VIEWPOINT

What Makes Something Psychoanalytic?

Wynn Schwartz

QUESTIONS about the “essence” or boundary of a subject matter are both useful and hazardous. These concerns can coalesce or divide, divert or focus, affirm or degrade. With the hazards in mind, I wish to identify the forms of activity specific to psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts apart from other disciplines and practitioners. Given the variety of practices and the competing and complimentary theories, psychoanalysts have grown uncertain and defensive about the special domain of their inquiry. What makes something psychoanalytic?

Boundary and essence questions are central in any systematic and comparative study. Comparative psychoanalysis is important for the pedagogical task of educating the analyst. Roy Schafer (1983, p. 286) has commented on the sense of authenticity that comes from working within a form or tradition, and this is significant in the act of becoming a psychoanalyst “of one persuasion or another.” It is also helpful in evaluating the actions and ideas that define the psychoanalytic practices of the different schools. And knowing the essential domain of classical psychoanalysis is necessary to identify what is to be called a “parameter” (Eissler 1980, p. 382) and what is to be recognized as nonpsychoanalytic. Since every concept is someone’s concept, it is helpful not to dodge the fact that members of the various schools only more or less work within what will be identified here as classically psychoanalytic. Some analysts will recognize their nonpsychoanalytic practices as parameters and analyze accordingly, and others will not.

Following both the philosophical critiques of Wittgenstein (1953) and the descriptive psychology of Ossorio (1978 and 1981), in order to establish the boundary of a subject matter it is necessary to differentiate concepts from theories. Wittgenstein and Ossorio have made it clear that concepts have their origin and derive their meaning from the social practices in which they have a place. Concepts are primary; they guide the practices that organize empirical data by indicating the range of possible data. Given a range of conceptual possibility, theories are attempts to understand why, empirically, only certain patterns of data historically occur. Theories are therefore both secondary and optional; they are heuristically useful only to the extent that they help understand what is seen to be the case. Concepts, on the other hand, are at least potentially timeless and eternal. For example, the

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concept of the unconscious as a range of possible facts descriptive of a person but excluded from awareness is a legitimate subject matter independent of the validity of the various theories about the unconscious. Because concepts are primary and theories are optional, I wish to separate the concept of psychoanalysis as a social practice from the various theories about that practice. Seen from this perspective, the optional theories, in part, define the interests of the various psychoanalytic “schools.”

My goals in this essay are consistent with Stephen Toulmin’s (1972) recognition that science is better defined by the practices of the scientist than by the scientist’s theories. Consequently, I am more interested in what psychoanalysts do than in what they claim is the explanation of their actions.

By focusing on practice rather than theory, I am able to avoid the trap of first having to demonstrate the subject matter’s truth or validity. Once a social practice has been invented, the relevant questions center on how it is to be played and whether it is useful. A serious reply to an insistent concern about the “truth” of psychoanalysis can therefore be, “True? By God, I’ve seen it done!”

My aim here is to specify what is essentially psychoanalytic. Because I think a simple definition is not adequate for the job, and there have been many attempts, I will employ a “paradigm case formulation” along the lines Ossorio (1981) has offered for the introduction of complex recursive and reflexive subject matters. A paradigm case formulation can be used in cases where definition is not feasible, yet a conceptual range or coherent subject matter is identified. The special features of this method allow for identifying a subject matter in terms of its characteristic actions. Basically, a paradigm case formulation involves the presentation of a classical, archetypal, indubitable, or most complex case of the subject matter and a list of possible transformations. In reference to the paradigm case there should be universal agreement. Observers may disagree, however, whether specific transformations are legitimate. Legitimate disagreement may come from recognition of logical error or because of significant real world practicalities. Both the logical world and the empirical world provide constraint.

**PARADIGM CASE FORMULATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS**

A psychoanalytic act is any social practice between two people in which one person, the analyst, by attending to and interpreting transference and resistance, helps another person, the analysand, in attempting the intentional action of verbal free association (Schwartz 1984). The attempted free associations produced in this two-person interaction are the primary data of psychoanalysis. The attempt at free association may consist of statements about thoughts, feeling, memories, dreams, and so on. To allow the free associations to occur, the analyst and analysand meet for 50 minutes, once a day, 5 days a week. The analysand reclines on a couch and the analyst sits behind the couch out of the analysand’s view. The analyst attempts to maintain a perspective of analytic neutrality in understanding and interpreting the analysand’s productions. Although more is at stake, neutrality involves not taking sides in interpersonal or intrapsychic conflict. Accordingly, the analyst’s position will involve neither scorn nor praise for the analysand’s productions. The aim of neutrality is to avoid foreclosure on the analysand’s freedom of expression and association. Given human nature, it will at times be difficult and painful for the analysand to attempt honest disclosure. Neutrality in attention and interpretation is a goal for the analyst. Here, I am in agreement with Kohut (and others) when he says (1977, p. 250) that “all psychoanalysts subscribe in principle to the tenet that the structure of the patient’s personality . . . will emerge optimally in a neutral analytic atmosphere.” Helpful, empathic neutrality.
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guides the analyst's actions and is a derivative of the paradigm case. The paradigm case is uncommitted, however, to the relation between free association and "the structure of the patient's personality." That is a matter for theory.

Interpretation is primarily an analysis of resistance and transference. Human response, practically speaking, demands that the analyst maintain an "analytic attitude" (Schafer 1983) in order to interpret the transference and resistance. The general aim of the interpretation of the transference and resistance is to facilitate an intrapsychic freedom of association (Kris 1982). "Free association" is a spoken verbal process involving attempts at utter honesty. "Freedom of association" is a general concept of the degree of eligibility to act on or acquire values, knowledge, and competence free of unconscious resistance.

Psychoanalysis is the subject matter of what happens when one person tries to free associate in the presence of another person, who tries to understand and facilitate the process through interpretations of transference and resistance. Transformations of the paradigm case may involve the length and frequency of the sessions and the position of the analyst and the analysand. Transference and resistance interpretation may be given different importance by different analysts. (Later in this essay I will attempt a theoretically neutral conceptualization of transference, resistance, interpretation, free association, and the unconscious, since these are the logically interdependent terms of the subject matter.)

The paradigm case of what makes something psychoanalytic—i.e., interpretations of transference and resistance—is obviously not the whole of what makes for a psychoanalysis. A psychoanalysis is a social practice that takes place over a significantly long period of time that is measured these days in years rather than months. The significance of the long-term relationship involves the clinical action of "working through" the irregular and varied aspects of the analysand's life in the context of a resistance and transference analysis. But given the amount of time and the vagaries of personality and experience, a lot more will almost certainly happen. Enough time passes during the "average expected" analysis that concepts such as maturation are used by some authors and practitioners. The working through of resistance and transference might encourage a better maturation than might otherwise be expected, but in any case the long period of the usual psychoanalysis makes possible both an extended human relationship and the unfolding of a significant degree of personal history.

Within the community of those who competently employ the paradigm case, legitimate disagreement may come from the following sources. Analysts may argue that certain transformations do not allow or support the basic phenomena of free association in a form that is consistent with an analysis of resistance and transference. For example, it might be argued that infrequent meetings or sitting face to face may hinder the process. Similarly, too much self-disclosure on the part of the analyst might confuse the transference. It is simply not practical to expect an analytic process to unfold under certain circumstances.

Another ground for disagreement either from within the psychoanalytic community or from the outside is the possibility that some descriptions of the process or data may be illegitimate by virtue of their logical integrity. What is sometimes given as basic psychoanalytic knowledge may be criticized, I believe, as presenting explanation or context that does not address the actual nature of the subject matter. This style of conservative critique appears in the work of some authors who have criticized "metapsychology" on the basis of category error, confusion of logical types, reductionism, and so on. The paradigm case formulation is neutral in terms of a school's preferred metapsychology or clinical theory. Some metapsychology and clinical theory may be useful even if confined by an antiquated or metaphorically problematic language.
Paul Ricoeur (1977) makes a kindred point regarding the usefulness of the dynamic and economic metapsychological concept of force. He recognizes that the free associations “will be represented both as a text to be interpreted and as a system of forces to be manipulated” (p 849). I am more happy remembering that the analysand and the analyst are both “linguistically self-regulating” mammals (Schwartz 1982). This recognition is at the heart of the psychoanalytic metapsychologies, no matter how awkward or philosophically troubling they might be. Free associations come from a language-producing mammal. Metapsychology and clinical theory recognize this in their concern with affect and the dynamics of vulnerability and feeling. The free associations are also produced by someone who is trying to be utterly honest and who is eligible to deliberate, choose, and assume ethical and aesthetic responsibilities (Schwartz 1984). Deliberate and nondeliberate intentional actions, accidents, and inherent mammalian governing principles are all part of the multitedetermined field producing the free associations. Both psychological and biological frames of reference are part of the training of the psychoanalyst, who is both a hermeneutist and a “natural historian.” The free associations are a “text” that occurs within and with necessary reference to the developmental history of the analyst and analysand. It is hard to imagine that psychoanalysts would ever part with this multiperspectival framework. We may fault the language of the metapsychologies, yet they codify significant reminders. The metapsychologies offer a multiperspectival reminder of possible contexts for psychoanalytic interpretation but not a necessary structure for psychoanalytic theory and action. They provide options but not requirements.

**Transference, Resistance, Interpretation, and the Unconscious**

The psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious and the clinical act of interpreting resistance and transference are interdependent. In interpreting something psychoanalytically, the analyst recognizes in the analysand's associations a state of affairs that the analysand does not recognize (adequately, usefully, responsibly, personally, etc.) and then describes that state of affairs such that the problematic recognition becomes less problematic. Traditionally, this has been stated as a transformation of the unconscious into the conscious when the focus has been on the availability of self knowledge, and as the transformation of id into ego when the focus has been on competence.

Interpretation is an action that centers on the unconscious acts of the analysand as they appear during the analysis. Seen this way, the unconscious is an observer's construct used during the study of the analysand's transference and resistance actions. One implication of this viewpoint is that the concept of the unconscious is the domain of possible fact that in order to become conscious must become a shared recognition. Hence the analysand must be "ready" to see what the analyst sees. Here, I am reminded that the *Oxford English Dictionary’s* first definition of consciousness is "joint or mutual knowledge."

Another implication of this constructionist view is that the unconscious is not an object “filled” with a specific content for which there is only one correct recognition and construction. Just as there are various versions of psychoanalytic theory, so there are various correct interpretations possible at any given moment. Action descriptions are always versions of the possible. They are correct to the extent that they usefully fit.

Psychoanalytic interpretation is as much a discovery of the truth as it is a creation of the truth. Psychoanalysis is a social practice that attempts to bring together and represent the analysand's actual activity and the analyst's formulation of that activity. Obviously, there are many ways that this can usefully happen. The unconscious acts of the analysand are a discoverable potential that requires a shared constructive act between analysand and analyst in order for it to have
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any mutual meaning. In the construction of the unconscious it is also discovered.

I would like to attempt to formulate a "theory neutral" conceptualization of transference and resistance. A neutral formulation should allow for all possibilities and serve as a format within which the known examples easily reside and new examples may be discovered. At the same time, a useful formulation must exclude examples that are not a part of the subject matter in question. Hence, the formulation should have room for but not be limited by principles such as the repetition compulsion, regression, repression, projection, and the like.

From an atheoretical perspective, the analysis of resistance is the interpretive act of understanding, pointing out, clarifying, and sometimes confronting and explaining why there are restrictions in the analysand's freedom of association. Restrictions in freedom can occur consciously or unconsciously, although psychoanalysts have traditionally been most interested in unconsciously motivated limitations and inhibitions. Generally, some concept of conflict is central in resistance interpretation.

The analysis of the transference is the interpretation of the relationship in which the free associations occur with specific reference to why the analysand has particular associations and resistances within the context of an idiosyncratic or personal vision of the analyst. In other words, the analysis of the resistance involves why there are restrictions in association, and the analysis of the transference involves understanding why the quality of the present analytic relationship facilitates the specific associations and resistances that occur. Note that in this formulation there is room for specifying that the transference is produced because of unconscious repetitive experiences projected onto the analyst and that the resistance is a function of the particular defense mechanisms that the analysand employs, given that unconscious repetition.

The psychoanalytic social practice is unique and serves as the basis of all psychoanalytic inquiry—i.e., the study of attempted free association through the analysis of resistance and transference. All theories that are psychoanalytic are optional and in one way or another secondary to the data developed during the social practice of doing psychoanalysis. Concepts and theories about the unconscious, the defenses, etc., are ways of accounting for, or implications of, the unique data encountered during psychoanalysis. This is to say that psychoanalysis is not essentially concerned with any particular theory of the unconscious, although the concept of unconscious activity is intrinsic to the concept of resistance and transference. My point is that if concepts and theories of the unconscious are to be psychoanalytic, they must shed light on the process of free association and the analysis of resistance and transference. If a theory does not do so, it is not inherently psychoanalytic.

Similarly, concerns with neurosis, developmental arrest, and so on, are associated with psychoanalytic practice because as a social undertaking, psychoanalysis had its origins and its continued use in therapeutic practice. But the therapeutic value of psychoanalysis is an empirical and historical matter independent of the practice itself. There could be a legitimate psychoanalysis even if it had no therapeutic value and had developed as an outgrowth of experimental psychology rather than psychiatry.

George Klein (1976, p. 38) has remarked that classical psychoanalysis has an essential place in the training of psychotherapists even if it proves to be nontherapeutic or not cost effective. Knowing oneself and one's tendencies when trying to speak freely in the company of another is certainly important knowledge for the therapist regardless of his or her therapeutic or theoretical orientation. Classical psychoanalysis has the potential for providing this lesson more personally than any other activity that I know.

By making these points, I am not attempting to deny the therapeutic value of a classically conducted psychoanalysis. Instead, I am trying to underline the fact that psychoanalysis has a unique subject
matter of intrinsic merit independent of its traditional use in the treatment of neurosis and character disturbance. It should also be clear that what I have presented as the paradigm of psychoanalysis is neutral regarding such matters as “the therapeutic alliance,” “the analytic holding environment,” and so on, although these concepts may be descriptive of the conditions that describe the situation necessary for a disturbed analysand to become a partner in the analytic process. Similarly, the formulation is neutral in regard to analyst attributes, such as deep personal involvement, that may contribute to a condition necessary to facilitate the analysis. I want to separate the practical considerations from the necessary ones. All that the paradigm case requires of the analyst is that he or she is willing and able to maintain analytic neutrality and analyze resistance and transference. The formulation is also neutral in regard to what may be therapeutic—e.g., the long-term personal empathic relationship, the analytic attitude, the interpretations of transference and resistance, all of that, or something else.

The paradigm case allows for a permissive stance in regard to psychoanalytic technique. An implication of the paradigm case is that any practice that facilitates a resistance and transference analysis of attempted free association is psychoanalytic. Analytic neutrality and interpretation have been the principal tools of the analysis and are logically tied to facilitating free associations. Neutrality and interpretation have a large body of procedures, rules, reminders, cautions, and lore that allows their safe and effective use. But one implication of the strict paradigm case analysis is that there may be many versions of psychoanalysis and that any practice that facilitates the transference and resistance work will do the job.

Anton Kris has pointed out that the paradigm case that I specify here contains an implicit statement of psychoanalytic aims. Kris (1982, p. 9) distinguishes free association (i.e., freedom from conscious restriction) from freedom of association (i.e., freedom from unconscious restriction). In classical psychoanalytic clinical practice the analyst aims at helping the analysand increase his or her freedom of association through analysis of resistance and transference. Kris argues that psychoanalysis involves a personal liberation from the unconscious resistances that limit freedom of association. Insofar as an analysis of resistance and transference increases the domain of awareness and competence, it increases the domain of potential association and action. The aim of psychoanalytic practice is the analysis itself. Psychoanalysis is an intrinsic activity that might, incidentally, provide the benefit of symptom relief but is fundamentally concerned with the aim of increased awareness and competence. Psychological freedom and liberation are the intrinsic aims, whereas symptomatic relief might not occur even if the intrinsic aims are met. It is unclear whether there is a necessary connection between what is viewed as a symptom in need of therapy and a resistance and transference capable of being analyzed. The therapeutic question involves theoretical and empirical concerns beyond the basic paradigm case conceptualization. Traditionally, these questions have been pursued under the banner of analyzability and the question of the “widening scope of psychoanalysis.”

FREE ASSOCIATION

So say whatever goes through your mind. Act as though, for instance, you were a traveller sitting next to the window of a railway carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing views which you see outside. Finally, never forget that you have promised to be absolutely honest, and never leave anything out because, for some reason or other, it is unpleasant to tell it. [Freud 1913, p. 135]

But what are free associations? There exists sufficient confusion about free as-
association to undermine the foundations of psychoanalysis. Some analysts claim that free associations never occur or that they are an ideal encountered only during the termination phase of an analysis. Perhaps free associations can be discarded altogether. My sense is that to view free association as optional, as the exception, or as a limiting case sometimes involves a misunderstanding of the fundamental rule and its distinction between content and intention.

Some analysts seem to feel that free association refers primarily to cognition in the form of thought fragments free from context or connection to other associations (e.g., Spence 1982). The problem here involves the meaning of the fundamental rule. What is "free" in free association? The fundamental rule is not a request for thought free of context but for thought free from deliberate censorship. The rule applies to intent not to content. Sometimes what the analysand thinks and dutifully reports involves images, feelings and constructions that are elaborate and attempts at making connection to other associations. Context and connection as they appear in an analysand's associations are not necessarily an indication of resistance, although they might be. Breaking a passively or actively thought construction into fragments could be as much a resistance as adding context. The central issue is not whether the material involves context but whether the analysand consciously or unconsciously avoids reporting what he or she feels and thinks. Psychoanalysis involves the study of a good faith attempt on the part of the analysand to report his or her experiences during the analysis. And, of course, good faith efforts meet bad faith and other avoidances both conscious and unconscious, and that is the resistance. So again, I am not suggesting that uncensored personal access and uncensored speech are the base-line conditions of psychoanalytic discourse. Instead, I am saying that psychoanalysis requires an attempt at such communication. Free association is an achievement in which the criteria are not fluency of word production, thoughts free of context, or any specific content but rather thought free of censorship.

Accordingly, a regressed verbal state is not part of the primary meaning of free association. Psychoanalysis involves the invitation and the acceptance of the invitation to speak without censoring, to speak as one is willing and able of the contents and experiences of one's awareness. Such an invitation might promote regressed speech, and regression may be an activity through which a person learns to speak without censorship. Nonetheless, regression is not what is asked for, even if it proves to be necessary in order for a therapeutic process to occur. What is required by the rule is an attempt at honesty. Psychoanalysis is the social practice in which free-associating analysands might, at times, be speaking regressively or in fragments but where in response to the fundamental invitation they are trying to speak with utter honesty. Inevitably such an invitation produces conflict. With this in mind, one can recognize the potential resistive aspect of regressed speech. Some personal recognitions are avoided by fragmenting them or by assuming a regressed position from which a sense of burdensome or painful responsibility is escaped. Psychoanalysis involves an invitation to the special social practice of verbal free association, not a request to regress. Practically speaking, however, it may be inevitable that the analysand, in honestly trying to speak free of censorship, will in some way have to come to terms with regressive thoughts and archaic images and feelings.

There are many implications to the position that what is central in psychoanalysis is what the analysand says and does while trying to free associate. One of the things analysands do is report on past and present experiences outside of the analysis. If the analyst is constructing a biography of the analysand, one implication is that the analyst has available for inspection the history of the analysis itself and only as "hearsay" various ver-
sions of the analysand's present and past life outside the analytic sessions. What the analyst learns during the analysis may be illuminated by reports on early history and outside life, yet constructions concerning these states of affairs are derivative and not the primary data or subject matter except that they have a place within the history of the ongoing analysis. As Schafer put it, "In this light, the history that the analyst comes to believe in with most justification is the history of the analysis itself" (1983, p. 206). Psychoanalytic history or biography is not the study of the vicissitudes of infancy. Psychoanalysis is not a developmental psychology except in the narrow sense that it is the study of the development of the analysis itself.

Psychoanalytic activity takes place within and between a dyad. From this field of two have developed theories of the "oedipal" group of three. Such theories are inherently constructions based on the dyadic interaction with its transference, resistance, and reported facts. Seen in this light the psychoanalyst's primary interest in fantasy and psychic reality makes sense both as conservational technique and as an attitude respectful of the actual data. The analyst and analysand work together and alone. They are accompanied by their recognitions, fantasies, conjectures, and other products of their psychic realities, shared or not. But there are only two people in the consulting room to validate the interpretations that involve more than the two.

A focus on the practice of free association rather than theory may be helpful for the psychoanalytic therapist. To the extent that psychoanalysis is employed as a technique of personal liberation, it is important that the analyst's assumptions not foreclose on the process or on the possibilities. Psychoanalytic theory must help articulate and illuminate the analysand's associations. Anton Kris (1983) has indicated that in order for the analyst to preserve his or her conceptual freedom, the free associations must be held as primary. Accordingly, he recommends that the analyst attend first to the associations before moving to theory and formulation. A commitment to practice rather than theory amplifies Kris's important reminder.

**Steps Toward a Comparative Psychoanalysis**

Subject matter comparisons can be made in regard to practices, concepts, theories, and histories. Theory is secondary to concept and practice and cannot serve as the primary anchor to the question of what makes something psychoanalytic. A theoretically neutral formulation is essential in doing comparative work. A subject matter first has to be identified in order to determine if something is an instance of that subject matter. For example, Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) have been able to write a significant comparative guide to the object relations theories because they already possess a sense of what is psychoanalytic in the Freudian tradition. But should Jung have a place in comparative psychoanalysis? What about Alfred Adler or even Carl Rogers? On what grounds are their practices and the acts of their students psychoanalytic and on what grounds are they not? Is it simply their place in or out of a historical tradition? Again, my argument is that it is not the historical tradition per se that identifies something as psychoanalytic but rather whether the practice in question involves an analysis of transference and resistance in attempted free association. Similarly, a theory that is not intended for or cannot be used in the study of attempted free association is not psychoanalytic.

Psychoanalysis is specific and limited even if the insights generated during an analysis enlarge and deepen our sense of ourselves and the worlds we live in and create. The empirical facts of psychoanalysis are contingent upon our being a certain sort of organism and on our being persons-in-the-world. Nonetheless, we should remember that psychoanalysis ex-
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ists within the domain of psychology and not the other way around. Psychoanalysis achieves its special integrity in relation to its own data—that is, the phenomena that occur when a person attempts to free associate. I am in disagreement with the idea that psychoanalysis can be a general psychology. When psychoanalysts work with or create practices or theories that do not bear on the psychoanalytic process, then even if those activities are informed by psychoanalytic practice, they should be seen as within other subject domains, such as anthropology, political science, or literary criticism. The way psychoanalysis limits psychology is that psychoanalytic fact and theory cannot be excluded or ruled out. Any psychological theory that is incompatible with the fact that people can study the resistance and transference actions that are involved in attempts to free associate is absurd. And, of course, this observation works both ways.

I am also not in agreement with a priori assumptions or theoretical commitments to the effect that psychoanalysis is necessarily a science of derivative phenomena, such as unconscious conflict, the meaning of dreams, libido economics, aggression, and so on. Free associations may be a royal road to the understanding of unconscious conflict or a tool that will liberate developmental arrest but to narrowly assume those applications as the scope of psychoanalysis cannot aid in a comparative study of the primary data. Charles Brenner, Otto Kernberg, and Heinz Kohut are all psychoanalysts, but they do not share the same theory. It is by their common practice and their respect for multidetermination that they recognize their kinship and family resemblance.

Comparative psychoanalysis should be concerned basically with those theories and practices that are related to the primary psychoanalytic data. Applied psychoanalysis makes use of the theories that derive from the study of free associations but applies that knowledge elsewhere. On these grounds, a psychohistory or a child analysis is an example of applied psychoanalysis.

How should the relationship between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy be understood, given my formulation? Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy should be seen as two independent subject domains that sometimes correspond in intent and practice. Psychoanalysis may be a psychotherapy or it may be applied without therapeutic intent. Psychotherapy is an independent subject domain always performed with an intent to heal, cure, remedy, resolve, accredit, decondition, or otherwise correct what is viewed as needing correction. A psychotherapy approaches psychoanalysis to the extent that it overlaps with the paradigm case. Merton Gill (1984) has argued that psychoanalysis has both intrinsic and extrinsic criteria. In his conceptualization, intrinsic and extrinsic criteria roughly correspond to what I have identified as the paradigm case and its transformations. Gill’s point is that the intrinsic qualities—my paradigm case—and not the extrinsics (the couch, the frequent sessions, and so on) are what identify psychoanalysis. On this point he and I agree.

CONCLUSION

I recognize that shared historical tradition is the customary way of identifying one’s psychoanalytic colleagues. More locally it may be a matter of where and with whom one trains. Nonetheless, a certain kinship is recognized among analysts across the schools even when there is antagonism over theory. Object relations theorists may argue with drive theorists and self psychologists, but they all know that they share something fundamental that they do not share with, say, behavior modifiers and social engineers. The analysts also know that they pay attention to a different set of activities than Rogers’ “client centered” therapists, even though there is a shared desire to be noncoercive and nondirective. The history of the schools is fascinating as scientific, cultural, and political history, but it does not, as I understand it, address the fundamental
question of what constitutes the subject matter. My solution to the problem of what makes something psychoanalytic is the simple reminder that there is an essential coherence and integrity to the unique experience that analysts and analysands share. It is not the historically relative theories but the enduring practice of the analysis of resistance and transference in attempted free association that gives psychoanalysis its central identity, continuity, and valid field of inquiry, from Freud to the present.

REFERENCES


