a number of others as the thing to do.)

c. “A person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action.”

From that, one might suppose that I could tell you which person I am by telling you my history of Deliberate Actions. In principle, that might come close, though it would have to be post mortem. In practice, there are serious limitations.

(1) We can divide my history of behavioral possibilities into two categories, i.e., (a) those behaviors that were possible and that I didn't do, and (b) those behaviors that were possible and that I did do. Conceptually, and in the systematic representation, the notion of Deliberate Action covers both, but telling you what I actually did will only tell you the latter. This is why there is room to tell you about my possibilities in addition to telling you what I did.

(2) Merely telling you what I did in normal conversational style will not tell you why I did what I did, even though, here again, conceptually, the notion of Deliberate Action encompasses both. (Recall the Judgment Diagram as a device for elucidating the structure and detail of a Deliberate Action.) The multilevel significance structure of Deliberate Action does not lend itself to a narrative discourse.

(3) Telling you what I've done will not tell you what possibilities I have now or in the foreseeable future, nor will it tell you where I'm headed. Only a post mortem account will be free of these difficulties. Fortunately, I can't give you that.

d. If we focus on my present status rather than my history, there are again things I can say, and again, they will have significant limitations.

We do not have a notational system or a taxonomy or a systematic vocabulary for distinguishing, describing, or identifying either (1) all the different relationships I have to the various people and other things in the world, singly or jointly, or (2) all the different places I might be in the Real World scheme of things. Nor could we, though we might do substantially better at it than we have.

We have almost no terms for the relationships I might have, and the ones we do have are crude. Our most refined and extensive vocabulary in this regard is the terminology we have for specifying attitudes. (For every attitude there is a corresponding relationship. Indeed, to speak of her having an attitude, A, toward some 'object,' X, can be reconstructed as a combination of (1) saying that she has the relation A to X and then (2) disclaiming, or withdrawing commitment about, whether that relation has any reality except a psychological reality for her, which is all it needs

to have in a given case for her to act on it.)

Thus, the specification of my place in the scheme of things is like the specification of the values of the parameters of Deliberate Action – the presumption is always that the specification is incomplete, partly because it is easy to see why it would be incomplete and partly because even if it were complete we would have no way of knowing that that was the case.

In connection with the initial formulation of the reality concepts of object, process, etc., we noted that one way to give an observed item a place in the real world is to give it a place relative to something else that already has a known place there. This is what is accomplished when I tell you that I am an account executive at BBDO, that I am a Republican, that I am a Baptist, or that I am the secretary of the ski club, or that I am the mother of two lovely children, or that I am the daughter of M and F.

Thus, group memberships and significant relationships do carry the right kind of information to tell you who I am. I can't give you an account that's neat and complete, but I can tell you some important ones.

e. In sum, the place I have in the scheme of things is systematically related to each of the following.

- (1) My place in various subdomains in the real world, e.g., my group memberships
- (2) My relationships with various items in the real world, e.g., with significant persons, institutions, events, and geographical locales
- (3) My behavior
- (4) My possibilities for behaviors and accomplishments
- (5) My past and future history in regard to all of the above

All of these, therefore, provide avenues for telling you, in a variety of partial ways, who I am, where I am in the scheme of things. *I am the person who...*

Not surprisingly, different persons will be differentially sensitive to,

and partial to, different avenues when it comes to saying, understanding, or thinking about who they are.

B. Let us return to the first of the issues noted above, i.e., what is the nature of the claim when I tell you that I know who I am even though I can't tell you who I am.

Here, we shall need to distinguish between two uses of the word "know." In the first sense, reflecting an Observer perspective, "I know that P" implies that (1) There is a way to *discover*, or find out, that P and (2) I have taken that way (e.g., made the proper observations and/or calculations) and discovered that P, therefore (3) I know that P. (One may add conditions, but these are the ones that count here.)

In the second sense, reflecting an Actor perspective, "I know P" implies (1) that I am in a position to know P and (2) that I have no doubts or questions about P, nor do I raise doubts or questions about P, and (3) there is no doubt or question about P (i.e., if someone else raises a 'question' such as "But how do you know?" or "But couldn't it be something else?" it will be a nonquestion or frivolous 'question').

I know I have a pain, not because I have a description, observation, or representation of it, but because I have it. I do not first have it and then later *discover* that I have it.

I know I want the orange, not because I have a description, observation, or representation of wanting it (though I might conceivably have that), but because I *want* it.

I know that I ate the orange, not because I have a description, observation, or representation of doing it (though I might have that) but because I *did* it (and that's what I did it as – recall "The Picture of Winston Churchill").

I don't need to *convince* myself that I am now sitting in my office chair by calling up a description/observation, a memory, or other *evidence* that

that's what I'm doing. An Observer would have to do that. An information processor would have to do that. I don't. It is enough that I *sat* in that chair a while ago.

As a person, I don't have to *discover*, nor do I have to *convince* myself that I am who I am. It is enough that I *am* who I am. That condition is prior to anything that I might discover or do by way of convincing myself. Nor is there any procedure for discovering who I am or for convincing myself about who I am. I am the person who would be making the fruitless effort if I were foolish enough to try to discover who I was.

A dab of common sense empiricism may be in order here. Simple observation supports the following generalization: 'Those people who, by common consent of those who know them, "Know who they are," "Know what they really want," "are in touch with themselves," etc., are not people who have made an investigation and *discovered* any of these things. Rather, as noted above, they are people for whom questions about such things don't arise in any serious way. The solution for those who do raise such questions is not to find an answer (there isn't any to be found) but to outgrow the inclination to raise the 'question'.

C. Thus, the main difficulty with the notion of telling you my place in the scheme of things lies in the telling, not in having it or knowing it. This is not surprising, since descriptions are primarily Observer devices, whereas it is statuses and status assignments that are primary for Actors, and it is as an Actor and a Person, not as an Observer, that I have the place that makes me *the person who...*

9. Stability

Dealing with possibilities is sometimes a slippery business because the logic of possibilities is a recursive one. My possibilities include not only the possibilities for behaviors but also the possibilities for possibilities for behaviors and the possibilities for possibilities for possibilities...

For example, most of my ordinary behaviors will, in one way or an-

other, no matter how trivial, change my behavioral possibilities. If I walk to the refrigerator I now have a possibility that I didn't have before, i.e., I can open the door, take something out, and eat it.

On a simple reading it would appear that my behavioral possibilities changed, therefore my status changed, therefore my place in the scheme of things changed, therefore my self concept should have changed. But no one would accept the last conclusion.

The simple reading is too simple. After all, before I took the first step I already had the possibility of walking to the refrigerator, opening the door, taking something out, and eating it. Indeed, that is the possibility I am usually actualizing when I walk to the refrigerator.

Then did my possibilities change or not when I did that?

If we take it moment by moment or behavior by behavior, we will be inclined to say that they did. But I do not exist in a moment or in a single, logically isolated behavior. Recall that a person is an individual whose *history* is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action. The appropriate size of the unit for conceptualizing a person is not a behavior but a life history.

Man has no essence. What he has is – a history.

Ortega y Gasset

My place in the room is not a good model for my place in the scheme of things. It is merely a good entry point as an obvious case where my behavioral possibilities depend on my place in relation to everything else and where my behavior changes that place. But what we need here is an example where my behavior doesn't change my place. Consider the following.

A. I am a reluctant farmer. I milk the cows. I plow the fields. I mend the fences. I keep the books. I ponder over government regula-

tions. I buy supplies. I repair equipment. All of these activities change some of the relationships I have. None of these changes make me something other than a reluctant farmer. (It just goes to show what a reluctant farmer can do.)

B. I am the left tackle on a football team. I block. I tackle. I run interference. I relay messages from the coach. All of the things I do as the left tackle change my relationships with other players. None of that changes me into something other than the left tackle.

C. I am an inferior person. I win the Nobel Prize in Economics. I write a best seller. I... Each of these things changes my relationships with various people, institutions, etc. None of these things changes me into something other than an inferior person.

The initial conclusion to be drawn from such examples is that if I am P, then whatever I do as P will not change me into something or someone other than P. It will not change my place in the scheme of things, though it may change my place within more limited domains and sets of inter-relationships.

Living the life of Maria the Martyr or Pablo the Unfortunate is like playing left tackle or being a farmer. Nothing I do as Pablo the Unfortunate will be incompatible with being Pablo the Unfortunate, nor will it change me into someone else.

"I am the person who..." assimilates to "I am the player who..." rather than to "I am the object which..." I am the player, not the piece. And "I am the player who..." paraphrases as "I am this character (the character who...) in a drama that encompasses the whole world."

Maxim: All the world's a stage.

Very likely those persons who are thoroughly imbued with the Observer oriented values of 'naturalism' will regard this as unbridled grandiosity of the kind that Galileo and Copernicus were supposed to have put an end to. Who among us has not heard chapter and verse on how insignificant we are as mere organisms on a minor planet of a minor sun

in a minor arm of a minor galaxy in a minor...!!!!?

Would we, then, be more important if we were galactic-sized amoebas?

We have noted earlier that the logical structure of Deliberate Action is such that there is no inherent limit on the scope of the states of affairs that constitute the values of its parameters. How could there possibly be such a limit? These states of affairs may, indeed, encompass the entire past and future history of the universe. "The scheme of things" is not a folksy reference to the cosmologies of astrophysicists. Conceptually, it is much more extensive than that and includes the latter as a set of pictures in a minor set of dimensions.

Ironically, what is illustrated by the True Believer's strictures concerning our insignificance is that even a closed mind encompasses galactic distances and cosmic time intervals *easily*.

Naturally, people will differ in regard to the scope and content they supply for the placeholder "the general scheme of things," but everyone will have *some* notion of "the whole world."

Whatever its scope and content, however, it serves as a "given" in the sense described earlier, and it serves not only as an implicit orienting framework but also as a continuing reminder of how much *doesn't* simply depend on me. This also sharpens my sense of what does depend on me, and therefore, of what my possibilities are.

(A pictorially oriented Observer might put it that my "scheme of things" is the "ground" against which my self concept is the "figure," and that is well and good, but for an Actor, one action is worth a thousand pictures.)

In sum, my place in the scheme of things is a place of which, paradigmatically, my entire life history is an expression. Thus my self concept *need* not change over my entire life history.

This condition is entirely compatible with the pragmatic changes in relationships that occur as a result of my behavior and it is compatible with changes in my person characteristics which occur during my lifetime. There is no strain between saying “I am the same person I was 20 years ago” and saying “I’ve certainly changed over the past 20 years.” That is part of common sense, too, though the explication of it is not on everybody’s lips.

Still, my self concept cannot be simply impervious to change. Where the experimental literature raises the question of why it doesn’t change, we shall have to deal with the question of why it would change. In this connection, however, there is the aspect of unthinkability to be considered.

10. Unthinkability and Impossibility

The delimitation of my behavioral possibilities in the form of my self concept is also the delineation of my behavioral impossibilities. Behaviors and histories which lie outside the scope of my self concept are unthinkable for me.

As noted earlier, what this means is not that I can’t think of those behaviors which lie outside the scope of my self concept, but rather, that I can’t take them seriously as possibilities *for me*. For me they are not real possibilities and I would not be able to act on them. This will hold no matter what I believe.

Maxim: What is real for a person is what he’s prepared to act on.

Maxim: Reality takes precedence over truth.

Maxim: Status takes precedence over fact.

It isn’t that there’s some peculiar feature of my self concept that makes

those behaviors unavailable to me. Rather, my self concept is a way of distinguishing what behaviors are available to me and what behaviors are not.

From a public standpoint, self concepts are almost invariably too narrow rather than too broad in what they allow as possibilities. Coaches know this. Teachers know this. Parents know this. And so do visionaries, entrepreneurs, employers, and therapists, and lots of others as well.

Consider the following cases.

- A. A person burns to death in her apartment when she could “easily” have saved her life by running out into the street without any clothes on.
- B. A person burns to death rather than jump out of a second story window.
- C. A soldier tells a war widow that her husband died a hero’s death when in fact he was counted by members of his unit for being a traitor and a coward. When asked why, he says, “It would have destroyed her. I just couldn’t do that to her.”
- D. A financier commits suicide rather than live a life of poverty and disgrace after being convicted of fraud and losing all his money.
- E. A politician commits suicide rather than live in disgrace after being convicted of soliciting and accepting bribes.
- F. A coach comes across a talented “loser.” He helps her gain her self confidence, and she becomes a world class athlete.

All of these are icons, cultural clichés. Individualized examples can be produced on demand.

Consider the following instruction to various classes of college students. “Think of a situation where you would be in an absolutely impossible position, a situation where, if it happened, you would for sure completely freak out.”

Only two kinds of answers were given by more than one student out of roughly two hundred.

- a. I am the person who is in charge of the red button that fires the missiles and starts a nuclear war. The word comes down, triply authenticated, to press the button.
- b. I suddenly find myself on the stage at Carnegie Hall looking over the footlights at thousands of people. Someone puts a violin in my hand and says, "You're on. Play!"

Indeed, this is the stuff of nightmares. The archetypal statements in these cases of unthinkability are "I just couldn't do that" or "I could *never* do *that!*"

To such statements, the response is likely to be an impatient, "What do you mean? *Of course* you can!" This response is likely because in most cases the person obviously has the ability and the knowledge and the opportunity and a salient incentive, so *of course* he can. When means, motive, and opportunity are present, to say "can't" is likely to seem like mere preciousness or perversity.

There is an easy resolution here, however. The "can't" does not reflect lack of sufficient knowledge, ability, opportunity, or incentive. Rather, it is the individual equivalent of, "That's not how we do things in *this* family!" or, "That's not how we do things in *this* country!" And the unelliptical expression is not, "I just couldn't do that," but rather, "I couldn't do that *and still be me.*"

It is because I am *who* I am, not because of my abilities, knowledge, etc., that I can't do it. *For me* it is impossible. For me it is unthinkable.

There are some things I can't do and still be me. There are some things I can't do and still be one of us. The logic of self concept unthinkability is essentially the same as the logical basis for the Degradation Ceremony. This is not surprising, since status considerations are central to both.

In the initial discussion of the reality concepts we noted that some things are impossible for me just because I am who I am and that this is a straightforward logical impossibility: if being who I am really precludes

my engaging in a given behavior, then I can't engage in that behavior and still be me. Which is to say that *I* can't engage in that behavior.

"If you say so, doctor, it must be true, but I'm not walking through any goddamn wall!"

There are more walls in a person's existence than are apparent to the naked eye. Some of them have public support. Others do not.

For the determinist, the materialist, the True Believer in naturalism, the world is just one never-ending wall, and any behavior at all is unthinkable. If it is real for them, of course, and not just something they say they believe.

11. Change

Given the nature of the self concept, it is clear that neither its original development nor subsequent changes, if any, are dependent in any simple way on information about myself. However, we are at this point in a position to identify some conditions under which a change in self concept would be expected, or at least would not be unexpected.

A. My self concept will change if there is a change in what I take my possibilities to be. If there is a behavior of which I would have said, "I just couldn't do that," and now I do that, that is one of the conditions under which we find a change in self concept, since those statements are a primary clue to where the limits of my possibilities lie.

It appears that the most common way that it comes about that I do something that "I just couldn't do" is that exceptional circumstances elicit the behavior either willy-nilly or after much soul searching. The archetypal statement in this connection is, "I never would have thought I could do *that*."

In one way or another, this is what we are told by the battered wife who finally leaves her husband, by the graduate of an Outward Bound

type of program, by the survivor of bloody combat, etc.

There is an alternative, however. That is to disown the behavior. Any version of “I wasn’t myself” will do the job, e.g., “The devil made me do it,” “I can’t imagine what possessed me to...,” “I just wasn’t thinking,” “That was the alcohol speaking,” and so on.

Recall the final condition for a successful degradation ceremony: the Denouncer makes whatever case needs to be made to the effect that the Act, as redescribed, is a genuine expression of the perpetrator’s character *and is not to be explained away by reference to extraordinary circumstances or altered states of mind.*

Note that there is no positive-negative asymmetry here. The thing I do that was unthinkable may be a very positive thing, as in the first two examples above, or it may be a very negative thing, as in the last example.

And, of course, there are awkward intermediate cases between simply disowning and simply changing.

1. If the unthinkable is something good that I’ve done, I may only partly accept it as real, i.e., I can act on it in some respects but not in others. Or I may alternate between accepting it and thinking I was just lucky. That is awkward.

2. If the unthinkable is something bad that I’ve done, I may, for example, as an Actor accept that as me and as a Critic still find it inexcusable. If so, I am in trouble.

B. A variation on this way of changing, and a less common one, is the case where I come to realize that something I’ve done or regularly do is, when redescribed, something of which I would have said, “I just can’t do that.” There is some reason to believe that this occurs most frequently in psychotherapy or counseling, professional or otherwise, with the redescription being supplied by the other person.

C. Relationships can be changed from either end. The other end of the relation between me and the Real World is the Real World, the general scheme of things, and basic changes in my formulation of the general scheme of things will do the job.

Consider the heuristic example of “The Face in the Wall.”

The Face in the Wall

Imagine that you and I are sitting in the office here having a conversation. I catch a hint of movement out of the corner of my eye, and I glance at the wall behind you.

An enormous Easter Island type of face emerges from the wall, looks around, glares at me for a moment, and then recedes back into the wall.

At that point, I have two major choices. I can say “You know, I had the most interesting hallucination just then...” Or I can walk out of the room knowing that the world is very different from what I always took it to be.

I can disown it or I can own up to it. If I own up to it, then, indeed, a world in which something like that could really happen is so different that my place in it and my possibilities in it couldn’t possibly be the same as they are now.

Moreover, under those conditions it would be astonishing if I had any clear sense of what my place was in this newly discovered world. Thus I, and my life, would lose the coherence that had been there, and I would, temporarily, at least (recall the “pruning” example), be deficient in my ability to carry on my affairs (what would “my affairs” be?).

This is, one might say, a portrayal of what psychological trauma is (as contrasted with a clever or careless account of a theoretical condition, “trauma,” which (somehow) causes psychological effects and which leans heavily on metaphors of broken machinery).

“A world in which *they* could do *that* to me”; “A world in which I

could do *that*” – there are many versions of “The Face in the Wall.” They are versions of the unthinkable come to life.

Again, there is no inherent positive-negative asymmetry here. For example, when I undergo a religious conversion, I have discovered a world of hope and redemption of which I would earlier have said, “That’s crazy talk.”

Changes such as religious conversions are generally not traumatic because they occur in the context of a social structure that serves as a psychological exoskeleton while I make the transition. But if, instead, it were a matter of solitary revelation, then, indeed, I might emerge from the wilderness in a state of confusion and find my way strewn with pitfalls.

12. Acquisition

In understanding how one acquires a self concept to begin with, it is helpful to remember that we have a certain place in the scheme of things not only in our own eyes, but in the eyes of others, particularly those with whom we interact.

Initially this is a relatively one-sided affair. As children, we deal with adults who not only give us a place in the scheme of things and treat us accordingly, but also have a strong tendency to make life unpleasant if we violate that status assignment and to make life more satisfying if we don’t.

Thus, we serve an apprenticeship in which we *have* a place *in the scheme of things which we share with them*.

Life is not like a supermarket, where I can walk down the aisle without any prior commitment and say “I’ll take *this*” and “I’ll take *that*.” By the time I come to realize that there is such a thing as a way of life, I am already living a particular way of life. By the time I come to realize that there is such a thing as my place in the scheme of things, I already have a place and have been acting accordingly.

The influence of others is normative, not absolute, of course. Variations and exceptions will depend primarily on the degree to which the received status assignments flatly fail to mesh (a) with each other, when there is more than one significant adult making them and (b) with my developing sense of who I am, which is based on everything and not just those particular statuses and status assigners.

When I learn arithmetic, I do that by addressing particular arithmetic problems and finding out from someone else, usually a teacher, what the correct answers are. But what I am learning is *not* what the answers to those problems are – usually I forget those answers rather quickly. What I am learning that is fundamental is how to operate that way, how to generate that kind of answer. I am acquiring a competence, and that competence may enable me to recognize that some of the answers I was given were wrong. Or it may not. The mark of acquiring skills or abilities, as against information, is that I can apply that competence to new instances and that I may become better than the teacher at what I learned from the teacher. It's a common phenomenon in the arts, athletics, and intellectual pursuits.

What I learn from others, not as information, but as reality, is what status they give me. But what I am learning that is fundamental is to operate that way. I am acquiring whatever I might have lacked for being able to assign statuses to things and treat them accordingly, and it becomes *natural* for me to do that (if it weren't natural from the outset) and I do that. But it is only as another character in the same drama that I can "treat them accordingly," so one of the things I learn is to assign myself a status and act accordingly.

Self-status assignment in mundane cases is a familiar phenomenon. Recall, e.g., the example of "choosing up sides" for a baseball game ("You be the catcher. *I'll be the pitcher*, and you can be..."). This is a status within a limited context.

My self concept is my ultimate self-status assignment, i.e., my self-

status assignment in the ultimate context, which is the Real World, the general scheme of things. It has no resemblance whatever to a body of information about myself.

Once I construct a single, coherent world, I also have a place in that world, since that is a requirement of its being coherent. Once I have that, then that is what it is and has been all along, and that is who I am and have been all along, and everything I do, I do *as* me.

The relation between my ultimate status, i.e., being me, playing the part I do in the Real World, and my various mundane statuses is that of implementation. When I play the part of the pitcher I do that as myself, and so playing the part of the pitcher in that game in those circumstances is a way of being myself.

Playing the part of the pitcher is playing a part in a repeatable pattern and is therefore not uniquely associated with me. Someone else could play the part of the pitcher in other games and someone else could have played it in this game, even though in this game, I *am* the pitcher. In contrast, no one else except me could take my unique part in the general scheme of things, because to do that *is* to be me. (Recall the discussion of the Real World as an all encompassing, non-repeatable, unique particular, all parts of which are unique, and the contrast between that and repeatable patterns.)

A person is, archetypally and just not incidentally, both a status assigner and a self-status assigner.

13. Comments

Several comments are in order here.

A. In the PC-C model we noted that the logic of variation requires both Person Characteristics and Circumstances for understanding behavior, since we have the following.

- (1) In the same circumstances different people will behave differ-

ently, therefore circumstances alone will not explain the occurrence of the behavior – some reference to the person is required.

(2) In different circumstances, the same person will behave differently. Therefore reference to the person alone will not explain the occurrence of the behavior – some reference to circumstances is needed.

In that discussion, “reference to the person” was taken to be equivalent to “reference to the person’s PC’s.” From our present vantage point we can see that that is not the case. In this context, reference to the person divides into reference to PC’s and reference to who the person is.

The logic of variation applies here just as it does above.

Consider the difference between my living the life of Pablo the Unfortunate and my living the life of Pablo the Modern Conquistador. My Person Characteristics (traits, attitudes, interests, abilities, values, states, etc.) do not determine which of these I do. I can do either one and have exactly the same set of Person Characteristics.

Given a set of PC’s and circumstances my behaviors will be different depending on which life I am living, which is to say, depending on *who* I am. Conversely, given that I am Pablo the Unfortunate, my behaviors in given circumstances will be different depending on my Person Characteristics.

Thus, in order to understand Pablo’s behavior we have to understand (a) his circumstances, (b) what kind of person he is, i.e., Person Characteristics, and (c) who he is, i.e., his identity.

To be sure, this is no more than to affirm that I, K, and PC are, indeed, three of the parameters of behavior. The foregoing may bring a new appreciation of why Identity is a full-fledged parameter of behavior and not something merely accidentally related to it.

Recall that the top level significance of a person’s behavior is the only serious candidate for being *what the behavior really is*. A person’s life

pattern is what provides that top level significance (see also “The Tennis Game,” below), and that life pattern corresponds to *who* the person is. Thus, who a person is is the fundamental, non-causal, determinant of behavior.

B. It is in part because my behavior is ultimately a case of acting on the status I have assigned myself (along with having assigned statuses to everything else and along with the fact that I *create* my behavior out of nothing) that it makes sense to say that my behavior originates with me, and not from some outside source. Presumably that qualifies me as an Agent, in the classic philosophical sense, though it is always risky to take a term of art and give it a place outside that art.

C. The present formulation of the self concept provides a systematic perspective on the common sense notion that persons are *essentially* self aware. (And recall that in Deliberate Action I know what I am doing.)

My behavior on a given occasion is the behavior it is not merely because I distinguish it from other behaviors and not merely because I select it as the behavior to engage in, but more directly, because that’s what I produce it *as*. Further, I produce it not merely as the behavior it is, but rather as *my* doing it.

None of these is compatible with any notion that my behavior could be what it is whether I knew about it or not or any notion that I could live the life I do without being aware of it.

D. Not surprisingly, self-status assignment is relevant to the sense in which I know who I am. We noted above that knowing who I am is not a matter of discovering who I am, for there is nothing I could find out that would tell me that. The end point of that discussion was that who I am is a certain one of the characters in the world-encompassing drama of real life (and there is no suggestion of a script here – it’s all improvisation)

What I take to be real is what I’m prepared to act on. Likewise, what I’m prepared to act on is what I take to be real. If we now point out that there is no uncertainty about which real life character I am and that is

because that character is the status I assign myself, it will be difficult to avoid the suspicion of arbitrariness. As an objection in principle, that is a needless concern.

Let us begin by noting a possible distraction. It's not that there is a given cast of characters and I on some basis pick one. It's not like volunteering to play Polonius in Hamlet. (Life is not a supermarket.)

Who I take to be the real me is who I'm prepared to act *as*, and that is not arbitrary, reflecting as it does my experience of *acting as*, and who I'm prepared to act *as*, and who I'm prepared to act *as* is who, as far as I'm concerned, is the real me.

Since, normatively, I make that self-status assignment only when there is someone I *am* prepared to act *as*, there is normatively, no questioning or doubting and no basis for either. Thus, I have a kind of certainty about who I am that is legitimately put as, "I know who I am." This is a kind of knowledge which neither requires nor is helped by an explicit formulation (hence the difficulty in telling you who I am).

Indeed, it is precisely when I make that self-status assignment explicitly that I am in the greatest danger of going wrong and assigning myself a status that is something other than who I am, for I am likely to be carried away by notions of who I'd like to be. (This is one of the many pitfalls awaiting me if I try to *discover* who I am.)

If I go wrong in that way, then I'm in trouble when I try to act accordingly. For then I am Pablo the Unfortunate *acting as* Pablo the New Entrepreneur or Pablo the Keeper of the Flame, etc. In effect, I am always doing a job and never just being myself, and it is only by accident that I would be well suited to that job.

To be sure, I might, as Pablo the Unfortunate, have good and sufficient reason to take on the twenty-four hour a day job of being Pablo the Keeper of the Flame, and then doing that job would be a way of being me, just as being the pitcher in the baseball game was a way of being me.

But it is difficult to come up with a plausible example. And having a good reason does not make me well suited to the job, either.

There are significant reality constraints on who I can successfully live my life as. They are not a bean counter's kind of reality constraints, but it is not for nothing that we speak of a person's "true self."

What Truth is to the Observer and Critic, Authenticity is to the Actor. There is no appeal beyond that.

In any given case there is no possible guarantee, in either procedure or principle or theory, that we have truth or authenticity. We are not missing anything here, either, and the absence of such guarantees has never kept us from legitimately distinguishing truth from falsity, authenticity from inauthenticity, and reality from unreality in particular cases. These are status assignments which we make as Critics and as Actors, respectively, and that has nothing to do with guarantees.

Maxim: A person takes it that things are as they seem unless he has reason enough to think otherwise.

E. Consider the heuristic example of "The Tennis Game."

The Tennis Game

Jil and Gil are playing tennis and Gil has just served the ball. Wil is standing on the sidelines.

Wil: Why were you waving your racquet like that?

Gil: I was trying to hit the ball.

Wil: Why were you trying to hit the ball?

Gil: I was trying to hit the ball into the opposite court over there.

Wil: Why were you trying to do that?

Gil: I was trying to win the point.

Wil: Why were you trying to win the point?

Gil: I'm trying to win the game.

Wil: Why are you trying to win the game?

Gil: I'm trying to win the set.

Wil: Why are you trying to win the set?

Gil: I'm trying to win the match.

Wil: Why are you trying to win the match?

Gil: I'm playing tennis, and that's how it's done.

There are several points to note here.

(1) This is a significance series, comparable to "The Farmhouse."

(2) "Why were you doing X?" in the present example is a paraphrase of "What were you doing by doing that?" and, as in "The Farmhouse," the answer is arrived at by supplying an enlargement of the context.

(3) The explanation is a part-whole explanation. Given the whole, the nature of the parts follows, though the natures of the things that serve as the respective parts do not.

(4) At the same time, the explanation takes the form of giving a reason for each case of doing X.

(5) Recall that it is in the nature of intrinsic social practices to *create* a structure of reasons for behaviors internal to the practice.

Paradigm: If I am playing chess, then I have a reason to try to checkmate the opposing king. If I am not playing chess, to say that I am trying to checkmate the opposing king is nonsense. It is nonsense to say (a) that I am doing it, or (b) that I have a reason to do it, or (c) that I am trying to do it.

(6) An intrinsic social practice is one that *can be understood as* being engaged in without a further end in view and without an ulterior motive. By virtue of this, intrinsic social practices are natural units of behavior.

(7) Reasons come to an end; explanation comes to an end. And they come to an end when the scope of the context for explaining a behavior internal to the practice becomes coextensive with the practice itself.

Thus, Gil's final answer, "I'm playing tennis, and that's how it's done,"

responds to the 'question' but does not answer it. Rather, it rejects the 'question' and gives an explanation for doing that, i.e., there's no such 'question' to be asked *about tennis*.

(8) Gil's final response could have been given to *any* of Wil's questions, just as "He's saving the country" could have been given in answer to any of the "What is he doing by doing that?" questions corresponding to the series of behavior descriptions in "The Farmhouse."

(9) Of course, it would be possible for Wil to respond to Gil's last answer with "But why are you playing tennis?"

This would be a new line of questioning rather than a continuation of the old. The new question has no connection to the 'question' that was rejected, and the answer to it, e.g. "Tennis is my game, and we play here every week at this time," is in no way an answer to the non-question of why someone would try to win the match in tennis. Nor would it be an answer to any of the preceding questions. (Note that up to and including Gil's final answer, every answer is an answer to any and all of the preceding questions.)

(10) An intrinsic pattern of behavior, such as a game, an emotional behavior, or an institution, is capable of being intrinsic in part because it is a logically closed and isolated structure and as such it is a conceptual totality, though it has *pragmatic* relations to other things. It is those pragmatic external relations that are involved in its having the *status* of a game, an emotional behavior, an institution, etc.

(11) If we begin with the new line of questioning, i.e., "Why are you playing tennis?" the series will end with a reference to a culture, a way of life. "I'm living the Iberian way of life, and this is how it's done."

A way of living is both a logical and an empirical totality. Recall that a culture includes places for both members and non-members and both world and history. Unlike a game, a culture has no pragmatic relationship to anything outside because there is, literally, *nothing* outside.

(12) But, as we noted earlier in connection with Critic and Actor

conceptual schemes, the cultural scheme is designed for a multiplicity of individuals, so that although it is a behavioral scheme, it does not have the immediacy of *my* behavioral scheme.

The gap between the two is brought out by asking “Why tennis and not something else that other persons living the Iberian way of life do?” for the initial question and “Why live this particular way when, as an Iberian, you could be living in a variety of ways, as other Iberians do and have done?”

This question points to an ellipsis above. The unelliptical ultimate answer to “Why are you playing tennis?” is “I’m living the Iberian way of life, and this is *my* way of doing it.”

For me this is *the way* it’s done. *Being me*, this is *how* I do it. *As me*, this is *what* I do.

We now have the conceptual sketch of a logically self contained, and all inclusive dramatic structure in which there are *in principle*, no further questions to be asked about why I do what I do. My self-status assignment, which corresponds to *who* I am, is the keystone which completes the structure.

This is not to say that there are not a great many other sorts of questions that one could ask. Rather, other kinds of questions require the introduction of other conceptual schemes which create the internal sense those questions could make. Such schemes, e.g., the “naturalistic” framework or various theoretical schemes, could not compete with the genuinely all-inclusive dramatic structure. Rather, their introduction would have to have a place in our behavioral scheme in order to be real and the value and significance of such schemes would be determined by their place in the dramatic structure of the real world.

The play’s the thing.

13. Pathology

1.0 The Concept of Pathology

When a person is in a particular state there is a systematic difference in his powers and/or dispositions.

A person may become unable to stand without collapsing, or become overwhelmingly afraid to leave the house, or begin to talk seriously in ways that don't make sense, or begin to check everything he does six times, or become unable to hold down any food, or...

In such cases we would almost certainly say that the person was in some kind of state, and very likely we would go beyond this and say that the person was in a pathological state. We would say the person was "sick."

Consider the following definitions.

- a. A person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action in a dramaturgical pattern.
- b. When a person is in a pathological state there is a significant restriction on his ability (1) to engage in Deliberate Action and, equivalently, (2) to participate in the social practices of the community.

The practical force of the latter is perhaps best indicated by some paraphrases in the vernacular:

- a. A person is sick when he is sufficiently limited in his ability to do what is essential to being a person, i.e., act on purpose in ways that make sense, knowing what he is doing.
- b. A person is sick when he is sufficiently limited in his ability to do what, as a real person in a real life setting he *ought* to be able to do.

The significance of this formulation will be developed below. From the outset, however, it is important to note that the definition does not apply to cases where the significant restriction on a person's behavior potential is a matter of lacking the opportunity. A person who is a prisoner

and a person who is a slave will each be strongly limited in what he is able to do because there are many behaviors which he lacks the opportunity to engage in, but neither is *per se* limited in his abilities, and so neither is *ipso facto* in a pathological state. (To be sure, being locked up all one's life would be pathogenic, but it would not be pathology.) Similarly, a person who merely refuses to act in many of the conventional ways but has the ability to do so is not thereby in a pathological state.

The conceptual formulation of a pathological state is the formulation of a kind of disability. Thus, we may speak of the Disability Model or the Deficit Model of pathology.

In pathology, the limited ability to participate in the social practices of the community may take either of two forms. The first is a limitation on which social practices one can participate in. The second is a limitation on the ways that one can participate in given social practices. An example of the first kind is not being able to do arithmetic; a corresponding example of the second kind is being able to do arithmetic, but only with a hand calculator. Both reflect limited abilities, from a normative standpoint.

2.0 Phenomenon and Explanation

The definition of "pathological state" tells us what it is for a person to be in a pathological state. It does not preempt the question of how we explain or account for a person's being in a pathological state, since that is a separate matter. Since we do in fact offer various sorts of explanation, the definition underlines the necessity for maintaining the distinction between the presence of pathology and any putative explanation of it.

To take a familiar example, certain kinds of pathology, e.g., ulcers, arthritis, jaundice, etc., are commonly called "physical" illnesses. And certain other kinds of conditions, e.g., phobias, obsessive thoughts, schizophrenia, etc., are commonly called "mental" illnesses. The distinction between the two, however, is the distinction between explanations of pathology, not between kinds of pathology *per se*. In this connection a simple thought experiment will be helpful.

The Elusive Symptom

Imagine that I have a broken leg or an extreme case of gout or arthritis. Imagine also that, nevertheless, I am able to do all the things I used to be able to do before I acquired this condition. That is, I can walk, run, and hop; I can kick various objects; I can climb ladders, and I can dance (and enjoy it). And so on. Moreover, this state of affairs can be expected to continue indefinitely. And finally, imagine that I am not exceptional in these respects, but rather that I am typical of people who have broken legs, gout, or arthritis.

Under the conditions, would I or anyone else claim I was “sick”? Obviously not – it would be nonsensical. Yet such physiological conditions are what we routinely and unreflectively refer to as *the illness*. What the thought experiment brings out clearly is that it is the restriction in behavioral capabilities which is essential to the notion of illness, because without that there is nothing to be explained by reference to a physiological, psychological, or other “condition,” and there is nothing that calls for treatment by reference to physiological, psychological, or other kinds of theories or models.

This is a point that physiologists are well aware of. They not infrequently remind us that normal human beings often exhibit physiological anomalies which are more extreme and dramatic to the physiologist (e.g., having a heart on the right side or having one with three chambers instead of two) than those involved in many serious illnesses. If these anomalies have no serious behavioral consequences they often pass completely unnoticed and certainly no one would seriously claim that they were illnesses. Likewise, we often detect psychological anomalies which occur in the absence of any significant restriction on the person’s ability to participate in the social practices of the community. In these cases we identify them as quirks, foibles, crochets, eccentricities, harmless addictions, etc., and do not thereby impute pathology.

Consider a couple of apparent exceptions. For example, if we discover

that a friend has a breast tumor that she never noticed because it make no discernible difference to her, we are not unlikely to say that she is sick and urge immediate treatment, even though there is no corresponding restriction in her abilities. However, note that in the thought experiment we stipulated that “this state of affairs will continue indefinitely.” Clearly, the grounds for saying that our friend is sick now is that we believe that we have detected an earlier stage of a process which, in its later stages *would* have significant behavioral disability as its consequences. (Death is the ultimate disability.) For if we were fully convinced that the current tumor would never, even if untreated, result in any behavioral limitations, it would again be nonsensical to say that she is sick now.

For a second example, there are illnesses that we are inclined to define by reference to pain, e.g., headaches. But the considerations here are essentially the same as for the broken bone, etc., in the thought experiment above.

a. First, pain which goes beyond the level of minor discomfort will inevitably reduce various abilities, e.g., the ability to concentrate, to pay attention, to calculate accurately, to make sensible judgments, to perform certain movements, and so on. In the absence of any such limitation, we are reminded of the classic statement attributed to a lobotomized patient – “I still have my pain, but it doesn’t bother me.” And we are back to the point of saying “Why would anyone call that illness?”

b. Second, there is a difference between participating in a given social practice with a normal degree of appreciation (enjoyment, excitement, pleasure, satisfaction, etc.) and participating without that. Thus, a person in pain would be limited in his ability to participate normatively in that social practice.

Note that with systematic concepts we usually have some range of choice in how we talk because we have some range of choice in how we exploit the conceptual connections provided by the system. Thus, in the case of the breast tumor, we could just as easily say that, no, she isn’t sick now, but she’d better go for treatment in order to avoid being sick later on. Or, we might show our understanding of the difference between a

paradigmatic illness and this derivative kind by saying “You’d better go see a specialist before you *really* get sick.”

Once we recognize that the conceptually essential feature of pathology is a significant restriction on a person’s ability to act and to participate in social forms of behavior, we are in a position to take two further steps. First, we recognize that such a restriction calls for an explanation. And, second, we recognize that in general, in fact and in principle, different sorts of explanation are possible.

Different sorts of explanation are possible because we can map human lives onto many different conceptual structures. Where we can do this, we can also map the difference between normality and pathology (or between normality and particular pathologies) onto these conceptual structures. And where we can do that, we can look for useful correspondences (whether we interpret them as causal or not) between the descriptions of pathology/normality which we give in the real world context and the “technical” descriptions we give in other conceptual systems, e.g., those provided by physiological, psychological, spiritual, sociological, economic, evolutionary, etc., theories or models. Thus, we might and often do offer many explanations, and many kinds of explanation, for a person’s being in the pathological state he is in.

As it happens, we do not have a guarantee from on high that one such conceptual system is superior to all the others for our purposes or that any single such system is sufficient for all our needs. (We do not have guarantees about anything else, either, for that matter.) Thus, in many cases our choice of explanation is likely to be as much an expression of our own quirks and crochets and ideology and social affiliations as it is a reflection of our competence and the nature of the phenomenon.

To describe a pathological state as a “physical illness” is, clearly, to signal that one endorses a physiological explanation of it. To describe a pathological state as *really* a physical illness is, likewise, to signal that one *insists* on a physiological explanation of it. And clearly, controversies about whether particular sorts of pathology are *really* physical or *really*

psychological are really political controversies, not scientific ones. Such controversies are a regular feature of our current communities of academic and clinical practitioners.

Corresponding to the multiplicity of explanations, treatments may be of various sorts. Most often, the explanations given of the pathological state and the treatment undertaken for it are formulated in the same conceptual system. However, this need not be the case. The treatment and the explanation may be formulated within different conceptual systems.

For example, we may conceptualize arthritis in physiological terms and address it psychologically for treatment purposes. Or we may conceptualize a depression as essentially a psychological phenomenon and still use medication as the primary treatment. Or, we may regard a headache as either physiologically caused or psychologically caused and then select a treatment, biofeedback, in which both physiological and psychological aspects are prominent.

One example of this sort provides a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* argument with respect to the thesis that the illness lies in the physiological anomaly.

The Elusive Symptom II

Imagine that Wil has a case of aphasia which is of sufficient extent to qualify as pathological. He also has an irreversible brain lesion in the left temporal lobe, and we accept that it is the brain lesion which explains the aphasia. For treatment purposes, however, we adopt a psychosocial framework, and we set about re-educating him in the ways of speech. After three years we have succeeded completely and he has no trace of aphasia or other, related, disabilities. The brain lesion, however, is irreversible, and it remains. If the pathology consisted in having the brain lesion we would now have to say that he is still aphasic, since he still has the brain lesion. But this is absurd.

In one sense, the definition of a pathological state amounts to saying that all pathology is psychopathology. That is correct, but only if we understand the prefix “psycho-” as a reference to the existential, real-world context of persons and their behavior in contrast to limited conceptual systems such as those found in physiological or psychological theories and models. The definition is not one which favors technical psychological explanations over other kinds.

Another thought experiment may help to clarify this point.

Blind Man’s Buff

Imagine that we are working within the Behavioral Model which says that pathology consists of maladaptive behaviors. We are developing behavioral criteria for various pathologies. Accordingly, either we look for groups of behavioral symptoms which empirically go together (and thus define a kind of pathology) or else we start with groups of persons whom we have already identified as having a given pathology and we look for the distinctive behaviors that are common to the group, this, as a way of giving a behavioral definition for the pathology.

Now, imagine that the pathology we are now dealing with is blindness. Blindness is one of those archetypal cases where we can say, “If ever there was a case of being in a pathological state, this is it!”

What we discover, however, is that there are no distinctive or impressive regularities in the behaviors of blind persons.

For one thing, the behaviors of blind persons show almost complete overlap, in both kind and variety, with the behaviors of persons who are not blind. We find a few relatively distinctive behaviors, such as feeling doors and walls, occasionally stopping and listening while walking, reading Braille inscriptions, carrying a white cane, or following the lead of a dog in a distinctive harness. But

no such behavior is anywhere near universal among blind persons.

Such behaviors are not *what blindness is*. They are not maladaptive, either. And so, we are left in a quandary.

In short, behavioral criteria do not give us access to the phenomenon of blindness, and they do not provide any understanding of it, either. The reason for this state of affairs is obvious. The pathology of blindness consists of being unable to see and the behavioral commonality among blind persons lies not in what blind persons do, but in what they do not, and cannot, do, namely any behavior that requires that they be able to see.

What blind persons *do* is as various as it is because it depends on their circumstances and on all their traits, attitudes, interests, styles, abilities, values, knowledge, and other Person Characteristics *other* than being blind, and these are just as various for blind persons as they are for anyone else.

Conversely, if we look for explanations, we find that they, too, are various. Some will involve the cornea; others, the optic nerve; still others the occipital lobe; some involve psychological disturbances; and in some cases we are left without an explanation.

Of course, we can and do subdivide cases of blindness into categories corresponding to these different explanations. But what is it that we are subdividing? Why, the pathology itself – the blindness. We do not wait to establish the explanation for the blindness in order to decide whether it is a case of pathology or not. Deciding on an explanation may be useful for deciding what, if anything, to do about it, but it does not help us understand what it is for a person not to be able to see or why that would make the difference that it does. We know that already.

In sum, equating pathology either with an underlying cause of symptoms (the Medical Model) or with behavioral criteria (the Behavioral Model) creates decisive difficulties. Separating the pathology from the

explanation and formulating the pathology as a disability avoids these problems without creating any comparable new ones.

3.0 The Social Dimension of Pathology

The definition of a pathological state indicates why pathology is a matter of prudential and ethical social concern.

A viable society requires that its members have and exercise a variety of basic capabilities in engaging normatively in social patterns of behavior. In general, normal social interactions and collective social participation require that a member of the community be able to take for granted that other members do have and do exercise that basic level of capability. (This is one reason why encounters with strangers or foreigners are generally problematic.)

Thus, as we go about our daily business we most likely take for granted that the people we encounter speak our common language, that they will drive on the proper side of the road, that they can read official signs and advertisements, that they can do simple arithmetic calculations, that they have normative reasons for what they do, and so on.

When a person is clearly incapable of meeting the basic requirements for social participation, he is unacceptable as a member in good standing of the community (and it would be fruitless to go through the motions of accepting him as one). In such cases it is normative for the community to expel the person or put him in protective custody or otherwise radically insulate him and the other community members from normal interdependence and opportunities for interaction.

But there are also intermediate cases, where the person exhibits incapacities which are not serious enough or extensive enough for Draconian measures but are too serious to ignore with impunity. Such incapacities are of legitimate interest to other people for much the same reason that any salient person characteristics are of interest, namely, so that they can

suitably adjust their expectations, their requirements, and their actions. Among such actions, of course, may be attempts to help him.

The definition of a pathological state refers to "... a significant restriction on his ability ... to participate in the social practices of the community." This is a way of bringing out the way in which the social character of human pathology is an essential aspect of the concept of pathology itself and not just an incidental consequence. This holds for both the radical incapacities mentioned above and for the intermediate cases.

4.0 The Ideal of Universality and the Problem of Relativity

Psychologists have aspired to a definition of psychopathology which would have universal applicability. But they have also tried to define psychopathology in terms of what we can readily observe, e.g., behaviors, "symptoms," or certain person characteristics. The effort has been fruitless and frustrating. The fact is that many a person who would be correctly classified as being in a pathological state in Segovia in 1960 would, given the same characteristics and behaviors *not* be correctly classified as being in a pathological state in Segovia in 2002 or in Hong Kong in either 1960 or 2002.

At best, a definition of psychopathology in terms of behaviors or simple observables will have a local and temporary practical value. The temporal limitation can be mitigated by frequent updating. (It is not mere happenstance that the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* has gone into a fourth edition, after a revision of the third edition, which was substantially revised from the second edition.) However, the parochial character remains, and universalizing what is essentially a parochial definition is not merely an academic or methodological issue, but is, rather, a clear and present danger (see below).

The error involved in trying to define psychopathology in concrete, observable terms is the same as the error involved in trying to define "trumps" by pointing to the queen of hearts. The moral that systematic concepts can be illustrated by pointing but cannot be defined that way

should by now be clear.

In this connection, it will be helpful to keep in mind that “is in a pathological state” is a status assignment, not an observation summary or an inference.

Our definition of “pathological state,” by making essential reference to a cultural context, exhibits the relativity of pathology not as an unfortunate dilemma or artifact, but rather as an essential aspect of the concept of pathology, so that only a definition which incorporated this relativity could be illuminating or truly universal.

What is implied by the relativity of pathology is that judgments of pathology are essentially context dependent and that such judgments must, paradigmatically, be made by a member of the community in question in the light of the norms, practices, and requirements of that community. In making such a judgment, the person doing so is operating within the norms and practices of the same community.

In sum, what the definition tells us is what it is, essentially, that is being decided by a person who makes the status assignment of “pathological” competently.

5.0 Norm and Judgment in Decisions about Pathology

In pursuing the implications of the concept of a pathological state, we may note that the definition refers to “a *significant restriction* on his ability to ...” This phrasing directs us toward the essential normative component of the concept of pathology.

In this connection, recall the paraphrase, “A person is sick when he is sufficiently limited in his ability to do what, as a real person in a real life setting, he *ought* to be able to do.” Thus, if we ask in regard to the definition, “significantly restricted in comparison to what?”, the answer will be “significantly restricted in comparison to what he *ought* to be able to do.”

What *ought* he to be able to do? This is a normative matter. To repeat, what the definition tells us is what it is, essentially, that is being decided by a person who makes a judgment about pathology. And one of the things that is being decided is whether the person's ability to act and to participate socially is significantly less than it ought to be.

Judgments about what a person ought to be able to do can be made realistically only in a full historical real world context. However, some informative general comments can be made in this regard.

For example, the norms and requirements in regard to the ability to participate socially are different for children and elderly persons as compared with young or middle-aged adults. We do not, for example, regard a child of four as having a significant limitation if he is unable to calculate or say what day of the week it is or identify where he is or remember what happened ten minutes ago. An adult showing the same limitations would be a candidate for protective custody. (One might say, children are already in protective custody.) We do regard it as a significant limitation if the four year old is unable to take food that is offered or is unable to walk or talk.

In general, the social practices and institutions of the community evolve in ways that realistically reflect the abilities of the various members, and the age of the person in question is one of the contextual factors routinely taken into account in setting social requirements and making judgments of pathology.

To be sure, adult norms are primary. However, once we have those, it is child's play, conceptually, to develop corresponding developmental norms. For all we have to do in principle is to examine the sequences of personal characteristics exhibited by children at different ages and note which sequences terminate in normal adult characteristics without any special effort being made other than normal child rearing practices. Such sequences and their alternatives thus provide our paradigm cases of normality and non-normality (not necessarily pathology) at any age.

Scientific techniques may extend our observational base and elaborate our calculations, but the logic of such adjustments, we may presume, has been familiar to human beings ever since there have been young ones and old ones. This does not, of course, prevent particular parents from being poor judges of what their children ought to be able to do.

Refugees and foreigners are not ubiquitous, unlike children, and so they are likely to be in a different case. Consider the case of a displaced person who comes to live in London. He comes from a society in which for ordinary conversation you stand face-to-face at a distance of eight inches or so and poke the other person in the chest from time to time as you talk. In this country it creates difficulty for him wherever he goes. He has tried various ways to break this habit, but he has met with very little success. Given the limitation it imposes on him, is he in a pathological state?

A standard answer to real life questions posed in the abstract is “Well, it all depends.” In the present case, it all depends on what this displaced person ought to be able to do. Probably, the most relevant facts would be the experience of other displaced persons from his country – do they succeed in changing, and how quickly.

But there are various possibilities which reflect some further considerations. For example, have we made a viable place in our community for refugees with their limitations just as we have made a viable place for four year olds with their limitations?

Or, to take another case, consider a professional person who in the recent past has demonstrated far above average intellectual functioning and social facility. At present he is functioning at an average intellectual level and is relatively isolated, though he does not violate the basic social norms. Is he in a pathological state?

Again, it all depends. The easy answer here is “Yes. He’s in a pathological state, because even though he doesn’t fail the general social requirements for being one of us, he ought to do better than that – he ought to

be able to do as well as he used to.”

This is how we would most often decide. On the other hand, we might assign him the status of “handicapped person” rather than “sick” if we have made a viable place in our community for handicapped persons with their limitations.

In short, the judgment of whether a person is in a pathological state depends on more than just his person characteristics. It also depends on the various statuses that are available and on his degree of fit to the statuses which are alternatives to “pathological state.”

6.0 Pathology and Needs

In most of the academic and popular psychology literature, “need” is used as a technical term designating a motivational concept. We encounter such examples as “He has a strong need to demonstrate his masculinity,” “They have a high need for achievement,” and “She had a strong need to express her anger.” In these examples “need” equals “motivation.”

In contrast, as used here, “need” is a non-motivational term and one which corresponds closely to the vernacular.

The paradigmatic concept of “need” is given by the following definition: A need is a condition or requirement the non-satisfaction of which is a pathological state or results in a pathological state.

6.1 This definition provides a simple conceptual schema for giving explanations for a person’s being in a pathological state. For example, “He’s in a pathological state because his need for Vitamin A was not met.”

The convenience of the schema conceals some widespread difficulties in providing convincing accounts of what the need is.

Some of the difficulties have to do with precision and accuracy. For example, my need for Vitamin A is not a need for Vitamin A in general

or in the abstract, nor is it even a need to ingest Vitamin A (since there are other ways of getting enough). Rather, we take it that the need (the condition the absence of which accounts for pathology) is for the vitamin to be present at certain functional physiological sites. However, we don't know what all these functional sites are, partly because we don't know all the ways that Vitamin A makes a difference in physiological functioning.

Thus, we are in the dilemma that we literally don't know what the need is and insofar as we can say what it is we are being inaccurate or very imprecise. This dilemma is present for many other needs as well, e.g., the need for emotional support (what kind, from whom, when, and under what conditions?), social acceptance, etc.

One of the common points of oversimplification in our common talk about needs is the quantitative aspects. For example, he doesn't merely need Vitamin A; rather, he needs *enough* of it. And he needs *enough* emotional support, and *enough* social acceptance, etc.

This consideration opens the door to a variety of unanswered questions involving degrees of deprivation. What happens, for example, when a person gets enough of something he needs so as not to be in a pathological state but gets less than is normal or typical? Or again, what happens when a person doesn't merely not get enough, but rather gets none or nearly none of what he needs?

Nevertheless, we do say "People need Vitamin A" or "People need emotional support" (etc.), and it is generally informative.

Still, although the concept of "need" provides a schema for explaining pathology, if we are lacking a further explanation of why or how the deficiency would result in pathology or constitute pathology, our need-based explanations will remain at the level of brute fact, or magic, and they are likely to miss the point. (It was a matter of brute fact that eating oranges or limes prevented scurvy. But in fact, what the sailors needed was Vitamin C, not oranges or limes per se, and those who got it some

other way didn't need oranges or limes at all.)

6.2 Although the concept of need is non-motivational, it is easy to see why it would have motivational implications. The general connection between needs and motivations is cognitive, not causal nor merely coincidental.

Since the consequences of failing to satisfy a given need is that I will be in a pathological state, if I take it (*rightly or wrongly*) that I have a need for X, I will thereby have a powerful prudential reason to satisfy that need. Indeed, if I take it that the satisfaction of a given need is essential for my survival, the motivation may well be preemptive.

But it is my conviction, not the need itself, that results in the motivation. Without that conviction, I may have all manner of needs (e.g., vitamins, oxygen) and have no motivation to satisfy them. Given our recent discoveries concerning just such needs as oxygen and vitamins and various neurotransmitters, we may take it that we have a vast number of needs that we routinely satisfy without being motivated to do so and without being aware of doing so.

In regard to the technical use of "need" as a motivational term, consider the face value of saying "She really wants to demonstrate her autonomy" as contrasted with "She has a strong need to demonstrate her autonomy." This use of "need" carries a strong connotation of preemptiveness on the part of the motivation and of helplessness and lack of awareness on the part of the person. This is responsive to and expressive of, the general character of the underlying theory, generally of the psychodynamic genre, rather than the specific character of the phenomenon being described. In a common sense approach such terminology is reserved for cases where the observable facts warrant it.

6.3 If we take the definition of need, above, as paradigmatic, we can derive certain other related notions of "need."

6.3.1 The first of these is what we may call "trivial needs." For example, "I need a quick drink right now," "I need to get an A in this class,"

and “I need a ride to the store” make use of such a notion.

This sort of reference is clearly not to the paradigmatic notion of “need.” Obviously, I would not enter into a pathological state if I did not get a ride to the store, etc. But I would be worse off, other things being equal, and therein lies the connection to the paradigmatic notion of need.

Because of that connection and that similarity, it does make sense to say “I need ...,” though, to be sure, in ordinary discourse and in other contexts, “I need ...” is often a euphemism for “I want ...”

6.3.2 In the second case we move in the opposite direction, beyond pathological states and restricted behavior potential, to the notion of a Basic Human Need, which is defined as follows.

A Basic Human Need (BHN) is a condition or requirement which, if not satisfied *at all*, makes human behavior *impossible*.

As this rule-of-thumb definition indicates, a Basic Human Need reflects something fundamental and universal about persons and their behavior as such.

Because of this, the framework of Basic Human Needs is one which can be, and has been, used effectively across cultural boundaries as a basis for multicultural mental health programs and research programs.

The notion of a Basic Human Need is well represented in the academic literature. Traditionally, social scientists have presented us with lists of BHN's, presenting them as universal and fundamental but saying nothing about the concept of “need” per se. The lists of needs are presented as empirical, with no conceptual foundation.

Note that our definition does not imply that there is any single definitive set of Basic Human Needs. And, in fact, different authors present us with different lists of Basic Human Needs. The items on the different lists show many strong family resemblances, but there is very little exact

duplication. (A survey of existing lists is a standing invitation to make up one's own list.)

Typical of items on lists of BHN's are "Order and Meaning," "Adequacy," "Autonomy," "Self-Esteem," "Safety and Security," "Physical Health" (strangely, no one mentions mental health), and "Love and Affection."

An examination of the BHN's referred to in the literature shows that nearly all of them clearly fit the definition above.

Adequacy, Competence, Order and Meaning, Safety and Security, and Self-Esteem appear to provide a clean fit. For example, if I were *completely* lacking in Order and Meaning, that would imply that I couldn't make *any* distinctions, since any distinction I make is ipso facto *some* order and meaning. And if I couldn't make any distinctions, that would make behavior impossible for me, since I could not supply any values for the K (Know) parameter. Similarly, in the *complete* absence of either adequacy or competence I could not supply any values for the KH (Know How) parameter. And in the complete absence of safety and security or physical health I would be dead before I could even recognize that fact. Etc.

A few of the listed Basic Human Needs are dubious or borderline, e.g., Love and Affection, and their fit to the definition depends on how broadly we construe them. For example, if the need for love and affection is construed as the need to have *some* positive standing in *some* community of persons, then it fits the definition.

In contrast, it may be more illuminating to consider such items as Love and Affection, not as Basic Human Needs, but rather as normal needs, i.e., those whose non-satisfaction results in pathology or constitutes pathology.

However, there is no need to underwrite the validity of every item on every list of Basic Human Needs in the literature. It is enough that the definition and the systematic concepts introduced earlier make it easy to understand (a) why there could be a list of Basic Human Needs, (b)

why the traditional lists have the kind of contents they do, and (c) why different authors present different lists. Beyond that it is good policy not to assume more responsibility than their authors have for making those lists sensible and non-arbitrary.

7.0 The Equivalence Clause

“... a significant restriction in his ability to engage in Deliberate Action *and, equivalently*, to participate in the social practices of the community.”

The equivalence of these two defining conditions bears some clarification. Let us begin by considering a social practice as given by a Process Representation (and note, incidentally, that in general this will hold for a drama per se as well). Paradigmatically, the Process Representation has the following specifications.

Process Name: The one or more names of the social practice in question

Process Description:

Stages: A temporally organized sequence of subprocesses which are the components of the social practice.

Options: For each stage, a set of alternative ways that the stage can be realized.

Elements: The formal ingredients of the social practice. (Elements are statuses).

Contingencies: These are restrictions on the conditions under which a given Option is a possible component of the social practice.

Versions (optional): These are the different ways (sequences of Options) that the social practice in question can occur.

In connection with such a representation, we may note the following.

- a. This is a simplified version of a Process Representation as presented above in Chapter 5.
- b. The format above is recursive. Each Stage is itself a process and

is therefore eligible to be represented as a structure of Stages, Options, etc., to give a finer grained representation.

- c. In a Social Practice Description the ultimate components (Stages, Options) are individual Deliberate Actions.

Recall that in Deliberate Action, the behavior being engaged in is (1) distinguished from some set of other behaviors and (2) selected as the behavior to engage in.

The occurrence of the social practice on a given occasion is the same thing as the occurrence of one of its Versions on that occasion. Hence a slogan for Actors: “If you’re going to do a thing, you have to do it in *one* of the ways it can be done.”

Thus, to engage in a social practice is, at every stage, to select one of the behavioral Options for that stage as against the others. To distinguish (and enact) the Option selected as against other Options that were not selected is the minimum discrimination involved in Deliberate Action. There will, in general, be additional discriminations, e.g., when more than one social practice is being engaged in simultaneously (recall “Dinner at 8:30”).

We have noted that in a given culture or society, social practices are what there is for members to do and that individual histories differ because the members select or invent different social practices and Options within those practices.

Thus, a person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of participation in the social practices of a community.

The multilevel structure of behavior is what is codified in the equivalence of the descriptions of a person as (a) engaging in Deliberate Action and as (b) participating in a social practice: Engaging in a given social practice (or practices) is what I am doing by enacting the Deliberate Action. Engaging in the social practice is the significance of enacting the Deliberate Action. (Engaging in a game of chess is what I am doing by

moving my king's pawn to King Four; participating in (a) the social practice of having dinner and also in (b) the social practice of "Provocation elicits Hostility" is what I am doing by serving well done steak at 8:30.)

Obviously, the connection between Deliberate Action and social practices is a conceptual one, not a merely empirical one. If there were not antecedently the social practice as a thing to be done, there would be no such Deliberate Action to select as the thing to do. The archetypal rationality of Deliberate Action is derived from the tautological character of intrinsic social practices, which we noted explicitly in connection with emotional behavior.

This is not to say that we cannot invent new social practices and new Deliberate Actions – we obviously can and do. But what we invent are new ways of doing something more general that already makes sense to do and, generally, is already done in other ways.

8.0 Explaining Pathology

The concept of a pathological state and the conceptual structure within which it is formulated allow for certain kinds of explanation for pathological states.

8.1 Abilities and Disabilities

The normative ability to engage in Deliberate Action and to participate in the social practices of the community is, conceptually and functionally, a single ability.

However, because of the diverse character of the available social practices and the abilities they require, it is also a complex ability. That is, it is constituted by or derived from a set of more specific abilities.

Similarly, each of these abilities will, in general, be constituted by or derived from a set of more specific abilities. And so on, though not indefinitely, for we soon reach simple, unitary abilities.

For each such ability there is a corresponding disability. However, there is an asymmetry here. Possession of a complex ability depends on having *each* of a set of component abilities. Because of this, the absence of that ability in general requires only the absence of *any* of the component abilities. Thus, disabilities will tend to cascade upward in the tree whereas abilities will not.

Thus, for example, if the normative ability to participate in the social practices of the community depends on component abilities A, B, C, and D, then the corresponding disability may be accounted for by reference to a disability with respect to A *or* a disability with respect to B, etc. (Note that nothing is importantly different if for “A” we substitute “either A1 or A2 ... or AN.”)

In turn, if ability A depends on component abilities P, Q, and R, then a disability with respect to A may be accounted for by reference to a disability with respect to either P, Q, or R. And so on.

In the end, when we reach simple abilities, the corresponding disability is accounted for by reference to prior history. Either the history is such that the ability was never acquired or else it was acquired and then lost.

Given a normative set of capacities and a normative history, the relevant set of abilities will be acquired and retained. Thus, non-normative capacities or non-normative histories are conceptual end points for accounting for pathological states.

8.2 Needs and Disabilities

We have already seen that pathological states can be explained by reference to the non-satisfaction of needs. Thus, the question arises of how such explanations are related to the disability schema described above. Such explanations are empirical and their validity will, in general, change over time. Conceptually, they will exemplify explanations in terms of a non-normative history.

Not every case of a non-normative history provides this kind of explanation. This is why explanations of this kind are empirically based.

For example, if my diet provides me with insufficient Vitamin C and I become so weak that I can hardly move, that will be a case of a non-normative history resulting in a disability which will almost certainly guarantee that I am in a pathological state.

Note that the lessened ability to move is what connects conceptually to the pathological state, not the lack of Vitamin C *per se*. And, for example, if we were to discover that additional amounts of lysine and ornithine would prevent any adverse effects from lack of Vitamin C, then we would no longer say that I need Vitamin C. Rather, I need *either* Vitamin C *or* enough lysine plus ornithine (*or* additional nutrients as yet undetermined *or* an effective prosthetic as yet not invented, *or* etc.). As we noted above, explanations of pathology by reference to unsatisfied needs are often serviceable in the specific cultural context but it is difficult to imagine a rigorous explanation of this sort.

It is easy to forget that, hand-in-hand with our increasing knowledge of our physiological “requirements” for good health will come an increasing ability to circumvent those particular “requirements,” so that in the end they are not and never really were *requirements*. (What they will be then is what, after all, they have been all along.) There is no inherent end to this process.

If the Vitamin C example is a case of losing abilities I once had, there will be parallel cases where I never did acquire a pathology-relevant ability. For example, if I grow up in an impersonal, highly-controlling social environment I am unlikely to acquire the ability to give other people’s interests any weight at all, much less a normative degree of weight, and I am unlikely to understand a great deal about why people do what they do. In this case there are normal abilities that I have never acquired and again, that will almost certainly guarantee that I am in a pathological state.

Or, consider the case where in spite of a normative family and social environment I never acquire more than a rudimentary sense of what is socially fitting on a given occasion. This, too, will pretty well guarantee that I am in a pathological state, but now we would probably offer an explanation in terms of a lack of Capacity.

Of course, Capacity, Person Characteristics, and personal histories do not simply pursue independent courses. Consider the following hypothetical example.

1. I am born with the capacity to acquire a normative set of abilities under normative conditions.
2. My early circumstances which are not recognizably non-normative or pathogenic are such that very early I acquire the Person Characteristic of, say, excessive self involvement (or, e.g., a pervasive anxiety).
3. By virtue of this PC my capacity for normal development is reduced.
4. More specifically, as it happens, my capacity for normal development (normal PC acquisition) *under the specific conditions I actually encounter* is lost.
5. From that point on my personal/social development is non-normative, i.e., my personal history is non-normative.
6. At a later date I am, by standard criteria, in a pathological state.

Note that it would be essentially the same case if the Person Characteristic in question were a physiological one – for excessive self involvement or anxiety one could substitute an excessive excretion of proteins by my kidneys or an atypical functioning of my left temporal lobe.

8.3 “Pathological” Person Characteristics

One of the possible kinds of explanation is that I lack a pathology-relevant ability because I have a Person Characteristic that is incompatible with having that ability.

For example, returning to the notion of excessive self involvement,

suppose that my personality was such that I could be correctly described as “extraordinarily self involved” or “extremely egocentric.” If you were a normal clinician and knew that one Person Characteristic of mine you would almost certainly conclude that I was in a pathological state.

If pressed to explain or justify that conclusion you would say somewhat as follows. “I don’t see how she could be *that* egocentric and still be able to participate in the normal range of ways in the normal range of social/personal interactions. On the contrary, it would be *extraordinary* if she was capable of interacting with people in any but the most limited sorts of ways.”

Thus, without any explicit formulation of my disabilities it would be possible to conclude, reasonably, that I was in a pathological state.

To be sure, this kind of explanation has its vulnerabilities. Whether or not I am in a pathological state depends on all my Person Characteristics, not just on the ‘pathological’ one. And while it might be extraordinary to be extremely egocentric and not be in a pathological state, it is clearly possible.

The advantage of this approach over what we might call a canonical disability analysis is that it is generally much easier, observationally, to establish that I am extremely egocentric than it is to systematically establish what my ability limitations are and then parlay that into a judgment about pathology.

An intermediate case in this connection is the traditional psychiatric “mental status examination.” Such an examination involves setting the patient a series of tasks success at which would indicate that he was oriented as to time, place, and person. The absence of such orientation presumably indicates that the person is not operating within a single, coherent, public, real world framework.

Although this does imply a disability of a certain sort, no disability analysis is made. Rather the reasoning is “it would be *extraordinary* if he

didn't know who he was or where he was or what day it was and nevertheless he could engage in the normative behavior that it takes to be normal." This is a relatively safe judgment, and it relates to the person's ability to engage in Deliberate Action *per se*.

8.4 Theoretical Explanations

What is required for a theoretical explanation of pathology is an account, in process terms or state of affairs terms, of normal psychological functioning. Almost any deviation from the normative pattern of functioning will provide a basis for the ascription of pathology.

For example, in a psychodynamic account we would find the following normative ingredients.

- a. A normative balance of id, ego, and superego functioning.
- b. A freedom from, or prior recovery from, significant fixations during development.
- c. A normative level of freedom from the operation of ego defense mechanisms.
- d. A normative ego function, in terms of effective discharge of psychic energy and the ability to modify cathexes in an adaptive way.
- e. A normative balance of object cathexes for various psychic objects.

Any deviation from such theoretical conditions would be potentially attributable as the cause of what we observe to be a case of pathology. Such an explanation will fit either the Need Frustration paradigm or the Incompatible PC paradigm. For example, in the same sense in which a person needs Vitamin A, a person needs to have a normative level of freedom from the operation of ego defense mechanisms. Or again, if a person has *this* level of ego defense mechanisms operating it would be extremely surprising if there were not a significant impairment in his ability "to love and work," or, more rigorously, to participate normatively in the social practices of the community.

In the present context we may count Existential approaches to pathology as being theoretical. For although they do not refer to hypothetical entities they do employ a systematic and distinctive idiom in their basic formulations.

Thus, for example, an Existential psychologist who describes a patient's mode of existence (in ordinary language terms) will generally be following the Incompatible PC paradigm. The logic of "Given that this person has *this* mode of existence, it would be *extraordinary* if ..." is the same as the logic of "If a person is *that* egocentric it would be extraordinary if ..."

The Existentialist would also say that the lack of authenticity is no less pathogenic than lack of Vitamin C.

Or, consider the Rogerian therapist who believes that unconditional positive regard is a necessary condition for normal, healthy psychological development and that the absence of unconditional positive regard results in the inability to symbolize some of one's experience and that enough of that condition is pathogenic.

He would say that people *need* unconditional positive regard, at least during their developmental years. He would also say "Given that this person is so lacking in the ability to symbolize his experience, it would be *extraordinary* if he could ..."

In sum, theoretical explanations of pathology follow the logic of clinical (i.e., common sense observational) explanation and provide distinctive conceptual content. There are many such theories, each with a significant number of practitioners and some number of more or less vocal True Believers. Whether they offer any net gain in understanding is an empirical question and an open question.

Maxim: What a person acts on successfully tends to become real for him.

9.0 Distortion of Reality

The notion of distorting reality goes back many centuries. For example, in the Buddhist tradition of right thought and right action, the enlightened person see things as they are whereas the unenlightened person sees things other than as they are.

The notion of distorting reality also plays a significant part in our understanding of pathology.

The way that distortion of reality enters our explanations of pathology is primarily via the Incompatible PC paradigm. For example, “Given that she distorts reality in such a way that she assumes that all people are critical of her and inimical to her, it would be *extraordinary* if she could participate normatively in the social practices of the community – her actions and interactions would have to be *extremely* limited.”

Note that once we say what the distortion is we can then go on to a canonical disability analysis by pursuing in detail which social practices or which Options in a given social practice would be made unavailable by that particular distortion. Note also how tedious this would be, which is why we generally stay with the Incompatible PC approach and focus only on those disabilities that we establish clinically.

In general, we find no difficulty with the notion that a person who grows up with the wrong view of things and never learns that that is the case is going to have a wrong view of things.

Maxim: What a person acts on successfully tends to become real for him.

What is less obvious is how a person might lose a previously acquired ability to see things, or at least, some things, as they are. It is not a simple matter, and, indeed, there are two closely related conceptual formulations for distortions of reality. We will designate them as the Unthinkability Model and the Insistence Model.

Recall that if something is unthinkable for me then I can't take it seriously as a possibility, which is to say that I can't act on that (for me, *merely* logical) possibility. Recall, too, that, for a given person, the real world is the one that includes him or her *as* a person, and specifically, *as* an Actor, Observer, and Critic.

And recall that for me, the real world is a way of codifying my behavioral possibilities and impossibilities and that my self concept is also a way of codifying my behavioral possibilities and impossibilities.

9.1 The Unthinkability Model

In the discussion of the self concept we saw that if the unthinkable occurs, one of the possibilities is that my self concept changes, so that what occurred is no longer unthinkable. But we also saw that the alternative is to reject the reality. (The face didn't really come out of the wall – it was a hallucination. I didn't really do that. It wasn't the real me that did that. What I was really doing was something other than what it might have seemed. Etc.)

To reject the reality of an unthinkable state of affairs is not, in general, a matter of having a real world with a puzzling blank spot in it (though when it comes to remembering, blank spots are relatively easy to carry off). Rather, it is to have a different account of the matter, and that is often easier than one might think, off hand.

Consider the implications of saying that my formulation of a real world is a way of codifying my behavioral possibilities and impossibilities. Even more pointedly, consider the implications of saying that I formulate a real world *as* a way of codifying my behavioral possibilities and impossibilities.

The one thing I cannot do is to formulate a real world in which I have *no* behavioral possibilities.

Maxim: A person needs a world in order to have the possibility of

behaving at all.

Maxim: A person needs the world to be one way rather than another in order to have a reason to behave in one way rather than another.

A world in which I had no behavioral possibilities would be a world in which I had no place, no status. But for me that could not be the real world, because for me the real world is the one that *includes* me *as* an Actor, Observer, and Critic, and that implies that I have a place in it *as* an Actor (hence that I have behavior potential), Observer and Critic.

We might say that a world in which I had no behavior potential would violate the first principle of world construction, and so it flatly can't and doesn't happen. If I'm going to construct a real world at all it must be one in which I have possibilities for behaving, and it will be this way even if that violates the way in which one of us would, properly, construe the relevant states of affairs.

The notion of a distortion of reality involves essentially a two-person game with the following ingredients.

- a. Me, and my formulation of certain states of affairs.
- b. Someone else, call her Marta, who has an incompatible view of those states of affairs. (Of course, Marta may be myself, but only at a later time, not right now.)
- c. In explaining the fact of the difference, Marta has the option of saying "I'm right and Pablo is wrong. The facts are A, B, C, and not, as he would have it, P, Q, R. The reason he sees it as a case of P, Q, R is that A, B, C is unthinkable for him. Therefore he doesn't see it that way. Instead he has a distorted view of the facts because *that's all he can manage*."
- d. To take that option is to give a distortion of reality explanation for what is perceived as an improper account of things.
- e. That is *never* Marta's only option for explaining the incompatibility of our views, nor is she guaranteed to be correct in giving this explanation. *She* may be distorting reality. (An old piece of clinical mythology has it that half the people in mental hospitals are there because they tried to get someone else put away.)

Maxim: If the situation calls for a person to do something he can't do, he will do something he can do.

This maxim captures the logic of the Unthinkability Model of distortions of reality: if formulating the world in the way that one of us would, properly, do (or in the way that I would otherwise be inclined to do) would leave me in the impossible position of having no behavior potential, then, as a normal world constructor, I will not be able to formulate the world as being that way, but instead will construct the world in the way that I can, and in the way that one must, namely as one that has a place for me, as one in which I do have behavioral possibilities.

But how could a real world state of affairs be such as to leave me with no behavioral possibilities?

For a warm-up, consider death. If I am dead, then, most of us would agree, I have no behavioral possibilities. I cannot formulate the real world as one in which I am dead *now* (though someone else could). There are a number of logical gyrations one can perform with this situation but they all add up to only two possibilities: Either I am still alive (e.g., even though my former body isn't) or else I am dead and I have no behavior potential. The possibility that I am dead *now* is unthinkable for me – it is not something I can take seriously because it is not something I can act on. (To anticipate, this is why in nightmares I always wake up *before* the tiger eats me up or before I smash into the ground after falling from a great height, etc. The principle is simple – I cannot construct, even in dreams, that impossible situation, and therefore I wake up (or, at any rate, the dream ends) when the situation is just short of being impossible.)

Recall that “a Person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action.” A paradigmatic Person for whom Deliberate Action is impossible is a self contradiction. So is a tennis player (per se) with no possible swings or a chess player (per se) with no possible moves. Etc.

Of course, for garden variety cases of distortions of reality which figure in our explanations of pathology, death is not the issue. (An Existentialist

might say, death is only one form of Nothingness – it is Nothingness that is the issue here. A condition of the non-possibility of acting is a condition of non-Being, a condition of Nothingness.)

Rather, such cases involve a contradiction in which the behavioral possibilities that are not ruled out by one side are ruled out by the other side, leaving no possibilities. General formulas for being in an impossible position include the following.

- (a) I have to – but I can't.
- (b) I couldn't possibly – but I did.
- (c) It couldn't possibly be – but it was.

To each of these one might add, “And I can't just ignore it,” but that already comes with the territory.

Thus, for example, if I have to be a loving mother (it's unthinkable not to be) and I can't, something has to give. Either I no longer *have to* be a loving mother or else I will construe myself as being a loving mother and construe the relevant facts accordingly, which will be a distortion of reality.

Consider the following example.

- a. I am a single parent working mother with a two-year-old son.
- b. Having to care for a two year old puts a heavy strain on my resources and severely limits my career opportunities.
- c. I am angry about that, and I am angry at him because he is the one who stands in my way.
- d. But I love him, too.
- e. I punish him severely, physically and otherwise, for his various delinquencies.
- f. A neighbor takes me to task for abusing the child.
- g. I am indignant. “I'm *not* abusing him,” I say. “I'm disciplining him. You have to discipline kids or they grow up to be spoiled brats. It's a parent's duty.”
- h. And I believe everything I say.

Here, if other explanations don't pan out, we will be inclined to say "It was unthinkable for her to be that angry at him and to be abusing him, so she didn't see it that way – she saw things in a way that didn't leave her in the impossible position of having to be a loving mother and being unable to."

Consider the following variation.

- a. I am a single parent working mother with a two-year-old son.
- b. Having to care for a two year old puts a heavy strain on my resources and severely limits my career opportunities.
- c. I am angry about that, and I am angry at him because he is the one who stands in my way.
- d. But I love him, too.
- e. I punish him severely, physically and otherwise, for his various delinquencies.
- f. A neighbor takes me to task for abusing the child.
- g. I say, ruefully, "I know I'm pretty hard on him. I'm not sure why – it seems like it just always comes out that way."

In the first case it is the nature of the behavior that is at issue. In the second case the general character of the behavior is more or less agreed on and it is the motive or the presence of a motive that is at issue. It is cases of this latter sort that legitimize the idiom of "unconscious motivation," but more often than not what we are dealing with is unconscious behavior. Fundamentally, we are dealing with a distortion of reality.

9.2 The Insistence Model

In the Unthinkability Model there is a state of affairs which I cannot incorporate into my real world because it is unthinkable and so I formulate my world as including a state of affairs which is incompatible with the unthinkable one. Since the latter is veridical, the former is a distortion of reality.

In contrast, in the Insistence Model, there is a required state of affairs which I incorporate into my world and maintain in the face of evidence

and/or pressure to change – I *insist* on it.

The background factors are similar. It is unthinkable for the required state of affairs not to be the case (that is why it is required).

The most obvious examples are found in cases of manic states and in cases of paranoid delusions.

For example, in a manic state I may insist that I am a world class industrialist and I will act out the part by spending the day calling major corporations proposing contracts or buyouts, surveying luxury automobiles or helicopters for possible purchase, attempting to make an appointment with the Prime Minister, etc. In all of this I ignore or deny the abundant facts that show that I am not a world class industrialist or that reflect the fact that I am not. (I do that as long as I can, but in general I can't do it forever. I can't in fact carry it off.)

Functionally, the Insistence and Unthinkability patterns of distortion are closely related. For example if I leave out a certain state of affairs from my world because it is unthinkable, what I include instead is not unlikely to be something that I then insist on, since that will be a way of avoiding the unthinkable. Conversely, one might say that Insistence is simply a special case of Unthinkability – what is unthinkable is that a certain fact not be the case.

Clinically, there is a simple and observable difference: In a case of Unthinkability you know what my world *doesn't* include, i.e., the unthinkable fact. In a case of Insistence you know what my world *does* include, i.e., the state of affairs I insist on.

9.3 Comments

a. Dyed in the wool pragmatists often find it implausible that such “soft” considerations as “I have to be a loving mother” can literally result in a different real world for a person. Perhaps the simplest reminder of how powerful such considerations can be is the fact that death is often

enough chosen as an alternative. We noted such cases in connection with the self concept, e.g., the case of the former politician who committed suicide in preference to living a life of disgrace. One of the alternatives to distortion of reality in a world in which the unthinkable occurs is to choose death instead.

b. Most of the theories used by clinicians to give psychological explanations of pathology include some version of the concept of distortion of reality. Leading the parade, of course, is psychoanalytic theory with its ego defense mechanisms and fixations. The Rogerian approach has the failure to symbolize one's experience and the failure to be open to one's experience. The Existential approach has inauthenticity and bad faith. Transactional Analysis has Old Tapes and Games People Play. And so on.

c. It should be clear that the present reference to "distortion of reality" is a case of using the idiom that has currency in clinical circles. If we hark back to the distinction between the real world (what you see when you look around you) and reality (the boundary condition on possible behaviors) then clearly, what is involved here is a distortion of the real world.

Ironically, perhaps, the "distorted" version of the real world does a better job of representing my possibilities for behavior than the veridical version would. As a failure at being a loving mother I may have no behavior potential at all whereas as an unusually strict disciplinarian I have pretty much my normal behavior potential.

We will not find it merely ironic, however, if we recognize that the point of constructing a real world is to codify possibilities and non-possibilities of behavior.

Maxim: A person will not choose less behavior potential over more.

10.0 Schizophrenic Robots?

Schizophrenia is one of the most debilitating and mysterious of the pathologies we encounter among human beings. (It has not been observed in species other than *Homo sapiens*.)

Part of the mystery is the general absence of any identifiable conditions that would account for the onset of the pathology. Partly, schizophrenia is mysterious because there is no reliable cure for it, and there are many who would say that no one ever completely recovers from it, though stable improvement is possible.

Another mysterious aspect is the multiplicity of symptoms that may be involved, together with the fact that apparently none of them is necessarily involved. No plausible accounts are available as to why *these* symptoms should go together or be alternatives.

Understandably, there is a significant question as to whether schizophrenia is a single pathology. For example, the standard psychiatric manual distinguishes “disorganized,” “paranoid,” and “catatonic” schizophrenic disorders as well as a derivative “residual” type. But the fact that persons sometimes move from one set of symptoms to another undermines the view that there are distinct disorders here.

Not surprisingly, some persons question whether “schizophrenia” really refers to anything at all and suggest that this is merely a wastebasket term for any kind of severe pathology that cannot be otherwise characterized.

10.1 Diagnostic Symptoms

The psychiatric manual (DSM-III, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition*) lists the following psychological criteria for the diagnosis of schizophrenia (pragmatic criteria such as a prodromal phase, continuous signs of illness for at least six months, etc., will be ignored here).

a. Delusions

1. Bizarre content: I’m being controlled; my thoughts are being broadcast; someone is putting thoughts in my head; someone is taking my thoughts away; etc.

2. Persecutory or jealous content accompanied by hallucinations: They’re out to get me; the FBI is after me; they’re undermining my efforts

because they're jealous of me; etc.

3. Grandiose, religious, somatic, or nihilistic: I'm Napoleon; I'm Jesus Christ; I'm bearing God's word for mankind; my teeth are rotting and stinking; the end of the world is nigh; etc.

b. Hallucinations

1. Auditory hallucinations in which a voice keeps up a running commentary on the person's thoughts or behavior or in which two voices converse with each other.

2. Auditory hallucinations on several occasions with a content of more than one or two words.

c. Any of the following

1. incoherence
2. marked loosening of associations
3. markedly illogical thinking
4. marked poverty of content of speech associated with one or more of the following.
 1. blunted or flat affect
 2. inappropriate affect
 3. delusions
 4. hallucinations
 5. catatonic or grossly disorganized behavior.

In addition the following are given as precursor or residual symptoms. (The fact that it is the same list for both is consistent with the notion that no one ever completely recovers. Nor is it to be supposed that these only occur before or after, but not during the illness.)

- a. social isolation
- b. impaired functioning in social roles
- c. peculiar behavior such as collecting garbage or talking to oneself
- d. deficiency in personal hygiene and grooming
- e. flat or blunted affect
- f. inappropriate affect
- g. peculiarities of speech: vague, circumstantial, metaphorical, etc.
- h. bizarre ideation or magical thinking

- i. non-normative perceptions – illusions, sensing the presence of forces or persons, etc.

10.3 The Elusive Symptom

One symptom of schizophrenia which is notable by its absence in the psychiatric manual is “concrete thinking.” Its absence is notable because “concreteness” is probably the single term most commonly and firmly used by clinicians to characterize schizophrenia. As far as clinicians as a group are concerned, schizophrenics are concrete.

There is a good reason for the omission. Three decades ago the picture was simple and clear-cut: (a) Clinical sources described schizophrenic persons as “concrete” (vs. “abstract”). (b) Research showed no differences between schizophrenic and normal persons on standard tests of abstract thinking. (These primarily involve classification tasks or deductive reasoning tasks.)

Today the picture is less clear-cut, but it is essentially the same. Some research now shows some statistically significant differences and other research does not. The differences found are in no way commensurate with the clinicians’ emphatic “schizophrenics are concrete.”

Another seemingly unrelated part of the clinical folklore is that schizophrenic persons do poorly at explaining what a given proverb, e.g., “Strike while the iron is hot,” means. No good explanation for this is available. Efforts to explain why proverbs are “abstract” have been instructive and futile.

10.4 A Functional Analysis of the Cognitive Deficits in Schizophrenia

Today there are many practitioners who would say flatly, “schizophrenia is a brain disorder,” partly because of the effects that psychoactive drugs have on schizophrenic symptoms and partly because recent research provides a number of suggestive findings regarding neurophysiological functioning in schizophrenia.

This appears to be one more case of confusing an explanation with the pathology *per se*. In this light, it will be an instructive exercise to formulate schizophrenia as a pathology of persons *per se*, which is to say, including human beings, authentic robots, and aliens, rather than merely as an aberration of *Homo sapiens*' physiology. This will require a purely psychological formulation.

10.4.1 Concreteness

We will begin with the elusive phenomenon of concreteness, which the clinicians find unavoidable and experimenters find all but non-existent.

Our initial clue is the clinical generalization that schizophrenic persons do poorly at explaining proverbs. Compare the following answers to the question "What does this proverb mean: 'Strike while the iron is hot?'"

- a. An iron will stay hot only so long. If you wait too long it will get cold.
- b. It means that you had better act when you have a good opportunity because the opportunity won't always be there.

Clinicians will instantly characterize the first answer as "concrete." It is also a defective explanation of what the proverb means. In contrast, the second answer is a good explanation and it is not concrete.

One could argue that the second answer is more abstract than the first, but that is not something that leaps to the eye as being *the* difference between the two that makes one answer a good one and the other not. This suggests that "abstract" is not the relevant contrast term for the "concreteness" shown by the schizophrenic kind of answer.

If we ask, what does it take to generate the second answer, the answer is clear. Dealing with the meanings of the words in "Strike while the iron is hot" will not do the job. What is required is to consider the question, "If a person says 'Strike while the iron is hot,' what is he doing by saying that – what is he saying by saying that?"

In turn, this suggests that the relevant contrast to “concreteness” here is “significance,” not “abstractness.”

We have already encountered this contrast. Recall that in the heuristic of “The Farmhouse” the least significant descriptions of the behavior (moving his arm up and down; pumping the pump) were described as “concrete” in contrast to the more significant descriptions (saving the country; poisoning the people).

Recall that significance depends on context: In *these* circumstances, moving his arm up and down is pumping the pump; ...; in *these* circumstances, poisoning the people is saving the country. In “The Farmhouse,” each new description of the behavior depended, in non-deductive fashion, on the introduction of additional real world context (facts, states of affairs).

Thus, we may characterize the concreteness in schizophrenia as a disability with respect to significance, as contrasted with an absence of abstractness as measured by classification tasks or deductive reasoning tasks. Moreover, there is no basis for supposing that the significance disability would be accompanied by a corresponding disability with respect to abstractness. One reason for this is that classification and deductive reasoning are context-free whereas significance is entirely context-dependent.

This formulation allows us to resolve the apparent conflict between clinical observation and experimental findings in regard to “concreteness.”

Because it is a significance disability, this concreteness can also be characterized as a disability with respect to managing context (particularly the context which is not here-now observable), a disability with respect to understanding things in their real world context. In turn, this lends a particular significance to the notion that a central feature of schizophrenia is that the person is “out of contact with reality.”

10.4.2 Background Summary for Symptom Analysis

Let us consider the implications of the preceding formulation in regard to symptomatology. Figure 15 codifies some basic background considerations for dealing with the multilevel structure of behavior and the significance/implementation considerations that it involves.

Figure 15. Significance/Implementation




Figure 15 shows the multilevel structure of behavior from the standpoint of observing/describing it and from the standpoint of producing it.

In observation/description we begin at the bottom with a concrete, “objective” description of the behavior based only on what is here-now observable. That description (Level 1) *and* some additional context will, in the familiar real world, generate a second description (Level 2). In turn that description and some additional content will generate a new description (Level 3). And so on, until we reach the level of intrinsic behavior (recall intrinsic social practices) which gives us a basis for stop-

ping and saying “This is what he is really doing.”

As we move from Level 1 to Level 4, we move from descriptions of behavior as concrete, performative, and meaningless to descriptions of the behavior as significant, meaningful, and intrinsic.

The behaviors at different levels are connected by the significance/implementation relationship. In going upward we move from a given behavior to its significance. In going downward we move from a given behavior to its implementation.

These relationships between levels holds both for the observation/description of behavior and for the production of behavior. (Essentially, the former is an observer’s attempt to reconstruct the latter.)

Note that there is a similar contrast to be drawn between concrete, meaningless descriptions of objects and situations and meaningful, significant descriptions. For example, I might describe what I am looking at as a brick structure about eighty feet high. I might also describe it as a three-story office building where a mixture of business activities are carried out.

Concrete or meaningful descriptions of behavior and of objects or situations tend strongly to go together. Consider, for example, the following.

Little White Balls

Imagine that you walk into my office one afternoon, and you say, “Hey, Pablo, what’ve you been doing this morning?”

I say, “Oh, I’ve been walking around on grass and knocking little white balls into holes in the ground, and then doing it all over again.”

Your reaction would be “Why would anyone want to do that?” And, indeed, that would be appropriate. Why *would* anyone want to do that?

In contrast, if I said I’d been playing golf all morning,

you wouldn't ask "Why would anyone want to do that?"
You know why.

And yet, notice, that when you play golf what you do is walk around on grass and knock little white balls into holes in the ground – and then do it all over again.

The moral of the story is that you can burlesque anything and make it meaningless by describing it at too concrete a level. Comedians and satirists get a lot of mileage out of this device.

10.4.3 Symptoms of Schizophrenia

Let us pursue the notion that the thought disorder in schizophrenia is essentially a significance disability, as developed above, and see what further consequences that disability might have or in what ways that disability might be expressed.

a. Flat or blunted affect

Although delusions and hallucinations are more dramatic, "flat affect," i.e., the absence of emotional responsiveness, is perhaps the most salient and most nearly universal symptom clinically, if only because it can be observed at almost any time, including in interactions between the clinician and the schizophrenic patient.

It is also one of the most direct derivations from the significance disability formulation. Recall that emotional behavior involves the appraisal of the significance of some state of affairs ("The rattlesnake is a danger to me!"). A person who is perceiving the world in very concrete terms is missing the significant aspects required to provide reasons for emotional responses. A world of little white balls is not a world in which emotion has a place.

As to why it might be the case that a person's world might change from the familiar world to a meaningless one, one possibility is obvious:

The world as it is is unthinkable because it contains a central fact that is unthinkable. (Recall that we are not considering any physiological explanations here.)

Such central facts may, for example, involve a pervasive personal failure or an enervating and irremediable conflict. For one young man who showed an almost pure meaninglessness syndrome it was the discovery, in his mid teens, that his successful, hardworking parents, who were all the family he had, not only didn't love him but had a pretty low opinion of him as a person.

Cases involving no more than blunted affect are rare.

b. Delusions per se

When it comes to the concepts involved in describing or enacting significant personal, social, and institutional behaviors and interactions, we are not to suppose that the schizophrenic person is simply lacking such concepts. Though they are not organized in the normative, coherent overall way, a significant repertoire of such concepts is present. Partly, this is because they were acquired before the onset of the pathology, and partly it is because encounters with them in reading, television, movies, and real life conversations, engaged in or observed, are unavoidable.

If we return to the notion of a significant restriction on the ability to move from the concrete to the meaningful, some consequences follow.

First, if I have that disability, much that goes on in the world will be mysterious or confusing to me if it is not *simply* meaningless. If I do not stay at the meaningless level (e.g., because I know there's more to life than that), I will construct significance in the ways that I can. These ways will be, unavoidably, idiosyncratic in nature, though they may have substantial normative components, especially those which are cultural clichés.

In effect, this is a prescription for delusion. All of the different kinds of delusions that are commonly found among schizophrenic persons are

examples of such idiosyncratic significance.

c. Delusions in context

If I find the world in this way mysterious, one of the mysteries is why it isn't mysterious to other people. Situations that are for me uncertain and undefined are dealt with by other persons in a forthright and confident (and generally successful) manner, and, until I come up with an answer, it isn't clear what they are doing or why. Thus, one of the things I might well find it imperative to account for is the difference between myself and other people. (This is not to imply that I think about that explicitly, though I may. Rather, it is something that makes a difference in my eventual world construction.)

At the same time, being out of touch with social norms for judgment and action significantly limits my ability to operate as a Critic. I am out of touch with what one of us would, properly, think about this, do about this, expect from this, etc. I will, therefore, be correspondingly limited in my ability to apply reality checks to my idiosyncratic formulations of what is going on.

Without such checks, my delusions will reflect primarily my own inclinations. These inclinations will tend toward wishful thinking, fearful thinking, insistence, denial, or some combination thereof.

For example, my sense of vulnerability, exacerbated by the difference between myself and other people, may well be expressed in delusions of persecution, or of being controlled, or of having my thoughts read or taken away, etc.

But threatened degradation elicits self affirmation, and I may instead exhibit delusions of grandeur. A combination of the two is found, for example, in the case where I use the fact that the Guardia Civil is after me as proof of what a special and important person I am.

The content of my delusion may primarily be simply the distortion of

reality that I accomplish in accordance with the Unthinkability Model or the Insistence Model or both.

Note that a delusion can provide a stable, global, and relatively coherent domain of significance in my life. Given, in addition, the deficiency in Critic function, it is understandable that delusions are usually exceptionally difficult to change.

Maxim: A person will not choose less behavior potential over more.

d. Rituals and magical thinking

Delusions are not the only kind of idiosyncratic significance I might generate. Given the non-availability of the normative path from concrete to significant and given the deficiency of Critic function I could start with any concrete event or behavior (my own or someone else's) and, if we push it to the limit, I could give it *any significance whatever*. Thus, I could save the world from destruction by holding up the wall with my hand (and note the opportunity for displacement here). I could instantly recognize them as evildoers because of the way they dress. And so on.

The difference between delusions and magical thinking is largely a matter of scope and stability rather than a clear difference in kind.

e. Catatonia, ambivalence

Catatonia involves the absence of voluntary movement. This may amount to no movement at all for hours at a stretch or it may involve staying in whatever posture I am placed in by someone else ("waxy flexibility").

Let us note, first, that inhibition of movement may be a case of ritual based on magical thinking.

But also, consider that in a meaningless world there is no reason to do anything. Further, in a meaningful but mysterious world doing anything

may be supremely dangerous, so that there is a positive reason to do nothing.

And in a relatively meaningless world the pro's and con's for doing a given behavior will not readily be resolvable into a clear "yes" or "no."

In short, where there are no delusions to organize the world as a field of action there may well be little motivation and little clear motivation for any action at all.

f. Social isolation and bizarre behavior

Idiosyncratic significance leads to idiosyncratic behavior. It also leads to problematic personal and social interactions, since the participants have different ideas of what is going on (except at the most concrete levels). Add an awareness of being different, and it is hardly surprising that bizarre behavior and social isolation are common symptoms of schizophrenia.

g. Bizarre speech

Up to now we have focused on the significance problems associated with the left side (bottom up) of Figure 15. Let us now consider implementation problems associated with the right side (top down) of Figure 15.

Let us begin with the inverse of the bottom up principle that I can start with a normal concrete event or behavior and give it any significance whatever. The inverse is that I can start with a normal significance (e.g., what I choose to do) and "implement" it with any concrete behavior whatever.

One example of this is found in the bizarre speech which is not uncommon in schizophrenia. Such speech ranges from the flatly unintelligible "word salad" to something so tantalizingly like real speech that some observers have speculated on the possibility of a private schizophrenic

language.

Consider what a young schizophrenic veteran had to say about his civilian friends who dropped him after he entered the service:

“I didn’t have a place with them anymore. I tried to tell them about the stock market, but they didn’t appreciate it. They asked me to pick up a record I lent them. I didn’t go because they tried to kill me. They’re all dead now – I had it done.”

Some clinical experience with such talk indicates that it can be “decoded” on the assumption that (a) it is produced top down, as is any other behavior, and (b) the functional gap in implementation is at the concrete level rather than higher up. Under these assumptions, the schizophrenic speech is decoded by dropping the concrete details and retaining the conceptual patterns that remain. Not only does this procedure lead to plausible results in a seminar setting, but one clinician has been able to do this well enough in real time to have conversations with schizophrenic patients whose speech is bizarre in this way.

At the other end of the bizarre speech continuum, the “word salad,” we should note that this is, among other things, a way of being non-committal and not saying anything. Thus, it is understandable as an alternative to catatonia, reflecting the fact that (a) in a meaningless world there is no reason to do any one thing rather than another and (b) in a mysterious world it may be dangerous to do any given thing.

And if they are alternatives, it will not be surprising if schizophrenic persons sometimes switch from the one set of symptoms to the other.

h. Poverty of speech content and thought

In a world of little white balls, there is a dearth not merely of emotional significance but also a dearth of social, behavioral, or any other significance. In the pure case, not only is there nothing to do – there is, correspondingly, nothing to say and nothing to think.

If my speech and ideation are sparse in content, that may simply re-

flect the extent to which my world is literally meaningless. It may also be a case of being non-committal in a world that is mysterious as well as relatively meaningless. Whatever content there is may reflect what kind of significance there still is in my world.

i. Self concept

We have noted that a disability with respect to Critic functioning and reality checking is to be expected. It should also be clear that in a world of little white balls in which things happen mysteriously (though other people don't seem to think so) there will be a corresponding Observer disability. The real world within which observation normally takes place is one that extends well beyond what is here-now present in terms of time, space, and significance. To be restricted to what is most concrete is to miss most of what there is to be observed.

Similarly, in a meaningless world in which there is essentially nothing to do (except to go through some motions) and no reason to do any particular thing, Actor functioning will be correspondingly disabled.

If ordinary significance is missing, what can we say about the ultimate significance which is the basis for the self concept?

First that any self concept would be a very tenuous sort of thing – what we would find would be hardly more than a collection of social roles (statuses).

Second, that a kind of self concept might be present where systematic delusions provided enough coherence for the notion of “myself” to make some kind of sense. Even this would be a “cardboard figure” kind of phenomenon, more like a role than a genuine self concept (e.g., the role of the fugitive from the FBI or the bearer of God's word for mankind).

The psychiatric manual says “The sense of self that gives the normal person a feeling of individuality, uniqueness, and self direction is frequently disturbed,” and “Nearly always there is some disturbance in

self-initiated, goal-directed activity which may grossly impair work or other role functioning.”

j. Hearing voices, etc.

I commonly experience thoughts as a voice in my head expressing the thought. Sometimes these are thoughts that merely occur to me (“they pass through my mind”). At other times they are *my* thoughts, i.e., thoughts that I am committed to and that I will act on, other things being equal. A special case, primarily of the second kind is the Critic judgments that provide feedback to the Actor, i.e., “diagnoses” and “prescriptions.” Ordinarily, I *hear* from my conscience – I don’t talk to it.

If I experience them concretely, I experience them as actual voices, but the speaker(s) will not be obvious.

Taking the pure case again, in a world in which nothing is meaningful and there is nothing to do and no reason to do anything and nothing to think, and no self to provide antecedent, inherent direction, thoughts will not be something I can act on, and so they will not be real for me as my thoughts – only as voices.

Since the speaker is not visible and it isn’t me, any effort to understand what is going on will lead toward familiar results: someone is putting thoughts in my head; I can hear people’s thoughts; I can hear people at a distance; etc.

Similarly, without a substantial self concept, no behavior is really *my* behavior. Since it is observably my body that is involved, someone is controlling me, or etc.

10.4.4 Summary

The present essay is not a disquisition on schizophrenia. The foregoing is an illustrative and necessarily incomplete exercise in which we use the conceptual structure and the conceptual distinctions of the Person

concept to articulate more detailed conceptual possibilities exemplified by schizophrenia and its manifold symptoms.

The delineation of the pathology leaves the following as unmysterious.

- (a) How there could be such a pathology
- (b) Why the symptoms are as manifold and sometimes as dramatic as they are
- (c) Why there would be *these* symptoms
- (d) Why a person might shift from one subset of symptoms to another
- (e) Why an alien or an authentic robot might be straightforwardly schizophrenic

11.0 Pathology and Problems

To be in a pathological state is to have a significantly restricted behavior potential, but one can have a significantly restricted behavior potential without being in a pathological state.

An example of the latter case is where the restriction is a matter of opportunity constraints rather than ability deficits. Being locked in a jail cell or being a slave were mentioned as examples. However, not all cases of opportunity constraints are as clear-cut as these examples might suggest. Consider, for example, the following two cases.

a. Jil is a 40-year-old woman who lives with her mother in the home where she grew up. Her place in the family, and her relationship with her mother is to be the obedient and conscientious daughter. Jil is a successful professional woman who has a normal complement of friends, is financially successful, and manages the household. She finds it unthinkable to get married and leave her mother and the family home.

b. Family X consists of a father, mother, and three sons and daughters, the youngest being ten years old. The family system operates on the principle that it's overwhelmingly important to be right: If you are right, then you get to have your way and your existence is validated, but if you

are wrong, then you are a non-entity. Both the interactions among family members and the interactions of family members with other individuals or agencies consist of do-or-die struggles to be right. Any family member who comments on this way of operating is immediately put in the wrong. Nobody in the family is happy. Individually, family members take part in the usual social activities with outsiders, but they have a strong tendency to be righteous.

In such cases as these two, we would often judge that some or all of these family members were significantly restricted in their actual participation in the social practices of the community. One of our options would be to say that these individuals were in a pathological state and that the crucial ability deficit was their inability to break out of the family pattern.

Another option would be to say that these persons were lacking in the normal opportunities to break out of the family pattern because, in each case, to do so in this family would be a heinous and heavily sanctioned undertaking. That being the case, these persons didn't *really* have a chance to break out of the family pattern. This is comparable to saying that the slave doesn't *really* have the opportunity to do many of the things he has the ability to do, not because the occasions and props are unavailable, but because he would be put to death if he did.

Note that this latter kind of formulation does not entail that the motivation is preemptive. The fact that the motivation is as strong as it is makes it quite capable of being decisive without being preemptive. At the same time, there is nothing about such a formulation that precludes preemptiveness of the motivation. Thus, we might expect a good deal of disagreement and less than optimal certainty about one's own judgment in such cases. Characteristically, we say that the persons in question "have a problem" or "have difficulties."

Of course, family problems are not the only kind which might concern us in this way. Interpersonal relationships and system functioning

in social, occupational, educational, political, and religious settings may also be major ingredients in personal problems.

What is it for a person to have a problem? Ordinarily we would say that a person has a problem when (a) there is a state of affairs which is important to the person to attain and (b) as matters stand, that achievement is either unlikely or quite uncertain. The state of affairs in question may be simple or complex. Compare: "I just can't think of leaving home" with "I could leave home all right but I have to do it in a way which leaves one on good terms with the rest of the family" or "If I don't keep my expenses down for the next three months I'll have to declare bankruptcy."

Note the parallel here to the discussion of needs, including the notion of "trivial needs" where it's not a matter of pathology but of simply being worse off. If I have a problem I will be worse off if I don't arrive at a solution. If I have a problem I need a solution.

Thus, being in a pathological state is a special case of being "worse off" and it is a special case of having a problem that wasn't solved.

Presumably, this is part of the basis for the slogan, "There's no such thing as mental illness – there are only problems in living."

Correspondingly, a significant number of clinicians who would not actively deny that there is such a thing as mental illness prefer not to operate with the concept of pathology (which they often equate to the Medical Model) at all. Rather, they deal with problems in living and often operate in a more educational or consultative mode.

Methods, techniques, and approaches which are effective in dealing with psychopathology are sometimes used effectively in dealing with other life problems. This extended range of applicability is least surprising when the techniques are based on general psychological principles. However, there are at least two important limitations to be aware of in this connection.

The first is that problem solving is a substantive enterprise, not merely a formal or procedural one. Having expertise with respect to one class of problems in no way creates a corresponding expertise with respect to other classes of problems. This is so even when the same principles apply and when some of the same techniques are effective. Training in theories, techniques, and application in psychotherapy does not automatically create a corresponding competence at dealing with problems of families, organizations, finances, etc.

The value of psychotherapeutic procedures in connection with non-pathology problems is probably best understood along the lines of the “Happy Pill” heuristic introduced above as a variation on “The Lion Walks In” in connection with emotional behavior. In that heuristic I had two problems, i.e., the lion and my panicky inability to move. The Happy Pill solved the second problem, whereupon I was able to solve the first problem by myself. Similarly, if I am having financial problems or employment related problems and the accompanying stress has made me short tempered and apprehensive, therapeutic techniques may help reduce those effects and thereby help me. But that is not a solution to my financial or employment problems, nor would I think of consulting a psychiatrist or psychologist for those.

The second limitation on the “I deal with problems” approach is that it glosses over a very important distinction, i.e., the distinction between being in a pathological state and other cases of having a problem. Pathology is distinctive, though not unique, in that it is the occasion for legitimate social concern and social action. We all have a significant stake in the status of persons who lack the ability to function as normal members of society. We do not have the same stake in an organization which is not making a profit or an employee whose career is progressing too slowly or in family members who are unhappy with each other.

Editor's Note

The original table of contents for *The Behavior of Persons* includes five chapters in Section IV on “Ordinary Mysteries: Touchstones of Adequacy”. The five chapters are:

11. Emotion
12. Personal Identity: Being Me and Being Myself
13. Pathology
14. Dreams
15. Imaginary Companions


The original table of contents also includes a section on Authentic Robots as well as a Conclusion.

Unfortunately, the available manuscript ends with Chapter 13, and the final chapters were not available for this edition of the book.

Anthony O. Putman, Ph.D.
Ann Arbor, Michigan
April, 2013

Appendix A

The Developmental Schema (PC = Personal Characteristics; BP = Behavior Potential)



References

- American Psychiatric Association (1980). *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition*. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
- Blackburn, Simon (1996). *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Garfinkel, H. (1967). "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies." In Manis, J. G. and Meltzer, B. N. (Eds.), *Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Gosling, J. (1962). "Mental causes and fear." *Mind*, 71, 289-306.
- Morris, Charles (1938). *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ossorio, Peter G. (1978). "*What Actually Happens*": *The representation of real world phenomena*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. (Original work published in 1971 as LRI Report No. 10a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute)
- Ossorio, Peter G. (1985). "An Overview of Descriptive Psychology." In *The Social Construction of the Person*. Edited by Kenneth J. Gergen and Keith E. Davis. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Ossorio, Peter G. (1997). "What There Is, How Things Are." In *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* (Vol. 27:2/3). Edited by Charles W. Smith. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Ossorio, Peter G. (1998). *Place*. Ann Arbor, MI: Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published in 1982 as LRI Report No. 30a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute)
- Penrose, Roger (1989). *The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Putman, Anthony O. (1981). "Communities". In *Advances in Descriptive Psychology* (Vol. 1). Edited by Keith E. Davis. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1999). *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Translated by C. K. Ogden. With an Introduction by Bertrand Russell. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc.

Peter G. Ossorio Sole-Authored Publications

- Ossorio, P. G. (1964). *Classification space analysis* (RADC-TDR-64-287). Rome Air Development Center, New York. (Also published in 1964 as LRI Report No. 1. Los Angeles, CA and Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1965). *Dissemination research* (RADC-TR-65-314). Rome Air Development Center, New York.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1966). Classification space. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 1, 479-524.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1966/1995). *Persons. The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. I*. Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published 1966 as LRI Report No. 3. Los Angeles, CA, & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1967). *Outline of behavior description* (LRI Report No. 4a). Los Angeles, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1967). *Rule-following in grammar and behavior* (LRI Report No. 7). Los Angeles, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1967/1968). *Attribute space development and evaluation* (RADC-TR-67-640). Rome Air Development Center, New York. (Original work published 1967 as LRI Report No. 2. Los Angeles, CA and Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1968/1981). Explanation, falsifiability, and rule-following. In K. E. Davis (Ed.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 1, (pp. 37-56). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. (Original work published 1968 as LRI Report No. 4c. Los Angeles, CA and Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1968). The shaping of things to come. [Review of *Science and human affairs*, by R. E. Farson, Ed., and of *New view of the nature of man*, by J. R. Platt, Ed.]. *Contemporary Psychology*, 13, 140-142.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1969). All the world's a fact. [Review of the book: M. Kochen, Ed. *The growth of knowledge*]. *Contemporary Psychology*, 14, 232-233.

- Ossorio, P. G. (1969/1978). *Meaning and symbolism: The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. VI*. Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published 1969 as LRI Reports No. 10 & 15. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1969/1981). Notes on behavior description. In K. E. Davis (Ed.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 1, (pp. 13-36). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. (Original work published 1969 as LRI Report No. 4b. Los Angeles, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1970/1981). Outline of Descriptive Psychology for personality theory and clinical applications. In K. E. Davis (Ed.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 1, (pp. 57-82). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. (Original work published 1970 as LRI Report No. 4d. Whittier, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1971/1978). *State of affairs systems* (LRI Report No. 14). Whittier, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute. (Original work published 1971 as RADC-TR-71-102, Rome Air Development Center, New York.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1971/1975/1978/2005). "What actually happens": *The representation of real world phenomena. The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. IV*. Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. Also published Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1975, 1978. (Original work published 1971 as LRI Report No. 10a. Whittier, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute. Later listed as LRI Report No. 20.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1972/1973). Never smile at a crocodile. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 3, 131-140. (Original work published 1972 as LRI Report No. 17. Los Angeles, CA and Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1976). *Clinical topics* (LRI Report No. 11). Whittier, CA and Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1977). *Positive health and transcendental theories* (LRI Report No. 13). Whittier, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1978). *Personality and personality theories* (LRI Report No. 16). Whittier, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.

- Ossorio, P. G. (1978). *Religion without doctrine* (LRI Report No. 19). Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1978). *Research, evaluation, and representation* (LRI Report No. 18). Whittier, CA & Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1979/1981). Conceptual-notational devices: The pcf and related types. In K. E. Davis (Ed.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 1, (pp. 83-104). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. (Original work published 1979 as LRI Report No. 22. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1980). *Behavior pattern indexing* (LRI Report No. 33). Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1980/1981). Representation, evaluation, and research. In K. E. Davis (Ed.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 1, (pp. 105-135). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. Originally published in 1980 as LRI Report No. 25. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1980/1982). Embodiment. In K. E. Davis & T. O. Mitchell (Eds.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 2, (pp. 11-32). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. (Originally published in 1980 as LRI Report No. 23. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1981). *Ex post facto: The source of intractable origin problems and their solution* (LRI Report No. 28a). Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1981). *Rap session 1981 conference* (LRI Report No. 28b). Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1982/1983). A multicultural psychology. In K. E. Davis & R. M. Bergner (Eds.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 3, (pp. 13-44). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. (Original work published 1982 as LRI Report No. 29. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1982). *Cognition* (LRI Report No. 32). Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.

- Ossorio, P. G. (1982/1998/2012). *Place*. Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. Previously published as *Place: The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. III*. (Original work published 1982 as LRI Report No. 30a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1982). *Status maxims* (LRI Report No. 30B). Boulder, CO.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1983/1985/1997). Pathology. In *Essays on clinical topics. The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. II*, (pp. 1-70). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. Also published in K. E. Davis and T. O. Mitchell (Eds.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 4. (pp. 151-201). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1985. (Original work published 1983 as LRI Report No. 34. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1983/1985). An overview of Descriptive Psychology. In K. Gergen and K. E. Davis (Eds.), *Social construction of the person*, (pp. 19-40). New York: Springer Verlaht. (Original work published 1983 as LRI Report No. 35. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1986/1997). Three minute lectures on emotion. In *Essays on clinical topics. The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. II*, (pp. 99-128). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published 1986 as LRI Report No. 36a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1986/1990). Appraisal. In A. O. Putman and K. E. Davis (Eds.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 5, (pp. 155-171). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published 1986 as LRI Report No. 37. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1986/1997). More three minute lectures on emotion. In *Essays on clinical topics. The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. II*, (pp. 131-161). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published 1986 as LRI Report No. 36b. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1987/1997). Projective techniques. In *Essays on clinical topics. The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. II*, (pp. 71-95). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published 1986 as LRI Report No. 38a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)

- Ossorio, P. G. (1987/1997). Cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. In *Essays on clinical topics. The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. II*, (pp. 165-193). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published 1987 as LRI Report No. 39a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1988). *Galaxies at 8:30*. LRI Report No. 42a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1990). *The human condition: Some formal aspects*. LRI Report No. 47a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1991). Naive baseball theory. *Psychological Inquiry*, 2, 352-355.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1992). *Experience for robots?* (ESI Report No. 1a). Boulder, CO: Ellery Systems, Inc.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1992). *An expert system for planning, design, and management support for the first lunar outpost* (NAS 9-18687). Houston, TX: NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. (Also published as ESI Report No. 2. Boulder, CO: Ellery Systems, Inc.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1992). *Robotic systems and automation for space application* (NAS 9-18677). Houston, TX: NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. (Also published as ESI Report No. 3. Boulder, CO: Ellery Systems, Inc.)
- Ossorio, P. G. (1995). *Knowledge support system for the first lunar outpost mission* (NAS 9-18916). Houston, TX: NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center.
- Ossorio, P.G. (1996). *1996 Rap Session with Peter Ossorio*. Society for Descriptive Psychology Web Site: <http://www.sdp.org/sdp/rap96/rap.html>
- Ossorio, P. G. (1997). *Essays on clinical topics. The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. II*. Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press.
- Ossorio, P. G. (1997). What there is, How things are. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 27: 2/3, June/September 1997, 149-172.

- Ossorio, P.G. (1997). *1997 Rap Session with Peter Ossorio*. Society for Descriptive Psychology Web Site: <http://www.sdp.org/sdp/rap97/rap97.html>
- Ossorio, P. G. (1998). What there is, How things are. In H.J. Jeffrey and R. M. Bergner (Eds.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 7, (pp. 7-32). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. (Original work published 1996 as LRI Report No. 49a. Boulder, CO: Linguistic Research Institute.)
- Ossorio, P.G. (1998). *1998 Rap Session with Peter Ossorio*. Society for Descriptive Psychology Web Site: <http://www.sdp.org/sdp/rap98/rap98.html>
- Ossorio, P.G. (1999). *1999 Rap Session with Peter Ossorio*. Society for Descriptive Psychology Web Site: <http://www.sdp.org/sdp/rap99/rap99.html>
- Ossorio, P.G. (2000). *2000 Rap Session with Peter Ossorio*. Society for Descriptive Psychology Web Site: <http://www.sdp.org/sdp/rap00/rap00.html>
- Ossorio, P.G. (2001). *2001 Rap Session with Peter Ossorio*. Society for Descriptive Psychology Web Site: <http://www.sdp.org/sdp/rap01/rap01.html>
- Ossorio, P. G. (2006). In a world of persons and their ways. In K. E. Davis & R. M. Bergner (Eds.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 8, (pp. 11-42). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press.
- Ossorio, P. G. (2006). Out of nowhere. In K. E. Davis & R. M. Bergner (Eds.), *Advances in Descriptive Psychology*, Vol. 8, (pp. 107-144). Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press.
- Ossorio, P. G. (2006/2013). *The behavior of persons*. Ann Arbor, MI. Descriptive Psychology Press. Previously published as *The behavior of persons: The collected works of Peter G. Ossorio, Vol. V*.

INDEX

Symbols

 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64

A

“All behavior has an ulterior motive.”
175

“All behavior is instrumental.” 175

A-O-C

and anticipated behavior 245
and assimilation/accomodation 251
and status assignment 274
conceptual frameworks of 254–258
diagram
 Learning Loop 244
 Loop 243
distinctions for each function 250
distinct perspectives of 253
simultaneous function of 245
where does the cycle begin? 251

Abilities

and disability (pathology) 423
as a “cause” 79
explanation of 75
in list of Person Characteristics 70

abilities

and stages of pathology 406
codified by SA System 113
complex 423–424
component 424
limit and empower 306
limited but not pathological 404
losing vs. failure to acquire 425
mark of acquiring 394
reflected in social practices 414
simple or unitary 423–424
verbal 135

Ability

and Capacity 83
and sensitivity 76
and world construction 156

conceptual scope of 158
linguistic 145
lower limiting case 85
vs. Skill and Know How 77

ability

and achievement 75–76
and becoming a person 3
and mastering concepts 16
and other competence concepts 77
and pain 406
and psychological anomalies 405
and seeing how things are 430
and Skill 77
as Critic 447
basic human 240
change when in a state 80
complex
 absence of any component 424
 components of 424
deficits vs. constraints 453–454
definition 75, 77
Deliberate Action
 is complex 423
 is single 423
description, tautological 317
descriptions 75–77
finite learning vs. infinite generation
11
forms of limitation 404
incompatible with PCs 426
in impossible situations 389
limitation by refusal 404
lost or never acquired 424, 425
norms and requirements 414
proof of ‘concept acquisition’ 20
relativized descriptions of 76
restriction and pathology 403
sensitivity a form of 76
sufficient limitations to be sick 403
to act on the Person Concept 5
to evaluate relationships 233
to love and to work 428

- to move from concrete to meaningful 446
- to restrict actions 240
- to shift reference frames 367
- to understand people 5
- vs. “pathological” PCs 427
- vs. capacity 76
- vs. Know How 146
- absolute
 - assessment of values 78
 - influence of others 394
- academic
 - agreement on “symbolic” behavior 199
 - controversies 408
 - notion of
 - Basic Human Need 419
 - need 416
 - survival instinct 239
 - qualms about who’s a person 31
 - standards of rational and irrational 209
 - treatment of “state of affairs” concept 159
 - view of “Folk Psychology” 147
- access
 - “to one’s experience” 374
 - to all conceivable states of affairs 52
 - to behavior as purposive 50
 - to circumstances and behavior 229
 - to facts about “the unconscious” 51
 - to homonymy and synonymy 139
 - to indescribable phenomena 288
 - to infinite collections 40
 - to paradigmatic verbal behavior
 - to verbal behavior 132
 - to part-whole relations 59
 - to patterns of behavior 59
 - to phenomena via behavioral criteria 410
 - to possibilities vs. case integrity 292
- accident
 - ruled out by competence 46, 48
 - vs. ability or capacity 76–77
- accounting for variation in behavior 213
- accreditation
 - and degradation 272–274
 - as rehabilitation 271
 - is a status assignment 268
 - public ceremony 268, 270
- accurate
 - and the Esthetic Perspective 227
 - critique 257
 - personality assessment via PC-B Model 221
- Achievement
 - and decontextualized behavior 174
 - and states of affairs concepts 158
 - as “what a person does” 64
 - definition 46
 - Description 65
 - in the
 - Achievement-anchored Descriptions 65
 - Achievement Description 65
 - Activity Description 64
 - Performance Description 64
 - Performative Description 67
 - public and objective character of behavior 195
 - Social Practice formula 59
 - Stimulus-Response Description 67
 - relation to
 - K, W, KH, and S 48
 - P 50
 - W 49
- achievement
 - and ability 75, 77
 - and Disability descriptions 77
 - and KH 77
 - and skill 77
 - given a status assignment 273

- need for 416
- not inherently primitive 245
- Observer's primary 277
- of working some kind of system 11
- resulting from know how 11
- uncertainty and personal problems 455
- vs. task analysis 193
- Achievement-anchored Description and Stimulus-Response Descriptions 67
 - definition 65
 - given after the fact 66
 - primary cases 66
 - referring to an entire behavior 66
 - three essential features 65
 - vs. Observation-anchored formula 100
- Achievement Description
 - as observer classification of behavior 149
 - definition 65
 - set notation of 56
 - vs. Achievement-anchored Description 65
- acquiring
 - ability
 - and retaining 424
 - before onset of pathology 446
 - by learning a system 11
 - by operating like us 10
 - from component abilities 424
 - vs. Unthinkability/Insistence 430
 - all PCs (infinite regress problem) 84
 - by practice and experience 152
 - concepts 19–20
 - criteria for 20
 - facts 19
 - general ability as a person 3
 - knowledge about persons 3
 - knowledge via sensitivity 76
 - language 10
 - no normal ability 425
 - paradigm human characteristics 3
 - PCs via
 - Capacity 83
 - Original Capacity 83
 - relevant history 83
 - Person Characteristics 82
 - Powers and Dispositions 82
 - rules of the "Person game" 291
 - theories or definitions about persons 3
- acquisition
 - and successful participation 85
 - and the Origin Problem 85
 - and universality of Person concept 5
 - facilitated and hindered by PCs 84
 - limits to 152
 - not accidental 85
 - of AOC statuses 242
 - of PCs as an event 194
 - of PCs inevitable or impossible 84
- act
 - accordingly, unless... 356
 - according to self-status assignment 394
 - ambiguity in modern parlance 44
 - and participate socially 414
 - an Unthinkable good 391
 - as the person I am 240, 262
 - as the real me 398
 - authentically 262
 - blindly 334
 - competently on facts and concepts 78
 - effectively
 - in uncertainty 244
 - immediately on appraisal 323
 - in one way rather than another 166
 - in ways that make sense 202, 403
 - on a constructed world 156
 - on a loss 344

- on an appraisal without deliberation 326
 - on a selection of possibilities 379
 - on behavioral distinctions 286
 - on being dead 433
 - on component concepts of Person 6
 - on distinctions 17
 - on impulses, desires, inclinations 242
 - on Knowledge 155
 - only out of self-interest 176
 - on motivational priorities 78
 - on my thoughts 452
 - on Person concept 5
 - on reasons 261
 - on the Insisted 436
 - on the Unthinkable 264, 431
 - on what's real 267, 344, 397
 - Maxim 387
 - on who I'd like to be 398
 - or not act 262
 - outside self image 387
 - reason to (Maxim) 365
 - refusal of conventions 404
 - that removes the motivation to act 353
 - to make it real 344
 - without all the facts 108
 - without deliberation 323, 326, 334
 - without thinking 324
- acting
- and Nothingness 434
 - appropriately (as mastery) 20
 - as an Actor 263
 - as someone else 398
 - as the real me 398
 - effectively 212
 - from significance vs. implementation 212
 - in a certain status 241
 - in certain ways and not others 117
 - intrinsically 179
 - on another relationship 230
 - and W & K parameters 233
 - heuristic 232
 - on an SA concept 132
 - on a rule 16
 - on C
 - by saying "C" 137
 - on concept B1, etc. 140–141
 - on concept C
 - in CLB 133
 - on concept L1, etc. 139–140
 - on concepts 16–20
 - shows mastery 16
 - vs. on distinctions 19
 - on distinctions 17–21
 - vs. on concepts 19
 - one way rather than another 254, 262
 - on minimum discriminations 315
 - on my place in the scheme of things 394
 - on possible relationships 235
 - on priority motivations 324
 - on reasons 213
 - in emotional behavior 335
 - in folk psychology 241
 - on self-status assignment 397
 - out a mistaken notion 245
 - out of fear 347
 - weights of possibilities for 118
- action
- "being me" embodied in 254
 - and Critic 257
 - and discriminating that action 51
 - and Givens 264
 - and Observer 255, 256
 - and restricted states of affairs 240
 - and the Actor's view of things 283
 - AOC contributions to 251
 - basic 193
 - counts as a move in the Person game 262
 - critique of, via social norms 447

- grounds for 263
- hypothetical, in context 14
- immediate 334
- in a hostile state 362
- in a particular mood 364
- in catatonia or extreme ambivalence 449
- is worth a thousand pictures 386
- real world as a field of 254
- right, in Buddhism 430
- to implementation, going from 191
- used ambiguously 44
- when Critic is primary 251
- Activity Description 63–64
- set notation of 56

Actor

- after-the-fact judgment 249
- appraisals, givens, status assignments 275–277
- as “insider” 247
- assimilates the world 243
- Authenticity vs. Truth 399
- author of behavior 243
- before-the-fact knowledge 247
- behavioral framework 255
- but what am I supposed to do? 250
- change over life cycle 245
- choice of acting or not 262
- communicates “through the Person” 281
- conceptual scheme 255
- creative impulse 246
- Critic discrepancies 282–285
- Critic feedback 281
- Critic judgments available to 243
- Critic prescription to 243
- dovetailing with Observer and Critic 288–289
- evaluation and feedback 244
- framework 254–255
- function disability 451
- function sophistication 246
- function vs. assimilate-accommodate 251
- having or knowing a place vs. telling 383
- implementations 251
- included in real world 432
- initiates behavior 244
- in the Observer Framework 259
- job description 242–243
- judgments made as a basis for acting 263
- judgments vs. Critic judgments 284
- knowledge of my own behavior 247
- isn’t coaching 248
- knowledge vs. Observer knowledge 371
- knows vs. Observer knows 382
- learns 247
- learns from Critic and Observer 247
- lot is not a happy one 262
- must be “the person I am” 262
- not a unitary skill 246
- not merely logically distinct 248
- not primitive or organismic 245
- Observer’s results available to 243
- perspective and appraisal 262
- perspective in Dramaturgical Model 261
- perspective on behavior 247
- Piaget’s functions 251
- priority of 251–252
- produced it as an X 318
- rules out the Unthinkable 264
- sensitized to grounds for acting 262
- thing a person does 248
- things that make a difference to 263
- treating things accordingly 274
- Unthinkability
 - contradiction 391
- way of life vs. cultural way of life 402

- works with what's there 283
- actor
 - in the real world 103, 111
 - responds to higher levels of significance 195
 - significance vs. implementation 194
- Actor-Observer-Critic. *See* A-O-C
 - schema for self-regulation 242–258
 - vs. Id-Ego-Superego 247
- actuality
 - Actor vs. Observer 257
 - vs. “mere possibility” 234
- actual now vs. possible now 121
- ad hoc classification of verbal behavior 150
- A Fine Piece of Machinery (heuristic) 207
- Agency Description
 - and decontextualized behavior 174
 - definition 63
 - Diamond Notation form 315
 - set notation of 56
 - vs. Performative Description 67
- agreement
 - and disagreement linked to concepts 4
 - in negotiation 15
 - vs. competence and judgment 15
- airplane
 - example of PCF 30–31
 - generic vs. specific 8
 - necessary and sufficient conditions for 30
 - vs. toy airplane 31
- Alien
 - vs. person, human, and robot 9
- all pathology is psychopathology 409
- All the World's a Stage 254
- alternative
 - formulation of Relationship Model 259
 - set of non-X's 17
 - to confounding persons and organisms 9
 - to definitions PCF 25
 - to distortion of reality 437
 - to instrumentality 177
 - to Natural World Model 297
 - to truth and knowledge about persons 5
- anger
 - “directing it at” something 339
 - and “displacement” 337–339
 - and hate 340
 - and immediate action 334
 - and setting things right 355
 - as a motive 347
 - between peers 329
 - Big Four emotion 311
 - experience of 318
 - general case of 327
 - intensity terms 311, 330
 - range of phenomena 338
 - seriousness of 330
 - special case of status dynamics 335
 - specific and paradigm cases 312
 - state of 352, 362
 - vs. condenscension 329
 - vs. resentment 328
- antecedent
 - vs. normative 14
- apparent
 - agreement 4
 - conflict about concreteness 442
 - disagreement 4
 - exceptions to pathology 405
 - point of loss (grief) 343
- appraisal 260–263

- “dangerous to me” 323
 - and flat or blunt affect 445
 - and intrinsic social practices 346
 - and learned tendency to act 323, 326
 - and reasons 261
 - and the W parameter 321, 326
 - a necessity 261
 - as a first-person concept 260
 - concept in Dramaturgical Model 259
 - definition 259
 - logical and empirical gaps 262, 263
 - made from Actor perspective 261
 - made from Critic perspective 280
 - reality basis of 326, 352
 - vs. mere description 260
- apprenticeship
 - in the scheme of things 393
- appropriate
 - contrast to “naturalistic” world 308
 - performative performance 67
 - placeholders 277
 - response to a “motive” question 350
 - sensitivity to the situation 227
 - settings 121
 - subjects via theory 3
 - treatment (per Critic) 280
 - unit size for a person 384
 - ways of discussing a state 366
- a priori
 - assumptions of current psychology 8
 - character made visible
 - in Relationship Formula 238
 - in universal laws 236
 - choice of zilch particle 114
 - elements of Dramaturgical Model 294
- universal laws 236
- arbitrary
 - choice of paradigm case 29
 - ultimate constituent 114
 - universal motives 51
 - zilch particle 114
- archetypal
 - account of overt behavior 249
 - case for PCF 30
 - case of pathology (blindness) 409
 - cases of emotion 333
 - embodiment 87
 - human behavior 59
 - person, definition of 31
 - rationality of Deliberate Action 423
 - statements of doing the Unthinkable 390
 - statements of Unthinkability 389
- argument
 - against illness in physiology 408
 - against inference 189
 - against purely instrumental behavior 50
 - for-against concepts 19
 - for unobservables 287
 - with my wife 172
- Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism 351
- articulation
 - of Person
 - as interrelated abilities 6
 - as interrelated concepts 18
 - concept 5
 - of the world in four ways 92
- aspects of behavior
 - appraisal 346, 349
 - asking about any 349
 - cognitive 46
 - competence 46
 - concepts 142 18
 - deleted creates mystery 53
 - frequency 71
 - in Agency Description 174
 - instrumental 194

- intrinsically intelligible patterns 51
- intrinsic social practice 180
- locutions 136, 142
- motivational 46
 - and Activity Description 64
- multilevel structure 187, 202
- outcome 46
 - and unknown or unwanted results 65
- patterns of occurrence 292
- Performance
 - and locutions 133
- personality 47
- process 46
- purposive or instrumental 174
- result
 - in Agency Description 67
- Significance 350
- transcendental motives 177
- Unthinkability 387
- valuation 207, 336
- world reconstruction 367
- aspects of social practices
 - coherency 174
- assumptions
 - about successful behavior 49
 - in World parameter of Community 182
 - not part of concepts 19
 - of incomplete specification 314
 - persons are organisms 8
- Attempt Description 66
- attitude
 - as Dispositions 70
 - as relationship 380
 - corresponding to emotional behavior 360
 - fear 312
 - propositional 147–152, 161
 - as behavior surrogate in grammar 150
 - as Observer classification 149
 - as umbrella term 151
 - kinds 147
 - unaffected by state 80
 - vs. trait 73
- Attitude Description 73
 - set notation of 72
- attributing Deliberate Action to persons 150
- Attributional Contingency
 - and attributes 220
 - and Relational Contingency 129
 - and selecting options 171
- authenticity
 - and “doing my thing” 246
 - lack of 429
 - no guarantee of 399
 - of emotional behavior 360
- author
 - and Observer bias 371
 - before-the-fact knowledge 247
 - has implementation problems 349
 - knowledge is my knowledge 247
 - of behavior 243
 - produces emotion as behavior 318
- authorship counts 197
- B**
- baseball
 - as a behavior pattern 293
 - as a model for life 291
 - behaviors not predictable 6
 - exercise of mastery 6
 - mastery of concept 6
 - players
 - can be wrong 15
 - may be impeached 15
 - not mysterious to other players 6
 - speak with authority 14
 - positions as status assignments 394
 - rules not discovered 15
 - what do we know when we know how? 16
 - what makes sense in 6

- world 114
- Baseball Talk 152
- Basic Human Need
 - definition 419
 - lists 420
- basic irrationality of human beings 265
- basic reality concepts 91
 - and basic descriptive formats 123
 - picking an ultimate constituent 115
- Beginning of the Brawl (heuristic) 299
- Behavior
 - all-inclusive 52
 - and Person closely connected 69
 - as "living out the drama" 294
 - conceptual scope 157, 158
 - depends on judgment 261
 - emotional
 - and motives 347
 - and reasons 335
 - and status 333
 - displaced 336
 - general case 325
 - essentially symbolic 199
 - explicit connections to Person Concept 155
 - fear 313
 - in Judgment Diagram 228
 - loss 343
 - Parametric Analysis of 45
 - perspective on Person Concept 52
 - primary component of Person Concept 7
 - self-regulation 242
 - Significance Description 60
 - states of affairs parameters 158
 - substitution 205
 - Symbolic 198
 - Symbolic formula 60
 - set notation 56
 - test of parametric analysis of 52
 - uncertainty, ignorance, and error 244
 - verbal 131–154
 - deliberate action 146
 - grammar 145
 - meaning and significance 135
 - synonymy and homonymy 138
 - verbal behavior
 - systematically incomplete 134
 - Verbal formula 132
 - vs. verbal behavior 133
 - complementarity 152–154
- behavior
 - "underlying concept of" 63
 - "universal laws of" 63
 - "unreasonable" 209
 - acting on concepts 17, 18
 - acting on status 397
 - Actor's knowledge of 247–249, 371
 - Actor model of 259
 - actual 202
 - adaptive (per Piaget) 250
 - aim vs. grounds 224
 - and "the real world" 90
 - and authenticity 212
 - and conceptual structure of language 136
 - and Identity 396
 - and movement 201
 - and naturalistic vocabulary 200
 - and reasons 224
 - and self-concept 387
 - and Substitution Operation 60
 - anger 327–330
 - anticipation of 245
 - AOC are forms of 248
 - appraisal 260
 - archetypal for humans 59
 - as a generative system 45
 - as change of state of affairs 49
 - as decision 229

- as movement 49
- as observation report 204
- aspects
 - cognitive 46
 - competence 46
 - concepts 18
 - goal-oriented 50
 - meaningful 47
 - motivation 46
 - outcome 46, 65
 - patterns 51
 - personality 47
 - process or procedural 46
 - purposive 50
 - recursive 57
 - reflexive 57
 - ulterior 47
 - whose? 46
- atomistic approach 202
- author's knowledge of 247, 318, 397
- authorship counts 197
- authorship vs. Social Practices 198
- Basic Human Need requirement 419
- basis for Trait 71
- burlesque via reduced significance 204
- burlesquing 444
- calculational system 55
- carrying off a particular 307
- cathartic 356
- celebration 332
- changes
 - place 384
 - self-concept 390
- choice
 - and PCs 220–221
 - via policy statements 185
- choices
 - and maxims 186
 - control of 244
 - vs. “free choice” 171
- coherent and not happenstance 142
- complementarity with verbal behavior 152
- concept like language concept 44–45
- concept of
 - common sense 44, 68
 - fundamental 52
 - superset of theories and philosophies 68
- concrete to significant 444
- context 190
- context-dependent 261
- context for understanding 108
- contingencies 351
- contrasted with alternatives 171
- control problems 323
- created out of nothing 243, 397
- Critic's knowledge of 248
- decontextualized view of 174
- degenerate existence of 306
- Deliberate Action definition 31
- depends on judgment 261
- descriptions 44, 55–68
 - Achievement 65
 - Achievement-anchored 65–66
 - Activity 64
 - after the fact 66
 - Agency 63
 - use of 67
 - Attempt 67
 - Cognizant Action 57–58
 - complete 180
 - Deliberate Action 58–59
 - everyday 66
 - instrumental 63
 - non-committal 61
 - outcome 65
 - Performance 64
 - Performative 67
 - procedural 64
 - Significance 60
 - Social Practice 59
 - Stimulus-Response 67
 - ulteriorly motivated 64
 - without motivation 64

- direct implementation of 191
- directly connected to Dispositions and Powers 79
- disowning 391
- distinctive performance vs. choice in pattern 195
- distinguishing one from another 142
- doing X by doing Y 47
- done on purpose 59
- done vs. behavior distinguished 58
- dramatic idiom for 290
- Dramaturgical Model 290
- emotional
 - difference between kinds 326
 - displaced 336
 - displacement 353
 - general case 325–333
 - diagram of 326
 - is behavior 330
 - is intrinsic 346
 - moods 361–369
 - reality basis of 326, 334, 335, 342, 345, 352, 363
 - reasons for 335
 - significance of 326, 350
 - state 352–354
- empirically universal criterion for 49
- envy 339
- episode vs. life history 88
- essentially symbolic 199–203
- exceptional circumstances 390
- expected vs. observed 233
- explanations come to an end 400
- expresses
 - “Us” 280
 - character and competence 276
 - personal and social dramas 290
 - status 237
- expression of relationship 233
- fear 313–325
 - and the Relationship Formula 324
 - characterization of 323
 - degrees of 325
 - Fear Formula 324
 - general case 320–322
 - diagram of 325
 - irrational 320
 - Significance Description 321
 - vs. prudential 323
- first-person 260
- formulas 44, 63–68
 - Symbolic 60
- fundamental, non-causal determinant of 397
- general case 52
- going through the motions 64, 74
- grief 341–347
- grounds vs. aims 225
- guilt 330
- hindered or helped by real world 157, 263
- history in community 170
- I can't do and be me 390
- ideal 210
- identifying location 142
- implementation 47, 203, 321, 323, 349
 - analysis 192–193
 - questions 194
 - vs. significance 444
- impossible 387–390
- impulsive 323
- includes another behavior 59, 60
- incomplete characterization of 203
- incomplete descriptions of 55, 191
- infinite forms vs. infinite instances 45
- in general vs. verbal behavior 131
- inherent contextual grounding 63
- inner and outer causes 216
- in Person terms 69
- in real life 259
- insider's knowledge of 247
- instrumental
 - and intrinsic 179

- and universal motives 176
- completely (fallacy) 175
- definition 175
- kinds of 177
- via Agency Description 180
- intentional vs. deliberate 52
- intrinsic
 - and instrumental 179
- intrinsic aspect of 177
- is not an island 169
- is someone's behavior 12, 46, 155
- is what it is 199, 248
- Itchy Explanation of 318
- jealousy 340
- joy 332
- knowledge only an aspect of 120
- lacking opportunity 403
- lamentation 341
- losing the notion 203
- making it mysterious 202, 203
- meaning and verbal behavior 135
- meaningless to meaningful 444
- minimum requirements for humans 59
- moods 361–369
- more fundamental than knowledge 120
- more than movements and postures 87
- multi-level structure 47, 135, 181, 187, 196, 202, 210, 211, 224, 422, 443
- my knowledge of my own 248
- normal adult requirements 58
- not a behavior at all 48
- not genus-species to verbal behavior 134
- not merely reaction 190
- novel 119
- object of 73
- observation methodologies 213
- Observer's knowledge of 248
- Observer's problems with 212, 349
- observer-describer requirements 58, 249
- observing vs. producing 443–444
- one of three world-parts 214
- only Performance 202
- Original Capacity 85
- other's knowledge of my 248
- out of nothing 306
- parameters
 - Achievement 46
 - Identity 46
 - Know 46
 - Know How 46
 - Performance 46
 - Person Characteristics 47
 - Significance 47, 187–211
 - Want 46
- parametric analysis 45, 314
 - test of 52–55
- part-whole relations to patterns 59
- patterns 51, 59
 - choices preserved 171
 - cultural 182
 - intrinsically meaningful 190, 401
 - logically closed 401
 - social practices 169
- PC-C model 213–222
- PCs vs. Circumstances 216
- peculiar movement 200
- penance 331
- performative to intrinsic 444
- possibilities and impossibilities in real world 157, 158, 166, 437
- possibilities and selections 122
- possibility vs. actuality 257
- pragmatic relation to other things 401
- predicting 174
- produced “top down” 194
- rationalization 339
- reality basis of 428
- reductionist approach 202

- relationships and place 230–241, 333
- relation to verbal behavior 133
- rule following 24
- scope from individual to pattern 61
- segmenting a continuous stream of 49
- self-affirming 345
- self-monitoring 244
- set by status 274
- significance via other choices 153
- significant vs. “abstract” 442
- simulation 64, 74
- simultaneous 188
- social unit of 88
- states 352
- status of 308
- stopping point 180, 188, 346, 444
- strictly instrumental 50
- subordinate to another concept 12
- substitution
 - explanations 337
 - formulation 205
 - toward objects 209
 - list of substitutes 338
- successful 49, 353
- super-case of verbal behavior 12
- symbolic 198–211
 - examples of 203
- systematically possible but not predictable 6
- top-level 180, 396
- transcendental motivations for 176
- true vs. possible 266
- type not determined by state 80
- ulterior motivation (fallacy) 175, 346
- unconscious 435
- understood via social practices 203
- unfinished 354–359
- talking about it 356
- unit of 49, 88, 180, 400
- universal motivation for 176
- unthinkable 387–390
- used ambiguously 44
- value analysis 208
- value of 238
- value of Know parameter 155
- verbal. *See* verbal behavior
- verbal individuals vs. non-verbal individuals 144
- verbal vs. non-verbal 131
- via formal or calculational systems 131
- vocal vs. verbal 136
- vs. change of person characteristics 194
- vs. life history 384
- vs. non-behavioral processes 65
- Want vs. Achievement 49
- what hinders or facilitates 116
- what it “really is” 202, 397
- what the person’s really doing 47, 350
- what the person is up to 47
- what you can’t see 195
- why this? why now? 217
- with no value 208
- behavior-neutral scheme 257, 258, 285, 286
- behavioral impossibilities 387
- behavioral repertoire 144–145
- behavioral scheme
 - access to phenomena 288
 - acting according to 275
 - and Actor-Critic nomenclature 285
 - and culture 279
 - and other conceptual schemes 402
 - and placeholders 288
 - an ex post facto scheme 308
 - behavior-neutral 257
 - commonality among A, O, C 286
 - Critic vs.

- Actor 282–285
- Observer 285–288
- distinctions in
 - by Actor and Critic 287
 - by Observer 287
- individual differences in 284
- locating something in 288
- mastering 286
- mine 258, 280
- no-behavior or anti-behavior 257
- ours 258, 280
 - vs. mine 282–285, 402
- playing different parts in 285–287
- speaking for Us 280–282
- unobservables 287
- vs. Actor framework 275
- vs. Critic framework 258
- vs. Observer framework 256
- behavior description
 - and outcomes 66
 - extension of scope to patterns 61
 - extraneous 191
 - incomplete
 - reasons for 62
 - noncommittal 61–69
 - reasons for giving 62–63
 - representing something and not everything 62
 - termination of 188
 - Verbal 134
 - withdrawn 66
- behavior patterns
 - and life history 70
 - by frequency 71
 - culture 89
 - deletion of 63
 - Derivatives 79–87
 - Capacities 82–86
 - Embodiment 86–87
 - States 80–82
 - Dispositions 71–75
 - Attitude 73
 - Attitude (set notation) 72
 - Interest 73
 - Interest (set notation) 72
 - Style 74
 - Style (set notation) 72
 - Trait 71
 - Trait (set notation) 72
 - emotional sincerity 346
 - heterogeneous 70, 293
 - in a life history 290
 - in community 182
 - in other rhetorical frameworks 85
 - Institution 89
 - in the Actor conceptual scheme 255
 - kinds of 88
 - minimum requirements for 85
 - multiple 61
 - Powers 75–79
 - Ability 75
 - aspects of 78
 - Knowledge 78
 - Values 78
 - universal 51
 - via Substitution operations 61
- behavior potential
 - a consideration in its own right 118
 - actual vs. possible 121
 - and “the survival instinct” 239
 - and Basic Human Needs 419
 - and givens 264
 - and reality 121
 - and status reduction 327
 - changes behavior potential 384
 - changes relationships 236
 - constraints 120
 - context of 119
 - correlates with self-concept 431
 - correlates with status 327
 - count of behaviors vs. value 238
 - created by distortion 433
 - created by status 379
 - definite description of 118–123
 - not a behavioral possibility 120
 - vs. circumstances 119

- vs. groups 120
- vs. novelty 119
- vs. terms for 118
- degradation 269
- discovery of 266
- distortion vs. codifying possibilities 437
- encoding 265
- expresses status 237
- from relationships 230–241
- from status 237
- history 82
 - and PCs 83
- history of 380
- in a world without a place for me 432
- in better and worse places 238
- in death 433
- in impossible positions 434
- inside life history 384
- in the scheme of things 237
- jealousy 340
- joy 332
- link between reality and real world 90
- loss of (general) 343
- non-processes 65
- of groups 120
- of individual in group 120
- partially codified in Powers 79
- part of “who I am” 379
- penance 335
- possible disability 406
- processes 65
- regularities 64
- relationship and status 236
- repertoire 79, 152
- required in world formulation 432
- requires something- 117
- scenarios 186, 187
- self-knowledge 63
- senses of 118

- significant restriction 403, 405
- significant restriction without pathology 453
- simulation 64
- thick sense 118
- thin sense 118
- trivial instances 118
- units 49
- via formulation of real world 431
- vs. boundary conditions 118
- without status 432

- being afraid vs. feeling afraid 317
- being in the world 238, 366
- being the behavior it was described as being 315

beliefs

- about the beginning of everything 300
- as “how it is” 182
- have truth value 19
- in community 182
- making them real 344, 387
- reality-checked against experience 267
- require concepts 19
- vs. slogans or mottoes 185

- blame 332

- blank spots 431

- Blind Man’s Buff (heuristic) 409

- bottled up inside 354

- boundary condition

- not what we see 121
- on possible behaviors 118

C

- Calculational System 22, 55, 56, 68

- aspects of 68

- features of 40

- vs. Paradigm Case Formulation 41

calculational system

- access to infinite sets 40
- ad hoc operations 41
- and verbal behavior 131
- as a behavior formula 44
- constructing 39
- EOP model 55
- for behavior 55–68
- generates behavior descriptions 55
- leverages finite time 152
- limiting cases 112
- limits to description 118
- mastery of 40
- modified 41
- notation 40
- related phenomena 55
- SA System 90
 - an EOP model 96
 - transition rules 92
- State of Affairs System 90
- vs. theories of behavior 68

Capacities 82–86

- pair with histories 82

capacities

- and pathology 424

Capacity

- and pathology 426
- and PC acquisition 83
- concept 82
- in Developmental Schema 458
- limiting case of 84
- linked to PCs and history 426
- Original Capacity 84–85
- PC Formula 82

capacity

- as PC potential 83
- individuation of 83
- in world construction 156
- non-normative development 426
- origin of 83–85
- prior 82

- works with history 82

categorical vs. historical 301–302

categories

- basic reality concept 91
 - have no privilege 116
- central to Actor scheme 255
- indispensible 115
- moving between 38
- of “displacement” behaviors 356
- of “unobservables” 287
- of all our possible behaviors 119
- of behavioral history 380
- of facts about myself 370
- of judgments 351
- of person characteristics 70
- of propositional attitudes 147–148
- of reasons 226
- of related emotions 312
- quasi-behavioral 151

catharsis 354–359

cat is on the mat

- as a proposition 147
- fact vs. situation 163
- in Verbal Behavior 139, 141
- shaped sentence 161–162
- sharing concepts 4
- state of affairs 91
- stipulating 148
- telling concepts 19

causal

- conceptual model creates confusion 204
- necessity vs. conceptual 48
- vs. “is an expression of” 238

cause

- of behavior 294–296
- of emotional states 362
- of pathology 410

ceremonies

- accreditation 270
- degradation 268–271

Chalk (heuristic) 217

change principle

for Relationship/Status model 235

in acquiring PCs 85

changing self concept 390

character

and self-status assignment 398

I am the one who... 385

in Actor's choices 276

in a drama covering the world 385

not a genuine expression of 271

ways of showing 331

of human life via drama 290

of persons generally 242

of the Perpetrator 269, 391

characteristics. *See* Person Characteristics (parameter)

acquiring vs. learning 83

adult norm 414

and contingent possibilities 122

and development 414

and pathology 412

answer "why now?" 217

deleted from Agency Description 63

distinguish persons 69

grouping and refining 70

of "being human" acquired 3

over a life history 72

Person 47

power to acquire 82

recaptured in inadequate theories 371

recognizing requirements for 123

reflect behavior 47

vs. status 416

characterization of a person 72

Choice Principles

definition 183

parameter of Culture 183

specifying values for 185–186

standard for Critic 279

vs. Contingencies 183

choice principles

and mythology 187

central to Critic scheme 258

distinguish cultures 184

formulating 185–186

choices

and constraints 183

and self monitoring 244

establish values 78

give significance 153

part of "who I am" 379

reflect PCs 174

thin vs. thick 118

to act or not 262

Choosing Your Movements (heuristic) 192

circumstances

and variations in behavior 213–222, 396

and who I am 396

are endless 119

aren't "outer" 216

are reasons 241, 261

behavior, and person 214

compete with PCs 216

create change 390

delimit non-standard behavior 205

described in verbalization 134

Factual Contingencies 130

for one of us 283

gap between appraisal and 262

implementation and significance 191, 194

in the Judgment Diagram 229

in the PC-C-B model 217

of successful degradation 269, 391

overall 228

relevant 228

- screening 351
- specific to emotional behavior 326
- to describe traits 71
- transforming into meaning 202
- vs. Ability 85
- vs. relevant history 82
- why this behavior NOW? 217
- with motivational relevance 228, 276, 351
- coaching
 - not for A 248
 - teaches O and C 248
- cognition
 - disallowed by Naturalism 200
 - subordinate to passion 265
 - tautological with motivation 321
- cognitive
 - aspect of behavior (K) 46
 - connection between needs and motivations 418
 - content of Person Concept 6
 - imperialism 121
 - parameter substitution 57
 - repertoire 78
- cognitive content
 - of the Person Concept 6
- Cognizant Action formula 57
 - set notation of 56
- coherent world 395
- Collective Unconscious 85–86
- commitment
 - in Agency Description 64
 - in Attitude descriptions 380
 - in incomplete descriptions 62
 - in Verbal Behavior 134
 - to ultimate constituents 114
 - WRT all parameters 62
- common sense
 - and calculational systems 68
 - and observation 278
- and the real world 90, 113
- concept of behavior 44
- judgment 173
- notion
 - of “acting on reasons” 213
 - of “intrinsic” 177
- PC concepts reflect social practices 221
- reality concepts 91
- terms don’t require definition 97
- test of behavior parameters 55
- value of knowing PCs 222
- world of the Observer 277
- communicable
 - concepts 22, 137
 - by virtue of L 142, 153, 154, 195
 - notational devices 22, 137
- community
 - and culture 181
 - and jealousy 341
 - aspect of
 - Basic Human Needs 420
 - degradation 269, 270, 329
 - limitations 415–416, 430, 454
 - pathology 412–413
 - basic capabilities 411, 428
 - changes behavior potential 269
 - changes status 269
 - has members 182
 - norms and transgression 269
 - scope 181
 - standards for Critic 258
 - unacceptable members 411
 - viability 181
 - view of “the whole world” 182
- competence
 - ability, skill, know how 77
 - acquiring 394
 - and judgment 14
 - and Knowledge 78
 - and Performance 77
 - and possibility 121

- and selectivity 16
- applying 394
- brought to bear on a task 49
- demonstrating 394
- described tautologically 317
- expectation and extent of success 76
- four concepts of 77
- gives authority 14
- grammatical, theories of 145
- in “The Human Game” 291
- in Basic Human Needs 420
- knowing rules vs. knowing how to play 13
- linguistic theory of 12–13
- lower limiting case 85
- no guarantee of success 15
- not created by training 456
- not the same as knowledge 13
- parameter 46
- preconditions 244
- primary in behavior 276
- reflected in explanations 407
- repositories 15
- required in definitions 24
- rules out luck and accidents 46
- terms 75
- vs. knowledge 24
- vs. rules or structure 291
- with calculational systems 41
- with indefinite learning history 77
- WRT the Person Concept 13
- competent player of the game 13–14
- complete account of our limitations 306
- complete description
 - and intrinsic social practices 180
 - definition 62
 - equals real world 164–165
 - not possible 164
 - specifically avoided 62
- completeness
 - degree required 314
 - in a world formula 112
 - of social practices 174
- complex mobile artifact 2
- composition operation 101–102
 - limits 112
- concepts
 - acquisition 18–19, 152
 - acting on 16
 - an aspect of behavior 18, 142
 - and disagreement 4
 - and how things are 162
 - and understanding 4
 - and what there is 162
 - are real 154
 - as the primary idiom 16
 - as ultimate constituents 114
 - basic contextual frame for 18
 - codify Options and Versions 221
 - come in pairs 18
 - connect representations 116
 - definition 18
 - don’t appear in the real world 137
 - don’t require beliefs 19
 - don’t require statements 19
 - emotional 352
 - exploiting connections 406
 - first person 260
 - have no truth value 19
 - in academic literature 159–162
 - in Knowledge PC 78, 155
 - in Know parameter 46, 51, 133, 155
 - in negotiation 15
 - in the Actor scheme 255, 276
 - in the Critic scheme 258
 - in the Dramaturgical model 259
 - in the Observer framework 256
 - in Verbal behavior 132
 - mastery of 6, 16
 - must be shared 4
 - not a something 18

- not restricted 51
- not singletons 18
- observation, four basic 91
- parts, and wholes 109
- placeholder 109
- practice and experience with 18
- public and communicable 22, 137, 153
- reality, four basic 90
 - schemas for representing 124
- recognition vs. mastery 20
- related to other concepts 20
- review of 18–20
- social structure of 136
- structure of vs. count of 154
- systematic 406, 412
- the trouble with 16
- value of parameters 36
 - unlimited 158
- vs. definitions 27
- vs. facts 159–162
- vs. rules 11, 17
- vs. stimuli 201
- conceptual-notational devices 22
 - choosing 292
 - simple vs. reflexive 42
 - device types 33
- conceptual domain 25, 35
- conceptually necessary 30, 32, 69
- conceptual repertoire 52, 154
- conceptual scheme
 - Actor 255
 - for the real world 256
 - True Believer 252
- concrete, performative, and meaningless 444
- concrete thinking 440
- conditioning 67
- conditions
 - enabling 122
 - for an airplane 30
 - for change 194
 - for change in self concept 390
 - for degradation 268–269
 - defense 271
 - for emotional states 352
 - for envy 339
 - for jealousy 340
 - for pathology 421
 - imposed by reality constraints 195
 - necessary and sufficient 23–25
 - normal vs. specific 426
 - of a definition 23–25, 27
 - universal 30
 - vs. happenings 78
- constituent
 - ultimate 114–115, 144
- context
 - affects facts and situations 163
 - and authenticity 212
 - and competence 14
 - and implementation 190
 - and significance 108, 442, 443
 - and symbolism 60
 - broadest possible 237, 395
 - deletion 63
 - impossible 203
 - in a world formula 107
 - in schizophrenia 442
 - of discourse 153
 - of facts given by facts 163
 - of myths and heroes 186
 - of pathology 413
 - real world 12
 - scope coextensive with practice 400
 - sensitive behavior vs. context-free 153
 - universal dependence of behavior on 47
- context-free 151, 152, 153, 442

contingency

- fine structure 126
- four types 125, 128–130
- gives constraints 128
- in the PC-C-B Model 220
- via states of affairs 166
- vs. choice principle 183

control problems

- in emotional behavior 323, 334

criteria

- for concept acquisition 19–20
- for observation limits 256
- for Observer discovery vs. Actor creation 318
- for segmenting behavior 49
- in esthetic judgment 227
- in PCF transformations 26
- ultimate 14
- via Achievement 66

Critic

- a distinct perspective 247, 249–250
- a form of behavior 248
- after-the-fact 248
- and idiosyncrasy 447
- and status assignment 258, 279–281
- can be primitive 246
- central concepts 258
- deficiency and delusions 448
- diagnoses and prescribes 243
- disagreements with Actor 282–285
- evaluates 244
- feedback to Actor 281
- feedback to Observer 285–288
- functionally related to Actor 248
- job description 243, 281
- pathology via primacy 251
- scheme 257–258
- sees as one of Us 280
- sensitive to PCs 247, 250
- special case of Observer 249
- status of 275

truth vs. authenticity 399

vs. assimilate-accomodate 251

works for the Actor 251

Critic scheme 258, 275

crochets 405

culture

- and Critic 279
- has terminal significance 401
- heroes 186
- nothing outside 401
- parameters
 - choosing values for 184
- parameters of 181–184
- primary unit of human life 181
- scope of 181
- unit of social behavior 89

D

decomposition 101–102

in process representations 124

limits to 112, 144

decontextualized views of behavior
174

deductive form of attributional con-
tingency
220

Deficit Model of pathology 404

definition

- drawbacks and limitations 24
- of terms 25
- requirements for 23–25
- used improperly 25
- vs. PCF 25, 27

degradation

- and transgression 341
- ceremony 268–271
- defense against 271
- elicits self-affirmation 335
- ex post facto quality of 270, 301
- in delusions 447

- in grief 344
- limitation or partial rejection 328
- not final 271
- parallels unthinkability 391
- PCF 270
- rejecting 271
- ultimate 341
- via provocation 327
- vs. guilt 330
- vs. status assignment 272–273
- Deletion operation 61–68
 - in Verbal description 134
- Deliberate Action
 - and authorship 197
 - and incomplete descriptions 62
 - and states 81
 - definition 69
 - formula 56, 58
 - in Social Practices 170–171, 422
 - in Verbal behavior 135, 141, 146, 150, 152–154
 - is what I produced it as 197
 - multilevel phenomenon 202, 422–423
 - paradigm of 31
 - requisite for Persons 433
 - vernacular definition 31
 - vs. Intentional Action 52, 144
- Deliberate Action formula 58
- denial 344–345
 - and “unfinished business” 359
 - defense mechanisms 373
- depression, grief, loss 343
- Derivatives 79–82
 - list of 70
- description
 - complete 51, 62
 - behaviorally 180
 - completion 346
 - concrete vs. significant 204, 442–445
 - definitive 120
 - everyday 66
 - expanding context 108
 - highly selective 165
 - incomplete
 - reasons for 62
 - vs. vague 134
 - may not correspond to behavior 55
 - mere description 260
 - minimum number 190
 - non-committal 61
 - observation report
 - “objective” 198
 - vs. significance 195
 - of animals as actors 144
 - of simultaneous behaviors 188
 - of who you are 378, 383
 - too much and too little 119
 - vs. classification 149
 - what the person was really doing 191, 350
- descriptive formats 91, 123
 - open-ended 144
- descriptive formulas vs. descriptions 92, 100–102
- Desert Island (heuristic) 116, 121
- development
 - and social practices 218
 - child 235, 250
 - history 84
 - minimum requirements 85
 - of PCs 84
 - origin problems 84
- Developmental Schema 458
- different account of the matter 431
- different explanations are possible 407
- Dinner at 8:30 (heuristic) 172
- Disability descriptions 77
- Disability Model of pathology 404

disagreement 4
 disclaimer test of Parameters of Behavior 53

discover
 an answer 15
 a thing's place 268
 my place 392
 vs. know 382
 vs. negotiate 15
 vs. speaking for us 15
 who I am 383

discovering who I am 383

disowning a behavior 391

displacement
 as a "happy pill" approach 356–357
 emotional 336–339
 in magical thinking 448
 postural 65
 psychic 85
 via drama 356
 via talking 356
 vs. state 353

Dispositions 71–74

 list of 70
 table of 72
 vs. Derivatives 79
 vs. Powers 75, 80
 vs. States 80

distinction

 acting on 17, 154
 by Observer 287
 not primary 286
 carries information 18
 creates alternatives 18
 in the Actor Scheme 275
 in the Know parameter 46
 in Verbal Behavior 132, 137, 144
 order and meaning 420
 specifying 46
 vs. concept 19

distinguishing X's from Y's and Z's
 306, 308

distorting
 reality 430, 432
 the real world 437

drama
 central to behavior 290
 definition 290
 explains patterns 293, 402
 not a metaphor 290
 patterns 187
 placeholders in 128
 portrays human life 290
 vs. narrative 291
 vs. social practice 290

Dramaturgical Model 289–308
 and Process Representation 290
 connection to status 289
 exemplifies human behavior 59
 for doing vs. for knowing 294
 grounded in process 290
 no external causes 294
 not an Observer model 293
 nothing a priori 294
 preserves case complexity 292
 reflects personal histories 89
 three related concepts 259
 uses status and relationships 259

E

eccentricities 405
 elaboration of Reality Concepts
 98–100
 ending 112
 Element-Operation-Product model
 39
 Elephants, Pink and Gray (heuristic)
 307
 eligibility 128
 Elusive Force (heuristic) 231

Elusive Pawn (heuristic) 301
 Elusive Relationship (heuristic) 232
 Elusive Symptom (heuristic) 405
 Elusive Symptom II (heuristic) 408
 Embodiment
 Person Characteristic 86–87
 related to Performance 87
 embodiment
 alien 9
 of different sorts 86
 robot 9
 emotion. *See also* emotional behavior
 ior
 and Behavior 313
 as the problem 356
 ceremonial 360, 360–361
 definition 312
 formula
 Anger 327
 Bad Fortune 341
 Degradation 335
 Grief 341
 Joy 332
 logic of 334
 Loss 342
 Provocation 327
 Status Dynamic 335
 Wrongdoing 331
 in schizophrenia 445
 in the Relationship/Status model 333
 joy 334
 mystique of 346
 negative vs. positive 334, 353, 355
 no consensus about definition 312
 reality basis for loss 342
 terms 311–312
 trivializing 356
 vs. rationality 356
 what counts as one? 311
 emotional behavior

acting on reasons 335
 and control problems 323
 differs by appraisal 326
 distinguished by emotional PCs 313
 distinguished by emotional PCs 360
 embedded in human behavior 330
 Fear 313
 fits Relationship/Status behavior 333
 general case 325–326
 increased in emotional state 353–354
 in schizophrenia 445
 intrinsic 346–347
 not impulsive 323–324
 rational 320
 reality basis 320, 335, 362
 successful 353
 taken as sincere 346
 vs. emotional state 352
 emotionally defined PCs 313
 empirical
 activity vs. competence 40
 categorization of reasons 226, 228
 choice of ultimate constituent 114
 connection between PC and Behavior 220–221
 criterion for behavior segmentation 52
 distinctions from plurality 8
 evidence against transcendental motives 176
 gap in appraisal 262, 263
 identities in Significance 188, 190
 identity via significance 60
 identity vs. logical inference 262
 universal vs. conceptually necessary 30–32, 69
 vs. normative 14
 envy
 can designate motivation 347

- emotional state 353
- not a mood 361
- reality basis 339
- equating pathology with symptoms 410
- equivalence clause of pathology 421
- Esthetic (reason) 227
- Ethical (reason) 227
- ethical transgressions 332
- evaluation
 - function 244
 - in Critic pathology 251
 - in Judgment Diagram 261
- event
 - as acquisition of a PC 194
 - definition 93
 - description of 91
 - distinguishing 115
 - has no duration 95
 - in significance 195, 350
 - reality concept 90
 - triggers a mood 363
- every behavior is someone's behavior 12, 53, 155
- evidence
 - against ulterior motives 176, 188
 - doesn't count in the transcendental 176–177
 - for and against concepts 19
 - for basic irrationality 265
 - in physical laws 236
 - vs. Actor's knowledge 382–383
 - vs. insistence 435
- example. *See also* heuristics
 - actuality vs. mere possibility 234
 - behavior doesn't change place 384
 - calculational system 40
 - common sense judgment 173
 - distortion of reality 434
 - effect of Capacity 426
 - enrichment by description 99
 - ex post facto 297
 - individuation by relationships and identities 104–105
 - loss 341
 - mood trigger 369
 - opportunity constraints 453
 - PC-C-B description 215
 - personal business via the ordinary 173
 - pruning model of loss 357
 - relevance of reasons 261, 351
 - significance 47
 - simulation 64
 - substitution 205–206
 - ulterior motive 175
 - valuation 207
- exceptions call for explanations 119
- existence of a self 370
- Existential
 - approaches to pathology 429
 - authenticity 246
 - Being-in-the-World 238
 - distortion of reality 437
 - expectation
 - vs. hearsay 267
 - vs. pathology 412
 - vs. prediction 174
- experience. *See* practice and experience
 - being open to 374, 437
 - having access to 374
 - notorious and septic meanings 318
 - of Rogerian organisms 371
 - symbolizing 374, 429, 437
 - vs. feeling 317–318, 360
- explaining a pathological state 404
- explanation
 - affects treatment 408

emotional 346
 failure of 337
 homunculus 207
 of pathology 410
 theoretical 428–429
 ultimate 337
 via needs 416–418, 425
 via non-normative history 424–426
 via scenarios 186
 vs. justification 223
 ex post facto
 and degradation 301
 and origin problems 300
 law 297–298
 phenomenon 298–304
 verbal formula 308
 world 306
 vs. “naturalistic” world 298, 308
 expression
 formal or ceremonial 360
 in choice of explanation 407
 individuating 105
 mistaken 230
 non-causal 238
 of a given trait 72
 of a state 80
 of character
 in a Degradation Ceremony 269
 in defense of degradation 271, 272
 in Degradation Ceremony 391
 in guilt 330–331
 in penance 331
 of competence 49, 317
 of emotion 320
 of hostility via Version choices 172–173
 of interests 74
 of life history 386
 of Person Characteristics 47, 171
 of place in the scheme of things 238
 of relationship 230, 237
 change 235

heuristic 232
 of repentance 271
 of restitution 331
 of status 237, 378
 under an Agency Description 233
 Unless Clauses 233
 used to evaluate behavior 233

F

Face in the Wall (heuristic) 392

facts

acquired by observation and thought 19
 and disagreement 4
 and fittingness 227
 and sharing concepts 4
 are a state of affairs 163
 are how things are 163
 as Knower and Known 371
 atomic 112
 brute 2, 260, 417
 can be told 19
 can generate new descriptions 188
 create context 163
 definition
 DP 163
 Oxford 159
 distorting 373, 432
 divide the world in two 164
 don't match sentences 159–162
 for us, not them 144
 in Knowledge 78
 in self-concept 372
 not a situation 163
 not common across persons 4
 not guaranteed 189
 observational 15
 of Observer and Critic 250
 overruled by status 265, 387
 potential Contingency 166
 reduce to 'p' 161–162
 single item of informatio 163
 unthinkable 436, 446

- vs. status revision 270
 - vs. true 159
- Farmhouse (heuristic) 107, 187, 204, 350, 400, 401, 442
- fault 332
- fear behavior
 - as a pattern 347, 349
 - characterization of 323
 - general case 320–324
 - diagram 322, 325
 - instance of 313
 - not an “itch” 318
 - paradigm case 313
 - parametric analysis 314
 - vs. prudential behavior 323
 - without talking fear 317
- fear concepts 324
- Fear Formula 324–325
- feeling over intellect 265
- Fine Structure of SAS Representations 126, 128
- first-hand experience 266
- First Play of the Game (heuristic) 298
- fittingness 227
- foibles 405
- Folk Psychology 147
- Forgiveness (heuristic) 193
- for its own sake 177, 178
- Formal Individuals 125, 127, 128
- formally
 - ending infinite regress 50
 - general case of behavior 52
 - possible behaviors 131
 - violating the SA System 112
- formal system
 - and automaton behavior 367
 - as behavior 131
 - can't represent the real world 112
 - carries reality constraints 154
 - depends on undefined terms 97
 - eliminated by limiting cases 112
 - no agreement on 97
 - not the real world 112
- form of ultimate answers 183
- forms of behavior description. *See* behavior: descriptions
- forms of representation. *See* representation, forms of
- formula
 - behavior 44
 - composition and decomposition 101–102
 - displacement 336–337
 - Envy 339
 - for behavior description
 - Achievement 65
 - Achievement-anchored 65–67
 - Activity 63–64
 - Agency 63
 - Attempt 66
 - Cognizant Action 57
 - Deliberate Action 58
 - Performance 64
 - Performative 66
 - Significance 60
 - Social Practice 59
 - Stimulus-Response 67
 - Symbolic Behavior 60
 - for emotions
 - Anger 327
 - Fear 324
 - Grief/Loss 341–345
 - Joy 332
 - Penance 331
 - Provocation 327
 - limiting cases 112–116
 - observation-anchored 100
 - Person Characteristic 82
 - recursion 84
 - placeholders 109–111

reality 101
 redescription 102
 Relationship 230
 alternate forms 237
 Relationship Change 235
 status dynamic 335
 thick reality 103–104
 Verbal Behavior 132, 287
 vs. description 100
 world 106–108
 foundations 115
 Four Bridges (heuristic) 266
 four emotions 311
 four slogans about DP 2
 Frameworks 253
 frequency of behavior 71, 75, 292
 From the Window (heuristic) 102,
 115
 Fulanese 8
 functional response 68
 function of
 arithmetic concepts 116
 competence and character 276
 Critic 279, 448
 mental mechanisms 206
 myths 186
 person and circumstances 213–214
 reality concepts 116
 relationships and place 230
 fundamental
 aspect of social practices 174
 behavior vs. knowledge 120
 concept of behavior 52, 59
 human capability 97
 jobs to being a Person 242
 limits to behavior 158
 needs 419
 non-causal determinant of behavior
 397
 operation of person as person 3,

394
 patterns of behavior 293
 Person Concept 9
 point of assigning status 273–274,
 289
 questions about the world 162
 reality vs. real world 120, 304
 status dynamic formula 335
 things about people 3
 unit of behavior 88
 way of understanding 107
 fury 330

G

game
 analogy of behavior 6
 as a calculational system 40
 as a coherent social practice 174
 clarifies what we know 16
 competent player of 13–16
 effective player of 212
 example of status assignment 394
 good model for real life 291
 highlights mastery 16
 intrinsic nature of 401
 inventing a new one 122
 limits of the rules 17–18, 24, 89
 playing a different one 15
 playing vs. knowing the rules 13
 rules vs. possibilities 291
 systematic possibilities within 6, 98
 that can't be told 306
 vs. drama 290–291
 general
 ability of persons 3
 case of
 behavior 52, 57
 emotional behavior 325
 fear behavior 320
 character of maxims 186
 character of persons 242
 circumstance screening activity 261

- community view of ability 414
 - concept C in verbal behavior 139
 - concept of behavior 44
 - concept of changing status 272
 - connection between needs and motivation 418
 - feature of reality formulas and real world description 103
 - form of choice principles 186
 - gap allows judgment 262
 - human behavior includes emotions 330
 - models for behavior 213
 - motives vs. emotional motives 351
 - nature of Critic judgments 284
 - person description 74
 - principle of place and relationships 238
 - reasons for incomplete descriptions 62
 - requirement for definition 25
 - requirements to be one of us 415
 - scheme of things 237, 377, 386, 392, 395
 - specification of ultimates 113
 - state vs. emotional state 352
 - understanding of why people do what they do 238
- Givens 263–264
- as a status assignment 274, 294
 - of Naturalism 297
- going through the motions 64, 175
- good fortune elicits celebration 332
- grammar
- and deep structure 146
 - difficulty of formulating 10
 - disconnected from the real world 12
 - generative 33, 92
 - not complete but still taught 10
 - of Persons 11, 13
 - of Transition Rules 111
 - proper use of 94
 - replacement in 98
- grammatical approach to Persons 155
- grief 341
- guess
- as a status assignment 273
 - vs. speaking with authority 14
- guilt 330–332
- repentance aspect 331
- ## H
- Happy Pill 318–320
- and the Lion 319
 - approach to anger 338
 - approach to non-pathology 456
- Happy Pill (heuristic) 319
- harmless addictions 405
- has the ability to
- but no opportunity 454
 - but refuses 404
 - expected success locution 76
 - explanation 76
- hatred 330
- Hedonic reasons
- definition 226
 - in the Judgment Diagram 228
- heterogeneous behavior patterns 70
- domains of fittingness 227
 - in Social Practices 88
 - in the Dramaturgical Model 293
- heuristics
- A Fine Piece of Machinery 207
 - and expectation 173
 - Blind Man's Buff 409
 - Chalk 217
 - Choosing Your Movements 192
 - Desert Island 116
 - Dinner at 8:30 172

- Elephants, Pink and Gray 307
 - Elusive Force 231
 - Elusive Pawn 301
 - Elusive Relationship 232
 - Elusive Symptom 405
 - Elusive Symptom II 408
 - Face in the Wall 392
 - Farmhouse 107, 187
 - First Play of the Game 298
 - for articulating a concept 52
 - for calculational systems 40
 - Forgiveness 193
 - for significance 47
 - Four Bridges 266
 - From the Window 102
 - Happy Pill 319
 - I Am the Very Model of a Modern Natural Scientist 294
 - Independent, Independent 304
 - I Never Liked You Anyhow 300
 - Inferiority Complex 376
 - Intimations of Mortality 282
 - Jury Duty 283
 - Life of the Party 368
 - link between actual and possible 121
 - Lion + Happy Pill 319
 - Lion Walks In 313
 - Little White Balls 444
 - of doing vs. understanding 291
 - Picture of Winston Churchill 196
 - Putting on Hamlet 358
 - Social Practice Schema 170
 - Sure Thing 263
 - Tennis Game 399
 - Twenty Dollar Bill 198
 - You Can Walk Through Walls 264
- higher mental processes 198
- historical
- accident 295
 - continuity 291
 - development of PC's 84
 - episode 88
 - formulation vs. categorical formula-
tion 301–302
 - individual 63
 - in a drama 127
 - individuals 69, 128
 - in society 181
 - in the Dramaturgical model 290
 - particulars 104, 112, 294
 - in categorical formulation 302
 - particulars in formulations 301
 - real world context 12, 213, 414
 - revision in degradation 270
- histories
- behavioral vs. non-behavioral 82
 - differ by choices 422
 - limited by PC's 84
 - make potential actual 82
 - must be relevant 82
 - non-normative 424
 - outside self concept 387
 - personal 89
 - vs. circumstances 214
 - work with capacities 82
- history
- and Original Capacity 84
 - as a lifetime sequence of Versions 290, 293
 - as a person among persons 3
 - component of status 381
 - conceptual vs. actual 71
 - conceptual vs. empirical 72
 - connects to what's real 344
 - described by frequency 71, 77
 - described by pattern of occurrence 88, 313
 - differences in 70
 - expresses status 378, 386
 - indefinite 77
 - in Degradation 272
 - in development 458

- in disability 424
- in learning vs. acquiring 83
- in PC formation 82, 84
- in self concept 386
- in World parameter 182
- non-normative 424–426
- of behavior potential 380
- of gaps in Deliberate Action 32
- of interaction 182
- of learning 46
- of social practices 170
- paradigmatic 32
- vs. no history 31
- homonymy 138–139, 142
- horror 324
- how much is enough? 71
- how things are
 - and language 165
 - as a fundamental perspective 162
 - for the Observer 255
 - in the Knowledge parameter 155
 - in transcendental claims 177
 - is a state of affairs 162–163
 - pure scenarios of 163
- human
 - as an organism 4
 - as organism 8
 - becoming 3
 - behavior, concept of 44
 - being one 3
 - learning to be 212
 - phenomenon 200
 - relationships, if not human 295
 - self-direction 242
 - anticipation 245
 - sense, common sense 6
 - value vs. trivial function 116
 - vs. non-human viewpoints 200
 - vs. person 9
- human behavior
 - and Basic Human Needs 419
 - archetypal form of 59
 - as agency 63
 - choice in 171
 - essentially “symbolic” 199
 - function of PC and C 213, 230
 - highly segmented 49
 - implementation limits 192
 - impossible context for 202
 - in a naturalistic framework 200
 - indubitable cases 53
 - instrumental fallacy 50
 - modeled by drama 290
 - much like language 44
 - not merely a performance 190
 - not movements 201
 - not problematic 199
 - requires context 190
 - vs. reflex 190
- Human Behavior as Essentially Symbolic 199
- Human Being
 - definition 9
 - vs. other kinds of Persons 9
- human beings
 - “a historical accident” 295
 - and development 415
 - and frames of reference 367
 - as authors 242
 - as organisms 4, 8, 25
 - in the Naturalistic view 295
 - self-directed 242
 - vs. other animals 144
- human lives
 - game model of 291
 - living out the drama 294
 - map to different structures 407
 - no real world outside 304
 - not a random sequence 88
 - portrayed by dramas 290
 - preserving coherence of 183
 - primary unit of 181

transparent and mysterious aspects of 310

humans as organisms 4, 25

hypothesis

- as a polemical activity 25
- as a status assignment 273
- vs. speaking with authority 14

I

“inner” and “outer” influences 216–218

IA. *See* Intentional Action

I am the person who 384–385

I Am the Very Model of a Modern Natural Scientist (heuristic) 294

I and Thou 2

I couldn’t do that and still be me 389

Id-Ego-Superego 245, 247

identify

- ability 75
- a particular process 124
- conditions for change of self-concept 390
- dangers 353
- gaps in Deliberate Action 32
- general, primitive behavior concept 44
- indubitable cases of behavior 53
- instances 16
- locations
 - in culture 185
- locations via grammar 145
- patterns in the Real World 279, 293
- psychological anomalies 405
- subgroups via transformation 26
- via systematic relationships 98

identities

- and individuation 104
- and relationships
 - alternate 104–105

- form a network 165
- in situations 165
- in the chain of significance 60, 188–190
- in the Observer perspective 256
- in the SA System 92

identity

- at risk 335
- between danger and escape 263
- coordination 96
- dealing with particulars 94
- is re-description 92, 93
- part of understanding behavior 396
- real world 92

Identity (parameter)

- a full-fledged parameter 396
- and “who are you?” 376
- as an index 155
- definition 46
- disavowal of 53
- in the Social Practice formula 59
- vs. PC specifications 69

Identity Operation 68

If there ever was a case of 314, 357

I know that P vs. I know P 382

I know who I am

- Actor perspective 382
- Observer perspective 382

illusory agreement and disagreement 4

implementation

- Actor vs. Observer 245, 349
- and circumstances 194
- and motives 350
- and ultimate status 395
- cases of 203
- concrete 444
- deletion in Agency Description 63
- direct 191, 193
- doing it vs. doing something else

- 193
- in a way can be done 198
- in Fear behavior 321, 322
- in schizophrenia 443, 449–450
- in Significance 47, 189
- in Style Description 74
- in the Actor perspective 255
- levels of 191
- of behavior pattern representation 59
- of DA in verbal behavior 141
- performative 444
- sometimes impossible 191–193
- implementing my status 395
- impossible
 - behavior
 - because of who I am 122, 389
 - by going from action to implementation 191
 - created from from familiar behavior 55
 - due to lack of Basic Human Needs 419
 - due to lack of opportunity 122
 - via non-human standards 200–201
 - contradicts Deliberate Action 433
 - PC acquisition 84
 - position 433–436
 - to be done 122
 - to get perfect understanding 94
 - via unthinkability 433
 - vs. non-accidental 75, 77, 85
 - vs. not impossible 122
- improving someone's status 268
- impulsivity condition of emotions 323–324, 349
- Incompatible PC paradigm 426, 428, 430
- incomplete
 - deliberately and selectively 55
 - forms of description 44
 - reasons for 62
 - sometimes correct 62, 149
 - verbal behavior 134, 203
- observations always the case 244, 314
- specifications pick out cases 35
- status specification 381
- systematically 44, 62, 134, 191
- via Deletion Operation 61
- Independent, Independent (heuristic) 304
- Individual Person 155
- Individuals, Formal
 - in a Social Practice Representation 218
 - in the Process Representation 125–129
- individuating descriptions 105, 375
- individuating expressions 105
- individuation of OPESA 104
- I Never Liked You Anyhow (heuristic) 300
- Inferiority Complex (heuristic) 376
- infinite regress
 - in implementation 191
 - in observation 278
 - instrumental behavior 50, 175
 - in verbal behavior 143
 - transcendental motives 177
- influence of others 394
- in one of the ways
- it can be different 233
- it can be done 171, 195, 220, 422
- it can occur 130, 170
- in principle vs. ad hoc 41
- Insistence Model 435–436
- Institution 89, 182

institutions

- change to reflect ability 414
- in my scheme of things 381
- in the Actor scheme 255
- in the Critic scheme 258, 285
- in the Observer scheme 285

instrumental

- “what we get out of it” 207
- behavior
 - description 63
 - not theoretically primary 174–176
 - paradigm not fundamental 50
 - salience of 194
- vs. intrinsic 74, 180–181

Intentional Action

- a multi-level phenomenon 202
- and animals 144
- and instrumental behavior 180–181
- and verbal behavior 133
- as a unit of behavior 49
- concept 48
- Deletion operation on 61
- description of 133
- doesn't require intentional action 51
- in a calculational system 55
- in Cognizant Action formula 57–58
- in Deliberate Action 69
- in Deliberate Action formula 58
- in Identity operation 68
- in Observing and Acting 58
- in the Substitution operation 57
- logical domain of 52
- magic when made impossible 203
- parametric analysis of 45
- primitive, general concept of behavior 44
- state of affairs 48, 51
- treating something as Q 201
- vs. Deliberate Action 52
- vs. Performance in Significance 201
- when it is the case 47–48

Intentional Action Description 68

interest

- an interest in something 73
- in situation descriptions 165
- more behaviors than just anyone 74
- shown via a variety of behaviors 73
- vs. ulterior motivations 74

Interest (PC) Description 73

interrelated

- structure of the Person Concept 5–6, 13, 18
- totality (state of affairs) 94, 95

- in these circumstances... 225, 227, 262, 395, 442
- significance 47
- symbolic behavior 60

Intimations of Mortality (heuristic) 282

intrinsic

- and what the person is really up to 190
- behavior in Interest PC 74
- for whom? 178
- institutions 182
- motivation vs. ulterior motivation 179
- pattern of behavior 51, 190, 401. *See also* intrinsic behavior
- requirement of verbal behavior 137
- social practice. *See* intrinsic social practice
- top-down behavior 194
- vs. instrumental 177

intrinsically meaningful behavior 190, 194

intrinsic behavior

- definition 179
- in the Dramaturgical Model 290

intrinsic social practice 177–180

- a function of community 178
- and emotional behavior 346

- and emotional explanations 346, 349
- and intrinsic behavior 179
- and verbal behavior 137, 203
- as unit of behavior 180, 400
- a tautology 179, 423
- burden of proof 179
- candidate for stopping descriptions 346, 444
- create reasons for behavior 400
- definition 177, 346, 400
- gives a behaviorally complete description 180, 346
- internal logic vs. reality constraints 196
- vs. culture 181
- vs. reflex 190
- vs. ulterior motive 178, 400

invisible choices 195

irritation 330

- is capable of
 - being intrinsic 401
 - competence term 75
 - vs. has the ability 76

Itchy Explanation 319

J

jealousy 340

Joy 311, 332–333

- as successful emotional behavior 353
- doesn't interfere with my life 355
- forms of 334
- vs. degradation 335

judgment

- about pathological state 416, 427
- and competence 14
- and mood 364
- and motivational relevance 261
- as ability 76
- as a practical syllogism 351

- as diagnosis and prescription 282

- bad or incompetent 320, 338

- basis for acting 263

- by Critic 243, 249, 257, 281, 447

- by Observer 249

- creating a PCF 27

- degree of mastery 15

- egocentrism 178

- first person 260

- forms of 261

- fundamental to behavior 261

- gap between Actor and Critic 283–284

- highly variable 212

- impeachable 15

- in mere description 260

- in using definitions 25

- observations, and reasons 283

- of relevance 261, 351

- repositories 15

- required for behavior 108

- the job of the Critic 282

- three kinds 261, 351

- via common sense 173

- via models 213

- vs. appraisal 261

- within norms and practices 413, 414

Judgment Diagram

- and evaluation 261

- and motivational relevance 261

- and Relationship-Status model 240

- does not show a process 229

- elaborates DA 380

- Figure 5 228

- reality basis in 335

- relevance in 351

- shows “acting on reasons” 241, 335

- shows salient perspectives 239

- supplements PC-C-B model 229

- uncertainty in 355

- used observationally 229

- visible and invisible procedures 229
- weights in 276
- Jung 85–86
- Jury Duty (heuristic) 283

K

- Kant 7, 304
- kicking the dog 205–206
 - substitute behaviors 338
- Know (parameter)
 - a “standing condition” 78
 - and accidents or luck 48
 - and circumstances 119
 - and contingent relevance 351
 - definition 46
 - in Activity Description 64
 - in Basic Human Needs 420
 - in Cognizant Action formula 57
 - in Deliberate Action formula 58
 - in fear behavior 314
 - in incomplete descriptions 62
 - in Intentional Action 45, 201
 - in Stimulus-Response Descriptions 67
 - in verbal behavior 133–134, 155, 287
 - only an aspect of Behavior 120
 - scope or limits 51, 155, 158
 - vs. Want 48
- Knower and Known 370–381
- know how
 - and learning 82
 - gives authority 14
 - in language 145
 - to be a person among persons 3
 - to use vs. knowing its use 16
 - vs. articulation of know how 11–12
- Know How (parameter)
 - a “standing condition” 78
 - and accidents or luck 48
 - and Basic Human Needs 420

- and incomplete descriptions 62
- and specific achievements 77
- as a competence concept 77
- definition 46
- indefinite 77
- in Intentional Action 45
- in the Activity Description 64
- vs. Ability 146
- knowing
 - a description is complete 381
 - during Observer primacy 252
 - folds into what we can do 120
 - gives leverage 81
 - how vs. knowing the rules 13
 - in Cognizant Action 58
 - in the Dramaturgical Model 294
 - language vs. throwing a ball 11
 - my place vs. telling or having it 383
 - someone’s PCs 222
 - vs. competence 13
 - vs. deceitful appearance 176
 - vs. discovering 397
 - vs. potential 82
 - vs. what one knows 11
 - what one is doing 63
- knowledge
 - about persons 3
 - after-the-fact 248
 - aspect of understanding people 6
 - author’s 247, 371
 - before-the-fact 247
 - different for Actor, Observer, and Critic 247
 - fits in a world formula 106
 - in incomplete descriptions 62, 64
 - in what is actual and what is possible 121
 - lent to infants 85
 - less fundamental than behavior 120
 - limits behavior 79
 - limits vs. conceptual limits 52

- not foolproof or complete 244
- of behavior potential limited 120
- of behaviors creates PC expectation 218
- of limits is limited 158
- of my behavior 247–248, 371
- of myself 398
- of others' behavior 248
- of PCs
 - creates behavior expectations 174, 218
 - in social practices 222
- parallels sensitivity 76
- starting point for 278
- systematized by Real World 155
- vs. ability 3, 5
- vs. competence 24
- vs. competence and character 276
- vs. language 296
- vs. who I am 389

Knowledge (PC)

a Power 75

definition 78

governs possible behaviors 79

States of Affairs values in 156, 158

systematized by Real World 155

knowledge of behavior 247

L

lacking the opportunity 403–404

language

- and selection of structure 161

- carries conceptual distinctions 137

- concept of 12

- doesn't say everything 165

- essential to a real world 154

- grammar is normative 145

- leverages finite resources 152

- logical domain of 52

- native speaker intuition and persons

14

- not a substitute for real things 156

- nothing out its reach 156

- placeholders 110

- presupposes a larger behavior 12, 157

- says something 165

- syntactics, semantics, pragmatics 132, 138

Language (concept)

- component of Person Concept 7

- explicit connections to Person Concept 156

- part-whole to Person Concept 52

- scope of 157

Language (parameter of culture) 181

- definition 183

- specifying values 184

LC-I 112–114, 157, 158

LC-II 112–114, 157

learned tendency to act 323, 326

learning

- a system creates ability 11, 394

- concepts 19

- Critic concepts 280

- history in Know How 46, 77, 315

- theories of X vs. the place X has 286, 312

- to operate as speakers among speakers 10

- to say a grammar 10, 146

- to treat things accordingly 394

- vs. acquiring 83, 394

- vs. mastery 18

learning history in Know How 46, 77, 315

life after degradation 271–272

life history

- and change 386

- and Original Capacity 84

- conceptual vs. actual 71

- conceptual vs. empirical 72
 - drama in 290
 - expresses self-concept 386
 - expresses status 378
 - frequency of behavior 71, 88
 - resemblances and differences 70
 - type of behavior and pattern of occurrence 88, 292–293, 313
 - unit for conceptualizing a person 384
 - Life of the Party (heuristic) 368
 - life pattern 397
 - life scope in Culture 181
 - limitation
 - on social practices done 404
 - on ways to do social practices 404
 - limiting case
 - for coherence and completeness 112
 - in world formulas 111–116
 - LC-I 112, 113
 - LC-II 112, 113
 - LC-III 112
 - LC-IV 112
 - not part of the SA System 112
 - to composition and decomposition 112
 - Lion + Happy Pill (heuristic) 319
 - Lion Walks In (heuristic) 313
 - list all the emotions 311
 - Little White Balls (heuristic) 444
 - locution
 - “is the same thing as” 96
 - about competence 76
 - and grammar 145
 - and syntactics 138
 - as “saying something” 146
 - as a vs. all other s 287
 - identify, distinguish, relate 145
 - idle and pointless 287
 - individuating 105
 - in Language parameter of Culture 183
 - in S-R theory 67
 - in the Know parameter 134
 - in Verbal Behavior 133, 156
 - in Verbal Behavior formula 287, 308
 - is public and objective 153, 195
 - meaningfulness 287
 - synonymous or homonymous 138
 - two perspectives: person and place 135
 - unlimited 144
 - verbal placeholder 110, 288
 - logical category change 38
 - logical domain of IA 52, 386
 - Loss 341–345
 - and behavior potential 343
 - that does diminish me 345
 - that doesn’t diminish me 345
 - love
 - betrayal of 340
- ## M
- magical
 - human phenomena 200–201
 - thinking 440, 448
 - in catatonia 448
 - vs. delusions 448
 - making a case for the elephant 307
 - making sense without theories 2
 - mastery
 - as ability 131
 - vs. rules 17, 212
 - degree of 15
 - exercise of 6
 - in competence concepts 41, 77
 - makes a person a person 6
 - not from endless products 40
 - of a concept 16, 20
 - of calculational systems 40

- of systematic possibilities 98
 - of the baseball concept 6
 - of the Person Concept 5, 6
 - routine spontaneous exercise of 5
- Maxim 16, 18, 32, 156, 157, 166, 173, 220, 221, 253, 278, 324, 328, 344, 365, 369, 385, 387, 399, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 437, 448
- maxim
 - about loss 358
 - about the real world 111
 - a warning or reminder 186
 - the world makes sense 155
 - vs. slogans or mottoes 186
- Meaning
 - Basic Human Need 420
 - linked to IA parameters 420
- meaning
 - and concepts 136
 - and distinctions 420
 - and selectivity 16
 - and use 136, 137
 - as a property of locutions 135
 - in synonymy and homonymy 138
 - in Verbal Behavior 135–138
 - lost in extreme states 364
 - talking vs. other behaviors 135
- means, motive, and opportunity 389
- Measure of All Things 257
- mechanism
 - category 37
 - explanation 206
- mechanisms
 - defense 373
 - for symbolism 199
 - in a psychodynamic account 428
 - mental 206, 247, 339
 - reward 25
 - traditional for distortion of reality 437
 - vs. doing what you learned to do 247
 - vs. self-direction 242
- meeting strangers and making sense of them 2
- Members (parameter of Culture)
 - definition 182
 - values of 184
- misunderstanding
 - common 4
 - impossible to prevent 94
- model
 - causality 204
 - change resistance in self concept 376
 - doing vs. knowing 294
 - doing vs. understanding 291
 - drama 127, 290
 - vs. narrative 291
 - Dramaturgical 259, 289–308
 - patterns in 293
 - vs. Relationship/Status 259
 - Element-Operation-Product 39, 96
 - game 290–291
 - Judgment Diagram in 241
 - negative-feedback loop 244
 - Observer-Observed 371
 - PC-C 213–218
 - and Judgment Diagram 229
 - and moods 366
 - and traditional personality variables 292
 - Piaget's 251
 - pruning a tree (loss) 358
 - real life vs. individual lives 291
 - Relationship/Status 213, 230–241
 - and moods 366
 - change in 235
 - emotion behavior cases 333
 - Judgment Diagram in 240
 - Relationship Change formula 235

- Danger case 324
 - Relationship formula 230
 - vs. Dramaturgical 259
- scratching an itch 319
- status as a job 239–240
- unfinished business 354
- why use any? 291–292
- moods
 - as “state of mind” 365–366
 - intentional 367–369
 - relative to baseline 364
 - temporary 364
 - vs. emotional states 361, 363–364
- more than we would expect from
 - just anybody 73, 74
- motivation
 - and control problems 334
 - and possible behaviors 79, 123, 208
 - and simulation 64
 - emotional vs. other 351
 - from delusions 449
 - in “denial” 373
 - in “displacement” 337
 - in “substitution” behavior 205
 - in “why” questions 348
 - in Activity Description 64
 - in Anger Behavior 327
 - in Degradation Ceremonies 269
 - in Deliberate Action 58
 - in expressing Traits 72
 - in Fear behavior 317, 323
 - in Guilt Behavior 331
 - in our scheme of things 280
 - in similar behaviors 208
 - in the general picture of emotional behavior 326
 - “successful” 353
 - in the Unless Clauses 324
 - need vs. conviction 418
 - not part of the Transition Rules 115
 - part of Want 46
 - pre-emptive 323, 355
 - as “pent up feelings” 354
 - in extreme emotional states 363
 - need 418
 - vs. decisive 454
 - preemptive 208, 323
 - priorities
 - parameter for 78
 - reasons for action or inaction 324
 - tautology with cognition 321, 346
 - transcendental 176
 - unconscious 435
 - value analysis 208
 - vs. “going through the motions” 64
 - vs. motivational priorities 78
 - vs. need 416–418
- motivational judgment 261
- motivational priorities
 - in Values 78
 - vs. motives 78
- motivational relevance
 - circumstances 261, 276
 - contingent 261, 276, 351
 - in Judgment 228, 351
 - none 261
 - reasons 224
 - tautological 261
 - three judgments on 261
- motivational significance
 - appraisal vs. mere description 260
 - tautological 263
- motive
 - can’t become a mechanism 37
 - emotional 347, 351
 - gets at Significance 350
 - in intrinsic behavior 74, 346
 - in intrinsic social practices 178, 182, 203, 400
 - means, and opportunity 389
 - transcendental 51, 177, 179
 - ulterior 178–179

- for all behavior 175
 - in fear behavior 346
 - in needs 226
 - in Significance 188
 - vs. Significance 346
 - unconscious 435
 - vs. reason 350
 - what is a motive? 347–351
 - movements
 - as a naturalistic notion 200
 - do not constitute behavior 201
 - in direct implementation 191
 - in symbolic behavior 200
 - not all there is to Style 87
 - vs. Performance 87
 - multilevel structure of behavior
 - and “symbolic substitute” accounts 210–211
 - and narrative discourse 380
 - and Significance 47
 - codifies intrinsic-instrumental connection 181
 - heuristic for 187
 - implementation 193, 196
 - in Deliberate Action and social practices 422
 - in symptom analysis 443
 - key to verbal behavior 135
 - two-level minimum 202
 - vs. linear behavior 61
 - my behavioral scheme
 - and the job of the Actor 275
 - immediacy and directness 280, 402
 - vs. our behavioral scheme 258, 282, 284
 - mysterious behavior
 - and significance 202, 446, 449–450
 - by deleting parameters 53, 202
 - in schizophrenia 447
 - ordinary 310
 - substitute behavior 211
 - via strict causality 204
 - vs. conventional behavior 204
 - vs. ordinary behaviors 53
 - vs. substitute behavior 337
 - mysterious resistance to change 377
 - my unique part in the world 395
- ## N
- native speaker intuition
 - in judgment and competence 14
 - in the SAS Transition Rules 94, 97
 - nature of concepts 16–18
 - necessary and sufficient
 - and practical judgment 25
 - conditions in definitions 23–24
 - as a degenerate PCF 27
 - deficient forms 38
 - in “appropriate” vs. “true” 23
 - in correct application 24, 25
 - in Observer distinctions 286
 - isn’t enough for the real world
 - 30–31, 286
 - not how we learn 286
 - need 416
 - as a motivational term 418
 - Basic Human Need 419
 - common talk about 417
 - connection to motivation 418
 - definition 416
 - other related notions 418
 - Need Frustration paradigm 424, 428
 - negative-feedback 244
 - in AOC 242
 - in AOC learning loop 244
 - vs. primitive-socialized-neutral 245
 - negative emotions call for distinctive
 - behaviors 334

- negotiation 15
- no “us” who play it that way 15
- no behavior is an island 169
- no guarantee of truth or authenticity 399
- non-accidental behavior 75, 77
- and competence 77
- and Powers 78–79
- non-arbitrary
- nomenclature 31
- real me 398
- unit of behavior 49
- non-Being 434
- non-empirical
- basis for empiricism 13, 103
- quality of the Relationship Formula 231–234
- non-human phenomena (naturalism) 200
- non-intrinsic social practices 178–179
- non-normality 414
- non-normative
- endpoints in pathology accounts 424
- history in disabilities 424–425
- non-verbal behavior
- always accompanies verbal behavior 141
- and state of affairs concepts 150
- and the scope of behavior 12
- essential to the study of language 138
- from non-verbal individuals 144
- in “propositional attitudes” 151
- required for verbal behavior 156
- vs. verbal behavior 131
- noncommittal
- about recognition 278
- aspect of Performative Description 67
- aspects of a simulation account 64
- descriptions
- have few vernacular forms 62
- via Deletion Operation 61–62
- descriptor of behavior limits 118
- no real world external to human lives 304
- normal degree of appreciation 406
- normal law vs. ex post facto law 297–298
- normative
- “ought” 414
- vs. moral “ought” 257
- ability for Deliberate Action 423–428
- behavior and concept mastery 16
- concepts in schizophrenia 446
- concepts of Critic 280
- degradation in pathology 411
- influence of others 394
- is not empirical 14, 145
- items in a psychodynamic account 428
- limitations in pathology 404, 413–414
- motivations 64
- picture of AOC 247
- reasons in daily life 411
- not common across all persons 4

- nothing
 - and failure of behavior 66
 - beyond an intrinsic practice 179
 - beyond culture 181
 - beyond person, circumstances, behavior 214
 - beyond the reach of language 156
 - but X 25
 - considered with Givens 264
 - could be a pawn, before chess 301–302
 - different vs. achievement 54
 - everyone knows about Persons 5
 - external to human lives 304
 - given, unthinkable, external in Dramaturgical Model 294
 - inherently problematic about human behavior 199
 - known about deceitful behavior 176
 - limiting states of affairs used by persons 158
 - metaphorical in the Dramaturgical Model 290
 - out of 25, 122, 243, 306, 397
 - outside culture 401
 - outside scope of “the real world” 6
 - prevents primitive Observer/Critic function 246
 - primitive about Actor function 245
 - said or implied in Deletion Operation 61
 - to be explained without disability 405
 - to do (in schizophrenia) 449–452
 - vs. something in Option selection 174
- vs. systematic possibilities 6
- Nothingness 434
- notion
 - “inner” and “outer” 216
 - “survival instinct” 239
- appraisal 335
- attack calls for counterattack 329
- attunement 365
- Basic Human Need 419
- behavior a function of person and circumstances 214
- behavioral possibilities and impossibilities 90, 118
- behavior is instrumental 177
- behavior potential 118
- cat is on the mat 147
- circumstances 214
- competence 77
- contingent motivational relevance 276
- correct only as incomplete descriptions 149
- counting occurrences to get patterns 293
- crime of passion 341
- Critic judgment 281
- deep structure vs. surface structure 146
- denial 359
- displacement of anger 339
- distorting reality 430–432
- doing something for its own sake 177
- ego defense 373

- opposite 374
 - emotional state 352
 - Emotion Formula 324
 - every behavior is someone's behavior 155
 - excessive self involvement 426
 - ex post facto law 297
 - facts shaped like sentences 162
 - feedback loop 247
 - fittingness 227
 - foolproof or complete knowledge 244
 - guilt 332
 - human behavior involves choice 171
 - I know but can't tell 379
 - illness 405
 - intrinsic behavior 179
 - limiting cases 111
 - loss 342
 - mere description 260
 - observation-anchored formula 103, 106
 - of bodily characteristics 86
 - of presenting a concept 19
 - out of contact with reality 442
 - part-whole vs. perspective 52
 - PC-C Model 214
 - Performative 67
 - person among persons 89
 - persons are self-aware 397
 - persons as agents 310
 - possibleX relationship 235
 - propositional attitudes 147
 - provocation 327
 - reality 90, 304
 - reality constraints 90
 - real world 90, 113, 304
 - reconstructing my world 366
 - representational placeholder 110
 - self 371–372
 - sequential change 124
 - significance disability 445
 - status assignment 272, 274
 - stimulus 67
 - style 74
 - substitute objects 209
 - systematic relationships 98
 - telling my place in the scheme of things 383
 - the whole world 386
 - things hinder or facilitate behavior 157
 - trivial needs 455
 - unfinished business 357
 - unified domain of persons and behavior 142
 - working through grief 344
- O**
- object
 - all-encompassing 115
 - as an undefined term 96
 - assigning a status 273–274
 - Basic Reality Concept 90
 - composition and decomposition 101
 - distinguishing 115, 142
 - don't come with transcendental labels 268
 - in Attitude Description 73, 360, 380
 - in Descriptive Formats 91
 - in Interest Description 73
 - no privilege over other concepts

- 154
- oriented scheme vs. process oriented 289
- part of another object 92
- part of a totality 94
- spacial relations vs. person relations 107
- substitute 209–210
- Transition Rules 93
- ultimate 112, 113, 144
- objective
 - description in Significance 443
 - viewpoint of Critic 257
- objectively speaking for Us 258
- observation
 - acquired by 19, 76
 - and concreteness 442
 - and reasons 283
 - and the real world 103, 451
 - and the State of Affairs System 277
 - and ultimates 114
 - as a behavior 249
 - as a starting point for knowledge 278
 - comes as knowledge of OPESA 278
 - composition and decomposition 102
 - concepts 91
 - concrete aspects vs. other aspects 349–350
 - gives distinctions to act on 286
 - in personality assessment 221
 - in significance descriptions 443
 - in the Observer framework 256, 285
 - Knower-Known model 371
 - knowing by 111
 - no logical limit to complexity 100
 - observing 104
 - part of effective living 212
 - priorities 256
 - reports of behavior 47
 - results available to A-O-C 243
 - supplies ingredients for the real world 278
 - vs. competence and judgment 15
 - vs. discovery 382
 - vs. doing 382
 - vs. status assignment 413
 - vs. wanting 382
 - what's P really doing? 195
- observation-anchored formula
 - multiple observations 103
 - special case of
 - Achievement-anchored description 100
 - reality formula 101
 - world formula 106
- observational
 - assessments 174, 216, 221
 - basis of relationship and status 230, 237
 - details in placeholder formulation 288
 - fact vs. how we should proceed 15
 - principles vs. transcendental declarations 176
 - social practices 221
- observation report 47, 107, 187, 194, 195, 198, 204
- Observer
 - and anticipated behavior 245
 - and placeholders 287–288
 - as a job description 242, 248
 - vs. implementation 246
 - as primary function 286
 - pathology 251

- benefits the Actor 251
- bias 371
- communicates with A and C 281
- deals with actualities 257
- definition 243
- development of 248
- Dilemma 350
- disability in schizophrenia 451
- distinctive qualities 249
- framework 255–257
 - central concepts 256
 - not a behavioral scheme 256
- function 242, 248, 277
- in Fear Behavior 318
- in the A-O-C loop 244
- in the Dramaturgical Model 277–279, 293
- knowledge of what I do 248
- knowledge vs. Actor knowledge 382
- learns from Actor and Critic 247
- not exempted from primitiveness 246
- perspective 256
- something we do 248
- speaks for Us 257
- special case of Actor 248
- status assignments 274, 279
- tasks and perspectives 249–251, 285
- Truth vs. Authenticity 399
- unthinkability 264
- observer-describer. *See* Observer
- observer requirements 58, 221, 371
- occult forces 79
- Old Farmhouse (heuristic) 107, 187
- old Portuguese saying 122
- old Spanish saying 7
- one world 2
- operant 67
- operate as a person among persons 3, 9, 11, 16, 18
- operate as English speakers among English speakers 10
- operation
 - a possible behavior 131
 - housekeeping 68
 - of “actuality bias” 234
 - of a change principle 85
 - of reasons in behavior selection 228
- Operations
 - Deletion 61–68
 - effect 61
 - in Verbal Behavior Descriptions 134
 - represents something but not everything 62
 - systematically incomplete 61, 191
 - Identity 68
 - in a calculational system 39
 - in calculational system for behavior 55
 - in chess 40
 - in modified calculational system 41
 - partial specification 57, 60
 - primary vs. housekeeping 56
 - Substitution 57–61
 - aspects of 60
 - expanding scope 61
 - in Achievement parameter 59
 - in cognitive parameters 57
 - in motivational parameter 58
 - in Performance parameter 60
- opinion
 - disclaimer 148
 - when speaking for Us 14
- opportunity
 - and pathology 404, 453
 - conditions not met 122, 205, 403–404, 453
 - in unthinkability 389
 - maxim 156, 166
 - vs. ability 389, 454
- Option
 - choices in distortion 430

- connection to PCs 171, 173–174, 220–221
 - going your own way 285
 - in Choice Principles 183
 - in Contingencies 183, 421
 - Attributional 129, 220
 - Co-occurrence 129
 - Factual 129
 - Relational 129
 - in fine structure of Process 128
 - in gross structure of Process 126, 218, 421
 - in individual histories 422
 - in process Paradigm 130
 - in Social Practice structure 170, 172
 - minimum discrimination in DA 422
 - vs. Version 130, 170, 219, 220, 422
 - ordinary language description
 - of actions 17
 - of Embodiment 86
 - of incompatible PCs 429
 - of intrinsic behavior 177
 - ordinary mysteries 310
 - organism
 - defining humans as 4, 8–9, 25, 371
 - in linguistic theory 12
 - invented as Knower 371
 - mere 385
 - Original Capacity
 - as a limiting case 85
 - in Developmental Schema 458
 - in PC development 84
 - our behavioral scheme
 - and Critic judgment 279, 281
 - and nomenclature of distinctions 285–286
 - and placeholders 287–288
 - as a drama 402
 - Critic vs. Observer 285, 308
 - placing something in 280, 287
 - size of 280
 - vs. my behavioral scheme 258, 282, 284
 - outcome
 - Achievement parameter 46
 - refutation test 54
 - and external factors 66
 - and PC factors 222
 - and prediction 174
 - as a criterion for descriptions 66
 - in Achievement-anchored Description 66
 - in Performance Description 64
 - in Social Practice formula 59
 - substituting for 59
 - unknown and unwanted states of affairs 65
 - out of contact with reality 308, 442
 - overlooked fact about emotions 334
- ## P
- panic 324
 - paradigmatic
 - ability 76
 - Alien (extraterrestrial) 9
 - behavior vs. anticipated behavior 245
 - betrayal of love 340
 - case of
 - “being myself” 240
 - contingent motivational relevance 276
 - good fortune 332
 - Paradigm Case Formulation 39
 - verbal behavior 132
 - elliptical 224
 - characteristics for humans 3
 - concept of “need” 416
 - derivations from 418–420
 - content of Know parameter 155
 - contents of the Knowledge parameter 155
 - covert denunciation 330

- Deliberate Action 152
- emotions 333, 339
 - vs. universal models 355
- facts in Embodiment 86
- feedback structure of AOC 244
 - A has priority 251
- Human Being 9
- Intentional Action 50
- Jealousy 340
- judgment of pathology 413
- Person 9
- Person without Deliberate Action 433
- place in the scheme of things 386
- procedure in the State of Affairs System 98
- quality of States 352
- reaction to serious loss 343
- reality basis of emotion 320
- redescription 99
- Robot 9
- SA System “products” 100
- Social Practice 88, 170
- status assignments 273
- success in behavior 49
- use of real world concepts 91
- ways of acting on a concept 20
- paradigm case
 - advantageous choices 29–31
 - conceptually arbitrary 29
 - family 26
 - family resemblance structures 33
 - from any specifiable subset 29
 - identifies subgroups 26
 - of “unfinished business” 368
 - of Fear behavior 313–315
 - of status 242
 - selection of 31–32
 - transformation on 26
 - vs. definition 27
 - without transformations 27
- Paradigm Case Formulation
 - begins with genuine cases 27
 - conceptual-notational device type 22, 25–39
 - degenerate case 27
 - disagreement about transformations 28
 - focus on conceptual necessity 30
 - formal structure 28
 - implications for research design 28
 - is reflexive 32
 - less problematic 27
 - like a definition 27
 - maps similarities and differences 32
 - multiple PCFs for the same domain 29
 - of Attributional Contingency 220
 - of degradation 270
 - of symbolism 211
 - operative rule of thumb 29
 - preserves a complex particular 39, 187, 292
 - preserves the Person concept 32, 81
 - representation and research 34
 - shows what a family of things has in common 28
 - simple vs. reflexive 42
 - success criterion 26
 - types of 41
 - vs. Prototype formulation 286
 - vs. theory or definition 28
- Paradigms (in the Process Representation) 126, 130, 218
- parameter
 - Achievement 46
 - cognitive 46
 - competence 46
 - defined 35
 - deletion 61, 202
 - falsifying 53–55
 - Identity 46, 155

- Know 46, 155
- Know How 46
- Knowledge 155
- may contain parameters 37
- meaning 47
- motivation 46
- multilevel structure 187
- outcome 46
- PC 47
- Performance 46
- personality 47
- Person Characteristics 47
- possible values 36, 158
- procedural 46
- process 46
- Significance 47
- substitution 57
- Want 46
- Parameter Principle 37
 - parametric analysis 22–26
 - converts to a loose definition 38
 - converts to a PCF 38
 - definition of 35
 - examples
 - families 38
 - Munsell Color Chart 35–36
 - identifies range of possibility and variation 39
 - kinds of 38
 - lays out possibilities 39, 187, 292
 - limits to 36
 - non-reductive 37
 - of behavior 45
 - conceptual connections 48
 - reading it 47
 - test of 52–55
 - of behavior patterns 69–70, 87–88, 292–293
 - of Culture 181
 - of methodology 91
 - of SA Transition Rules 123
 - recursive 37
 - requirements and possibilities 51
 - shows all the ways an X can be or change 37–38, 69
- paranoid
 - delusions 307, 436
 - schizophrenia 438
- Parent-Adult-Child 245, 247
- part-whole
 - and part-part 113
 - composition 102
 - decomposition 101
 - in Significance descriptions 400
 - progressive enrichment 102
 - relations
 - behavior to behavior pattern 59
 - vs. perspectives 52
- partial
 - description of who I am 378, 381
 - specification
 - Cognizant Action formula 57
 - Deliberate Action formula 58
 - in Substitution Operation 57
 - of K in Verbal Behavior 133–134
 - of parameters 35
 - of P in Verbal Behavior 133, 145
 - Social Practice formula 59
 - Symbolic Behavior formula 60
- participating
 - an expression of PCs 171
 - as a person among persons 3
 - simultaneously
 - in DA and SP 422
 - in multiple behavior patterns 61, 423
 - to acquire concepts 19
 - to create a history 170
 - to learn the rules 18
 - with a normal degree of appreciation 406
 - without an ulterior motive 179
- participation
 - and basic capabilities in communities 411

- and Original Capacity 85
- inability to meet basic requirements 411
- in intrinsic social practices 179
- non-accidental 85
- restricted 454
- passion over cognition 265
- pathological
 - a status assignment 413, 416
 - capacities 424
 - histories 424
 - motivation 418
 - Person Characteristics 426
 - primacy of C or O in AOC 251
 - problems in living 455–456
 - state 81, 403
 - and Basic Human Needs 419
 - as disability 404
 - as physical illness 407
 - as psychopathology 409
 - explanation 407, 423–429
 - formulation of treatments 408
 - for persons 403
 - from unmet needs 416–421, 425–427
 - judging 415–416
 - normative components 413–416
 - phenomenon 404–411
 - relativity of 412–413, 415
 - social dimensions 411–412
 - vs. limited behavior potential 404, 453–456
- pathology
 - and adult norms 414
 - and distorting reality 430, 437
 - and priority 186
 - as disability 410
 - aspects
 - cultural context 413
 - social character 412
 - as status assignment 413
 - conceptually essential feature of 407
 - derivative 406
 - Disability Model of 404
 - equivalence clause 421
 - errors, and biases in self-correcting systems 252
 - Existential approach 429
 - explanation of 404, 407, 441
 - vs. disability 410
 - judgments are normative 413–414
 - normative component of 413
 - phenomenon of 404
 - political controversies about 407
 - relative 413
 - schizophrenia 437–453
 - social dimension essential 411–412, 413
 - subdividing 410
 - theoretical explanations 428
 - two forms 404
 - via incompatible PCs 426
 - vs. anomaly 404
 - vs. having a problem 425, 455–456
 - vs. need 417
 - vs. pathogenic 404
 - vs. psychopathology 409
- patterns
 - adult-infant joint effort 85
 - and multiple behaviors 190
 - and PC acquisition 85
 - and placeholders 288
 - and status 289
 - and who the person is 397
 - coherent 174
 - conceptual interrelationships 20
 - deviation from 428
 - distinctive choices in 195
 - distinguish life histories 70
 - drama 290
 - emotional behavior 346
 - eye for an eye 329
 - Fear 347
 - frequency 71, 292, 313, 360
 - frequency vs. scope 293
 - heroes 186

- in a cultural context 186–187
- in Social Practice formula 59
- Institution 89
- in Substitution operation 61
- in the Actor perspective 255
- in the Observer framework 256, 279
- in the PC-C model 293
- in the Real World 279
- in Trait descriptions 71
- intrinsically intelligible 51, 190, 401
- life history 293, 397
- loss and grief 357
- motive 351
- myths 186
- PCs vs. Social Practices 88
- repeatable 395
- scope of 61
- severing 63
- Social Practice 88, 169–170, 182, 290, 346
- universally intrinsic 51
- Unthinkability and Insistence 436
- vs. possibilities 75

PC

- and “state of mind” 366
- and expectations 174
- and which life I’m living 396
- and who I am 376
- categories 72
- connection to other parameters 50
- development via joint effort 85
- driven relationship change 235
- emotionally-defined cases 360
- expectations 215
- Formula 82
 - Recursive 84
- hinder or facilitate PC acquisition 84
- historical development of 84, 426
- in “unless” clauses 220
- Incompatible (paradigm). *See* In-

- compatible PC paradigm
- in Developmental Schema 458
- individuates capacities 83
- influence social practices 222
- in the Judgment Diagram 228
- minimal 85
- new ones from new social practices 222
- observational assessment of 218–222
 - small sample 221
- parameter definition 54
- parameter in Intentional Action 45
- vs. circumstances 216

PC-C model 213, 292

- and state of mind formulations 366
- both required to understand behavior 395–396
- completed by the Judgment Diagram 229, 240
- diagram 214
- inner vs. outer 216
- message 218

PCF. *See* Paradigm Case Formulation

PC Formula 82, 84

Penance 331

people

- as actual particulars 213
- as a primary case 30
- decision making vs. the thing to do 229
- differ in mastery 15, 173, 212
- have no transcendental labels 268
- make sense 2, 155
- not inherently mysterious 2–6, 31
 - via Person Concept 157
- reasons they have 226
- simultaneous effects on 261
- understanding people
 - ability 5

- knowledge 6
 - what makes them non-mysterious 5
 - why they do what they do 238
- performance
 - distinctive vs. distinctive choice 195
 - expresses competence 49, 77, 315–316
 - in Style PC 72, 74
 - in symbolic behavior 60
 - in Verbal Behavior 152
 - theory of 12–13, 145
 - vs. behavior 195, 201–202
 - vs. reflex 190
 - vs. significance 202, 349, 357
- Performance (parameter) 45
 - and Embodiment 87
 - as a “happening” 78
 - definition 46
 - in Activity Description 64
 - in grammatical theories 145
 - in incomplete descriptions 62
 - in Significance 47
 - in Stimulus-Response Descriptions 67
 - in Symbolic Behavior formula 60
 - in the Performance Description 64–65
 - in Verbal Behavior 133, 155
 - more than movements and postures 87
 - public and objective character 195
 - relation to other parameters 48
 - values of 50
- Performance Description 56, 64–65
- performative 67, 152, 444
- Performative Description 56, 66
- Person
 - among Persons 11
 - and appraisal 260
 - and Self 372
 - as a fundamental concept 9
 - concept. *See* Person Concept
 - conceptual scope 157–158
 - definition of 9, 32, 69, 81, 155, 379, 384, 403, 422, 433
 - for whom Deliberate Action is impossible 433
 - game 262
 - grammar of 11
 - I am the one who... 383
 - Individual 7, 155
 - is AOC point of communication 281
 - logical structure of 79
 - vs. Behavior 69
 - vs. Human, Robot, Alien 9
- person
 - among persons 3, 16, 18, 89, 212
 - an ability 3
 - and appraisal 260–261, 327
 - archetypal 31–32
 - as Actor 262–263, 274, 277
 - behavior potential 118–120, 237–239, 273
 - codifying 155, 156, 158
 - characteristics of. *See* Person Characteristics (parameter)
 - choices in Social Practices 170–172
 - competence 46
 - conceptually necessary vs. universal 32, 69
 - creates a limiting case 112
 - criterion for 14
 - development 31–32
 - disagree 4
 - disagreement 27
 - distinguishing one from another 69, 72, 86
 - has “first person” perspective 260–261
 - history of 46, 70, 72, 84, 88, 293, 397
 - I and Thou 2

- in a world of persons and their ways 3
- individual 155
- in the real world 103, 111, 156
- in the scheme of things 165
- is not a behavior 384
- limits of 120, 158
- mastery of a concept 5, 6
- not a 50-50 proposition 31
- not mysterious to others 6
- paradigm case 32
- perspective on AOC 248
- relative and absolute status 239–241, 272, 395
- relevant concept of behavior 44
- requirements for being one 3
- spontaneity 3, 5, 6
- systematic possibilities for 6
- treating infants as 32
- vs. particles, chemicals, material objects, and organisms 44
- vs. Person Concept 12
- vs. self 372, 377, 399
- what's fundamental to all 4, 8, 31
- what P is up to 47, 190–191, 350
- what the person is up to 396
- what there is to understand 6
- personal histories 89, 426
- personality variables 89, 216, 292
- person characteristics
 - acquiring vs. learning 83
 - and behavior potential 117–120, 122
 - and life history 72
 - change in
 - long-term 82–84, 120
 - quick, non-persistent 80
 - in AOC requirements 246
 - in a satisfactory outcome 222
 - in development 235
 - in my having a reason 283
 - in our behavioral scheme 280
 - in satisfactory outcome 412
 - in the Actor conceptual scheme 255
 - in the Judgment Diagram 229
 - in the PC-C model 214–216
 - observational assessment of 174
 - severed from descriptions 63
 - vs. status in pathology 416
 - what kind of person...? 212, 387
- Person Characteristics (parameter)
 - acquisition 82
 - and Capacity 83
 - and personal histories 426
 - connection to
 - behavioral choice 220
 - other parameters 50
 - definition of 47
 - distinguishes Persons 69
 - incompatible 426–427
 - in Deletion descriptions
 - Agency 63
 - in Intentional Action PA 45
 - in PC Formula 82
 - in questions about self 376
 - limiting and empowering 306
 - patterns in 70
- Person Characteristics/Circumstances. *See* PC-C model
- Person Concept 5
 - a hazardous transition 11
 - all inclusive 22, 52
 - centrality of states of affairs in 159
 - codifies LC-I 113
 - cognitive content 6
 - competence vs. explicit structure 291
 - components of vs. perspectives on 52
 - connections between components 155–156
 - doing it right 11

- extent of structure 13
 - four components of 7
 - fundamental 9
 - makes sense 6
 - mastery of 6, 20
 - notational devices in 22
 - primary components 7
 - systematic possibilities in 6
 - universal 6
 - vs. grammar 9–13
 - what makes a person a person 6
- perspectives
 - AOC 245, 247, 254
 - cultural 184
 - general considerations 253
 - on the Person Concept 52
 - on the world 162
 - on verbal behavior 135
- Piaget 250–251
- picking out cases 24, 25, 105, 115
- Picture of Winston Churchill (heuristic) 196, 248, 263, 318, 382
- place
 - and placeholders 110–111, 277, 287–288, 381
 - and reasons for behavior 238, 432
 - and self concept 377, 384, 393, 395
 - and status assignment 268, 272, 289, 377, 379
 - better or worse 328
 - changing 272
 - determines missing pieces 109
 - expression of 237–238
 - for everything 160, 268
 - for missing pieces 109, 359
 - framework of relationships 106–107, 165, 237, 308
 - in a whole 109, 268
 - individuation via 106
 - in emotional behavior 334, 355
 - in language games 16
 - in our scheme 280
 - in Relationship Formula 237
 - in the Actor scheme 274
 - in the Critic scheme 279, 285
 - in the Dramaturgical Model 290
 - in the Observer scheme 257, 277, 285
 - in the scheme of things 108, 165, 230, 237–240, 256, 268, 289, 327, 377–379, 381, 383–386, 393–394
 - of an element 127, 135
 - of community 182
 - of concepts
 - in a system 154
 - in our behavior 144
- placeholder 109–111
 - and missing somethings 109
 - and reality constraints 118
 - concept 109
 - in different perspectives 253, 367
 - in language useage 110
 - in propositional attitudes 151
 - in the Observer scheme 277, 288
 - in the state of affairs structure 128, 164
 - in world formulas 106, 386
 - reality 111
 - representational 109
 - verbal 110
- player
 - competent 13–14, 16
 - vs. character 385
- playing golf to sell insurance 64, 74
- poisonous residues of philosophical and psychological theories 176
- policy
 - statement 185
 - vs. choice principles 185
 - vs. strategies 186
- possibilities
 - and individuality 172

- and PCs 222
- and real world 156–158, 166, 431–433, 437
- and relationships 117, 230, 237–238, 379, 384
- and who I am 379, 384, 387–388
- as an Actor 254, 257
- as an Observer 257
- as behavior potential 118–122
- codified in Powers 79
- connect reality and real world 90
- contingent 122, 183
- default 122
- delimit impossibilities 387
- for change 390
- from parameters 35
- from status 237
- in a drama 291
- in Intentional Action 51
- limited by
 - choice principles 183
 - Givens 264, 386
 - moods 364
- of behavior patterns 70
- out of nothing 122
- range of 39
- recursive 383
- systematic 6, 39, 98, 166, 187, 292
- two categories 380
- via Substitution and Deletion 63
- vs. not known to be impossible 122
- vs. reality 121, 265–266
- vs. unthinkability 431

Powers

- acquisition 82
- aspects of 78–79
- in pathology 403
- list of 70
- most fundamental 3
- not occult 79
- part of a pattern 313
- related to parameters 79

- restrict behavior 75
- specifying 119
- systematic variations 80
- types of 75–78
- vs. Derivatives 79
- vs. possibilities 122
- vs. states 80, 352

practical syllogism 351

practice and experience 18–19, 152

pragmatics in linguistics 132, 138

predictable vs. possible 6

preemptive motivation 208–209, 323–324, 334, 354–355, 363, 418, 454

prescription

- as a discursive form 21
- for delusion 446
- in the Critic scheme 243, 250–251, 281–282, 452
- policy statement 185
- via choice principles 183

presuppositions

- in concepts 19
- in World parameter of Culture 182

primitive

- concept of behavior 44
- notion of fittingness 227
- objects (limiting case) 113

prior capacity 82

privileged form of representation 92

problem solving

- competence transfer 456
- in grief and loss 343–344
- ordinary 366–368

process

- completion 302, 406
- in Dramaturgical Model 289–290
- in Judgment Diagram 229

process (reality concept) 90
 definition 93
 in transition rules 94–95

Process Description. *See also* Process

Representation
 abbreviated 421
 represents all Versions 170
 Social Practice form 59

processes 8, 65, 79, 91, 92, 93, 94,
 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104,
 106, 111, 113, 114, 115, 120, 121,
 123, 124, 127, 132, 156, 169, 170,
 198, 201, 208, 254, 255, 258, 268,
 272, 277, 278, 279, 285, 301, 305

Process Representation 123–131

contingency limitations 183
 forms of
 abbreviated 421
 Paradigm 130
 Social Practice 218, 421
 in Dramaturgical Model 289
 logic of 190
 portrays all Versions 170
 required specifications 218
 structure
 Fine 128
 Gross 126
 State of Affairs 127
 visual schema 125

Products

in a calculational system 39–40,
 55–56
 in the Identity operation 68
 of the SA System 92, 100

provocationism

in “displaced” emotional behavior
 338
 in love and hate 340
 in the Anger description 327–330
 in the anger state 353, 362

Provocation elicits Hostility 327,
 423

Prudential (reason)

definition 227
 in the Judgment Diagram 228

psychopathology 412

vs. pathology 409

Putting on Hamlet (heuristic) 358

Q

quirks vs. pathology 405

R

rage 330

random actions 88, 246

Reality

constraints 116–123
 in Behavior 198, 304
 in Performance 195–196
 on social practices 306
 on who I am 399
 primary 293
 vs. behavior potential 118
 when speaking for Us 15
 within a system 154
 formula 101
 and placeholders 109–111
 composition and decomposition 102
 observation-anchored 103
 thick 104, 106
 social 169
 vs. Real World 90, 120–121
 vs. Truth 265, 387

reality

and unthinkability 389, 431
 basis for emotions 320, 326,
 333–334, 339, 342
 as reasons 335–336
 basis for my place 355, 381
 basis in emotional states 352–353,
 362–363
 check 267, 284, 447
 distortion of 430–435, 437

- encodes possibilities 265
 - of concepts 154
 - primary contact with 261
- Reality (perspective) 7
 - an observational concept 91
 - a perspective on Person 52
 - in describing the Real World 115
 - in limiting cases 114–115
- reality categories 116
- Reality Concepts 90–130
 - and status assignment 381
 - basic four 91–116
 - generate and connect representations 116
 - implicit definitions 97
 - in limiting cases 114–115
 - in real world descriptions 123
 - interrelationships 92
 - in World parameter of Culture 184
 - structuring vs. extending 154
- really is
 - a world out there 305
 - insistence 27, 177
 - the behavior 197, 202, 397
- Real World 102, 155, 158, 169, 277, 278, 279, 380, 392, 395
 - codifies possibilities 156
 - descriptions 123–130
 - limits 116–123
 - scope of 157
 - systematizes Knowledge 155
- real world 6, 12, 13, 24, 30, 40, 52, 60, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 135, 137, 138, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 164, 166, 168, 212, 213, 253, 254, 256, 260, 266, 277, 285, 290, 304, 342, 381, 402, 407, 414, 427, 431, 432, 433, 435, 436, 437, 442, 443, 451, 459, 461
- not a formal system 112
- Real World Description 123
- reasons
 - acting on 241, 335
 - and relationships 240, 241
 - and relevant circumstances 229, 261, 351
 - and Social Practices 276, 400
 - and status 237–238, 241
 - and weights 228–229, 276
 - definition of 224
 - empirical categories 228
 - for giving incomplete descriptions 62
 - giving 224
 - in Emotional Behavior 335
 - in the Actor schema 254, 276
 - in the Fear Formula 324
 - in the Judgment Diagram 228
 - in the Relationship Formula 237
 - kinds of 226
 - Esthetic 227
 - Ethical 227
 - Hedonic 226
 - Prudential 227
 - tautologous 226, 228
 - vs. reality bases 335–336
- recognizing
 - a relationship 230
 - kinds of change 273
 - pathology 407
 - prevents infinite regress 278
 - required
 - for concept acquisition 20
 - to be one of Us 283
 - to be one of us 14
 - significance of a behavior 153
 - systematic possibilities 98
 - the thing Observed 277–278

reconstructing my world 366–367

recursion

aspect of Behavior

in Significance Description 60

in Social Practice formula 59

in Substitution Operation 57

in Verbal Formula 139

in composition 102

in decomposition 101

in historical development 84

in PC Formula 84

in SA formulas 100, 124

limits 84

logic

in PA 37

in possibilities 383

in Process Representation 421

process in definitions 24

vs. reflexivity in PCF 32

redescription

as elaboration and replacement

97–98

as enrichment 99, 102

in Degradation rejection 271

in the Unthinkable 391

permissive, not obligatory 97

spans all aspects of the universe 102

Redescription Rules 92–93

reducing someone's status. *See* degradation

reflexive 32, 34, 41, 42, 57

reflex vs. behavior 190

regret 341

rehabilitation 271–272

Relationship, Status, and Behavior
Potential 236–239

Relationship/Status Model 213, 234

and “state of mind” 366

and Emotional Behavior 333

and Judgment Diagram 240–241

change formula 235

special case 324

vs. Dramaturgical Model 259

Relationship Change Formula
235–236

Relationship Formula 74, 230–235

behavior potential form

237

expresses possibilities 234

generalized form 237–238

parameters in “Unless” clauses 233

special case of 324, 333

status form 237

tautological 232

utility of 233–234

vs. mere possibility 234

relationships

among Parameters 48, 78

among Reality Concepts 92, 93

and individuation 104

and opportunities 241

and reasons 240

and self-concept 385, 387

and status 230–241

betrayal 341

between concepts 20

in the PC-C Model 214, 221

can change from either end 236

change affects other relationships

236

change formula. *See* Relationship

Change Formula

distinguish states of affairs 132, 152

formula. *See* Relationship Formula

frame of reference for 106–107, 165

in Attitude PC 380

in Envy 339

in implementation 195

in Jealousy 340

in life history 378–381

in limiting cases 113

- in Relational Contingencies 129
- in Status parameter of Culture 183
- in systematic possibilities 6
- in the Dramaturgical Model 259
- in the PCF 34
- in Verbal Behavior 156
- in World Formulas 106
- part-whole 102, 113
- possible 234
- significance/implementation 203, 211, 350, 443, 444
- systematic 98
- tautological 208
- terms for 380
- via Transition Rules 92
- vs. appraisal 260
- vs. identity 104–105
- relative and absolute status 239
- relativity of pathology 413
- relevant
 - circumstances 228–229, 257
 - concepts and sensitivities 260
 - contingently 261, 351
 - differences in a PCF 28–30
 - distinctions 8
 - intervening history 82–84
 - locutions 144
 - motivationally 261, 276, 283, 351
 - patterns of behavior 85
 - practice and experience 19–20
 - scheme of things 289
 - states of affairs 283, 432
 - tautologically 261
 - tautologically 351
 - tautologically 262
- religious conversions 393
- replacement and elaboration 98–99
- representation
 - and missing pieces 109
 - and placeholders 109–110
 - forms of
 - basic reality concepts 115
 - Deliberate Action 58
 - PCF 34
 - process representation 123–124
 - Social Practice 59
 - function in transition rules 94
 - generation of 116
 - has no privileged form 92
 - in the Dramaturgical Model 290
 - in the State of Affairs System 90, 98–99, 138
 - of a world 95, 106, 113, 116
 - of circumstances 134
 - of historical development 84
 - of limitless sets 40
 - psychic 85
 - seamless and specific 103
 - via systematic structure of concepts 154
 - vs. competence 291
 - vs. knowing 382
 - vs. reconstruction 229
- representational formats 123
- representational schemas 123
- repugnance 325
- requirements
 - changing nature of 425
 - for acquiring PCs 85
 - for a definition 23
 - for appraisal 261
 - for human behavior 59
 - for social participation 411, 414–416
 - of a coherent world 395
 - of descriptive formulas 100
 - vs. need 416–417
- resentment 330
- resolving power of conceptual structures 153
- response
 - as an Actor 250

- functional 68
- in conditioning literature 67
- in Stimulus-Response Descriptions 67
- in Symbolic Behavior 199
- mediating 135
- topographical 68
- responsibility 332
- restriction calls for an explanation 407
- Rewrite Rules 92
- righteous anger 330
- robot 7
 - and schizophrenia 441
 - as persons 9
 - authentic 83, 356, 453
 - definition of 9
 - without emotions 356
- routine screening for motivational relevance 351
- routine spontaneous exercise of mastery 5, 6
- rules
 - accepting and enforcing 14
 - and mastery 16, 212
 - boundaries 17, 24, 89
 - following
 - for competent players of the game 14
 - vs. acting on concepts 11, 16–18
 - knowing vs. knowing how 13, 16
 - of thumb
 - for Basic Human Needs 419
 - for creating PCFs 29–30
 - for state vs. mood 362
 - rewrite 33–34, 92
- S**
- Santayana 7, 116
- SA System 90, 92
 - and ultimate objects 113
 - has no truth value 112
- products
 - formulas vs. descriptions 100–102
 - replacement and elaboration 97–100
 - vs. limiting cases 112
- satisfaction and needs 416, 418, 420, 424
- scheme of things
 - anchors observations 111, 135
 - and behavior potential 237–238, 327, 384
 - and place, status, or relationship 165, 230, 237–238, 377, 379, 381
 - and placeholders 109, 128
 - and self concept 395
 - and status assignment 268, 274, 289
 - and ultimate constituents 114
 - apprenticeship in 393
 - as a fundamental way of understanding 107
 - as a world formula 110–111
 - behavioral scheme of things 279, 281, 285
 - changing place in 385, 392
 - from a dramaturgical perspective 165
 - I am the person who... 381
 - in degradation and accreditation 272–274
 - in emotional behavior 355
 - in English statements 110, 161
 - in life history 386, 395
 - in the Actor conceptual scheme 255
 - in the Actor scheme 274
 - in the Observer framework 256, 274, 285, 386
 - my scheme of things 268, 272, 393–394
 - no taxonomy for 380
 - our scheme of things 258, 268, 272, 280, 393
 - our vs. my 283, 284

- partial descriptions of 378, 381
- place is not given 268
- resolves context problems 107–108
- scope of 386
- telling vs. knowing 383
- vs. “job” model of status 240
- vs. more limited schemes 377
- vs. relative and absolute status 239
- vs. room model 384
- schizophrenia 437–453
 - “concrete thinking” 440, 441
 - abstract vs. concrete 441
 - abstract vs. significant 442
 - Actor disability 451
 - as a pathology of persons 441
 - aspects
 - multi-symptom 438
 - as Significance Disability 442
 - bizarre speech 449
 - cognitive deficits in 440
 - Critic disability 447, 448
 - delusions 446–448
 - flat affect 445
 - idiosyncratic significance 447, 448
 - Observer disability 451
 - self-concept disability 451
 - symptoms, missing 440
 - symptoms, psychiatric 438–440
 - symptoms, switching 450
 - word salad 450
- scope
 - and placeholders 109
 - by Composition 109
 - extension
 - by Composition 102, 124
 - by Substitution 61
 - life scope 181
 - of behavior patterns 61, 293
 - of calculational systems 68
 - of Culture 181
 - of Deliberate Action 386
 - of self concept 387
 - of social practices 400
 - of the Know parameter 51–52
 - of the Person Concept 6, 13, 157–158
 - of the scheme of things 165, 386
 - of the State of Affairs System 90, 100
- selection 16, 114, 121, 122, 132, 165, 173, 220, 228, 323
- selectivity 16, 153
- self-affirming behavior
 - in “displaced” emotional behavior 339
 - in grief 345
- self-awareness 200
- self-knowledge 63, 233, 370, 371
- self-status assignment 394–399
 - in my drama 402
 - knowing who I am 397
 - who I’m prepared to act as 398
- self concept
 - acquisition 393
 - Actor perspective 382
 - and change 373–374, 390
 - and information experiment 372
 - and Person 372
 - and relationship change 392
 - and self awareness 397
 - and status experiment 374
 - and still be me 389
 - as history of Deliberate Action 379
 - definition
 - “informational” 372
 - descriptive 377
 - discovering who I am 383
 - distinguishes possibilities 388
 - in possibilities and choices 379
 - observer bias 371
 - Observer perspective 382
 - telling vs. knowing 383

- too narrow 388
- why would it change? 387
- semantics 132, 138
- sensitivity
 - in common sense judgment 173
 - individual variation 76, 227
 - in doing my thing 245
 - in the Actor perspective 263
 - to Significance 212
- significance 187
 - and displacement 336
 - and intrinsic practices 346
 - and multilevel behavior 60, 224, 380
 - burlesque by reduction 204
 - disability (schizophrenia) 442, 445–446
 - final 351
 - from movements 201
 - highest level 191
 - holds behaviors together 60
 - idiosyncratic 446–449
 - in a real world context 212, 442
 - in definitions 137
 - in Simulation Descriptions 64
 - in symbolic behavior 200, 203–204
 - in Verbal Behavior 135
 - invisible to observation 195, 202
 - later behaviors and earlier behaviors 189
 - motivational 260, 263
 - of Limiting Cases 112
 - problem 349
 - represented by choices 153
 - top level 396–397
 - vs. abstractness 442
 - vs. concreteness 442
 - vs. implementation 47, 189, 194, 212, 349, 350, 443–444
 - vs. performance 201–202
 - vs. reasons 225
 - what P was really doing 350
- Significance (parameter) 45, 48
 - and intrinsic practices 51, 180
 - codifies multilevel behavior 187
 - definition 47
 - disclaimer test 54
 - in “unfinished business” 357
 - in specifying motives 64, 350
 - in the Agency Description 63
 - specifying behaviors in 47, 350
- Significance/Implementation 87, 194, 211, 443–444
- Significance Description 59, 60, 321
 - vs. concrete description 204
- significant, meaningful, and intrinsic 444
- Significant Action 326
- simulation 64, 74
- skill
 - as a competence concept 77
 - at AOC 246
 - connection to performance 315
 - definition 77
- slogan of the spirit of DP
 - 2
- social control 183
- social pattern of behavior 88, 169, 346
- Social Practice Description 59, 422
- Social Practice formula 56, 59
 - social practices
 - a medium of expression 172
 - and behavioral history 170
 - and emotional behaviors 346–347, 349
 - as a medium of performance 172
 - basis for observational assessments 174, 221–222
 - burlesque of 204
 - choices express PCs 171–174, 220,

- 221–222, 276, 355
- choices vs. decision making 229
- choosing a Version 170–171, 219, 422
- codifies possibilities 254
- coherence 174
- constraints on
 - reality 306
 - situational 196
- contingencies 166
- definition 169, 346
- disability 424
 - vs. distortion 430
- don't cause lockstep 172
- evolve 414
- heterogeneous 88
- in Achievement Description 65
- in a life history 170, 290, 293
- in concept acquisition 19
- in ex post facto phenomena 302–304, 306, 308
- in pathology 403–404, 412, 421
- in Person definition 422
- in Significance parameter 54, 346
- in status assignments 273
- in symbolic behavior 199
- in the Actor scheme 275–276
- in the Critic scheme 258, 279–280, 285
- in the Desert Island heuristic 121
- in the Observer scheme 285
- in the PC-C-B model 221
- in the scheme of things 284
- intrinsic 51, 177–180, 346, 400
 - behaviorally complete description 180
 - gets at what P is really up to 190
- in Verbal behavior 146, 150, 203
- is Deliberate Action 171, 422
- learnable, teachable, doable, done 170, 346
- limits 306, 404
 - vs. anomalies 405
- may contain social practices 89
- mere participation 195
- non-intrinsic 178
- normative examples 178
- overlap 290
- parameter of Culture 182
- pattern 88
- simulating 170
- special case of Process Representation 218, 421
- ulterior motives in 178, 346, 400
- unit of behavior 88–89, 180, 181, 400
 - vs. Institution 89
 - what there is to do 170, 422
- Social Practice Schema 171, 219
- social prestige ladder 328
- society
 - definition 181
 - viable 411
- soul 199, 284
 - speaking
 - for us 14–15, 280, 285
 - Fulanese 8
 - with authority 7, 14–15
- speaking with authority 7, 14
- specific prescriptions 183
- spirit of the initial work 2
- spontaneous
 - exercise of mastery 5–6
 - operation as a person 3
- stages
 - are processes 422
 - in co-occurrence contingencies 129
 - in the Process Representation 125, 126, 218, 421
 - in the Social Practice Description 422
 - in the Social Practice Schema 219
- stand-alone viability of Culture 181

- standing
 - as one of us 15
 - in some community 420
 - in the community 269, 331, 333, 411
- standing conditions
- in Agency Description 78
- in emotion terms 312
- State (Person Characteristic) 70, 79, 80, 81, 90, 93, 98, 102, 111, 112, 126, 127, 132, 138, 156, 162, 254, 277, 461
- State of Affairs (reality concept) 90–92
 - composition and decomposition 101
 - elaboration vs. replacement 99
 - in propositions 148
 - relation to other reality concepts 93
- State of Affairs System
 - an apparatus, not a representation 138
 - an ingredient in Real Worlds 156, 277
 - answers fundamental questions 162
 - concepts 90
 - does not begin or end 111
 - has no limiting cases 112
 - in the Ability parameter 156
 - representation and elaboration 98–99
 - transition rules 93
- states
 - a comparison 80
 - are “objectless” 362
 - are temporary 352
 - as limits 306
 - caused, not motivated 81
 - definition 80, 403
 - emotional 352, 362
 - conditions for 352–354
 - in the Relationship/Status model 366
 - other manifestations of 353–354
 - reality basis for 363
 - in Attributional Contingencies 220
 - in Degradation Ceremony 269
 - initial, in learning 85
 - like becoming another person 81
 - manic 436
 - observed vs. baselines 364
 - of consciousness 310
 - of mind 268, 312, 360, 365, 366
 - in Degradation Ceremonies 391
 - vs. state of being 366
 - pathological 403
 - and needs 416–419, 425
 - and non-normative histories 423–424
 - and PCs 427
 - as problems in living 455–456
 - as psychopathology 409
 - a status assignment 413, 416
 - being “worse off” 455
 - Disability Model 404
 - explanations of 407, 423
 - normative component of 413–415
 - relativity of 412
 - social dimensions of 411
 - treatments of 408
 - vs. refusing conventions 404
 - vs. restricted behavior potential 453–454
 - vs. restricted opportunity 404
 - vs. moods 361–362
- states of affairs
 - and Abilities 156
 - and appraisal 260
 - and death 433
 - and distortion of reality 432
 - and problems in living 455
 - and status 239–241
 - and successful behavior 49
 - an observation concept 91
 - are indispensable 115
 - are real 154

- as a placeholder 164
 - as a totality 94
 - as reasons 224, 228, 240–241, 261, 276, 283
 - as values of IA parameters 48–49
 - combine into states of affairs 101
 - definition 93, 159, 163
 - divide into states of affairs 101
 - have no transcendental labels 268
 - here-now observable 67
 - in appraisal 261
 - in ex post facto phenomena 298
 - in my relationships 260
 - insistence 435–436
 - in the Deliberate Action formula 58–59
 - in the K parameter 51, 133, 155
 - in the Limiting Cases 112–114
 - in the P parameter 46, 50
 - in the Process Representation 126–127
 - in the Real World 156, 268, 432
 - in the Relationship Formula 233–234
 - in the W parameter 46
 - in Verbal Behavior 132, 156
 - not restricted 386
 - in Intentional Action 52
 - in the K parameter 51
 - obtain 201
 - possible vs. actual 158, 164
 - say how things are 162–163
 - something is the case 48
 - structure 127
 - unobservable 287
 - unthinkability 431
 - vs. stimulus 51, 67, 201
- status
- accreditation 268, 270
 - and being myself 240
 - and choice principles 184
 - and enacting behavior patterns 289
 - and unthinkability 432
 - arbitrariness 398
 - as “the person who...” 377, 381, 383, 385
 - as a job 239, 242
 - as a place 379
 - in the scheme of things 237
 - relative to a domain 239
 - that is better and worse 238
 - as individual differences 238
 - as self-concept 377, 384, 395
 - assessing 238
 - assigners 394
 - being in the world 238
 - better or worse 328
 - change in
 - and self concept 384
 - reactions to 238
 - creates a unique world 240
 - degradation 268–270, 327
 - demand accordingly 274, 289
 - evaluate accordingly 274, 289
 - exclusionary 240
 - expressed by life history 378
 - expresses behavior potential 237, 327
 - improving 268, 270
 - in “unfinished business” 357
 - includes standards for judgment 242
 - individual implementation of 242
 - in grief and loss 342–345
 - vs. other emotions 355
 - in provocation 327–328
 - in the Dramaturgical Model 259, 389
 - in the eyes of others 393
 - in the Process Representation 421
 - in the Relationship/Status model 240–241, 259
 - in the scheme of things 239, 379
 - more and less 328
 - of behavior patterns 401

- of pathology 413
- parameter of Culture 183
- present vs. historical 380
- primary for Actors 383
- provides diagnosis and prescription 282
- reducing 268–270
 - consequences of 269
 - historical revision in 270
- relative vs. absolute 239
- self-assignment 394–395, 397–398, 402
- treat accordingly 274, 282, 289
- ultimate context for 395
- who I am vs. who I'd like to be 398
- status assigners 394
- status assignment
 - “given” and “unthinkable” 274, 294
 - acting accordingly 289, 394
 - appraisals and givens 274
 - by others 393–394
 - by self 394. *See also* self-status assignment
 - concept of 268, 272–273
 - creates a role in a drama 289
 - for objects 273
 - for persons 273
 - has nothing to do with guaranteed 399
 - implications of accreditation-degradation 273
 - in the Dramaturgical Model 289, 294
 - multiple and simultaneous 274
 - not an observation or inference 413
 - of pathology 413, 416
 - permanence and impermanence 274
 - primary for Actors 383
 - primary point of 273, 289
 - special cases of 258, 274
 - the job of AOC 258, 274–276
 - stimulus 51, 67
 - Stimulus-Response Descriptions 56, 67–68
 - strategy in choice principles 186
 - structure
 - analysis 39
 - and Status 183
 - a precondition for coherence 244
 - behavioral 275
 - conceptual 20
 - conceptual, of language 136
 - deep 34, 146
 - delineating 7
 - dramatic 402
 - family resemblance 33
 - general case vs. special case 45
 - in composition and decomposition 101–102
 - in games 291
 - in language 12
 - in religious conversions 393
 - multilevel, of behavior 61, 181, 187, 196, 210, 211, 380, 422, 443
 - in Verbal behavior 135
 - of AOC 242, 244
 - of a PA 36
 - of a PCF 28
 - of circumstances 153
 - of Derivatives 79
 - of developmental accounts and theories 84
 - of emotional behavior 326, 349
 - of emotional phenomena 312–313
 - of Id-Ego-Superego 245
 - of intrinsic patterns of behavior 401
 - of locutions 138
 - of Parent-Adult-Child 245
 - of pathology 407, 423
 - of PCs 70
 - of SAS Transition Rules 96, 112
 - of Significance/Implementation 47,

- 87, 443
 - of Social Practices 170, 182, 196, 400
 - gross 219
 - overlapping 290
 - of the Person Concept 5–6, 12–13, 18, 155, 453
 - of the Process Representation 124
 - fine 128
 - gross 126
 - State of Affairs 127
 - Versions 130
 - preserved by Choice Principles 183
 - provides systematic possibilities 6
 - sentence 44, 147, 151, 160
 - surface 98, 111, 146
 - tripartite 245
 - Value parameter 78
 - vs. competence 291
- Style**
- and complexity of real life 292
 - and Performance 87
 - Description 74
 - emotional 313
 - in Attributional Contingency 220
 - limit and empower 306
 - notion of 74
 - parameter 70, 72
 - verbal 135
- subjective**
- appraisals 260
 - forces governing behavior 216
 - state incidental to emotion 320
- subject matter**
- analysis 22
 - and perspectives 253
 - introducing 27, 37
 - losing 27
 - of psychology 8
 - protected by PCF 29
 - via paradigm case 30
- substantive**
- addition vs. most complex case 29
 - assymetry in cases 30
 - categories, ultimate 91
 - contribution of Identity operation 68
 - distinctions in language 144
 - limit to the Know parameter 51
 - problem solving 456
 - vs. logical in significance 224
- substitute behaviors** 205–211, 337–338
- Substitution Operation** 55, 56, 57–61
- and Deletion Operation 63
 - aspects of 60
 - creates Deliberate Action 58
 - creates more complex formulas 60
 - definition 57
 - descriptions correspond to behaviors 61
 - extends scope 61
 - in Diamond Notation 315
 - in the Achievement parameter 59
 - in the cognitive parameter 57
 - in the motivational parameter 58
 - in the Performance parameter 60
 - in Verbal behavior 142–145
 - is recursive 60
 - products from 56
- success**
- in the real world as a Person 212
 - of a definition 24
 - via knowledge and competence 24
- successful behavior** 49
- as a joint effort 85, 248
 - as me 245
 - emotional 353
 - Fear 323
 - in PC acquisition 85
 - provides a unit of behavior 49
 - with possible relations 235

- successful human 212
- suicide 239, 388, 437
- Sure Thing (heuristic) 263
- survival instinct 239
- symbolic behavior 198–211
 - conventional 203
 - formulating the mystery of 200
 - logical cases of
 - Case I 199–203
 - Case II 203–205
 - Case III 205–210
 - Case Summary 211
- Symbolic Behavior Formula 56, 60, 326
- symbolism 198, 211, 310
- synonymy 138–139, 142
- syntactics 132, 138
- systematic
 - access to
 - all the different relationships 380
 - all the possibilities 292
 - infinite collections 40
 - concepts 406, 412, 420
 - connections
 - among subject matter devices 22
 - definition of a Person 69
 - delusions 451
 - difference
 - from a baseline 364
 - in powers or dispositions 80, 352, 403
 - formulation of everything 157
 - formulation of Verbal behavior 132
 - framework for emotions 312–313
 - identification of locutions 145
 - notation (Descriptive Formats) 91
 - possibilities 6, 98, 187, 292, 294
 - in the PCF 39
 - relation of place to the scheme of things 381
 - relationships 98, 381
 - structure of concepts 154
 - way of talking about Deletion operations 62
- systematically
 - distinguishable 44–45
 - incomplete forms of description 44, 61–62, 191
 - Verbal behavior 134–135
- systems
 - and pathology 252
 - AOC 253
 - belief 184
 - calculational. *See* calculational system
 - communication and signaling 161
 - conceptual 20, 113–114, 302, 407
 - before and after 302
 - connections in 406
 - primitive objects in 113
 - delineating 11
 - family resemblance (type) 41
 - for generating forms of behavior
 - description 55, 68
 - formal 96–97, 154, 367
 - mastering 131
 - replacement vs. elaboration 98
 - undefined terms in 97
 - use of, as a behavior 131
 - vs. a real world 112
 - generative 44–45
 - of behaviors 169
 - of construction, representation, and use 94
 - of derivation 98
 - operation vs. a transformation 34
 - place of a concept in 154
 - position in 240
 - rewrite 33, 41
 - self-correcting 252
 - signaling 161
 - State of Affairs. *See* State of Affairs System

T

talk therapy 355

tautological

- ability description 317
- connection in emotional motives 351
- motivational significance 263
- nature of appraisal 262
- patterns of behavior 51, 179, 346, 423
- reasons 226, 228
- relation
 - between cognition and motivation 321
 - between reality basis and emotional behavior 342, 345
 - between reality basis and motivation 324, 342, 346
- Relationship Formula 232
- requirement in Degradation 269
- version of the survival instinct 239
- vs. contingent 225–226, 260–261, 351

temporal

- extent in the Substitution operation 61
- formulation vs. historical formulation 302
- patterns in life histories 70
- segmentation problem 49
- sequences in the Observer scheme 255

temporally extended whole 302

Tennis Game (heuristic) 399

terror 324

test

- native speaker intuition 97
- of the eight behavior parameters 52–55, 201–202
- via intrinsicness 226
- that's what I produced it as 104, 198

then and there present 199–200

theories

- acquiring 3
- akin to a PCF 28
- anthropomorphic 279
- atomistic 157
- descriptions in 407
- developmental 84
- general character of 418
- grammatical 145
- have no guarantees 399
- have truth value 19
- incommensurable 253
- information 18
- introducing 25
- learning without 277, 286, 312
- misanthropic 279
- naturalistic 279
- of behavior 68, 131, 174
- of competence 12
- of learning 85
- of linguistic competence 13
- of pathology 429, 437
- of performance 12, 13
 - normative vs. empirical 145
- of personality 253
- of treatment 405
- of Verbal behavior 131
- of verbal performance 145
- philosophical 2
- poisonous residues in 176
- psychoanalytic 85, 437
- psychological 2, 213, 214, 409
- scientific 2
- theistic 279
- vs. authority 14–15
- vs. competence 313, 456
- with an inadequate definition of person 371

there being a reason and my having

that reason 283

things are what they are 2
 top down production of behavior
 194, 202, 449, 450
 top level significance 396, 397
 touchstones of sincerity 324
 Trait Description 71, 72, 73
 traits 71
 and capacities 83
 emotional 313, 360
 high or low frequency pattern 71
 in Attributional Contingencies 220
 limit and empower 306
 prevention or reduction 72
 verbal 135
 vs. attitude 73
 vs. moods 364
 vs. non-emotional motive patterns
 351
 while in a state 80
 transcendental
 apperception 370
 ego 370
 independence 305
 labels 268
 motives
 evidence doesn't count 176–177, 179
 like revelations 176
 used to end infinite regress 177
 notions in philosophy 370
 universal motives 51, 176
 world of “things in themselves” 304
 Transition Rules 92
 a calculational system 96
 and the search for foundations 115
 do not distinguish things 123
 elaboration of 92–116
 in composition and decomposition
 124
 ingredients for construction 156
 limiting cases 103, 111–116, 157
 select the reality concepts 97

 table of 93
 treating something as 143, 201, 210,
 307, 308
 trivializing emotion 356
 true vs. possible 266
 trusted repositories of judgment 15
 truth
 and authenticity 399
 as a placeholder 253
 no guarantee for finding 399
 oriented and knowledge-focused 5
 value
 of concepts 19
 of statements 19
 of the SA System 112
 vs. reality 265, 387
 Twenty Dollar Bill (heuristic) 198
 types
 of anger behavior 330
 of behavior 70, 292, 293, 360
 of behavior patterns 292
 of conceptual-notational devices 22
 of Contingencies 128–130
 of information in the Process Repre-
 sentation 126
 of Powers 75
 of redescription 97

U

“universal” definition of pathology
 412
 ulterior
 aspects of behavior 47
 in significance 188
 motive
 and needs 226
 God only knows 176
 regress 175
 vs. intrinsic 74, 177–179, 182, 346,
 400
 ultimate

- answer 183, 402
- components of Social Practices 422
- constituents 114
- context 395
- criterion for being a person 14
- degradation 341
- descriptions 51
- disability 406
- explanations for behavior 183, 346
- object (limiting case) 112, 113
- objects
 - arbitrary 114
 - creation of 144
 - distinguished by attributes 113
 - selected by conceptual systems 114
 - set limits to what there can be 113
- postulations of 115
- self-status assignment 395
- significance 451
- status 395
- substantive categories 91
- transgression 341
- unit of social behavior 89
- uncertainty
 - about my status 355–357, 398
 - always present in behavior 244
 - and givens 264
 - and individuation 105
 - handled by AOC 213, 244
- unconscious 51, 80, 374, 435
- undefined terms 96–97
- underlying concept of human behavior 63
- under normal circumstances 76, 77, 85
- under normal conditions 76
- uneasiness 324
- unfinished business
 - and loss and grief 357
 - as catharsis or displacement 357
- units
 - for conceptualizing a person 384
 - for understanding verbal behavior 132
 - of behavior 49, 66, 88
 - choices of 88
 - natural 400
 - real 180
 - of human lives 181
 - of process 123–124
 - of social behavior 88–89
- universal
 - agreement about formal systems 97
 - among baseball players 6
 - among persons 5, 6
 - assent 4
 - context dependence of behavior 47
 - criterion for unit of behavior 49
 - currency 241
 - definition of pathology 412
 - empirically, vs. conceptually necessary 30–32, 69
 - human needs 419
 - laws of behavior 63
 - motive 51, 176, 373
 - relativity in pathology 413
 - social-organismic conflict 245
- universality considerations 5–6, 31, 236
- universally 8, 32, 51, 90, 310
 - universe
 - in composition and decomposition 102
 - in ex post facto phenomena 300
 - in state of affairs concepts 51, 386
 - of actions 6
 - self-contained 6
 - vs. the real world 6
- unsuccessful behavior 49
- unthinkability 387–390
 - and degradation 389

- Unthinkability Model 431–435
- unthinkable
 - accepting the 391
 - a kind of status 294
 - and contradictory 434–435
 - and loss 345
 - as distortion of reality 432
 - bad behavior 391
 - can't be taken seriously 264, 431
 - death 433, 437
 - for me 389
 - good behavior 391
 - good behavior 391
 - in schizophrenia 446
 - in the Dramaturgical Model 294
 - like a wall 390
 - no longer 431
 - outside self-concept 387, 431
 - vs. calling it to mind 264
 - vs. given 263–267
 - vs. insistence 436
 - world 393, 431
- use
 - a concept 5, 16, 18, 19, 137
 - and mastery 5, 16
 - correct, in definitions 23
 - current 24
 - my way vs. our way 198
 - of “is” 96
 - of “know” 382
 - of “need” as a motivational term 418
 - of ad hoc classifications 150
 - of a frame of reference 107
 - of conventional forms 177
 - of emotion terms 312, 349
 - of locutions to say something 135
 - of scenarios 186
 - of status and relationships 259
 - of systematic relationships 98
 - of the SA System 142
 - of the term “paradigmatically” 32
 - of verbal behavior 150
 - preserving and clarifying 23
 - successful 24
 - without specification 17, 27, 97
- V**
- value analysis
 - motivational form of 208, 336
- values
 - characterize cultures 185
 - define parameters 36–37
 - incomplete specification 35, 381
 - in Degradation 269, 329
 - of parameters 35, 314–316
 - Ability 156
 - Achievement 49, 50, 59
 - are states of affairs 48
 - conceptual connections 48–50
 - deletion 61
 - from a parametric analysis 37
 - Identity 155
 - in the Activity Description 64
 - in Verbal behavior 133, 137
 - Know 48, 51, 57, 58, 67, 73, 133, 134, 155
 - Knowledge 155
 - of Culture 184
 - Performance 47, 60, 77
 - Person Characteristics 47
 - Significance 47
 - Want 48, 58
 - restriction on 36
 - specify choice principles 185
 - specifying 35
- Values (parameter) 70, 75
 - definition 78
 - governs possibilities 79
- valuing an attribute 208
- verbal 12, 22, 25, 27, 67, 110, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 194, 195, 203, 249,

275, 287, 296, 308

Verbal Behavior 131–154

ad hoc classifications 150

a form of behavior 12, 131

and grammar 145

as symbolic behavior 203

calculational aspects of 131

conceptual unit 132

context of 152–153

deep structure of 146

formula for 132

implements non-verbal behavior

141

is Deliberate Action 131, 141, 146,

153, 156

meaning and significance 135–138

not a species of behavior 134

paradigm case 132

pragmatics 132

represented by Deletion operation

134

requires a general case of behavior

157, 195

specifying 131

synonymy and homonymy 138

vs. Behavior 133, 152

vs. non-verbal behavior 12

Verbal Formula 139, 281, 287, 308

generates endless instances 142,

142–143

is recursive 139

reflects classical forms 138

systematic aspects 139

Versions

defined 130

distinct subsets of 130

imply a complete Process 170

in the Dramaturgical Model 290

in the Process Representation 125,
421

occur 170, 190, 220, 422

reflect ways people operate 221

substitute for Options 220

taken by one of Us 285

violation of a norm as an attack 329

vocal behavior 136

W

“why” questions 348–350

walking through walls 390

want

not discovered, described, or ob-
served 382

vs. need 419

what I really want 245–246

Want (parameter) 45

a standing condition 78

definition 46

implementation 194

in practical logic 351

in substitution behavior 206

test of 54

unlimited 158

values affect Performance and
Achievement 48

values in the Know parameter 48,
58

way of life

and institutions 182

in a Significance series 401

living vs. realizing 393

my way of living it 402

unit of social behavior 89

way of living

a logical and empirical totality 401

culture 181

in the Relationship/Status model

366

what behavior it was 149, 229

what behavior it was produced as
248

what gets put in what position 284
 what I'm prepared to act on 344, 397
 what I'm using it as 198
 what is a concept? 18
 what is real? 397
 what I take to be real 267, 344, 397
 What kind of person are you 375
 what positions there are 284
 what there is
 as a fundamental question 162
 catalogue of 116
 conceptions of 115
 to be observed 451
 to be represented 91
 to do 170, 172, 422
 in Culture 182
 we do 199
 ultimate substantive categories 91
 vs. human value of things 116
 what we use it as 198
 what you expect from just anyone
 71–72, 73, 74, 77, 173
 which one 104–105
 color 36
 element in a string 105
 element of a domain 39
 I am 105
 is primitive and organismic 245
 is the same or different 35
 Jack is 105
 object, process, etc. 103
 person 86
 via locution 105
 Who are you? (experiment) 374–379
 who I'd like to be 398
 why pathology is a social concern
 411
 without having to find out anything

else first 278
 Wittgenstein 17, 159, 160, 459
 world. *See* real world
 construction of 90, 156, 157, 277
 differences via behavior 46
 of persons and their ways 3, 7, 89
 self-contained 6
 vs. reality checks 447
 with no behavior potential 432
 World Formula 277
 world formula 106–108
 and limiting cases 112
 placeholders in a 110
 world makes sense 2, 155
 World of Beans to Count 255
 world representation 103, 106, 123
 wrongdoing elicits penance 331

Y

You Can Walk Through Walls (heuristic) 264
 you pays your money and you takes
 your choice
 of “what there is” 115
 the wrong description 116

Z

zilch particle 114